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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Seongjin Cho on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[France, the Jacobin State: Why a Strong State Struggles to Reform]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jopenman19/france-the-jacobin-state-why-a-strong-state-struggles-to-reform-2db74adcd77e?source=rss-e8eb919c8246------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[france]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Seongjin Cho]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 09:00:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-21T09:00:12.676Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Fiscal stagnation, the retreat from West Africa, and street politics have led to the search for a post-imperial economic model.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JvS9MD211zTQ4E1oVuPfFA.png" /><figcaption>[Image = Generated by AI]</figcaption></figure><p>France is not a failed economy. That is precisely what makes its predicament so interesting.</p><p>It has world-class infrastructure, a highly educated workforce, universal healthcare, nuclear power, high-speed rail, aerospace and defense industries, luxury brands, and some of the most productive workers in Europe.</p><p>Its state can still do things that most governments cannot. It can mobilize capital, protect households during a crisis, rescue strategic industries, and build technologies whose development takes decades.</p><p>Yet France increasingly struggles to turn those capabilities into sustained economic growth.</p><p>Public spending is exceptionally high. Debt keeps rising. Productivity growth has slowed. Industrial capacity has weakened outside a handful of flagship sectors. Reforms announced in Paris repeatedly end in strikes, blockades, and months of political confrontation.</p><p>Meanwhile, the country is losing the privileged position it once held across much of West Africa.</p><p>These developments are related, but not in the obvious way.</p><p>France did not become rich simply by extracting wealth from Africa, nor did it fall into stagnation because African governments rejected French influence. Its deeper problem is domestic: a governing model built to direct an industrial economy, protect citizens through centralized institutions, and project power abroad has become better at preserving old promises than creating new productivity.</p><p>France’s crisis is not the disappearance of the state. It is the exhaustion of a particular kind of state.</p><h3>The Paradox of the Strong State</h3><p>In 2025, France recorded a general government deficit of €152.5 billion, equivalent to 5.1 percent of GDP. Public debt reached 115.7 percent of GDP, up from 112.6 percent a year earlier, according to the <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/9008766"><strong><em>final 2025 government accounts published by INSEE</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>, France’s national statistics agency.</p><p>This was not the result of a government that failed to collect revenue.</p><p><strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/8961174"><strong><em>INSEE’s preliminary fiscal figures</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong> put public expenditure at 57.2 percent of GDP in 2025. Compulsory levies, which consist of taxes and mandatory social contributions, amounted to 43.6 percent.</p><p>France is among the countries that tax and spend the most. Yet it continues to borrow on a large scale. How did it get here?</p><h3>France did not merely regulate the economy. It designed it.</h3><p>France is often described as a Jacobin country.</p><p>The term refers to the centralizing tradition that emerged from the French Revolution: one republic, one legal order, one administrative system, and a state strong enough to impose common rules across the entire national territory.</p><p>But modern French statism has several ancestors. It also owes something to Colbert’s industrial mercantilism, Napoleon’s administrative machinery, and the dirigisme of the postwar Gaullist state.</p><p>Together, these traditions created a government that did not simply regulate markets. It sought to construct them.</p><p>Elite officials in Paris identified strategic objectives. State-owned companies, public banks, research institutions, and large private firms then carried them out.</p><p>Nuclear power, high-speed rail, telecommunications, aerospace, and the defense industry all emerged from this model. France built globally competitive capabilities without possessing the continental domestic market of the United States or the Soviet Union. For decades, it worked remarkably well.</p><p>The difficulty is that the economy changed. The industrial order in which scale, capital intensity, and centralized planning offered decisive advantages gradually gave way to an economy driven by software, services, smaller firms, rapid experimentation, and the diffusion of technology across thousands of businesses.</p><p>France remained good at producing national champions. It was less successful at creating an environment in which small firms could become medium-sized firms and new technology could spread quickly through the rest of the economy.</p><p>The state could build a nuclear power station. It struggled to digitize an entire landscape of small businesses.</p><h3>France spends heavily, but much of the money is tied to the past</h3><p>The central problem is not simply that France has a large welfare state.</p><p>French social protection reduces poverty and cushions economic shocks. During the financial crisis, the pandemic, and the energy-price surge, the state prevented business failures and household distress from turning into social collapse.</p><p>That capacity should not be dismissed. It is one of France’s greatest institutional strengths. The problem is the composition of spending.</p><p>Pensions, healthcare, and social transfers are politically and legally difficult to reduce. Their costs rise automatically as the population ages. Interest payments increase as debt accumulates and older bonds are refinanced at higher rates.</p><p>This leaves less fiscal space for education, basic research, industrial renewal, digital infrastructure, and the energy transition.</p><p>The <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance/eu-member-states/country-pages-including-country-reports/country-report-france_en"><strong><em>European Commission’s 2026 country report on France</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong> noted that almost 60 percent of French public expenditure goes to social protection and healthcare, with pensions representing roughly one-quarter of total spending.</p><p>France increasingly devotes more capacity to honoring yesterday’s commitments than financing tomorrow’s growth.</p><h3>The welfare state rests on too narrow an employment base</h3><p>Nordic countries also maintain high taxes and extensive public services. France’s distinctive weakness is not the mere existence of generous social protection, but the relatively small proportion of the population supporting it through employment.</p><p>According to the <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-france-2026_e88a1716-en/full-report/executive-summary_54991856.html"><strong><em>OECD’s 2026 Economic Survey of France</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>, the employment rate among people aged 15 to 64 was 69.4 percent in 2025, compared with an OECD average of 70.4 percent.</p><p>The difference is particularly large at the edges of working life. France’s employment rate among 60- to 64-year-olds was 12.2 percentage points below the OECD average. Young people also tend to enter stable employment relatively late.</p><p>When fewer people work, the cost of financing pensions, healthcare, and unemployment protection falls more heavily on those already employed and on the companies employing them.</p><p>Higher labor costs then discourage hiring. Weak employment growth narrows the contribution base further.</p><p>France is caught in a self-reinforcing cycle:</p><blockquote><em>Low employment produces high labor taxation. High labor taxation makes expanding employment more difficult.</em></blockquote><p>This is why pension reform becomes politically explosive.</p><p>Economically, France needs people to remain in employment longer. Politically, pensions are not merely another government expenditure. Workers see them as a right they have purchased through decades of contributions.</p><p>What appears to the Treasury as an actuarial adjustment can feel to a worker like the confiscation of a paid-for entitlement.</p><h3>Deindustrialization was not followed by a sufficiently powerful productivity engine</h3><p>France has not lost all of its industry.</p><p>Aerospace, defense, nuclear technology, luxury goods, cosmetics, agriculture, and tourism remain formidable strengths. Output per hour worked also remains above the EU average.</p><p>But a collection of highly successful sectors is not the same as an economy-wide productivity engine.</p><p>A study by <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/7711863"><strong><em>INSEE and the Banque de France</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong> found that the French value-added content of domestic final demand fell from 89 percent in 1965 to 78 percent in 2019. For manufactured goods, it declined from 82 percent to 38 percent.</p><p>Some of this reflects the globalization experienced by every European economy. But France also developed a thinner manufacturing base and fewer internationally competitive medium-sized industrial companies than Germany.</p><p>Innovation policy presents a similar paradox.</p><p>France offers substantial tax incentives and public support for research. Yet total research and development spending amounted to only 2.18 percent of GDP in 2024, according to the <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance/eu-member-states/country-pages-including-country-reports/country-report-france_en"><strong><em>European Commission’s 2026 assessment</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>. This figure falls below the 3 percent target long promoted at the European level.</p><p>The problem is not an absence of programs. It is the weak conversion of programs into widespread productivity.</p><p>France has no shortage of policy. It has a shortage of diffusion.</p><h3>A state strong enough to announce reform, but not to sustain it</h3><p>Centralization allows the French government to make decisions quickly. It also makes social consent harder to construct.</p><p>Major reforms are designed by the presidency and the central administration, then presented as nationally uniform solutions. Trade unions, local governments, and civil society often enter the process too late to shape the fundamental decision.</p><p>They therefore resist during implementation.</p><p>In France, the street frequently becomes the negotiating table that the formal political system failed to provide.</p><p>Governments announce ambitious reforms. Large demonstrations follow. Implementation is delayed, exemptions are added, or the next administration changes direction. Old structures survive while new subsidies and special rules are layered on top.</p><p>France has consequently produced another paradox:</p><blockquote><strong>The state is strong, but reform is weak. The administration is large, but policy continuity is fragile.</strong></blockquote><p>Government intervention is intended to reduce uncertainty. Yet frequent political reversals encourage companies to postpone investment and households to save rather than spend.</p><p>France is not collapsing. It remains rich, productive, and technologically capable.</p><p>But its debt is rising faster than its underlying capacity to grow. The <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance/eu-member-states/country-pages-including-country-reports/france/economic-forecast-france_en"><strong><em>European Commission’s 2026 forecast</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong> projected growth of just 0.8 percent and public debt of 118.1 percent of GDP by the end of the year.</p><p>France has not become a poor country.</p><p>It has become a country in which preserving the institutions of past success grows more expensive every year.</p><h3>Did Losing West Africa Make France Poorer?</h3><p>Over a remarkably short period, the political map of France’s African presence was transformed.</p><p>French forces left Mali in 2022. They withdrew from Burkina Faso and Niger in 2023. Chad ended its defense agreement with Paris. Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal moved to recover military facilities previously used by France.</p><p>French military sites in Senegal were fully returned during 2025, according to the <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/information-par-pays/senegal/relations-bilaterales"><strong><em>French Foreign Ministry’s account of bilateral relations</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>.</p><p>A <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/academ/2025-07_Nouveaux%20rapports%20de%20force%20en%20Afrique-Synth%C3%A8se.pdf"><strong><em>2025 assessment published through the French Ministry of the Armed]</em></strong> Forces</a> described the withdrawals that began in 2022 as a turning point in relations between France and its former colonies.</p><p>Military bases, diplomatic influence, and the privileged position of French companies all came under pressure at the same time.</p><p>This invites a simple explanation for France’s economic difficulties: France prospered by extracting wealth from Africa and began to decline when African countries rejected French control.</p><p>The argument is emotionally powerful. Economically, however, it is incomplete.</p><h3>West Africa does not finance the French welfare state</h3><p>France’s colonial history involved extraction, political coercion, and systems designed to benefit metropolitan interests. The later system known as <em>Françafrique</em> also gave French political and commercial networks privileged access long after formal independence. None of that should be minimized.</p><p>But the present-day scale of trade is far too small to explain France’s fiscal problems.</p><p>According to the <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2026/03/02/actualites-economiques-nigeria-ghana-semaine-du-23-fevrier-2026"><strong><em>French Treasury’s 2025 trade figures</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>, total merchandise trade between France and all of sub-Saharan Africa amounted to €25.1 billion. French exports to the region were €11.1 billion, while imports were €14 billion.</p><p>France’s total global merchandise exports were €614.7 billion and imports €683.9 billion that year, according to the <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/2026/02/06/rapport-2026-sur-le-commerce-exterieur-de-la-france"><strong><em>Treasury’s annual foreign-trade report</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>.</p><p>Sub-Saharan Africa therefore accounted for roughly 1.9 percent of France’s merchandise trade. West Africa represented only part of that amount.</p><p>France’s largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa was not a former French colony but Nigeria. In 2025, 93 percent of French imports from Nigeria consisted of crude oil. France ran a bilateral goods deficit of €3.7 billion.</p><p>These figures do not support the idea that revenue extracted from West Africa directly finances French pensions and public services.</p><p>France’s €152.5 billion fiscal deficit in 2025 was more than six times the value of its entire merchandise trade with sub-Saharan Africa.</p><h3>The CFA franc was an advantage, but not a secret French treasury</h3><p>The CFA franc remains one of the most emotionally and politically charged symbols of France’s African presence. The monetary system undoubtedly created advantages for France.</p><p>A fixed exchange rate against the euro reduced currency risk. Shared institutional traditions, French commercial law, banking relationships, and political access made it easier for French companies to operate in the region.</p><p>The CFA system was not just a currency arrangement. It was part of an ecosystem of influence.</p><p>But the claim that France simply takes African foreign-exchange reserves and uses them to finance its own state no longer reflects the institutional structure of the West African currency union.</p><p>The <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.banque-france.fr/fr/publications-et-statistiques/publications/la-zone-franc"><strong><em>Banque de France’s description of French–African monetary cooperation</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong> states that, following the 2019 reform of arrangements with the West African Economic and Monetary Union, the centralized deposit of foreign-exchange reserves at the French Treasury ended. The operating account at the Banque de France was closed, and France withdrew from the governing bodies of the regional central bank, the BCEAO.</p><p>The fixed exchange rate and French convertibility guarantee remained. The corresponding arrangements in Central Africa were not reformed in the same way.</p><p>This does not end the debate over monetary sovereignty. A currency tied to the euro may constrain the ability of West African economies to respond to their own employment, competitiveness, and development needs. The colonial origins and symbolism of the CFA franc also remain politically important.</p><p>But France’s principal benefit was never a magical pool of African money paying for French public services. It was an institutional operating system that reduced risk for French businesses. What France is losing is less a treasure chest than a priority lane.</p><h3>Would the loss of Niger’s uranium shut down French nuclear power?</h3><p>Niger’s uranium offers another example of the gap between symbolism and scale.</p><p>After the military takeover in Niger, French nuclear company Orano lost control over important local mining operations. That represented a real corporate loss and weakened a long-standing channel through which France secured access to a strategic resource.</p><p>Yet the French nuclear system was not absolutely dependent on Niger.</p><p>The French government’s <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/questions/QANR5L16QE14625"><strong><em>2024 parliamentary response on uranium security</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong> emphasized the diversification of countries and suppliers, along with recycling as a way to reduce natural-uranium demand.</p><p>By 2025, Niger supplied only 33 tonnes of natural uranium to EU utilities, accounting for just 0.23 percent of the total, according to the <a href="https://euratom-supply.ec.europa.eu/activities/market-observatory_en">Euratom Supply Agency</a>. Canada provided 36.68 percent, Kazakhstan 20.31 percent, Russia 15.98 percent, Uzbekistan 10.37 percent, and Australia 9.39 percent.</p><p>The loss of privileged access in Niger increased strategic risk and imposed costs on Orano. It did not bring France’s nuclear reactors to a halt.</p><p>Its deeper significance was political: France could no longer assume that a combination of historical influence, security cooperation, and corporate presence would guarantee access.</p><h3>What France lost was not trade alone, but a multiplier of power</h3><p>The most important French assets in West Africa never appeared fully in merchandise-trade statistics.</p><p>Military bases provided intelligence and forward operating capacity. Defense cooperation connected African governments with French arms manufacturers. Development aid, schools, universities, banks, telecom companies, logistics groups, and diplomatic relationships reinforced one another.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yySoOwIxSswst4CkEq8gQQ.png" /><figcaption>[Image = Generated by AI]</figcaption></figure><p>This was the system known as <em>Françafrique</em>.</p><p>French companies benefited from language, law, networks, and familiarity. The French state gained military partners and diplomatic support. Commercial presence reinforced political influence, while political influence created further commercial opportunities.</p><p>The real loss is therefore not just revenue.</p><p>It is the multiplier through which France converted a relatively limited economic presence into disproportionate geopolitical power.</p><p>Yet this system was weakening long before the recent military coups.</p><p>A <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/RINFANR5L16B1841.html"><strong><em>French parliamentary report on France’s African policy</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong> found that France’s share of the African market fell from approximately 15 percent in 2000 to 7.5 percent in 2020.</p><p>French exports did not simply collapse. The African market expanded while China, India, Türkiye, the Gulf states, and other European countries moved faster.</p><p>China offered infrastructure and finance. Türkiye and Gulf countries expanded in construction, aviation, and logistics. Russia provided regime security and military support to governments that wanted an alternative to France.</p><p>African states also gained agency. They could play competing powers against one another and negotiate better terms instead of depending on Paris.</p><p>France’s retreat is therefore not merely the result of Russian propaganda or manipulation. Anti-French sentiment drew on genuine grievances: colonial memory, the symbolism of foreign military bases, the CFA franc, relationships between French companies and local elites, and the failure of a decade of military intervention to restore security across the Sahel.</p><p>Russia exploited this discontent. It did not invent all of it.</p><h3>Africa did not cause France’s crisis. It exposed it.</h3><p>France’s productivity slowdown, deindustrialization, and fiscal deterioration began long before the withdrawal from Mali and Niger.</p><p>Its commercial market share in Africa had also been declining for decades.</p><p>France had used diplomatic influence and historical privilege to compensate for weaknesses in competitiveness. Once African governments acquired alternative partners, that strategy became less effective.</p><p>The retreat from West Africa is therefore more symptom than cause.</p><p>Still, it may amplify France’s difficulties. Access to resources and contracts becomes more competitive. Intelligence networks weaken. Defense exports lose political support. France must maintain the costs and ambitions of a nuclear power, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and a global military actor while its economic base grows slowly.</p><p>Influence is shrinking while the obligations of great-power status remain.</p><p>France’s problem is not simply the loss of empire.</p><p>It is the widening gap between ambition and capacity.</p><h3>Why Does Tax Reform Explode in France?</h3><p>A further question follows.</p><p>Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway also collect high taxes. Canada has universal healthcare and a broader welfare state than the United States.</p><p>Why do tax and pension reforms so often produce nationwide confrontation in France?</p><p>The easiest explanation is cultural: the French have a revolutionary tradition and simply enjoy protesting. History matters, but that answer is too convenient.</p><p>French people do not take to the streets because they possess a unique national gene for rebellion. They do so because the political and bargaining system often fails to absorb conflict before a final decision is made.</p><blockquote><strong>Nordic societies do not lack conflict. They are more likely to negotiate it before it reaches the street.</strong></blockquote><h3>Canada is not actually taxed like France</h3><p>Canada and the Nordic countries should not be treated as a single high-tax model.</p><p>According to the <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/revenue-statistics-2025_3a264267-en/full-report/tax-revenue-trends-1965-2024_98c75833.html"><strong><em>OECD’s Revenue Statistics 2025</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>, Denmark had the highest tax-to-GDP ratio in the OECD in 2024, at 45.2 percent. France was second at 43.5 percent.</p><p>Finland stood at 42.2 percent, Sweden at 41.4 percent, and Norway at 40.2 percent.</p><p>Canada’s ratio was 34.9 percent, close to the OECD average of 34.1 percent.</p><p>Canada provides more extensive public services than the United States, but its overall tax burden is not comparable to that of France or Denmark.</p><p>The difference becomes even clearer when taxation of labor is examined.</p><p>For a single person without children earning the average wage, the labor tax wedge in France was 47.2 percent in 2025, according to the <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2026/04/taxing-wages-2026_d1f39986/3a5169ef-en.pdf"><strong><em>OECD’s Taxing Wages 2026</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>.</p><p>The comparable figure was 42.5 percent in Finland, 41.1 percent in Sweden, 36.4 percent in Norway, 35.8 percent in Denmark, and 32.1 percent in Canada.</p><p>Denmark collects a larger share of national income in tax than France, but imposes a much smaller tax wedge on the employment of an average worker. The method of financing matters.</p><p>Denmark relies heavily on broad income and consumption taxation. France places more of the burden on payroll-based social contributions paid by employers and employees.</p><p>French workers therefore experience the welfare state as something purchased through contributions attached to their employment. When pension rules are changed, they may feel that the government is taking away a right they have already paid for.</p><p>The dispute is not only over how much the state collects.</p><p>It is over ownership of the benefit.</p><h3>Strong unions can reduce the need for political strikes</h3><p>French trade unions appear powerful because they can stop trains, close refineries, and mobilize large demonstrations.</p><p>Membership figures tell a different story. The latest available OECD estimate puts French union membership at roughly 10 percent of employees. By comparison, <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://data-explorer.oecd.org/vis?df%5Bag%5D=OECD.ELS.SAE&amp;df%5Bds%5D=dsDisseminateFinalDMZ&amp;df%5Bid%5D=DSD_TUD_CBC%40DF_TUD&amp;df%5Bvs%5D=1.0&amp;dq=..&amp;lc=en&amp;lo=10&amp;lom=LASTNPERIODS&amp;pg=0&amp;snb=81&amp;to%5BTIME_PERIOD%5D=false&amp;vw=tb"><strong><em>OECD union-density data</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong> show membership rates in 2024 of 65.9 percent in Sweden, 60.4 percent in Denmark, 52.1 percent in Norway, and 51.4 percent in Finland.</p><p>France has another paradox: low union membership but almost universal collective-agreement coverage.</p><p>Because the state can extend sectoral agreements to firms and employees that were not directly represented in the negotiations, <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/collective-bargaining-and-social-dialogue.html"><strong><em>98 to 100 percent of French employees were covered by collective agreements in 2018</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>.</p><p>This creates representation without mass membership.</p><p>French unions cannot rely on the number of dues-paying members alone to establish their legitimacy. They must also demonstrate an ability to mobilize the wider workforce. Strikes and demonstrations become not only tools of protest but proof of representativeness.</p><p>Nordic unions operate differently.</p><p>A large share of workers actually belongs to a union, while employers are also organized. Wages and working conditions are negotiated primarily through sectoral institutions before governments legislate.</p><p>The <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/nordic-lessons-for-an-inclusive-recovery-responses-to-the-impact-of-covid-19-on-the-labour-market_2aa7bcc1-en/full-report/component-5.html"><strong><em>OECD’s comparative work on Nordic labor markets</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong> describes systems built around high union and employer-organization membership, sector-level bargaining, and coordinated wage setting.</p><p>Nordic countries still experience strikes. Negotiations can fail, and political conflict can become intense.</p><p>But a strike is more often the final stage of an organized bargaining process. In France, street mobilization frequently substitutes for a bargaining process that participants believe has already failed.</p><p>In the Nordic model, the possibility of a strike strengthens negotiation.</p><p>In France, the weakness of negotiation makes the strike necessary.</p><h3>Tax compliance depends on trust, not only tax rates</h3><p>Citizens do not judge a tax system solely by the amount collected.</p><p>They also ask whether the burden is fair, whether services are delivered, whether decision-makers are competent, and whether the government can be trusted to keep its promises.</p><p>The <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results_9a20554b-en/full-report/executive-summary_7c5c9309.html"><strong><em>OECD’s 2024 survey on trust in public institutions</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong> found that in 2023, 34 percent of French respondents reported high or moderately high trust in the national government. (The corresponding figure was <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results-country-notes_a8004759-en/denmark_ac5b6973-en.html"><strong><em>44 percent in Denmark</em></strong></a><strong><em>, </em></strong><a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2024/06/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results-country-notes_33192204/finland_8f83ddc0.html"><strong><em>47 percent in Finland</em></strong></a><strong><em>, and </em></strong><a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results-country-notes_a8004759-en/canada_1d3c42d0-en.html"><strong><em>49 percent in Canada</em></strong></a><strong><em>])</em></strong>.</p><p>Nordic trust is neither automatic nor permanent. Finland’s figure had fallen sharply since 2021, and Denmark’s had also declined.</p><p>But trust in courts, public administration, police, and local services generally remains stronger. In Finland, 81 percent of recent users reported satisfaction with the education system, while 83 percent were satisfied with administrative services.</p><p>When citizens repeatedly experience taxation being converted into effective services, high taxes can be understood as part of a reciprocal social contract.</p><p>When trust is weak, even a necessary reform is interpreted differently.</p><p>Citizens ask not only whether pension reform is required, but why this government is pursuing it, who will be protected, and who will be made to pay.</p><h3>In France, every conflict eventually points toward the president</h3><p>Political structure also matters.</p><p>France has decentralized certain responsibilities, but it remains a highly centralized political system. Taxation, pensions, and major labor-market policies are decided nationally. The president dominates political life and becomes the visible author of reform.</p><p>Responsibility and anger therefore converge on a single point.</p><p>The 2023 pension reform illustrated the problem. The government proposed raising the statutory retirement age from 62 to 64. It ultimately relied on Article 49.3 of the Constitution, a mechanism that allows legislation to pass without a final vote in the National Assembly unless the government loses a motion of no confidence.</p><p>Article 49.3 is constitutional and has been used by governments of different political traditions. But in the context of a highly contested pension reform, its use reinforced the perception that the executive had bypassed both parliament and the public. <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/node/19494"><strong><em>Vie-publique, France’s official public-information service, explains the operation and limits of Article 49.3 here</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>.</p><p>The economic necessity of a reform and the legitimacy of the method used to enact it are separate questions.</p><p>When people feel excluded from the decision, the street becomes the remaining veto point.</p><p>Canada disperses conflict through federalism. The <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/intergovernmental-affairs/services/federation/distribution-legislative-powers.html"><strong><em>constitutional division of powers</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong> gives provinces responsibility for areas including education, hospitals, municipalities, and natural resources. Healthcare delivery is largely provincial even though the federal government provides funding and national conditions.</p><p>Conflicts over services and taxation are therefore divided among Ottawa, provincial capitals, and municipalities. A dispute in Quebec need not become the same dispute in Alberta or Ontario.</p><p>Nordic countries are often unitary states, but proportional representation, coalition governments, strong municipalities, and institutionalized bargaining distribute decision-making among several actors.</p><p>In France, conflict often begins after the executive has announced a national decision.</p><p>In the Nordic countries, much of the conflict occurs before a final decision exists.</p><h3>The French street functions as an unofficial upper chamber</h3><p>Protest is not irrational in a system where protest has repeatedly changed policy.</p><p>French citizens have seen governments withdraw, delay, or dilute reforms after strikes and demonstrations. The lesson is obvious: mobilization works.</p><p>The street consequently performs a constitutional function that does not formally appear in the constitution. It acts as a final chamber of review. This is why the explanation cannot simply be that French people dislike taxes. What matters is the sequence through which collective decisions are made.</p><blockquote><strong>In the Nordic countries, conflict enters the bargaining room before legislation. In France, it enters the street after legislation.</strong></blockquote><p>The amount of taxation a society will accept depends on more than the tax rate. Who made the decision? Did affected groups have a real voice? Is the burden fairly distributed? Can the government be trusted? Does taxation produce services that citizens can see and use?</p><p>France’s central challenge is not learning how to suppress conflict. It is learning how to resolve conflict before the street becomes the only credible negotiating arena.</p><h3>Can France Reinvent the State Without Dismantling It?</h3><p>The conventional prescription for France is simple: reduce spending, cut taxes, liberalize the labor market, and shrink the state.</p><p>That diagnosis captures part of the problem, but it mistakes the instrument for the objective.</p><p>France does not need to become a minimal state. Nor would French society accept the destruction of the protections that have limited poverty, preserved access to healthcare, and prevented economic shocks from becoming social catastrophes.</p><p>The more serious question is whether France can transform a state designed to command, insure, and preserve into one that can also negotiate, adapt, and invest. That requires several changes at once.</p><h3>From maintaining the past to financing the future</h3><p>France cannot stabilize its debt through economic growth alone. Nor can it close the fiscal gap through repeated temporary taxes and across-the-board reductions that weaken investment along with consumption.</p><p>The <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-france-2026_e88a1716-en/full-report/putting-public-finances-on-a-sustainable-path-while-boosting-long-term-growth_a7381159.html"><strong><em>OECD’s 2026 Economic Survey</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong> argues for sustained fiscal consolidation focused on spending efficiency, systematic reviews of tax expenditures, and better control of current expenditure.</p><p>The crucial distinction is not between spending and austerity. It is between spending that preserves existing arrangements and spending that expands future capacity.</p><p>France should protect basic research, early education, vocational skills, digital adoption, energy systems, and productive public investment. Savings should come from overlapping programs, poorly targeted tax exemptions, administrative duplication, and benefits that cannot be justified by either social need or economic return.</p><p>A spending review should not be a ritual in which every ministry produces small reductions while the overall structure remains untouched.</p><p>It should answer a more political question:</p><p>Which promises must the republic preserve, and which promises can no longer take priority over the next generation?</p><h3>From taxing employment to expanding employment</h3><p>The French social model will remain difficult to finance as long as too few young and older people are employed.</p><p>Raising employment is therefore not merely a labor-market objective. It is fiscal reform.</p><p>France needs better vocational pathways for young people, more lifelong training, workplaces adapted to older employees, and a pension system that rewards continued participation without treating workers in physically demanding occupations as if all careers were identical.</p><p>Labor taxation can be reduced only if the missing revenue is replaced or spending is permanently lowered. Unfunded cuts would worsen the debt problem.</p><p>Over time, however, France can shift part of the burden away from employment toward broader and less distortive tax bases. The OECD has suggested greater reliance on broad consumption, property, and environmental taxation while reducing inefficient exemptions and protecting lower-income households.</p><p>The goal is not to make labor cheap by making workers insecure.</p><p>It is to stop financing the welfare state in a way that discourages the employment on which that welfare state depends.</p><h3>From consultation after the decision to negotiation before it</h3><p>France cannot reform sustainably if every major change is designed by a small circle in Paris and defended as an accomplished fact.</p><p>That does not mean giving every interest group a permanent veto. It means moving conflict upstream.</p><p>Trade unions and employer organizations should be involved before the core parameters of a reform have been fixed. Parliament should be given time and space to construct compromises. Local governments should receive clearer responsibilities and the fiscal resources needed to exercise them.</p><p>France’s current decentralization is often administrative rather than political. It has multiple layers of government but blurred responsibility.</p><p>The <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-france-2026_e88a1716-en/full-report/putting-public-finances-on-a-sustainable-path-while-boosting-long-term-growth_a7381159.html"><strong><em>OECD’s 2026 survey</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong> found that French subnational expenditure represented 11.2 percent of GDP in 2023, below the OECD average of 16.1 percent. At the same time, overlapping responsibilities among regions, departments, intermunicipal bodies, municipalities, and the central state create substantial coordination costs.</p><p>Real decentralization is not the creation of additional offices.</p><p>It is the transfer of identifiable authority, revenue, and accountability.</p><p>If regional differences can be managed regionally, not every dispute needs to become a national confrontation with the president.</p><h3>From Françafrique to ordinary competition</h3><p>France also needs a post-imperial African policy.</p><p>The old model treated historical familiarity as a permanent strategic asset. Military access, political networks, language, monetary arrangements, aid, and business interests reinforced one another.</p><p>That era is ending.</p><p>France cannot restore its position by lecturing African governments, defending every legacy institution, or treating Chinese, Turkish, Gulf, and Russian engagement as illegitimate intrusions into a naturally French sphere.</p><p>African countries are not waiting to choose between loyalty to France and loyalty to one of France’s rivals. They are diversifying their partnerships.</p><p>France still has valuable assets: universities, scientific institutions, language networks, technology, infrastructure expertise, cultural ties, and large African diasporas.</p><p>The French military sites in Senegal were returned in 2025, yet <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/information-par-pays/senegal/relations-bilaterales"><strong><em>17,722 Senegalese students were enrolled in France during the 2024–25 academic year</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>, an increase of 30 percent over five years.</p><p>That is a clue to the relationship France can still build.</p><p>Influence based on permanent military presence and privileged access may decline. Influence based on education, joint research, local employment, investment, entrepreneurship, and mobility can survive.</p><p>France does not need to leave Africa.</p><p>It needs to stop behaving as though Africa cannot leave France.</p><h3>The state must become an architect of consent</h3><p>The French state remains unusually capable.</p><p>Its weakness lies not in its ability to act, but in the way it converts action into legitimacy.</p><p>At home, the government often decides first and negotiates afterward. Abroad, it long assumed that historical relationships would compensate for declining competitiveness. In both cases, the same model is reaching its limits.</p><p>Command cannot substitute indefinitely for consent. Privilege cannot substitute indefinitely for competitiveness.</p><p>The lesson of the Nordic countries is not that France should copy their tax rates or institutions line by line. Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway each have distinct political economies.</p><p>The lesson is that a large welfare state requires more than revenue. It requires institutions capable of producing trust, visible reciprocity, and negotiated adjustment.</p><p>The lesson of West Africa is similar. Durable influence cannot rest only on inherited asymmetry. It must be continuously earned through relationships that the other side also considers valuable.</p><p>France does not have to choose between Jacobin centralism and an Anglo-American minimal state.</p><p>Its real choice is between two versions of strength.</p><p>One is the strength to announce a decision, impose a national rule, and survive the protests that follow.</p><p>The other is the strength to negotiate before deciding, abandon institutions that no longer work, and persuade citizens that reform is not simply another demand imposed from above.</p><p>France still possesses the resources to renew itself.</p><p>What it has not yet found is a political method equal to its economic intelligence.</p><p>*This article was translated from Korean to English using OpenAI (GPT-5.0). The author bears all responsibility for the use of generative AI.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2db74adcd77e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Revisiting a prediction about MyPayment, five years on.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@jopenman19/revisiting-a-prediction-about-korean-fintech-five-years-on-1e4b34d13566?source=rss-e8eb919c8246------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mypayment]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Seongjin Cho]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 11 Oct 2026 06:26:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-11T07:41:36.688Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 2021, I’m published a <a href="https://www.kci.go.kr/kciportal/ci/sereArticleSearch/ciSereArtiView.kci?sereArticleSearchBean.artiId=ART002730561"><strong><em>[study of MyPayment(Korean)]</em></strong></a>, a proposed Korean payment initiation service. With a customer’s consent, an app could instruct a bank transfer without holding the money. When paying through an app could mean topping up a separate balance, i saw a chance for less stranded money, more choice at checkout, and potentially lower merchant costs.</p><p>Those were possibilities. My research asked a narrower question:</p><h3><strong><em>what would make people want to use such a service?</em></strong></h3><p>I surveyed 207 adults in the Seoul metropolitan area and tested five factors together. Transaction convenience had the strongest association with intended use (standardized β = 0.576). Social influence and the resources needed to use the service also mattered. Ease of use and perceived risk were not statistically significant after accounting for the other factors. The model explained 73% of variation in stated intention.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*i26hszcNTFcl3Hd6O1aduA.png" /><figcaption>[Image = Generated by AI based on “Study on the Factors Affecting the Use of MyPayment Service”]</figcaption></figure><p>At the time, I saw two implications. Academically, convenience deserved a place alongside familiar technology acceptance factors. For practitioners, the lesson was to design around the transaction: faster completion, useful options, and less effort between deciding to buy and paying.</p><p>Five years later, the story is less linear. Korea has expanded <a href="https://www.fsc.go.kr/no010101/85688"><strong><em>[open banking(Korean)]</em></strong></a>, including access at bank branches. By October 2025, the regulator reported 39 million unique users. Yet wallets and prepaid tools did not fade away. In the first half of 2026, the <a href="https://www.bok.or.kr/portal/bbs/B0000502/view.do?menuNo=200690&amp;nttId=11064870"><strong><em>[Bank of Korea reported(Korean)]</em></strong></a> that the daily value of easy payments rose 16.8% year over year, while prepaid payment instruments rose 21.9%. These figures do not measure MyPayment adoption; they show a market growing through multiple models.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eRXfRenFNbaxlO3-CIlnpw.png" /><figcaption>[Image = Generated by AI]</figcaption></figure><p>My understanding of convenience has changed. It includes knowing where money sits and what happens when something goes wrong. Korea’s <a href="https://www.fsc.go.kr/no010101/83004"><strong><em>[2024 rules requiring separate safeguarding of prepaid balances(Korean)]</em></strong></a> made that concern concrete. A quick checkout means little if customers cannot trust what follows.</p><p>Academically, I would now study actual use: my sample came from one region, and some “perceived risk” questions measured trust or absence of worry, making that result hard to interpret. A follow-up should track transactions, refunds, consent, revocation, merchant costs, and differences across users. my survey never established that payment initiation would reduce fees in practice.</p><p>The practical lesson now is to prove convenience across the whole journey, with protection and measurable value for customers and merchants. People care about the experience of paying more than the label of the payment rail.</p><h3>A global view: from new rails to trusted routines</h3><p>The same shift is visible beyond Korea, though the systems are not interchangeable. In the UK, <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.openbanking.org.uk/insights/open-banking-in-2025-now-part-of-the-uks-everyday-financial-life/"><strong><em>Open Banking Limited counted 351 million open-banking payments in 2025</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>, up 57% from 2024. That includes one-off domestic payments and “sweeping” transfers between a person’s own accounts, so it is not a tally of retail checkouts. Its growth suggests what becomes possible when account access is reliable enough to become routine.</p><p>Brazil chose a different route: its central bank built Pix as shared instant-payment infrastructure. It recorded <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.bcb.gov.br/estabilidadefinanceira/pix-em-numeros-estatisticas"><strong><em>more than seven billion Pix transactions in January 2026</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>. Pix Automático, <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.bcb.gov.br/detalhenoticia/20729/noticia"><strong><em>launched in June 2025</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>, brought prior authorization to recurring bills. This addresses a problem we had in mind: allowing people to pay without repeatedly loading a wallet. Pix is an entire payment network with broader scope than a payment-initiation service.</p><p>India offers a lesson in interoperability at scale. The <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.npci.org.in/product/upi/product-statistics"><strong><em>National Payments Corporation of India recorded 24.07 billion UPI transactions in September 2026</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>, with 756 banks live on the system. Such volume is striking, but it cannot tell us how consumers experience failed payments, refunds, or disputes, or what merchants ultimately pay to accept them.</p><p>Europe is pairing speed with protection. Since October 2025, providers in the euro area have been <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://finance.ec.europa.eu/consumer-finance-and-payments/payment-services/payment-services_en"><strong><em>required to offer instant euro transfers and verify the intended recipient</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong>. EU lawmakers also reached a <strong><em>[</em></strong><a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/11/27/payment-services-council-and-parliament-agree-to-step-up-the-fight-against-fraud-and-increase-transparency/pdf/"><strong><em>provisional agreement on PSD3 and a Payment Services Regulation</em></strong></a><strong><em>]</em></strong> focused on fraud prevention and fee transparency. That agreement is a policy direction, not a rule already in force.</p><p>Together, these examples temper my earlier optimism. New rails can expand choice, but lower costs and better experiences must be measured rather than assumed. The next study I would want to read would compare payment methods on completion rates, fraud losses, refunds, merchants’ total costs, and the speed of the first tap.</p><p>*This article is based on the 2021 paper by S. Cho and J. W. Shin, “Study on the Factors Affecting the Use of MyPayment Service,” published in the Journal of the Korea Society of Information Technology Policy &amp; Management.</p><p>*This article was translated from Korean to English using OpenAI (GPT-5.0). The author bears all responsibility for the use of generative AI.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1e4b34d13566" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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