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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Josh Manchester on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Josh Manchester on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Pandemic note #1: The US is not a nation-state. It is a market-state.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@joshmanchester/pandemic-note-1-the-us-is-not-a-nation-state-it-is-a-market-state-609468c5fc2c?source=rss-1669f24562e4------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Manchester]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2020 21:50:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-12-03T14:19:03.219Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Pandemic note: <strong>The US is not a nation-state. It is a market-state.</strong></h3><p><strong>Will it decentralize and survive or Balkanize into regions and city-states?</strong></p><p>The 2020 pandemic will turn the US from a failing market-state into a functional market-state, with a functional decentralized society; OR a legacy nation-state mindset will foster collapse and we will experience a very dangerous Balkanization, with a slow break-up of the country into regions and city-states.</p><p>The pandemic is the latest in a string of transnational phenomena that have perplexed Federal agencies and politicians stuck in a 20th century nation-state mindset.</p><p>Over the past 20 years, the US has been beset by one strategic surprise after another, despite the trillions spent on intelligence, the military, and homeland defense. Why?</p><p>What do all of the following have in common?</p><ul><li>September 11th and the ensuing war against Al Qaeda;</li><li>a global financial crisis spurred by mortgage-backed securities;</li><li>the ongoing increase in climate volatility;</li><li>government confusion about the rise of Bitcoin;</li><li>and now the COVID-19 pandemic.</li></ul><p>All of these surprises are transnational in nature, and not state-based. The US fails at planning for them because sclerotic 20th century nation-state institutions are run by dogmatically partisan political parties stuck in a 20th century mindset.</p><p>In contemplating current events, I went deep into my bookshelves looking for works on bioterrorism. More on that in part 2. I remembered some very prescient writing by the strategist and historian Philip Bobbitt, who authored his magnum opus <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Shield-Achilles-Peace-Course-History-ebook/dp/B0055PGVVW/ref=sr_1_2?dchild=1&amp;keywords=the+shield+of+achilles&amp;qid=1586196309&amp;sr=8-2">The Shield of Achilles</a> in 2002 and a follow-on tour de force, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Terror-Consent-Wars-Twenty-First-Century/dp/1400042437/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&amp;keywords=terror+and+consent&amp;qid=1586196336&amp;sr=8-1">Terror and Consent</a> in 2008. In flipping through these works afresh after a few years of having digested them it immediately became clear that his larger thesis around a transformation in state power has been playing out before our very eyes for the past two decades.</p><p>Bobbitt argued that the society of nation-states to which we all became accustomed in the 20th century had evolved into something new in the 21st: a society of market-states. Nation-states sought to better the welfare of the nation. Market-states instead seek to maximize the opportunity of their citizens.</p><p>Moreover the globalized, transnational economy which the premier market-state, the US, has created and led, is subject to new forms of threats. In the first decade of the 21st century, when Bobbitt wrote these works, the primary focus was on terrorism via Al Qaeda, with a secondary focus on WMD. But for states of consent, as opposed to states of terror, Bobbitt rightfully deduced that any sort of interruption to their ability to provide consent — freedoms of assembly, conscience, enterprise, etc — are forms of terror, even if not executed by “terrorists.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/340/1*PnS8tjRZFQpPFgwbjF70uw.png" /><figcaption>We are now all living in this book. Everyone should read it.</figcaption></figure><p>What exactly is a market-state? How would it be performing better in the current crisis? Here are some ways Bobbitt described a market-state in his works:</p><ul><li>“The emerging constitutional order that promises to maximize the opportunity of its people, tending to privatize many state activities and making representative government more responsive to the market” ( SOA index, p 931)</li><li>“If the function of law in the nation-state is process-oriented, churning out impartial rules and regulations to promote desired behavior, the market-state pursues its objectives by incentive structures and sometimes draconian penalties, not so much to assure that the right thing is done as to prevent the social instability that threatens material well-being.” (p. 229)</li><li>“In the market-state, the State is responsible for maximizing the choices available to individuals. This means lowering the transaction costs of choosing by individuals and that often means restraining rather than empowering governments.” (p. 230)</li></ul><p>How does this apply to the COVID-19 pandemic?</p><p>Again, written in 2002:</p><ul><li>“Governments are steadily being weakened with respect to their capacity to control international events, and <strong>the kind of security problems states will face in the twenty-first century are more likely to be about managing cooperation than triumphing through conflict</strong>” [emphasis added] (p. 338)</li><li>“In this new era, looking at the world in terms of conflict — looking at the world, that is, from the perspective of the state of war — doesn’t fully protect states because many highly dangerous threats don’t come from adversaries but from systemic collapse. Power outages, epidemics, computer viruses, financial panics, overpopulation, deforestation, water pollution, and energy “famines” (so named because they arise from hoarding) might be exploited by our adversaries, but they will arise whether or not there is a mastermind behind them. Of course, peoples have always faced these or analogous threats; the plague of the fourteenth century, and the great famines of the Indian subcontinent in the twentieth century are examples. But these events rarely posed mortal threats to the state system. Today, however, because the system is both globalized and highly interdependent, nonmilitary events in remote regions as well as among nonstate actors can cascade, bringing states to the point of collapse.” (p. 339)</li><li>“In such a world we must move our thinking from threat-based strategies that rely on knowing precisely who our enemy is and where he lies, to vulnerability-based strategies that try to make our infrastructure more slippery, more redundant, more versatile, more difficult to attack. . . . national security will cease to be defined in terms of borders alone because both the links among societies as well as the attacks on them exist in psychological and infrastructural dimensions, not on an invaded plain marked by the seizure and holding of territory. The line between the public and the private that has been the essential division between state and society has been partly effaced because most of the critical infrastructures are in the hands of the private sector. We will have to take in new national security partners drawn from the private sector in order to protect the public good . . . steps including enhanced intelligence collection, pre-emption, the development of defensive systems (including sensors), vaccinations, the prepositioning of medical supplies, and advanced methods of deception that provide the basis for operating within a different paradigm, one that relies on a vulnerability analysis.” (p.813)</li></ul><p>COVID-19 has caught our political-media-industrial complex by surprise because our ancient political parties and the press that serves them both are all stuck in 20th century nation-state thinking, while our actual societies, economics, and culture have created a world of market-states.</p><p>Contrast the US government’s and media’s diminished expectations of the danger, lack of warnings, innumeracy, and slow general actions etc, with those that took place in an emergent fashion from the market, individuals, and civil society. Examples abound, but here are a few:</p><ul><li>The Johns Hopkins University Center for Systems Science and Engineering (JHU CSSE) created <a href="https://www.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6">Coronavirus and COVID-19 Global Case Tracker</a> visualization tool that has become the default place for daily data on the pandemic. The team <strong>open-sourced all of the </strong><a href="https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19"><strong>documentation and data sources on Github</strong></a>, for data transparency.</li><li>Large businesses began to execute emergency operations plans and business continuity plans, with zero central direction from the US government. A great example is <a href="https://www.texasmonthly.com/food/heb-prepared-coronavirus-pandemic/">HEB, the grocery chain in Texas</a>, which had been “<strong>working on our pandemic and influenza plan for quite a while now, since 2005,</strong> when we had the threat of H5N1 overseas in China. That’s when we first developed what our plan looked like, [as well as] some of our requirements and business implications.”</li><li>Our own portfolio company <a href="https://www.flexport.com/">Flexport</a>, a software-enabled freight forwarding business, has <strong>an internal social impact group</strong> called Flexport.org, which activated its disaster response plan on January 27, 2020, raised $6m from the general public, and began sourcing aircraft and trucks to match PPE supply with demand.</li><li><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/tomaspueyo/">Tomas Pueyo</a>, a successful tech executive, authored the Medium post <a href="https://medium.com/@tomaspueyo/coronavirus-act-today-or-people-will-die-f4d3d9cd99ca">Coronavirus: Why You Must Act Now</a>, on March 10th. This was a Paul Revere-like moment on the internet, and was viewed over 40 million times in less than 10 days, and translated into over 30 languages. Pueyo, with a professional history of growth marketing, laid his case out using <strong>simple quantitative analysis with clear charts and easily understood detail</strong> — the inverse of common press dialogue in the United States. Given the uncluttered user interface of his chosen platform, Medium, there were also <strong>zero advertisements</strong> in his message to distract the reader.</li><li>All manner of private entities began to cancel public events. Example: <a href="https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/2020-ncaa-tournament-canceled-due-to-growing-threat-of-coronavirus-pandemic/">the NCAA cancelled its annual college basketball championship on March 13th</a>, and all winter and spring championship games, citing “the evolving COVID-19 public health threat, our ability to ensure the events do not contribute to the spread of the pandemic, and the impracticality of hosting such events at any time during this academic year given ongoing decisions by other entities.” It’s worth asking: in contrast to most elected or appointed officials, or media pundits, <strong>are the heads of private entities at greater liability risk?</strong> Do they not have more skin in the game in the public sphere than a typical talking head? These decisions were a form of private-sector pre-emption, or pre-clusion (a term Bobbitt uses in Terror and Consent).</li><li>As opposed to military and government sponsored planning and preparation for the general public, over the years <strong>the market has provided its own forms of scenario planning for public consumption</strong>. Our current pandemic is eerily similar to the 2011 film <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt1598778/">Contagion</a>, which jumped from the 270th most watched Warner Brothers film in December 2019 to the <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/davidmack/contagion-movie-coronavirus">2nd most-watched in 2020 as of March 3rd</a>. Other cultural outlets offered additional mental models for the general public: Netflix’s blockbuster film Bird Box, based on Josh Malerman’s novel, in which no character can go outside without a blindfold, and the novel Station Eleven, with the rapid onset of a global pandemic originating from the former Soviet Union, killing 99% of humanity. These were widely consumed and received awards, offering market-based warnings to society.</li><li><a href="https://thehill.com/changing-america/well-being/prevention-cures/491006-bill-gates-is-funding-factories-for-7-potential">Bill Gates has pledged billions of dollars to build seven vaccine factories in parallel</a>, due to the unique nature of each vaccine requiring different safety, advocacy, and facilities, while admitting from the start that only two of the seven will ultimately be chosen for use, and many <strong>billions of his foundation’s capital will be wasted</strong>. He is happy to do this because the world economy “is losing trillions of dollars.”</li></ul><p>In short, the market, private actors and civil society, and even municipalities and state governments in some cases, acted independently and with high speed, in an emergent fashion.</p><p>In contrast the Federal government is stuck in 20th century nation-state institutions and 20th century nation-state political parties, all masquerading on cable news, in a form of meaningless kabuki posturing that is like a sport on ESPN, but perversely inverted: rather than watching skilled athletes who have trained for years to excellence, you watch scientifically illiterate talking heads, whose actions actually risk our lives. The political-media industrial complex is more obsessed with blaming each other for all of society’s faults than with any actual solutions. This produces massive blindspots, through which an indifferent virus with rapid transmission can go about its business. If it wasn’t clear before it should be now: dogmatic partisanship is a substitute for thought.</p><p>Thanks to the internet at least we now have back-testing for credibility:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*d5yoj7PYrBnJoaZ_" /></figure><p>The Trump administration has been equally guilty in spreading false information.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/807/1*WiZLvBxl4hBDnH23UTf-lA.png" /></figure><p>Meanwhile, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis’ concept of 50 states as “laboratories of democracy,” is now playing out in a time-compressed fashion. Whereas typically a given state policy might take two decades to compare to different policies in other states in order to understand the results, today all 50 states have their own quarantine policies, with governors in command as never before, and their policies will be realized for comparison over a period of months, with the quantitative metric being the mortality rate of the state population.</p><p>How could the Federal government pour gasoline on the positive emergent decentralization that is already happening?</p><p>Dr. Harvey Fineburg, the president of the Moore Foundation (“Moore’s law,” yes, that Moore), also the president of the <a href="https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/harvey-fineberg/">Institute of Medicine at Harvard</a>, and an expert in medical decision-making, has published an opinion piece, <a href="https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMe2007263">Ten Weeks to Crush the Curve</a> in the New England Journal of Medicine, calling for “unified command” against the pandemic, with a commander reporting directly to the president. Fineburg sees “not a coordinator across agencies” but that the commander “carries the full power and authority of the American president to mobilize every civilian and military asset needed to win the war.”</p><p>In my humble opinion, Fineburg gets this half right. Having served in the military in wartime and seen the damage caused by conflicting chains of command and unclear reporting relationships, a unified command for all government assets makes perfect sense to me. Fineburg is right that an inter-agency coordinator is not enough.</p><p>But such a commander having the ability to <strong>extra-legally</strong> mobilize all civilian assets however would be a waste of time. As above, the private entities of the market state are already responding in an emergent fashion just fine.</p><p>How should this commander interact with private agencies and the market? This is exactly what Bobbitt foresaw. The commander would be a hypernode in a network, and the most valuable thing such a commander could provide would be legitimacy and credibility to private efforts, by removing red tape that hinders them, and by freeing them from unnecessary bureaucratic oversight. In this way, the legitimacy flows both ways: by efficiently deploying interagency resources in support of private actors who can continue to respond in a decentralized fashion, everyone will win, including the legitimacy of our form of government.</p><p>Fineburg’s proposal that a newly appointed unified commander be able to extra-legally seize all civilian assets to fight the virus will contribute to a decline of legitimacy of the government, already severely distrusted by nearly everyone. If this is the plan, it would be better for Federal agencies to do nothing at all.</p><p>Does anyone think a Federal Corona Czar can manage Bill Gates’ virus philanthropy better than he can?</p><p>Imagine two different scenarios:</p><ul><li>A Corona Czar takes charge as Fineburg imagines, but with a nation-state mentality. The Federal government uses the <a href="https://www.usa.gov/selective-service">Selective Service Act to draft healthy males</a> into temporary military service and then puts them involuntarily in clinical trials for vaccine candidates that bureaucrats have chosen.</li><li>The Corona Czar assumes command but with a market-state mentality. She takes over the FDA and authorizes <a href="https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/42639016/How%20to%20accelerate%20Coronavirus%20vaccine%20testing_020.pdf?sequence=2&amp;isAllowed=y">challenge trials</a> to replace Phase 3 trials for any Sars-Cov-2 vaccine that has cleared Phases I and 2 as normal. The Czar calls Bill Gates and asks what else he needs the government to do for his efforts to be successful. The Czar then calls every governor, etc etc etc.</li></ul><p>Some have suggested that Gates himself should become the Czar, but this gets it backwards too. Gates is already acting as a de facto ambassador from the 21st century private economy of the market state to the 20th century mindset governing the nation-state.</p><p><strong>Balkanization is far worse than decentralization</strong></p><p>Renewed and beneficial decentralization — to cities, states, market actors, and private individuals — is already happening in the course of the pandemic.</p><p>During this crisis, if the legal authority and power of Federal agencies is devolved to states then Federal legitimacy will survive in some new fashion. If it is not then over time it is very possible for states to ask why they are a part of a Federal government at all when it simply seeks to control them from afar while offering little assistance of value, and in fact, contributing to the demise of their citizens by the spread of false information. The entire apparatus will completely collapse.</p><p>The further a state is from the Eastern seaboard, the more likely it is to ask itself questions about secession. Robert Kaplan noted in <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Empire-Wilderness-Traveling-Americas-Departures-ebook/dp/B00OWWOL9I/ref=sr_1_2?crid=1871VLVK0T5VS&amp;dchild=1&amp;keywords=an+empire+wilderness&amp;qid=1586196671&amp;sprefix=an+empire+wilderness%2Caps%2C147&amp;sr=8-2">An Empire Wilderness: Travels Into America’s Future</a> that one reason the western states have 30–50% of their land owned by Federal agencies is as a form of insurance that they won’t secede.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/0*DLZK_WSSlkYjn9RZ" /></figure><p>Minus a constructive way for the Federal government to support states, market actors and civil society, then as states become de facto independent polities once again, the country will slowly Balkanize. <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Nine-Nations-North-America/dp/0380578859/ref=sr_1_2?crid=3982H03QYPV3T&amp;dchild=1&amp;keywords=nine+nations+of+north+america&amp;qid=1586196269&amp;sprefix=Nine+nations+of+no%2Caps%2C148&amp;sr=8-2">The Nine Nations of North America</a>, written in 1981 was a useful way to think about internal structures at the time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*UFhy5BqDy84y8vHu" /><figcaption>The Nine Nations of North America, imagined by Joel Garreau</figcaption></figure><p>The eminent geographer Joel Kotkin <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2013/09/04/a-map-of-americas-future-where-growth-will-be-over-the-next-decade/#2d9d709c623d">attempted to draw a map of US geographic and economic power in 2013 in Forbes</a>, and developed 7 regions and 3 city-states (New York, Los Angeles and Miami).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*htd_hvs6m2ZPvM0R" /><figcaption>Joel Kotkin’s map of economic regions in the US</figcaption></figure><p>Whether Garreau’s 1981 analysis or Kotkin’s 2013 updated map, newly independent regions like this might be the result of poorly considered and hamfisted Federal decisions made today. In a Balkanized American continent, they might become small independent countries.</p><p>None of us should want this to happen. The consequences for the world order that has created the market that has led to such robust private entities are terrible to consider. Balkanization of the U.S. into many small countries would be an invitation to foreign powers to move in, colonize, and restart the 18th Century wars for domination of North America. Generally speaking the U.S. population would rather hang together than allow that to happen, and it would be disastrous for world peace if it did happen as there is no credible alternative to US force for preserving the society of market-states that operate by the consent of their citizens.</p><p>No less than Henry Kissinger himself thinks the “Coronavirus pandemic will forever alter the world order.” In his <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coronavirus-pandemic-will-forever-alter-the-world-order-11585953005">Wall Street Journal essay of that title on April 3rd</a>, he compared current events to his own personal experience in the Battle of the Bulge: “When the Covid-19 pandemic is over, many countries’ institutions will be perceived as having failed. Whether this judgement is objectively fair is irrelevant. The reality is the world will never be the same after the coronavirus.”</p><p><a href="https://twitter.com/TheDailyShow/status/1245889758322200576?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1245889758322200576&amp;ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.businessinsider.com%2Fbill-gates-factories-7-different-vaccines-to-fight-coronavirus-2020-4">Bill Gates further elaborated on his thinking in building vaccine factories at a loss</a>: “Governments will eventually come up with lots of money for these things but they don’t know where to direct it, they can’t move as quickly . . . Normal government procurement processes, and understanding which are the right seven [vaccines], you know in a few months those may kick in, but our foundation, you know we can get it bootstrapped and get it going and save months because every month counts.”</p><p>The choice is between a 20th century nation-state mentality that continues to fail or a 21st century market-state mentality that treats our robust society as it is and not as it ought to be.</p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/josh-manchester-a717071/"><em>Josh Manchester</em></a><em> is the founder and general partner of </em><a href="http://www.championhillventures.com/"><em>Champion Hill Ventures</em></a><em>, an early stage venture capital firm based in North Carolina.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=609468c5fc2c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Venture-backed Startups Will Build the Defense Technology the Free World Needs Right Now]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@joshmanchester/venture-backed-startups-will-build-the-defense-technology-the-free-world-needs-right-now-d2cefa2b2196?source=rss-1669f24562e4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d2cefa2b2196</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defense]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military-innovation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Manchester]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Jun 2019 01:14:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-13T01:14:35.718Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>We Don’t Need the FAANGs to Disrupt the Primes</strong></p><p><em>“The U.S. military might struggle to win, or perhaps lose, a war against China or Russia.”</em></p><p>The National Defense Strategy Commission reached this grim conclusion <a href="https://news.usni.org/2018/11/14/document-the-assessment-and-recommendations-of-the-national-defense-strategy-commission">in its 2018 assessment of the Pentagon’s military strategy and its weapon programs</a>. Congressional leaders of both parties selected the commissioners, half by the Republicans, half by the Democrats. All the commissioners were eminent former senior leaders in the Defense Department from Democratic and Republican administrations. Their unanimous conclusion was that the Pentagon is failing to prepare for the future and that “the United States will soon face a national security emergency.”</p><p>China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have collectively deployed thousands of cheap but deadly missiles that today can devastate the archipelago of regional bases from which an increasingly obsolete U.S. military is designed to fight. China and Russia are also making rapid advances in hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, and deep learning, with stated goals to use all of these for military purposes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/686/1*jnLzBVPA1o8UHlfOenQRLw.png" /><figcaption>Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” 2019.</figcaption></figure><p>The case of China is particularly worrisome. Over the past three decades China’s defense spending has doubled roughly every eight years, with a focus on naval, air, and space systems geared for offensive operations. China’s leaders maintained the pace of this astonishing military buildup even when the United States imposed across-the-board defense cutbacks on itself following the Great Recession. Upon ascending to power in 2012, Chinese President Xi Jinping departed from his more prudent predecessors and adopted much more aggressive foreign and national security policies, policies that aim at the sovereign rights of China’s neighbors in East and South Asia. Judging by its actions alone, China under Xi apparently believes quite strongly in the utility of military power.</p><p>Losing a war against China or Russia would entail more than a horrendous loss of lives. It would result in a world where the United States, Japan, Australia, South Korea, the NATO countries and other democracies lose control over their affairs.</p><p><strong>The unsustainable nature of the tech-defense relationship</strong></p><p>With U.S. defense spending exceeding $700 billion per year, how could the United States be on the brink of a national security emergency? Simply put, America’s national security competitors are outflanking an Industrial-Age U.S. military machine that, like a lumbering dinosaur, is not adapting fast enough to its changing environment. The Pentagon desperately needs rapid innovation. Yet the current defense industry structure is not compatible with U.S. venture capital and high-growth technology industries for several reasons:</p><p>· The U.S. military’s industrial base is centered on a few huge oligopoly suppliers known within the Beltway as <strong>“the Primes”</strong> — Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, General Dynamics, and Northrop Grumman. These companies, ancient by tech startup standards, have optimized themselves to sustain a 20th century Industrial Age World War II-style force structure which supports the political decision-makers across the country who appropriate the funding that industrial base receives. The Primes are great at building very large platforms that cost billions of dollars and take 15–30 years to field. The Primes are also historically heavy on hardware talent and much lighter on software talent.</p><p>· The Primes receive the vast majority of defense spending. Defense budgets have historically not unlocked for startups. While a defense private equity industry exists to aggregate small companies and flip them downstream to the Primes, venture capital investors, who have a much higher return threshold, know that it’s hard to have venture outcomes (in other words, to make money) when a company can’t win large market share or survive as a stand-alone business.</p><p>· Venture-backed tech industries have matured as an asset class in peacetime and most mainstream U.S. venture firms in existence today do not have institutional cultures or histories that include defense innovation, apart from cybersecurity.</p><p>· Major tech companies, like the <strong>FAANGs</strong> (Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, Google and Microsoft too), are generally unwilling to work on defense related projects, and sometimes must deal with employee protests when they do.</p><p>· Many observers perceive this as an indicator that software engineers generally don’t want to work on defense-related innovation.</p><p>· Finally, in a bizarre set of twists, some of the organizations that comprise the Limited Partners of venture capital firms (the blue chip endowments and foundations of the U.S. Eastern establishment, often founded on the fortunes of great American industrialists from decades ago, along with public pension funds throughout the country) are <a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/us-money-funding-facial-recognition-sensetime-megvii">sometimes accidentally funding Chinese defense technology</a> while often restricting their U.S. venture managers from making defense investments. Foundations and endowments in particular often have negotiated Limited Partnership Agreements with the venture firms they finance precluding them from investing in anything that could have military usage. The irony is that these same tax-exempt pools of capital are frequently investors in Chinese venture funds which provide software to make smarter and more deadly Chinese weapons and to the advanced surveillance systems that have turned China’s Xinjiang province into a virtual Uighur prison camp and a human rights disaster.</p><p>No single individual or entity has caused this state of events to transpire; it is simply the accumulation of various cultural aspects of the capital formation process of the venture industry and its portfolio companies.</p><p>Fortunately, we believe that almost all these characteristics will rapidly change over the next few years. But first let’s discuss some additional background.</p><p><strong>Venture capital has come of age in a time of unprecedented peace</strong></p><p>The U.S. venture capital industry is about 100 years old. Bessemer Ventures was formed in 1911 and originally had just the family fortune of Henry Phipps Jr., a co-founder of Carnegie Steel, as its sole limited partner. Despite these deep roots, the U.S. venture industry has only institutionalized as an asset class since the mid-1990s. Until then it was extremely clubby and very small. Sequoia Capital, KPCB, Charles River Ventures, and NEA were all founded in the 1970s and Accel Partners in the 1980s. But it has really only been since the mid-1990s (Benchmark Capital was founded in 1995, as was my own former firm, Foundation Capital) that the industry has institutionalized and grown substantially, first in the desktop computing and internet boom, and second during the combination of platform shifts over the last ten years that have given us mobile computing, social media, e-commerce, cloud computing, software-as-a-service and all of their associated new business models.</p><p>For a quarter of a century, the institutional, mainstream venture investing ecosystem, at the startup, venture firm and limited partner levels, developed business processes, mental models, networks, and expertise in certain technical areas and heuristics — in aggregate, an industry culture — that have created one of the most dynamic parts of the U.S. economy. The U.S. tech industry is also one of the most unique aspects of American life — and a powerful, difficult-to-replicate form of “soft power,” featuring an inclusivity for aspirational immigrant founders — a feature perhaps unequalled in human history.</p><p>From a long-term U.S. historical viewpoint, it is striking that the venture industry’s maturation has occurred during a unique period in American history when the United States had no major great power competitor, either ideologically or technologically. The Cold War ended in 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved, and Russia was in disarray for the next 15 years. This period of peace was not without its own unique trials, but the security challenges associated with terrorism, counterinsurgency, and lower-intensity military activity have not required the sort of Herculean societal and political efforts that were drawn upon during the Cold War or World War II. We should all be grateful every day that this has been the reality of the last 25 years.</p><p>A useful analogy might be made with gold. In 1933, President Roosevelt made it illegal for U.S. citizens to own gold. In 1934, Benjamin Graham published the first edition of <em>Security Analysis</em>. In January 1975 it became legal to own gold again. Graham died in 1976. It was therefore illegal to own gold during key years of the development of modern security analysis. From this gap came gold bugs — the weirdos who seemed to always talk about nothing else, and didn’t get invited to key social events.</p><p>No analogies are perfect but this captures some of the similarities between venture and defense today. Cybersecurity investors understand the cybersecurity parts of U.S. defense. But most mainstream Silicon Valley venture firms do not spend time on other parts of defense due to the industry’s institutionalization during this recent period of relative peace and American dominance — which has also been a time when the lion’s share of defense spending has gone to the Primes, as discussed.</p><p>Sadly, peace is ahistorical. Great power competitions are a feature of humanity, not a bug. Periods of time when a major power, or superpower, are not challenged in some profound fashion by one or more other powers, regardless of whether they are driven by fear, prestige, economic interest, or ideology — are, in short, rare when looking back on the sojourn of homo sapiens on planet earth. The period when the free world had a monopoly on power has now ended.</p><p><strong>The tech-defense status quo is inverting</strong></p><p>The only previously delineated area where we don’t expect much change is from the FAANGs. These massive companies are best viewed as small nation-states themselves with global stakeholders. For example, many of their employees are not U.S. citizens and may not want their employers engaged in U.S. defense work.</p><p>We think everything else will invert.</p><p>· We believe defense budgets will begin unlocking for young startups. Many key national security decision-makers in Washington are now seeking better, faster alternatives to the byzantine Pentagon acquisitions process. Thought leaders like Will Roper, in charge of the U.S. Air Force’s $40 billion annual research and acquisition budget, are <a href="https://federalnewsnetwork.com/dod-reporters-notebook-jared-serbu/2019/03/air-force-looks-to-build-big-idea-pipeline-to-expand-its-industrial-base/">eagerly welcoming the contributions that smaller, nimble venture-capital funded entrepreneurs can make</a>. Roper, and others in the Pentagon, are reforming their practices to make it easier for genuine innovators to compete against the legacy defense oligopoly. When recently asked at a conference what problem keeps him up at night, Roper replied, “The industrial base.”</p><p>· Given the hardware roots of the Primes, they are ill-suited to provide solutions to many of the most pressing problems today. The Defense Department will increasingly allocate resources to startups solving software problems for which the Primes have no existing stock of machine learning engineers.</p><p>· As this happens some venture firms will experience cultural shifts toward more defense investing. As venture capitalists see that startups are receiving large purchase orders from various Defense Department units, they will develop strategies to deploy capital toward defense innovation. A good example is <a href="https://dod.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/1861753/source/GovDelivery/">last week’s award by the Air Force of $121 million to Pivotal Software in San Francisco</a>.</p><p>· Institutional limited partners as a group will likely slowly allocate away from any China-based manager who could be investing in Chinese military technologies. Some LPs with the freedom to do so may remove restrictions on defense investing from limited partnership agreements.</p><p>· We believe it is a myth that software engineers do not want to work on defense. This is a classic case of preference falsification, the social phenomenon in which people do not speak their true minds about a given topic, though their actions often indicate otherwise. We believe that talented engineers are often very attracted to defense-related work because it often offers the hardest problems to solve.</p><p>An enormous opportunity therefore exists for startups: to hire the engineers who don’t want to work for ancient and outdated Primes, and who aren’t very welcome at the FAANGS, but who wish to create the technologies that an increasingly eager democratic government needs to defend itself and its allies. Companies in our own portfolio, like <a href="https://www.spacex.com/">SpaceX</a>, <a href="https://www.rigetti.com/">Rigetti Computing</a>, <a href="https://www.anduril.com/">Anduril Industries</a>, and <a href="https://umbralab.com/">Umbra Lab</a> are executing this strategy.</p><p><strong>The hardest technical problems today are defense-related</strong></p><p>How can data from satellites, drones, land-based radar, ships, and other sources be stitched together, in real time, to find long-range missiles on mobile transporters, hiding among the background in cities, forests, and mountains?</p><p>How can friendly troops, who have separated into very small units in order to hide and survive, be connected to each other electronically, and be resupplied from historically long ranges?</p><p>How and to what degree and in what conditions should an adversary’s sensor networks be spoofed? What type of false electronic picture can be painted?</p><p>The aggregation of targeting data for an air wing takes 72 hours today and has a heavy human component. Can this complex optimization problem be solved autonomously, such that the targeting list for pilots is developed in 15 minutes?</p><p>How does a deployed force of perhaps 50,000 personnel, with planes, ships, and land forces, continue to fight when satellite links have been knocked out, and “reachback” to the U.S., for data processing, is no longer possible?</p><p>Can deep learning be used for crisis diplomacy? Put another way, since DeepMind’s AlphaZero can teach itself to move pieces forward on a board to win a game, can it learn to move them backwards, to de-escalate a crisis?</p><p>These problems, and many others, are asking to be solved by entrepreneurs.</p><p><strong>Phase change</strong></p><p>There is a looming breakdown in deterrence. If the U.S. defense establishment is unable to adapt to the new great power competitive environment, then adversaries will be tempted to grab for a <em>fait accompli</em>, with war the result. This has been the pattern since Homer wrote <em>The Iliad</em>; there is no evidence to conclude human behavior is different in the 21st Century.</p><p>We believe the prevention of this scenario involves rapid technical innovation. The defense environment is more favorable now for upstart firms than anytime in the past several decades. If you are a founder building technology to ensure the survival of government by consent, our firm would like to talk to you.</p><p><em>Josh Manchester is the founder and General Partner of </em><a href="https://www.championhillventures.com/"><em>Champion Hill Ventures</em></a><em>, an early stage venture capital firm. Robert Haddick is the firm’s Director of Research. Both are former officers in the US Marines.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d2cefa2b2196" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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