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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Judge Glock on Medium]]></title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Solving Texas’s Street Homelessness Problem]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cicero-news/solving-texass-street-homelessness-problem-3649aa7caa32?source=rss-1c7206c33e0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[texas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mental-health]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[austin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[homelessness]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Judge Glock]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Nov 2020 04:57:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-08T14:46:20.922Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/880/0*XAAV_6QSGXioj8vl.jpg" /></figure><p>In the ten years after 2007, Texas actually made strides in reducing homelessness. The total homeless population plummeted from 40,000 to just under 24,000 persons, a 40% drop. Yet after 2017, Texas homelessness started rising again, most especially among the “unsheltered” homeless, or those living on the streets. The unsheltered population increased from 7,000 to 10,500 people.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> Some cities like Austin saw almost a 50% increase in unsheltered homeless in 2019 alone. Austin now has almost half of its homeless population outside of shelters, the highest rate in the state.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> The recent coronavirus pandemic will only exacerbate these trends and the problems that emerge from them.</p><p>There are several reasons for this statewide reversal on homelessness despite a strong economy in the several years going into the pandemic. One important issue is that housing prices in some Texas metro areas, especially Austin, have increased rapidly. Austin rent prices have increased by 50% since the end of the last recession in 2010, which has driven many marginal renters into the streets.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> A report from the White House Council of Economic Advisors has shown that a doubling in rents can almost double the homeless population, and it seems that that effect is at work.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><p>More generally, cities like Austin have removed bans on camping or lying in the streets, and in the process have both attracted more homeless individuals and lost a tool to help encourage homeless people into needed treatment. These cities have understandable concerns that removing people from the streets would be uncompassionate. But we will show leaving homeless people on the streets and in crowded encampments is bad for the homeless and bad for the cities in which they live. Cities can prevent street-camping while providing superior alternative treatment and shelter options at reasonable cost, and many cities have done so.</p><p>We offer several viable reforms to help solve Texas’s unsheltered homeless problem. The first reform will be to redirect Texas’s two main homeless grants into providing cheap available shelter and pay-for-performance services. The second will be to redirect Texas’s public safety grants into the creation of homeless outreach teams in those cities with above average homelessness. The third will be reforming the state’s Assisted Outpatient Treatment and Inpatient admittance criteria for individuals undergoing a mental health crisis. The fourth will be simply using state power on state land to clean up encampments and provide superior alternatives.</p><p>This paper will show a few simple things that the state of Texas and its cities can do to reduce open camping and street homeless, and provide better and more efficient treatments for the state’s homeless residents.</p><p><strong>The Problem of Encampments</strong></p><p>Until about 20 years ago, there were few homeless encampments and few cities allowed camping on their streets.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> Recently, many cities began to worry that removing such camps would be cruel and have allowed them to expand. In reality, however, these encampments are dangerous and destructive for the homeless, and the more compassionate route is encouraging their residents into safer and sheltered situations.</p><p>The biggest problem with the encampments is that they are bad for the health of the homeless. The Arizona Center for Problem-Oriented Policing simply notes that “homeless encampments can be dangerous to health.” Garbage in these camps attracts rats; food cannot be stored or dishes washed, leading to more food-borne disease; toilets are often not available so waste is scattered about living areas; diseases spread easily in close and unsupervised quarters; unprotected cooking and heating fires can get out of control, and so forth.</p><p>Violence in these camps can also be endemic. One small Florida homeless encampment had 3 homicides in 10 months. One California encampment had 5 shooting deaths in one month. Although general statistics on the health of unsheltered and camping homeless is hard to come by, In Los Angeles, with some of the largest open camps in the developed world, 3 homeless people die in street encampments every day, or 1,000 a year, a rate of death higher than those of combat soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><p>Nearby neighborhoods also suffer from the encampments. Human waste and garbage from them have found to pollute watersheds and occasionally be carried onto other property. Studies have shown that areas next to homeless encampments have higher levels of petty and serious crime, especially theft, armed robbery, rape, and aggravated assault.<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> The encampments also frighten nearby homeowners, drive away businesses, and prevent the use of public space and public parks.</p><p>Despite claims that insufficient shelter is the problem, most studies show that many of the chronically homeless on the streets or in encampments do not want to go into existing shelter programs. Surveys of those in encampments find that many, from 25 to 41%, say they would not go into shelters if the camp was closed. Larger numbers say that if forced to leave, they would just move.<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> In practice, when options are provided, even larger proportions refuse to accept them. Burien, Washington, a majority minority city near Seattle, recently had around 100 homeless people on the streets and encampments. After they instituted a camping ban, and gave ample warning and options for treatment, all except 6 left rather than accept shelter, and there was only one arrest in clearing the public space.<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a> Similarly, in the recent legal case of Martin v. City of Boise, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals mandated that Boise, Idaho, and other such cities, could not remove homeless people from public spaces without “sufficient” shelter, but the court ignored the fact that despite hundreds of homeless people on Boise’s streets, there had never been a night in which the city’s three main shelters had been full.<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a></p><p>The reality is that existing encampments are dangerous, but city and state governments refuse to close them because they fear that the current alternatives are insufficient. Cities can actually end these encampments while providing better alternatives that actually help the homeless get back on their feet</p><p><strong>The Types of Shelter the Homeless Need</strong></p><p>There are several ways to help those in homeless camps return to better environments. I will describe them below in order of how costly they are and how much structured services they require.</p><p>For many, homelessness is less the result of the absence of a home than the absence of a friend and family network. That is why most cities, even very progressive coastal cities, run “family reunification” or “Return Home” programs that offer to connect homeless people to their often distant families again, and pay for transportation. Although derided as mere “greyhound therapy” by some, there are few things more helpful than returning a person to the support structure that knows them best. As an option and not a mandate, it is appropriate and helpful.<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a></p><p>Another simple solution is to open up “safe parking” spaces for those who still own a car but don’t have a residence, and who are most likely to be able to get back on their feet and return to work. These can be set up with minimal cost on public lots with some basic utility attachments and bathrooms. The City of San Diego provided safe parking lots at the cost of $165,000 a year each, and each of these lots of which hosted about 350 homeless individuals over the course of the year, or about $500 per person. <a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a> Sometimes, temporary assistance to landlords to accept the temporarily homeless, or “rapid re-housing,” is a solution that prevents a further spiral into despair.<a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a></p><p>Another solution for those caught in encampments who still value some of their freedom is “structured camping facilities,” or encampments that are overseen by the government. These involve minimal expense, are accompanied by regular cleaning, police patrols, and medical and other services, but allow the homeless to bring their property and tents inside. The main complaints of the homeless about these camps are usually their distance from services, food, and public transportation. There are ways to ensure these in the camps at minimal expense. For instance, the government may open up of “day resource centers,” where the homeless can stay during the daytime, and where they are provided with basic social services.<a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a></p><p>At a slightly more structured level, Oakland has created “community cabins” (more colloquially known as “tuff sheds”) that cost $30,000 to build and $18,000 a year to maintain with services, and which are provided in a safe environment. The Utah Housing First Program built similar shelters for as little as $10,000 per unit, with lower operating costs as well.<a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a> By contrast, Austin spends $28,000 a year per homeless individual for its direct homeless and shelter services, without taking into account other expenditures such as hospitalizations and jail time.<a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a></p><p>Finally, for those homeless individuals who have been on the streets for at least a year, known as the “chronically homeless,” and who show little indication that they can return to support on their own, the state can assist in the creation of competitively-provided Permanent Supportive Housing (PSH), with more intensive and demanding treatment than today’s units. Today, most PSH contracts with states and cities just reward providers for keeping open beds or warehousing residents. Even the few PSH Pay-for-Performance programs mainly try to reward providers for keeping them inside the housing program, as opposed to improving the homeless’s overall well-being.<a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a></p><p>All of these types of shelter and services have benefits for different groups. But one issue in providing such homeless services is that neighbors can be opposed to them. There are many reasons, from crime to property values, to be legitimately worried about nearby homeless services and shelters. The solution is to enforce even higher levels of public safety and cleaning around them than before. Mayor Kevin Faulconer of San Diego made a promise that any homeless shelter would be accompanied by public attention that ensured that the area around it would be both safer and cleaner than it was before the site came, and since then his city council has voted to expand the services programs to more areas, with minimal neighborhood opposition.<a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a></p><p>As this section has made clear, there are a myriad of different shelter arrangements for the homeless, all of which are superior to current encampments and all of which can provide for different homeless populations at reasonable costs. There is no reason for mayors or local officials to claim that they have to allow current encampments to continue in lieu of better alternatives.</p><p><strong>Reforming Mental Health Treatment</strong></p><p>Simply getting the unsheltered homeless into safe environments is important, but for many it is not enough. Nationally, 28% of the homeless report having a severe mental illness. Local numbers are hard to come by, but in large cities such as Dallas, that number can go up to 43%.<a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a> The unsheltered population, however, reports mental illness rates higher than 75%. Unfortunately, concerns about civil liberties have caused both the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill from hospitals and created a reluctance to push them into outpatient treatment, leading to tens of thousands of unsupervised mentally ill homeless on our streets. Yet the mentally ill homeless need such help more than anyone.</p><p>Right now, for the severely mentally ill who need inpatient treatment, one problem is that Texas has two standards for those who can potentially be ordered for inpatient treatment: there is one for emergency evaluation and one for actual admittance. This can lead to the inappropriate scenario where someone is evaluated to be a danger to himself or others in first evaluation, but will not meet the separate criteria for actual admission.<a href="#_ftn20">[20]</a> Texas law also only allows only 48 hours of treatment, which is too short for most patients to stabilize. Finally, the language on inpatient commitment is ambiguous and vague. Besides other criteria, an individual can only be committed if they present a “a danger to self or others,” but the law does not clarify that the danger can involve inability to take care of oneself, allowing long-term deterioration and self-destruction without any state intervention.</p><p>There are other problems for what Is known as “Assisted Outpatient Treatment” (AOT) for those severely mentally ill who do not warrant inpatient treatment. For one, Texas does not have a “psychiatric deterioration standard” for either inpatient or outpatient mandatory admission, which means courts cannot examine the likelihood that the individual will continue to deteriorate without assistance as a reason for admitting someone to treatment. It also allows an initial order of assisted outpatient treatment for only 90 days, which is often not enough to stabilize a mentally ill individual, especially when they remain on the streets.<a href="#_ftn21">[21]</a></p><p>A few basic reforms to mandated mental health treatment, which would clarify the standards of admittance, and extend times for supervision, when combined with reforms to the mental health and drug treatment courts described below, can help a significant portion of the unsheltered homeless population.</p><p><strong>What the State Can Do</strong></p><p>First, the state should do all it can to end encampments and move people to safer environments. The state can and should ensure clean-ups of encampments on state land, including land under or around state highways, and provide alternatives.<a href="#_ftn22">[22]</a> Governor Greg Abbot recently cleared some of the state Transportation Department land and opened up nearby structured camping facilities. The state can and should expand these to provide alternatives to any camps on state public land.<a href="#_ftn23">[23]</a></p><p>The state also can use its fiscal clout to encourage cities to do better. Texas provides about $5 million a year in Emergency Solution Grants (ESG) as part of a federal program to local “Continuums of Care” (CoCs) which run local homeless services. These grants focus on immediate shelter for those in dire need.<a href="#_ftn24">[24]</a> The state should allocate its ESG grants only to those cities and CoCs that show consistent declines in unsheltered homelessness. If a city or CoC region shows any significant increase in unsheltered homeless, say, at least 5% in a year, it should lose its ESG grant. The ESG grant allocation should also be redirected to focus on only two possible programs, structured camping facilities and community cabins, as the two most efficient shelter services. It should also mandate that all CoC create “By Name Lists” so they know everyone that comes into the shelter system and can track them over time.<a href="#_ftn25">[25]</a></p><p>The state also offers, out of its own funds, Homeless Housing and Service Program (HHSP) grants, also at about $5 million a year, which focus on more long-term homeless services.<a href="#_ftn26">[26]</a> These too should be allocated to cities which can show consistent declines in unsheltered homelessness, and should be cut off if cities fail to meet these goals. More importantly, every dollar of these grants should also go to Pay-For-Performance housing and service contractors.</p><p>The Pay-For-Performance PSH Model should be based on a few overall metrics. Those service providers should receive about $20,000 a year the city currently spends directly on shelter services, and they should support their homeless clients in any way they see fit in improving two key metrics: reducing number and costs of hospitalizations and number costs of arrests relative to the mean expectation of that client. If we set the expected baseline of homeless costs around the US Department of Housing and Urban Development level, of about $35,000 of hospitalization costs and $10,000 of incarceration and crime costs a year, the state would assume about $45,000 in costs per homeless client per year. Any reduction in costs relative to the baseline would be shared 75% by the homeless service provider with 25% going to the state. If the homeless provider moves a homeless individual to independence, and that individual stays out of the shelter and homeless service system for 3 years, the provider will keep 80% of the savings relative to the full payment.<a href="#_ftn27">[27]</a> Unlike the current federal PSH model, these contracts will allow mandated treatment and other required services for participants.</p><p>The state also offers public safety grants to cities, and there are two ways these can be repurposed to focus on the needs of the homeless population. First, the state can ensure that grants to cities with above-average unsheltered homeless populations goes to Community Outreach police teams, which are trained to deal with homeless individuals and get them into treatment.<a href="#_ftn28">[28]</a> Houston created a Homeless Outreach Team (HOT) in 2011, and it is now composed of 9 police officers and 4 case managers that have helped Houston reduce its homelessness by half since that date. Its success should be replicated across the state. The State Criminal Justice Planning Fund and the Victims of Crime Act fund, both state grants to local police departments, can be repurposed to focus on the needs of homeless offenders and victims, using required HOTs, and to get them into safer treatments.<a href="#_ftn29">[29]</a> Second, the state can ensure that its community courts grant dollars are focused on mental health and drug treatment courts, which have shown success in pushing individuals into treatment. Right now, many of the states’ community or specialty courts are reluctant to push individuals into treatment, but the state’s “Specialty Courts” grants can be conditioned on moving a larger proportion of all drug and mental health cases through the system, as opposed to the normal jail system, and of processing cases faster.<a href="#_ftn30">[30]</a> Any city that reduced the proportion of all arrests in the system going to specialty courts for two years in row would lose their specialty court funding, as would any city that did not process the majority of drug and mental health court cases in 45 days (otherwise the referrals from the specialty courts would take place long after the possibility of helping the individual in a crisis had passed).<a href="#_ftn31">[31]</a></p><p>The state can also reform its inpatient and AOT mental health treatment laws to ensure that those with severe mental illnesses get immediate treatment and can stabilize. Inpatient treatment should be at least 3 days and outpatient treatment should be supervised for at least 6 months. At the same time, the state should clarify that “psychological deterioration” is a justifiable reason for the state to intervene before someone’s mental illness causes long-term consequences, and the state should include inability to take care of oneself as part of an evaluation of self-harm.<a href="#_ftn32">[32]</a> All of these will make sure mentally ill individuals receive the treatment they needed.</p><p>Finally, the state can shame cities into doing better. By creating viable alternatives and showing that they are safer, more affordable, and better for the homeless than large encampments, they can help end cities’ quiet acquiescence in this tragedy.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>In the early 2000s, Los Angeles’s Skid Row was an international scandal of misery and decay. In 2006, LAPD Commissioner William Bratton began a program called “Safer City,” which cleaned up homeless camps in Skid Row and pushed people into shelter and treatment. It reduced homelessness and crime on Skid Row by half. When it was reversed years later all the old problems returned, and the number of deaths on Skid Row doubled.<a href="#_ftn33">[33]</a></p><p>Similarly, In Austin, after the city ended its anti-camping ordinance, unsheltered homeless went up by 50% in a year, while the number of people in shelters dropped by 20%. Violent and property crime among homeless themselves increased by over 15% as people returned to dangerous streets.<a href="#_ftn34">[34]</a> Despite any claims of compassion, continuing to allow ubiquitous street camping is not helping the homeless.</p><p>The state of Texas can help end the dangerous encampments and help the homeless people get their lives back together. It’s something we know how to do; it’s something we can do; it’s something we should do.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <a href="https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-of-homelessness-report/texas/https://www.usich.gov/homelessness-statistics/tx/">https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-of-homelessness-report/texas/https://www.usich.gov/homelessness-statistics/tx/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <a href="https://www.statesman.com/news/20200519/austin-sees-11-increase-in-homeless-count-45-increase-in-unsheltered-population#:~:text=The%20latest%20tally%20of%20homeless,1%2C500%20people%20who%20were%20unsheltered.&amp;text=In%20total%2C%20volunteers%20counted%202%2C506%20people%20experiencing%20homelessness.https://www.texastribune.org/2019/12/09/how-many-people-are-homeless-texas-least-25000/">https://www.statesman.com/news/20200519/austin-sees-11-increase-in-homeless-count-45-increase-in-unsheltered-population#:~:text=The%20latest%20tally%20of%20homeless,1%2C500%20people%20who%20were%20unsheltered.&amp;text=In%20total%2C%20volunteers%20counted%202%2C506%20people%20experiencing%20homelessness.https://www.texastribune.org/2019/12/09/how-many-people-are-homeless-texas-least-25000/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <a href="https://www.rentjungle.com/average-rent-in-austin-rent-trends/R">https://www.rentjungle.com/average-rent-in-austin-rent-trends/R</a> Rental trends famously vary depending on the statistical source, but more easily measured Housing prices have increased even faster than rents, almost doubling in the ten years to 2020. <a href="https://www.zillow.com/austin-tx/home-values/">https://www.zillow.com/austin-tx/home-values/</a>. Most Texas cities are famously open to new building, which keeps rental and housing prices down, but Austin has some notable restrictions on building causing increased housing costs. <a href="http://soa.utexas.edu/sites/default/disk/SHANNON-MASTERSREPORT-2015.pdf">http://soa.utexas.edu/sites/default/disk/SHANNON-MASTERSREPORT-2015.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> <a href="https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Understanding-Encampments.pdf">https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Understanding-Encampments.pdf</a> <a href="https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/WelcomeHome_TentCities_final_report.pdf">https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/WelcomeHome_TentCities_final_report.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/30/homeless-deaths-los-angeles-county">https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/30/homeless-deaths-los-angeles-county</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> <a href="https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/homeless-encampments-0">https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/homeless-encampments-0</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> <a href="https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/homeless-encampments-page-3">https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/homeless-encampments-page-3</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> <a href="https://www.city-journal.org/reducing-street-homelessness-burien-washington">https://www.city-journal.org/reducing-street-homelessness-burien-washington</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> <a href="https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/eide-amicus-Boise-09252019.pdf">https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/eide-amicus-Boise-09252019.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> <a href="https://downtownsandiego.org/family-reunification-program/">https://downtownsandiego.org/family-reunification-program/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> <a href="https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/government/the-spike-in-city-spending-on-homelessness-aid-is-clear-but-the-results-are-murkier/">https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/government/the-spike-in-city-spending-on-homelessness-aid-is-clear-but-the-results-are-murkier/</a> <a href="https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/politics/mayor-faulconer-to-expand-safe-parking-program-for-homeless-in-san-diego/509-e9df27a4-59e4-49d4-9f22-30de445f37ed">https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/politics/mayor-faulconer-to-expand-safe-parking-program-for-homeless-in-san-diego/509-e9df27a4-59e4-49d4-9f22-30de445f37ed</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> <a href="https://endhomelessness.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Performance-Benchmarks-and-Program-Standards.pdf">https://endhomelessness.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Performance-Benchmarks-and-Program-Standards.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> <a href="https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/eide-amicus-Boise-09252019.pdf">https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/eide-amicus-Boise-09252019.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a> <a href="https://www.oaklandca.gov/news/2018/oakland-unveils-newest-rapid-rehousing-facility-and-city-council-passes-8-6-million-emergency-funds-for-homeless-services">https://www.oaklandca.gov/news/2018/oakland-unveils-newest-rapid-rehousing-facility-and-city-council-passes-8-6-million-emergency-funds-for-homeless-services</a></p><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szEZfKJ2pSY">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szEZfKJ2pSY</a> <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/02/housing-first-solution-to-homelessness-utah/">https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/02/housing-first-solution-to-homelessness-utah/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> Echo Austin &amp; Politifact.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a> <a href="https://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-money-for-homeless.html">https://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-money-for-homeless.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> <a href="https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/mayor-announces-three-tent-shelters-around-san-diego-for-homeless/509-cdc0d945-5900-46ea-940a-4be5454d1b8a">https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/mayor-announces-three-tent-shelters-around-san-diego-for-homeless/509-cdc0d945-5900-46ea-940a-4be5454d1b8a</a> ; <a href="https://www.hoover.org/research/how-san-diego-cleaned-its-act-and-got-real-homelessness">https://www.hoover.org/research/how-san-diego-cleaned-its-act-and-got-real-homelessness</a> At the same time he ensured that people could not camp without consequence on city streets, <a href="https://inewsource.org/2020/05/25/san-diego-police-ticket-homeless-pandemic/">https://inewsource.org/2020/05/25/san-diego-police-ticket-homeless-pandemic/</a> . Austin has made a similar pledge, of sorts. After it ended its laws against camping last year, it made an exception for the area around the main homelessness service center, the ARCH, to ensure that it didn’t attract excessive community attention.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> <a href="https://www.usmayors.org/2016/12/08/mayors-examine-issues-of-homelessness-and-hunger-in-america/">https://www.usmayors.org/2016/12/08/mayors-examine-issues-of-homelessness-and-hunger-in-america/</a> <a href="https://www.ourcalling.org/mental-healthcare-crisis-dallas/#:~:text=The%20homeless%20community%20of%20Dallas,homeless%20are%20severely%20mentally%20ill">https://www.ourcalling.org/mental-healthcare-crisis-dallas/#:~:text=The%20homeless%20community%20of%20Dallas,homeless%20are%20severely%20mentally%20ill</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a> <a href="https://www.dfps.state.tx.us/handbooks/aps/files/APS_pg_4800.asp">https://www.dfps.state.tx.us/handbooks/aps/files/APS_pg_4800.asp</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[21]</a> /https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/grading-the-states.pdf</p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[22]</a> Texas Transportation Code §472.012;</p><p>In Austin, the state TxDOT began cleaning up encampments after bridge inspectors had trouble accessing overpasses, but the city had technically agreed to take over the duty in 1986. <a href="https://communityimpact.com/austin/central-austin/city-county/2019/07/11/clearing-of-homeless-camps-under-state-highway-overpasses-will-continue-despite-austins-loosened-public-camping-laws/">https://communityimpact.com/austin/central-austin/city-county/2019/07/11/clearing-of-homeless-camps-under-state-highway-overpasses-will-continue-despite-austins-loosened-public-camping-laws/</a>. If an encampment outside of state land becomes a public health risk due to an outbreak of disease, the governor can potentially order a quarantine and clear the site, but this should only be used in true emergency situations. Texas Health and Safety Code §§81.084: Application of Control Measures to Property</p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[23]</a> <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/05/politics/austin-homelessness/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/05/politics/austin-homelessness/index.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref24">[24]</a> <a href="https://www.tdhca.state.tx.us/home-division/">https://www.tdhca.state.tx.us/home-division/</a> <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2018-title24-vol3/xml/CFR-2018-title24-vol3-part576.xml#seqnum576.409">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2018-title24-vol3/xml/CFR-2018-title24-vol3-part576.xml#seqnum576.409</a> HUD still has to approve each state and local government’s “consolidated plan.” The overall allocation to states, cities, and other entities is the same as for the CDBG program, for some reason, but the state’s portion still has significant discretionary capability, and almost no restrictions in the state code about how to allocate these funds: <a href="https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/GV/htm/GV.2306.htm">https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/GV/htm/GV.2306.htm</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref25">[25]</a> This surprisingly simple and obvious reform is very recent and is still not required by many cities. <a href="https://community.solutions/the-by-name-list-revolution/">https://community.solutions/the-by-name-list-revolution/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a> <a href="https://reports.nlihc.org/rental-programs/catalog/homeless-housing-and-services-program">https://reports.nlihc.org/rental-programs/catalog/homeless-housing-and-services-program</a> The legislative direction for this is fairly open and most reforms can be done by administrative code: <a href="https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/GV/htm/GV.2306.htm">https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/GV/htm/GV.2306.htm</a> Administrative Code Here: <a href="https://texreg.sos.state.tx.us/public/readtac$ext.ViewTAC?tac_view=5&amp;ti=10&amp;pt=1&amp;ch=7&amp;sch=D&amp;rl=Y">https://texreg.sos.state.tx.us/public/readtac$ext.ViewTAC?tac_view=5&amp;ti=10&amp;pt=1&amp;ch=7&amp;sch=D&amp;rl=Y</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref27">[27]</a> The budgetary implications for this would be unclear if it was an addition to current HHSP funds, since most of the $10,000 criminal justice savings are not on budget, and around $15,000 of the state hospitalization expenses are Medicaid, of which are 60% paid for by the federal government, but since the funds for this will come entirely out of existing HHPD, it will at worst be revenue neutral.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref28">[28]</a> Almost all of the costs are hospital related. In New York, hospitalization costs are $35,000 a year for the chronically homeless, and prison and jail costs are only about $1,000 a year. If we estimate the social cost of crime as a multiple of this, considering that some crimes are not detected and the costs of crime are also borne by the public, we can estimate $10,000 a year in criminal costs. costs.http://cceh.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/supportive_housing_brief.pdf HUD sets expected cots per hospitalization event and jail time, and these can be used to compute the total. <a href="https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/costs_homeless.pdf">https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/costs_homeless.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref29">[29]</a> <a href="https://www.houstoncit.org/hot/">https://www.houstoncit.org/hot/</a> <a href="https://gov.texas.gov/organization/financial-services/grants">https://gov.texas.gov/organization/financial-services/grants</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref30">[30]</a> For instance, the Travis County Adult Drug Diversion Court has continuously reduced those referred to the court, even while requesting increased funding from the state specialty court grants. <a href="https://www.statesman.com/news/20160904/transparency-accountability-needed-at-travis-county-drug-court">https://www.statesman.com/news/20160904/transparency-accountability-needed-at-travis-county-drug-court</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref31">[31]</a> See current demands in Title 2, Subtitle K, Specialty Courts section: t-code/title-2/subtitle-k/</p><p><a href="#_ftnref32">[32]</a> <a href="https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/texas">https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/texas</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref33">[33]</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/30/homeless-deaths-los-angeles-county">https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/30/homeless-deaths-los-angeles-county</a>)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref34">[34]</a> . <a href="https://www.statesman.com/news/20200519/austin-sees-11-increase-in-homeless-count-45-increase-in-unsheltered-population#:~:text=The%20latest%20tally%20of%20homeless,population%20took%20place%20on%20Jan">https://www.statesman.com/news/20200519/austin-sees-11-increase-in-homeless-count-45-increase-in-unsheltered-population#:~:text=The%20latest%20tally%20of%20homeless,population%20took%20place%20on%20Jan</a>.</p><p>In the ten years after 2007, Texas actually made strides in reducing homelessness. The total homeless population plummeted from 40,000 to just under 24,000 persons, a 40% drop. Yet after 2017, Texas homelessness started rising again, most especially among the “unsheltered” homeless, or those living on the streets. The unsheltered population increased from 7,000 to 10,500 people.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> Some cities like Austin saw almost a 50% increase in unsheltered homeless in 2019 alone. Austin now has almost half of its homeless population outside of shelters, the highest rate in the state.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> The recent coronavirus pandemic will only exacerbate these trends and the problems that emerge from them.</p><p>There are several reasons for this statewide reversal on homelessness despite a strong economy in the several years going into the pandemic. One important issue is that housing prices in some Texas metro areas, especially Austin, have increased rapidly. Austin rent prices have increased by 50% since the end of the last recession in 2010, which has driven many marginal renters into the streets.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> A report from the White House Council of Economic Advisors has shown that a doubling in rents can almost double the homeless population, and it seems that that effect is at work.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><p>More generally, cities like Austin have removed bans on camping or lying in the streets, and in the process have both attracted more homeless individuals and lost a tool to help encourage homeless people into needed treatment. These cities have understandable concerns that removing people from the streets would be uncompassionate. But we will show leaving homeless people on the streets and in crowded encampments is bad for the homeless and bad for the cities in which they live. Cities can prevent street-camping while providing superior alternative treatment and shelter options at reasonable cost, and many cities have done so.</p><p>We offer several viable reforms to help solve Texas’s unsheltered homeless problem. The first reform will be to redirect Texas’s two main homeless grants into providing cheap available shelter and pay-for-performance services. The second will be to redirect Texas’s public safety grants into the creation of homeless outreach teams in those cities with above average homelessness. The third will be reforming the state’s Assisted Outpatient Treatment and Inpatient admittance criteria for individuals undergoing a mental health crisis. The fourth will be simply using state power on state land to clean up encampments and provide superior alternatives.</p><p>This paper will show a few simple things that the state of Texas and its cities can do to reduce open camping and street homeless, and provide better and more efficient treatments for the state’s homeless residents.</p><p><strong>The Problem of Encampments</strong></p><p>Until about 20 years ago, there were few homeless encampments and few cities allowed camping on their streets.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> Recently, many cities began to worry that removing such camps would be cruel and have allowed them to expand. In reality, however, these encampments are dangerous and destructive for the homeless, and the more compassionate route is encouraging their residents into safer and sheltered situations.</p><p>The biggest problem with the encampments is that they are bad for the health of the homeless. The Arizona Center for Problem-Oriented Policing simply notes that “homeless encampments can be dangerous to health.” Garbage in these camps attracts rats; food cannot be stored or dishes washed, leading to more food-borne disease; toilets are often not available so waste is scattered about living areas; diseases spread easily in close and unsupervised quarters; unprotected cooking and heating fires can get out of control, and so forth.</p><p>Violence in these camps can also be endemic. One small Florida homeless encampment had 3 homicides in 10 months. One California encampment had 5 shooting deaths in one month. Although general statistics on the health of unsheltered and camping homeless is hard to come by, In Los Angeles, with some of the largest open camps in the developed world, 3 homeless people die in street encampments every day, or 1,000 a year, a rate of death higher than those of combat soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><p>Nearby neighborhoods also suffer from the encampments. Human waste and garbage from them have found to pollute watersheds and occasionally be carried onto other property. Studies have shown that areas next to homeless encampments have higher levels of petty and serious crime, especially theft, armed robbery, rape, and aggravated assault.<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> The encampments also frighten nearby homeowners, drive away businesses, and prevent the use of public space and public parks.</p><p>Despite claims that insufficient shelter is the problem, most studies show that many of the chronically homeless on the streets or in encampments do not want to go into existing shelter programs. Surveys of those in encampments find that many, from 25 to 41%, say they would not go into shelters if the camp was closed. Larger numbers say that if forced to leave, they would just move.<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> In practice, when options are provided, even larger proportions refuse to accept them. Burien, Washington, a majority minority city near Seattle, recently had around 100 homeless people on the streets and encampments. After they instituted a camping ban, and gave ample warning and options for treatment, all except 6 left rather than accept shelter, and there was only one arrest in clearing the public space.<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a> Similarly, in the recent legal case of Martin v. City of Boise, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals mandated that Boise, Idaho, and other such cities, could not remove homeless people from public spaces without “sufficient” shelter, but the court ignored the fact that despite hundreds of homeless people on Boise’s streets, there had never been a night in which the city’s three main shelters had been full.<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a></p><p>The reality is that existing encampments are dangerous, but city and state governments refuse to close them because they fear that the current alternatives are insufficient. Cities can actually end these encampments while providing better alternatives that actually help the homeless get back on their feet</p><p><strong>The Types of Shelter the Homeless Need</strong></p><p>There are several ways to help those in homeless camps return to better environments. I will describe them below in order of how costly they are and how much structured services they require.</p><p>For many, homelessness is less the result of the absence of a home than the absence of a friend and family network. That is why most cities, even very progressive coastal cities, run “family reunification” or “Return Home” programs that offer to connect homeless people to their often distant families again, and pay for transportation. Although derided as mere “greyhound therapy” by some, there are few things more helpful than returning a person to the support structure that knows them best. As an option and not a mandate, it is appropriate and helpful.<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a></p><p>Another simple solution is to open up “safe parking” spaces for those who still own a car but don’t have a residence, and who are most likely to be able to get back on their feet and return to work. These can be set up with minimal cost on public lots with some basic utility attachments and bathrooms. The City of San Diego provided safe parking lots at the cost of $165,000 a year each, and each of these lots of which hosted about 350 homeless individuals over the course of the year, or about $500 per person. <a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a> Sometimes, temporary assistance to landlords to accept the temporarily homeless, or “rapid re-housing,” is a solution that prevents a further spiral into despair.<a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a></p><p>Another solution for those caught in encampments who still value some of their freedom is “structured camping facilities,” or encampments that are overseen by the government. These involve minimal expense, are accompanied by regular cleaning, police patrols, and medical and other services, but allow the homeless to bring their property and tents inside. The main complaints of the homeless about these camps are usually their distance from services, food, and public transportation. There are ways to ensure these in the camps at minimal expense. For instance, the government may open up of “day resource centers,” where the homeless can stay during the daytime, and where they are provided with basic social services.<a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a></p><p>At a slightly more structured level, Oakland has created “community cabins” (more colloquially known as “tuff sheds”) that cost $30,000 to build and $18,000 a year to maintain with services, and which are provided in a safe environment. The Utah Housing First Program built similar shelters for as little as $10,000 per unit, with lower operating costs as well.<a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a> By contrast, Austin spends $28,000 a year per homeless individual for its direct homeless and shelter services, without taking into account other expenditures such as hospitalizations and jail time.<a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a></p><p>Finally, for those homeless individuals who have been on the streets for at least a year, known as the “chronically homeless,” and who show little indication that they can return to support on their own, the state can assist in the creation of competitively-provided Permanent Supportive Housing (PSH). Today, most PSH contracts with states and cities just reward providers for keeping open beds or warehousing residents. Even the few PSH Pay-for-Performance programs mainly try to reward providers for keeping them inside the housing program, as opposed to improving the homeless’s overall well-being.<a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a></p><p>All of these types of shelter and services have benefits for different groups. But one issue in providing such homeless services is that neighbors can be opposed to them. There are many reasons, from crime to property values, to be legitimately worried about nearby homeless services and shelters. The solution is to enforce even higher levels of public safety and cleaning around them than before. Mayor Kevin Faulconer of San Diego made a promise that any homeless shelter would be accompanied by public attention that ensured that the area around it would be both safer and cleaner than it was before the site came, and since then his city council has voted to expand the services programs to more areas, with minimal neighborhood opposition.<a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a></p><p>As this section has made clear, there are a myriad of different shelter arrangements for the homeless, all of which are superior to current encampments and all of which can provide for different homeless populations at reasonable costs. There is no reason for mayors or local officials to claim that they have to allow current encampments to continue in lieu of better alternatives.</p><p><strong>Reforming Mental Health Treatment</strong></p><p>Simply getting the unsheltered homeless into safe environments is important, but for many it is not enough. Nationally, 28% of the homeless report having a severe mental illness. Local numbers are hard to come by, but in large cities such as Dallas, that number can go up to 43%.<a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a> Although homelessness surveys don’t separate the chronically homeless and unsheltered population and provide specific mental health statistics for them, it is doubtless that these constitute the vast majority of the homeless mentally ill. Unfortunately, concerns about civil liberties have caused both the deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill from hospitals and created a reluctance to push them into outpatient treatment, leading to tens of thousands of unsupervised mentally ill homeless on our streets. Yet the mentally ill homeless need such help more than anyone.</p><p>Right now, for the severely mentally ill who need inpatient treatment, one problem is that Texas has two standards for those who can potentially be ordered for inpatient treatment: there is one for emergency evaluation and one for actual admittance. This can lead to the inappropriate scenario where someone is evaluated to be a danger to himself or others in first evaluation, but will not meet the separate criteria for actual admission.<a href="#_ftn20">[20]</a> Texas law also only allows only 48 hours of treatment, which is too short for most patients to stabilize. Finally, the language on inpatient commitment is ambiguous and vague. Besides other criteria, an individual can only be committed if they present a “a danger to self or others,” but the law does not clarify that the danger can involve inability to take care of oneself, allowing long-term deterioration and self-destruction without any state intervention.</p><p>There are other problems for what Is known as “Assisted Outpatient Treatment” (AOT) for those severlly mentally ill who do not warrant inpatient treatment. For one, Texas does not have a “psychiatric deterioration standard” for either inpatient or outpatient mandatory admission, which means courts cannot examine the likelihood that the individual will continue to deteriorate without assistance as a reason for admitting someone to treatment. It also allows an initial order of assisted outpatient treatment for only 90 days, which is often not enough to stabilize a mentally ill individual, especially when they remain on the streets.<a href="#_ftn21">[21]</a></p><p>A few basic reforms to mandated mental health treatment, which would clarify the standards of admittance, and extend times for supervision, when combined with reforms to the mental health and drug treatment courts described below, can help a significant portion of the unsheltered homeless population.</p><p><strong>What the State Can Do</strong></p><p>First, the state should do all it can to end encampments and move people to safer environments. The state can and should ensure clean-ups of encampments on state land, including land under or around state highways, and provide alternatives.<a href="#_ftn22">[22]</a> Governor Greg Abbot recently cleared some of the state Transportation Department land and opened up nearby structured camping facilities. The state can and should expand these to provide alternatives to any camps on state public land.<a href="#_ftn23">[23]</a></p><p>The state also can use its fiscal clout to encourage cities to do better. Texas provides about $5 million a year in Emergency Solution Grants (ESG) as part of a federal program to local “Continuums of Care” (CoCs) which run local homeless services. These grants focus on immediate shelter for those in dire need.<a href="#_ftn24">[24]</a> The state should allocate its ESG grants only to those cities and CoCs that show consistent declines in unsheltered homelessness. If a city or CoC region shows any significant increase in unsheltered homeless, say, at least 5% in a year, it should lose its ESG grant. The ESG grant allocation should also be redirected to focus on only two possible programs, structured camping facilities and community cabins, as the two most efficient shelter services. It should also mandate that all CoC create “By Name Lists” so they know everyone that comes into the shelter system and can track them over time.<a href="#_ftn25">[25]</a></p><p>The state also offers, out of its own funds, Homeless Housing and Service Program (HHSP) grants, also at about $5 million a year, which focus on more long-term homeless services.<a href="#_ftn26">[26]</a> These too should be allocated to cities which can show consistent declines in unsheltered homelessness, and should be cut off if cities fail to meet these goals. More importantly, every dollar of these grants should also go to Pay-For-Performance housing and service contractors.</p><p>The Pay-For-Performance PSH Model should be based on a few overall metrics. Those service providers should receive about $20,000 a year the city currently spends directly on shelter services, and they should support their homeless clients in any way they see fit in improving two key metrics: reducing number and costs of hospitalizations and number costs of arrests relative to the mean expectation of that client. If we set the expected baseline of homeless costs around the US Department of Housing and Urban Development level, of about $35,000 of hospitalization costs and $10,000 of incarceration and crime costs a year, the state would assume about $45,000 in costs per homeless client per year. Any reduction in costs relative to the baseline would be shared 75% by the homeless service provider with 25% going to the state. If the homeless provider moves a homeless individual to independence, and that individual stays out of the shelter and homeless service system for 3 years, the provider will keep 80% of the savings relative to the full payment.<a href="#_ftn27">[27]</a></p><p>The state also offers public safety grants to cities, and there are two ways these can be repurposed to focus on the needs of the homeless population. First, the state can ensure that grants to cities with above-average unsheltered homeless populations goes to Community Outreach police teams, which are trained to deal with homeless individuals and get them into treatment.<a href="#_ftn28">[28]</a> Houston created a Homeless Outreach Team (HOT) in 2011, and it is now composed of 9 police officers and 4 case managers that have helped Houston reduce its homelessness by half since that date. Its success should be replicated across the state. The State Criminal Justice Planning Fund and the Victims of Crime Act fund, both state grants to local police departments, can be repurposed to focus on the needs of homeless offenders and victims, using required HOTs, and to get them into safer treatments.<a href="#_ftn29">[29]</a> Second, the state can ensure that its community courts grant dollars are focused on mental health and drug treatment courts, which have shown success in pushing individuals into treatment. Right now, many of the states’ community or specialty courts are reluctant to push individuals into treatment, but the state’s “Specialty Courts” grants can be conditioned on moving a larger proportion of all drug and mental health cases through the system, as opposed to the normal jail system, and of processing cases faster.<a href="#_ftn30">[30]</a> Any city that reduced the proportion of all arrests in the system going to specialty courts for two years in row would lose their specialty court funding, as would any city that did not process the majority of drug and mental health court cases in 45 days (otherwise the referrals from the specialty courts would take place long after the possibility of helping the individual in a crisis had passed).<a href="#_ftn31">[31]</a></p><p>The state can also reform its inpatient and AOT mental health treatment laws to ensure that those with severe mental illnesses get immediate treatment and can stabilize. Inpatient treatment should be at least 3 days and outpatient treatment should be supervised for at least 6 months. At the same time, the state should clarify that “psychological deterioration” is a justifiable reason for the state to intervene before someone’s mental illness causes long-term consequences, and the state should include inability to take care of oneself as part of an evaluation of self-harm.<a href="#_ftn32">[32]</a> All of these will make sure mentally ill individuals receive the treatment they needed.</p><p>Finally, the state can shame cities into doing better. By creating viable alternatives and showing that they are safer, more affordable, and better for the homeless than large encampments, they can help end cities’ quiet acquiescence in this tragedy.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>In the early 2000s, Los Angeles’s Skid Row was an international scandal of misery and decay. In 2006, LAPD Commissioner William Bratton began a program called “Safer City,” which cleaned up homeless camps in Skid Row and pushed people into shelter and treatment. It reduced homelessness and crime on Skid Row by half. When it was reversed years later all the old problems returned, and the number of deaths on Skid Row doubled.<a href="#_ftn33">[33]</a></p><p>Similarly, In Austin, after the city ended its anti-camping ordinance, unsheltered homeless went up by 50% in a year, while the number of people in shelters dropped by 20%. Violent and property crime among homeless themselves increased by over 15% as people returned to dangerous streets.<a href="#_ftn34">[34]</a> Despite any claims of compassion, continuing to allow ubiquitous street camping is not helping the homeless.</p><p>The state of Texas can help end the dangerous encampments and help the homeless people get their lives back together. It’s something we know how to do; it’s something we can do; it’s something we should do.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <a href="https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-of-homelessness-report/texas/https://www.usich.gov/homelessness-statistics/tx/">https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-of-homelessness-report/texas/https://www.usich.gov/homelessness-statistics/tx/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <a href="https://www.statesman.com/news/20200519/austin-sees-11-increase-in-homeless-count-45-increase-in-unsheltered-population#:~:text=The%20latest%20tally%20of%20homeless,1%2C500%20people%20who%20were%20unsheltered.&amp;text=In%20total%2C%20volunteers%20counted%202%2C506%20people%20experiencing%20homelessness.https://www.texastribune.org/2019/12/09/how-many-people-are-homeless-texas-least-25000/">https://www.statesman.com/news/20200519/austin-sees-11-increase-in-homeless-count-45-increase-in-unsheltered-population#:~:text=The%20latest%20tally%20of%20homeless,1%2C500%20people%20who%20were%20unsheltered.&amp;text=In%20total%2C%20volunteers%20counted%202%2C506%20people%20experiencing%20homelessness.https://www.texastribune.org/2019/12/09/how-many-people-are-homeless-texas-least-25000/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <a href="https://www.rentjungle.com/average-rent-in-austin-rent-trends/R">https://www.rentjungle.com/average-rent-in-austin-rent-trends/R</a> Rental trends famously vary depending on the statistical source, but more easily measured Housing prices have increased even faster than rents, almost doubling in the ten years to 2020. <a href="https://www.zillow.com/austin-tx/home-values/">https://www.zillow.com/austin-tx/home-values/</a>. Most Texas cities are famously open to new building, which keeps rental and housing prices down, but Austin has some notable restrictions on building causing increased housing costs. <a href="http://soa.utexas.edu/sites/default/disk/SHANNON-MASTERSREPORT-2015.pdf">http://soa.utexas.edu/sites/default/disk/SHANNON-MASTERSREPORT-2015.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> <a href="https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Understanding-Encampments.pdf">https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Understanding-Encampments.pdf</a> <a href="https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/WelcomeHome_TentCities_final_report.pdf">https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/WelcomeHome_TentCities_final_report.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/30/homeless-deaths-los-angeles-county">https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/30/homeless-deaths-los-angeles-county</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> <a href="https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/homeless-encampments-0">https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/homeless-encampments-0</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> <a href="https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/homeless-encampments-page-3">https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/homeless-encampments-page-3</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> <a href="https://www.city-journal.org/reducing-street-homelessness-burien-washington">https://www.city-journal.org/reducing-street-homelessness-burien-washington</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> <a href="https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/eide-amicus-Boise-09252019.pdf">https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/eide-amicus-Boise-09252019.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> <a href="https://downtownsandiego.org/family-reunification-program/">https://downtownsandiego.org/family-reunification-program/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> <a href="https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/government/the-spike-in-city-spending-on-homelessness-aid-is-clear-but-the-results-are-murkier/">https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/government/the-spike-in-city-spending-on-homelessness-aid-is-clear-but-the-results-are-murkier/</a> <a href="https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/politics/mayor-faulconer-to-expand-safe-parking-program-for-homeless-in-san-diego/509-e9df27a4-59e4-49d4-9f22-30de445f37ed">https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/politics/mayor-faulconer-to-expand-safe-parking-program-for-homeless-in-san-diego/509-e9df27a4-59e4-49d4-9f22-30de445f37ed</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> <a href="https://endhomelessness.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Performance-Benchmarks-and-Program-Standards.pdf">https://endhomelessness.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Performance-Benchmarks-and-Program-Standards.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> <a href="https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/eide-amicus-Boise-09252019.pdf">https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/eide-amicus-Boise-09252019.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a> <a href="https://www.oaklandca.gov/news/2018/oakland-unveils-newest-rapid-rehousing-facility-and-city-council-passes-8-6-million-emergency-funds-for-homeless-services">https://www.oaklandca.gov/news/2018/oakland-unveils-newest-rapid-rehousing-facility-and-city-council-passes-8-6-million-emergency-funds-for-homeless-services</a></p><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szEZfKJ2pSY">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szEZfKJ2pSY</a> <a href="https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/02/housing-first-solution-to-homelessness-utah/">https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/02/housing-first-solution-to-homelessness-utah/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> Echo Austin &amp; Politifact.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a> <a href="https://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-money-for-homeless.html">https://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-money-for-homeless.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> <a href="https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/mayor-announces-three-tent-shelters-around-san-diego-for-homeless/509-cdc0d945-5900-46ea-940a-4be5454d1b8a">https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/mayor-announces-three-tent-shelters-around-san-diego-for-homeless/509-cdc0d945-5900-46ea-940a-4be5454d1b8a</a> ; <a href="https://www.hoover.org/research/how-san-diego-cleaned-its-act-and-got-real-homelessness">https://www.hoover.org/research/how-san-diego-cleaned-its-act-and-got-real-homelessness</a> At the same time he ensured that people could not camp without consequence on city streets, <a href="https://inewsource.org/2020/05/25/san-diego-police-ticket-homeless-pandemic/">https://inewsource.org/2020/05/25/san-diego-police-ticket-homeless-pandemic/</a> . Austin has made a similar pledge, of sorts. After it ended its laws against camping last year, it made an exception for the area around the main homelessness service center, the ARCH, to ensure that it didn’t attract excessive community attention.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> <a href="https://www.usmayors.org/2016/12/08/mayors-examine-issues-of-homelessness-and-hunger-in-america/">https://www.usmayors.org/2016/12/08/mayors-examine-issues-of-homelessness-and-hunger-in-america/</a> <a href="https://www.ourcalling.org/mental-healthcare-crisis-dallas/#:~:text=The%20homeless%20community%20of%20Dallas,homeless%20are%20severely%20mentally%20ill">https://www.ourcalling.org/mental-healthcare-crisis-dallas/#:~:text=The%20homeless%20community%20of%20Dallas,homeless%20are%20severely%20mentally%20ill</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a> <a href="https://www.dfps.state.tx.us/handbooks/aps/files/APS_pg_4800.asp">https://www.dfps.state.tx.us/handbooks/aps/files/APS_pg_4800.asp</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[21]</a> /https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/grading-the-states.pdf</p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[22]</a> Texas Transportation Code §472.012;</p><p>In Austin, the state TxDOT began cleaning up encampments after bridge inspectors had trouble accessing overpasses, but the city had technically agreed to take over the duty in 1986. <a href="https://communityimpact.com/austin/central-austin/city-county/2019/07/11/clearing-of-homeless-camps-under-state-highway-overpasses-will-continue-despite-austins-loosened-public-camping-laws/">https://communityimpact.com/austin/central-austin/city-county/2019/07/11/clearing-of-homeless-camps-under-state-highway-overpasses-will-continue-despite-austins-loosened-public-camping-laws/</a>. If an encampment outside of state land becomes a public health risk due to an outbreak of disease, the governor can potentially order a quarantine and clear the site, but this should only be used in true emergency situations. Texas Health and Safety Code §§81.084: Application of Control Measures to Property</p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[23]</a> <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/05/politics/austin-homelessness/index.html">https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/05/politics/austin-homelessness/index.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref24">[24]</a> <a href="https://www.tdhca.state.tx.us/home-division/">https://www.tdhca.state.tx.us/home-division/</a> <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2018-title24-vol3/xml/CFR-2018-title24-vol3-part576.xml#seqnum576.409">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2018-title24-vol3/xml/CFR-2018-title24-vol3-part576.xml#seqnum576.409</a> HUD still has to approve each state and local government’s “consolidated plan.” The overall allocation to states, cities, and other entities is the same as for the CDBG program, for some reason, but the state’s portion still has significant discretionary capability, and almost no restrictions in the state code about how to allocate these funds: <a href="https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/GV/htm/GV.2306.htm">https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/GV/htm/GV.2306.htm</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref25">[25]</a> This surprisingly simple and obvious reform is very recent and is still not required by many cities. <a href="https://community.solutions/the-by-name-list-revolution/">https://community.solutions/the-by-name-list-revolution/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a> <a href="https://reports.nlihc.org/rental-programs/catalog/homeless-housing-and-services-program">https://reports.nlihc.org/rental-programs/catalog/homeless-housing-and-services-program</a> The legislative direction for this is fairly open and most reforms can be done by administrative code: <a href="https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/GV/htm/GV.2306.htm">https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/GV/htm/GV.2306.htm</a> Administrative Code Here: <a href="https://texreg.sos.state.tx.us/public/readtac$ext.ViewTAC?tac_view=5&amp;ti=10&amp;pt=1&amp;ch=7&amp;sch=D&amp;rl=Y">https://texreg.sos.state.tx.us/public/readtac$ext.ViewTAC?tac_view=5&amp;ti=10&amp;pt=1&amp;ch=7&amp;sch=D&amp;rl=Y</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref27">[27]</a> The budgetary implications for this would be unclear if it was an addition to current HHSP funds, since most of the $10,000 criminal justice savings are not on budget, and around $15,000 of the state hospitalization expenses are Medicaid, of which are 60% paid for by the federal government, but since the funds for this will come entirely out of existing HHPD, it will at worst be revenue neutral.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref28">[28]</a> Almost all of the costs are hospital related. In New York, hospitalization costs are $35,000 a year for the chronically homeless, and prison and jail costs are only about $1,000 a year. If we estimate the social cost of crime as a multiple of this, considering that some crimes are not detected and the costs of crime are also borne by the public, we can estimate $10,000 a year in criminal costs. costs.http://cceh.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/supportive_housing_brief.pdf HUD sets expected cots per hospitalization event and jail time, and these can be used to compute the total. <a href="https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/costs_homeless.pdf">https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/costs_homeless.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref29">[29]</a> <a href="https://www.houstoncit.org/hot/">https://www.houstoncit.org/hot/</a> <a href="https://gov.texas.gov/organization/financial-services/grants">https://gov.texas.gov/organization/financial-services/grants</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref30">[30]</a> For instance, the Travis County Adult Drug Diversion Court has continuously reduced those referred to the court, even while requesting increased funding from the state specialty court grants. <a href="https://www.statesman.com/news/20160904/transparency-accountability-needed-at-travis-county-drug-court">https://www.statesman.com/news/20160904/transparency-accountability-needed-at-travis-county-drug-court</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref31">[31]</a> See current demands in Title 2, Subtitle K, Specialty Courts section: t-code/title-2/subtitle-k/</p><p><a href="#_ftnref32">[32]</a> <a href="https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/texas">https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/texas</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref33">[33]</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/30/homeless-deaths-los-angeles-county">https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/30/homeless-deaths-los-angeles-county</a>)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref34">[34]</a> . <a href="https://www.statesman.com/news/20200519/austin-sees-11-increase-in-homeless-count-45-increase-in-unsheltered-population#:~:text=The%20latest%20tally%20of%20homeless,population%20took%20place%20on%20Jan">https://www.statesman.com/news/20200519/austin-sees-11-increase-in-homeless-count-45-increase-in-unsheltered-population#:~:text=The%20latest%20tally%20of%20homeless,population%20took%20place%20on%20Jan</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3649aa7caa32" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news/solving-texass-street-homelessness-problem-3649aa7caa32">Solving Texas’s Street Homelessness Problem</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news">Cicero News</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Giving Schools Back to Their Communities: How to Improve Schools and Restore Growth in California]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cicero-news/giving-schools-back-to-their-communities-how-to-improve-schools-and-restore-growth-in-california-b81a0fc31850?source=rss-1c7206c33e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b81a0fc31850</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[education]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[prop-13]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[california]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[schools]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Judge Glock]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2020 18:37:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-09-29T18:37:04.034Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UiAQvKci9SolLjFZzh8b-g.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Summary</strong></p><p>California has made sure that its local governments get no financial benefits from welcoming new residents, which explains why they allow so little building. The Cicero Institute wants to change that. We propose to reform the school grant system so local schools keep at least half of the new funds raised from property taxes and also allow local residents to redirect funding to schools, both of which are now impossible. These reforms will improve school districts and make California open to building again.</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>For decades, California has been more resistant to new housing development than any other state. One of the reasons local California governments resist new homes is that the state government has made sure they receive few financial benefits from it.¹ California’s current school funding system, the Local Control Funding Formula or LCFF, ensures that cities can’t keep any of the money raised from new development. California also has, more famously or infamously, Proposition 13, which capped property taxes and limited the local fiscal benefits to growth.</p><p>There is a way that we can make sure cities again share in the benefits of building. Most importantly, California can reform its school financing grants so they don’t offset funds raised by taxes in local communities. California can also allow local voters to redirect more of their money to schools without losing such grants. If we can reform the school grant system so that local governments can keep more of their own revenue, even as we redirect state revenue to needy students, we can improve local governments and schools together.</p><p>First, we propose to reform the LCFF and ensure that local school districts get to keep at least half of all the new funds raised from increases in property taxes, instead of losing all of the funds by a reduction in state support, as the current system mandates.² Second, we propose to reform the property tax distribution system, which still allocates property taxes to local governments just as they were distributed in 1978, so that voters can redirect them to their best uses, most importantly, to schools. Thus we can again allow local governments to gain from growth, even while we reestablish the connections between local government and their schools. It would be a winning strategy for California students and their communities.</p><p><strong>The School Funding Mess in California</strong></p><p>School finance in California has involved decades of litigation and legislative battles, but the current funding situation solidified in 2014.³ Since then, California has distributed grants to school districts based on something known as the Local Control Funding Formula or LCFF. The LCFF system mandates that each school district spend at least a “Base Rate” of about $9,000 per student in both state and local funds (a little lower for earlier grades, a little higher for later grades). If local school districts can’t achieve that level of spending with their own taxes, the state makes up the rest until they hit the $9,000 floor. The state government also provides some “Special Aid” grants based on the absolute number of students who have reduced price lunches, or are disabled, or are English as a Second-Language Learners. Finally, the state provides “Supplemental Grants” to school districts with a higher proportion of these disadvantaged children.⁴</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JjjwyZEqBwfC147m-0bM5g.jpeg" /></figure><p>As a result of these reforms, the vast majority of school funding in California today is provided by the state government. Right now, California public schools receive about $100 billion a year in overall funding, 58% from the state, 32% from the local government, and 9% from the federal government. The ratio of state to local funding is almost the exact opposite of what it was at the beginning of the 1970s, before the rise of school finance litigation and Prop. 13. The large majority of today’s state funding, about 85%, is provided through the Base Rate or Base Grant system, which provides the extra money on top of local funds until school districts spend about $9,000 per student. Only a few school districts are not affected by this system. Just over 100 of the 1,000 school districts in the state, with only about 5% of students, raise more in taxes than the required Base Rate, and thus receive no Base Rate funds. (These high-income communities are known, confusingly, as Basic Aid districts.)</p><p>Today, about $32 billion dollars of school funding comes from local sources, including sales taxes, utility taxes, and, most importantly, property taxes. That amounts to almost half of all the funds raised by local government from taxes, and thus is far and away the most important issue in local finance. Property taxes specifically pay two-thirds of local school aid.⁵</p><p>Before the Serrano v. Priest case of 1976, which mandated equal spending across school districts, and before Prop. 13 passed in 1978, local governments would raise additional funding for public schools by increasing property tax revenue. This could be done by allowing additional building or raising property taxes. The system encouraged cities to allow more building to get more revenue. Right now, however, Basic Aid districts are the only school districts who receive any benefits from raising more local revenue for schools. In all the other school districts, raising additional funds through more building will cause the state to reduce their Base Rate grants by the same basic amount.⁶</p><p>There are some obvious benefits to California’s current LCFF system. One is equity, at least as measured by school district funding. Most school districts spend the same basic amount of funding per student. Those few wealthy school districts that raise more, do not receive any extra funding from the state.</p><p>But there is one overwhelming problem with the formula. If a city below the Base Rate takes in more property or other taxes, every additional dollar of taxes gets taken away. One way to think about this is that for every extra property tax dollar local governments raise for schools, the state “taxes” them 100% by removing the equivalent amount of grants. This provides a bad incentive for local municipalities, especially poorer ones which benefit more from the growth of government services, to allow more growth and housing, since most of their new property taxes will be taken back into the state fund.⁷</p><p>In most of the United States, one of the main benefits to cities of new projects is that they bring new property taxes, which can improve local services for schools. But if such projects don’t bring any new revenue, as in California, local municipalities are more likely to vote them down.</p><p>The LCFF has also caused tension between local and state authorities, and made local governments suspicious of any attempt at redirecting property taxes to schools. For instance, in 1992 and in 2004, the state redirected some local taxes into school districts. But in each case the Base Rate remained stable, which meant that the only effect of the redirection was that the state government had to pay less to hit the $9,000 (or its earlier equivalent) ceiling and local governments pay more. This history has caused understandable suspicion on the part of the local governments about the state moving more property taxes to schools. It doesn’t have to be this way.</p><p><strong>The Solution: Reforming the Base Rate System</strong></p><p>Fortunately, there are ways to ensure both good schools and well-resourced local governments.⁸ One solution would be to simply lower the top level of the Base Rate funding formula and allow school districts to keep more of the local funding they raise.</p><p>For example, the state could set a Base Rate of, say $5,000 a student, and then only withdraw 50% of the additional state funding for every dollar raised locally, up to $7,000 of state aid. A district that raised $7,000 could still be topped off up to $9,000, after which districts would be entirely self-funded, as Basic Aid districts are now.⁹ The only fiscal losers in this situation would be a handful of moderately well-funded school districts that would get somewhere between $7,000 and $9,000 in total spending, but which would have gotten the full $9,000 without. As we will detail below, there are other ways to more than make up for this relatively minor short-fall. This new system would provide basic levels of funding, while retaining incentives for most school districts and local governments to expand their tax base and exercise power over their local schools. (Another, related, solution would be to simply allow school districts to keep the property tax revenue from any new housing in their district, without offsetting any school Base Rate grants, but this has long-term fiscal consequences for the state.)</p><p>One concern with any version of this new system is that it would exacerbate inequality between school districts. But one of the most important findings of recent research is that there is little connection between poor students and poor districts. Some central cities with lots of commercial and business property, such as Los Angeles, Long Beach, and Oakland, have both above average poverty rates and above average property tax revenues, while other cities, such as San Jose and Anaheim, have rather low poverty rates and also low property tax revenues.¹⁰ In fact, many of the lawyers pushing the original California school district equalization case, Serrano v. Priest, were shocked to learn that poor and black students were <em>more </em>likely to be in high property tax districts than middle-class and white students. Thus the earliest school financing reforms actually directed funding <em>away </em>from poor and minority students in the name of equalizing district funding.¹¹ Therefore, if the goal is equalizing outcomes for students, equalizing school district funding, as we do now, is a poor way to do it.¹²</p><p>Since our reform would reduce the total amount of money moving through the Base Rate system, any remaining concerns about equity can be alleviated by redirecting those funds to the Special Aid and Supplemental Aid formulas, which today constitute only about 15% of total state school spending. Focusing state spending on these programs, instead of the Base Grant, would give the neediest students direct aid from the state, instead of just using district property taxes as a poor, or even counter indicative, proxy for student need.</p><p>As an example of how our reform would work, consider the San Francisco Unified School. The SFUSD currently spends $850 million dollars a year on 54,000 students. The funding for the schools comes from three main sources: first, $430 million from state Base Rate grant funds; second, $130 million from the special state funds for the disadvantaged; and, third, $270 million from local sources. Since today, Base Grants for SFUSD are below the maximum of $9,000 per student per year, any increase of local funding is offset by an equivalent reduction in state spending.</p><p>In our reform, the total amount of state funds going through the Base Rate system would be reduced by about $50 million to start, while $25 million of those funds would be redirected to disadvantaged students, leaving the school district $25 million short of its current level. But if the school district raised an extra $50 million in increased property taxes through more building, which would be expected for the city in normal times of growth, it would keep $25 million of that increase. Although under this scenario the total level of spending is stable, it makes sure the city gets the benefits of more building, and, over the long term, allows it to grow its funding for students.¹³</p><p><strong>Reallocation of Local Funding</strong></p><p>The relationship between local government finances, public schools, and property taxes is further complicated by an obscure side-effect of Prop. 13. Since the proposition froze all existing property taxes and capped them, it was impossible for local governments, such as municipalities, school districts, and special districts (including utility, mosquito, or fire control districts) to divide a shrinking pie of revenue between them, especially since these districts didn’t always overlap. Thus the state legislature passed AB 8 in 1979, which froze the existing allocation of property taxes between different local governments. The same allocation still exists today. If, say, in 1979, local municipalities in Santa Clara County received 40% of property taxes, school districts received 30%, special districts 10%, and the county got 20%, the same division of revenue is still in place today. That means the current allocation of property taxes is woefully out-of-date and irrelevant to current needs and the demands of citizens.¹⁴</p><p>To assist the transition to a new school funding system, and allow any districts that lose out in our new system to keep up spending for schools, we also propose to make the distribution of local taxes more flexible. Our school financing reform should thus be accompanied by reform to AB 8, which would allow residents to redirect funding to those areas that residents most desire, including schools.¹⁵</p><p>Because the general distribution of property taxes is inefficient, often going to mosquito or fire control or library districts as well as county governments that don’t need the income, a redistribution could be accomplished on the local level with minimal pain, and with great benefits to the local voters.¹⁶ Our proposed reform to AB 8 would allow the residents inside any local government body to vote on the possibility of transferring property tax streams to the schools, while keeping any transfer out of the Base Rate system, which would mean none of the increased transfer would be “taxed” by withdrawal of grants. This would allow the funds to go to their best use, and further add to the local benefits of boosting property tax funding.¹⁷</p><p>At the same time, we propose that the state push counties to devote increased proportions of their property taxes to school districts, namely, any school district that gets less than their Base Grant level funding from local taxes ($5,000 in the above example) and substitute the funds dollar-for-dollar with direct state subventions.¹⁸ This again would be revenue neutral, since the money below the Base Rate would be withdrawn from state funding for the school district, but it would bring more school districts closer to the Base Rate line and thus enable them to benefit from any increased property tax revenues.</p><p>The reason this otherwise revenue neutral reallocation is important is because it reconnects local governments with the property tax funding stream and reincentivizes them to encourage development. For purely historical reasons, many school districts receive little or no property taxes under the AB 8 system, while county governments continue to receive over 50% of their income from property taxes, and 25% of all property tax revenue.¹⁹ The connection between county property tax growth and many county services, such as courts, is thin, and therefore this proportion of county revenue would better come as a grant from the state, rather than from existing property taxes. By contrast, the potential connections between neighborhood schools and property taxes is strong, and thus this stream should be returned to them. There is a precedent for this reallocation. In 1987 the Tax Equity Allocation pushed counties to provide property taxes to underfunded cities in exchange for court grants, and this helped equalize property taxes in several areas.²⁰ In general, allowing local voters to increase property tax funding to schools would help raise the total amount going to students, which is today still below the national average, despite California’s well-above average cost-of-living.²¹</p><p><strong>The Benefits</strong></p><p>Reestablishing the connections between property taxes and school finance could lead to many benefits. One is a potential boom in housing construction. In the 1970s, before school finance reform and Prop. 13, California had about 20 million residents, and its local governments approved 40,000 new homes per year, or about 1 new home per 500 people. Today, California has about 40 million residents and its local governments approve 20,000 new homes per year, or about 1 new home per 2,000 people.²² If our school financing incentive increased local approvals to just half of the 1970 level, it would lead to 200,000 extra homes per decade, or double the current level. Over the long-term, this could reduce housing prices by a quarter.²³</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xnY-jy_dHeqCqwX47W5iLA.jpeg" /></figure><p>There is increasing public recognition that separating school financing from local property taxes is counterproductive. One of the main arguments for the Schools and Communities First Ballot Proposition, or “split roll,” which aims to restore local government’s ability to tax business and commercial properties at market value, despite Prop. 13, is that it will allow more funding for schools. Yet under the current LCFF formula, most districts would have had that extra funding offset, dollar-for-dollar, by reduced state aid. That is why the split-roll proposition creates a separate Local School Tax Fund to administer the aid, outside the Base Rate formula. This is a way to surreptitiously restore the connection between property taxes and school aid, a connection which should be encouraged. Similarly, any desire for a broader reform of Prop. 13 will need to include a proposal such as ours, since local voters are unlikely to reestablish such a tax if they think it will only allow the state to absorb more revenue and withdraw more school aid.²⁴</p><p>There are other benefits to our school finance reform beyond better-incentivized local governments and better funded low-income students. Once again cementing the tie between schools, property taxes, and increased funding incentivizes everyone to take more interest in their local community. Recent research indicates that parents who feel more invested in their local schools, due to their taxes contributing to them, volunteer more time and spend more effort ensuring that such schools succeed.²⁵</p><p>There is a legitimate question of whether our proposed new tax system runs afoul of decades of school finance litigation, and of the California Supreme Court’s stated goal of ensuring every student an adequate and equitable education. Yet it will be tough to strike down such a proposal as ours on equity grounds, since it would specifically redirect more state spending from wealthier areas to needy students. The recent California Supreme Court decision upholding the LCFF system also gives the state some leeway to direct school funding without achieving 100% parity between every district.²⁶</p><p>School finance reform should be the center of any attempt to reform local finances. Yet there are other state grants to local governments that are not tied either to the growth in population or property taxes, and that therefore implicitly burden development. These make districts spread set amounts of state dollars ever thinner whenever more people move to the area, and therefore again prevent growth.²⁷ Along with broader reform to the Base Rate and the AB 8 distribution systems, such a general grant reform will be essential in ensuring local municipalities have the right incentives for growth.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Many economists view property taxes not just as a way to raise funds, but as what they call a “benefit tax.” People pay for the benefits a local jurisdiction provides through their property taxes, which is almost like a “fee” to use those libraries, parks, and public safety programs. Yet once this fee is provided, anyone, no matter how low or high their income, gets free use of that public good. By far the most important of these local public goods is schooling. Although the state should continue to support the neediest students, it needs to re-establish the connection between local public goods and local voters, and that means keeping local property taxes as much as possible in the districts from which they came.²⁸</p><p>Today, even the limited funds raised under the Prop. 13 property tax are effectively commandeered by the state through bad policy, both by “taxing” the property taxes through the aid formula and by distributing them poorly through AB 8. Therefore, many local governments have little incentive to expand their tax base and bring in more residents. Through reasonable reform, we can improve the incentives of local governments, boost incentives to growth, and improve outcomes for students. It is a change whose time has come.</p><ol><li>Judge Glock, “Why California Cities Already Lost Local Control (And Why the State Needs to Push Housing)”, <em>Medium</em>, April 9, 2019, <a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news/why-we-already-lost-local-control-in-california-and-why-the-state-needs-to-push-housing-f82dd0abe63d">https://medium.com/cicero-news/why-we-already-lost-local-control-in-california-and-why-the-state-needs-to-push-housing-f82dd0abe63d</a></li><li>Unfortunately, previous finance reform efforts have often focused on the general idea of opposing the “fiscalization of land use” instead of trying to best match land use incentives with fiscal incentives. Even more commonly, local finance reform efforts have usually focused on fixing state budget shortfalls. “Reforming California Municipal Finance and the State-Local Relationship — a City Perspective”, <em>CaliforniaCityFinance.com</em>, January 10 2011, <a href="http://www.californiacityfinance.com/LocalReformMenu110114.pdf.">http://www.californiacityfinance.com/LocalReformMenu110114.pdf.</a> We’ve also discussed how to share the benefits of building inside a municipality, such as San Francisco. Judge Glock, “How to Make San Francisco Neighborhoods Stop Worrying and Love More Housing”, <em>Medium</em>, April 3, 2019, <a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news/how-to-make-san-francisco-neighborhoods-stop-worrying-and-love-housing-11930da744ce">https://medium.com/cicero-news/how-to-make-san-francisco-neighborhoods-stop-worrying-and-love-housing-11930da744ce</a></li><li>Jon Sonstelie, et al, “For Better or For Worse? School Finance Reform in California”, <em>Public Policy Institute of California</em>, February 2000, <a href="https://www.ppic.org/publication/for-better-or-for-worse-school-finance-reform-in-california/">https://www.ppic.org/publication/for-better-or-for-worse-school-finance-reform-in-california/</a></li><li>Jeff Camp, “Who Pays: Where California’s Public School Funds Come From”,<em>Ed100</em>, <a href="https://ed100.org/lessons/whopays">https://ed100.org/lessons/whopays</a></li><li>California State &amp; City Revenues, <a href="http://www.californiacityfinance.com/state_v_city_finance.pdf">http://www.californiacityfinance.com/state_v_city_finance.pdf</a> Dan Walters, “California’s property tax revenues to increase by $3-plus billion”, <em>The Sacramento Bee</em>, July 11, 2016, <a href="https://www.sacbee.com/article88953097.html">https://www.sacbee.com/article88953097.html</a></li><li>Margaret Weston, “Basic Aid School Districts”, <em>Public Policy Institute of California</em>, September 2013,, <a href="https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_913MWR.pdf">https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_913MWR.pdf</a></li><li>One offsetting factor is that any new child brought into the system will not cost the school district anything extra, because the state grant will be distributed per capita to the student. Yet any new student will most likely come from a new housing unit, whose taxes will be taken to fund the grant. Therefore there is no way under the current system for school districts to <em>improve </em>their financing because of new construction.</li><li>Another solution would be to allow lower-income school districts to keep 50% of all the funds they raise from property taxes up to the state funding limit. That means that up to the LCFF, now around $9,000 per student, only 50% of the state grant would be removed. After the combined grants and property taxes top out at $13,500, school districts would again keep all of their funding, and the state would provide no further aid. But this could involve tens of billions of dollars of extra spending in a situation when the state is already in a fiscal crisis.</li><li>That means, for instance, that a district that raised another $1,000 over the $5,000 Base Grant would get to keep $500, and only $500 would be withdrawn from state aid, for a total of state and local funding of $7,500 per child.</li><li>For general background, see Daphne A. Kenyon, “The Property Tax School Funding Dilemma”, <em>Lincoln Institute of Land Policy</em>, 2007, <a href="https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/the-property-tax-school-funding-dilemma-full_0.pdf">https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/the-property-tax-school-funding-dilemma-full_0.pdf</a></li><li>Understanding California’s Property Taxes”, <em>Legislative Analyst’s Office</em>, November 29, 2012, <a href="https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/tax/property-tax-primer-112912.aspx">https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/tax/property-tax-primer-112912.aspx</a> <a href="https://www.ppic.org/publication/for-better-or-for-worse-school-finance-reform-in-california/">https://www.ppic.org/publication/for-better-or-for-worse-school-finance-reform-in-california/</a></li><li>In general, even if housing pays its way for local municipalities, it brings little to no gain for a school district, which provides the most important local public good. For current calculations of municipal finance and school construction, see <a href="http://www.californiacityfinance.com/FiscalComparison.pdf">http://www.californiacityfinance.com/FiscalComparison.pdf</a></li><li>See SFUSD budget here <a href="https://archive.sfusd.edu/en/assets/sfusd-staff/FY%2019-20%20SFUSD-SFCOE%20LCAP%202nd%20Reading.pdf?_ga=2.150943999.89723174.1594853942-936488441.1594853942.">https://archive.sfusd.edu/en/assets/sfusd-staff/FY%2019-20%20SFUSD-SFCOE%20LCAP%202nd%20Reading.pdf?_ga=2.150943999.89723174.1594853942-936488441.1594853942.</a> In many respects, San Francisco mirrors the median school district in the state, and therefore the reform would be revenue neutral in such places. It is worthwhile to note that the Base Rate per student is calculated with only the Base Rate and local source funds, and not the special state funds for the disadvantaged. San Francisco, like other school districts, also receives some separate funding streams in the Base Rate grant, and uses some special local parcel taxes not included in the Base Rate system, that explains why its per student funding is above $9,000. <a href="https://archive.sfusd.edu/en/assets/sfusd-staff/Budget%20Book_2nd%20Reading_Final.pdf?_ga=2.150943999.89723174.1594853942-936488441.1594853942">https://archive.sfusd.edu/en/assets/sfusd-staff/Budget%20Book_2nd%20Reading_Final.pdf?_ga=2.150943999.89723174.1594853942-936488441.1594853942</a></li><li>Such redistribution of property taxes would now most likely require a 2/3s vote of each house, due to proposition 1A in 2004 and Proposition 22 in 2010, but since those earlier propositions passed due to concerns about the state appropriating property tax revenue, as opposed to redistributing it, there should be more broad-based support now. I will add that no policy I have ever studied in my professional life is as abstruse and nonsensical as the local tax distribution system under AB 8 and its successor laws. For instance, several miscalculations involving water contracts and pension bonds were included in the original 1979 allocation, and have never been changed, now totaling 40 plus years of policy determined by an accounting error. <a href="http://www.californiacityfinance.com/ElledgePropertyTax06.pdf">http://www.californiacityfinance.com/ElledgePropertyTax06.pdf</a></li><li>There is precedent for some reallocation. From 1992 to 2004 the state reallocated a larger proportion of property taxes to schools. In this case, however, since the existing requirements of school district equality were kept in place, all those transfers did was to move more money into the state’s coffers, because it had to contribute less to the Base Rate system. For more examples of how state funding has caused local governments to lose control of their revenues, see <a href="https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/rb/RB_399MSRB.pdf">https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/rb/RB_399MSRB.pdf</a></li><li>Although many local governments and school districts have distinct boundaries, a recent examination shows that in the Bay Area, for instance, the large majority of people live in cities and school districts where there is majority overlap of school and municipal district lines (For instance, San Francisco, Oakland, Fremont, Vallejo, Berkeley and Alameda are all coterminous with their school districts, and Concord, Livermore, Napa Union City, Pleasanton, Milipatas and Palo Alto are entirely within a single school districts). William Fischel, <em>Making the Grade</em>, 203–204.</li><li>If the school district and the other district are not coterminous, there may be issues about some voters losing property tax revenue without getting any corresponding gain, but most, although not all, school districts in California are coterminous with the local municipality, which itself usually is coterminous with most other local bodies. The possibilities of revenue transfers could also incentive more counties to change the boundaries of their local governing bodies through their Local Agency Formation Commission, or LAFCO.</li><li>There is also the problem of newly formed municipalities and annexed areas not receiving their appropriate share of tax revenue. “State Policy Disconnect: Fiscal Shifts Imperil New City Incorporations and Annexations of Developed Areas”, <em>CaliforniaCityFinance.Com</em>, March 14, 2014, <a href="http://www.californiacityfinance.com/SB89Problem140314.pdf">http://www.californiacityfinance.com/SB89Problem140314.pdf</a> School facility funding in California since 1998 is usually divided on a 50/50 split with the state, with the rest being paid by voter-approved general obligation bonds, which are supported as ad valorem property tax increases, so there is no incentive problem there. <a href="https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/6-Brunner%283-07%29.pdf">https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/6-Brunner%283-07%29.pdf</a></li><li>“The State-Local Fiscal Relationship”, <em>Public Policy Institute of California</em>, <a href="https://www.ppic.org/publication/the-state-local-fiscal-relationship/">https://www.ppic.org/publication/the-state-local-fiscal-relationship/</a></li><li>Property Tax Allocation FAQs, <a href="http://www.californiacityfinance.com/PropTaxAllocFAQ.pdf">http://www.californiacityfinance.com/PropTaxAllocFAQ.pdf</a> , 3.</li><li>“Financing California’s Public Schools”, <em>Public Policy Institute of California</em>, <a href="https://www.ppic.org/publication/financing-californias-public-schools/">https://www.ppic.org/publication/financing-californias-public-schools/</a></li><li>“The Bay Area Today”, <em>Plan Bay Area 2040</em>, <a href="http://2040.planbayarea.org/the-bay-area-today">http://2040.planbayarea.org/the-bay-area-today</a></li><li>Over a decade, the direct construction effects would only reduce housing prices by about 6%, considering a current housing stock of 14 million units and a supply elasticity of housing of about 3 (or a 1% increase in supply leads to a 3% decrease in prices), as estimated by current research. <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1051137701902888">https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1051137701902888</a> But if prices incorporated a long-term increase in the housing stock the change would be more substantial and immediate. Right now, the “cap rate,” or the rent level divided by the home price, is only about 3% in major California metro areas, versus about 6% in most of the country. An increase in housing supply which reduced the cap rate to 75% of the national level, through reductions in the long-term increase in rental prices, would effectively also cut housing prices by a quarter.</li><li>Lisa Renner, “For California schools, 2020 could prove historic”, <em>Capitol Weekly</em>, October 9, 2019, <a href="https://capitolweekly.net/for-california-schools-2020-could-prove-historic/">https://capitolweekly.net/for-california-schools-2020-could-prove-historic/</a> “California Proposition 15, Tax on Commercial and Industrial Properties for Education and Local Government Funding Initiative (2020)” <em>Ballot Pedia</em>, <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/California_Tax_on_Commercial_and_Industrial_Properties_for_Education_and_Local_Government_Funding_Initiative_(2020)">https://ballotpedia.org/California_Tax_on_Commercial_and_Industrial_Properties_for_Education_and_Local_Government_Funding_Initiative_(2020)</a> For those who want to end Prop. 13 more generally, there would be no way to get local buy-in for it without insuring local governments that the state will not just take most of the extra property tax funding through withdrawal of grants. Thus our proposed reform, or a similar one, would be necessary for Prop. 13 reform as well. We take no stance on the Prop. 13 in general or Split-Roll specifically..</li><li>Joan Youngman, “School Finance and Property Taxes”, <em>Lincoln Institute of Land Policy</em>, April 2016, <a href="https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/articles/school-finance-property-taxes.">https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/articles/school-finance-property-taxes.</a> Lawrence O. Picus, “The Local Impact of School Finance Reform in Four Texas School Districts”, <em>Sage Journals</em>, December 1, 1994, <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.3102/01623737016004391">https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.3102/01623737016004391</a></li><li>“CAMPAIGN FOR QUALITY EDUCATION v. STATE”, <em>Findlaw</em>, April 20, 2016, <a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1746741.html">https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1746741.html</a></li><li>“STATEWIDE MUNICIPAL GRANTS”, <em>California Consulting</em>, March 2017, <a href="https://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Sacramento-Valley-Division-Page-Resources/20170303-Mbr-Mtg-Citrus-Heights-Resources/CALIFORNIA-CONSULTING-Statewide-Municipal-Grants-M">https://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Sacramento-Valley-Division-Page-Resources/20170303-Mbr-Mtg-Citrus-Heights-Resources/CALIFORNIA-CONSULTING-Statewide-Municipal-Grants-M</a> “Understanding California’s Property Taxes”, <em>Legislative Analyst’s Office</em>, November 29, 2012, <a href="https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/tax/property-tax-primer-112912.aspx">https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/tax/property-tax-primer-112912.aspx</a> For instance, in 2004 the state government provided a per capita grant, from the statewide Vehicle License Fees, in exchange for municipal property taxes, which once again limited the benefits of approving new and generally above-average housing values. Michael Coleman, A Critique of “The Housing Bottom Line: The Fiscal Impact of New Home Construction on California Governments”, <em>CaliforniaCityFinance.com</em>, August 31, 2007, <a href="http://www.californiacityfinance.com/HsgBttmLine070831.pdf">http://www.californiacityfinance.com/HsgBttmLine070831.pdf</a> Elisa Barbour, “State-Local Fiscal Conflicts in California: From Proposition 13 to Proposition 1A”, <em>Public Policy Institute of California</em>, December 2007, <a href="https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/OP_1207EBOP.pdf">https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/OP_1207EBOP.pdf</a></li><li>Wallace Oates, ed., <em>Property Taxation and Local Government Finance</em>.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b81a0fc31850" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news/giving-schools-back-to-their-communities-how-to-improve-schools-and-restore-growth-in-california-b81a0fc31850">Giving Schools Back to Their Communities: How to Improve Schools and Restore Growth in California</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news">Cicero News</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reforming America’s Police Unions]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cicero-news/reforming-americas-police-unions-b44c486db245?source=rss-1c7206c33e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b44c486db245</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[police-brutality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[accountability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[protest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unions]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[police]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Judge Glock]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2020 17:49:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-22T23:39:15.935Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/0*CHIhz0D8awYwHQ7h.jpg" /></figure><p>Judge Glock &amp; Devon Kurtz</p><p><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></p><p>America’s law enforcement agencies are facing a public reckoning. In the wake of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor’s wrongful deaths at the hands of police officers, millions of Americas have taken to the streets to demand reform.</p><p>Polling shows that the American public is firmly behind police reform.¹ Maintaining public order is our government’s most basic and important role, but success in doing so depends on the public’s confidence in police. Although the large majority of police officers do a dangerous job well, and although most Americans don’t support more radical proposals to “defund the police,” they are upset about the perceived inability of police departments to hold bad officers accountable, and especially about the disproportionate impact of those bad officers on minorities and African-Americans. It is imperative that policymakers take action to restore public faith in police accountability.</p><p>Many of the problems that the public perceives to exist in police departments actually emerge from police unions, which bargain collectively on behalf of officers on many issues concerning police discipline. When an officer commits misconduct, his or her union contract usually guarantees that there are strict limits on internal investigations and otherwise tries to shield officers from punishment. The Chicago Task Force on Police Reform under Mayor Rahm Emanuel stated that “The collective bargaining agreements between the police unions and the City have essentially turned the code of silence into official policy.”² As more activists have traced police protections back to police unions, a chorus of media outlets have begun to call for greater scrutiny after decades of unchecked power. Many police chiefs and commissioners have added their own voices to the chorus demanding police union reform.</p><p>We propose two main avenues of reform to limit police union powers. On the federal level, Congress should use its power of the purse to attach conditions to the federal funds that flow to local and state law enforcement agencies. Such grant conditions would demand union contracts and civil service rules that include greater transparency, accountability, and oversight. Placing these conditions on law enforcement grants would incentivize local and state lawmakers and police officials to rework their agreements with police unions in order to keep their access to federal funding for hiring, equipment, and community programing.</p><p>On the state level, lawmakers can directly reform collective bargaining agreements by police. Without ending such agreements, they can limit their control over police discipline and other staffing issues. They can also directly reform civil service rules or disciplinary procedures that are enacted in laws and regulations, and which police unions also use to prevent individual accountability. Evidence indicates that such reforms can lower crime while also reducing police abuse of civilians.</p><p>Good cops don’t want bad cops on the force. And most police chiefs and police departments want to hold individual officers accountable. We can ensure public order, restore faith in police, and remove bad actors if we fight back against police unions’ overweening power over police discipline.‍</p><p><strong>BACKGROUND ON POLICE UNIONS</strong></p><p>For most of the 20th Century, the majority of American cities and states refused to recognize police unions as legitimate bargaining agents for rank-and-file officers. Famously, Massachusetts Governor and future-Republican President Calvin Coolidge deployed the Massachusetts State Guard to break the Boston Police Strike in 1919, and argued that there was “no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, any time.” Coolidge’s efforts earned him national renown, including from Democratic President Woodrow Wilson, who described the strike as “a crime against civilization.”³</p><p>Following World War II, police officers once again tried to unionize, but their efforts were thwarted by a series of court rulings, which upheld the right of cities to ban police unions. But in the early 1960s, as part of a wave of municipal worker unionization in general, cities began to recognize police unions. In New York City, Mayor Robert Wagner recognized the Police Benevolent Association as a bargaining agent for police officers in the city in 1964, six years after recognizing other public sector unions.⁴ A number of police supporters were elected as mayors in cities such as Minneapolis and Philadelphia. By the 1970s, police officers were able to unionize in cities across America, including Boston, Detroit, Seattle, Buffalo, Milwaukee, Omaha, Oakland, Atlanta, and Los Angeles.⁵</p><p>The early years of police unions offered dolorous examples of their misuse of power. When New York cut some police salaries during the city’s dire fiscal crisis in 1975, the New York Patrolman’s Benevolent Association began handing out flyers at airports and bus stations claiming New York was “Fear City” and advising tourists not to come.⁶ When thousands of New York policemen were laid off around the same time, they blocked the Brooklyn Bridge for hours and slashed car tires, while the still uniformed police refused to intervene.⁷ Other police unions threatened “slowdowns” or stopped working, allowing city streets to descend to chaos.⁸</p><p>Over the next fifty years police unions became some of the most powerful organizations in the country. The Fraternal Order of the Police today has almost 350,000 members, making it one of the nation’s largest unions, while the National Association of Police Organizations has another 240,000.⁹ Overall, “protective service” employees, composed of police, prison guards, and firefighters, are the most heavily unionized sector of the economy, at about 33% unionized, compared to a national unionization rate of about 11%. The police in particular have an over 60% unionization rate, perhaps the highest of any group anywhere in the nation, outside of firefighters, and over 80% of all police officers are represented by collective bargaining agreements.¹⁰ Police unions today don’t just negotiate with state and local governments, they have the ability to influence state and local legislators and elect their own managers. Any discussion of police reform therefore has to face the power of police unions.¹¹</p><p><strong>HOW UNIONS STYMIE ACCOUNTABILITY AND REFORM</strong></p><p>In the early years of police unionization, the primary motivations were better pay and working conditions. The nascent police unions opposed reform measures in only a handful of occurrences. State and local opposition to police unionization was primarily pecuniary. More recently, police unions’ largest victories have been in winning disciplinary protections for officers.</p><p>Today, most states allow police unions to not just negotiate over “wages and benefits” but also over the “terms and conditions of employment,” which include things like staffing, shifts, and disciplinary procedures. While other terms and conditions agreements can impinge on good policing practice, bargaining over discipline is perhaps the most dangerous in terms of preventing police abuse.</p><p>In a 2017 Duke Law Journal article, Professor Stephen Rushin surveyed 178 police collective bargaining agreements for clauses affecting discipline. He found that these agreements usually contains some or all of the following clauses: prohibiting internal investigations of anonymous civilian complaints; allowing officers to request deletion of formal complaints and disciplinary histories after a few years, or to automatically remove them; limiting the internal complaint period to a short period of time after an incident of alleged brutality or misconduct; limiting Open Records Act requests of officers’ disciplinary files; barring public access to police body-camera footage without a court order; barring internal investigators from searching officers’ lockers or using polygraphs when interrogating officers; delaying interrogations of officers suspected of misconduct; limiting the lengths of internal investigations and civilian oversight of investigations; and requiring municipalities to indemnify officers in cases of civil judgements.¹²</p><p>All of these clauses should be matters of grave public concern. Although some police officers complain about simple procedural rules such as Miranda warnings for criminal suspects, when investigating their own, unions have guaranteed a litany of procedural protections that would make Ernesto Miranda’s heads spin, and which go far beyond the dictates of due process or common sense.</p><p>Unions negotiate these clauses because they translate into real protections for officers facing investigations. As Professor Rushin explains:</p><blockquote><strong><em>Excessively delaying interrogations of officers after alleged misconduct allows officers to coordinate stories in a way that deflects responsibility for wrongful behavior. The destruction of disciplinary records makes it more difficult for supervisors to identify officers engaged in a pattern of misconduct. The disqualification of entire classes of civilian complaints prevents supervisors from even investigating potentially abusive behavior. Limitations on civilian oversight and arbitration clauses rob the public of the opportunity to monitor police behavior.¹³</em></strong></blockquote><p>One of the most damaging types of clauses in these agreements allows any removed officer to request binding arbitration, with some of the arbitrators chosen by the police union itself. A recent Washington Post study of the largest police departments showed that police arbitration in particular guaranteed that almost 25% of all removed officers were later reinstated on the force, some after being fired multiple times.¹⁴</p><p>All of these clauses are dangerous because they prevent the removal of bad cops, and most studies show that a small number of bad cops cause most of the problems with police abuse. One study found that just 5% of officers in the Chicago Police Department garnered a third of all citizen complaints.¹⁵ In other cities the ratios were even higher. A National Institute of Justice Report stated that, “It has become a truism among police chiefs that 10 percent of their officers cause 90 percent of the problems.”¹⁶ Even the handful of the worst officers, those convicted of crimes, are difficult to remove from the force. In a 2017 review, the Minnesota Star Tribune found that more than 500 current or formerly licensed police officers had been convicted of at least one crime since 1995, yet three-quarters of those officers were never even disciplined by their departments. Such results help explain the anger at the George Floyd murder in Minneapolis.¹⁷</p><p>Research into the effect of police unions on abuse is preliminary but indicate that increased police union protections does increase abuse. A study of a Florida ruling which allowed sheriff officers to unionize found a 40% increase in citizen complaint in counties that began collective bargaining. A recent study of 100 police departments by Abdul Rad shows that police unionization was associated with statistically significant increases in the killing of unarmed civilians. He also found that that the contract provisions that seemed to increased killings the most were formal waiting periods for investigations, restrictions on internal investigators, and unfair access of the accused to investigative material before making statements.¹⁸ A recent, preliminary survey of police unionization in the 1960s and ’70s found unionized states and cities had significant increases in police shootings, especially against minorities and African-Americans.¹⁹ Just a raw look at the Bureau of Justice Statistics numbers also shows that unionized departments tend have to more per-capita citizen complaints, but about half the rate of disciplined officers.²⁰</p><p><strong>THE SOURCE OF POLICE UNION POWER</strong></p><p>Public sector unions today are a powerful force and make up almost half of all union members. But police unions have some peculiar powers and protections. One reason is that these unions often garner support from both sides of the political aisle: from those on the left, who support public unionization, and from those the right, who support police and public order. Police also have particular powers in negotiating that other unions lack. A recent “playbook” by a police union law firm showed that some police unions use tactics like slowdowns or the “blue flu” to get municipalities to the negotiating table.²¹ Other police unions have hired private investigators to stalk city council members, or used their police powers to harass politicians with frivolous charges and interrogations.²²</p><p>Police unions have thus achieved some particular negotiating benefits not granted to other public sector unions. For instance, some states, such as Texas, Georgia, and Wisconsin, ban public sector bargaining in general, but specifically carve out exceptions for police bargaining.²³</p><p>Due to the dangerous strikes and job actions of police and firefighter unions in the 1960s, many states granted these two groups, and only these two groups, “compulsory interest arbitration.” Unlike individual arbitration, compulsory arbitration means that whenever the government and the police unions refuse to agree to terms to a new collective bargaining agreement, the negotiation automatically goes to an arbitrator. That arbitrator, partially picked by the police unions themselves, then has power to decide on points of disagreement on wages, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment. Decades of research shows that such contract arbitrators have tended to give police unions to particular benefits, including on disciplinary procedures, that other public sector unions cannot achieve.²⁴</p><p>Even in those states where police unions are not allowed to negotiate over disciplinary procedures, or where their negotiations are limited, they can use their heft inside state legislatures and city councils to enact civil service rules that prevent accountability. Many states, such as Maine, require several steps and appeals before any public official can be removed.²⁵ Other cities, such as Cincinnati, show complicated police removal regulations outside of the collective bargaining agreements.²⁶</p><p>At the behest of police unions, fourteen states have also passed “Law Enforcement Officers Bills of Rights” to give police officers special protections against removal, including many included in collective bargaining agreements.²⁷ Besides being an obvious contradiction in terms, since bills of rights are enacted to protect the public from government, not the other way around, they have also prevented individual accountability. Their extension to correctional officers has also caused several scandals in the Baltimore and New York prison systems.²⁸</p><p>In other states, police unions passed laws to make police disciplinary records private.²⁹ In California, the law ensures that not only internal police records, but the records of any appeal to higher agencies such as the Civil Service Commission, remain private as well.³⁰ These laws prevent the public from getting data on police departments in general, and on discovering which bad officers are causing the most harm to the public.³¹</p><p>Beyond the collective bargaining agreements and laws concerning police discipline, there are other unfortunate effects of police unions on public safety. Collective bargaining terms on simple issues such as staffing, shifts, and patrol often prevent deploying officers at needed places and times, or in creating new community-oriented policing strategies.³²</p><p>More broadly, the police unions’ ability to garner sometimes excessive pay and benefits for their members limits the resources available for public safety. This itself tends to cause more abuse because underfunded and undermanned police departments tend to be more likely to use deadly force relative to those that have sufficient manpower.³³ More generally, underfunded police pension and benefit systems, which at 71% funding, tend to be lower even than public pensions in general, at 74%, pose a grave threat to the future solvency of states and municipalities, which is presents yet another threat to public safety.³⁴ The recent Janus ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court gives local governments increased flexibility in negotiating with unions and in allowing dissatisfied union members to leave, but state and local governments taken full advantage of this opportunity.</p><p>But for the purpose of preventing excessive force and bad behavior, dismantling unfair protections against officer discipline is the best way to improve police departments. It can help ensure transparency, accountability, and overall public safety. There are both federal and state avenues for reform.</p><p><strong>PROPOSAL: ADD CONDITIONS TO THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE’S POLICING GRANTS</strong></p><p>We propose that Congress add specific conditions to the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s competitive grant programs in order to incentivize local, state, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies to excise clauses from collective bargaining agreements and civil service rules that unduly limit internal investigations, obscure patterns of misconduct, shield officers from discipline, and otherwise work against the public interest and safety of our communities.³⁵</p><p>Each year, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) awards hundreds of millions of dollars in competitive grants to local, state, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies. These awards help these jurisdictions hire and train new officers, procure cutting-edge technology, and implement community outreach and educational programs.</p><p>Since its enactment in 1994, Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) has allocated billions of dollars in federal support to nearly 13,000 jurisdictions through 27 grant programs. COPS has provided funding to hire more than 133,000 community policing officers. In 2020, 596 jurisdictions received a total of $394 million to hire 2732 officers for 36 months. The Bureau of Justice Assistance distributed another $800 million in emergency COVID funding grants to police departments nationwide.</p><p>While in a given year only a limited portion of the country’s law enforcement agencies receive funding from BJA grants, virtually every police department in the country has at some point received funding from BJA. Each year, thousands of departments continue to compete for additional federal funding. With local and state governments bracing for steep budget shortfalls from COVID-shutdowns and the economic downturn, more police departments than ever before will be searching for alternative funding streams. This unfortunate situation presents Congress with a unique opportunity to incentivize meaningful reforms in police departments across the country.³⁶</p><p><strong>PROPOSAL: REFORM COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND POLICE CIVIL SERVICE RULES</strong></p><p>At the state level, state legislators can directly create reforms to collective bargaining. If they are not willing to remove collective bargaining rights for police unions in general, which are today disallowed in only five states, they can remove the ability of unions to negotiate on terms and conditions of employment, or at least on disciplinary proceedings.³⁷</p><p>There is evidence that limiting police union negotiations over discipline can work. In 2006, the New York Court of Appeals held that, counter to the then common assumption, state law actually guaranteed to local governments the right to retain total control over police discipline, due the urgent necessity to guarantee effective police forces. Despite three separate attempts by police unions to pass bills overturning the ruling, three separate governors have vetoed the bills, and the ruling remains in place.³⁸ While earlier, almost 20% of NYPD police union contracts dealt with disciplinary rules, now these contracts contain just a few lines reiterating general laws. Today, the NYPD is widely regarded as a model institution, with very low uses-of-force numbers and low amounts of citizen complaints, accompanied by some of the lowest crime numbers of any big city in the nation.³⁹ In Dallas, the police department and the fire department unions must “confer and meet” on contract terms together, which means that they just negotiate on wages and benefits, not the disciplinary issues which are distinct for each department. Dallas also shows far below average rates of police abuse.⁴⁰</p><p>There is no evidence that in those states that forbid collective bargaining by police that there are significant number of removals of police for inappropriate or political reasons. In those states, such as Georgia, Texas, and Florida, which have reformed civil service removal rules for all public employees, there is ample evidence that managers and the public have seen increased accountability, without any noticeable increase in politicized firing.</p><p>More generally, the states can refuse to recognize collective bargaining agreements, or repeal any civil service rules, that contain clauses for delayed investigation of complaints, unfair access to records before making statements, and automatic arbitration on dismissals. Such reforms can guarantee that police officers can keep themselves accountable.‍</p><p><strong>CONCLUSION</strong></p><p>One lawyer dealing with police department discipline recently said, “It takes an edict from the king to fire a bad cop, many times because of the union.” Unions today not only ensure their members get high pay and benefits; they ensure that their worse members don’t get disciplined. These bad cops not only cost the police department credibility and respect, they often also cost the departments tens of millions of dollars in lawsuits a year.⁴¹ That is why police chiefs and public officials everywhere are demanding reform to police union power. The Police Chief in Minneapolis, where George Floyd’s death sparked the recent protests, has said he is stepping back from further negotiations with the union.⁴²</p><p>Even many public sector unions have come agree on the need for reform. The head of the American Federation of Teachers, and a member of the AFL-CIO board, said that “None of our contracts should shield misconduct.” The AFL-CIO has already put forward reforms to police union bargaining.” AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka said that “We would like to work with those unions to create a code of excellence so that we can exemplify the best conduct that’s out there⁴³</p><p>We need our police forces to protect us against bad actors. But we also need to ensure that police forces protect the public against bad actors coming from inside the forces themselves. We can do that with police union reform, which will help good officers do their job and help restore public respect for our police.</p><p>[1] <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/americans-are-more-troubled-by-police-actions-in-killing-of-george-floyd-than-by%20violence-at-protests-poll-finds-11591534801">https://www.wsj.com/articles/americans-are-more-troubled-by-police-actions-in-killing-of-george-floyd-than-by violence-at-protests-poll-finds-11591534801</a></p><p>[2] <a href="https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf">https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf</a></p><p>[3] Levine, Marvin.1988. “A Historical Overview of Police Unionization in the United States,” in The Police Journal: Theory, Practice, and Principles.</p><p>[4] <a href="https://www.nber.org/chapters/c7906.pdf">https://www.nber.org/chapters/c7906.pdf</a> and <a href="https://www.nber.org/chapters/c7903.pdf">https://www.nber.org/chapters/c7903.pdf</a></p><p>[5] Ibid. See early rulings against unions such as Perez v. Board of Police Commissioners, King v. Priest, and City of Jackson v. Mcleod. For comparable municipal unionization movement in Canada, see <a href="https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/unions-and-the-public-interest.pdf">https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/unions-and-the-public-interest.pdf</a></p><p>[6] The Boston Police made a similar flyer two decades later. <a href="https://untappedcities.com/2015/05/15/bostons-anti-tourist-guide-of-1993-welcome-to-fear-city-mirrors-nycs-of-1970s/">https://untappedcities.com/2015/05/15/bostons-anti-tourist-guide-of-1993-welcome-to-fear-city-mirrors-nycs-of-1970s/</a></p><p>[7] Flood, The Fires. <a href="https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1975/07/02/issue.html">https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1975/07/02/issue.html</a></p><p>[8] <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1985/02/06/opinion/when-the-police-threaten-disorder.html">https://www.nytimes.com/1985/02/06/opinion/when-the-police-threaten-disorder.html</a></p><p>[9] <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/police-union-membership-rising-as-positions-sit-vacant">https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/police-union-membership-rising-as-positions-sit-vacant</a></p><p>[10] <a href="http://about:blank/">chrome-extension://oemmndcbldboiebfnladdacbdfmadadm/https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf</a> ; <a href="https://www.cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf">https://www.cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf</a>, p. 3. Abdul, Police Unions, 8.</p><p>[11] For more background, see U.S. Department of Justice, “Police Labor-management Relations,”, August 2006. <a href="http://about:blank/">chrome-extension://oemmndcbldboiebfnladdacbdfmadadm/https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/all/p-r/Police%20-%20Labor%20Mang.%20Relations.pdf</a> and <a href="http://www.justiceacademy.org/iShare/Library-COPS/cops-p110b-pub.pdf">http://www.justiceacademy.org/iShare/Library-COPS/cops-p110b-pub.pdf</a></p><p>[12] Rushin, Stephen. 2017. “Police Union Contracts,” in Duke Law Journal 66,6.</p><p>[13] Ibid. More generally, such agreements make it difficult to gather evidence and demand criminal penalties against police officers as well. The Cato Institute found that only 36% of officers who were convicted of crimes actually served prison sentences. <a href="https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1897&amp;context=law_journal_law_polic">https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1897&amp;context=law_journal_law_polic</a></p><p>[14] <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired/</a></p><p>[15] <a href="https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/pol.20160573">https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/pol.20160573</a></p><p>[16] <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/opinion/police-unions-must-not-block-reform.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/opinion/police-unions-must-not-block-reform.html</a> <a href="https://www.rstreet.org/2018/07/10/sorry-but-police-unions-are-just-as-troubling-as-other-public-sector-unions/">https://www.rstreet.org/2018/07/10/sorry-but-police-unions-are-just-as-troubling-as-other-public-sector-unions/</a></p><p>[17] <a href="https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-police-officers-convicted-of-serious-crimes-still-on-the-job/437687453/">https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-police-officers-convicted-of-serious-crimes-still-on-the-job/437687453/</a></p><p>[18] Abdul Rad, Police Officer Abuse Thesis, Oxford University</p><p>[19] Professor Rob Gillezeu reporting his preliminary results on NPR. The full research article is not yet available. <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/06/10/874096421/labor-leaders-call-for-police-reform-as-they-face-criticism-for-police-union-tie">https://www.npr.org/2020/06/10/874096421/labor-leaders-call-for-police-reform-as-they-face-criticism-for-police-union-tie</a></p><p>[20] <a href="https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ccpuf.pdf">https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ccpuf.pdf</a>. See general collection of studies at Campaign Zero: <a href="https://www.joincampaignzero.org/contracts">https://www.joincampaignzero.org/contracts</a></p><p>[21] <a href="https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_firms_playbook_shows_how_police_play_hardball_at_bargaining_table/">https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_firms_playbook_shows_how_police_play_hardball_at_bargaining_table/</a></p><p>[22] <a href="https://www.city-journal.org/police-unions-16198.html">https://www.city-journal.org/police-unions-16198.html</a></p><p>[23] And, in the case of Texas and Wisconsin, for firefighters as well <a href="https://www.cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf">https://www.cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf</a></p><p>[24] <a href="https://brandilaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/BINDING-INTEREST-ARBITRATION-IN-THE-PUBLIC-SECTOR-A-NEW-PROPOSAL-FOR-CALIFORNI.pdf">https://brandilaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/BINDING-INTEREST-ARBITRATION-IN-THE-PUBLIC-SECTOR-A-NEW-PROPOSAL-FOR-CALIFORNI.pdf</a> <a href="https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/police-and-fire-pay-keep-rising-benefits-sticky-under-arbitration/">https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/police-and-fire-pay-keep-rising-benefits-sticky-under-arbitration/</a></p><p>[25] Maine State Civil Service Appeals Board: <a href="https://www.maine.gov/bhr/state-hr-professionals/rules-policies/policy-practices-manual/Grievance-Procedure-State-Civil-Service-Appeals-Board">https://www.maine.gov/bhr/state-hr-professionals/rules-policies/policy-practices-manual/Grievance-Procedure-State-Civil-Service-Appeals-Board</a>, For other states, like Washington, that allow more discretion for police hiring and firing, see <a href="https://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=41.12&amp;full=true">https://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=41.12&amp;full=true</a></p><p>[26] On another level, however, there is an inherent conflict between collective bargaining rights and civil service, since whatever is negotiated through collective bargaining takes the place of procedures that come from typical civil service rules passed through the democratic process. <a href="https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3706&amp;context=uclrev">https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3706&amp;context=uclrev</a> and <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/41881382?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">https://www.jstor.org/stable/41881382?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents</a></p><p>[27] The First LEOBR was passed in Maryland in 1972. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/04/24/the-police-officers-bill-of-rights/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/04/24/the-police-officers-bill-of-rights/</a>; <a href="https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/27/blue-shield">https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/27/blue-shield</a>. See California’s here: <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/files/policeofficersbillofrights.pdf">https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/files/policeofficersbillofrights.pdf</a></p><p>[28] <a href="https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/bs-xpm-2013-05-14-bs-ed-correctional-officers-20130514-story.html">https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/bs-xpm-2013-05-14-bs-ed-correctional-officers-20130514-story.html</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/10/nyregion/after-fraud-charges-norman-seabrook-is-removed-as-head-of-jail-officers-union.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/10/nyregion/after-fraud-charges-norman-seabrook-is-removed-as-head-of-jail-officers-union.html</a></p><p>[29] <a href="https://law.stanford.edu/publications/let-the-sunshine-in-illuminating-the-powerful-role-police-unions-play-in%20shielding-officer-misconduct/">https://law.stanford.edu/publications/let-the-sunshine-in-illuminating-the-powerful-role-police-unions-play-in shielding-officer-misconduct/</a> <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/10/police-unions-violence-research-george-floyd/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/10/police-unions-violence-research-george-floyd/</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/nyregion/police-disciplinary-records-court-ruling-nyc.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/nyregion/police-disciplinary-records-court-ruling-nyc.html</a> <a href="https://gothamist.com/news/the-nypd-is-keeping-cop-disciplinary-records-secretexcept-when-its-important">https://gothamist.com/news/the-nypd-is-keeping-cop-disciplinary-records-secretexcept-when-its-important</a></p><p>[30] <a href="https://www.aclunc.org/blog/frequently-asked-questions-about-copley-press-and-sb-1019#:~:text=What%20was%20the%20Copley%20Press,be%20disclosed%20to%20the%20public.">https://www.aclunc.org/blog/frequently-asked-questions-about-copley-press-and-sb-1019#:~:text=What%20was%20the%20Copley%20Press,be%20disclosed%20to%20the%20public.</a> <a href="https://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Police-stifle-bill-on-discipline-hearings-access-2553155.php">https://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Police-stifle-bill-on-discipline-hearings-access-2553155.php</a></p><p>[31] <a href="https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/SLPR-Vol.-28-1-Bies.pdf">https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/SLPR-Vol.-28-1-Bies.pdf</a></p><p>[32] <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0019793918808727">https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0019793918808727</a></p><p>[33] <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/this-california-city-defunded-its-police-force-killings-by-officers-soared/2020/06/22/253eeddc-b198-11ea-856d-5054296735e5_story.html">https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/this-california-city-defunded-its-police-force-killings-by-officers-soared/2020/06/22/253eeddc-b198-11ea-856d-5054296735e5_story.html</a></p><p>[34] <a href="https://www.hgexperts.com/expert-witness-articles/underfunded-police-pensions-strain-u-s-cities-45259">https://www.hgexperts.com/expert-witness-articles/underfunded-police-pensions-strain-u-s-cities-45259</a></p><p>[35] It is true that a line of U.S. Supreme Court cases, beginning with Garrity v. New York in 1967, have forbidden police departments and other public employers from firing employees who refuse to cooperate in criminal investigations, so some sort of agreement on when and where interrogations take place may be necessary, but overall, many police departments don’t have the 48 or more hour standard for investigation without constitutional problems. For background, see <a href="https://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/sites/ck/files/public/institutes-centers/ilw/Jackson_Louis_Competition/Employment-Law-Contest-Paper3-second-placewinner.pdf">https://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/sites/ck/files/public/institutes-centers/ilw/Jackson_Louis_Competition/Employment-Law-Contest-Paper3-second-placewinner.pdf</a></p><p>[36] Admittedly, some members of the BJA may object, since they are covered by their own collective bargaining agreement, including issues such as discipline and terms and conditions of employment, negotiated with the Department of Justice. <a href="https://www.opm.gov/cba/api/documents/d4b3badc-dda7-e911-915c-005056a577c8/attachments/1533_OJP%20&amp;%20AFSCME%202830_06222020-Redacted.pdf">https://www.opm.gov/cba/api/documents/d4b3badc-dda7-e911-915c-005056a577c8/attachments/1533_OJP%20&amp;%20AFSCME%202830_06222020-Redacted.pdf</a></p><p>[37] <a href="https://www.cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf">https://www.cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf</a> The four states are North and South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Georgia. As a minor but worthwhile reform, the only two states which allow a can police officer right to strike, Hawaii and Ohio, should remove that right. Ibid, 8.</p><p>[38] <a href="https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/bill-repeals-local-control-of-cop-discipline/">https://www.empirecenter.org/publications/bill-repeals-local-control-of-cop-discipline/</a><a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-court-of-appeals/1300777.html">https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-court-of-appeals/1300777.html</a>. <a href="http://about:blank/">chrome-extension://oemmndcbldboiebfnladdacbdfmadadm/https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/olr/downloads/pdf/collectivebargaining/Police-Officers-08-01-2010-07-31-2012.pdf</a>, HAS just three sentences. Also New York MTA police just repeats departmental regulations <a href="http://about:blank/">chrome-extension://oemmndcbldboiebfnladdacbdfmadadm/https://www.seethroughny.net/contracts/MTA/MTAHQ_PBA_2018.pdf</a> recent decision: <a href="https://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2017/10/negotiating-disciplinary-procedures-for.html?m=0">https://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2017/10/negotiating-disciplinary-procedures-for.html?m=0</a> The PBA tried to argue for a 20% pay boost to offset loss of disciplinary procedures. It was not awarded by arbitrators: <a href="http://about:blank/">chrome-extension://oemmndcbldboiebfnladdacbdfmadadm/https://www.perb.ny.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/ia2006-024.pdf</a>,</p><p>[39] For earlier rulings in this regard, see <a href="https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3706&amp;context=uclrev">https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3706&amp;context=uclrev</a> p, 830. Surprisingly, most researchers still cite the earlier agreements without noting the changes. <a href="http://about:blank/">chrome-extension://oemmndcbldboiebfnladdacbdfmadadm/https://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Stoughton_MLR1.pdf</a>.</p><p>[40] Abdul Rad, 90–100.</p><p>[41] For the first, and seemingly only time, a police union itself was also held liable in one case, that of Abner Louima’s sexual abuse in New York City. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/13/new-york-police-unions-powerful">https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/13/new-york-police-unions-powerful</a>. Chicago and New York pay about $50 million annually in lawsuits related to police behavior. <a href="https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/pol.20160573;">https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/pol.20160573;</a> <a href="https://gothamist.com/news/nypd-misconduct-lawsuits-cost-taxpayers-nearly-69-million-last-year">https://gothamist.com/news/nypd-misconduct-lawsuits-cost-taxpayers-nearly-69-million-last-year</a> Police departments tend to be the most lawsuit-prone institutions for any local government. <a href="https://www.city-journal.org/html/suing-city-hall-12541.html">https://www.city-journal.org/html/suing-city-hall-12541.html</a></p><p>[42] <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/06/10/874481704/minneapolis-police-pause-contract-talks-with-union-over-officers-accountability">https://www.npr.org/2020/06/10/874481704/minneapolis-police-pause-contract-talks-with-union-over-officers-accountability</a></p><p>[43] <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/police-unions-face-reckoning-over-contracts-shielding-misconduct">https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/police-unions-face-reckoning-over-contracts-shielding-misconduct</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b44c486db245" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news/reforming-americas-police-unions-b44c486db245">Reforming America’s Police Unions</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news">Cicero News</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Solving the Homelessness Crisis in San Francisco]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cicero-news/solving-the-homelessness-crisis-in-san-francisco-540b5fd63780?source=rss-1c7206c33e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/540b5fd63780</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bay-area]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[homeless]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[shelter]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[san-francisco]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Judge Glock]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Apr 2020 21:49:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-08T14:57:38.145Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/840/0*qgtrhslemSUpVU5O" /></figure><p><strong>I.</strong> <strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>In the past ten years, San Francisco has spent unprecedented time, money, and effort attacking homelessness. It more than doubled spending on homeless services, from $150 million in 2011 to $360 million today. In 2018 it passed a special business tax, Proposition C, to create another $300 million more a year in homelessness funding. It opened a special Department of Homelessness in 2016 to focus on the issue.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p>The result of this effort? The homeless population has increased from 5,700 to over 8,000, the majority of whom are unsheltered. There are over 9,700 homeless by the city’s own, more expansive, definition, or about 1 of every 100 residents of the city.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> The city’s streets have become world-famous for their dangerous and unsanitary encampments.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> The particularly devastating toll of the coronavirus outbreak on the city’s homeless population demonstrate both the city’s failures and the dangers of continuing to fail to address them.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a></p><p>San Francisco’s tragedy is not due to national trends. Nationwide, despite the Great Recession, the total U.S. homeless population has been reduced from 650,000 to 550,000 over the past decade, a drop of over 15%, with the greatest drop occurring in the unsheltered population, which has fallen to under 200,000, or about a third of the total.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> Whatever San Francisco specifically is doing to solve homelessness, it is not working.</p><p>The Cicero Institute proposes three interrelated and evidence-based reforms to solve the homeless crisis in San Francisco, which should also be applicable to other cities with similar problems. First, the city should combine mass-produced temporary shelter for those in immediate need with competitively provided, and more treatment-intensive, Permanent Supportive Housing. Second, the city should broaden mental health conservatorship for truly disabled individuals and also provide pay-for-performance contracts with service providers. Third, the city should empower a Safe Streets Court to both keep public order and to mandate the best treatment for individuals unable to take care of themselves.</p><p>These reforms will both alleviate the ills that beset the neediest people in our city, and help restore public faith in our streets. A new compact, that both provides necessary services and mandates their use, will solve San Francisco’s most persistent, and persistently shameful, problem.</p><p><strong>II.</strong> <strong>Facts about the San Francisco Homeless Population</strong></p><p>San Francisco’s homeless population is large, but not unparalleled. As a proportion of population, four cities have higher homelessness (Seattle, Washington D.C., Boston, and New York City, in that order), while three cities (Seattle, Los Angeles, and Berkeley), have a higher percentage of “unsheltered” homeless.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> Of large cities, however, San Francisco does have highest percentage of non-family homelessness (91%), meaning our population is largely single men, and, except for Long Beach, CA, it has the highest percentage that are “chronically” homeless, 31%, meaning they suffered over a full year of homelessness, and either the highest or second highest (with San Jose), of youth homelessness.<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> Our homeless population is thus more vulnerable and isolated than almost any other.</p><p>Many public surveys of the homeless conflate the temporarily homeless, most often families, or mothers with children, who tend to be in shelters, with the chronically homeless, who tend to be single-men, and tend to be unsheltered. Again, it is these latter are the most familiar to San Francisco residents, and they of course represent the hardest cases. While 32% of the non-chronically homeless surveyed cited a history of drug or alcohol abuse, 63% of the chronically homeless did, and while 32% of the non-chronically homeless described psychiatric conditions, 53% of the chronically homeless did.<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> National surveys and compilations from intake reports demonstrate that the real percentages for both drug abuse and mental illnesses for the unsheltered homeless is probably above 75%.</p><p>The simple lack of housing is thus only one of many problems confronting homeless individuals. Only 12% of surveyed homeless mentioned “eviction” as the reason for their homelessness, the rest cited alcohol or drug use, arguments with family or friends, lost jobs, or divorce or breakup.<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a> A breakdown in social ties in particular seems to be one important cause of homelessness. About half of all homeless were previously living with a friend or relative before being pushed to the streets.<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a> Of course, all of these issues can be caused by or related to each other, but a mere shortage of rent money for housing does not seem to be the only issue.</p><p>Yet San Francisco has focused its anti-homeless effort, and about 85% of its homeless spending, on providing subsidized or city-managed housing.<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a> Every year in recent times, the San Francisco government permanently “rehouses” about 2,000 homeless people, totaling almost 20,000 over the past decade.<a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a> San Francisco currently has 2,300 emergency shelter beds and 7450 units of supportive housing for the homeless (9750 beds total), up from 1,400 and 6000 (7,400 total) just since 2016.<a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a> San Francisco also has the highest proportion of supportive housing, or about 1 per 100 residents, of any city in the nation.<a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a> Yet still our homelessness problem grows.</p><p>One reason the current housing program have not solved our problem is that expansive housing and service spending can indeed pull some individuals either into the homeless system or from other cities, even if such “pull” factors explain only a small part of our overall homeless population. About 55% of our homeless have lived in San Francisco for at least 10 years. Nonetheless, the 15% who have moved to the city in the past decade, but did not move here while homeless, could at least partially be responding to high levels of services her than elsewhere. About 30% of our homeless population, however, moved to San Francisco while homeless, most likely because of both our climate and services.<a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a> Some surveys of the homeless or near homeless do show they are attracted, understandably, to high service provision, including during the coronavirus pandemic. <a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a> Although San Francisco does not separate out the origins of chronically homeless and unsheltered individuals, it is likely a much higher proportion of the chronically homeless came from outside the city.<a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a></p><p><strong>III.</strong> <strong>The Need for More and Competitively Provided Housing</strong></p><p>Although individual units of subsidizing housing on their own have not cured homelessness, <strong>t</strong>here is a strong correlation between lack of affordable market-rate housing in a city and homelessness.<a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a> The fact that San Francisco has the most unaffordable housing in the United States certainly contributes to our homelessness problem. A recent analysis estimated that merely deregulating housing in the San Francisco area, and bringing housing costs down to a national level, would lower homelessness by over half, allowing even many of those with mental health problems or substance abuse issues to rent low-cost Single Resident Occupancy units, by using already provided federal social security or disability support payments.<a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a></p><p>The current “Housing First” consensus, however, assumes that permanent and publicly subsidized housing should be provided to any homeless individual in just about any city. One major problem with this strategy is that most homeless individuals are only temporarily homeless, and it is hard to target permanent housing at the truly needy.<a href="#_ftn20">[20]</a> A recent study in <em>Science</em>, for instance, demonstrated that only 2% of those targeted in a Chicago homeless housing program would have actually stayed homeless without the program.<a href="#_ftn21">[21]</a> Researchers today estimate that it takes at least 10 Permanent Supportive Housing (PSH) units in a city to take one homeless individual off the streets. <a href="#_ftn22">[22]</a> The fact that PSH in much of California now costs over $500,000 a unit means it cannot solve our problems.<a href="#_ftn23">[23]</a> In San Francisco, we have more than doubled our supportive housing, which would have been enough to house every chronically homeless individual back in 2010, but the total number of chronically homeless has also almost doubled in the last five years, to about 3,000.<a href="#_ftn24">[24]</a></p><p>Instead of housing any individual that comes into the system, we need two types of essential housing services for the homeless. One is mass-produced temporary shelter. Although homeless shelters today can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars per bed, Oakland has had recent success with their “tough sheds” program, using off-the-shelf sheds or cabins at low cost in a camp-like setting, for only about $20,000 a cabin, each of which houses two individuals. Increases in 3D printing and modular housing means further cheap shelter can be provided for those in temporary need.<a href="#_ftn25">[25]</a></p><p>For long-term permanent supportive housing, or PSH, we need a model that helps some people get back on their feet, and opens up beds for the truly needy. The only way to do this is through a pay-for-performance housing support system. Economist Kevin Corinth has suggested using such a model, where housing and service providers are rewarded for every assigned person who emerges to an independent life. <a href="#_ftn26">[26]</a></p><p>The model would provide a base housing cost for any PSH provider, say $4,000 a month. If a PSH provider moved an individual to independent housing, they would get $2,000 for every month that individual did not use homeless services, up to $36,000. To ensure that service providers are not penalized for reducing service use, those that move individuals to independent living would be guaranteed to receive other homeless individuals in the vacated unit, or the equivalent value, for at least the estimated time of the housing use. Those organizations who do not move homeless individuals to independence would not receive more clients. Thus, instead of paying housing providers hundreds of thousands of dollars to keep a single person in a room for decades, the service providers can compete to provide the services people need, and can open up beds for those with truly no prospects for independent living. We need to enforce accountability on current providers, instead of ending the government’s relationship with a check and some summary inspections.</p><p>The combination of a generally deregulated housing market, mass-produced shelter, and competitive long-term housing and service provision would do much towards alleviating San Francisco’s homelessness.</p><p><strong>IV.</strong> <strong>The Need for Mandated Mental Health Treatment</strong></p><p>Some of San Francisco’s homeless do have little prospect of living independently, and need the government to help them just sustain their life and well-being. As mentioned above, of San Francisco’s homeless, 42% report alcohol and drug use, while 39% report psychiatric conditions. Those with these two problems are more often chronically homeless and more often unsheltered. <a href="#_ftn27">[27]</a></p><p>Unfortunately, the current climate in California makes it difficult to get the mentally disabled or severely addicted into treatment. “Conservatorship” the main route to mandated treatment, is only reserved for cases of people that pose imminent threat to themselves or to others and who are “gravely disabled” beyond a reasonable doubt.<a href="#_ftn28">[28]</a> There are numerous reports of how difficult it is to secure conservatorship even for the most difficult and dangerous cases.<a href="#_ftn29">[29]</a> The state legislature passed a very minor expansion of conservatorship in 2018, which allows conservatorship for those who have been detained at least <em>eight times </em>in the previous year. Obviously this does not do enough, with some estimates that it would just allow about 6 more people to be put into conservatorship in the City of San Francisco.<a href="#_ftn30">[30]</a></p><p>Conservatorship should be a viable possibility for more mentally ill individuals and their families. Although studies are sparse, some show that mandated conservatorship can indeed improve outcomes for the mentally ill.<a href="#_ftn31">[31]</a> Thus the law should expand the standard of “gravely disabled,” to include those who cannot recognize their own mental disability and who pose a threat to themselves or others, and such decision should be by a “clear and convincing” standard, which is slightly more lenient, instead of beyond a reasonable doubt.<a href="#_ftn32">[32]</a></p><p>Under California’s 2002 “Laura’s Law,” a family member can also ask for Assisted Outpatient Treatment (AOT) of a mentally ill relative, which mandates they follow a mental health treatment regime. Although less expansive than conservatorship, it is also difficult to secure, and the individual must again be shown to be an imminent threat to themselves or others.<a href="#_ftn33">[33]</a> Still, studies prove it can be effective. A survey of almost 3,000 New Yorkers with mandated AOT found that while 19% experienced homeless in the three years prior to treatment, that dropped to 5% afterwards.<a href="#_ftn34">[34]</a> Other studies show that AOT reduces the likelihood for getting arrested for all crimes by over 50%, and violent crimes by 80%.<a href="#_ftn35">[35]</a></p><p>AOT should be expanded to include not just those whose threat is “imminent,” but those for whom treatment could substantially reduce future incidents of violent or destructive behavior, even if an individual has stabilized after current treatment.<a href="#_ftn36">[36]</a> If services are provided by independent organizations, they too should be paid on a pay-for-performance standard, with rewards for those who move into independent living situations or prevent continued descents back into mental illness, and a similar pay-scale as that described above. Mandating more conservatorship and AOT should help those most in need of it, instead of, as today, allowing the mentally ill to fall apart on our streets.</p><p><strong>V.</strong> <strong>Safe Streets Court</strong></p><p>San Franciscans cite both homelessness and public order as two of the city’s three biggest problems, along with housing affordability.<a href="#_ftn37">[37]</a> Every San Franciscan knows these problems are related, and in particular that untreated and uncared for homeless individuals pose a threat to both themselves and others on city streets, or simply drive many people away from them.</p><p>San Francisco’s homeless already have extensive contact with our criminal justice system. About 25% of San Francisco’s homeless reported spending at least one night in jail within the past twelve months. Many cycle in and out of jail numerous times over the course of a year.<a href="#_ftn38">[38]</a></p><p>Yet the police can help the homeless while maintaining public safety. Ever since the first Drug Court opened, in Miami in 1989, criminal justice reformers have demonstrated the importance of specialized courts that focus on non-punitive ways to return people to productive lives. San Francisco has embraced this movement, and today has eight high-quality “collaborative courts,” from a Drug Court to a Behavioral Health Court to a Veterans Justice Court, all of which address the specialized needs of certain groups of offenders.</p><p>The general tendency of these courts is the combination of “graduated incentives and sanctions” along with frequent “status” hearings, to keep tabs on their “clients.” Research has shown that regular mandated treatment through such courts can do much to move people out of cycles of law-breaking and homelessness. Research has also shown that repeated interactions with a judge are one of the most important indicators of success in such programs.<a href="#_ftn39">[39]</a> The Columbia University economist Brendan O’Flaherty argues that “aggressive but nonpunitive referral is a positive strategy” for helping homeless people with serious disabilities or barriers to employment get back on their feet.<a href="#_ftn40">[40]</a></p><p>Today, there is an attenuated version of a San Francisco court for the homeless. The “Community Justice Center” focuses on individuals with mental or behavioral problems in the in downtown and the South of Market Area (SOMA). Almost half of all homeless people in San Francisco live in these areas, thus the Community Justice Center serves many homeless individuals.<a href="#_ftn41">[41]</a> Today, it has more “attendees” than all other cooperative courts in San Francisco combined.<a href="#_ftn42">[42]</a></p><p>The Community Justice Center program should be expanded into a general “Safe Streets Court” that focuses on the needs of the homeless and others mainly living on streets across the city. It should follow the practices of other collaborative courts and use graduated sanctions and rewards to improve treatment and help people adhere to the rules of San Francisco’s public spaces.</p><p>Yet the trend in California right now has made it harder to use courts to mandate services. The San Diego Tribune reported a drop in drug court treatments after Prop. 47 reduced penalties on many lower level crimes. California journalists have also reported about one homeless man who was arrested almost a dozen times in a year for trespassing, without ever spending more than a night in jail or receiving one mandate for treatment. <a href="#_ftn43">[43]</a> Instead of creating consequences for ubiquitous defecation on the city’s streets, the city continues to set up “poop patrols” to clean them, at a cost of almost $200,000 per employee. Once again restoring penalties, and enforcing them, for low-level public drug dealing, shoplifting, theft, and disorderly behavior is necessary to get people back into treatment and make an expanded Safe Streets Court effective.<a href="#_ftn44">[44]</a></p><p>History shows that policing can indeed make the streets safer, even while it improves the lives of the homeless. For instance, the L.A. Safer Cities Initiative, pioneered by Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa and LAPD Police Chief William Bratton (who was later tapped as New York Mayor Bill de Blasio’s police chief), helped clean up L.A.’s Skid Row just over a decade ago. L.A. City Council Member Jan Perry said before the program’s inauguration in 2006, the area used to be like “’Dante’s Inferno.’ Now it’s like a neighborhood.”<a href="#_ftn45">[45]</a> In just the first year of the initiative, which demanded adherence to public order laws and mandated treatment for those who refused it, property crimes dropped by 25% and violent crimes by 33%.<a href="#_ftn46">[46]</a> Counter to some expectations the decline in crime did not involve pushing it to other areas, since adjacent areas actually experienced further reductions in crime. At the same time, the homeless population in the area dropped by half. <a href="#_ftn47">[47]</a> Yet, after the withdrawal of police in 2014, the homeless population quadrupled, and crime returned.<a href="#_ftn48">[48]</a> The use of Safer City type initiatives, along with a Safe Streets Court mandating treatment, can restore order on San Francisco’s streets and help the homeless at the same time.</p><p><strong>VI.</strong> <strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>There was a time not too long ago when San Francisco, like many large cities, had a small homeless population with reasonable social support.<a href="#_ftn49">[49]</a> Although the system was not perfect, the combination of a housing market with affordable rents, accompanied by temporary shelter, enforced mental health care, and police and social workers willing to mandate treatment and enforce public order, kept the city safe and the homeless housed. Such a situation is not beyond our reach. With a combination of the right services, incentives, and mandates, we can ensure that San Francisco becomes again a livable, vibrant, and caring city, for both its neediest citizens and the wider population.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <a href="https://sf.curbed.com/2019/12/19/21027974/san-francisco-homeless-decade-2010s-kositsky-navigation-center-friedenbach">https://sf.curbed.com/2019/12/19/21027974/san-francisco-homeless-decade-2010s-kositsky-navigation-center-friedenbach</a> <a href="http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HSH-Strategic-Framework-Full.pdf">http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HSH-Strategic-Framework-Full.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <a href="https://abc7news.com/society/homeless-population-history-in-bay-area/5260657/">https://abc7news.com/society/homeless-population-history-in-bay-area/5260657/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <a href="https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2016/11/04/san-franciscos-tent-cities">https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2016/11/04/san-franciscos-tent-cities</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/15/san-francisco-homeless-coronavirus-msc-shelter">https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/15/san-francisco-homeless-coronavirus-msc-shelter</a> <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/US/70-people-contract-coronavirus-san-franciscos-largest-homeless/story?id=70102372">https://abcnews.go.com/US/70-people-contract-coronavirus-san-franciscos-largest-homeless/story?id=70102372</a> <a href="https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/SF-providing-medications-alcohol-cannabis-to-15251350.php">https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/SF-providing-medications-alcohol-cannabis-to-15251350.php</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> <a href="https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2018-AHAR-Part-1.pdf.">https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2018-AHAR-Part-1.pdf.</a> Although there remain some questions about the national decline, see: <a href="https://www.aei.org/economics/getting-real-with-the-new-homelessness-numbers/">https://www.aei.org/economics/getting-real-with-the-new-homelessness-numbers/</a></p><p>About 25% of the nation’s homeless population is in California, but the total California homeless population has been relatively stable over the past decade. <a href="https://www.kqed.org/news/11678178/homeless-in-california-what-the-data-reveals">https://www.kqed.org/news/11678178/homeless-in-california-what-the-data-reveals</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> <a href="http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Report-2019-San-Francisco.pdf">http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Report-2019-San-Francisco.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> <a href="https://sfgov.org/scorecards/benchmarking/homelessness">https://sfgov.org/scorecards/benchmarking/homelessness</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> <a href="http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Report-2019-San-Francisco.pdf">http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Report-2019-San-Francisco.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> <a href="http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2017-SF-Point-in-Time-Count-General-FINAL-6.21.17.pdf">http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2017-SF-Point-in-Time-Count-General-FINAL-6.21.17.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> <a href="https://home.uchicago.edu/kczerniak/Economics%20of%20Homelessness.pdf">https://home.uchicago.edu/kczerniak/Economics%20of%20Homelessness.pdf</a> Nationally, the number is closer to 75%. <a href="https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/aeirpaper/930649.htm">https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/aeirpaper/930649.htm</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> <a href="http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HSH-Strategic-Framework-Full.pdf">http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HSH-Strategic-Framework-Full.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> <a href="http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HSH-Strategic-Framework-Full.pdf">http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/HSH-Strategic-Framework-Full.pdf</a>; <a href="https://www.sfchronicle.com/archive/item/A-decade-of-homelessness-Thousands-in-S-F-30431.php">https://www.sfchronicle.com/archive/item/A-decade-of-homelessness-Thousands-in-S-F-30431.php</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> <a href="https://sfgov.org/scorecards/benchmarking/homelessness">https://sfgov.org/scorecards/benchmarking/homelessness</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> <a href="https://sfgov.org/scorecards/benchmarking/homelessness">https://sfgov.org/scorecards/benchmarking/homelessness</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a> <a href="http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Report-2019-San-Francisco.pdf,">http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Report-2019-San-Francisco.pdf,</a> <a href="http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Executive-Summary-2019-San-Francisco.pdf.">http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Executive-Summary-2019-San-Francisco.pdf.</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> Nationally, about 1/3 of homeless individuals who moved to a different city cite shelter or service availability as a reason for the move. <a href="https://home.uchicago.edu/kczerniak/Economics%20of%20Homelessness.pdf">https://home.uchicago.edu/kczerniak/Economics%20of%20Homelessness.pdf</a>. For particular attraction to San Francisco during the coronavirus pandemic because of service provisions, see <a href="https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/philmatier/article/SF-a-magnet-for-homeless-seeking-free-hotel-room-15241814.php">https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/philmatier/article/SF-a-magnet-for-homeless-seeking-free-hotel-room-15241814.php</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a> <a href="https://projects.sfchronicle.com/sf-homeless/2018-state-of-homelessness/">https://projects.sfchronicle.com/sf-homeless/2018-state-of-homelessness/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> <a href="https://urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/pdf/QR_EJHP01PB.pdf">https://urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/pdf/QR_EJHP01PB.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> <a href="https://urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/pdf/QR_EJHP01PB.pdf,">https://urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/pdf/QR_EJHP01PB.pdf,</a> 2. See also impact of housing costs in homelessness in Brendan O’Flaherty, <em>Making Room: The Economics of Homelessness </em>(Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 96–164.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a> <a href="https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/housing-first-and-homelessness-SE.pdf">https://media4.manhattan-institute.org/sites/default/files/housing-first-and-homelessness-SE.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[21]</a> <a href="https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Impact-of-homelessness-prevention.pdf">https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Impact-of-homelessness-prevention.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[22]</a> For instance, the “chronically homeless,” those homeless for more than a year have dropped by 15% in the US, from about 105,000 too 90,000, over the past decade. But in this same time, the amount of permanent supportive housing (PSH), long-term housing specifically for the chronically homeless, has increased from 55,000 to 110,000, almost a doubling, Over 55,000 new homes have decreased chronic homelessness by less than 15,000 people. And an analysis of individual cities, shows there is almost no correlation between increases in PSH and decreases in homelessness. <a href="https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2018-AHAR-Part-1.pdf,">https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2018-AHAR-Part-1.pdf,</a> p. 4.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[23]</a> <a href="https://www.lamag.com/citythinkblog/proposition-hhh-audit/">https://www.lamag.com/citythinkblog/proposition-hhh-audit/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref24">[24]</a> chrome-extension://oemmndcbldboiebfnladdacbdfmadadm/http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Report-2019-San-Francisco.pdf, 34.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref25">[25]</a> <a href="https://www.eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2018/10/16/oaklands-tuff-shed-program-by-the-numbers">https://www.eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2018/10/16/oaklands-tuff-shed-program-by-the-numbers</a> <a href="https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2019/04/04/oakland-to-invest-millions-in-tuff-shed-program-to-help-house-homeless/">https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2019/04/04/oakland-to-invest-millions-in-tuff-shed-program-to-help-house-homeless/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a> <a href="https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Housing-First-Results-Second.pdf">https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Housing-First-Results-Second.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref27">[27]</a> <a href="http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Executive-Summary-2019-San-Francisco.pdf.">http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Executive-Summary-2019-San-Francisco.pdf.</a> See research on “mental health courts,” which shows that most crimes committed by mentally ill are not during psychotic states, but simply because mentally ill tend to share characteristics (anti-social history and peers, substance abuse, family discord), with other offenders. Mental illness does make it harder for the ill to readjust behavior after offenses, however. <a href="https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/JJ_SP15_54_2_Fisler.pdf">https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/JJ_SP15_54_2_Fisler.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref28">[28]</a> E. Fuller Torrey, <em>American Psychosis: How the Federal Government Destroyed the Mental Illness Treatment System </em>(Oxford: Oxford University, 2013), 86, 96–98.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref29">[29]</a> <a href="https://namila.org/resources/guide-to-lps-conservatorship/">https://namila.org/resources/guide-to-lps-conservatorship/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref30">[30]</a> <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1045">https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1045</a></p><p><a href="https://www.sfweekly.com/news/after-months-of-contentious-arguments-s-f-passes-mental-health-conservatorship-bill/">https://www.sfweekly.com/news/after-months-of-contentious-arguments-s-f-passes-mental-health-conservatorship-bill/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref31">[31]</a><a href="http://www.guardianship.org/IRL/Resources/Handouts/Family%20Members%20as%20Guardians_Handout.pdf">http://www.guardianship.org/IRL/Resources/Handouts/Family%20Members%20as%20Guardians_Handout.pdf</a> Such conservatorships should be “limited conservatorships,” only dealing with a person, and not their estate or property.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref32">[32]</a> This would be similar to AB2156 or AB 1971, both introduced last year <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB2156">https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB2156</a>. The change in “reasonable doubt” to “clear and convincing” however, might require a new ruling of the State Supreme Court, which back in 1979, in <em>Conservatorship of Roulet</em>, mandated a criminal law standard for conservatorship, although a 1980 case does allow some leeway for probate conservators. <a href="https://apha.confex.com/apha/141am/webprogram/Handout/id2468/Handout--Poster_292971.pdf">https://apha.confex.com/apha/141am/webprogram/Handout/id2468/Handout--Poster_292971.pdf</a> <a href="https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/106/611.html">https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/3d/106/611.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref33">[33]</a> <a href="https://www.californiacriminaldefenselawyerblog.com/lauras-law-may-provide-relief-to-families-of-the-seriously-mentally-ill-offender/">https://www.californiacriminaldefenselawyerblog.com/lauras-law-may-provide-relief-to-families-of-the-seriously-mentally-ill-offender/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref34">[34]</a> <a href="https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/kendra_web/finalreport/program_eval.htm">https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/kendra_web/finalreport/program_eval.htm</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref35">[35]</a> Torrey,<em> American Psychosis, </em>147.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref36">[36]</a> See discussion here: <a href="https://calmatters.org/projects/mentally-ill-forced-treatment-conservatorship-california-debate/">https://calmatters.org/projects/mentally-ill-forced-treatment-conservatorship-california-debate/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref37">[37]</a> <a href="https://sfchamber.com/public-safety-homelessness-affordability-biggest-issues-2018-sf-chamber-poll/">https://sfchamber.com/public-safety-homelessness-affordability-biggest-issues-2018-sf-chamber-poll/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref38">[38]</a> <a href="http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Report-2019-San-Francisco.pdf,">http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Report-2019-San-Francisco.pdf,</a> p. 38.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref39">[39]</a> <a href="https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/JJ_SP15_54_2_Fisler.pdf,">https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/JJ_SP15_54_2_Fisler.pdf,</a> p. 12.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref40">[40]</a> O’Flaherty, <em>Making Room, </em>280.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref41">[41]</a> <a href="http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Report-2019-San-Francisco.pdf,">http://hsh.sfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-PIT-Report-2019-San-Francisco.pdf,</a> p. 11.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref42">[42]</a> <a href="https://sfgov.org/lhcb/san-francisco-collaborative-court-programs">https://sfgov.org/lhcb/san-francisco-collaborative-court-programs</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref43">[43]</a> <a href="https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/sd-me-prop47-courts-20180614-story.html">https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/sd-me-prop47-courts-20180614-story.html</a> <a href="https://news3lv.com/news/nation-world/accused-serial-trespasser-arrested-again-in-fresno-and-released-shortly-after">https://news3lv.com/news/nation-world/accused-serial-trespasser-arrested-again-in-fresno-and-released-shortly-after</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref44">[44]</a> <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/san-francisco-poop-patrol-employees-make-184000-a-year-2018-8">https://www.businessinsider.com/san-francisco-poop-patrol-employees-make-184000-a-year-2018-8</a> <a href="https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/08/san-franciscos-sidewalk-poop-problem/566621/">https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/08/san-franciscos-sidewalk-poop-problem/566621/</a> <a href="https://www.kron4.com/news/bay-area/man-caught-pooping-in-aisle-of-san-francisco-safeway/">https://www.kron4.com/news/bay-area/man-caught-pooping-in-aisle-of-san-francisco-safeway/</a><a href="https://www.danielperlmanlaw.com/blog/2016/12/prop-47-decreasing-participation-diversion-programs.shtml">https://www.danielperlmanlaw.com/blog/2016/12/prop-47-decreasing-participation-diversion-programs.shtml</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref45">[45]</a> <a href="https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103289221">https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103289221</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref46">[46]</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/us/31skidrow.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/us/31skidrow.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref47">[47]</a> <a href="http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1008.316&amp;rep=rep1&amp;type=pdf">http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1008.316&amp;rep=rep1&amp;type=pdf</a> See even positive portrayals of improvement such as</p><p><a href="#_ftnref48">[48]</a> <a href="https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-homeless-how-we-got-here-20180201-story.html">https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-homeless-how-we-got-here-20180201-story.html</a> <a href="http://www.ladowntownnews.com/news/number-of-homeless-people-on-skid-row-spikes-by/article_aa32fbda-bafb-11e9-849f-ab047fa8951a.html">http://www.ladowntownnews.com/news/number-of-homeless-people-on-skid-row-spikes-by/article_aa32fbda-bafb-11e9-849f-ab047fa8951a.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref49">[49]</a> See discussion of relatively small homeless populations in major cities like San Francisco in the 1960s, and massive increases in the later 1970s and early 1980s in Kenneth Kusmer, <em>Down and Out, on the Road: The Homeless in American History </em>(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 239–247.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=540b5fd63780" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news/solving-the-homelessness-crisis-in-san-francisco-540b5fd63780">Solving the Homelessness Crisis in San Francisco</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news">Cicero News</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Two Decades of Pandemic Planning Failed]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cicero-news/why-two-decades-of-pandemic-planning-failed-a20608d05800?source=rss-1c7206c33e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a20608d05800</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[health-and-human-services]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[planning]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bureaucracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cdc]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Judge Glock]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2020 14:00:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-27T10:55:11.796Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*9IQHoX9n8f67tOWE" /></figure><p>At the commencement of the 2020 coronavirus pandemic, the United States government flailed and then failed in its attempt to respond to the crisis. Americans couldn’t help but ask why the government didn’t have a plan for this situation, a situation that was not only predictable, but which many scientists and public officials had predicted numerous times.¹</p><p>The truth is the government had a plan. Most commentators forgot that just six months before the current outbreak, Congress passed the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act of 2019, which offered funds and planning authority for just such a crisis as we now face.² This act was a reauthorization and an extension of half a dozen similar acts passed over the previous two decades, which acts were themselves extended in countless congressional spending bills, all of which resulted in countless plans.</p><p>By the time the virus broke on American shores, the problem was not that the United States didn’t have a single plan for an international pandemic. The problem was it had dozens of plans, totaling thousands of pages, issued by different agencies and by different administrations, apparently with little thought to how they would be combined or who would implement them. In the process of mandating all of these plans, the government had also created an array of competing and often contradictory authorities in different bureaucracies, which often worked at cross-purposes.</p><p>The failure of the United States government to respond to the coronavirus was not a failure of foresight. It was a failure to create a coherent strategy and to provide clear lines of authority to implement it. To prepare for the next pandemic, we need to end our current proliferation of planning mandates and overlapping agency authorities (such as that of the Assistant Secretary for Response and Preparedness), strengthen the pandemic response ability of one agency (preferably the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), and reform our current National Emergency Act to allow clear delegation of emergency power. Only by examining our current failures and rectifying them, most importantly, by combining authority, responsibility, and accountability in the right hands, can we make sure that our next Pandemic Preparedness Act is not an embarrassment to its name.</p><p><strong>Pervasive Pandemic Preparedness Planning</strong></p><p>After the avian influenza scare of 2005, Congress did the thing it does best, demand that somebody else come up with a plan. With the help of some of the best known names in politics, Congress passed the Pandemic Preparedness and Response Act in December of the following year.³ The act ordered the administration to convene a Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Policy Coordinating Committee, with most of the Cabinet in attendance, to write a plan for a biological catastrophe.⁴ The result was, first, a White House Homeland Security Council National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, followed the next year by National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan. The latter plan contained 233 pages of nebulous suggestions, such as recommending that, in a crisis, the government should be “providing anticipatory guidance and dispelling unrealistic expectations about the delivery of health and medical care.”⁵ These general plans in turn birthed numerous individual departments plan, such as the Department of Defense Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza.⁶ To supplement these federal plans, the Preparedness Act, and its subsequent iterations, also mandated that states create their own Pandemic Preparedness Plans, which have to be submitted regularly to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for approval. These plans total thousands of pages.⁷</p><p>Even before the 2006 act passed, however, the Department of Health and Human Services decided to issue its own Pandemic Influenza Plan, in 2005, and it issued one again 2009, and again in 2017, with similar vague exhortations. The subsequent versions of the plan contain no discussion of the National Strategies upon which the coordinating committees labored so diligently.⁸</p><p>These specific pandemic plans, usually focused on influenza, but with ramifications beyond it, are only a fraction of the government’s plans for biological crises. After 9/11, the government began writing regular National Response Frameworks, published by the Department of Homeland Security, on how to deal with any national emergency, including a biological attack or pandemic. (Any doubts about the Framework’s importance are dispelled by the opening of one such plan, which introduces the reader to “This important document.”)⁹ As the most recent Response Framework claims, it is “composed of a base document, Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes, Support Annexes, and Incident Annexes.” One of those supporting annexes is the Response Federal Agency Interagency Operational Plan, which says it “builds upon” on the National Response Framework in planning to respond to an emergency, but is mainly just a longer version of the Framework.¹⁰ Another of the annexes birthed from the Framework was, of course, a specific Biological Incident Annex.¹¹ The Annex claims that it “serves as the Federal organizing framework for responding and recovering from a range of biological threats,” although what the other plans do is therefore made unclear.¹²</p><p>To further add to the confusion, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), apparently on its own initiative, created a National Health Security Strategy for the United States in 2009, with updates in 2015 and 2019, describing responses to pandemic and infectious disease outbreaks. Surprisingly, the plan contains no reference to the hundreds of pages of pandemic planning from other departments, or even from other plans written by HHS itself.¹³</p><p>The HHS National Health Security Strategy was an annex of sorts to the more comprehensive National Security Strategy, issued by the White House National Security Council, which itself also includes plans to deal with an epidemic, and demands the government “detect and contain biothreats at their source.”¹⁴ But the White House also issued numerous specific plans to deal with biological threats outside of the so-called NHSS and the NSS. As a sampling, there was the 2006 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-10, “Biodefense for the 21st Century,” and the 2009 National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats (featuring the peerless “Objective Seven,” which demanded that the government “Transform the international dialogue on biological threats”) and the 2016 National Security Council’s Playbook for Early Response to High-Consequence Infectious Disease.¹⁵ In the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017, Congress mandated that the White House convene a group of interagency officials to write a specific National Biodefense Strategy, which was released to understandably little fanfare the following year. The strategy offers such inimitable insights as “Biological Threats Originate from Multiple Sources,” including “naturally occurring outbreaks.” Its relation to previous pandemic plans is not clear, since none of them are cited.¹⁶</p><p>The United States has also made league with international organizations in creating new plans. In 2005, the U.S. and the World Health Organization encouraged all WHO member nations to create their own pandemic response plans.¹⁷ One might imagine that the innumerable plans already issued by the United States would satisfy this requirement. Instead, the US Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at HHS created a United States Health Security National Action Plan, which at least admits it “derives from, maintains alignment with, underscores, and supports the goals and implementation plans of other federal statutory and policy obligations, including the United States’ National Security Strategy, the National Health Security Strategy (NHSS), the National Biodefense Strategy (NBS), and other important federal initiatives and partnerships.”¹⁸ It also notes that the Plan was a supplement of sorts to North American Plan for Animal and Pandemic Influenza, written with the help of the health administrations of Canada and Mexico, and released in 2007 and again 2012, whose details I will not bore you with.¹⁹</p><p>In summary, the acronyms for existing federal pandemic response plans include, but are not limited to, NSPI, NSPIIP, PIP, NRF, RFIOP, BIA, NHSNAP, NSS, NHSS, NBS, NAPAPI, along with assorted other incidents, annexes and iterations, to use the language favored by their authors.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/962/1*fBqvI849DegiTD-P0nwRsg.png" /></figure><p>Such a farrago of mismatched plans does have consequences. Because of the piles of unreadable PDFs, nobody can be held responsible to any of them, and different departments of government, with their own, often-contradictory plans, continue to work at cross-purposes. When <em>Politico </em>noted that the Trump administration was not following the National Security Council’s Playbook for Early Response to High-Consequence Infectious Disease, the administration responded that they weren’t working with that plan anymore, but with some combination of the Biological Incident Annex to the National Response Framework, the Biodefense Strategy, and something called the Pandemic Crisis Action Plan (or PanCAP), whose provenance and even existence outside of this discussion I have not been able to discover.²⁰ Inevitably, the Trump administration has now written its own hundred-plus page plan specifically for the COVID-19 pandemic. After decades of pandemic planning for just such a crisis, only one previous plan is even referenced in it.²¹</p><p><strong>Who’s in Charge?</strong></p><p>Another question not infrequently asked during the crisis is, who is supposed to be in charge of the response? It may surprise the reader to know that, at least according to the 2006 Pandemic Preparedness Act, someone named Robert Kadlec, the Assistant Secretary for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, is supposed to “coordinate the Federal interagency response to a pandemic.”²² Kadlec seems like a qualified individual. He spent 20 years as an Air Force physician, and was a staff director of a subcommittee on bioterrorism in the Senate, and a director of biodefense on Homeland Security Council from 2002 to 2005, before becoming special assistant to the President from 2007 to 2009.²³ His name, or even existence, however, may surprise the public, because they haven’t heard a word from him in the three weeks since the HHS said they were delegating him to lead the response, at least at their own department, seemingly counter to the express words of the statute putting him in charge across all agencies.²⁴</p><p>But one can’t blame HHS for limiting the Assistant Secretary’s mandate, since other statutes give other agencies authority to coordinate pandemic response. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention by its very title would seem to lead the response to a pandemic, and indeed, its empowering law says that “Congress finds that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has an essential role in defending against and combatting public health threats domestically and abroad,” so that the director should appropriately “maintain capabilities related to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies, sufficient to enable such Centers to conduct this important mission.”²⁵ Thus, Robert Redfield, the CDC’s director and a former professor at the University of Maryland, would seem to be in charge as well.²⁶ The CDC contains a Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, with authority to implement quarantines and stop the spread of diseases, and a National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (affectionally called by no one the NCEZID).²⁷ But how these agencies relate to other agencies is not clear.²⁸</p><p>The job of quarantining and controlling such diseases is further muddied because Congress has also given such authority to the Surgeon General of the United States, now occupied by Jerome Adams, a former assistant professor of anesthesiology at Indiana University and Indiana State Health Commissioner. Adams oversees the Public Health Service, whose originating law gives him authority to “make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession.” How this authority squares with those of the CDC or other agencies is not clear.²⁹</p><p>The Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, the CDC Director, and the Surgeon General all serve in the Department of Health and Human Services. And thus the Secretary of HHS, now Alex Azar, a former Deputy Secretary of HHS during the Bush administration, should clearly have some authority. In fact, according to law, he seems to have all of it. As one HHS website declares, “The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services has statutory responsibility for preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases in the United States.” Some of this he has delegated to CDC and their Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, but it is not clear how that fits with statutory authority carried by the Surgeon General and Assistant Secretary for Preparedness or other agencies.³⁰</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*C56WtOaf7VyQh7ME.jpg" /></figure><p>There are other agencies outside of HHS which are also supposed to lead the response to a pandemic. The Federal Emergency Management Agency would seem to be the lead responder, since, in FEMA’s own words, the agency was created due to a “lack of coordination [in emergency situations] and the fact that, at the Federal level, no single entity was responsible for coordinating Federal response and recovery efforts during large-scale disasters and emergencies.”³¹ So today, FEMA, led by Administrator Peter Gaynor, who was director of the Providence and then Rhode Island emergency management agencies, says it “coordinates the federal government’s role in preparing for, preventing, mitigating the effects of, responding to, and recovering from all domestic disasters, whether natural or man-made.”³² How it is supposed to enforce this coordination with the other agencies is not clear.</p><p>Besides those agencies given direct emergency authority, many others seem to have a crucial job in disease response, but their authority is not integrated with other disaster response “coordinators.” The Food and Drug Administration, under Steven Hahn, former head of the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, has significant power to approve drugs and tests that deal with a disease outbreak.³³ The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, under Anthony Fauci, former recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2008 for his role in combating the AIDs epidemic, has a role in sponsoring the research into new cures and responses to epidemics.³⁴ Other agencies also have claimed and appear to have some authority in responding to infectious diseases, as well as planning for them, including the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security.³⁵ For the reader’s sake, I will not got into such seeming tertiary organizations as the National Pandemic Influenza Economics Advisory Committee. (This committee has apparently not met in years.)³⁶</p><p>The White House itself is supposed to organize disaster response under the National Security Council, and it is not surprising that in this case it has also created a Coronavirus Task Force, composed of most major members of the US Cabinet and other officials, although the task force surprisingly excludes many officials the law themselves designated as “coordinators,” such as the Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and the FEMA Administrator. The newly created “response coordinator” for the task force is Deborah Birx, the US Global AIDS Coordinator under the past two presidents, although exactly what authority she has to “coordinate” with other departments is also not clear.³⁷</p><p>To summarize, the acronyms of those agencies that are supposed to organize a response to a communicable disease crisis include, but are not limited to, the ASPR, CDC, DGMQ, NCEZID, USSG, HHS, FEMA, FDA, NIAID, DOD, DHS, NSC, CTF, and associated sub-agencies and divisions and offices. Inside these agencies, there are dozens of intelligent and accomplished individuals, often from bipartisan or civil service backgrounds, who are supposed to lead in a crisis. The problem is that those people have no clear lines of authority about who is supposed to coordinate them or be in charge, and no clear plan to follow even if such authority were provided.</p><p><strong>A Failure of Government and A Partial Solution</strong></p><p>The haphazard, confused, and contradictory response of the US government to the coronavirus pandemic perfectly illustrates what political scientist Steven Teles calls our “kludgeocracy.”³⁸ Since the United States government, unlike the parliamentary governments of many other developed nations, does not have a unified system of executive and legislative control, its reforms tended to be more slow and sporadic. Our relative slowness in changing policy is one of the geniuses of American government, in that it ensures policy changes are enacted more deliberately, and with more broad-based support, than other nations’. But there are costs beyond mere sluggishness. The fact that the US government also has a proliferation of “veto-points,” from congressional committees to agency regulators to judges to presidential task forces, means most new policies are awkward “kludges,” or fixes layered on top of more pervasive problems. Many new policies, such as Pandemic Preparedness Act, just layer new agencies on top of old, or demand more of what has been called the kudzu of bureaucracy, interagency committees. Such fixes often further exacerbate the existing confusion, and lead to new awkward kludges and more problems, such as the proliferation of coordinators without clear authority, who in fact create more veto-points preventing action.³⁹ The proliferating bureaucracies, in turn, lead to an increasing desire to enlarge the powers of the presidency itself to corral competing fiefdoms. The failures of such a habit in the present crisis are too obvious to require elaboration.</p><p>Despite these structural problems, the question remains, are there potential solutions in preparing for the next, inevitable, crisis? Absent a radical change of our system of government, which would neither be warranted or wise, there are limits to what we can accomplish. Nothing would be more futile than to demand a new <em>true </em>plan for responding to a viral outbreak, and a new <em>true </em>coordinator to organize it. This would only create something like the Director of National Intelligence, which Congress created in the wake of 9/11 to synchronize the work of proliferating intelligence agencies, but which has had little authority and less power in the subsequent years. It has only added one more layer of bureaucracy to many.⁴⁰</p><p>The first recommendation to Congress in trying to prepare for the next crisis is simple: Do No Harm. They should not respond to the coronavirus by creating one more administrator or director or interagency committee to organize pandemic response. Whatever one thinks of our existing agencies, there are great reservoirs of talent and expertise in them that can be brought to bear with the right direction.</p><p>If anything, consolidating existing agencies, or even eliminating many positions, would be more productive. The Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response has proven to be a paper tiger, without authority across different agencies and without a voice in the executive offices. It should be eliminated. HHS’s pandemic response should be taken away from both the Assistant Secretary and the Surgeon General and should be centralized in the CDC.⁴¹ If anything, outside agencies like FEMA should be forced to defer to the CDC in a biological crisis, while the CDC’s more research-oriented activities would best be hived off into the National Institutes of Health, which are nimbler in producing innovative breakthroughs. Philip Howard’s group Common Good has long advocated combining public authority and responsibility in a handful of clearly-defined positions, and we should heed them now.⁴² Fewer bureaucracies with more consistent lines of authority would create the accountability we need in a crisis.</p><p>Congress also should not respond to the coronavirus by mandating any more plans. While generic planning can be a productive exercise, as Helmuth von Moltke said over a century ago, “No plan survives first contact with the enemy.” As we also learned from the most extensive economic planning exercises of the 20th century, the “Five Year Plans” created by many developing nations, conditions on the ground are inevitably changed by the time the plan itself is finished.⁴³</p><p>Instead of plans, disaster exercises, such as the Crimson Contagion pandemic response exercise run in 2016, at least require concrete decisions and steps, and demand analysis of potential failures and new avenues. Such exercises, at least if their lessons are heeded, offer better food for thought and create better institutional knowledge than one more unreadable plan.⁴⁴</p><p>Finally, Congress should look at amending the one act that is supposed to govern all national crises, the National Emergency Act of 1976. Right now, the act gives only limited authority to cut through existing rules and bureaucracies.<a href="#_ftn45">[45]</a> A renewed National Emergency Act, one which provided some ability to establish clear lines of authority for certain agencies and bureaucracies and override contradictory laws in a crisis, would improve our ability to respond to a pervasive disaster such as our current one. An amended emergency act should also separate the declaration of emergency from the exercise of power under it. Right now, the President both declares the national emergency and then wields emergency power. Instead, the President should have power to declare the emergency, but then, at least in in the case of a pandemic, that authority should be transferred to the CDC, which is best prepared to implement any presidential directive. As long as the CDC director is still answerable to the President, this reform would maintain political accountability, while removing concerns about power grabs in an emergency.⁴⁶</p><p>Finally, after this crisis we should continue to strengthen one of the existing assets of American democracy, our federal system. Although the overlapping authority of local, state, and federal governments would seem to be one more example of our “kludgeocracy,” America’s unparalleled decentralized system allows politicians and officials on the ground to respond to a crisis even when the federal government lags.⁴⁷ Although some cities and states have responded slowly, others acted with appropriate dispatch, and demonstrated the value of rapid action in curbing the worst effects of the pandemic.⁴⁸ We should remove any existing laws that preempt the state and local ability to respond in a crisis, and make sure national actions remain a floor, and not a ceiling, on action.⁴⁹ Differing state and local responses will demonstrate the value of the best policies and allow them to spread.</p><p>The sad truth is that the U.S. government did plan for just such a crisis as the one we now face. But we cannot count on planning to solve a future crisis. We need to simplify and clarify our federal bureaucracy so it can respond more nimbly to such a crisis in the future, even while we continue to rely on the wisdom of many thousands of Americans in state and local governments to lead.</p><p><strong>Judge Glock<br></strong>Senior Policy Analyst, The Cicero Institute</p><p>If you liked this article, and would be interested in other articles by me and my colleagues, visit <a href="https://www.ciceroinstitute.org/">the Cicero Institute</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/07/coronavirus-epidemic-prediction-policy-advice-121172">https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/07/coronavirus-epidemic-prediction-policy-advice-121172</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/269/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22monograph+reform%22%5D%7D&amp;r=1&amp;s=1">https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/269/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22monograph+reform%22%5D%7D&amp;r=1&amp;s=1</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <a href="https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s1821/text">https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s1821/text</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> This was an updated version of sorts of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002, which had focused more on bioterrorism, but which had also created some of the essential authorities later extended under the 2006 act, and the 2013 and 2019 reauthorizations, as well as assorted other acts, such as the Bioshield Act of 2004. <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-107publ188/pdf/PLAW-107publ188.pdf">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-107publ188/pdf/PLAW-107publ188.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-implementation.pdf">https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-implementation.pdf</a> Ironically, perhaps, these plans came out before the final passage of the Pandemic Preparedness Act of 2006. The actual “Coordinating Committee” recommended by the act never met, and the government treated these plans, written while the act was moving through Congress, as fulfilling the act’s mandate.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&amp;did=473250">https://www.hsdl.org/?view&amp;did=473250</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> <a href="https://www.nga.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Pandemic-Influenza-Primer.pdf">https://www.nga.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Pandemic-Influenza-Primer.pdf</a> <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3294751/">https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3294751/</a></p><p><a href="https://www.azdhs.gov/documents/preparedness/emergency-preparedness/pandemic-flu/az-pandemic-influenza-response-plan.pdf">https://www.azdhs.gov/documents/preparedness/emergency-preparedness/pandemic-flu/az-pandemic-influenza-response-plan.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pdf/professionals/hhspandemicinfluenzaplan.pdf">https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pdf/professionals/hhspandemicinfluenzaplan.pdf</a> The original plan claimed it was an addendum to the National Response Framework and the World Health Organization pandemic planning requirements, both described below. There are exactly two brief mentions of even the existence of the National Strategy Plans in the 2017 HHS Plan.</p><p><a href="https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pan-flu-report-2017v2.pdf">https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pan-flu-report-2017v2.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> <a href="https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/about_nrf.pdf">https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/about_nrf.pdf</a> <a href="https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1582825590194-2f000855d442fc3c9f18547d1468990d/NRF_FINALApproved_508_2011028v1040.pdf">https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1582825590194-2f000855d442fc3c9f18547d1468990d/NRF_FINALApproved_508_2011028v1040.pdf</a> <a href="https://www.gsa.gov/governmentwide-initiatives/emergency-response/the-national-response-framework">https://www.gsa.gov/governmentwide-initiatives/emergency-response/the-national-response-framework</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> <a href="https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1471452095112-507e23ad4d85449ff131c2b025743101/Response_FIOP_2nd.pdf">https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1471452095112-507e23ad4d85449ff131c2b025743101/Response_FIOP_2nd.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> <a href="https://www.gsa.gov/governmentwide-initiatives/emergency-response/the-national-response-framework">https://www.gsa.gov/governmentwide-initiatives/emergency-response/the-national-response-framework</a> <a href="https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1511178017324-92a7a7f808b3f03e5fa2f8495bdfe335/BIA_Annex_Final_1-23-17_(508_Compliant_6-28-17).pdf">https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1511178017324-92a7a7f808b3f03e5fa2f8495bdfe335/BIA_Annex_Final_1-23-17_(508_Compliant_6-28-17).pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> <a href="https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1511178017324-92a7a7f808b3f03e5fa2f8495bdfe335/BIA_Annex_Final_1-23-17_(508_Compliant_6-28-17).pdf">https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1511178017324-92a7a7f808b3f03e5fa2f8495bdfe335/BIA_Annex_Final_1-23-17_(508_Compliant_6-28-17).pdf</a> The NRF’s BIA contains both a “base document and a branch plan.”</p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> <a href="https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/Documents/nhss0912.pdf">https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/Documents/nhss0912.pdf</a> <a href="https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/Documents/nhss-ip.pdf">https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/Documents/nhss-ip.pdf</a> Although earlier versions were apparently done at HHS’s own initiative, more recent National Health Security Strategies were required by Pandemic Preparedness Act <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-113publ5/pdf/PLAW-113publ5.pdf">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-113publ5/pdf/PLAW-113publ5.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf">https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a> <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&amp;did=784400">https://www.hsdl.org/?view&amp;did=784400</a> <a href="https://www.hsdl.org/?view&amp;did=31404%20">https://www.hsdl.org/?view&amp;did=31404</a></p><p><a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/25/trump-coronavirus-national-security-council-149285">https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/25/trump-coronavirus-national-security-council-149285</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf">https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a> <a href="https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/international/Documents/napapi.pdf">https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/international/Documents/napapi.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> <a href="https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/international/Documents/jee-nap-508.pdf">https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/international/Documents/jee-nap-508.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> <a href="https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/international/Documents/napapi.pdf">https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/international/Documents/napapi.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a> For sporadic references to this mysterious plan, which may or may not be another name for a government plan already discussed, see <a href="https://www.nga.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/FEMA_FactSheet_COVID-Response_03.04.20.pdf">https://www.nga.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/FEMA_FactSheet_COVID-Response_03.04.20.pdf</a></p><p><a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-150">https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-150</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[21]</a> <a href="https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6819-covid-19-response-plan/d367f758bec47cad361f/optimized/full.pdf">https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6819-covid-19-response-plan/d367f758bec47cad361f/optimized/full.pdf</a> The Biological Incident Annex received a few stray mentions.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[22]</a> <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-109s1821is/html/BILLS-109s1821is.htm">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-109s1821is/html/BILLS-109s1821is.htm</a> In the most recent updates of the act, the wording is changed slightly to: “coordinate with relevant Federal officials to ensure integration of Federal preparedness and response activities for public health emergencies,” and “provide integrated policy coordination and strategic direction, before, during, and following public health emergencies, with respect to all matters related to Federal public health and medical preparedness and execution and deployment of the Federal response for public health emergencies and incidents covered by the National Response Plan.” <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/300hh-10">https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/300hh-10</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[23]</a> <a href="https://www.phe.gov/newsroom/bio/Pages/kadlec.aspx">https://www.phe.gov/newsroom/bio/Pages/kadlec.aspx</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref24">[24]</a> <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/02/robert-kadlec-hhs-coronavirus-response-118934">https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/02/robert-kadlec-hhs-coronavirus-response-118934</a> <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/02/13/2020-02839/office-of-the-assistant-secretary-for-preparedness-and-response-statement-of-organization-functions">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/02/13/2020-02839/office-of-the-assistant-secretary-for-preparedness-and-response-statement-of-organization-functions</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref25">[25]</a> <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/247d-4">https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/247d-4</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a> <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/247d-4">https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/247d-4</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref27">[27]</a> <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/19/2017-00615/control-of-communicable-diseases">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/19/2017-00615/control-of-communicable-diseases</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref28">[28]</a> <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/dgmq/index.html">https://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/dgmq/index.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref29">[29]</a> <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/264">https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/264</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref30">[30]</a> <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/specificlawsregulations.html">https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/specificlawsregulations.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref31">[31]</a> <a href="https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1823-25045-8164/pub_1_final.pdf">https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1823-25045-8164/pub_1_final.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref32">[32]</a> <a href="https://training.fema.gov/history.aspx">https://training.fema.gov/history.aspx</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref33">[33]</a> <a href="https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-organization/stephen-hahn">https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-organization/stephen-hahn</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref34">[34]</a> <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/dr-anthony-fauci-trusted-voice-coronavirus-200330124431910.html">https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/dr-anthony-fauci-trusted-voice-coronavirus-200330124431910.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref35">[35]</a> See DoD and DHS plans cited above.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref36">[36]</a> <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-109s1821is/html/BILLS-109s1821is.htm">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-109s1821is/html/BILLS-109s1821is.htm</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref37">[37]</a> <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-presidents-coronavirus-task-force/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-presidents-coronavirus-task-force/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref38">[38]</a> Steven Teles, Kludgeocracy: The American Way of Policy, <a href="https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/4209-kludgeocracy-the-american-way-of-policy/Teles_Steven_Kludgeocracy_NAF_Dec2012.d8a805aa40e34bca9e2fecb018a3dcb0.pdf">https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/4209-kludgeocracy-the-american-way-of-policy/Teles_Steven_Kludgeocracy_NAF_Dec2012.d8a805aa40e34bca9e2fecb018a3dcb0.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref39">[39]</a> For a classic description of how interagency coordination can stymie projects, see Jeff Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, <em>Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland</em></p><p><a href="#_ftnref40">[40]</a> <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/485416-is-it-even-worth-having-a-director-of-national-intelligence">https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/485416-is-it-even-worth-having-a-director-of-national-intelligence</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref41">[41]</a> For instance, Taiwan has a Center for Disease Control with a Central Epidemic Command Center for organizing general responses to pandemic, which was create after the SARS outbreak of 2004. <a href="https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En">https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref42">[42]</a> <a href="https://www.commongood.org/">https://www.commongood.org/</a> Philip Howard has also proposed a temporary Recovery Authority to cut through the bureaucratic morass. As a solution for the present crisis, such an additional authority could be productive, but it should in no way be extended. <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/03/30/when-coronavirus-pandemic-ends-u-s-needs-federal-recovery-authority-column/2918842001/">https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/03/30/when-coronavirus-pandemic-ends-u-s-needs-federal-recovery-authority-column/2918842001/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref43">[43]</a> Economist Paul Gregory noted that despite the ballyhoo surrounding the Five Year Plans of the Soviet Union, many of the plans were not even finished until two or three years into the actual planning period, and were amended immediately after their “completion.” In reality, enterprises on the ground, in the Soviet Union and other planned economies, largely ignored such plans. Paul Gregory, <em>The Political Economy of Stalinism</em>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref44">[44]</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-outbreak.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/19/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-outbreak.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref45">[45]</a> See most recent National Emergency Declaration, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergency-concerning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref46">[46]</a> The return of a reorganization authority, which from 1932 to 1982 allowed the President to reorganize departments after examination and potential veto by Congress, could also potentially help over the long-term clarify existing bureaucracies. <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42852.pdf">https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42852.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref47">[47]</a> Peter Schuck and James Q. Wilson, Understanding America.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref48">[48]</a> <a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/03/30/coronavirus-is-bay-area-social-distancing-lockdown-working-some-see-progress/">https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/03/30/coronavirus-is-bay-area-social-distancing-lockdown-working-some-see-progress/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref49">[49]</a> For brief discussion of how some federal laws could pre-empt state action, see <a href="https://www.astho.org/Programs/Preparedness/Public-Health-Emergency-Law/Emergency-Authority-and-Immunity-Toolkit/Emergency-Declarations-and-Authorities-Fact-Sheet/">https://www.astho.org/Programs/Preparedness/Public-Health-Emergency-Law/Emergency-Authority-and-Immunity-Toolkit/Emergency-Declarations-and-Authorities-Fact-Sheet/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a20608d05800" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news/why-two-decades-of-pandemic-planning-failed-a20608d05800">Why Two Decades of Pandemic Planning Failed</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news">Cicero News</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Misconceptions about California’s Housing Crisis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cicero-news/misconceptions-about-californias-housing-crisis-ebf1d223acf8?source=rss-1c7206c33e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ebf1d223acf8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[california]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[yimby]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nimby]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Judge Glock]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Jan 2020 20:22:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-25T17:29:33.374Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Misconceptions about California’s Housing Crisis: <strong>Why Cars and Suburbs Are Part of the Solution, Not the Problem</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*cUQhGvFrL4Og-ZIm" /></figure><p>The “Yes-In-My-Backyard,” or YIMBY, movement in California has become the most powerful force for better housing in modern American history. Their success in advocating for more housing, through both state and local work, is incomparable.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p>Yet much of the rhetoric of the supposedly pro-housing YIMBY movement attacks single-family housing, suburban development, and the common use of cars.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> Since the majority of Californians live in suburbs and own their own homes, and since over 90% of households have at least one car, such attacks will limit YIMBYs’ ability to branch out from their urban base.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> Despite claims by some YIMBYs, most Californians and most Americans are not opposed to single-family homes or cars, but want them to be cheaper, greener, and more convenient.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> Luckily, we can achieve these goals, while also providing more options for those who want to live in dense urban areas.</p><p>This article is a brief attempt to set the record straight about suburbs, homes, and cars, and correct some of the unfortunate errors that have crept into a successful pro-housing movement. Single-family zoning in our densest cities is indeed a problem that the YIMBYs are best-placed to fix, but that doesn’t mean that all types of single-family housing are destructive, and that we don’t need to build more car-accessible houses outside of our dense urban areas as well. In California, there is no hope for our housing crisis unless we build both up and out.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a></p><p><strong>Misconception 1: California is peculiarly resistant to building because of its tradition of single-family, suburban homeownership.</strong></p><p>California housing prices are at least twice as high as the rest of the United States, and, in the biggest coastal cities, at least three times at high.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> But our high prices are not because our state is more infested with homeowners who refuse to allow development. At least since 1920, California has had below average homeownership rates. By 1960, the national homeownership rate was 62%, but only 58% in California, and since then the state’s homeownership rate has declined. It is now 55%. The gap between the national and California homeownership has been growing, just while California has become ever more resistant to building relative to the rest of the U.S.<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a></p><p>California’s existing homeowners also have not prevented dense development. In fact, California cities have always been relatively dense, and are the only major part of the US to densify over the past 50 years. The Los Angeles region had 4,600 people per square mile in 1960, and this has increased to over 7,000 people today. San Francisco had 4,200 people per square mile in 1960, and has over 6,200 today. These areas were less sprawling than places like Atlanta, Austin, and Pittsburgh even in 1960, and are much denser than the average American city today, which has around 3,000 people per square mile. California’s cities have continued to densify, even as California housing prices have more than doubled relative to the national average.<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a></p><p>In other words, the reason for high California prices is not excessive homeownership and sprawl.</p><p><strong>Misconception 2: The federal government has spent billions bolstering homeownership and expanding suburbs, especially through the Federal Housing Administration.</strong></p><p>Much of the rhetoric around housing claims that single-family and suburban homeownership has been the result not of individual choices but of federal subsidies, especially federal subsidies coming from the New Deal and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which was created in 1934 to insure home mortgages. In a 2016 article in the <em>Journal of Policy History, </em>I demonstrated that this claim is unsupported by statistics. From the 1930s to the 1960s, the FHA insured 26% of all single-family home loans, but it also insured 40% of all multifamily and rental construction mortgages, so the federal government was biased more towards rental property than single-family homes. At the same time, it insured 23% of home loans in central cities, and 19% of loans in the suburbs, so it was biased towards big cities rather than suburbs.<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a></p><p>If one adds the fact that the federal government created millions of public housing units after 1937 that were always rental and tended to be in cities, you get a clear bias away from suburbs and single-family homes. And this federal bias towards cities actually increased after 1960.<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a></p><p>In sum, federal subsidies to housing have focused on dense and central-city homes, yet this has not prevented a gradual increase in “sprawl” across the United States.</p><p><strong>Misconception 3: The Federal government has long subsidized drivers at the expense of non-drivers and transit commuters.</strong></p><p>When people don’t blame federal home-subsidies for American sprawl and homeownership, they blame supposed subsidies from non-drivers to drivers through the construction of roads and highways. This is inaccurate.</p><p>Congress created the 1956 Interstate Highway Act as a “Pay as You Go” system, which at the time was funded by a 3-cent tax on gasoline. All original federal highway funds thus came from “user fees” paid by drivers. By contrast, the 1964 Mass Transportation Act, and all subsequent federal transit legislation, was a straight grant with no contribution from transit riders. In fact, since 1982, about 20% of the gas tax has been siphoned off to pay transit riders as well, with that percentage increasing over time.</p><p>Today, there is no doubt that drivers subsidize transit riders, and not the other way around. According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, drivers contribute a $2 federal subsidy to other modes of traffic per 1000 passenger miles traveled (PMT), mainly due to the 18.3% federal gas taxes, while transit riders get a $111 federal subsidy per 1000 PMT.<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a> Considering all subsidies from federal, state, and local governments, transit riders pay only about 25% of the cost of their ride, while drivers pay about 98% of the cost of their driving.<a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a></p><p>Despite large and increasing subsidies to transit (transit was self-funding as little as four decades ago) the percentage of Americans taking transit to work has continuously declined, from about 20% in 1950 to almost 5% today. The percentage taking transit for non-work trips has declined even faster, and now is about 2% of all passenger miles traveled.<a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a></p><p>Also, despite claims of monetary savings from concentrating more development and infrastructure spending in dense, transit-dependent areas, most studies show that larger and denser cities have more expensive capital costs of government per capita than more “sprawling” cities, due to the congestion costs and difficulties of building and maintaining services in dense areas.<a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a></p><p>In sum, the reasons most Americans drive and live in suburbs is not due to subsidies to driving. In fact, without significant federal, state, and local transit subsidies, the percent of Americans driving would be much higher.</p><p><strong>Misconception 4: Federal government subsidies have made housing a continuously appreciating asset for the last 100 years.</strong></p><p>Many people argue that homeowners’ desire to protect a continuously appreciating asset, their homes, explains why they are so resistant to new building. In fact, despite a short-term dip in the World War I to World War II period, housing prices were almost completely flat from 1900 to the mid-1990s. Homeowners saw almost no gain in prices over almost 100 years, and only saw a sudden doubling in prices from 1997 to 2006, when supply constraints on housing became more common in a handful of large, coastal cities. In areas like Atlanta, Austin, and others, there has been just a steady rise of prices with inflation over a 100-year period. Home prices in those areas have stayed around $100 per square foot, the cost of construction.<a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a></p><p>In other words, in most of the U.S., and for most of our history, where and when homeownership has been common, homes have been mainly valued for their ability to provide peace and privacy, and stable savings, with little prospect of gain.</p><p><strong>Misconception 5: The US has a particular addiction to cars, sprawl, and single-family homes that have driven up home prices.</strong></p><p>The history of past 100-plus years show that as countries get richer, their cities tend to spread out more and people tend to drive more. The U.S. is more sprawling and more car dependent than other nations, but that is largely because we became richer, earlier.<a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a></p><p>A look at the trajectory of other urban areas proves this near universal trend towards “sprawl.” The population density of the Paris region has decreased from almost 100,000 people per square mile in 1850 to 20,000 in 1950, to less than 10,000 today, and this almost exactly mirrors London’s trajectory, and those of most other major European cities. In Western Europe, central cities have declined in population by over 10% in the past 50 years, while their suburbs have more than doubled in population, a rate comparable to the declines and increases in America’s recent history.<a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a></p><p>The U.S. does drive more than most other countries, about 10,000 Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) per capita on average, which has increased from about 6,000 in 1970, but other countries are charting the same path. The Netherlands, the U.K., Sweden, and France all drove about 2,000 VMT per capita in 1970, but this has increased to 4,000 today, and continues to rise as these countries get richer.<a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a></p><p>More importantly, America’s more sprawling society has not increased the prices of our homes relative to other countries. In fact, it has been the opposite. Our homes are among the cheapest on Earth. The most common measure of home affordability is the value of the median house in a country to that country’s median family income. In the United States, a home costs about four times a median family’s income, one of the lowest ratios in the world, and even this rate is driven up mainly by housing prices in coastal cities. In most of the US the rate is 3 to 1. In Canada and New Zealand, the cost of the median home compared to the median family income is 8 to 1, while in the Netherlands, Denmark, and the U.K., the rate is closer to 12 to 1. Other European countries’ home costs are even higher. In most of these countries, these much pricier homes are also significantly smaller.<a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a></p><p><strong>Misconception 6: Public transit is quicker and greener than automobile travel.</strong></p><p>The average commute to work by car in the US is about 25 minutes, while the average commute by transit is over 45 minutes. Some people claim that the slowness of transit commutes is only due to America’s sprawling cities. Yet even in New York and San Francisco, the first and third densest areas in the US, commutes by car take about 30 minutes, while commutes by transit take 50 minutes.<a href="#_ftn20">[20]</a> In general, denser cities in America have longer and slower commutes than less dense cities, no matter the mode of travel. And, as density increases, the amount of time spent in road congestion, for both bus riders and car drivers, increases as well, almost doubling with a doubling of density.<a href="#_ftn21">[21]</a></p><p>Yet, despite increasing congestion, density seems to have little effect on reducing driving. A metasurvey of studies on density and VMT by the California Air Resources Board shows that even a doubling of density, an incredible change achieved in no modern city, tends to reduce VMT by only 10 to 15%, and this mirrors the findings of a National Research Council metasurvey that found reduction of from 5% to 12%.<a href="#_ftn22">[22]</a> The fact that these decreased VMT are also associated with increased congestion, and therefore increased greenhouse gases per mile traveled, means the environmental effects of increased density approach zero.<a href="#_ftn23">[23]</a></p><p>Relying solely on transit also makes access to jobs more difficult, especially for the poor. Even in large and dense cities, the proportion of all jobs in the city that can be reached in 45 minutes by car approaches 100%, while the number of same jobs that can be reached by transit are only about 33%.<a href="#_ftn24">[24]</a> This is why most people, even very poor people, commute to work by car. Almost 80% of families who make under $15,000 a year in income commute by car, about the same ratio as the rest of the population. In fact, very high-income individuals tend to skew more towards transit than the middle class, because they often use commuter rail to travel to high-paying professional jobs in downtown districts.<a href="#_ftn25">[25]</a></p><p>Traveling by transit is also not necessarily more environmentally friendly than cars. Today, it takes about 2,900 British Thermal Units (BTU) for a car to move one passenger one mile (Passenger Mile Traveled, PMT), but it takes buses about 4,100 BTU per PMT. While the energy efficiency of cars is improving over 1% per year, buses have actually been getting about 1% dirtier per year. Rail transport has about the same level of BTUs per PMT of cars today, but rail too has been getting dirtier even as cars gets cleaner. With the gradual implementation of California’s electric car mandates and those in other states, there is no reason why cars cannot continue getting greener than transit.<a href="#_ftn26">[26]</a></p><p><strong>Misconception 7: America generally, and California specifically, has no more room to grow out, since sprawl will only exacerbate our environmental dilemmas.</strong></p><p>Nationally, just 3% of America’s land is urbanized.<a href="#_ftn27">[27]</a> In California, the number is 5%.<a href="#_ftn28">[28]</a> Even in dense regions such as the nine county Bay Area, the large majority of land is undeveloped. About 40% of all land in that region is actually cattle pasture.<a href="#_ftn29">[29]</a></p><p>Californians absolutely have to protect their biological treasures, such as the San Bruno Mountains, Yosemite, and the Marin Headlands in the Bay Area, but that doesn’t mean we don’t have hundreds of thousands of acres of cattle land that could be used for houses. And, as we’ve written before, due to California’s genial climate and pro-environmental legislation, almost any housing in California is greener than housing elsewhere, which means that all building here is a win for the climate.<a href="#_ftn30">[30]</a></p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The United States and California have many problems with our housing markets, but an “excessive” focus on sprawl, cars, and single-family homeownership is not one of them. We desperately need more housing in our dense coastal cities, but we also need to allow more housing on the fringe of our existing cities, which is what most Americans continue to prefer.</p><p>On the whole, America and the rest of the world are traversing the same path to a low-density, more car-dependent culture, one where cars are thankfully becoming much cleaner, and cleaner faster, than public transit.</p><p>Despite the problems in the U.S. housing market, our homes are much more affordable than most of the world. The handful of very expensive cities in America, largely in California, are in fact the least sprawling and most dense. The federal government, by contrast, has done much to encourage density, transit, and multifamily living, but have had little success in this regard.</p><p>People should be allowed to live in whatever sort of neighborhood density or situation they demand, and that means building both up and out, and providing for both transit and automobiles. Yet attacking suburbs, homes, and cars will not solve California’s housing crisis.</p><p><strong>Judge Glock<br></strong>Senior Policy Analyst, The Cicero Institute</p><p>To learn more and explore related policy issues, visit our website, <a href="http://www.ciceroinstitute.org/">www.ciceroinstitute.org</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Patrick Sisson, “YIMBY in action: How pro-housing policies became a political rallying cry,” <em>Curbed</em>, Jun 28, 2019, <a href="https://www.curbed.com/2019/6/28/19154146/yimby-real-estate-housing-apartment-rent-deveopment-zoning">https://www.curbed.com/2019/6/28/19154146/yimby-real-estate-housing-apartment-rent-deveopment-zoning</a> “A Commitment to “Yes””, <em>CAYIMBY</em>, September 23, 2019, <a href="https://cayimby.org/legislative-commitment-2019/">https://cayimby.org/legislative-commitment-2019/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Conor Dougherty and Brad Plumer, “A Bold, Divisive Plan to Wean Californians From Cars”, <em>NY Times</em>, March 16, 2018, <a href="https://cayimby.org/a-bold-divisive-plan-to-wean-californians-from-cars/">https://cayimby.org/a-bold-divisive-plan-to-wean-californians-from-cars/</a> Erin McCormick, “Rise of the yimbys: the angry millennials with a radical housing solution”, <em>The Guardian</em>, October 2, 2017, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/oct/02/rise-of-the-yimbys-angry-millennials-radical-housing-solution">https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/oct/02/rise-of-the-yimbys-angry-millennials-radical-housing-solution</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Sarah Jo Peterson, “Living Car-Free and Car-Lite in the United States: An Update with 2016 Data,” <em>Medium</em>, October 10, 2017, <a href="https://medium.com/@sjpeterson/living-car-free-and-car-lite-in-the-united-states-an-update-with-2016-data-4df3e13a8b75">https://medium.com/@sjpeterson/living-car-free-and-car-lite-in-the-united-states-an-update-with-2016-data-4df3e13a8b75</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Christopher Ingraham, “Americans say there’s not much appeal to big-city living. Why do so many of us live there?”, <em>The Washington Post</em>, December 19, 2018, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/12/18/americans-say-theres-not-much-appeal-big-city-living-why-do-so-many-us-live-there/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/12/18/americans-say-theres-not-much-appeal-big-city-living-why-do-so-many-us-live-there/</a> Kris Hudson, “Generation Y Prefers Suburban Home Over City Condo,” <em>The Wall Street Journal</em>, January 21, 2015, <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/millennials-prefer-single-family-homes-in-the-suburbs-1421896797">https://www.wsj.com/articles/millennials-prefer-single-family-homes-in-the-suburbs-1421896797</a> Chris Salviati, Rob Warnock, “2018 Millennial Homeownership Report: American Dream Delayed,” <em>Apartment List</em>, December 6, 2018, <a href="https://www.apartmentlist.com/rentonomics/2018-millennial-homeownership-report-american-dream-delayed/">https://www.apartmentlist.com/rentonomics/2018-millennial-homeownership-report-american-dream-delayed/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> For problems with relying on only dense urban areas for housing growth, see Patrick Wolf, “San Francisco cannot solve the Bay Area’s affordable housing crisis on its own,” <em>SF Examiner</em>, December 16, 2018, <a href="https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/san-francisco-cannot-solve-the-bay-areas-affordable-housing-crisis-on-its-own/">https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/san-francisco-cannot-solve-the-bay-areas-affordable-housing-crisis-on-its-own/</a>;</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> <a href="https://medium.com/@judgeglock/why-we-already-lost-local-control-in-california-and-why-the-state-needs-to-push-housing-f82dd0abe63d">https://medium.com/@judgeglock/why-we-already-lost-local-control-in-california-and-why-the-state-needs-to-push-housing-f82dd0abe63d</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> “Historical Census of Housing Tables,” <em>U.S. Census Bureau</em>, October 31, 2011, <a href="https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html">https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> “Urban Areas in the United States: 1950 to 2010 Principal Urban Areas in Metropolitan Areas Over 1,000,000 Population in 2010,” <em>Demographia, </em><a href="http://demographia.com/db-uza2000.htm">http://demographia.com/db-uza2000.htm</a> The only two areas outside California to gain significant density were Salt Lake City and Las Vegas.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Judge Glock, “How the Federal Housing Administration Tried to Save America’s Cities, 1934–1960,” <em>Journal of Policy History </em>(2016), <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-policy-history/article/how-the-federal-housing-administration-tried-to-save-americas-cities-19341960/DF2237D887E2D45D4B422AB0CE1D9F52">https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-policy-history/article/how-the-federal-housing-administration-tried-to-save-americas-cities-19341960/DF2237D887E2D45D4B422AB0CE1D9F52</a> The comparison is based on loans made with and without federal insurance, which is the only way to show a “causal” effect of federal intervention on the housing market. Some people also point to the mortgage interest deduction, but many forget to note that the mortgage on a rental property is also deductible as a business expense, and studies have shown that the personal mortgage interest deduction has no impact on homeownership. “Tax Reform, the Mortgage Interest Deduction, and Multifamily Investing,” <em>Resource Investing, </em>October 2, 2017, <a href="https://www.resourcealts.com/insight/mortgage-tax-reform-multifamily/">https://www.resourcealts.com/insight/mortgage-tax-reform-multifamily/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Ibid.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> “Table 4. Net Federal Subsidies per Thousand Passenger-Miles by Mode: FY 1990–2002,” <em>Bureau of Transportation Statistics</em>, May 20, 2017, <a href="https://www.bts.gov/archive/publications/federal_subsidies_to_passenger_transportation/table_04">https://www.bts.gov/archive/publications/federal_subsidies_to_passenger_transportation/table_04</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> “NTD Data,” <em>Federal Transit and Administration</em>, <a href="https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd/ntd-data">https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd/ntd-data</a> and “2017 Annual Database Fare Revenue,” <em>Federal Transit and Administration</em>, 2017, <a href="https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd/data-product/2017-annual-database-fare-revenue">https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd/data-product/2017-annual-database-fare-revenue</a> and “2017 Annual Database Operating Expense,” <em>Federal Transit and Administration</em>, 2017, <a href="https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd/data-product/2017-annual-database-operating-expense">https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd/data-product/2017-annual-database-operating-expense</a> and “2017 Annual Database Revenue Sources,” <em>Federal Transit and Administration</em>, 2017, <a href="https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd/data-product/2017-annual-database-revenue-sources">https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd/data-product/2017-annual-database-revenue-sources</a> and “2017 Annual Database Capital Use,” <em>Federal Transit and Administration</em>, 2017, <a href="https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd/data-product/2017-annual-database-capital-use">https://www.transit.dot.gov/ntd/data-product/2017-annual-database-capital-use</a> For interpretation of this data, see “Transport Costs Per Passenger Mile,” <em>The Antiplanner</em>, March 20, 2007, <a href="https://ti.org/antiplanner/?p=88">https://ti.org/antiplanner/?p=88</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Joseph Stromberg, “The utter dominance of the car in American commuting,” <em>Vox</em>, April 29, 2015, <a href="https://www.vox.com/2015/4/29/8505097/car-commuting">https://www.vox.com/2015/4/29/8505097/car-commuting</a>; Travel Mode Shares in the U.S.,” <em>The Transport Politic</em> <a href="https://www.thetransportpolitic.com/databook/travel-mode-shares-in-the-u-s/">https://www.thetransportpolitic.com/databook/travel-mode-shares-in-the-u-s/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> According to Helen Ladd, except for very sparsely populated, or semi-rural areas, “higher density typically increases public sector spending.” Helen F. Ladd, “Population Growth, Density and the Costs of Providing Public Services,” <em>Urban Studies</em> (1992): <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00420989220080321">https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00420989220080321</a> See also Marc Holzer, Ph.D. et. al, “Literature Review and Analysis Related to Optimal Municipal Size and Efficiency,” <em>New Jersey Government</em>, May 6, 2009, <a href="https://www.nj.gov/dca/affiliates/luarcc/pdf/final_optimal_municipal_size_&amp;_efficiency.pdf">https://www.nj.gov/dca/affiliates/luarcc/pdf/final_optimal_municipal_size_&amp;_efficiency.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a> “100 Years of Inflation Adjusted Housing Prices,” Observation, <a href="http://observationsandnotes.blogspot.com/2011/07/housing-prices-inflation-since-1900.html">http://observationsandnotes.blogspot.com/2011/07/housing-prices-inflation-since-1900.html</a> and <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SFXRSA">https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SFXRSA</a> <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ATXRNSA">https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ATXRNSA</a>; Kevin Erdmann, Shut Out: How a Housing Shortage Caused the Great Recession and Crippled Our Economy (New York: Rowman &amp; Littlefield, 2018).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> On subsidies to cars, some people include subsidies to the oil industry, but this is relatively minor. The Energy Information Administration compiled total federal subsidies to energy in 2016 (including tax expenditures through deductions and credits), and it shows that of the $15 billion spent annually on energy subsidies, 45% went to renewables and another 7% went to conservation, and about 8% to coal. Most of the other 40% went to the LIHEAP (low income heating assistance program) which is just a redistribution, not a real energy subsidy. Oil and coal together got only a little over a billion in tax expenditures, or less than 10%. “Direct Federal Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy Fiscal Year 2016,” <em>EPA, </em><a href="https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf">https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/pdf/subsidy.pdf</a>. On the other hand, the social cost of carbon from cars should be included as an implicit “subsidy” to gasoline, but that also increases the costs for fuels used by public transit, which, as I show below, uses about the same BTUs per PMT as cars today, so overall it would not affect a car vs. non-car subsidy. In a world of $50 or $100 per ton of carbon dioxide tax, however, this would increase gasoline costs by about 44 or 88 cents per gallon. Marianne Lavelle, “Carbon Tax Plans,” <em>Inside Climate News, </em>March 7, 2019,<a href="https://insideclimatenews.org/news/07032019/carbon-tax-proposals-compare-baker-shultz-exxon-conocophillips-ccl-congress">https://insideclimatenews.org/news/07032019/carbon-tax-proposals-compare-baker-shultz-exxon-conocophillips-ccl-congress</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a> Also, despite a focus on supposed renter-friendly European countries, many European countries in fact have higher homeownership rates than the U.S. with rates of 78% in Belgium, 80% in Italy, and 76% in Portugal. Peter Gordon and Wendell Cox, “CITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: DO POLICY DIFFERENCES MATTER?”, <em>USC Lusk Center for Real Estate</em>, <a href="https://lusk.usc.edu/file/757/download?token=DsnboRVL">https://lusk.usc.edu/file/757/download?token=DsnboRVL</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> “Transportation Statistics by Country,” <em>International Comparisons</em>, <a href="http://internationalcomparisons.org/environment/transportation.html">http://internationalcomparisons.org/environment/transportation.html</a> “Moving 12-Month Total Vehicle Miles Traveled/Total Population: All Ages including Armed Forces Overseas*1000,” <em>Fred Economic Data</em>, <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=lls">https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=lls</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> Those higher prices often procure less than 1/2 of the space of American homes. “HOUSE PRICES VS. INCOME — WHERE CAN YOU AFFORD TO BUY?”, <em>Towergate Insurance</em>, <a href="https://www.towergateinsurance.co.uk/commercial-property-insurance/house-price-income-ratio">https://www.towergateinsurance.co.uk/commercial-property-insurance/house-price-income-ratio</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a> “Average Commute Times for Metro Areas,” <em>Governing</em>, <a href="https://www.governing.com/gov-data/transportation-infrastructure/commute-time-averages-drive-public-transportation-bus-rail-by-metro-area.html">https://www.governing.com/gov-data/transportation-infrastructure/commute-time-averages-drive-public-transportation-bus-rail-by-metro-area.html</a>. Some of the most sprawling areas of the U.S., such as Phoenix and Dallas, also have the lowest commute times. John Genovese, “Phoenix among shortest commute times of large metro areas, US Census shows,” ABC15, June 22, 2017, <a href="https://www.abc15.com/news/region-central-southern-az/other/phoenix-among-shortest-commute-times-of-large-metro-areas-us-census-shows">https://www.abc15.com/news/region-central-southern-az/other/phoenix-among-shortest-commute-times-of-large-metro-areas-us-census-shows</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[21]</a> See David Levinson, Wes Marsall, and Kay Axhausen, <em>Elements of Access: Transport Planning for Engineers, Transport Engineering for Planners </em>(New York: Network Design Lab, 2017)<em>, </em>73. As density doubles, the percent of time in congested traffic, including for buses, increases from about 15% to 30% of all travel time.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[22]</a> Marlon G. Boarnet, “Impacts of Residential Density on Passenger Vehicle Use and Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” <em>California Air Resources Board</em>, September 30, 2014, <a href="https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/sb375/policies/density/residential_density_brief.pdf">https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/sb375/policies/density/residential_density_brief.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[23]</a> In fact, there is a strong correlation between density and more exposure to local air pollutants, because VMT by cars and trucks are more concentrated in areas where people live. Sefi Roth and Felipe Carozzi, “When it comes to harmful air pollution, denser cities aren’t greener cities.”, <em>LSE US Centre</em>, August 15, 2019, <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2019/08/15/when-it-comes-to-harmful-air-pollution-denser-cities-arent-greener-cities/">https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2019/08/15/when-it-comes-to-harmful-air-pollution-denser-cities-arent-greener-cities/</a> Theodore J. Mansfield, et.al, “The Effects of Urban Form on Ambient Air Pollution and Public Health Risk: A Case Study in Raleigh, North Carolina,” National Center for Biotechnology Information, HHS Author Manuscripts, December 9, 2014, <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4461560/">https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4461560/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref24">[24]</a> Levinson, <em>Elements of Access</em>. One reason that there is less transit commuting today comes from the simple fact that most urban areas do not have “monocentric” employment centers, with a single dominant job center, and transit works best only in monocentric employment cities. Shlomo Angel and Alejandro M. Blei, “The spatial structure of American cities: The great majority of workplaces are no longer in CBDs, employment sub-centers, or live-work communities,” <em>Cities,</em> January 2016, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275115300238">https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264275115300238</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref25">[25]</a> Wendell Cox, “HOW LOWER INCOME CITIZENS COMMUTE,” <em>NewGeography</em>.com February 7, 2012, <a href="http://www.newgeography.com/content/002666-how-lower-income-citizens-commute">http://www.newgeography.com/content/002666-how-lower-income-citizens-commute</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a> Stacy C. Davis and Robert G. Boundy, <em>Transportation Energy Data Book, Ed. 37 </em>(Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy, 2019), Table 2.14, p. 2–19, <a href="https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Edition37_Full_Doc.pdf#page=64">https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Edition37_Full_Doc.pdf#page=64</a>, The most recent report no longer includes the impact of the original production and transmission of electric energy for rail transit, so this calculation used the 2016 counts. Stacy C. Davis, Susan E. Williams, and Robert G. Boundy, <em>Transportation Energy Data Book, Ed. 35 </em>(Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy, 2016), Table 2.16, 2–20,21. <a href="https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Edition35_Full_Doc.pdf">https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Edition35_Full_Doc.pdf</a>; Judge Glock, “How New California Housing Can Slow Global Warming,” <em>Medium</em>, August 25, 2019, <a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news/how-new-california-housing-can-slow-global-warming-1e634766ba8#_ftn30">https://medium.com/cicero-news/how-new-california-housing-can-slow-global-warming-1e634766ba8#_ftn30</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref27">[27]</a> “U.S. Cities are Home to 62.7 Percent of the U.S. Population, but Comprise Just 3.5 Percent of Land Area,” <em>Census</em>, March 4, 2019, <a href="https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-33.html">https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-33.html</a> Wendell Cox, “NEW US URBAN AREA DATA RELEASED,” <em>newgeography</em>, March 26, 2012, <a href="https://www.newgeography.com/content/002747-new-us-urban-area-data-released">https://www.newgeography.com/content/002747-new-us-urban-area-data-released</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref28">[28]</a> Wendell Cox, “AMERICA’S MOST URBAN STATES,” <em>newgeography</em>, March 7, 2016, <a href="https://www.newgeography.com/content/005187-america-s-most-urban-states">https://www.newgeography.com/content/005187-america-s-most-urban-states</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref29">[29]</a> American Farmland Trust, Greenbelt Alliance, and Sustainable Agriculture Education (SAGE), “Sustaining Our Agricultural Bounty: An Assessment of the Current State of Farming and Ranching in the San Francisco Bay Area” <em>Sage Center</em>, March 2011, <a href="https://www.sagecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Sustaining-Our-Agricultural-Bounty-An-Assessment-of-Agriculture-in-the-San-Francisco-Bay-Area.pdf">https://www.sagecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Sustaining-Our-Agricultural-Bounty-An-Assessment-of-Agriculture-in-the-San-Francisco-Bay-Area.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref30">[30]</a> Judge Glock, “How New California Housing Can Slow Global Warming,” <em>Medium</em>, August 25, 2019, <a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news/how-new-california-housing-can-slow-global-warming-1e634766ba8#_ftn30">https://medium.com/cicero-news/how-new-california-housing-can-slow-global-warming-1e634766ba8#_ftn30</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ebf1d223acf8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news/misconceptions-about-californias-housing-crisis-ebf1d223acf8">Misconceptions about California’s Housing Crisis</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news">Cicero News</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Pull Back the Curtain on Hospital Prices]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cicero-news/pull-back-the-curtain-on-hospital-prices-63596d2e3bb4?source=rss-1c7206c33e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/63596d2e3bb4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cms]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[price-transparency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[health-and-human-services]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hospital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Judge Glock]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Dec 2019 19:32:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-23T22:45:24.211Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/0*T_4kWq17cn5NIJNg" /></figure><p>Prices don’t just reveal. They discipline. Prices allow consumers to goad businesses for the best deal, and they allow businesses to see how they can best their competitors.</p><p>In the healthcare industry, prices aren’t revealed and they don’t discipline. Prices for the same service can vary by factors of four or five between regions, between hospitals, and even within the same hospital. In fact, about 20% of all price variations come from charging different prices to similar patients in the exact same location.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p>In June of 2019, the Department of Health and Human Services, along with other federal agencies, proposed a new rule, which would demand price transparency on at least 70 “shoppable” procedures from both hospitals and insurers. The rule would require hospitals and insurers to post publicly-accessible and machine-readable prices, both for cash and negotiated insurance prices, and both before and after insurance co-pays and deductibles.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> The rules will increase competition and lower prices, and they deserve your support.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a></p><p>Real price transparency and real competition is not an impossible dream. Today, the Surgery Center of Oklahoma posts the exact price for every service on its website. (As an exempli grati, an elbow Cubital Tunnel Release costs $4,510; an adenoidectomy, $2,695.) Its costs are among the lowest in the nation.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> Employers like Safeway Supermarkets and the State of California have demanded transparent prices from providers, and offered their employees “reference price” plans, where employees can shop around and keep the savings relative to a set price. Both employers and employees have saved up to 20% on covered procedures.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> Even some hospital systems, such as Baylor in Texas, publish calculators that allow patients to see different estimates of charges, which has allowed more comparison shopping.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> The new federal rule would expand these incipient but successful attempts at openness.</p><p>Price transparency would encourage other innovative insurance models. Today, cash payments with subsequent indemnity offers a new frontier for insurance, since many hospitals charge cash-paying patients from 1/2 to 1/10th of insurance-negotiated rates.<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> New insurance companies like Sidecar Health indemnify patients against hospitals’ cash charge using the reference price model. Yet Sidecar now has to discover hospital cash prices one-by-one. A machine-readable price would allow them to obtain this information in seconds instead of years.<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a></p><p>There is no end to the innovative businesses that can be built in a price transparency regime. New tech companies could search not just the region but the whole nation for the lowest possible surgery prices, and thus turn the hospital market from a series of local monopolies into a national and competitive industry. Based on current divergences in prices across hospitals and regions, the savings could be from 50 to 80%.<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a></p><p>Insurers also could offer deals for members on bundled services across different hospitals, such as using imaging in one, surgery in another, and outpatient check-ups in a third. The disaggregation of hospital services could help transform even the regional hospital markets into dozens of separately competitive industries, and again save more than 50% over the current costs. These immense savings are exactly why the American Hospital Association and other hospital groups are suing to stop the transparency rules right now.<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a></p><p>A price transparency rule would also eliminate the work of today’s unfortunately necessary middleman, such as Compass Professional Health Services, which insurers pay to track down the prices of procedures in their area, so they know what baseline to use in negotiations.<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a> Such busywork would disappear under the new rules. As Center for Medicare Services Administrator Seema Verma has shown, price visibility can also help cure abusive practices such as surprise billing and supplementary charges.<a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a></p><p>Most importantly, the new rules can move healthcare markets closer to the competitive markets that exist in other industries. Today, a national survey found that over 70% of patients do not consider alternative providers for their health care, and only 3% actively compared prices before deciding on care.<a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a> The most commonly reported barrier to price-shopping was the absence of cost comparisons. The majority of patients said they would comparison shop if provided with the information<a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a> And just as patients could comparison shop if given prices, businesses could see where high prices allow them to come in and undercut their competitors.</p><p>Previous health-care price transparency laws on the state level have shown only modest success.<a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a> Yet the kind of price transparency matters, as does the long-term effects of price transparency.<a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a> Although sixteen states have an “All Payers Claim Database,” only two demand disclosure of direct charges to patients and make those charges publicly available.<a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a> A survey of studies by the Congressional Research Services shows that the right kind of price transparency can indeed lower prices in a range of markets.<a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a> And some of the biggest problems with the hospital market, such as local concentration, and insufficient incentives for patients to shop around, will become more apparent and more easy to ameliorate once price transparency is in place.<a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a> Thankfully, the new federal price transparency rule demands just the sort of prices that help the most, such as specific cash charges and charges to patients after insurance deductibles.<a href="#_ftn20">[20]</a></p><p>We’ve written about the benefits of price transparency for Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs), but the benefits of transparency are universal.<a href="#_ftn21">[21]</a> Since hospital spending is the largest single part of healthcare spending (over a third), and since it is the fastest growing portion of it (over a 150% increase over two decades), price transparency here is more urgent than anywhere.<a href="#_ftn22">[22]</a></p><p>The new transparency rule has attracted bipartisan support, as it should.<a href="#_ftn23">[23]</a> It offers the hope that the open competition that works so well in other sectors of the economy can finally be brought to health care.</p><p><strong>Judge Glock<br></strong>Senior Policy Analyst, The Cicero Institute</p><p>To learn more and explore related policy issues, visit our website, <a href="http://www.ciceroinstitute.org/">www.ciceroinstitute.org</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a><a href="https://healthcarepricingproject.org/sites/default/files/Updated_the_price_aint_right_qje.pdf">https://healthcarepricingproject.org/sites/default/files/Updated_the_price_aint_right_qje.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <a href="https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cms-1717-f2.pdf">https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cms-1717-f2.pdf</a></p><p><a href="https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=CMS-2019-0163-0001&amp;contentType=pdf">https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=CMS-2019-0163-0001&amp;contentType=pdf</a> <a href="https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190822.353918/full/">https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190822.353918/full/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> You can send your supportive comment to Health and Human Services through the Patient Rights Advocacy Website here: <a href="https://www.patientrightsadvocate.org/tell-your-story">https://www.patientrightsadvocate.org/tell-your-story</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <a href="https://surgerycenterok.com/">https://surgerycenterok.com/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> <a href="https://nypost.com/2019/10/12/how-price-transparency-would-revolutionize-healthcare/">https://nypost.com/2019/10/12/how-price-transparency-would-revolutionize-healthcare/</a>. See also H.B. Global of Pennsylvania’s efforts to negotiate transparent prices. <a href="https://www.realclearhealth.com/articles/2019/10/30/price_transparency_is_more_than_a_worthwhile_experiment__110959.html">https://www.realclearhealth.com/articles/2019/10/30/price_transparency_is_more_than_a_worthwhile_experiment__110959.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> <a href="https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/04/missing-true-point-hospital-price-transparency/">https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/04/missing-true-point-hospital-price-transparency/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> <a href="https://www.latimes.com/business/healthcare/la-fi-medical-prices-20120527-story.html">https://www.latimes.com/business/healthcare/la-fi-medical-prices-20120527-story.html</a>. <a href="https://www.consumerreports.org/healthcare-costs/how-paying-your-doctor-in-cash-could-save-you-money/">https://www.consumerreports.org/healthcare-costs/how-paying-your-doctor-in-cash-could-save-you-money/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> <a href="https://sidecarhealth.com/">https://sidecarhealth.com/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> See how some insurers already pay their members to travel abroad for cheaper procedures <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/09/business/medical-tourism-mexico.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/09/business/medical-tourism-mexico.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-us-hospitals/hospital-groups-file-lawsuit-to-block-trumps-price-transparency-rule-idUSKBN1Y81YY">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-us-hospitals/hospital-groups-file-lawsuit-to-block-trumps-price-transparency-rule-idUSKBN1Y81YY</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Rosenthal, <em>An American Sickness, </em>180.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> <a href="https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/seema-verma-talks-surprise-billing-price-transparency.html">https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/seema-verma-talks-surprise-billing-price-transparency.html</a> <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/07/opinion/sunday/medical-billing-fraud.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/07/opinion/sunday/medical-billing-fraud.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> <a href="https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1471">https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1471</a>The absence of comparison shopping is despite the fact that across a variety of services such as imaging and lab work, price-shopping would permit price savings without sacrificing quality of care. <a href="https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2016.0408">https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2016.0408</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ascassociation.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=829b1dd6-0b5d-9686-e57c-3e2ed4ab42ca&amp;forceDialog=0">https://www.ascassociation.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=829b1dd6-0b5d-9686-e57c-3e2ed4ab42ca&amp;forceDialog=0</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> <a href="https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1471">https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1471</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a>New Hampshire’s “HealthCost” transparency program has had little impact on prices since it was inaugurated in 2007, but it did increase comparison shopping and slightly lower prices on some procedures. <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ha_Tu5/publication/38084827_Impact_of_Health_Care_Price_Transparency_on_Price_Variation_The_New_Hampshire_Experience/links/5b7ec78e92851c1e122a41eb/Impact-of-Health-Care-Price-Transparency-on-Price-Variation-The-New-Hampshire-Experience.pdf">https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ha_Tu5/publication/38084827_Impact_of_Health_Care_Price_Transparency_on_Price_Variation_The_New_Hampshire_Experience/links/5b7ec78e92851c1e122a41eb/Impact-of-Health-Care-Price-Transparency-on-Price-Variation-The-New-Hampshire-Experience.pdf</a>; <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-states-effort-to-publicize-hospital-prices-brings-mixed-results-11561555562">https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-states-effort-to-publicize-hospital-prices-brings-mixed-results-11561555562</a> <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-states-effort-to-publicize-hospital-prices-brings-mixed-results-11561555562">https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-states-effort-to-publicize-hospital-prices-brings-mixed-results-11561555562</a> <a href="https://hbr.org/2019/07/price-transparency-in-health-care-is-coming-to-the-u-s-but-will-it-matter">https://hbr.org/2019/07/price-transparency-in-health-care-is-coming-to-the-u-s-but-will-it-matter</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> <a href="https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/hospital-price-transparency-making-it-useful-patients">https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/hospital-price-transparency-making-it-useful-patients</a> Many price transparency programs (such as the hospital transparency requirements in Minnesota and Ohio) only demand average reimbursement charges across all payers, which does not provide enough information for comparison shopping. <a href="https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/26640487/nejmp1100540.pdf">https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/26640487/nejmp1100540.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a> <a href="https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/price-transparency-a-key-way-states-control-healthcare-costs">https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/price-transparency-a-key-way-states-control-healthcare-costs</a> <a href="https://www.catalyze.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Price-Transparency-and-Physician-Quality-Report-Card-2017_0-1.pdf">https://www.catalyze.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Price-Transparency-and-Physician-Quality-Report-Card-2017_0-1.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL34101.pdf.">https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL34101.pdf.</a> Studies of real-estate “nondisclosure” states, where home sales prices are not publicly available, have found wider variability of home prices and disproportionate negative impacts on poorer households. <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-states-where-home-prices-are-secret-11560956939">https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-states-where-home-prices-are-secret-11560956939</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> <a href="https://www.modernhealthcare.com/reports/achieving-transparency-in-healthcare/#!/">https://www.modernhealthcare.com/reports/achieving-transparency-in-healthcare/#!/</a> <a href="https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf">https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a> The laws require reasonable estimates of bundled payments and services, which the Surgery Center of Oklahoma shows are possible. The next step for transparency would be mandating publication of quality metrics, which a handful of states, such as California and Minnesota, already do for physicians, and Maryland does partially through reporting “avoidable costs” in its price transparency releases. <a href="https://www.catalyze.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Price-Transparency-and-Physician-Quality-Report-Card-2017_0-1.pdf">https://www.catalyze.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Price-Transparency-and-Physician-Quality-Report-Card-2017_0-1.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[21]</a> <a href="https://medium.com/8vc-news/pbm-price-transparency-dd8e0bc84eab">https://medium.com/8vc-news/pbm-price-transparency-dd8e0bc84eab</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[22]</a> Rosenthal, American Sickness, 23, <a href="https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2018.05424">https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2018.05424</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[23]</a> <a href="https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/hospital-price-transparency-making-it-useful-patients">https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/hospital-price-transparency-making-it-useful-patients</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=63596d2e3bb4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news/pull-back-the-curtain-on-hospital-prices-63596d2e3bb4">Pull Back the Curtain on Hospital Prices</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news">Cicero News</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why is PG&E Failing California?
 All the Wrong Incentives]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cicero-news/why-is-pg-e-failing-california-all-the-wrong-incentives-db271b81537c?source=rss-1c7206c33e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/db271b81537c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[regulation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[utilities]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[california]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wildfires]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Judge Glock]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Dec 2019 20:16:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-03T05:36:43.636Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Why is PG&amp;E Failing California?<br> All the Wrong Incentives</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/890/0*__UnREM-NnSqPv0r.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>The Pacific Gas &amp; Electric Company (PG&amp;E), California’s largest electric utility, is in bankruptcy for the second time in 20 years. It filed this time in January of 2019, after its flagging power lines sparked over a dozen wildfires and over a hundred deaths, as well as hundreds of thousands of home evacuations and billions of dollars in damages. This year, its power lines caused more fires and more deaths, and the company began rolling blackouts to prevent continued casualties and costs. The blackouts have kept millions of Bay Area customers in the dark, often for days at a time. Thus a once-stodgy utility company, one that provides power to one out of every twenty Americans, has become a high-risk, low-reward business, with dire consequences for people of California.</p><p>Why has PG&amp;E gone so wrong? Specifically, why has the backbone of PG&amp;E’s electric grid, its transmission and distribution lines, become a literal live-wire threat to the state, one which often has be turned off? There is plenty of blame to go around, including poor forestry practices by state and federal agencies,<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> higher temperatures caused by climate change,<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> and simple bad practices by PG&amp;E itself.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a></p><p><strong>Yet a major reason for PG&amp;E’s debacle is that state and federal electric regulators have not incentivized PG&amp;E to improve safety or efficiency</strong>. Regulators have demanded billions of dollars in new transmission investment, but they have not focused on delivering cheap and effective electricity to California’s citizens. Even worse, they have ignored alternative models in other countries that have allowed utilities to absorb both the upsides and downsides to investment, and which could have created safe and affordable electricity for customers.</p><p><strong>At the same time as regulators have de-incentivized needed repairs, they have increased liabilities for the simple act of delivering power, whether or not a company maintains its wires properly. Instead of finding other means to prevent and limit fire damage from live wires, regulators and PG&amp;E have settled for the unnecessary default of just cutting off power entirely.</strong></p><p>PG&amp;E’s odd responses to criticism of its electric grid reveal why the system needs to change. When the <em>Wall Street Journal </em>wrote an article<em> </em>on collapsing, century-old electric lines and towers, PG&amp;E argued that one of those towers “was not slated for work” and that work on another “was not maintenance related.” <a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> In other words, the <em>Journal </em>was wrong to even imply that PG&amp;E planned to repair these lines. Why is this considered a defense? Because electric utility regulators, and not PG&amp;E, decide what maintenance “plans” PG&amp;E should carry out, and these power-line repairs were not among them. There is a better, incentives-driven model, one that forces utilities like PG&amp;E to respond to customer demands for safe electricity, and that imposes appropriate liabilities for failure to do so. But first we have to explain why we ended up with our current, failing model.</p><p><strong>California’s Grid: Gold-Plated and Collapsing</strong></p><p>Regulation of California’s electric grid is divided and confusing, and this is part of the problem. The Federal Electric Regulatory Commission (FERC) supervises the highest-voltage “transmission lines,” which for PG&amp;E means long-distance lines over 60 kilovolts. The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) supervises the lower-voltage “distribution lines,” which means lines from electrical substations to the homes and lower-power commercial customers. The California Independent Systems Operator (CAISO), a non-profit organized by the state of California, runs the market that allows purchases and sales of electric power on these lines.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a></p><p>PG&amp;E, meanwhile, owns the transmission and distribution lines. It tries to buy power as cheaply as possible, and then sell it at the electric “tariff rate” set by the FERC and CPUC. PG&amp;E generates about half of the electric power its sells, from its Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant and a handful of natural gas plants, and purchases the other half, most of it renewable energy from solar and wind farms, but also gas plants and electricity from out-state.</p><p>When FERC and CPUC set the tariff rate at which PG&amp;E can sell electricity to its customers, they take into account the “rate base,” or how much regulator-approved investment PG&amp;E has made in its electric lines. The more approved investments, the higher rate PG&amp;E can charge. As its annual report states, the company “capitalizes” many “costs that that would otherwise be chargeable to expense if it is probable that the incurred costs will be recovered in future rates” approved by FERC and CPUC.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></p><p>FERC, which controls the long-distance and most dangerous lines, has not been skimpy about approving transmission investment. <strong>PG&amp;E’s FERC approved transmission investments increased from about $600 million in 2010 to about $1.6 billion in 2018. </strong>Meanwhile, CPUC has also expanded distribution investment substantially.<strong> State utilities’ CPUC approved distribution investments increased from $8 billion in 2010 to almost $11 billion in 2018, with PG&amp;E’s being the largest component.</strong><a href="#_ftn7"><strong>[7]</strong></a><strong> In other words, PG&amp;E and other state utilities pay billions of dollars more a year for power lines than just a few years ago, and somehow their customers get less for it.</strong><a href="#_ftn8"><strong>[8]</strong></a></p><p>These large and increasing investments are reflected in PG&amp;E’s rates to final customers. <strong>While nationally electricity costs about 13 cents a kilowatt hour, California and PG&amp;Es ratepayers pay about 20 cents, the highest in the continental US, or over 50% more than average, for power that is also more likely to fail</strong>.<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a></p><p>The bigger question is, where has all this investment gone if not into safe electric transmission? California’s own electricity investment report argues that much of it has gone to mandated connections to new renewable sources, which tend to be located at great distance from traditional generators and power lines.<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a> There is nothing inherently wrong with such mandates, but the costs must be acknowledged.</p><p>Often, however, regulators disapproved simple maintenance spending and then blamed PG&amp;E for failing to do more. When PG&amp;E suggested inspecting 300,000 poles a year to ensure safety in 2012, CPUC cut the total to 235,000.<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a> In 2011 and 2012, when PG&amp;E spent almost $100 million more on replacing poles than allowed by CPUC, the regulator took that as a reason to deny future claims for pole replacement spending. It said “PG&amp;E demonstrated the capacity and willingness to spend more than previously authorized…to meet service obligations,” thus they would not include extra required pole replacements in the “rate base.” These sorts of decisions created exactly the wrong incentives, penalizing PG&amp;E for doing more than was required.<a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a></p><p><strong>Workable Grid Models</strong></p><p>When both California and the United States began electricity market deregulation in 1996, they were focused on one thing: allowing competition between power generators. The basic model was that while the electric grid itself was a natural monopoly, and thus all its spending needed to be regulated, electric generation wasn’t, and thus could be competitive.</p><p>California forced old integrated utilities like PG&amp;E to sell off half of their generating capacity, and then buy the rest of their power in an open market supervised by CAISO. CPUC and FERC, meanwhile, would still supervise every one of PG&amp;E proposed expenditures. The disaster of the 2000 California brownouts, caused by insufficient competition in the generating market, price limits on retail sales, and the inability for utilities like PG&amp;E to buy electricity on a “forward” market, meant reform stalled.<a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a> Although California soon removed these remaining generations restrictions, and began policing for market manipulation, the electric grid itself remained under classic, early-20th century regulation.</p><p>Other countries, however, have helped make the provision of grid and transmission services a dynamic industry. <strong>Since reform in 1989, Great Britain’s national grid company is regulated on a “price cap” model. The regulator still sets a cap on what the company can charge its customers, but the cap is left in place for at least five years, and any energy or distribution efficiencies the grid company puts in place in the meantime it can keep. Thus the price can stay temporarily higher, and the utility can keep profits from more efficiency, without having to go through tedious “rate base” investment requests to regulator</strong>. In California, by contrast, the more efficient the utility is, the lower its “rate base” and the lower the prices the regulator allows them to charge. California’s system incentivizes inefficiency.<a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a></p><p>Similar market and price-cap reforms in Argentina brought down power prices there by half.<a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a> In Argentina they also differentiate final electricity prices by location, which is known as “nodal pricing.” Thus when congestion on transmission lines leads to insufficient power and higher prices in some areas of the country than in others, the differences in price incentivizes the grid company to construct more transmission and deliver the extra electricity.<a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a></p><p>California still needs to regulate access to the grid, and it should still require power companies to adopt clean power and reliability mandates, but it needs to do these things with the right incentives. Instead of just telling companies what to spend, customers need to tell PG&amp;E what they actually want, and regulators need to allow PG&amp;E to invest to meet those demands. PG&amp;E should not be going to CPUC and FERC for any possible investment in a “mother may I” attitude. The current model leads to inefficient investments in some areas, as well as inefficient under-investments in others, such as power line maintenance.</p><p><strong>Who is Liable and Why it Matters</strong></p><p>The proximate cause of PG&amp;E’s most recent bankruptcy is an estimated $30 billion liability for wildfire damages. The fear of more liabilities, and not just fear for the public’s safety, is a motivating factor in the recent power shutoffs, or, to use PG&amp;E’s clunky phrasing, the “de-energization” of parts of the Bay Area.</p><p><strong>The problem is that current liability policies lead PG&amp;E to cut-off power even when it is not necessary to prevent wildfires, and thus subjects the public to unnecessary pain and suffering.</strong></p><p>One reason for PG&amp;E’s “de-energization” is a California rule known as “inverse condemnation.” Under this rule, utilities are subject to strict liability for any damages caused by their wires or equipment.<a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a> This means that plaintiffs in lawsuits against PG&amp;E, unlike plaintiffs against most private companies, do not have to show that the company was negligent in maintaining its wires in order to get damage awards from them. As long as the company’s equipment was one cause of a fire, it is fully liable for all of the damages of that fire. This is true even if there were several other causes for the fire, and even if the utility did everything in its power to prevent it.<a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a></p><p>States impose inverse condemnation rules when something is beneficial to the whole public, such as transmission wires and any unavoidable costs of operating them, with the understanding that the entire public, and not just one group, should help pay for any consequences of them. Yet in 2017 CPUC decided that San Diego Gas and Electric could not raise its rates to recover $379 million in inverse condemnation liabilities due to a 2007 wildfire. These wildfire liabilities would be pure losses to the company. CPUC made this decision though the inverse condemnation rules meant courts had never actually found the company at fault for the fire.<a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a> Basically, instead of imposing costs on the whole public, CPUC’s decision imposed costs on every utility operating inside a fire zone.</p><p><strong>The CPUC ruling preventing higher rates for wildfire liabilities sent shockwaves through the utility world, and meant that basically any working low-voltage electric wire was a time bomb, which could subject utilities to uncapped billions in damages, no matter what they did to prevent it.</strong></p><p>As the Vice President of Moody’s said, “California’s application of inverse condemnation effectively turns the state’s investor-owned and publicly owned electric utilities into an insurance backstop,” which explained Moody’s downgrading of public utility debt.<a href="#_ftn20">[20]</a> Another California utility, Southern California Edison, claimed that under the new risk system, they required a rate of return of 17%, or almost double what was once required, to attract the risky capital to maintain and expand transmission wires. These new rates of return will have to be passed to the ratepayers eventually, even if the direct consequences of fire are not.<a href="#_ftn21">[21]</a> The costs of making utilities general insurers for the public against all fire is that the public, somehow or another, will have to pay for it.</p><p>PG&amp;E, however, can avoid these excess liabilities and insurance risks by another route: just cutting off power, the bluntest and most painful way to deal with wildfire risks. In 2018, the year after the CPUC ruling, PG&amp;E decided to adopt blanket blackouts. This despite the fact that fire risks did not suddenly increase in 2018, and the fact many fires since have apparently started even in areas where PG&amp;E has cut off power, and that only about 5% of wildfires, or about 10% of acres burned, involved electric line malfunctions.<a href="#_ftn22">[22]</a></p><p>The blackouts accelerated this year, after PG&amp;E’s bankruptcy, and the reason for this is again liability law. All new claims incurred during a bankruptcy proceeding are “senior” to previous claims, meaning they have a particular impact on previous bond and stockholders, and further delay exit from the bankruptcy itself.<a href="#_ftn23">[23]</a> In other words, PG&amp;E right now is particularly sensitive to claims and therefore it is more likely to shut down power, even if it the likelihood of fire damage is small.</p><p>PG&amp;E has made many inexplicable decisions about when and where to “de-energize,” but one explanation for their decisions comes from the division between state and federal regulation of recovery of liability costs. Although the CPUC disallowed San Diego Gas and Electric from recovering the costs of wildfire liability from ratepayers, the federal regulator, FERC, which focuses on high-voltage transmission wires, did allow recovery, through higher customer rates, of almost $100 million relating to damages caused by these transmission wires.<a href="#_ftn24">[24]</a></p><p><strong>The division of state and federal responsibility means that state-supervised low-voltage lines are, ironically, much more likely to cause liability for PG&amp;E than high-voltage lines.</strong> <strong>When PG&amp;E began power cut-offs last year, consequently, they only cut-off lines of less than 70 kilovolts</strong>.<a href="#_ftn25">[25]</a> This was only 1 kilovolt above the San Diego Gas and Electric line that sparked the 2007 San Diego fire and caused billions in liabilities. Unless the company thought there was no way a higher-voltage line than San Diego’s could start a fire, this was on odd cut-off point. Yet it makes sense in that almost all the cutoff lines were subject to CPUC no-recovery through higher rates rules, while the lines that kept running were likely to get ratepayer recoveries under FERC.</p><p>The 70 kilovolt cut-off proved ineffective in preventing wildfires, however, because later that year a 115 kilowatt helped spark the devastating Camp Fire. PG&amp;E had earlier debated and decided against shutting off that particular line.<a href="#_ftn26">[26]</a> The likely recovery rules are one explanation for the failure to cut-off power even in a legitimately dangerous area. Yet CPUC has now found that another low-voltage distribution line went down in the same area, which under California rules could make the company entirely subject to state liability with no possibility of recovery through rates. This failure explains PG&amp;E billions in liability for the Camp Fire and its subsequent bankruptcy.<a href="#_ftn27">[27]</a></p><p>In 2019, PG&amp;E began shutting down some high voltage lines as well as lower voltage ones. <strong>Yet most shutdowns continued to be on lower voltage distribution lines subject to CPUC authority and no-recovery rules.</strong> <a href="#_ftn28">[28]</a> <strong>In reality, this means most small homeowners are subject to blackouts, while large businesses and industries are exempt.</strong> As one Stanford professor explained, “What PG&amp;E is doing is blacking out the kind of low-voltage wires that deliver power to homes. But, typically, big commercial customers, like a tech headquarters … tend to be located closer to the bulk transmission system [and] the high-voltage lines, which are much less impacted by this outage.”<a href="#_ftn29">[29]</a></p><p>PG&amp;E claims that they focus on low-voltage lines is because the higher-voltage lines are better maintained, and in less fire prone areas, but recent analyses of failing high-voltage transmission wires and towers casts doubt on this explanation.<a href="#_ftn30">[30]</a></p><p><strong>PG&amp;E’s new CEO Bill Johnson claims “we have a tremendous amount of 60 to 70 Kv transmission that you cannot really put underground,” so their recent shut-off and repair work “is really limited to distribution.”</strong><a href="#_ftn31"><strong>[31]</strong></a><strong> Yet the amount of PG&amp;E’s transmission or inability to “underground” it is no explanation for why shutoffs will not affect transmission wires. The PG&amp;E CEO’s implicit 60 KV cut-off means that PG&amp;E is only concerned with shutting down lines subject to CPUC.</strong> Again, the inability to recover in higher rates from CPUC as opposed to FERC helps explain their decision.</p><p>The types of rates PG&amp;E charges also impact how and when they blackout regions. Under state regulations, PG&amp;E gets to charge customers for the transmission, distribution, and generation of electricity. But all of those charges get bundled into the cost of a kilowatt hour, and are therefore dependent on the amount of power consumed per customer.</p><p><strong>The problem is that the costs of transmission and distribution are largely fixed, but the charges the regulators allows are not</strong>. In other words, most of the costs of bringing wires to an area, as well as maintaining and insuring them against liability, have nothing to do with how much power is consumed on them on any given day. This means that large commercial and industrial customers, who consume a lot of power, but use little extra distribution, give the utilities most of their profits, and few of their costs. Previous utility attempts to impose a flat “customer charge” just for hooking up to the system, which more closely match the real fixed costs, have been opposed and beaten back by regulators.<a href="#_ftn32">[32]</a> Currently, utilities shed most of their projected liabilities from disconnecting scattered homes, but lose almost none of their revenue, further incentivizing them to keep power running only to large business customers. <strong>By forcing PG&amp;E to “subsidize” small and distant homes through per-watt transmission charges, the regulators have actually encouraged PG&amp;E to shut off power to them as well. </strong>As usual, such hidden cross-subsidies have unintended consequences.</p><p><strong>Competition in supplying last-mile power could alleviate these cross-subsidies, as well as other problems in transmission.</strong> In places like New England and the United Kingdom, different companies compete to sell rate plans for both residential and commercial customers, and they lease the distribution wires from the main utility in order to do so. People can thus choose the rate plans that work best for them, including plans that allow more spending on green or clean energy, or plans offering discounts for moving electricity consumption from peak hours.<a href="#_ftn33">[33]</a> <strong>These competitive plans involve fewer cross-subsidies to favored groups. Customers thus bear the costs and get the benefits of the most efficient use of energy.</strong></p><p><strong>If CPUC also allows higher prices for transmission during high-liability times, retail competition can also help internalize the costs of fire and other damages from energy use.</strong> Thus consumers would have to pay more for energy during fire-prone times, and perhaps their retailers would even negotiate to cut-off power if the danger was sufficient. In other words, retail competition would force customers to pay for all of the costs of generation and transmission.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The failures of PG&amp;E’s electrical system are plain to see. Instead of getting cheaper and safer, like goods in most industries, PG&amp;E’s power is more expensive, more dangerous, and more irregular than ever. Its system would be an embarrassment even in a much poorer country, let alone the richest area on Earth.</p><p>The solution is not a complete deregulation, but regulation to incentivize the best results. There are several reforms that can help get us out of our current morass.</p><ol><li><strong>CPUC (and FERC) should change to a “price cap” utility regulation model, with rates set for at least five years, so utilities can keep the gains of increased efficiency. </strong>Under a price cap model, utilities don’t have to go to regulators to justify every investment and have such investments added to their “rate base.” Instead, they can fund investments that improve efficiency and safety, and ignore those that don’t, even while prices to consumers stay capped in the short-term, and gradually drop over time as efficiency increase.</li><li><strong>CPUC should allow retail competition in selling electric power to customers. </strong>Retail competition would allow customers to choose appropriate rate plans from different companies, including plans which incentivize use at low-demand times, and plans that charge more for using wires during times when liability risks are greater, and which don’t cross-subsidize small and distant homeowners.</li><li><strong>CPUC should allow a basic customer charge on all utility hook-ups. </strong>Since most of the costs of transmission and distribution come from hooking up a home and a business, not the amount of energy used by them, this basic cost should be included in rates. This would prevent cross-subsidies from large electric consumers to low electric consumers, and the resulting shut-offs to those lower-energy users.</li><li><strong>If we don’t switch to a price-cap regime, CPUC should allow utilities to raise rates to meet the costs of “inverse condemnation” on all power lines. </strong>This would overturn CPUC’s 2017 decision, and mean companies would not be so frightened of liability that they would shut off even working and well-maintained power lines.</li><li><strong>Even better, California legislators should rescind “inverse condemnation” for utilities, and make them liable only for negligence in maintaining their lines. </strong>Under the current regime, utilities get charged for wildfires even if they acted perfectly. Instead, utilities should be charged only when they fail to maintain or fix lines, which again gives them the right incentives to improve them.</li></ol><p>There is no reason California cannot have cheap, green, and regular electric power. We just need to show our electric companies how to get there. We need to force PG&amp;E and its ilk to earn their money, instead of just rewarding them for spending it.</p><p><strong>Judge Glock<br></strong>Senior Policy Analyst, The Cicero Institute</p><p>To learn more and explore related policy issues, visit our website, <a href="http://www.ciceroinstitute.org/">www.ciceroinstitute.org</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Doug Lamalfa, “California wildfires show we need common-sense forest policies.” USA Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network, LLC, Nov. 14, 2018. <a href="https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/11/14/california-wildfires-show-we-need-common-sense-forest-policies/1994124002/">https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/11/14/california-wildfires-show-we-need-common-sense-forest-policies/1994124002/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Alejandra Borunda, “Climate change is contributing to California’s fires.” National Geographic. National Geographic Partners, LLC, October 25, 2019. <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2019/10/climate-change-california-power-outage/">https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2019/10/climate-change-california-power-outage/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Ivan Penn et all, “How PG&amp;E Ignored Fire Risks in Favor of Profits.” The New York Times. The New York Times Company, March 18, 2019. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/18/business/pge-california-wildfires.html.">https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/18/business/pge-california-wildfires.html.</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Katherine Blunt and Russell Gold, “PG&amp;E Delayed Safety Work on Power Line That Is Prime Suspect in California Wildfire.” The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones &amp; Company, Inc, Feb. 27, 2019. <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-delayed-safety-work-on-power-line-that-is-prime-suspect-in-california-wildfire-11551292977.">https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-delayed-safety-work-on-power-line-that-is-prime-suspect-in-california-wildfire-11551292977.</a></p><p>Robert Walton, “PG&amp;E disputes allegations it deferred maintenance on transmission line tied to deadly Camp Fire.” UtilityDive. Industry Dive, Feb. 28, 2019. <a href="https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pge-disputes-allegations-it-deferred-maintenance-on-transmission-line-tied/549423/">https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pge-disputes-allegations-it-deferred-maintenance-on-transmission-line-tied/549423/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> For background of these divisions, see David Hirsch, Power Loss.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> “2018 Annual Report.” PG&amp;E. p. 123.5. <a href="https://www.pge.com/pge_global/common/pdfs/about-pge/company-information/regulation/FERCForm1.pdf">https://www.pge.com/pge_global/common/pdfs/about-pge/company-information/regulation/FERCForm1.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> “California Electric and Gas Utility Cost Report.” California Public Utilities Commission Energy Division. April 2019. Pp. 23, 15. <a href="https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/About_Us/Organization/Divisions/Office_of_Governmental_Affairs/Legislation/2019/2018%20AB%2067%20Report.pdf">https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedFiles/CPUCWebsite/Content/About_Us/Organization/Divisions/Office_of_Governmental_Affairs/Legislation/2019/2018%20AB%2067%20Report.pdf</a>. PG&amp;Es distribution costs over time is not broken out of total statewide distribution costs in this report, but in 2018 it composed about 40% of the costs</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> “Fact Sheet.” FERC, Aug. 8, 2006. <a href="https://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/epact-fact-sheet.pdf">https://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/epact-fact-sheet.pdf</a>. Since the Energy Act of 2005, the federal government has also provided millions in tax breaks and incentives to expand transmission capacity, which has helped spur PG&amp;Es spending.</p><p>“Major utilities continue to increase spending on U.S. electric distribution systems.” USEIA, Jul. 20, 2018. <a href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36675">https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=36675</a>. Electric distribution has increased from $31 billion to $51 billion nationally in the past 20 years, with the Western US growing the quickest. Most of these costs have not been upgrading older lines. According to a 2015 <a href="https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/09/f26/QTR2015-3F-Transmission-and-Distribution_1.pdf">U.S. Department of Energy report</a>, 70% of power transformers are 25 years of age or older, 60% of circuit breakers are 30 years or older, and 70% of transmission lines are 25 years or older.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> “Electricity Rates by State.” Electric Choice. Eisenbach Consulting, LLC, Aug. 2019. <a href="https://www.electricchoice.com/electricity-prices-by-state/">https://www.electricchoice.com/electricity-prices-by-state/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> “California Electric, 22. When PG&amp;E proposed a $4.8 billion long-term investment strategy in 2012, the CPUC cut it in half.</p><p>Allysia Finley, “’Stakeholder’ Capitalism in Action.” The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones &amp; Company, Inc, Oct. 21, 2019. <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/stakeholder-capitalism-in-action-11571696787">https://www.wsj.com/articles/stakeholder-capitalism-in-action-11571696787</a>. One estimate is that almost 30% of all transmission investment in the pipeline is towards connection to new generation resources, largely renewable. “Transmission &amp; Distribution Infrastructure.” Harris Williams &amp; Co. Summer 2014. <a href="https://www.harriswilliams.com/sites/default/files/industry_reports/ep_td_white_paper_06_10_14_final.pdf">https://www.harriswilliams.com/sites/default/files/industry_reports/ep_td_white_paper_06_10_14_final.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> “Decision Authorizing Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s General Rate Case Revenue Requirement for 2014–2016.” California Public Utilities Commission. Aug. 20, 2014. p. 189. <a href="http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M102/K361/102361873.PDF">http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M102/K361/102361873.PDF</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> “Decision Authorizing Pacific Gas…” CPUC, Aug. 20, 2014. p. 197. <a href="http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M102/K361/102361873.PDF">http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M102/K361/102361873.PDF</a>. In this case, as in the last one, CPUC claimed the extra spending merely made up for deferred maintenance that PG&amp;E previously failed to perform, and they should not get the benefits of such deferral. PG&amp;E argued that it had to delay earlier implementation due to other mandates from the regulator. In any case, safety seemed of at best secondary focus for both. An advocacy group recommended including up to $200 million extra capital costs for poll replacement, which PG&amp;E did not oppose, but CPUC denied this proposal as well. Ibid, 194.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Paul Joskow &amp; Edward Kahn. “A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in California’s Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000: The Final Word.” Feb. 4, 2002. <a href="https://economics.mit.edu/files/1151">https://economics.mit.edu/files/1151</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> A. Al-Sunaidy &amp; R. Green. “Electricity Deregulation in OECD Countries.” N.d. <a href="http://spiral.imperial.ac.uk:8080/bitstream/10044/1/10436/2/OECD%20deregulation%20paper.pdf">http://spiral.imperial.ac.uk:8080/bitstream/10044/1/10436/2/OECD%20deregulation%20paper.pdf</a>. [PS clarity needed on mechanics of UK system, and this part.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a> Gomez-Ibanez, Regulating Infrastructure.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> For the past four years, California’s CPUC has operated a “congestion charge” market, but this is still incipient, and should be expanded. It’s nodal pricing is also not used to determine investment, and is not as “fine-grained” as other countries’ nodal models.</p><p>“Congestion Revenue Rights Auction Efficiency.” California ISO, Feb. 8, 2018. <a href="https://www.caiso.com/Documents/DraftFinalProposal-CongestionRevenueRightsAuctionEfficiency-Track1.pdf">https://www.caiso.com/Documents/DraftFinalProposal-CongestionRevenueRightsAuctionEfficiency-Track1.pdf</a>. For entirely new transmission wires, the regulators still need to supervise spending and eminent domain authority, but they should be led by differences in prices between nodes, which show wing insufficient transfers and power in some areas relative to others.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a> The principle of inverse condemnation, although generally applied to government actions, was first applied to privately-owned “public utilities” in Barham v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 74 Cal. App. 4th 744, 751–52.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> Marshall v. Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles, 219 Cal. App. 3d 1124, 1138–39 (1990)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> Rob Nikolewski, “CPUC Rules Against SDG&amp;E in 2007 Wildfire Case.” The San Diego Union-Tribune. Nov. 30, 2017. <a href="https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/energy-green/sd-fi-sdge-wildfirecaseruling-20171130-story.html">https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/energy-green/sd-fi-sdge-wildfirecaseruling-20171130-story.html</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a> “Regulators and Legislators Explore Credit-Supportive Fire Risk Solutions for PG&amp;E and Other California Utilities.” Moody’s Investors Service. April 3, 2019. <a href="https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Regulators-and-legislators-explore-credit-supportive-fire-risk-solutions--PBC_1169106?WT.mc_id=AM~RmluYW56ZW4ubmV0X1JTQl9SYXRpbmdzX05ld3NfTm9fVHJhbnNsYXRpb25z~20190403_PBC_1169106">https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Regulators-and-legislators-explore-credit-supportive-fire-risk-solutions--PBC_1169106?WT.mc_id=AM~RmluYW56ZW4ubmV0X1JTQl9SYXRpbmdzX05ld3NfTm9fVHJhbnNsYXRpb25z~20190403_PBC_1169106</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[21]</a> Robert Walton, “Southern California Edison Requests Higher ROE, Citing Wildfire Risks.” Utility Dive. Industry Dive, April 12, 2019, <a href="https://www.utilitydive.com/news/southern-california-edison-requests-higher-roe-citing-wildfire-risks/552577/">https://www.utilitydive.com/news/southern-california-edison-requests-higher-roe-citing-wildfire-risks/552577/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[22]</a> Carolyn Kousky, Katherin Greig, and Brett Lingle, “Financing Third Party Wildfire Damages,” Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, February 2019, p. 26 <a href="https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Financing-Third-Party-Wildfire-Damages-Options-for-Californias-Electric-Utilities.pdf">https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Financing-Third-Party-Wildfire-Damages-Options-for-Californias-Electric-Utilities.pdf</a> Tara Law, “California’s Power Shutoffs Might Prevent Wildfires. But Are They Worth the Risks?” Time Magazine. Time USA, LLC, Oct. 25, 2019, <a href="https://time.com/5710169/california-power-wildfires-pge/">https://time.com/5710169/california-power-wildfires-pge/</a>. At least in 2015, however, these malfunctions burned about 50% of all wildfire acreage. Ivan Penn, “Power Lines and Electrical Equipment are a Leading Cause of California Wildfires.” The Los Angeles Times. Oct. 17, 2017. <a href="https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-utility-wildfires-20171017-story.html">https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-utility-wildfires-20171017-story.html</a>.</p><p>“Facts + Statistics: Wildfires.” Insurance Information Institute. <a href="https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-wildfires">https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-wildfires</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[23]</a> Adam Rogers, “California’s Power Outages Are About Wildfires — But Also Money.” Wired Magazine. Condé Nast, Oct. 10, 2019. <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/californias-power-outages-are-about-wildfiresbut-also-money/">https://www.wired.com/story/californias-power-outages-are-about-wildfiresbut-also-money/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref24">[24]</a> San Diego Gas &amp; Electric Company v. Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, 18–1368 (Supreme Court, 2018). <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-1368/98044/20190430151930791_18-___PetitionForAWritOfCertiorari.pdf">https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-1368/98044/20190430151930791_18-___PetitionForAWritOfCertiorari.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref25">[25]</a> Jeff St. John, “Why PG&amp;E Didn’t Cut the Power to Possibly Prevent California’s Deadliest Wildfire.” Green Tech Media. Nov. 28, 2018. <a href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/why-pge-didnt-cut-power-to-possibly-prevent-californias-deadliest-wildfire">https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/why-pge-didnt-cut-power-to-possibly-prevent-californias-deadliest-wildfire</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a> Dan Brekke, “Report: PG&amp;E Knew High-Voltage Lines Posed Fire Danger, But Put Off Repairs.” KQED News. Jul. 10, 2019, <a href="https://www.kqed.org/news/11760156/report-pge-knew-about-extensive-power-line-problems-but-delayed-repairs-for-years">https://www.kqed.org/news/11760156/report-pge-knew-about-extensive-power-line-problems-but-delayed-repairs-for-years</a>; J. D. Morris, “PG&amp;E Considers Shutting Off More Lines During Times of Wildfire Risk.” San Francisco Chronicle. Hearst Communications, Inc, Dec. 14, 2018. <a href="https://www.sfchronicle.com/california-wildfires/article/PG-E-considers-shutting-off-transmission-lines-13467311.php">https://www.sfchronicle.com/california-wildfires/article/PG-E-considers-shutting-off-transmission-lines-13467311.php</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref27">[27]</a> Besides the 115 kilovolt line, one pole holding up a 12 kilovolt line also failed at the time of the fire, apparently with “bullets and bullet holes at the break point.” Although the shooting of the pole is not PG&amp;E’s fault, and although it may not be the main cause of the fire, the inverse condemnation rules mean it may all be charged to state CPUC authority. “PG&amp;E Publicly Releases Supplemental Report on Electric Incidents Near the Camp Fire.” PG&amp;E. Dec. 11, 2018. <a href="https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20181211_pge_publicly_releases_supplemental_report_on_electric_incidents_near_the_camp_fire">https://www.pge.com/en/about/newsroom/newsdetails/index.page?title=20181211_pge_publicly_releases_supplemental_report_on_electric_incidents_near_the_camp_fire</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref28">[28]</a> Almost all shutdowns are away from the high-power lines. See transmission lines at California energy map here: <a href="https://ww2.energy.ca.gov/maps/infrastructure/3P_Enlg.pdf">https://ww2.energy.ca.gov/maps/infrastructure/3P_Enlg.pdf</a> and a representative daily shutdown map here. <a href="https://www.sfgate.com/california-wildfires/article/pge-potential-power-outage-map-wind-fire-14501332.php">https://www.sfgate.com/california-wildfires/article/pge-potential-power-outage-map-wind-fire-14501332.php#</a> Large lines such as on the East Side of the Peninsula and along the Crystal Springs Reservoir are still under power, while transmission-line free areas are not.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref29">[29]</a> Paris Martineau, “Why the PG&amp;E Blackouts Spared California’s Big Tech HQs.” Wired Magazine. Condé Nast, Oct. 9, 2019. <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/why-the-pgande-blackouts-spared-californias-big-tech-hqs/">https://www.wired.com/story/why-the-pgande-blackouts-spared-californias-big-tech-hqs/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref30">[30]</a> Katherine Blunt &amp; Russell Gold, “PG&amp;E Knew for Years Its Lines Could Spark Wildfires, and Didn’t Fix Them.” The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones &amp; Company, Inc, Jul. 10, 2019. <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-knew-for-years-its-lines-could-spark-wildfires-and-didnt-fix-them-11562768885">https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-knew-for-years-its-lines-could-spark-wildfires-and-didnt-fix-them-11562768885</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref31">[31]</a> David Louie, “PG&amp;E Power Outage: State Lawmakers Press Utility on Reducing Public Safety Power Shutoff Events.” ABC7 News. ABC, Inc, , Nov. 18, 2019. <a href="https://abc7news.com/politics/state-lawmakers-press-pg-e-on-reducing-power-shutdown-events/5706011/">https://abc7news.com/politics/state-lawmakers-press-pg-e-on-reducing-power-shutdown-events/5706011/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref32">[32]</a> “PG&amp;E 2019 SB695 Compliance Report.” PG&amp;E. N.d. <a href="https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=6442461195.">https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=6442461195.</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref33">[33]</a> Erik Derosiers, “Competitive Electricity Retailing: Why Restructuring Must Go On.” Utility Dive. Industry Dive, Jul. 11, 2017. <a href="https://www.utilitydive.com/news/competitive-electricity-retailing-why-restructuri.ng-must-go-on/446830/">https://www.utilitydive.com/news/competitive-electricity-retailing-why-restructuri.ng-must-go-on/446830/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=db271b81537c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news/why-is-pg-e-failing-california-all-the-wrong-incentives-db271b81537c">Why is PG&amp;E Failing California?
 All the Wrong Incentives</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news">Cicero News</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How New California Housing Can Slow Global Warming]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cicero-news/how-new-california-housing-can-slow-global-warming-1e634766ba8?source=rss-1c7206c33e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1e634766ba8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[environment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[global-warming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ceqa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[california]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[housing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Judge Glock]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 24 Aug 2019 21:50:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-23T22:46:02.297Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/0*2WCMwN84y0TD2aA6" /></figure><p>California’s mild climate and extensive environmental regulations make the state a veritable environmental oasis in America. California is especially “green” in its low level of carbon emissions. The average Californian emits only 9 tons of Carbon Dioxide or its equivalent per year, the second lowest rate in the United States. In fact, California’s Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emission rate is about half the national average, and less than 1/10th the level of the most polluting states.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><blockquote>The average Californian emits only 9 tons of Carbon Dioxide or its equivalent per year, the second lowest rate in the United States.</blockquote><p>Unfortunately, a handful of California’s supposed environmental laws actually work to drive people and homes out of the state, and into more polluting regions. Many of these laws treat new residents as contributors to California’s emission problem, instead of viewing them as they should, as reducers of global GHGs. Some of these laws may actually exacerbate, instead of ameliorating, global climate change.</p><p>One of the best ways for California to mitigate climate change is to make California more welcoming to new residents. Since climate change is a global problem, California’s emissions goals and environmental laws should take into account their own global impact, including how they might attract people to or drive people from California.</p><blockquote>California’s emissions goals and environmental laws should take into account their own global impact, including how they might attract people to or drive people from California.</blockquote><p>We therefore propose that, at the least, all of California’s environmental laws should evaluate greenhouse gas impacts on a per capita basis, instead of just by total emissions. More optimistically, California should count new residents as positive contributions to reducing global warming, instead of, as today, counting them as additional emitters. In this way, we can help mitigate global climate change, even as we make the great green land of California more welcoming for everyone.</p><p><strong>How the California Global Warming Act Can Sabotage its Own Goals</strong></p><p>California Assembly Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, is rightfully regarded as a landmark environmental reform, and has done much to reduce carbon emissions in the state. The law, along with subsequent amendments, requires the state to return its total Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions to 40% below 1990 levels by 2030, and 80% by 2050.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a></p><p>Shockingly, however, the law’s carbon targets only count total emissions from the state, and make no mention of per capita changes. Thus, ironically, the state’s climate goals can be achieved as much by pushing residents out as by reducing emissions from existing residents. This seemingly minor issue has had grave ramifications.</p><p>For one, although California has had notable success reducing GHGs, those gains have been entirely offset by losses in population to other states. Since 1990, California has lost, on net, 3.8 million domestic migrants to other states. These states on average have about double the GHG emissions of California. These lost residents therefore emit about 41 million extra metric tons of CO2 per year.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> This is approximately equal to the entire reduction of annual GHG emissions that has taken place in California since 2006.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> Thus for every climate gain we have made inside our state, we have lost as much by driving residents away. Such a loss needs to be acknowledged in California climate policy.</p><blockquote>For every climate gain we have made inside our state, we have lost as much by driving residents away.</blockquote><p>Many cities and counties, in adopting their own climate plans under AB 32, have used the law to limit housing and population. Marin County’s climate plan includes efforts to “Institute growth boundaries or programs to limit suburban sprawl” and to “Improve the County’s jobs/Housing Balance,” which often means limiting residential development.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> Santa Clara County is using greenhouse gas funding from the state to purchase and preserve thousands of acres of agricultural land immediately on the edge of its urban areas, in order to keep away new housing.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> Cities like Berkeley have touted their own success in reducing total greenhouse gas emissions, without mentioning that they have done this by restricting population growth.<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a></p><p>Even cities that fully mitigate the impact of new development on the climate have seen environmental laws sabotage their efforts. San Diego recently purchased “carbon offsets” for all potential emissions of a new green housing development it permitted.<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> Yet that project was blocked by a court because it found the carbon offsets focused on “global” impacts of climate, instead of mitigating the emissions locally. Of course, since climate change is a global issue, those impacts should be paramount in any analysis.<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a></p><p>Many state-level agencies have counterproductively supported such efforts. The State Attorney General’s offices has celebrated “exemplary and innovative local sustainability and climate policies,” such as “City of San Jose’s Urban Growth Boundary,” “Yolo County’s Jobs/Housing Balance Policy” and so forth.<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a> The California Air Resources Board includes in its global warming plan the “conservation of agricultural and other lands” from housing development.<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a></p><p>Lawsuits attacking the supposed negative climate impacts of new housing in California are common.<a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a> As early as 2007, then Attorney General Jerry Brown sued San Bernardino County over its housing plan, arguing that it allowed too much new development and therefore new emissions. An article at the time noted “the lawsuit is one of at least seven around the state using the global warming threat to challenge building or planning proposals by developers and local governments.”<a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a> The fact that the California Supreme Court, in interpreting AB 32, claimed that “Meeting our statewide reduction goals does not preclude all new development,” is not a particularly comforting stance, since it assumes an inherent contradiction between development and meeting climate goals.<a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a></p><p>The argument we’re making here to recognize the climate benefits of new housing is not an argument to relax environmental regulations. Although there is reasonable debate about how environmental regulations could push some industries or jobs to low-cost or low-regulation areas, there is no such a debate on housing.<a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a> The relationship between housing construction and population, especially in a growing area like California, is almost one-to-one.<a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a> Thus for every new housing unit built in the state, there will almost certainly be one new household, of slightly over 2 people on average, emitting lower total GHGs. Given that the value of a new home in California is significantly greater than the cost of construction, environmental building codes are not the major deterrent to new homes. Environmental laws and urban zoning that completely block such development are far more important.<a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a> As long as the housing is actually allowed, significant environmental regulations will not deter it. Yet right now, all California housing faces the unnecessary burden of proving that it will have little or no local climate impact, when its real impact is almost always towards reducing global emissions.</p><p><strong>How “CEQA” Can Exacerbate Environmental Harms</strong></p><p>One of the most frequent barriers to new housing in California is the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and its requirement of extensive “CEQA reports” on new development. Unfortunately, the law’s anti-housing tendency is exacerbated by a false conception of the GHG impacts of new development. A 2007 law, SB 743, required all CEQA reports to show that a new development mitigates its potential GHG emissions.<a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a> CEQA should instead acknowledge that new housing in California reduces global emissions and therefore global warming.</p><blockquote>A 2007 law, SB 743, required all CEQA reports to show that a new development mitigates its potential GHG emissions. CEQA should instead acknowledge that new housing in California reduces global emissions.</blockquote><p>Opponents of development have used CEQA report lawsuits to block many types of green infrastructure, such as a parking company that sued a proposed rail line to the Los Angeles airport. In a recent egregious case, the California Supreme Court demanded a new CEQA report on a project which had been in the pipeline for 25 years, and whose CEQA report had been in process for five of those years, and which overall promised to be a “net zero” greenhouse gas project. The California Supreme Court, however, said that the current CEQA report did not show that reduction in greenhouse gases was “sufficient” to meet the state’s greenhouse gas goals, even though it was a clear global gain relative to a no-development baseline.<a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a></p><p>The baseline assumption, in fact, for all CEQA reports is that new development is an environmental hazard that must be deterred or mitigated. CEQA reports today are required to analyze the “growth-inducing impacts” of new development as a potential threat.<a href="#_ftn20">[20]</a> To that end, the Bay Area Air Quality Management District, which implements CEQA climate change regulations, advocates blanket reductions in “land-use driven” emissions, meaning more development. <a href="#_ftn21">[21]</a></p><p>Luckily, some state officers have taken steps to evaluate CEQA greenhouse gases effects by per capita, instead of total, emissions. Most specifically, the California Office of Planning and Research has declared the “significant threshold” (after which all new projects need to account for and mitigate climatic impacts), for new housing and jobs is “per capita or per employee VMT [Vehicle Miles Traveled] that is 15% below that of existing development.”<a href="#_ftn22">[22]</a></p><p>Yet this 15% reduction in VMT relative to the California norm is still an inappropriate metric for the “negative” impact of a new housing development. For one, VMT is a very poor measure of climatic impact. Today, California’s low carbon emissions have little to do with driving behavior, and everything to do with its mild climate and carbon-free energies, including for existing electric and hybrid cars. Californians drive only about 10% fewer miles per year than average Americans, despite emitting only half as much carbon.<a href="#_ftn23">[23]</a> The Bay Area ranks about in the middle of large urban areas nationally in terms of VMT per capita per day, at about 25, and LA is about the same, even though these areas have very low per capita GHG emissions.<a href="#_ftn24">[24]</a> Reducing driving in these areas by stifling new development will not mitigate climate change.</p><p>Controls on supposed “high VMT” projects often do not even restrict VMT on a per capita basis, let alone on a total basis. Although planners hope that any denial of “sprawling” development will prevent driving, often the opposite is the case. When one region prevents new projects, another region often attracts the displaced residents. This is happening today in the Bay Area and Central Valley cities. Due partially to decades of supposed anti-sprawl housing policy, San Francisco is second in the nation in “supercommuters,” or people who spend over 3 hours a day getting to and from work. They total over 100,000 people, or about 5% of the working population. San Francisco’s supercommuters have increased by over 110% in the past decade, the fastest increase in the nation.<a href="#_ftn25">[25]</a> By fighting “sprawling” development, planners often just push workers into even more distant, and sprawling, areas. Despite attempted controls on land use, there is no ability to control where people live and where they work.</p><p>In evaluating CEQA reports, the California Supreme Court has supported the per capita VMT and other limits instituted by state regulators. They have noted that “CEQA is not intended as a population control measure. Of note, the future residents and occupants of development enabled by Project approval would exist and live somewhere else if this Project is not approved. Whether ‘here or there,’ GHG emissions associated with such population growth will occur.”<a href="#_ftn26">[26]</a> In reality, the general assumption of the negative climatic impacts of development, and the low VMT “significant threshold” for CEQA reports, effectively functions like a population control measure, preventing much new development that would reduce global GHG emissions.</p><blockquote>The general assumption of the negative climatic impacts of development, and the low VMT “significant threshold” for CEQA reports, effectively functions like a population control measure, preventing much new development that would reduce global GHG emissions.</blockquote><p><strong>The Environmental Benefits of “Greenfield” Development</strong></p><p>As the previous discussion of Vehicle Miles Traveled indicates, much of the debate about new development in California is also a debate about “sprawl,” a term that is often vaguely defined. Yet California needs to understand that allowing new development, even development occasionally derided as “sprawl,” and even development on its “greenfields,” is still a win for the global climate relative to the alternative of allowing no development at all.</p><p>For one, dense development does not have significant effects on driving behavior. A recent metasurvey showed that increasing existing densities by 40% would only reduce per capita driving by 5%. Such an increase would be at the extreme end of density increases in U.S. history, and would be unlikely to occur.<a href="#_ftn27">[27]</a> In fact, the Bay Area is one of the few metropolitan regions to “densify” in the past 30 years, and yet it has seen no decrease total VMT, and an 11% decline in transit ridership.<a href="#_ftn28">[28]</a> Current estimates are that even if 3/4s of new housing were built at twice the density of current development, an unobtainable goal, this would reduce CO2 emissions by personal transportation, which is itself only about 25% of all emissions, by less than 10% by 2050.<a href="#_ftn29">[29]</a></p><p>On the whole, even if dense new development significantly lowered automobile VMT and increased transit usage, there would be little to no climate impact. Back in 1970, cars used about twice as much energy per passenger mile traveled as buses, about 4,900 British Thermal Units, to 2,500 units. Those measures are now reversed, with cars using about 2,900 BTU, and buses about 4,100 BTU per passenger mile. While the energy efficiency of cars is improving over 1% per year, buses have actually been getting about 1% dirtier per year. Commuter rail is about 2,700 BTUs per passenger mile, and rail transit in general is close behind. Thus today, rail transit and autos have the same total energy use, but the trains are getting dirtier while cars have continued to get cleaner.<a href="#_ftn30">[30]</a> California’s mandates on electric vehicles will make cars an unquestionably cleaner source of transportation within the next few years.</p><p>The likelihood of much denser development is further limited by the fact that California cities are already the densest in the United States. Of the 10 most densely populated urban areas, 7 are in California, with Los Angeles, counter to its reputation, being the densest overall metro, and San Francisco being third. At around 4,300 people per square mile, coastal California cities are already more than twice as dense as the rest of the United States.<a href="#_ftn31">[31]</a></p><p>Since California cities are already very dense, have little “infill” space left, and are reluctant to displace current residents, the only hope to bring new residents to the state is building in its current “greenfields.” Contrary to myth, this does not mean bulldozing pristine virgin paradises. Today, 40% of the 9 county Bay Area region is taken up by grazing cows, whose belching methane gas are a genuine global warming concern. Another 20% is taken up by purely private agricultural land. Since today agriculture uses 80% of the water in the state, it in fact presents a significant environmental issue.<a href="#_ftn32">[32]</a> If this incredibly valuable land was instead taken up with all new housing, it would be an unalloyed good for the globe, bringing more people from cold and dirty regions to California’s friendly and mild clime.</p><blockquote>Today, 40% of the 9 county Bay Area region is taken up by grazing cows, whose belching methane gases are a genuine global warming concern.</blockquote><p>Pushing people into denser developments also does not seem to have a positive impact on GHG emissions made by the home itself. Multi-family homes do not, on average, use less energy than single-family homes. Multi-family homes used on average 78,000 BTUs per square foot of heated space per year, while single-family homes use only 55,000 BTUs. This is partially because multi-family homes use more energy heating and cooling “common areas,” like stairwells and lobbies. At the same time, construction of large-multifamily buildings often involves concrete rather than timber, and concrete has significantly higher GHG emissions, from twice to seven times as high, per square foot of new construction as timber.<a href="#_ftn33">[33]</a> Therefore, California’s law should look at the overall environmental impacts of new building, and not merely whether they are single or multi-family. The current green building codes do a much better job of controlling emissions than land-use controls on different types of development.</p><p>Some might argue that restricting sprawling development would force more people into the dense areas, which might have some minor climate benefits. Yet forty years of California history shows that most developments denied around the region do not suddenly appear inside the central city. We can and should allow as much dense development as we can inside California’s cities, but that is not mutually exclusive to the goal of allowing new development on the outskirts of existing cities. California must learn to embrace all sorts of development if it is going to help fight climate change.</p><p><strong>Some Prospective Reforms, to Improve Housing and the Environment</strong></p><p>Some simple environmental reforms could allow more housing development in California even as they help ameliorate global climate change.</p><p>First, and at the least, California should modify AB 32 and its climate targets so that they aim at “per capita” reductions in emissions, and not total reductions. This would encourage more GHG efficiency, instead of merely meeting the target by driving people away, and help keep more people in our low-GHG state.</p><p>It would be even more effective if California could modify AB 32 to take into account the net benefits from encouraging more migration into the state. California should recognize that a person who halves their climate emissions by moving from Texas to the Bay Area is part of the necessary goal of reducing global climate changes. With this reform, we can more easily achieve our climate goals by attracting more people from the United States, even with the same or greater reductions in total global emissions.</p><blockquote>California could modify AB 32 to take into account the net benefits from encouraging more migration into the state.</blockquote><p>CEQA should also be modified to take into account the climatic benefits of development. Instead of limiting new development unless it encourages significantly less driving than other housing, it should at least make the CEQA “significant threshold” for a new development the same as other states’ VMTs, instead of lower than the already lower VMT in California. Better, the opponents of any particular CEQA report should have to show that the total lifetime GHG effects of new housing development are less than an equivalent development in other states.</p><p>Ideally, since California housing today is a clear victory for the climate, all new housing should be exempted from CEQA, which can occasionally take up to thousands upon thousands of pages of wasted paper per project. Under this proposal, all new housing developments would still be forced to abide by other green building codes and environmental regulations on habitat preservation and so forth, but they would actually be allowed to be constructed if they met those requirements.</p><p>More generally, California cities and counties should open themselves to more development. Instead of using climate as an excuse to drive people away, advocates should use climate arguments to bring more residents into these cities, both in infill areas inside the cities and even in “greenfield” areas on its immediate fringes. Thus every city climate plan should include a description of what it can do to attract more residents, instead of the opposite.</p><p>For decades, California has been a leader in environmental laws but a laggard in welcoming new residents. It is time to stop using a false and parochial sense of environmental impact in order to limit growth. The climate change problems we face are global, and California’s environmental laws, and housing policy, must take this into account.</p><p><strong>Judge Glock<br></strong>Senior Policy Analyst, The Cicero Institute</p><p>To learn more and explore related policy issues, visit our website, <a href="http://www.ciceroinstitute.org/">www.ciceroinstitute.org</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> United States, Energy Information Administration, “Energy Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions by State, 2005–2016,” February 27, 2019, Table 6, <a href="https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/analysis/">https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/analysis/</a>;“U.S. States by Carbon-Dioxide Emissions Per Capita,” <em>World Atlas, </em>2014<em> </em><a href="https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/us-states-by-carbon-dioxide-emissions-per-capita.html">https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/us-states-by-carbon-dioxide-emissions-per-capita.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Public Policy Institute of California, “AB 32,” <a href="https://www.ppic.org/blog/tag/ab-32/">https://www.ppic.org/blog/tag/ab-32/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> David Friedman &amp; Jennifer Hernandez, “California Environmental Quality Act, Greenhouse Gas Regulation, and Climate Change,” (Chapman University Center for Demographics and Policy, 2015), 48. <a href="https://www.newgeography.com/files/California%20GHG%20Regulation%20Final.pdf">https://www.newgeography.com/files/California%20GHG%20Regulation%20Final.pdf</a> California as a whole has grown in population, due to natural increase and international immigration, but at only about the national average rate. Net domestic migration is the best measure of California’s ability to attract or repel other residents from the United States.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a>California Air Resources Board, <em>California Greenhouse Gas Emissions for 2000 to 2015, 2017 ed</em>., p. 1–2. <a href="https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/pubs/reports/2000_2016/ghg_inventory_trends_00-16.pdf">https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/pubs/reports/2000_2016/ghg_inventory_trends_00-16.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Marin County, “Marin County Climate Action Plan,” July 2015, <a href="https://www.marincounty.org/-/media/files/departments/cd/planning/sustainability/climate-and-adaptation/full-cap-2015/marincapupdate_final_20150731.pdf?la=en">https://www.marincounty.org/-/media/files/departments/cd/planning/sustainability/climate-and-adaptation/full-cap-2015/marincapupdate_final_20150731.pdf?la=en</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Johnny Magdaleno, “In Wealthy Silicon Valley, a $500 Million Plan to Save Threatened Farmland,” <em>Reuters, </em>August 8, 2019, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-farming-land-feature/in-wealthy-silicon-valley-a-500-million-plan-to-save-threatened-farmland-idUSKCN1UY1B6">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-farming-land-feature/in-wealthy-silicon-valley-a-500-million-plan-to-save-threatened-farmland-idUSKCN1UY1B6</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Dee Williams-Ridley, City Manager, to Timothy Burroughs, Director, Planning and Development Department, “Climate Plan Action Update,” December 6, 2018, <a href="https://www.cityofberkeley.info/recordsonline/api/Document/AS1qYEO88qcY6Ips8nwbGgL4jGxxlSquza3ESlDOTS6DL2nWl1jPxxzLJVhyvQgYDIlKPuJDdT3oigVB31dHEfM%3D/">https://www.cityofberkeley.info/recordsonline/api/Document/AS1qYEO88qcY6Ips8nwbGgL4jGxxlSquza3ESlDOTS6DL2nWl1jPxxzLJVhyvQgYDIlKPuJDdT3oigVB31dHEfM%3D/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Alison St John, “Sierra Club Sues San Diego County Over Carbon Offsets For New Developments,” <em>KPBS, </em>September 6, 2018, <a href="https://www.kpbs.org/news/2018/sep/06/sierra-club-sues-san-diego-county-over-carbon-offs/">https://www.kpbs.org/news/2018/sep/06/sierra-club-sues-san-diego-county-over-carbon-offs/</a> One could argue that such a development is itself a carbon offset that attracts other people to California.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Frank Gormlie, “Judge Rules Against San Diego County’s Plan on Greenhouse Gas Emissions- Brings Major Residential Developments to a Halt,” <em>Obrag.com, </em>January 7, 2019, <a href="https://obrag.org/2019/01/judge-rules-against-san-diego-countys-plan-on-greenhouse-gas-emissions-brings-major-residential-developments-to-a-halt/">https://obrag.org/2019/01/judge-rules-against-san-diego-countys-plan-on-greenhouse-gas-emissions-brings-major-residential-developments-to-a-halt/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> California Attorney General, “Sustainability and General Plans: Examples of Policies to Address Climate Change,” January 22, 2010, <a href="https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/environment/GP_policies.pdf">https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/environment/GP_policies.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> California Air Resources Board, “California’s 2017 Climate Change Scoping Plan,”November 2017, <a href="https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_2017.pdf">https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/scoping_plan_2017.pdf</a> Despite overall AB 32 goals, many places, like Caltrans, OPR, and other agencies have made efforts to evaluate emissions on a per capita basis, or to at least include expected population growth in their calculations. Caltrans, “California’s Transportation Plan 2040,” June 2016, <a href="https://dot.ca.gov/-/media/dot-media/programs/transportation-planning/documents/finalctp2040-report-webready.pdf">https://dot.ca.gov/-/media/dot-media/programs/transportation-planning/documents/finalctp2040-report-webready.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> See, e.g., Kevin Fixler, “Sonoma County Housing, Hotel Project Sued Over Greenhouse Gas Emissions Concerns,” <em>North Bay Business Journal, </em>August 6, 2019, <a href="https://www.northbaybusinessjournal.com/industrynews/construction/9874071-181/healdsburg-housing-construction-environmental-law">https://www.northbaybusinessjournal.com/industrynews/construction/9874071-181/healdsburg-housing-construction-environmental-law</a>; ust Elijah CHiland, “Envnronmental Groups Sue Over 12,000 Acre Centennial Devleopment in Northern LA County,” <em>LA Curbed, </em>May 28, 2019, <a href="https://la.curbed.com/2019/5/28/18643045/centennial-tejon-ranch-lawsuit-sprawl">https://la.curbed.com/2019/5/28/18643045/centennial-tejon-ranch-lawsuit-sprawl</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Mark Martin, “Sprawl Clashes with Warming in California, <em>SFGATE, </em>May 27, 2007, <a href="https://www.sfgate.com/green/article/Sprawl-clashes-with-warming-in-California-2591007.php">https://www.sfgate.com/green/article/Sprawl-clashes-with-warming-in-California-2591007.php</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> Center for Biological Diversity v. The Newhall Land and Farming Company, 62 Cal.4th No. S217763, Supreme Court of California, November 30, 2015, <a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-supreme-court/1719578.html">https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-supreme-court/1719578.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a> Wayne B. Gray and Ronald J. Shadbegian, “When Do Firms Shift Production Across States to Avoid Environmental Regulation?” <em>National Center for Environmental Economics Working Papers Series, #02–02, </em>January 2002, <a href="https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-12/documents/when_do_firms_shift_production.pdf">https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-12/documents/when_do_firms_shift_production.pdf</a> reasonably Sarah Stafford, “The Impact of Environmental Regulations on the Location of Firms in the Hazardous Waste Managmeent Industry,” <em>Land Economics </em>76, no. 4 (Nov., 2000): 569–589.</p><p><a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3146953?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">https://www.jstor.org/stable/3146953?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> For decades, in fact, population has been reasonably estimated from the number of housing units in an area SK Smith and M. Mandell, “A Comparisons of Population Estimation Methods,” Journal of American Statistical Association 79 (1984): 282–9. <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12340389">https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12340389</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a> Morris A. Davis and Jonathan Heathcote, “The Price and Quantity of Residential Land in the United States,” <em>Journal of Monetary Economics </em>54, no. 8 (Nov. 2007): 2596–2620, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0304393207000785">https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0304393207000785</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> “California Senate Bill 743: An evolutionary change to transportation impact analysis,” <em>Fehr &amp; Peers, </em><a href="https://www.fehrandpeers.com/sb743/">https://www.fehrandpeers.com/sb743/</a>. California’s SB 375, adopted back in 2008, which covers regional transportation planning agencies, allows them to use per capita VMT as a metric for success, but those transportation agencies have limited authority. Louis Bedsworth, et. al., Driving Change: Reducing Vehicle Miles Traveled in California,” <em>Public Policy Institute of California Papers</em>, 2011, <a href="https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/rb/RB_211LBRB.pdf">https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/rb/RB_211LBRB.pdf</a>; Senate Bill №375, Chapter 728, September 30, 2008, <a href="http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0351-0400/sb_375_bill_20080930_chaptered.pdf">http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_0351-0400/sb_375_bill_20080930_chaptered.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> Kerry Jackson, “Welcome to California,” <em>City Journal, </em>July 8, 2019, <a href="https://www.city-journal.org/california-housing-development">https://www.city-journal.org/california-housing-development</a>; Center for Biological Diversity v. The Newhall Land and Farming Company, 62 Cal.4th No. S217763, Supreme Court of California, November 30, 2015, <a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-supreme-court/1719578.html">https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-supreme-court/1719578.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a>State of California, Title 14, Division 6, Chapter 3 “Guidelines for the Implementation of the California Environmental Quality Act,” <a href="http://resources.ca.gov/ceqa/docs/2018_CEQA_FINAL_TEXT_122818.pdf">http://resources.ca.gov/ceqa/docs/2018_CEQA_FINAL_TEXT_122818.pdf</a>; Port of Los Angeles, <em>Environmental Impact Report, Chapter 7, Growth Inducing Impacts, </em>January 2012, <a href="https://www.portoflosangeles.org/pola/pdf/eir/albs/deir/chapter_7_growth-inducing.pdf">https://www.portoflosangeles.org/pola/pdf/eir/albs/deir/chapter_7_growth-inducing.pdf</a> Although the state denies that such impacts should be regarded as either positive or negative, it’s guidelines show concern with any construction that could “significantly affect the environment.” We do not want to argue that there are no environmental concerns with development that need to be addressed, such as species habitat destruction or water usage. We only mean to argue that those other environmental concerns should be weighed against the possible climate change benefits of new housing.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[21]</a> Bay Area Air Quality Management District, “California Environmental Quality Act Guidelines Update: Proposed Thresholds of Significance,” November 2, 2009, <a href="http://www.baaqmd.gov/~/media/files/planning-and-research/ceqa/proposed-baaqmd-ceqa-air-quality-thresholds-nov-2009.pdf?la=en">http://www.baaqmd.gov/~/media/files/planning-and-research/ceqa/proposed-baaqmd-ceqa-air-quality-thresholds-nov-2009.pdf?la=en</a>. The plan allows individual projects to measure their “per capita” reductions, but the overall evaluation of projects and reductions required is not per capita. For impacts see Alexander G. Crockett, “Addressing the Significance of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under CEQA: California’s Search for Regulatory Certainty in an Uncertain World,” <em>Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal </em>4, no. 2 (Jan. 2011): 203–250. <a href="https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&amp;httpsredir=1&amp;article=1060&amp;context=gguelj">https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&amp;httpsredir=1&amp;article=1060&amp;context=gguelj</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[22]</a> Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, “Technical Advisory on Evaluating Transportation Impacts in CEQA,” November 2017, <a href="http://opr.ca.gov/docs/20171127_Transportation_Analysis_TA_Nov_2017.pdf">http://opr.ca.gov/docs/20171127_Transportation_Analysis_TA_Nov_2017.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[23]</a> Jeff Davis, “Trends in Per Capita VMT,” <em>Eno Transportation Weekly, </em>June 7, 2019, <a href="https://www.enotrans.org/article/trends-in-per-capita-vmt/">https://www.enotrans.org/article/trends-in-per-capita-vmt/</a>; Office of Highway Poliyc Information, Federal Highway Administration, “Selected Measurs for Identifying Peer States,” Table PS-1, October, 2017, <a href="https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2016/ps1.cfm">https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2016/ps1.cfm</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref24">[24]</a> <a href="http://www.vitalsigns.mtc.ca.gov/daily-miles-traveled">http://www.vitalsigns.mtc.ca.gov/daily-miles-traveled</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref25">[25]</a> Sydney Bennet, “Rise of the Super Commuters,” <em>Apartment List: Rentonomics, </em>April 24, 2018,<em> </em><a href="https://www.apartmentlist.com/rentonomics/increase-in-long-super-commutes/">https://www.apartmentlist.com/rentonomics/increase-in-long-super-commutes/</a>; Michelle Robertson, “Stunning Increase in Bay Area ‘super commuters’ in the last decade amid housing crisis,” <em>SFGATE, </em>April 27, 2018, <a href="https://www.sfgate.com/traffic/article/Bay-Area-commute-San-Francisco-traffic-12861808.php">https://www.sfgate.com/traffic/article/Bay-Area-commute-San-Francisco-traffic-12861808.php</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a> Center for Biological Diversity v. The Newhall Land and Farming Company, 62 Cal.4th No. S217763, Supreme Court of California, November 30, 2015, <a href="https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-supreme-court/1719578.html">https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-supreme-court/1719578.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref27">[27]</a> David Brownstone, “Key Relationships Between the Built Environmental and VMT,” Special Report 298, Transportation Research Board, 2008, <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/eee6/4a3db35cbe1ad74b966a41d1753e2b7a37c3.pdf">https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/eee6/4a3db35cbe1ad74b966a41d1753e2b7a37c3.pdf</a>; Tim De Chant, “More Density Equals Less Driving: Just an Urban Legend?” <em>Grist, </em>July 14, 2011, <a href="https://grist.org/transportation/2011-07-14-drive-a-lot-housing-density-may-not-be-to-blame/">https://grist.org/transportation/2011-07-14-drive-a-lot-housing-density-may-not-be-to-blame/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref28">[28]</a> Metropolitan Transportation Commission, “Transit Ridership,” <em>MTO Vital Signs, </em><a href="http://www.vitalsigns.mtc.ca.gov/transit-ridership">http://www.vitalsigns.mtc.ca.gov/transit-ridership</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref29">[29]</a> Phil McKenna, “Forget Curbing Suburban Sprawl: Building Denser Cities Would do Little to Reduce C02 emissions, a new National Academy of Science Report Concludes,” <em>MIT Technology Review, </em>September 3, 2009, <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/415135/forget-curbing-suburban-sprawl/">https://www.technologyreview.com/s/415135/forget-curbing-suburban-sprawl/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref30">[30]</a> Stacy C. Davis and Robert G. Boundy, <em>Transportation Energy Data Book, Ed. 37 </em>(Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy, 2019), Table 2.14, p. 2–19, <a href="https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Edition37_Full_Doc.pdf#page=64">https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Edition37_Full_Doc.pdf#page=64</a>, The most recent report no longer includes the impact of the original production and transmission of electric energy for rail transit, so this calculation used the 2016 counts. Stacy C. Davis, Susan E. Williams, and Robert G. Boundy, <em>Transportation Energy Data Book, Ed. 35 </em>(Washington DC: U.S. Department of Energy, 2016), Table 2.16, 2–20,21. <a href="https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Edition35_Full_Doc.pdf">https://tedb.ornl.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Edition35_Full_Doc.pdf</a>, California has been making notable efforts to make its bus fleet electric, so its CO2 emissions are probably proportionally lower than its BTUs, but California’s car fleet is also quickly becoming more electric. In any case, the “load factor” of transit has continued to decrease in almost all areas of the U.S., and shows little sign of abating.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref31">[31]</a> Wendell Cox, “California’s Dense Suburbs and Urbanization,” <em>NewGeography.com, </em>March 15, 2018, <a href="https://www.newgeography.com/content/005908-californias-dense-suburbs-and-urbanization">https://www.newgeography.com/content/005908-californias-dense-suburbs-and-urbanization</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref32">[32]</a> American Farmland Trust, et. al., “Sustaining Our Agricultural Bounty: An Assessment of the Current State of Farming and Ranching in the San Francisco Bay Area,” March 2011, <a href="https://www.sagecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Sustaining-Our-Agricultural-Bounty-An-Assessment-of-Agriculture-in-the-San-Francisco-Bay-Area.pdf">https://www.sagecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Sustaining-Our-Agricultural-Bounty-An-Assessment-of-Agriculture-in-the-San-Francisco-Bay-Area.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref33">[33]</a> U.S. Department of Energy, <em>Buildings Energy Data Book, 2011 </em>(Washington DC: US DOE, 2012), I-32 <a href="https://openei.org/doe-opendata/dataset/6aaf0248-bc4e-4a33-9735-2babe4aef2a5/resource/3edf59d2-32be-458b-bd4c-796b3e14bc65/download/2011bedb.pdf">https://openei.org/doe-opendata/dataset/6aaf0248-bc4e-4a33-9735-2babe4aef2a5/resource/3edf59d2-32be-458b-bd4c-796b3e14bc65/download/2011bedb.pdf</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1e634766ba8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news/how-new-california-housing-can-slow-global-warming-1e634766ba8">How New California Housing Can Slow Global Warming</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news">Cicero News</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Restoring the Lost Promise of a Paperwork Budget]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/cicero-news/restoring-the-lost-promise-of-a-paperwork-budget-17eaa2eb91f7?source=rss-1c7206c33e0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/17eaa2eb91f7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[congress]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[regulators]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[federal-government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[president]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[paperwork]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Judge Glock]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Jul 2019 18:54:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-23T23:07:55.134Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Judge Glock | Senior Policy Analyst| </em><a href="http://www.ciceroinstitute.org/"><em>The Cicero Institute</em></a><em><br>Maleka Momand | CEO | Esper</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*MMbp9YeWy0_Lali9.jpg" /></figure><h3><strong>Introduction</strong></h3><p>Everyone hates paperwork. And as far as we know, no politician has run a campaign on expanding government red tape.</p><p>Yet despite the fondest hopes of politicians in both parties, the number of official forms Americans complete keeps expanding. Federal paperwork in particular has become a burdensome millstone around the neck of the American people, amounting to about 100 hours for every employee in the United States, or about two and a half weeks of work each year.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p>One reason for this paper explosion is that paperwork reforms, although frequently proposed and occasionally adopted, are almost inevitably forgotten. Previous attempts to limit “paperwork” have been reshaped into the general attempts to reform the entire regulatory system. In the process, the seemingly simple and straightforward task of cutting paperwork hours has been snubbed.</p><p>There is a solution. If we require government officials to stick to a mandatory “paperwork budget,” both for the whole government and for each agency, we can make them think about the costs they impose on the public. Then these agencies will have to decide which types of paperwork actually benefit the country, and which are a senseless and unnecessary encumbrance. While the goal of a strict paperwork budget has often been celebrated in theory, it is long past time to institute it in fact.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a></p><h3><strong>The Current Burden</strong></h3><p>Thanks to an older law, the Regulatory Right to Know Act, we at least know how much paperwork the federal government requires. Today, the government estimates that the 110 billion separate questions they ask the public each year take about 11.3 billion hours to answer. This includes everything from tax forms to regulatory reports to grant applications. The burden has increased by over 125% in the past 30 years.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> The current burden means it would take over 5 million workers, working year-round, just to complete all current federal forms.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> These total hours are likely an underestimate, since most researchers agree that the government tends to low-ball the time required to fill out paperwork.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a></p><p>In dollar amounts, the government estimates its paperwork costs about $141 billion a year.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> But again, most researchers think the government underestimates the costs. With more realistic assumptions of the cost per hour of paperwork, about $35 per hour, it would be almost $400 billion, or about 2% of our whole Gross Domestic Product, just filling out federal forms.<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> This figure doesn’t even account for state and local forms, the quantity of which is largely unknown but undoubtedly rivals if not surpasses the federal government’s total.</p><p>Everyone has some experience with government paperwork, largely around tax time. And indeed, about 8 billion hours, or 70% of the estimated federal paperwork burden, comes from the IRS, which asks prodding questions about everything from the number of children in a household to the amount of Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income for corporations.<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a></p><p>Yet other agencies’ paperwork burdens remain significant. The total amount of forms in other agencies exceeds the Internal Revenue Service’s and has been expanding more quickly. The American Action Forum estimates there are 23,000 separate federal forms the public must complete, of which over 5,000 are imposed by Health and Human Services, including surveys of state underage drinking prevention policies and a questionnaire about “changes of attitude” at family planning practices. The Department of Agriculture has almost 4,000 forms, dealing with issues like a farmer’s soybean acreage or the inventory of high moisture content prunes. Thousands of these forms cannot be submitted electronically. <a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a></p><p>Beyond the time and cost of federal paperwork, there are other burdens that are often ignored. For one, increasing the number of forms increases the danger of private citizens being fined or jailed for even inadvertent mistakes on them. Many forms include penalties of up to a year in jail for failure to complete or return them. <a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a> Only about 25% of federal forms are “voluntary,” or have no penalty attached to them. But even that distinction is unclear for most citizens.<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a> Given the increasing penalties and increasing ambiguities around federal paperwork, most Americans rightfully view all government paperwork as a potential peril.<a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a></p><h3><strong>OIRA and the Failure of Paperwork Review</strong></h3><p>The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Executive Office of the President is the only office with the power to dam the paperwork flood. When any federal agency wants to create a new federal form, they must send an Information Collection Request (ICR), as they are known, to OIRA, which then decides whether to put an official “control number” on the form. Without that number, the form, whether mandatory or voluntary, can and should be ignored by the public.</p><p>Today, however, OIRA almost never refuses an ICR from an agency. In fact, there has been a consistent and bipartisan trend towards fewer and fewer ICR disapprovals over the past 40 years.<a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a> In Ronald Reagan’s first term, immediately after the creation of OIRA, over 4% of all ICRs were disapproved. In George H.W. Bush’s presidency, the number dropped to 1.35%. By George W. Bush’s first term, it was down to 0.27%. Despite President Donald Trump’s supposed deregulatory policies, his OIRA has disapproved only 0.04% of over 10,000 ICRs, or 1/100th of the Reagan first-term rate. Only three requests were completely disapproved, two for no stated reason, and one, the Naval Academy Application form, with the simple request that it be resubmitted with appropriate ethnic classifications.<a href="#_ftn14">[14]</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/933/1*se11rG3uYYI0eNokJaoGQw.png" /><figcaption><strong>Figure 1: Percent of ICR Disapprovals by Presidential Term. Source: Search of all Completed Information Collection Request reviews on Reginfo.gov, compared to “Disapproved” and “Disapproved and Continue” conclusions.</strong></figcaption></figure><p>One reason for the decline in disapprovals is that OIRA has lost the resources to control paperwork. It now employs only about 45 employees to supervise the entire federal regulatory apparatus, a reduction about half from its original level.<a href="#_ftn15">[15]</a> Only one of its five branches deal with “Information Policy,” and that branch deals with many statistical and privacy issues beyond ICRs. Probably no more than the equivalent of 5 full-time equivalent workers supervise ICRs for the entire federal government.<a href="#_ftn16">[16]</a></p><p>OIRA staff and administrators are also uninterested supervising paperwork requests. In interviews with a researcher for the Administrative Conference of the United States, OIRA’s information staff claimed their main contribution was improving the statistical methods of federal collections, rather than reducing or changing the total paperwork burden. They also denigrated the “retail” work of supervising most federal ICRs.<a href="#_ftn17">[17]</a> Recent OIRA administrators have shared this lack of interest. For instance, in Cass Sunstein’s insightful Harvard Law Review article of his time as the administrator of OIRA in the Obama administration, he discussed information collection requests only once in a footnote.<a href="#_ftn18">[18]</a> Overall, OIRA has become completely unmoored from its original purpose, which, although it is often forgotten today, was reducing paperwork.</p><h3><strong>Previous Failed Attempts at Paperwork Control</strong></h3><p>Both Democratic and Republican administrations and both Democratic and Republican Congresses have made sporadic efforts to control paperwork at the federal level. But after every reform, complacency quickly sets in, and the paperwork expansion returns. The reason is that there are no consistent and mandatory rules about agencies’ controlling their total paperwork burden.</p><p>The first effort to limit federal paperwork was the 1942 Federal Reports Act. This act allowed the President’s office to supervise and limit the increasing number of required forms, especially questionnaires, that emerged from the New Deal and World War II. In a few years, the act reduced the number of federal forms in half. But soon the White House lost interest in limiting requests, and the paperwork total surpassed the previous amount.<a href="#_ftn19">[19]</a></p><p>President Jimmy Carter was the first President to take a personal interest in paperwork. His executive order in 1979 actually mandated a paperwork budget for those agencies under presidential control. He succeeded in cutting down the burden of federal paperwork by 15% in just two years, an unparalleled success, never before equaled and never again repeated.<a href="#_ftn20">[20]</a></p><p>President Carter also championed and helped pass the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, which created both OIRA and the new ICR system. <a href="#_ftn21">[21]</a> According to the statute’s “purposes” preamble, the goal of the new agency was to “minimize the paperwork burden for individuals. <a href="#_ftn22">[22]</a> One early judicial ruling said that “The cornerstone of the PRA is the ICR.”<a href="#_ftn23">[23]</a></p><p>Yet, beginning in the Reagan administration, OIRA shifted its focus under the Paperwork Reduction Act to supervising all federal regulations, and became associated with evaluating the costs and benefits of different proposed regulations.<a href="#_ftn24">[24]</a> Reagan did continue Carter’s goal of a paperwork budget, and promised a 13% reduction in paperwork in his first year in office, but the administration’s interest lay elsewhere. Amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act in 1986 contained aspirational goals of reducing paperwork a few percentage points a year, but had no discernible effect. Agencies began backsliding from Carter’s reforms, and, despite relatively frequent ICR disapprovals in the Reagan administration, the paperwork burden grew by billions of hours.<a href="#_ftn25">[25]</a></p><p>The 1995 Paperwork Reduction Act amendments, passed by a Republican Congress with Democratic President Bill Clinton’s signature, ambitiously proposed reducing paperwork by 50% in 5 years, but the act was not mandatory and the goals were barely mentioned in later years.<a href="#_ftn26">[26]</a> The “Chief Information Officers,” created inside agencies by the act to supervise information collection, began to focus more on information technology procurement and gradually reduced their roles supervising ICRs.<a href="#_ftn27">[27]</a></p><p>More recent presidential administrations have also tried to control federal paperwork, but none was willing to go as far as even attempting an paperwork budget. George W. Bush’s administration asked its agencies to detail how they minimized burdens whenever they submitted their annual paperwork burden, but it was just a request.<a href="#_ftn28">[28]</a> President Barack Obama pushed some agencies to eliminate at least 2 million hours of annual burdens, but didn’t ask that they keep new requests in check, and so the totals again expanded.<a href="#_ftn29">[29]</a> Although the Trump administration has used its annual calls for paperwork data to ask agencies to limit paperwork, its request is completely hortatory. In fact, unlike previous administrations, Trump’s OIRA has issued no new paperwork reduction memos.<a href="#_ftn30">[30]</a> Thus the Trump administration has continued the long-term trend of ever-decreasing interest in the ever-increasing paperwork burden.</p><h3><strong>Enforcing Accountability</strong></h3><p>Most previous paperwork budgeting attempts failed because there were no means to hold agencies accountable. Fortunately, procedures exist to help track the paperwork agencies produce and circulate. With technological tools like updated electronic filing and digital document storage, OIRA or state governments could better exercise their oversight function and more easily field agency information collection requests.<a href="#_ftn31">[31]</a> Technology can both help implement a paperwork budget and streamline the process of enforcing it. <a href="#_ftn32">[32]</a> Due to the absence of these technologies and procedures, some earlier paperwork reforms have even been counterproductive. In the most egregious examples, the Paperwork Reduction Act notices can expand the size of federal forms completed by the public and require extra paper to print.<a href="#_ftn33">[33]</a> A new federal technology platform for agencies and ICRs could show that the agency that controls information also knows how to collect and display it.</p><p>Unfortunately, unlike the sporadic federal attempts, efforts to control paperwork at the state and local levels have been almost nonexistent. We have no good numbers on the size of such burdens, how many forms states and local governments demand, or how those burdens have changed. It is possible this paperwork, which includes everything from environmental impact reports for development to city contractor reports on their workforce composition, could rival in size and scope those imposed by the federal government. The only equivalent of the federal paperwork reduction act we have found is a Texas law that limits certain information requests that can be made of teachers.<a href="#_ftn34">[34]</a> The absence of any effort to control or even report total paperwork at the state level is shocking. At the very least, states should begin mandating that their regulators report the size and cost of their paperwork burden, which could be a stepping stone to stricter accountability.</p><p>At the federal level, a single mandatory paperwork budget imposed by OIRA for both the overall government and for each department, and directed through a new technology platform that enforces it, would push all federal agencies to make tough decisions. While the current administration has promised to control regulation “through a budgeting process,” they haven’t made an equivalent order to control paperwork.<a href="#_ftn35">[35]</a> Under the Paperwork Reduction Act, OIRA already has broad discretion to limit ICRs and thus create an effective paperwork budget.<a href="#_ftn36">[36]</a> A presidential mandate to keep information collections to a set amount each year could at least prevent this burden from getting worse. Otherwise, if current trends continue, in 30 years we may be wondering why we each spend over a month and a half of our working lives filling out government forms.</p><p><strong>Judge Glock</strong><br>Senior Policy Analyst, The Cicero Institute</p><p><strong>Maleka Momand</strong><br>CEO, Esper</p><p>To learn more and explore related policy issues, visit our website, <a href="http://www.ciceroinstitute.org/">www.ciceroinstitute.org</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), “Inventory of Currently Approved Information Collections, July 15, 2019,” <a href="https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAReport?operation=11">https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAReport?operation=11</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Paperwork reduction budgets have recently been advocated by the George Washington Regulatory Studies Center and the American Action Forum. This article, however, details why previous budgeting attempts failed and how interest in paperwork reform has declined. Marcus Peacock, “Implementing a Two-for-One Regulatory Requirement in the U.S.” <em>George Washington University Regulatory Studies Working Paper, </em>December 7, 2016, <a href="https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs1866/f/downloads/Peacock_Implementing-Two-For-One%2012-2016_final.pdf">https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs1866/f/downloads/Peacock_Implementing-Two-For-One%2012-2016_final.pdf</a> Sam Batkins of the American Action Forum has been the most consistent advocate. Sam Batkins, “Can a Regulatory Budget Trim Red Tape,” <em>The Regulatory Review Blog, </em>August 28, 2013, <a href="https://www.theregreview.org/2013/08/28/28-batkins-regulatory-budget/.AA">https://www.theregreview.org/2013/08/28/28-batkins-regulatory-budget/</a> As is shown below, numerous Presidents and Congresses also advocated a paperwork budget.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> The total hours were approximately 5 billion hours in 1989, and 7 billion hours in 2000. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), “Inventory of Currently Approved Information Collections, July 15, 2019,” <a href="https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAReport?operation=11">https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAReport?operation=11</a>; Government Accountability Office, “Paperwork Reduction Act: New Approach May Be Needed to Reduce Government Burden on Public,” <em>GAO-05–424,</em>May 20, 2005,<em> </em><a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/246399.pdf">https://www.gao.gov/assets/250/246399.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> See agencies’ estimates of hours at Douglas-Holtz Eakins, “Oversight of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,” Testimony to Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, July 15, 2015, <a href="http://www.americanactionforum.org/wp-content/uploads/files/insights/DHE7-15-15JudiciarySubcommTestPDF.pdf">http://www.americanactionforum.org/wp-content/uploads/files/insights/DHE7-15-15JudiciarySubcommTestPDF.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Adam Samaha, “Death and Paperwork Reduction,” <em>Duke Law Journal </em>65, no. 279 (2015): 279- 344. <a href="https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3821&amp;context=dlj">https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3821&amp;context=dlj</a></p><p>(Noting that the estimates do not include the time learning about regulations, traveling to government offices, and so forth.)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), “Inventory of Currently Approved Information Collections, July 15, 2019,” <a href="https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAReport?operation=11">https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAReport?operation=11</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> See some estimates at Anne Kim, “When Paperwork Attacks! Five Ideas for Smarter Government,” <em>Progressive Policy Institute: Policy Brief, </em>March 2012, <a href="https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/03.2012-Kim_When-Paperwork-Attacks-Five-Ideas-for-Smarter-Government.pdf">https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/03.2012-Kim_When-Paperwork-Attacks-Five-Ideas-for-Smarter-Government.pdf</a>; Sam Batkins and Gordon Gray, “Regulatory and Compliance Implications of Tax Day,” <em>American Action Forum: Insight, </em>April 15, 2014, <a href="https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/regulatory-and-compliance-implications-of-tax-day/">https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/regulatory-and-compliance-implications-of-tax-day/</a>and Sam Batkins, “101 Unfunded Mandates and Counting,” <em>American Action Forum: Insight, </em>October 7, 2016, <a href="https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/101-unfunded-mandates-counting/">https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/101-unfunded-mandates-counting/</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a>On the other hand, the IRS also seems to be most scrupulous about measuring its hourly burden, which might make their percent of the total disproportionately large. Douglas-Holtz Eakins, “Oversight of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,” Testimony to Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, July 15, 2015, <a href="http://www.americanactionforum.org/wp-content/uploads/files/insights/DHE7-15-15JudiciarySubcommTestPDF.pdf">http://www.americanactionforum.org/wp-content/uploads/files/insights/DHE7-15-15JudiciarySubcommTestPDF.pdf</a>; Demian Brady, “Tax Reform Bill Made Modest Progress Toward Simplification,” <em>Policy Paper, National Taxpayers Union Foundation, </em>April 15, 2019, <a href="https://www.ntu.org/foundation/detail/tax-reform-bill-made-modest-progress-toward-simplification-but-significant-hurdles-remain">https://www.ntu.org/foundation/detail/tax-reform-bill-made-modest-progress-toward-simplification-but-significant-hurdles-remain</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Sam Batkins, “How Many Federal Forms Are There,” <em>American Action Forum Insight</em>, April 21, 2016, <a href="https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/many-federal-forms/">https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/many-federal-forms/</a>; OIRA, “Information Collection Review,” <a href="https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain">https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> For instance, failing to provide a federally approved lead-based paint hazard brochure to a tenant in a rented property can lead to up to a year in prison; failing to complete a EPA regulatory compliance documents can lead to up to six months in prison; refusing to answer any Department of Commerce form under the penumbra of the census can cause fines of $500. U.S. Attorney’s Office, Middle District of Florida, “St. Petersburg Landlord Pleads Guilty to EPA Lead Paint Disclosure Offense,” Press Release, August 29, 2014, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/st-petersburg-landlord-pleads-guilty-epa-lead-paint-disclosure-offense">https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/st-petersburg-landlord-pleads-guilty-epa-lead-paint-disclosure-offense</a>; EPA, “Summary of Criminal Prosecutions: Ronald Wright, FY 2015,” <a href="https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/criminal_prosecution/index.cfm?action=3&amp;prosecution_summary_id=2646&amp;searchParams=M5%2C%3A%2FXT%2A%5CCYZ%40%5BO%5CDFM%3C%3B1%5CF53HFUH%3FP0RW%5DSK%2F16%254%22FMJ%5E%21%5FU1NNJJ%2EUBE%20%0A93%25%3B1%2B51%3C%26L%3B%3E%27%29CZNLVZQ%28B4MKKGDC%3C%3BH%40%20%20%0A">https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/criminal_prosecution/index.cfm?action=3&amp;prosecution_summary_id=2646&amp;searchParams=M5%2C%3A%2FXT%2A%5CCYZ%40%5BO%5CDFM%3C%3B1%5CF53HFUH%3FP0RW%5DSK%2F16%254%22FMJ%5E%21%5FU1NNJJ%2EUBE%20%0A93%25%3B1%2B51%3C%26L%3B%3E%27%29CZNLVZQ%28B4MKKGDC%3C%3BH%40%20%20%0A</a>; 13 U.S. Code 221, Refusal or Neglect to Answer Questions; False Answers, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/13/221">https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/13/221</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Stuart Shapiro, “The Paperwork Reduction Act; Research on Current Practices and Recommendations for Reform,” Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States, February 15, 2012, p. 29–31, <a href="https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Draft-PRA-Report-2-15-12.pdf">https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Draft-PRA-Report-2-15-12.pdf</a>; P. Stephen Gidiere III, <em>The Federal Information Manual: How the Government Collects, Manages, and Discloses Information Under FOIA and Other Statutes </em>(Chicago: American Bar Association, 2006).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> See, e.g. Harvey Silvergate, <em>Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent </em>(New York: Encounter Books, 2011),<em> </em>315.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Search of all Completed Information Collection Request reviews on Reginfo.gov, compared to “Disapproved” and “Disapproved and Continue” conclusions. Adding “Withdrawn” conclusions increases the following numbers by about two percentage points, but does not change the overall trend. Reports of the pre-1980 era suggest that only “between one and five percent” of forms were refused by the Office of Management and Budget, which had authority before OIRA. The exact number of disapprovals for Jimmy Carter’s presidency was 0.98%.. Search of Reginfo.gov, and Stuart Shapiro, “The Paperwork Reduction Act; Research on Current Practices and Recommendations for Reform,” Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States, February 15, 2012, p. 2–3, <a href="https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Draft-PRA-Report-2-15-12.pdf">https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Draft-PRA-Report-2-15-12.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref14">[14]</a> “OIRA Conclusion: OMB Control NO: 0703–0036,” February 22, 2017, <a href="https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201610-0703-003">https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201610-0703-003</a>. The administration also “Disapproved” three other ICRs, but noted that they could continue with the collection after corrections.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref15">[15]</a> Lili Carnegelia, “Regulators’ Budget Report: OIRA Shrinks as Responsibilities Grow,” <em>George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center, Commentaries, </em>July 19, 2016, <a href="https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/regulators-budget-report-oira-shrinks-responsibilities-grow">https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/regulators-budget-report-oira-shrinks-responsibilities-grow</a>;</p><p><a href="#_ftnref16">[16]</a> Stuart Shapiro, “The Paperwork Reduction Act; Research on Current Practices and Recommendations for Reform,” Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States, February 15, 2012, <a href="https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Draft-PRA-Report-2-15-12.pdf">https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Draft-PRA-Report-2-15-12.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref17">[17]</a>Stuart Shapiro, “The Paperwork Reduction Act; Research on Current Practices and Recommendations for Reform,” Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States, February 15, 2012, <a href="https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Draft-PRA-Report-2-15-12.pdf">https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Draft-PRA-Report-2-15-12.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref18">[18]</a> Sunstein twice mentioned information collection requests as a statutory requirement in the text, but argued he wanted to focus the article on how OIRA reviewed rules. This lack of interest in information is somewhat ironic, since the main thrust of the paper was explaining how the OIRA manages to “collect widely dispersed information” about regulations in reviewing them. Cass Sunstein, “The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities,” <em>Harvard Law Review </em>126 (2013): 1838–1878; <a href="https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol126_sunstein.pdf">https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol126_sunstein.pdf</a>; See also, Lisa Heinzerling’s review of her relationship with OIRA during her time at EPA, where ICRs are unmentioned, Lisa Heinzerling, “Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House,” <em>Pace Environmental Law Review </em>31 (Winter 2014): 325–369, <a href="https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&amp;httpsredir=1&amp;article=1741&amp;context=pelr">https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&amp;httpsredir=1&amp;article=1741&amp;context=pelr</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref19">[19]</a> Luther Stringhman, “Government Questionnaires and the Federal Reports Act of 1942,” <em>Public Administration Review </em>3, no. 2 (Spring 1943): 150–7. <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/972298?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents">https://www.jstor.org/stable/972298?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents</a>; OIRA, “Managing Information Collection and Dissemination,” Records Management Center, OIRA, 2002, p, 12, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/paperwork_policy_report_final.pdf">https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/paperwork_policy_report_final.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref20">[20]</a> President Jimmy Carter, Executive Order 12174, Federal Paperwork Reduction, November 30, 1979, <em>American Presidency Project, </em><a href="https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-12174-federal-paperwork-reduction">https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/executive-order-12174-federal-paperwork-reduction</a>; See “Signing of Paperwork Reduction Act,” <em>Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1980–1981, </em>2794–6.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref21">[21]</a> The act emerged out of the discovery that the vast majority of reporting requirements came not from statutes, but from regulations, meaning that to control paperwork regulation had to be controlled as well. For instance, the Federal Paperwork Commission, which did the research preceding the act, discovered that although the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 itself had only 5 demands for reports from employers, OSHA regulation referenced 400 separate reporting requirements. But see even forgotten paperwork reduction attempts, such as the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, “The Legislative history of the Paperwork Reduction Acts,” <a href="https://www.givemeliberty.org/docs/TaxResearchCD/OtherIndexes/PRAbrief.pdf">https://www.givemeliberty.org/docs/TaxResearchCD/OtherIndexes/PRAbrief.pdf</a>; Richard Neustadt, “Taming the Paperwork Tiger: An Experiment in Regulatory Management,” <em>Regulation Magazine </em>(1981): 28–31,<em> </em><a href="https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1981/1/v5n1-6.pdf">https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1981/1/v5n1-6.pdf</a>; See Timeline of past regulatory and paperwork reform efforts at “Regulatory Policy Timeline,” Argive.org: <a href="https://argive.org/reform-timeline">https://argive.org/reform-timeline</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref22">[22]</a> All 10 “purposes” described in the act’s preamble involved controlling paperwork. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 2812, December 11, 1980 <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-94/pdf/STATUTE-94-Pg2812.pdf">https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-94/pdf/STATUTE-94-Pg2812.pdf</a>;</p><p><a href="#_ftnref23">[23]</a> Jim Tozzi et. al. v. EPA, Civ. №00–0173, <a href="http://www.thecre.com/regbylit/20010702_paperwork.html">http://www.thecre.com/regbylit/20010702_paperwork.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref24">[24]</a>President Ronald Reagan, EO 12291, “Federal Regulation,” February 17, 1981, <a href="https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12291.html">https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12291.html</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref25">[25]</a> OIRA, “Managing Information Collection and Dissemination,” Records Management Center, OIRA, 2002, p. 17 <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/paperwork_policy_report_final.pdf">https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/paperwork_policy_report_final.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref26">[26]</a> Samaha, “Death and Paperwork Reduction,” 290 <a href="https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3821&amp;context=dlj">https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3821&amp;context=dlj</a>;</p><p><a href="#_ftnref27">[27]</a> OIRA, “Managing Information Collection and Dissemination,” Records Management Center, OIRA, 2002, p. 22, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/paperwork_policy_report_final.pdf">https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/paperwork_policy_report_final.pdf</a>.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref28">[28]</a> Joshua Bolton, “ Fiscal Year 2004 Information Collection Budget,” OMB Bulletin №04–01. <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/bulletins/fy04/b04-01.pdf">https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/bulletins/fy04/b04-01.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref29">[29]</a>Samah, “Death and Papework Reduction,” <a href="https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3821&amp;context=dlj">https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3821&amp;context=dlj</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref30">[30]</a> Neomi Rao, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, “Memorandum for Chief Information Officers,” Executive Officer of the President, Office of Management and Budget, August 6, 2018, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Minimizing-Paperwork-and-Reporting-Burdens-Data-Call-for-the-2018-ICB.pdf">https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Minimizing-Paperwork-and-Reporting-Burdens-Data-Call-for-the-2018-ICB.pdf</a>; <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/federal-collection-information/">https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/information-regulatory-affairs/federal-collection-information/</a>. The administration has proposed a new “Federal Data Strategy” but that focuses on better use of data and outreach, rather than paperwork.”Federal Data Strategy,” <a href="https://strategy.data.gov/">https://strategy.data.gov/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref31">[31]</a> The only discussion of ICRs in Sunstein’s article on OIRA was to mention how he created online “dashboards” which displayed all ICRs under OIRA review, which did make review of ICRs significantly easier. Cass Sunstein, “The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,” p. 1854, <a href="https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol126_sunstein.pdf">https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol126_sunstein.pdf</a>,</p><p><a href="#_ftnref32">[32]</a> Currently, the government’s “How to Guide” for the Online ICR form by agencies takes up a 124 page PDF. General Services Agency, “ROCIS How To Guide for Agency Users of the Information Collection Request (ICR) Module,” September 1, 2017, <a href="https://www.rocis.gov/rocis/jsp3/common/ROCIS_HOW_TO_Guide_for_AGENCY_Users_of_ICR_Module-090117.pdf">https://www.rocis.gov/rocis/jsp3/common/ROCIS_HOW_TO_Guide_for_AGENCY_Users_of_ICR_Module-090117.pdf</a> See current regulatory, but not paperwork, electronic filing suggestions at Tayler Lonsdale, Maleka Momand, Yihwan Kim, and Brad Hakes, “Improving Regulations.gov: A Perspective from Silicon Valley,” Argive.org, June 15, 2017, <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/586bee97c534a5731df8f6c4/t/5942c4c0be6594acc08fa2a5/1497547972474/Argive+Improving+Regulations.gov-2.pdf">https://static1.squarespace.com/static/586bee97c534a5731df8f6c4/t/5942c4c0be6594acc08fa2a5/1497547972474/Argive+Improving+Regulations.gov-2.pdf</a>; Todd Rubin’s and Cary Coglianese’s “Improving Regulations.gov,” <em>The Regulatory Review, </em>May 28, 2019, <a href="https://www.theregreview.org/2019/05/28/coglianese-rubin-improving-regulations-gov/">https://www.theregreview.org/2019/05/28/coglianese-rubin-improving-regulations-gov/</a>. For the government’s electronic regulatory control reforms under the “eRulemkaing Initative” which began in 2002, see “Welcome to the eRulemaking Initiative,” website, <a href="https://www.fdms.gov/fdms/public/aboutus">https://www.fdms.gov/fdms/public/aboutus</a>;</p><p><a href="#_ftnref33">[33]</a> See requirements of notice in “Revenue Procedure 2017–40,” Publication 1167: General Rules and Specifications for Substitute forms and Schedules,” IRS Bulletin 2017–26, June 26, 2017, <a href="https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p1167--2017.pdf">https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p1167--2017.pdf</a>; PBGC Paperwork Reduction Act Notice, ERISA Section 4010,</p><p><a href="https://www.pbgc.gov/sites/default/files/paperwork-reduction-act-notice.pdf">https://www.pbgc.gov/sites/default/files/paperwork-reduction-act-notice.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref34">[34]</a>“Paperwork Reduction Act: Texas Education Code 11.164,” TexasAFT.org, <a href="https://www.texasaft.org/resources/know-rights/paperwork-reduction-act/">https://www.texasaft.org/resources/know-rights/paperwork-reduction-act/</a>; New York has periodically tried to pass acts mandating digital reports and documents instead of paper, but even these bills have failed to pass. See S4149B, New York State Senate, <a href="https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s4149">https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s4149</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref35">[35]</a>For regulatory budgeting executive order, Trump, Executive Order 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, Federal Registrar 9339, February 3, 2017 <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/03/2017-02451/reducing-regulation-and-controlling-regulatory-costs">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/02/03/2017-02451/reducing-regulation-and-controlling-regulatory-costs</a>; For general call to limit data collection, Neomi Rai, Administrator, OIRA, Memorandum for Chief Information Officers, July 21, 2017, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/MEMORANDUM-FOR-CHIEF-INFORMATION-OFFICERS.pdf">https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/MEMORANDUM-FOR-CHIEF-INFORMATION-OFFICERS.pdf</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref36">[36]</a> “Paperwork Reduction Act,” 44 USC 3501, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/44/3501">https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/44/3501</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=17eaa2eb91f7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news/restoring-the-lost-promise-of-a-paperwork-budget-17eaa2eb91f7">Restoring the Lost Promise of a Paperwork Budget</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/cicero-news">Cicero News</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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