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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Julian Giessing on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Julian Giessing on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Julian Giessing on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@julian.giessing?source=rss-1555f1713743------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[An eye for the exit — the European VC’s strategic failure]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@julian.giessing/an-eye-for-the-exit-the-european-vcs-strategic-failure-85c3cb014f25?source=rss-1555f1713743------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Julian Giessing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 09 May 2020 13:29:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-05-09T13:29:36.436Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>An eye for the exit — the European VC’s strategic failure</strong></h3><p>One of the core investment criteria for a Private Equity fund is the so-called exit potential, i.e. the potential to sell a portfolio company within 5–7 years after an acquisition. For a company’s exit potential to be judged favorably two aspects need to be fulfilled:</p><p>1. the external environment: Is there liquid exit market with a larger number of potential buyers, a favorable IPO market, or interested later-stage PE funds?</p><p>2. the company metrics: Can the PE fund build the company into an attractive acquisition or IPO candidate within the limited holding period?</p><p>In the early years of European startups a similar thinking was found among European founders: “Let’s copy an American startup and then sell it to the US company”. This is understandable and indeed every successful company and economy starts with copying competitors — China is the most recent economy criticized for this approach, three decades before it was Japan, and don’t forget the story behind the now famed slogan “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Made_in_Germany">made in Germany</a>”.</p><p>While European startups have successfully emancipated themselves from looking to primarily exit to a US competitor, an exit thinking prevails among European VCs well into today.</p><p>Let’s look at the following situation to better understand what I am talking about:</p><p>Once a VC decides not to invest into a startup anymore, the European VC is looking to sell the company for a face- and money-saving exit. However, currently the only exit opportunities are strategic buyers or traditional PE funds. Both have one characteristic in common: they only buy companies that are break-even or at least close to it. Thus, the VC pressures its portfolio startup into cutting costs — reducing the headcount and slashing marketing and sales costs. This indeed leads to the bottom line inching into the black but at the expense of top line growth.</p><p>Even worse: While the VC successfully exits the company, it is often an early death sentence for the startup — as a stand-alone company, as a daring adventure of a passionate team, as a place with a unique vision and culture.</p><p>If American VCs sell startups jet fuel as First Round Capital’s Josh Kopelman famously said, then European VCs sell their startups jet fuel and unbeknownst to them a drogue chute as well. The premature reduction of growth initiatives to increase a VC’s exit potential robs startups of their raison d’être.</p><p>Do we really believe European moonshot startups have a chance to ever leave the atmosphere with the additional drag of a chute?</p><p>I encourage European VCs to go full throttle till the last minute even at the risk of a high-speed impact. At Ginkgo Equity, we acquire these falling chute-less startups and turn them into a great stand-alone SMEs. Unlike a drogue chute, I like to think of ourselves as a trampoline: cushioning the impact and preserving the existing energy to bounce back to new heights.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=85c3cb014f25" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Improving the Risk-Return-Profile of Corporate Innovation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@julian.giessing/improving-the-risk-return-profile-of-corporate-innovation-4d747df389b2?source=rss-1555f1713743------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Julian Giessing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 18 Feb 2020 10:54:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-18T10:54:43.181Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Corporates around the world are aware of the rapid changes coming from digital disruption and new market entrants. Their strategy to counter these new challengers is following their footsteps. According to a <a href="https://www.bcg.com/de-de/publications/2014/mergers_acquisitions_growth_incubators_accelerators_venturing_more_leading_companies_search_next_big_thing.aspx">BCG study</a> corporates run a number of innovation activities.</p><p>I would shortly summarize these tools as:</p><p>· <strong>Idea Scouting</strong>: Corporates scout innovative (business) ideas internally and externally within the startup community.</p><p>· <strong>Startup Investing</strong>: Corporates directly participate in startup funding rounds — mostly through a dedicated investment unit (CVC).</p><p>· <strong>Venture Building</strong>: Corporates build their own startups from scratch — either with internal resources only or with the support from external consultants.</p><p>The German business publication “Manager Magazin” released a critical review of these innovation activities in their February 2020 edition (<a href="https://www.manager-magazin.de/premium/konzerneigene-start-ups-das-scheitern-der-berliner-digitallabore-a-00000000-0002-0001-0000-000169070111">here</a> in German, paywall) suggesting most have failed. I agree with some aspects. Each of the outlined activities from above has distinct pros and cons.</p><p>Most importantly, I believe these activities have a rather unattractive risk-return profile. The required invest and time till payback are generally quite large.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/668/1*FFRLdhc-siw2VVzPXRkkqw.png" /></figure><p>Ideally, corporates would see a quick return on a relative modest investment. We believe that Distressed Venture Capital fills this gap (see my <a href="https://medium.com/@julian.giessing/distressed-venture-capital-38c6be0e186e">article </a>on what I understand as Distressed Venture Capital).</p><p>Distressed Venture Capital allows corporates to acquire a high-tech startup with relevant revenues and proven business model at an attractive valuation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/668/1*_CveNme5ndKTM0Qk-GrIOg.png" /></figure><p>We at Ginkgo Equity have been thinking about launching a Corporate Innovation Program based on this premise. The simple idea is to join forces with corporates and jointly acquire under-performing startups. We co-invest alongside our corporate partners and assume the turnaround risk. We are compensated only upon a successful turnaround.</p><p>This models significantly lowers the required investment for corporates while acquiring a majority stake of a high-tech company. Additionally, the operating and turnaround risk is outsourced to a specialist partner.</p><p>I am looking forward to your comments and ideas. Feel free to reach out to hear more about this distressed opportunity with Ginkgo Equity and how we can partner to successfully enhance your innovation return.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4d747df389b2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The funding gap between VC and PE…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@julian.giessing/the-funding-gap-between-vc-and-pe-51a182d81938?source=rss-1555f1713743------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[funding-gap]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Julian Giessing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Feb 2020 08:25:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-04T08:25:26.143Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Much has been talked about different funding gaps in the German and European venture capital market. First, it was the Series A crunch (for instance <a href="https://www.dreamit.com/journal/2016/11/1/new-data-on-the-series-a-crunch">here</a> and <a href="https://firstround.com/review/what-the-seed-funding-boom-means-for-raising-a-series-a/">here</a>), then it was the lack of growth capital for <a href="https://www.acgusa.org/closing-the-innovation-funding-gap/">Series B and beyond</a>, and the small number of unicorns in Europe (<a href="https://t3n.de/magazin/oekosystem-europa-startups-ohne-248178/">article in German</a>), or the lack of mega-rounds led by <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/kjartanrist/2019/07/25/the-future-of-startups-is-in-europe/#1aff4fc18de9">European VCs</a>…..and going back to a lack of Seed funding again (see <a href="https://spinlab.co/blog-detail/venture-capital-gap">this article</a> from 2019).</p><p>We believe there is another gap in the funding arena that has been overlooked so far. A large number of startups does not qualify for further VC financing because the growth numbers are too low, the target market turns out to be too small, or competitors seem to take the top spot. Ok then, so these startups might turn to another group of traditional investors that focus more on sustainable growth rather than exponential growth — private equity investors. However, they mostly also do not qualify for investment from these traditional private equity firms either. PE typically looks at profitable companies with strong cash flows or at least asset-heavy companies to secure debt financing — not at asset-light tech-startups with a high burn rate.</p><p>Below is a graphical depiction of these traditional funding options (more on this <a href="https://www.fuer-gruender.de/kapital/eigenkapital/venture-capital/">here </a>in German).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/610/0*YbB_uynQS0fXfllj.PNG" /></figure><p><strong>…and what it means for startups</strong></p><p>Hence, startups that are in-between VC financing and PE financing requirements face a predicament. At worst, they are shut down after money runs out. At best, they are lucky enough to find a strategic investor, an individual business angel, or family office that believes in their story. However, this is a rather random process. It is difficult to identify entities and individuals with more opportunistic investment strategies willing to look at firms outside of the well-trodden paths. Especially, when time is a concern and runaway is down to less than six months.</p><p>We want to change this randomness and create an opportunity for all startups that do not fit the traditional investors’ investment criteria. We fill the gap between traditional VCs and traditional PE firms. We provide growth capital to startups with a solid revenue base, strong but below VC growth that typically still incur loses.</p><p>We call this investment strategy Distressed Venture Capital (see more in <a href="https://medium.com/@julian.giessing/distressed-venture-capital-38c6be0e186e">this article</a>).</p><p>We believe these firms to have great potential. Assuming we can maintain a sustainable growth path, improve operational processes and financial management, we see a strong investment case. Our focus is to turn these startups into profitable SMEs over the long run. Thus, we provide a future for these startups where they can stride on as independent firms, with a strong management team, and committed employees.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=51a182d81938" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A perspective on failing startups…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@julian.giessing/a-perspective-on-failing-startups-9bcbfed5c515?source=rss-1555f1713743------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[sme]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Julian Giessing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Jan 2020 08:17:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-01-30T08:20:47.545Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>A (new) perspective on failing startups…</strong></h3><p>For the startup press the biggest news are about the newest unicorn startups, the biggest funding rounds, and highest growth rates. Equally big are just the news on the most recent startup failures. Of course, most attention is paid to the big failures where a valuation gets slashed by more than half like WeWork or blank fraud like Theranos.</p><p>We all know the numbers that supposedly 90% of startups fail but we rarely hear about this large number failed startups. This is because most failing startups never reach this legendary status and press coverage. Their stories are just not exciting and fantasy-inducing but rather a fizzling out of a once promising venture that never really got off the ground.</p><p>Or is it? Did these failing startups really not get off the ground? Or did they just not fly high enough to satisfy their investors’ expectations? As <a href="https://www.vox.com/2019/1/23/18193685/venture-capital-money-kills-business-basecamp-ceo-jason-fried">Basecamp CEO Jason Fried</a> said in 2019 “Lots of businesses could be great $10 million, $20 million businesses, but they’re not allowed to be. [They’ve] got to be $200 million or $500 million or a billion…”</p><blockquote><strong><em>Most startups don’t fail, they fail their investors’ return requirements.</em></strong></blockquote><p>VC investors need the outsized success of their superstar performers to return their investors’ money. Neeraj Agrawal, a general partner at Battery Ventures once framed this in terms of growth. A superstar startup needs “triple, triple, double, double, double” (T2D3) annual revenue growth. Most portfolio ventures however never achieve this growth. And depending on the gap between the T2D3 target they are deemed failing — and from the viewpoint of a traditional VC this is indeed true.</p><p>We prefer to call these startups underperforming rather than failing where “underperforming” just means “underperforming in the eyes of a traditional VC”. Ask any old-school business leader running a €5m revenue business what she thinks about 30% annual growth. I am sure she would say she would not know how to manage such strong growth.</p><p>Thus, we neither agree with the notion that a startup needs exponential growth nor with the old-school view. We believe that a €5m business growing at 30% annually has the potential to be a great medium sized company. This is the game we are in: we acquire failing…ahm underperforming startups from traditional VCs and build them into profitable SMEs.</p><p><strong>…and why they fail</strong></p><p>According to a <a href="https://www.cbinsights.com/research/startup-failure-reasons-top/">popular survey by CBinsights</a> of failed startup founders most (42%) said it was due to no market need.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*j8cziODj2TX3bq7b0_lOng.png" /></figure><p>No market need in that there weren’t enough customers willing to pay for the product. But what does “not enough” mean? Does it mean “not enough” customers to build a company with €10m revenue? Or does it mean “not enough” customers to build a company with €100m revenue? And if it is the former — can you build a company that is actually profitable on “just” €10m revenue?</p><p>Statistics show that in the USA and in Europe most companies are actually at much less than €10m revenue a year — indeed while exact data is difficult to come by due to changing definitions of SMEs the average revenue for SMEs is a little below €1m (see the numbers for Germany <a href="https://en.ifm-bonn.org/statistics/#accordion=1&amp;tab=1">here</a>). Still their owners seem to be able to live from that — and some probably not too bad or they would presumably take another job.</p><p>Why is it then that startups fail because there was “no market need”? We believe this again is due to the perspective of traditional startup investors. They take on a high risk and expect to be fairly compensated for this risk. VC investors are in the game to maximize upside potential. A company with just €10m revenue after 8 years does not constitute a fair compensation for the risk associated with the investment. Thus, it is easier to just drop these portfolio ventures rather than investing further resources in a startup that will most likely not move the needle on the fund return.</p><blockquote><strong><em>VCs need founders to pitch a unicorn (to fail at building it).</em></strong></blockquote><p>Startup founders naturally buy into this dream of building unicorns — indeed they have to in order to get any funding (or try pitching a VC for €3m with promising a profitable €10m business down the line rather than a loss-making €200m game changer).</p><p>But for that €200m revenue company you probably need a multi-billion Euro market. See this example of AirBnB market size slide in their pitch deck.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/621/1*kEUn5nLltFBLRPnJZgPKXg.png" /></figure><p>Thus, the “no market need” startups maybe were just not operating in a “€3bn market” but rather a “€150m market” of which they could have captured 10%. So maybe these startups give up to early with the notion of “no market need” because it is part of the expectations they formed for themselves and what their investor require them to achieve.</p><p>In fact, in this <a href="https://medium.com/gabor/there-are-3-ways-to-build-a-100m-revenue-startup-ac4363ee46e1">article</a> Gabor Cselle from Google’s incubator explains that a potential of $100m revenue is required for a startup to justify VC investment. This is mathematically impossible in a 50m market, realistically impossible in a 150m market, and very difficult in a 300m market.</p><p>We are not saying that all startups are wrong when they claim there is “no market need” but we believe some might be wrong with this assessment. We believe that a “no market need €150m market” can actually be a great market.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9bcbfed5c515" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Distressed Venture Capital]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@julian.giessing/distressed-venture-capital-38c6be0e186e?source=rss-1555f1713743------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[private-equity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Julian Giessing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jan 2020 10:51:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-01-27T10:51:33.380Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In public markets and the private equity world the term “distressed investor” is quite common and widely understood.</p><p>A typical investment object is distressed debt where hedge funds by debt of struggling companies at a steep discount (“pennies on the dollar”) and hope to profit from a turnaround. My former professor Edward Altman from NYU estimated in his testimony in front of the ABI Chapter 11 Reform Commission in 2012 that there are “more than 200 financial institutions investing between $350–400 billion in the distressed debt market in the United States”.</p><p>Distressed Private Equity (also called “Special Situations” or “Turnaround”) is not just about hoping to profit from a turnaround but actively managing the turnaround in an operating capacity. The data provider Preqin counts about 500 distressed private equity firms. Furthermore, their analysis of returns suggests that Distressed PE has outperformed basically all other PE classes since 2000 (of course partly driven by the financial crisis in 2008/09) but even up to 2007 only Real Estate PE performed better. Interestingly, recently Secondaries took the first place.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*QzDRmtVXhnKtg0mAVcG_vA.jpeg" /></figure><p>In Venture Capital however the term “Distressed” has not been in use. One reason might be that by nature any startup is “distressed”. Gilbert et al. (1990) characterize financial distress by negative cumulative earnings over at least a few consecutive years, losses, and poor performance. At least the first two clearly hold true for startups.</p><p>But when we talk of Distressed Venture Capital we mean a situation where traditional VCs shy away from investing further because the risk-return-profile does not meet their requirements (more on that in future posts). The most common characteristic of these distressed startups is slower than expected growth. But there can be other reasons too why traditional VCs do not make further investments, e.g. the total addressable market (TAM) turns out to be smaller than expected, there are changes in the founder team, or the market entry of heavily funded competitors.</p><p>In 2017, <a href="https://medium.com/hackernoon/is-there-a-new-beginning-for-distressed-vc-backed-companies-437b852acc0d">Jonathan Lu asked</a> whether there is a new beginning for distressed VC-backed companies.</p><p>We believe that “yes” under certain circumstances distressed VC-backed startups can be turned around. This is when we enter and</p><p>· buy out incumbent shareholders to acquire a majority stake of the startup,</p><p>· recapitalize the venture to have a solid financial foundation,</p><p>· and restructure it to build a profitable SME with long-term prospects.</p><p>Hence, we are a secondary distressed venture capital investor and combine the best performing investment strategies of the last two decades. Just like in Private Equity, a core part of our work is a strategy adjustment and heavy operational involvement while traditional VCs act more like mentors.</p><p>Distressed Venture Capital is a form of growth capital — not for blitz-scaling but for maintaining a healthy growth path and achieving profitability.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=38c6be0e186e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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