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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Julian Critchlow on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Julian Critchlow on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Julian Critchlow on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Nuclear’s Un-learning Curse]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@julian_critchlow/nuclears-un-learning-curse-4e01426f5658?source=rss-60a56b2ec20d------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Julian Critchlow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 08:38:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-04T08:38:25.733Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Nearly every other clean technology gets cheaper the more we build it. In the west, nuclear has done the opposite. Not as a natural law of physics but as a failure of policy and delivery.</em></p><p>On 17 October 1956 on the Cumbrian coastline, the Queen opened Calder Hall as the world’s first full-scale nuclear station to supply electricity commercially [i]. Building on its military programmes, Britain had gone from breaking ground to a working full-scale power station in under four years.</p><p>Seventy years later, we are building Hinkley Point C, whose first unit is expected to come online in 2030 — nearly thirteen years after major works began on site and at almost twice the cost in real terms of the original budget (about £35bn in 2015 prices, or £48bn in current money, against roughly £18bn at the 2016 investment decision [ii]).</p><p>This puzzle is worth closer scrutiny. The underlying physics did not get harder — though the plants got far larger and more complex. Yet the country that built its first full-scale nuclear power station in under four years now takes over a decade to build one, at a cost the engineers of the 1950s would have found unthinkable. What happened in the meantime?</p><h4><strong>The one technology that defies Wright’s Law</strong></h4><p>In my last article on <a href="https://medium.com/@julian_critchlow/the-electric-revolution-a-century-late-but-now-inevitable-ab88a6e6afd5"><em>electric vehicles</em></a>, the hero was the experience curve: for every doubling of cumulative deployment, the unit cost of a technology falls by a predictable percentage. Solar module costs drop roughly 20% each doubling; lithium-ion batteries around 19%. And it is this effect that helps drive the entire clean-energy transition to completion.</p><p>The law in question is Theodore Wright’s — an American aeronautical engineer who observed in 1936 that the cost of building an aircraft fell by a constant fraction every time cumulative output doubled — a function of <em>experience, or learning by doing</em> [iii]. This law has proved one of the most durable regularities in economics, seen in 62 technologies examined by the Santa Fe Institute [iv]</p><p>Almost everything in the clean energy transition obeys Wright’s Law: solar panels; wind turbines; batteries. Build more, learn, get better, get cheaper, repeat. Western nuclear is the one great exception. As the fleet grew, costs did not fall — they rose. Inexorably.</p><p>Economists have a deadpan name for it: <em>negative learning by doing </em>[v]. This is nuclear’s <em>un-learning curse</em>, and any honest case for nuclear has to confront it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OPqpHP31BZCBg40J3a5PgQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: Liu, He, Qiu &amp; Kammen, “Can China break the ‘cost curse’ of nuclear power?”, Nature 643:1186–88 [Jul 2025]</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Do we need nuclear?</strong></h4><p>We should be clear-eyed about the case for nuclear, because it is stronger than most critics will allow, but narrower than most champions will claim.</p><p>Wind and solar are the main winners in the energy transition: in 2024, 92.5% of new global capacity was renewable, and recent UK auctions cleared well below Hinkley’s inflation-linked price [vi]. Few credible plans propose meeting the world’s rising demand primarily through new nuclear. Equally the last slice of a clean power grid remains challenging — and the answer is part energy security; and part grid mechanics.</p><p>The energy security part worries about the still, dark, windless week. The <em>Dunkelflaute</em> — a lull in the wind and the solar resources that can last not just hours or days but weeks. As I wrote about in <a href="https://medium.com/@julian_critchlow/whither-the-uk-electricity-market-dc092f83998e"><em>Whither the UK electricity market</em></a>, existing batteries — superb for daily arbitrage in the 2 to 4 hour timeframe — struggle to bridge that gap. The cost of over-building generation and storage to cover the tail of lulls climbs sharply as you approach the last few percent of emissions. A dependable, weather-independent, low-carbon generation source flattens that curve, cutting the cost of a deeply decarbonised system by as much as 10–62% in one oft-cited study [vii].</p><p>Multiple technologies are competing for this role including gas turbines with carbon capture, hydrogen turbines and long-duration storage — but nuclear is in the mix as a mature, proven alternative.</p><p>The grid mechanics part is where nuclear is genuinely distinctive. A grid is not just short of energy in a lull; it is short of stability. A large nuclear turbine-generator is a several-hundred-tonne rotor spinning in lockstep with the grid, and it supplies — as a by-product of simply running — the services that hold an alternating-current system together: inertia (the shock-absorber that slows how fast frequency can fall after a fault), fault level (the current surge that lets protection detect and clear faults), and dynamic voltage support. Conventional grid-following inverters — wind, solar, batteries — do not provide these in the same inherent way a synchronous machine does.</p><p>Nuclear is not the only solution. Synchronous condensers — a spinning machine with no fuel, sometimes converted from a retired coal generator — supply inertia and fault level; grid-forming inverters and batteries can synthesise frequency and voltage response. A system can buy each service separately. But nuclear delivers firm, synchronous, zero-carbon power and the whole stability bundle in one generation source. The choice ultimately comes down to price.</p><h4><strong>The curse in the build</strong></h4><p>Consider the West’s flagship programme, the European Pressurised Reactor — sold, with no small irony, as the <em>safe, standardised</em> answer to nuclear’s woes. Published project estimates — although differing in perimeter — tell a consistent story of major cost and schedule escalation.</p><p>· <em>Olkiluoto 3 (Finland)</em>: contracted at about €3.2bn, delivered at a project cost near €11bn (3.4x), and connected 13 years late; the overruns contributed materially to the collapse and break-up of its builder, Areva, since split into Framatome and Orano.</p><p>·<em> Flamanville 3 (France)</em>: contracted at €3.3bn with EDF’s completion estimate at €13.2bn in 2015 euros (4x the original); on a broader perimeter including financing, France’s Cour des Comptes puts it near €23.7bn in 2023 €. It reached full power in December 2025, roughly 13 years late [viii].</p><p>·<em> Hinkley Point C (UK)</em>: £35.2bn in 2015 prices — about £48bn in current money — almost 2x the £18bn figure at approval, first unit around 2030.</p><p>· <em>Vogtle 3 and 4 (Georgia US)</em>: Across the Atlantic, a different design, but the same story: external estimates put the all-in total near $35bn (£28bn), more than 2x early estimates and seven years late [ix].</p><p>This is not just repeated bad luck. Even the developer, EDF, accepts the underlying logic: in justifying its next reactor after Sizewell C, EDF says the identical second unit at Hinkley will run “20–30% faster” than the first, because “repeating a design is always easier than building a one-off.”</p><h4><strong>Why the West has not learnt from doing</strong></h4><p>So why did the West lose the ability to build the thing it helped invent? No single root cause explains the story but instead the recent overruns were systemic: detailed designs still incomplete when the concrete was poured; skills and suppliers lost over decades with no orders; declining site productivity; fragmented contracts and weak owners; and, yes, safety standards revised upward mid-build, each plant re-engineered against a moving target.</p><p>The 2020 Joule study [v] found that more than half of US cost escalation from 1976–87 came, not from the reactors, but from indirect or “soft” costs — quality assurance, supervision and declining labour productivity — as each plant looks increasingly like a bespoke, first-of-a-kind endeavour. Tellingly, it also found that nominally repeated designs did not automatically become cheaper. Even France’s historic fleet — among the most standardised in the world — still saw costs rise: standardisation is necessary, but not sufficient.</p><p>Wright’s Law is not magic; it is repetition — the learning lives in building the same standardised design, over and over, using the same firms and supply chain. The West did neither reliably, and failed in two compounding ways. Slow builds let cost escalation and falling site productivity accumulate over more years; lost standardisation makes every plant a fresh first-of-a-kind, so the repetition that would drive the curve never begins.</p><p>Both failures surface in one measurable number — how long a plant takes to build — and both push up the overnight (i.e. excluding the cost of financing) cost of construction. Longer schedules also swell financing charges through interest during construction. The chart of construction times makes the point: Western builds run to a decade or more and drift longer still, while China and its East Asian peers hold to five or six years. Build time is less the cause than the visible marker of the standardisation, stable supply chains and steady policy that actually drive cost down — though the two track each other closely.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iU_dy_YVjTp06Es0qGTfgQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Source: Liu, He, Qiu &amp; Kammen, “Can China break the ‘cost curse’ of nuclear power?”, Nature 643:1186–88 [Jul 2025]</em></figcaption></figure><p>This is not a case for cutting corners: the countries that build nuclear cheaply do not build it dangerously. The narrower claim is that continually re-regulating each new plant, one-off, forfeits the standardisation that lowers cost and raises safety together — the discipline that made aviation astonishingly safe. Some requirements may well have bought safety at disproportionate cost; but the deeper failure was systemic, not simply regulatory. The problem, in the end, was rarely the physics. It was the delivery.</p><h4><strong>The end of life curse</strong></h4><p>Here is what the new-build debate almost always misses: the bill does not stop when the reactor is switched off.</p><p>For any country like the UK with an historic civil and military programme, new modern reactors add relatively little to the challenge of dealing with nuclear liabilities — not least because they generate relatively small volumes of spent fuel and high-activity waste per unit of electricity and are legally required, under the Energy Act 2008, to fund an approved programme for their own decommissioning.</p><p>However the back end illustrates further the problem where there is barely an experience curve to ride, only one-off, first-of-a-kind clean-up with little standardisation to repeat. In the UK, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) is responsible for cleaning up the country’s early public-sector nuclear legacy. Sellafield in Cumbria — the site of Calder Hall and the 1957 Windscale fire — alone accounts for around £191bn of an NDA-wide undiscounted legacy bill [x] that has climbed to roughly £272bn in cash terms, up from about £50bn two decades ago [xi].</p><p>It is tempting to blame ever-tightening regulations for that rise, but the NDA’s own accounts point elsewhere: unrealistic early plans corrected upward, waste-treatment strategies re-thought, world-first retrievals that prove harder than forecast, efficiency savings assumed and never delivered — as well as delay and delivery failure [xii]. This is less the goalposts moving than a one-off programme that cannot deliver to plan — with nothing to repeat and everything to rediscover.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*R_86GX99VvOQb7G0fOsEZg.png" /><figcaption><em>Source: Nuclear Decommissioning Authority accounts 2005/06 to 2025/36</em></figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Proof that it’s a choice</strong></h4><p>If the un-learning curse were a law of nature, there would be no exceptions. There are two — and one important export test — that are devastating to the fatalist.</p><p>China brought its overnight cost per kilowatt down sharply by the early 2000s and has held it broadly stable since, while running the world’s largest construction programme and building a reactor in five to six years — around half the American timescale. Even here, the fall owes less to a textbook learning curve than to the industrial strategy behind it [xiii]. The recipe is unglamorous, and the causation is key: a stable, supportive policy regime and a continuous, multi-decade order book are what make everything else possible — standardised design families built again and again across twin-unit sites, and, above all, indigenisation, as China localised the manufacture of its reactors and the cost fell in step.</p><p>The proof is stark: the reactors that cost China most were the Western designs it imported — the French M310 units at Daya Bay the extreme outlier, with even the later EPR and AP1000 running roughly half as much again as its home-grown fleet. And the advantage is bound to that supply chain: it does not travel — the same reactor costs roughly twice as much when China builds it abroad.</p><p>Critics might argue that China benefits from state capitalism. So instead look at South Korea, which built a standardised fleet at home at broadly flat cost while the West’s soared — then suggested that the discipline can travel, building the Barakah plant in the United Arab Emirates: four reactors for roughly $20–24bn (£16–19bn), each unit taking about nine years from first concrete to commercial operation, and the fleet finishing only some four years behind its original schedule. And licensing and operator readiness contributed much to this slip, rather than construction. This record for cost and programme delivery is far beyond any recent examples in Europe or America and delivered for a country with no prior nuclear industry by exporting a proven design and refusing to re-engineer it wholesale. In 2025, Korea went on to win the Czech Dukovany contract against EDF. Korea’s progress underlines that China’s success is a repeatable recipe, not a quirk of one political system.</p><p>Standardise. Repeat. Keep the order book flowing. Stop redesigning mid-build. That is the essence of the law.</p><h4><strong>SMRs: the curse in new clothes?</strong></h4><p>Which brings us to Small Modular Reactors, on which much hope — and public money — now rests. The pitch is seductive: move most of the build into a factory, and nuclear finally gets its own Wright’s Law, learning like an aircraft line rather than suffering like a civil-engineering megaproject.</p><p>It could work. But two problems lurk. First, a smaller reactor forfeits the economies of scale of a gigawatt plant, so it must claw them back through factory volume — which needs dozens of identical orders. And volume only helps if the product is genuinely a standardised product: a customer needs to buy a power station, not a reactor — and the whole plant — not merely the nuclear island — must be modularised, factory-built and installed in a fraction of the on-site time. Miss the order book and you get the worst of both worlds. That is roughly how America’s flagship NuScale project was cancelled in 2023, the estimated cost of its six-reactor plant reaching some $8.03bn (about £6.3bn) as its projected power price and customer subscriptions stopped adding up, even with a federal cost-share award of up to $1.355bn (£1.1bn), of which only about $183m was drawn [xiv].</p><p>Second, and deeper: <em>SMR economics require scale — for most designs, global scale — driven by global standardisation</em>, yet most governments are backing their own national champions — Rolls-Royce here, GE Hitachi in the US and Canada, Westinghouse, France’s Nuward, China’s Linglong One. The field is fracturing across at least half a dozen designs. And while regulators cooperate on safety — in September 2025 the ONR and America’s NRC agreed to share reviews and recognise each other’s completed assessments [xv] — no major jurisdiction yet grants automatic recognition to another’s licence: a design approved in Britain must be re-approved, often re-engineered, for the United States or an EU member state. Industrial nationalism is quietly dismantling the very standardisation the factory promise depends on.</p><p>It is the un-learning curse, waiting to be reborn — this time across borders.</p><h4><strong>So what?</strong></h4><p>If nuclear is to earn its place, the West must stop treating each plant as a heroic one-off and start treating the whole thing as an industrial-capability problem. Four things follow.</p><p><em>Commit to a fleet, not a plant.</em> Britain has made a start — a repeat large design, a single SMR programme, now also selected for three reactors in Sweden [xvi] — but a design is not a pipeline. Pick the fleet and commit to a published, multi-decade order book: not a subsidy but the mechanism that makes designs, suppliers, skills and productivity cheaper, and the only way a domestic supply chain forms at all. It was what made China’s biggest lever — indigenisation — possible. What counts is the size of the full order book — domestic and international — not the nationality of the orders, as Korea’s export record shows.</p><p><em>Regulate the fleet, not the reactor.</em> Britain’s own regulatory review has now said as much; the task is to deliver it — a more stable, fleet-based application of the goal-based regime we already have, in place of mid-build ratcheting — and to carry it across borders, so a design proven once earns formal credit from the ONR, America’s NRC and Canada’s CNSC rather than being re-engineered at every frontier.</p><p><em>Be honest about SMRs.</em> Britain has backed an exportable design, which is the right instinct — but only such designs deserve support, and only on condition of regulatory harmonisation. Without the order book, even a good SMR will struggle to beat a large reactor on cost per kilowatt.</p><p><em>Finish the job on liabilities.</em> Fund decommissioning honestly and up front, through robust, transparent Funded Decommissioning Programmes with real security behind them — and be as honest about the construction-cost risk the RAB model shifts onto consumers and taxpayers. And, at long last, site and build the geological disposal facility promised for a generation.</p><p>Western nuclear did not become expensive simply because fission is hard. It became expensive because we never built the stable designs, supply chains and continuous pipeline an experience curve needs. China, Korea and the UAE show that this is a choice, not a curse. The question, as ever, is not whether we can build affordable, safe nuclear — much better performance is plainly possible — but whether we are disciplined enough to standardise, repeat and hold our nerve long enough to do it.</p><p>The first time round, we learned by doing. The task now is to stop un-learning.</p><blockquote>Unless indicated otherwise, the views expressed in posts here are my own, and not those of Bain &amp; Company, Guernsey Electricity or the Cambridge Centre for Better Futures.</blockquote><p><strong>Notes</strong></p><p>[i] Noting that the Soviet Union’s smaller Obninsk reactor supplied the public grid two years earlier</p><p>[ii] EDF project updates on Hinkley Point C: £35bn (2015 prices), ≈ £48bn in current money; first unit expected around 2030; second unit reported 20–30% faster [EDF / World Nuclear News — Feb 2026]</p><p>[iii] T. P. Wright, “Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes”, Journal of the Aeronautical Sciences [1936]; Our World in Data, Learning Curves [2023]</p><p>[iv] Nagy, Farmer, Bui &amp; Trancik, “Statistical Basis for Predicting Technological Progress”, PLOS ONE [2013]</p><p>[v] Grübler, “The costs of the French nuclear scale-up: negative learning by doing”, Energy Policy [2010]; Eash-Gates et al., “Sources of Cost Overrun in Nuclear Power Plant Construction”, Joule [2020]</p><p>[vi] IRENA, Renewable Power Generation Costs 2024 (share of net capacity additions); UK CfD strike prices vs Hinkley’s £92.50/MWh (2012 prices), index-linked.</p><p>[vii] Sepulveda, Jenkins, de Sisternes &amp; Lester, “The Role of Firm Low-Carbon Electricity Resources in Deep Decarbonization”, Joule [2018] — saving refers to the category of firm low-carbon resources, not nuclear alone.</p><p>[viii] EDF (completion estimate, 2015 euros) and Cour des Comptes (broader perimeter incl. financing) on Flamanville 3 [2020–2025].</p><p>[ix] Vogtle 3 &amp; 4: external all-in estimates (multiple owners; not directly comparable with any single owner’s share) [2024].</p><p>[x] There is a trap in the official numbers worth flagging. The figure the government reports is discounted to a present value, and the Treasury’s rate has swung so violently — even turning negative on long-dated liabilities — that the reported provision leapt to £237bn in 2021/22 and fell to £105bn two years later — a swing driven by the discount rate, not by anything happening on the ground. The discounted number is fine for government accounting but useless as a measure of whether the clean-up is getting cheaper; the National Audit Office now foregrounds the undiscounted figure instead. The underlying undiscounted estimate has nearly always risen.</p><p>[xi] NDA Annual Report &amp; Accounts 2004/05–2025/26 (NDA-wide undiscounted provision ≈ £272bn; Sellafield ≈ £191bn; statutory discounted provision ≈ £114bn) [Jul 2026]; NAO, Decommissioning Sellafield (to ~2125) [Oct 2024]; PAC [Jun 2025].</p><p>[xii] Successive upward revisions in the NDA’s own accounts reflect unrealistic early plans replaced by more robust ones, revised waste-treatment strategies, and assumed efficiency savings that never materialised — with delay and delivery failure, not regulation, dominating the record [NDA ARAs; NAO/PAC, 2012–2025].</p><p>[xiii] Liu, He, Qiu &amp; Kammen, “Can China break the ‘cost curse’ of nuclear power?”, Nature 643:1186–88 [Jul 2025]; Barakah / Dukovany: Partnership for Global Security; KHNP [2024–2025]; Korea home-fleet costs: Lovering, Yip &amp; Nordhaus, Energy Policy [2016]</p><p>[xiv] NuScale / UAMPS Carbon Free Power Project cancellation [DOE-OIG-26–25, March 2026 / E&amp;E News — 2023]; SMR landscape [World Nuclear News — 2026].</p><p>[xv] Office for Nuclear Regulation, “Nuclear regulators renew transatlantic collaborative agreement” [Sep 2025]; parallel US NRC announcement [Sep 2025]. Mutual recognition of completed assessments, not of licences.</p><p>[xvi] Vattenfall, “Videberg Kraft selects Rolls-Royce SMR as supplier for new nuclear power in Sweden” [Jun 2026]. Supplier selection for three ~470MW reactors at Värö; not yet a final investment decision.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4e01426f5658" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Electric Revolution: A Century Late, But Now Inevitable]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@julian_critchlow/the-electric-revolution-a-century-late-but-now-inevitable-ab88a6e6afd5?source=rss-60a56b2ec20d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ab88a6e6afd5</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Julian Critchlow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 16:48:15 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-01T16:48:15.412Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>EVs lost the twentieth century to oil, infrastructure and the Model T experience curve. A century later, the same forces are working in reverse: battery costs are falling faster than almost anyone predicted, home charging is replacing the petrol station for most journeys, and the total cost of owning an electric car is — in many markets — already lower than its petrol equivalent. This is not a prediction. It is already happening.</em></p><p>One of the first practical electric vehicles didn’t arrive with Elon Musk in 2008. It arrived with Gustave Trouvé on the Rue Valois in Paris in 1881 — a tricycle powered by a rechargeable lead-acid battery and an improved Siemens motor. By 1900, roughly a third of all cars on the roads of the United States were electric <a href="#_edn1">[1]</a>. They were quieter, cleaner, easier to drive, and required no tortuous hand-cranking to start. For a brief, tantalising window, the electric vehicle looked like the obvious future.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ui5SsUD1AEKla-dpIDiNDQ.png" /><figcaption>Sources: Image rendered based on contemporary sketch and 2021 reconstruction</figcaption></figure><p>What ended it was Henry Ford — and something more consequential than any single invention: the production line. Ford’s famous declaration about the Model T — “any colour you want, as long as it is black” — is often read as arrogance. It was actually a precise manufacturing decision. Ford narrowed colour choice to simplify production, reduce cost and speed throughput; by eliminating variables that slowed the line, construction time fell from over twelve hours per vehicle to just ninety minutes. Between 1914 and 1925, the black-only policy had less to do with aesthetics — it was about ruthlessly eliminating anything that raised cost or slowed scaling.</p><p>The effect was to demonstrate, for the first time at industrial scale, what economists would later formalise as the “experience curve”: the observation that for every doubling of cumulative production, unit costs fall by a predictable percentage. As Ford built more cars, the cost of building each one fell. As costs fell, more people could afford them, which drove further volume, which drove costs down further still. The virtuous cycle was self-reinforcing.</p><p>Two things killed the electric car simultaneously. The first was infrastructure: petroleum could be transported, stored, and dispensed at scale with a simplicity that distributed battery charging simply couldn’t match. The second was the experience curve itself — a century of ICE production grinding costs down toward a floor that the nascent electric vehicle had no hope of competing with. By 1920, the internal combustion engine had won. The electric revolution was put back by approximately a century.</p><p>The profound irony is that it is precisely those same forces — infrastructure and the experience curve — that are now working in the opposite direction. But to understand why, it helps to look at what happened first in electricity generation.</p><h3>The Pattern We Have Already Seen in Power</h3><p>Before getting to EVs specifically, it’s worth seeing how this dynamic played out in electricity generation — because the pattern is now repeating in transport, almost beat for beat.</p><p>When a new technology is born, its costs are far above the incumbent. In that early phase, policy support is essential. Without it, the technology never reaches the scale needed to run down the experience curve. The learning rate for solar panels has been around 20% per doubling of cumulative production <a href="#_edn2">[2]</a> and for lithium-ion batteries, roughly 19%. <a href="#_edn3">[3]</a> But learning rates don’t happen automatically — Tesla demonstrated this with the deliberate engineering progression from the Model S to the mass-market Model 3, a discipline that BYD and China’s broader battery industry have since industrialised at a scale no single Western manufacturer can match.</p><p>The critical moment comes when the new technology’s falling costs cross the incumbent’s (relatively flat) cost floor. At that point, policy is no longer driving the deployment. The market is.</p><p>That is precisely what happened in electricity generation. In 2010, new solar and wind capacity was considerably more expensive than new gas. By 2024, the opposite was true: according to IRENA, 91% of new utility-scale renewable capacity added that year was cheaper than the weighted-average cost of equivalent new fossil fuel generation and renewables accounted for 92.5% of all new electricity capacity added globally — 585 out of 633 gigawatts. <a href="#_edn4">[4]</a></p><p>Policy helped get renewables onto the experience curve. Once costs crossed the incumbent’s, the market took over.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QwM0GSY_gjvxyxPupdLC6Q.png" /><figcaption><em>Source: Our World in Data — Solar PV Module Prices (2024), based on IRENA and BloombergNEF data. IRENA — Renewable Power Generation Costs 2024.</em></figcaption></figure><p>The EV story is now following the same script — with one important wrinkle. The experience curve in transport runs through the battery.</p><h3>Why Transport Decarbonisation Matters So Much</h3><p>Transport is the world’s second-largest source of energy-related CO₂ emissions, after electricity and heat generation. Roughly half of every barrel of oil extracted globally ends up in some form of transport fuel. <a href="#_edn5">[5]</a> The physics make a compelling case on their own terms.</p><p>A modern internal combustion engine converts roughly 12–30% of the energy in the fuel it burns into motion at the wheels — the system is extraordinarily wasteful. An electric drivetrain, by contrast, converts over 77% of the electrical energy drawn from the battery into motion. <a href="#_edn6">[6]</a> That is a fundamental physics advantage, independent of how the electricity is generated. Burning petroleum to push a car from A to B is simply a poor use of energy — and as the electricity grid decarbonises, the advantage compounds further.</p><p>But physics doesn’t buy cars. Capital does. And for most of the past decade, the cost of EVs — dominated by the battery — has been the decisive barrier to mass adoption. That is now changing faster than almost anyone predicted.</p><h3>The Battery Learning Curve in Numbers</h3><p>In 2010, a lithium-ion battery pack cost around £870–£1,100 per kilowatt-hour (approximately $1,100–$1,400). <a href="#_edn7">[7]</a> A 75 kWh pack — the kind you’d find in a mainstream family EV — would have cost over £63,000 in battery alone. That’s an expensive car before you’ve added a single door handle.</p><p>By 2025, according to BloombergNEF’s annual battery price survey, the global average pack price had fallen to around £85/kWh ($108/kWh) — a record low, and down 8% on 2024 — with battery electric vehicle packs cheaper still at approximately £78/kWh ($99/kWh). In China — which accounts for over 85% of global battery manufacturing capacity <a href="#_edn8">[8]</a> — average pack prices were lower still at around £66/kWh ($84/kWh) <a href="#_edn9">[9]</a>. <br> <br>This is the second year running below the $100/kWh threshold long cited as the point at which EVs reach purchase-price parity with equivalent ICE vehicles. We are at the economic tipping point now and the implications are significant.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fep2yulRn-N8u1yQywhWkQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Sources: Our World in Data based on Rupert Way (2026), Ziegler and Trancik (2021), BloombergNEF, and Avicenne Energy; BloombergNEF — Annual Battery Price Survey 2025 (December 2025)</em></figcaption></figure><p>This cost collapse is not a coincidence. It is the consequence of deliberate policy in China and Europe deploying EVs at scale over the past decade, combined with the ferocious competitive intensity of Chinese battery manufacturers. The OECD estimates that Chinese firms in the auto sector received subsidies 4x larger than OECD rivals as a share of revenue<a href="#_edn10">[10]</a> — a combination of cheap state loans, regulatory mandates and industrial policy that actively managed costs down the curve rather than simply waiting for scale to do the work.</p><p>BYD alone now produces more Battery EVs than any other company in the world. The result is that the global car market is being repriced — whether the incumbents like it or not.</p><h3>The Total Cost of Ownership</h3><p>Capital is only part of the total cost of owning a car. The fuller picture depends on five moving parts.</p><p>The first is the upfront cost — the purchase price of the vehicle. This is rapidly converging between EVs and their ICE equivalents across most markets, and is already below parity in China and several South-East Asian markets.</p><p>The second is running costs, which break into two components. Fuel: charging at home on a domestic tariff costs materially less per mile than filling up at a petrol station — typically two to three times cheaper in the UK. Servicing: an electric drivetrain has approximately 10% of the moving parts of a combustion engine. <a href="#_edn11">[11]</a> No oil changes, no timing belts, no exhaust systems. The servicing saving over a vehicle’s lifetime is substantial.</p><p>The third is road pricing and taxation. VED in the UK changed in April 2025: new EVs now pay £10 in the first year and £200 thereafter, with a supplement for vehicles over £50,000. The playing field on tax has narrowed, but the fuel and servicing savings more than offset it.</p><p>The fourth is residual value — the price you achieve when you sell or hand back the vehicle. This matters because over 80% of new private car sales in the UK are financed, <a href="#_edn12">[12]</a> and monthly finance payments are largely determined by the gap between purchase price and projected residual. This is where EVs have had a genuine problem. Rapid model cycles — BYD is refreshing models every 12–18 months against the traditional 5–7 year automotive cycle, the “iPhone effect” — combined with manufacturing overcapacity driving down new-car prices, have depressed used EV values. Equally, residual values for petrol cars are under simultaneous pressure: why buy a second-hand petrol car when a used EV is cheaper to run and increasingly cheaper to buy?</p><p>The fifth factor, specific to EVs, is battery longevity — the concern that batteries will degrade to uselessness within eight years. The data is increasingly reassuring. Recurrent Auto’s dataset of over 30,000 tracked EVs shows that, excluding major recalls, under 4% have had batteries replaced — and most of those are first-generation vehicles over a decade old. <a href="#_edn13">[13]</a> As the fleet ages and replacement battery costs continue to fall, this concern should recede further.</p><p>Add all five factors together and the total cost of ownership calculation is, in many markets and for many buyers, already tilting toward the EV.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8vOcwivtm28Mbh16nD_lxQ.png" /><figcaption><em>Sources: Motoring Research TCO methodology; VW UK configurator May 2026; RAC -ICE &amp; Octopus Go — EV for fuel price; Which? EV running cost data 2024; OZEV / DfT charging cost estimates; GOV.UK — VED rates from April 2025. Key assumptions: home charging, no major insurance differential. Actual costs will vary significantly by electricity tariff, mileage and model and factors like battery guarantees/rapid model cycles that impact residual values, increasing the cost of financing new purchases. The overall conclusion nonetheless that EV is lower total cost of ownership despite higher purchase price is robust and will improve as battery prices fall.</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Range Anxiety</h3><p>The way conventional car owners refuel is fundamentally reactive: you notice you’re running low, divert to the nearest garage, and fill up in three minutes. That just-in-time system is why the UK needs approximately 9,000 petrol stations — a dense national network designed around unpredictable, reactive demand.</p><p>EVs don’t work that way. You charge at home, overnight. You leave every morning with a full charge. Most people drive well under 30 miles a day, and a standard 7kW home charger replenishes that in roughly 90 minutes — silently, overnight, without a second thought. <a href="#_edn14">[14]</a> The home charger — on drives, on-street parking, car parks and workplaces — is the new petrol station, for the vast majority of journeys.</p><p>The problem is the minority of journeys that aren’t average. Long-distance travel — motorway runs, weekend trips, the annual migration to see family — requires a different solution: fast public charging at high-traffic locations. The UK motorway network has approximately 119 service areas, <a href="#_edn15">[15]</a> and ensuring each has reliable, high-speed chargers capable of handling peak demand — bank holiday Mondays, Christmas getaways — is the genuine infrastructure challenge. It is also a soluble one. It requires investment and coordination, not a fundamentally new approach. Norway has already done it.</p><p>But here is the irony that almost nobody talks about. As EV penetration rises and petrol car sales fall, the refuelling dynamics begin to reverse. Norway offers a preview: as the petrol car stock has declined, falling footfall has led petrol stations to close — sometimes faster than the underlying stock would predict, as operators respond to forward signals. As those stations disappear, drivers of remaining petrol cars will find that <em>they</em> are the ones who need to plan journeys around the available network. The car that “always leaves home full” turns out to be the EV. Range anxiety is a transitional problem for the whole system — not a permanent feature of electrification.</p><h3>The Market Evidence</h3><p>The clearest way to see policy and economics interacting in real time is to look across markets.</p><p>Norway is the established case study, and its numbers remain extraordinary. In 2024, 88.9% of all new cars sold in Norway were fully electric. <a href="#_edn16">[16]</a> EVs registered in Norway now outnumber petrol cars in the total stock for the first time — though diesel cars remain a significant proportion of the overall fleet. <a href="#_edn17">[17]</a> The country got there through exceptionally well-designed policy — VAT exemptions, toll road discounts, priority parking — that made the early economics work before the technology reached parity. But the policy created the demand that drove costs down to the tipping point where economics takes over — recognising that the transition path is never quite as straight as the experience curve suggests, with plug-in hybrids and extended-range EVs bridging charging infrastructure and capital cost constraints in some markets.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dEyqiX7USQgCZTLM09A8yg.png" /><figcaption><em>Sources: New Automotive Global Electric Vehicle Tracker (May 2026) 12 month rolling average</em></figcaption></figure><p>The UK story is more instructive as a case study in policy uncertainty than as a picture of where things stand today. EV sales were on a strong trajectory until September 2023, when the then Prime Minister moved the ban on new ICE car sales from 2030 to 2035. The signal was damaging: it created uncertainty in the supply chain, undermined residual value projections, and told the market that the government’s commitment was contingent. UK policy has since moved back toward a 2030 phase-out framework under the current government, but the episode illustrates a broader truth — policy wobble has a cost measured in carbon, investment and industrial positioning, even when it is subsequently reversed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CsSMcyeQOt8S77cHyQhqoA.png" /><figcaption><em>Sources: New Automotive Global Electric Vehicle Tracker (May 2026) 12 month rolling average</em></figcaption></figure><p>Sweden and Iceland have shown similar wobbles, demonstrating that political disruption can interrupt the S-curve even when the underlying economics are moving in the right direction.</p><p>But all of this is, to some extent, beside the point. The markets that will determine the pace of global EV deployment and battery cost curves are not Norway or the UK. They are China and the United States.</p><p>China has made its choice. EV penetration is accelerating, battery manufacturing capacity is being built at extraordinary scale, and Chinese manufacturers — BYD most visibly, but behind it a deep ecosystem of suppliers and material scientists — are driving the global experience curve whether other countries participate or not. China alone accounted for 64% of global renewable energy additions in 2024.[4] Its dominance in battery manufacturing is at least as pronounced.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VU3GrB5E34Z3dGvTbkMl2A.png" /><figcaption><em>Sources: IEA EV Data Explorer 2025</em></figcaption></figure><p>The United States, under current political conditions, is pulling in the opposite direction — rolling back EV incentives, imposing tariffs on Chinese batteries, and signalling policy retreat. This will delay adoption in the US market. It will not stop the global cost curve. The batteries will get cheaper regardless, because China will keep making them at scale.</p><p>The question for governments in the UK, Europe and beyond is not whether EVs will win in the end — the economics are now sufficiently clear that the outcome is not genuinely in doubt. The question is whether they will be organised to <em>manufacture</em> the winning technology, or merely to <em>buy</em> it. Those are very different industrial and geopolitical positions to be in.</p><h3>What This Means for Everyone</h3><p>The transition to electric vehicles is not simply a swap of one drivetrain for another. It reshapes the economics and structure of several of the world’s largest industries simultaneously.</p><p><strong>For the driver</strong>, the change is mostly welcome. The car still takes you from A to B — but it will be newer technology, more software-defined, and increasingly feature-rich. It will be quieter. It will eliminate exhaust emissions, reducing respiratory harm: road transport accounts for around 30% of particulate emissions in UK urban areas, with well-documented consequences for asthma and cardiovascular health. And it will become, in time, something more than a vehicle. Smart charging means the car can be timed to charge when grid electricity is cheapest and cleanest. Vehicle-to-grid technology — already being piloted — means the car’s battery, which is typically larger than a home battery storage unit, can supply electricity back to the house or the grid during peak demand. The family car as flexible grid asset is not science fiction. It is beginning now.</p><p><strong>For the electricity system</strong>, the implications are profound. Electrifying the entire UK car fleet would add ~50% to electricity consumption<a href="#_edn18">[18]</a>. That sounds alarming, but it is largely manageable — because the timing of EV charging is highly flexible. Cars charged overnight at home shift load into the grid’s lowest-demand period, improving utilisation rather than creating new peaks. The challenge is not so much total generation as it is the rate of buildout of smart charging infrastructure and, in due course, the reinforcement of local distribution networks. Heating electrification, which is likely to follow, will be a considerably harder network challenge.</p><p><strong>For the automotive industry</strong>, the disruption is already seismic — and the geography of value has shifted dramatically. A decade ago, the world’s most valuable car companies were overwhelmingly American, European and Japanese — Ford, GM, Volkswagen, Toyota. Today, Tesla’s market capitalisation exceeded all of them combined at its peak, and BYD has overtaken almost every legacy manufacturer by volume. The shift to EVs has concentrated manufacturing power and — critically — battery supply chain control in China in a way that has no precedent in the industry’s history. Countries that built their industrial base around the internal combustion engine — Germany, Japan, the US Midwest — are navigating an existential adjustment. The business model is changing too. Petrol and diesel automotives were built around the dealer network and the service bay: complexity meant recurring revenue. EVs, with their relative mechanical simplicity, undercut that model. New intermediaries are emerging — companies like Octopus EV in the UK, which combines salary sacrifice schemes, smart home charging and fleet management into a single offering, replacing what the traditional dealer once provided.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mC2jfyuDbDM-Y0lm3LXCZA.png" /><figcaption><em>Source: CapitalIQ (2014-May 2026) — EV valuations are dominated by Tesla</em></figcaption></figure><p><strong>For oil and gas</strong>, the trajectory is becoming clear. We are in all likelihood at or near peak oil demand from transport.[5] As the global fleet transitions — slowly at first, then rapidly once the economic tipping point is passed — the roughly half of every oil barrel that currently goes to transport fuels will progressively shrink, with implications not just for upstream production but for refining capacity globally. The adjustment will not be instantaneous, but it is directionally inevitable: a slow-motion unwinding of a century of fossil fuel integration into our economy, in mirror image of what happened to the electric car after 1920.</p><p>The electric car was invented 145 years ago. It was a better technology then, and it is a better technology now. The last century was a detour, caused by an infrastructure problem that petroleum solved more conveniently than wires and batteries could. That problem is now solved at the system level — through the combination of local charging for daily use and fast public charging for longer journeys.</p><p>What took so long was not physics. It was the experience curve: the patient, relentless process of scaling a technology until its cost crosses the incumbent’s. For EVs, that crossing point is now, or very nearly so, in most developed markets — though the pace of the transition will vary sharply by region, policy environment and the speed at which charging infrastructure scales.</p><p>As James Carville — Bill Clinton’s campaign strategist — might have put it: it’s the economics, stupid.</p><blockquote><em>Unless indicated otherwise, the views expressed in posts here are my own, and not those of Bain &amp; Company, Guernsey Electricity, Nyobolt or the Cambridge Centre for Better Futures.</em></blockquote><p><a href="#_ednref1">[1]</a> US Department of Energy — History of the Electric Car, 2014<br><a href="#_ednref2">[2]</a> Our World in Data — Solar Panel Price Learning Curve, 2024<br><a href="#_ednref3">[3]</a> Our World in Data — Battery Price Decline, March 2026 update<br><a href="#_ednref4">[4]</a> IRENA — Renewable Capacity Statistics 2025, March 2025<br><a href="#_ednref5">[5]</a> IEA — World Energy Outlook 2023<br><a href="#_ednref6">[6]</a> US Department of Energy / FuelEconomy.gov — How Do Gasoline Cars Work? and How Do Electric Cars Work?<br><a href="#_ednref7">[7]</a> BloombergNEF — Annual Battery Price Survey 2024, December 2024<br><a href="#_ednref8">[8]</a> IEA Global EV Outlook 2025, July 2025<br><a href="#_ednref9">[9]</a> BloombergNEF — Annual Battery Price Survey 2025 (December 2025): global avg pack $108/kWh; BEV pack $99/kWh; China avg $84/kWh. Projections: ~$80/kWh by 2026, ~$60/kWh by 2030<br><a href="#_ednref10">[10]</a> OECD “Measuring distortions in international markets: Industrial subsidies”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, Paris — 1 June 2026<br><a href="#_ednref11">[11]</a> US Department of Energy — Electric Drivetrains, comparative parts analysis<br><a href="#_ednref12">[12]</a> FCA — Motor Finance Review, 2024: motor finance accounts for over 80% of private new car sales<br><a href="#_ednref13">[13]</a> Recurrent Auto — EV Battery Health Report (30,000+ vehicle dataset), 2025/2026; InsideEVs citing Recurrent 20,000-vehicle study (2.5% replacement rate, earlier dataset)<br><a href="#_ednref14">[14]</a> Department for Transport — National Travel Survey 2023: 915 trips and 5,974 miles per person per year; average car trip approximately 8–9 miles. Charging calculation: 30 miles/day at ~3.5 miles/kWh = ~8.6 kWh; at 7kW charge rate = approximately 73 minutes to replenish a typical day’s driving.<br><a href="#_ednref15">[15]</a> National Highways — Service Area locations on the Strategic Road Network, UK; approximately 119 motorway service areas as of 2024<br><a href="#_ednref16">[16]</a> OFV (Norwegian Road Information Authority) — January 2025<br><a href="#_ednref17">[17]</a> WC Shipping / Norwegian EV Market Report, 2025<br><a href="#_ednref18">[18]</a> NESO Future Energy Scenarios (FES) 2025 Data Workbook — Estimated 100–120Wh would be added to 260–280TWh electricity system</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ab88a6e6afd5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Whither the UK electricity market…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@julian_critchlow/whither-the-uk-electricity-market-dc092f83998e?source=rss-60a56b2ec20d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dc092f83998e</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Julian Critchlow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 18:53:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-16T18:53:32.639Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It is nearly 3.5 years since the Review of Electricity Market Arrangements (REMA) was launched, reflecting a widely held belief that the historic market structure was not fit for a future fully decarbonised electricity system.</p><p>During its review, REMA has looked at many aspects of the market structure with its big decision, as of July 2025, being to rule out a shift to Zonal Pricing and instead focus on a “package of reforms” to improve efficiency. This package includes four key pillars: the Strategic Spatial Energy Plan (SSEP); sending clearer, predictable locational signals through the national Transmission pricing framework; improved operational efficiency to manage network constraints; and strengthening the Capacity Market to support flexibility, storage and hydrogen.</p><p>In the meantime, the electricity sector is undergoing a fundamental transformation in the way that we generate and deliver clean, secure and low cost power. The nature and pace of this change is truly unprecedented. Where once the electricity market was all about energy retailers providing a semi-fixed quarterly or annual electricity tariff (by hedging a volatile commodity — first coal &amp; oil then gas), today increasingly the system is made up of capital assets with high upfront investment but very limited running costs. By 2030, nearly all our electricity system will be driven by the economics of invested capital not by the volatile commodities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*kZLyuy6N2Ji-yLg1JJSIzw.gif" /></figure><p>We have seen this type of transition before. In the early decades of the telecommunications industry with its capacity constrained by the number of fixed lines, pricing focused on the amount of time that a caller was “on the line”. Parents were always imploring their teenagers to cut their calls short and not to hog the telephone line, as they watched the “per minute” pricing notch up huge monthly bills.</p><p>But then along came the new digital mobile telecommunications world with its rapidly increasing bandwidth. In the digital world, nearly unlimited data could be transmitted and multiple digital calls conducted in parallel. As a result, mobile pricing evolved from the “per minute” to a “fixed monthly bill” based on the bandwidth/quality of signal that the customer wanted, with bundles of unlimited data and calls.</p><h3>Future structure of the electricity system</h3><p>So let’s look at the future structure of the electricity system (see my previous articles on <a href="https://medium.com/@julian_critchlow/powering-the-transition-delivering-clean-power-by-2030-ish-part-1-8156b8987ac4">Powering the Energy Transition</a> for more detail). The future system that the National Electricity System Operator (NESO) describes in 2050 [1] is (a) 2.5–3.6x the scale of yesterday’s electricity system; (b) powered by low carbon sources such as nuclear and renewables; and (c) balanced through energy storage, management of demand and backup thermal plant (either hydrogen or natural gas with carbon capture post combustion).</p><p>Given that all these assets — nuclear power plant, solar and wind, batteries, transmission &amp; distribution networks — have high upfront investment with limited ongoing running costs, investors require fixed price contracts to price as low cost as possible. Onshore &amp; Offshore Wind and Solar farms are contracted via Contracts for Difference (CfDs). Nuclear power stations are typically supported either through a CfD or through a Regulated Asset Base (RAB) model, under which the project can recover regulated revenue including a return on capital. Transmission &amp; Distribution networks regulated through a fixed Revenue, Incentives, Innovation &amp; Outputs (RIIO) mechanism. And as generations are increasingly dominated by renewable generation sources, the back-up Capacity Markets will incentivise Batteries and Gas Peaking Generation with further fixed contracts, paying them to stand-by ready to provide the backup generation when there is no wind nor solar.</p><p>But hold on a minute: if future supply and demand are both volatile, shouldn’t we price electricity to attempt to align demand with supply i.e. price cheaper when we have lots of supply; and more expensive when the generators and networks are working close to full capacity?</p><p>Well let’s consider how customers might respond: today if you bought a Tesla Powerwall 3 in the UK , it would cost you around £600 per kWh (£7,000–9,000 for 13.5kWh) <a href="#_ftn1">[2]</a>. A typical Lithium Ion battery can cycle around 6,000–10,000 times over its lifetime, which means that the cost is around 7–12p/kWh per cycle [3].</p><p>Today on some tariffs (e.g. E.ON Next Drive Smart V5.2), the off-peak price can be as low as 6.5p/kWh and the peak as high as 28.5p/kWh, a differential of 22p/kWh and more than enough to justify a battery at 7–12p/kWh to charge off-peak and use at peak! So at these prices, a savvy domestic customer might reasonably invest in “behind the meter” batteries — using their own capital if they have it or financing it with their installer using the monthly energy bill savings to fund the installation.</p><p>Utilities have an even better case for investing in batteries. At scale Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) are much cheaper than domestic batteries. Instead of 7–12p/kWh for a domestic battery, a BESS might come in at 5–7p/kWh<a href="#_ftn3">[4]</a> with an anticipated up to 49% fall in costs by 2035<a href="#_ftn4">[5]</a> to 4–5p/kWh. Even taking account of energy losses, grid fees and degradation, a spread of 6–10p/kWh would justify utility scale investment.</p><p>If households and utilities both install batteries, the off-peak demand will rise as they charge the batteries; and the peak demand will fall as they discharge their batteries, causing prices to fall at peak and rise at off-peak. As more and more batteries are installed, the pricing differential between peak and off-peak will be squeezed until eventually the price difference in insufficient to justify any more investment in batteries.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4tUd8_lUHJULxI5PgCfp8A.gif" /></figure><p>These 2–4 hour batteries won’t, of course, be able to cope with a “Dunkelflaute”, a period of sustained doldrums without wind or solar generation, as these can last weeks. To ensure that the lights stay on, the system would require either plentiful long duration energy storage; or sufficient back-up gas generation capacity (with associated gas storage or swing).</p><p>In an optimised electricity system this backup generation shouldn’t be called upon very often (less than 5% annual generation in a typical weather year). But when it is called upon, it would need to earn ALL its annual running costs from a VERY high spike in the wholesale price. This will be politically unpalatable (witness the 2018 “Beasts from the East” gas shortages) forcing the system to “insure” against these events by paying the generator a fixed fee to be available to run; with a a smaller operational price when they actually do run.</p><h3>A “typical” UK electricity bill</h3><p>So let’s take at the impact of these changes on the structure of a typical UK electricity bill.</p><p>In the past (let’s say 2010), the average electricity bill depended mostly (~85%) on how much electricity was used with a relative small proportion of the bill being a fixed standing charge (~15%). This split was justified by the breakdown of the industry’s costs.</p><p>Generation costs were largely driven by the price of gas that was burnt in the Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT’s) to generate the electricity (i.e. per therm of gas or kWh of electricity generated). Policy Costs supporting renewables were typically paid based on the units of electricity generated (i.e. also per kWh). Transmission &amp; Distribution Network costs were driven by the size of the customer and since the pattern of consumption was mostly the same for different types of customers could be allocated on a per unit consumed (i.e. per kWh).</p><p>Retail costs — the costs of call centres and items like bad debt — were the only cost that did not vary much by the amount of electricity consumed, instead being driven largely by the number of customers served.</p><p>As a result, most of the electricity industry costs varied by the amount of electricity consumed and the bills reflected this with standing charges, indicatively, around ~15% of the bill and variable unit charges around ~85% (see animation below with the fixed cost elements shown in red).</p><p>In the future decarbonised electricity system (let’s say 2030), all of this changes.</p><p>Gas Generation is replaced by nuclear and renewables with its high upfront capital costs and low running costs, contracted on a fixed price basis (i.e. Regulated Asset Base RAB or Contracts for Difference CfD respectively).</p><p>Network capacity will also be largely fixed and driven, not by the units consumed (kWh) but by the maximum customer demand (kW or MW). Many customers will have “behind-the-meter” generation or storage which means their net consumption (kWh) could be nearly zero but they still require back-up capacity for when the sun doesn’t shine or their batteries are empty.</p><p>Policy costs will largely be a fixed cost and exactly allocation would depend on future policy direction — but might like networks arguably be allocated more by peak demand rather than consumption. And as customer bills become less volatile, they will have less need to speak to their Energy Retailer — think more Water than Energy utility.</p><p>In summary, the electricity bill of the future could look much more like the mobile telecoms bill of today: a largely fixed monthly fee based on the customer’s “peak demand capacity” (potentially around 85% of the bill) with a fixed bundle of electricity included within it (potentially around 15% of the bill).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dOUkVXT2xe1dsrVvl6f06Q.gif" /></figure><h3>Implications for the electricity system</h3><p>The implications of this transition are manifold — and go well beyond the structure of a typical electricity bill.</p><p>On the one hand, it can be argued that the “invisible hand” of the market will adapt to the changing economics of the industry. As in the storage example above, capital could flow both “in-front-of-the-meter” from infrastructure investors and “behind-the-meter” from households and businesses to take advantage of price differentials which will in turn dampen the peaks &amp; troughs of pricing. But unchecked it will also create huge volatility as less power is traded through the wholesale markets and the grid is increasingly underutilised acting as a standby system. Huge price volatility risks more bankruptcy in retailers, traders and generators; more calls for interventions to stop “excess profits” in flex providers; more risk of blackouts; and higher costs for the energy transition.</p><p>The alternative is for policy makers and industry to face into the rapidly changing market and to transform the structure of the market. The current framework — 10’s of thousands of pages of industry licence codes — was designed for a world of dispatchable fossil fuel generation and passive demand. It wasn’t designed for a system dominated by intermittent renewables, active demand management and millions of distributed assets behind the meter.</p><p>At a policy level, the relationships between DESNZ, NESO, and Ofgem — all of whom oversee and shape the development of the electricity system — need to transition to a world where the primary challenge is no longer just “to keep the lights on today?” but “to enable the largest infrastructure investment programme in a generation?”</p><p>In parallel, the nature of every market participant will change fundamentally. Energy retailers will move away from their traditional role of turning a volatile commodity into a semi-fixed tariff. Instead they will evolve into businesses that help customers install, finance, maintain and optimise the equipment behind the meter — heat pumps, batteries, solar panels, EV chargers — while the backup generation capacity they once procured through the wholesale market is increasingly delivered centrally through capacity mechanisms.</p><p>Investors in generation assets will see a similar transformation. The old model — willing to play the commodity cycle with relatively limited capital — will give way to capital intensive, lower risk, lower return investments. Think infrastructure funds rather than utilities. When the revenue is largely fixed through Contracts for Difference, Regulated Asset Bases and capacity payments, the risk profile looks much more like a toll road than a trading floor.</p><p>Trading will also have to adapt to a very different market. As more generation is contracted at fixed prices and less flows through the wholesale market, liquidity will fall dramatically. The day-ahead and intraday markets will still matter for balancing — but the days of large volumes of speculative commodity trading in UK power are numbered.</p><p>And finally, customers will have to get used to a fundamental change in their billing relationship — paying more for services than for consumption. Standing charges, fixed by their peak demand, will rise as a proportion of the bill. And there will be much more focus on the capital invested behind the meter: the heat pump, the battery, the solar panels, the EV charger. The bill will increasingly look like a broadband or mobile telecoms subscription — a fixed monthly fee for a bundle of capacity and services — rather than a metered commodity. And their incentives will be smart management of their peak demand as energy efficiency.</p><p>In short, every part of the electricity system — from Whitehall to the wholesale market, from the retail energy company to the solar panel on your roof — is going to have to reinvent itself. The question, as ever, is not whether this will happen but are we organised to make it happen fast enough.</p><blockquote>Unless indicated otherwise, the views expressed in posts here are my own, and not those of Bain &amp; Company, Guernsey Electricity, Nyobolt or the Cambridge Centre for Better Futures.</blockquote><p>[1] <a href="https://www.neso.energy/document/364541/download">NESO Future Energy Scenarios 2025</a> — Table 2 [Nov 2025]<br>[2] <a href="https://www.tesla.com/en_GB/powerwall/get">Tesla.com</a> [Feb 2026] <br>[3] <a href="https://www.spiritenergy.co.uk/kb-batteries-residential-solar-energy-storage-overview">Spirit Energy — Guide to Residential Storage</a> [Jan 2025]<br>[4] <a href="https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/how-cheap-is-battery-storage/">Ember — How cheap is battery storage?</a> [11 Dec 2025]<br>[5] <a href="https://about.bnef.com/insights/clean-energy/global-cost-of-renewables-to-continue-falling-in-2025-as-china-extends-manufacturing-lead-bloombergnef/">BNEF — Global cost of Renewables to Continue Falling in 2025</a> [6 Feb 2025]</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dc092f83998e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why does UK pay so much for electricity?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@julian_critchlow/why-does-uk-pay-so-much-for-electricity-3a2697b32347?source=rss-60a56b2ec20d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3a2697b32347</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Julian Critchlow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2025 15:16:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-12-02T11:30:15.781Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Electricity is central to Britain’s economic future. It will power our homes, transport and industry alike but today the UK is paying some of the highest prices in Europe. It wasn’t always that way — we used to pay close to the EU average for our electricity but all that changed in the last few years as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed deeper structural flaws in how we make and price power.</em></p><p><em>In the media, the explanations for the rise in UK electricity prices are many and varied. It is due to the high cost of subsidising renewables, particularly offshore wind. It is the cost of long networks to bring wind power south from Scotland and onshore from the offshore wind farms. It is the marginal price mechanism and the rising cost of the gas. Or it is the failure of energy policy to protect our energy intensive industries and households (delete depending on which bills you pay!).</em></p><p><em>Like Eric Morecambe famously said: we have “</em><a href="https://vimeo.com/479336770"><em>…all the right notes, but not necessarily in the right order</em></a><em>.” So in the following 10 graphs, I hope to explain why electricity prices matter, what has driven them up in recent years and what choices we have in future to make a net-zero economy affordable.</em></p><h3><strong>Why it matters…</strong></h3><p>The UK has in London the 6th most exposed financial centre for listed fossil fuels reserves<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> but, over the next 20 years, the UK has initiated one of the most profound transformations in its energy system since the Industrial Revolution.</p><p>Electricity will replace gas and oil as the primary energy source, rising from about 17% of our energy today to closer to 69%<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> by the middle of the century.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*aAQixaO896U-8OccK6jywg.png" /></figure><p>The cost of electricity will therefore increasingly shape our economic trajectory. High electricity prices will make energy-intensive industries uncompetitive, threaten the survival of small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs), and weigh heavily on household bills and the broader cost of living.</p><h3>How are we doing…</h3><p>The bad news is that, whilst our industrial gas prices are roughly the EU-14 average (fig. 2), our industrial electricity prices are amongst the highest, with industry and households alike bearing the pain. UK is amongst the most expensive (i.e. bottom quartile) in both industrial and domestic tariffs whereas the USA is cheapest (i.e. top quartile) in both.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ky_pcm0CNvF9GGJES4bWQg.png" /></figure><p>It hasn’t always been this way. If we look back in history then we see that high UK domestic electricity prices are a relatively recent phenomenon with a dramatic rise occurring after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, when the UK moved from close to the EU14 average price to one of the highest.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/726/1*gB1_27i35tpgBgbC_BGwAQ.png" /></figure><h3>Who or what has caused this rise…</h3><p>There is no shortage of analysis on the cost of energy starting in 2017 with a government Cost of Energy Review<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> conducted by Professor Dieter Helm and more recently regular articles across the media, including the Financial Times<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a>, The Economist<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a>, “The Week”<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> and even <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m002fj8f#playt=00h12m00s">BBC Radio 4 “More or Less”</a>. Each of these assessments draws subtly different conclusions but the ultimate question remains: are higher energy prices driven by our unique policy decisions or a function of the UK’s energy fundamentals?</p><p>Prior to Brexit, this would have been a relatively simple question to answer as the EU - via Eurostat - published disaggregated data on the different cost elements driving electricity prices for all EU members… but then in 2020, the UK left the EU and was no longer included in the data. To understand what has happened since 2020, it necessary to reconstruct the dataset from the underlying sources including DESNZ international high-level comparisons combined with detailed cost breakdowns in Ofgem Price Cap determinations.</p><p>Then an interesting picture emerges with all elements including network, policy &amp; taxes rising materially over the last 8 years but with the most significant increase in the generation costs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/893/1*Py6PLz4OKx7EQY9eOQ11kA.png" /></figure><h3>Are our policy makers to blame…</h3><p>Guy Newey, CEO of the Energy Systems Catapult, has written an excellent article on the history of policy decisions impacting electricity prices<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a>. At its most basic, policy determines the wholesale price mechanism that sets electricity prices; the subsidies that support emerging technologies; the cross-subsidy between domestic and industrial energy users (particularly industrial energy intensive users); and the taxes on energy. In UK bills, ‘policy &amp; taxes’ cover environmental and social schemes (legacy Renewable Obligation, Feed-in-Tariffs and Contract for Difference payments), the Capacity Market, and VAT for households.</p><p>In most countries, Energy-Intensive Industries (EII’s) argue that high electricity prices make them uncompetitive internationally and so governments, sensitive to jobs and investment, often grant exemptions or rebates to energy intensive industry and put most of the environmental, social and sales taxes on domestic consumers.</p><p>Historically the UK has been the exception to this rule, imposing policy costs on domestic and industrial consumers alike – so where in most EU14 countries residential prices are 1.5-3.0x medium sized industrial electricity prices, the UK the prices are nearly equal<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a>. However from April 2024 the government broadened exemptions for Energy‑Intensive Industries, with further measures phasing in through 2024–25.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/902/1*1klwF4MO1gJZFmSabkIl4Q.png" /></figure><h3>So it’s all the fault of gas prices?</h3><p>At the foundation of electricity pricing is the cost of the primary energy source, historically fossil fuels and increasingly in the future renewable energy.</p><p>In the early twentieth century, coal was the main dispatchable power generation source in the UK, with oil being used at the peak for a few hours a year but in the latter half of the century, nuclear was added as baseload power and then in the 1990’s, there was a “dash for gas” generation with the arrival of competitive gas from the UK continental shelf.</p><p>In the last decade, new renewables have displaced further coal which was increasingly uneconomic due to carbon pricing and the costs of Flue Gas Desulphurisation (FGD). On 30th September 2024, Ratcliffe-on-Soar, the last coal station closed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1020/1*etJCdUMDzEo2J7Rodtbqog.png" /></figure><p>Given the commodity represented c. 70-80% of the levelized cost of gas generation, the wholesale price of electricity was set by a mechanism called “marginal pricing”: generators bid in to supply for each half hour and all prices are stacked up from lowest to highest with the final “marginal” plant required to meet demand setting the price for everyone else. In the US and most of the EU, the marginal plant is a gas plant.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/949/1*PVQXtK9NFzmVvwOMG5TB8Q.png" /></figure><p>In the short‑term wholesale markets (day‑ahead and intraday), gas is usually the marginal plant setting the price 98% of the time (2021<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a>) which is why UK wholesale power closely tracks gas. Although suppliers typically hedge prices, a sustained rise in prices will be impact the forward prices and as hedges are replaced will eventually be reflected in retail energy tariffs, albeit with a lag and some dampening.<br> <br>UK gas prices are set by trading on the National Balancing Point (NBP) and typically (but not always) are close to the main European gas price on the Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF). However, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, both the UK and European gas prices have skyrocketed and decoupled from the US gas price traded on Henry Hub (HH).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/680/1*mMyVQ2jdtxzhehKHit84WQ.png" /></figure><p>This abrupt rise in gas – although softened by suppliers’ hedging - drove wholesale electricity up and was the primary cause of the rise in UK electricity prices.</p><h3>Hold on…fixed price nuclear &amp; renewables are 50+% of our electricity?</h3><p>Not quite – it is true that nuclear and renewables are now more than 50% of our electricity and the government’s Clean Power 2030 aims to fully decarbonise the electricity system with new nuclear, onshore &amp; offshore wind and solar with some low carbon flexible generation.</p><p>However all the existing nuclear and much of the wind is either traded merchant at the prevailing wholesale price or on older subsidy mechanisms like the Renewable Obligation Certificates (RoCs) where a subsidy is added to the wholesale electricity price. When the gas price shot up, these generators received a windfall – and Government responded in the Autumn Statement 2022 by announcing an Electricity Generator Levy to clawback a proportion of the exceptional profits of non-fossil plant (i.e. nuclear, renewables, biomass and energy-from-waste).</p><p>Today developers of wind farms bid for a Contract for Difference (CfD) at a fixed price<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a> and developers of new nuclear are either on a CfD or a fixed return on a Regulated Asset Base (RAB). So increasingly as we build out the new capacity it will be on a fixed price, with less and less flowing through the wholesale market.</p><p>At its heart, the economics of our electricity system will depend on the cost of new nuclear and new renewables. The costs of the new renewables are driven by the quality of the renewable resources (i.e. sun irradiation and wind mean power density), the capital cost of capturing the energy through solar panels and wind farms (including the land they occupy), the network cost of delivering the power to customers and the flexible capacity/demand or interconnection to cover the renewables intermittent generation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/734/1*XC9NL3C2mV7rd797aWtzFA.png" /></figure><p>Here, geography matters. During the early days of EU renewable deployment in the 2010’s, Germany - in the north of Europe - heavily subsidised the emerging solar industry, whilst Spain - in the south of Europe - subsidised wind farms. Regrettably as sailors and sun-seekers alike know, the wind is typically in the north of Europe and the sun in the south!</p><p>Since those early days, the capital costs of renewables has fallen dramatically as they are deployed rapidly and at scale around the world. Today onshore wind and solar are the lowest cost of generation - cheaper than new fossil fuel plants – and renewables represented 92.5% globally of new generating capacity last year<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/729/1*l7ty9CCB8vCbvTivCUKGfQ.png" /></figure><p>So what does this mean for the UK? The UK has excellent wind resources<a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a> but expensive land. As a result of resource quality and historic planning barriers in England, wind was typically built onshore in Scotland and offshore on the UK continental shelf.</p><p>From 2015-19, the auctions for Offshore Wind brought the Contract for Difference costs down from £115/MWh to below £40/MWh. But since 2022, inflation in supply chains and rising interest rates have driven costs up and in the current 7th auction round (AR7) the UK government has been forced to set maximum price caps at £92/MWh for Onshore Wind and £113/MWh for Offshore Wind.</p><p>To put this into a global context, with cheap land, abundant sunshine and imports of low-cost solar panels, Saudi Arabia was able to achieve globally leading levelized cost of solar electricity of $13-18/MWh in 2024. The harsh reality is that the UK starts with a structural cost disadvantage in generating electricity.</p><p>Finally, until and unless, the electricity market structure is reformed, the wholesale electricity price will depend on that marginal gas plant – even if most of the electricity is generated by low carbon sources on fixed price contracts.</p><h3>So what does this all mean?</h3><p>As we have seen, <strong>UK electricity is expensive for a mixture of factors</strong>. Some are inherent: our limited solar resource, our constrained land for onshore wind, and reliance on more costly offshore wind. Some are more transitionary: like the spike in UK/European gas prices and our reliance on gas at the margin. Others are policy choices: subsidy mechanisms, cross-subsidies &amp; taxation, market design.</p><p><strong>The choice now is pace and coherence.</strong> Accelerate delivery of the lowest cost, most secure clean power; build the critical grid faster; unlock flexibility at scale to complement low-cost renewables; reform market design without serial tinkering; and decide where the UK will cross-subsidise strategic industries (and where it will not!).</p><p>If we do these five things in the coming years, we’ll cut costs, de‑risk investment and give the UK’s clean‑power mission the backbone it needs to support future economic competitiveness.</p><blockquote>Unless indicated otherwise, the views expressed in posts here are my own, and not those of Bain &amp; Company, Guernsey Electricity, Nyobolt or the Cambridge Centre for Better Futures.</blockquote><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Carbon Tracker: <a href="https://carbontracker.org/reports/unburnable-carbon-ten-years-on/">“Unburnable Carbon: 10 Years On” (June 2022)</a> Figure 1</p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Medium: <a href="https://medium.com/@julian_critchlow/powering-the-transition-delivering-clean-power-by-2030-ish-part-1-8156b8987ac4">Powering the Transition: Delivering Clean Power by 2030 (-ish) – Part 1</a> (29 May 2025)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> BEIS: <a href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a749c26ed915d0e8e39997a/Cost_of_Energy_Review.pdf">Cost of Energy Review</a> by Professor Dieter Helm CBE (6 Aug 2017)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Financial Times: “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/684a1bd9-d15c-4769-83d0-1989163f4700">How to cut Britain’s sky-high electricity prices</a>” (16 Jun 2025); “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/f3bcd4a4-0a5f-4fc1-ad8a-cf2530e6001a">Why are the UK’s industrial electricity prices so high?</a>” (9 Jun 2025) “<a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2f254529-e03e-46a2-a7ec-4a2e86c96cac">Gas, not net zero, has driven up UK power bills</a>” (19 Mar 2025)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Economist: “<a href="https://www.economist.com/britain/2025/07/31/is-britains-net-zero-push-to-blame-for-its-high-energy-prices">Is Britain’s net-zero push to blame for its high energy prices?</a>” (31 Jul 2025); “<a href="https://www.economist.com/britain/2025/03/10/why-britons-pay-so-much-for-electricity">Why Britons pay so much for electricity</a>” (10 Mar 2025)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> The Week: <a href="https://theweek.com/tech/why-britains-electricity-bills-are-some-of-the-highest-in-the-world">Why are UK electricity prices so high?</a> (27 Sep 2025)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> SubStack: Guy Newey “<a href="https://substack.com/inbox/post/160632201">Whose fault is it? Why are GB electricity prices currently so high compared to other countries?</a>” (13 Apr 2025)</p><p><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> DESNZ (May 2025) QEP 5.4.1 &amp; 5.6.1: ‘medium’ bands; H2 2024; domestic incl. VAT, industrial ex‑VAT</p><p><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Zakeri et al (2023) <a href="https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/19109/">The role of natural gas in setting electricity prices in Europe</a> – UK figure for 2021</p><p><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Strictly the LCCC pays the difference to the generator between the wholesale electricity price and the agreed strike price. And recoups payments if the wholesale electricity price goes above the strike price</p><p><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Irena (Mar 2025): <a href="https://www.irena.org/Publications/2025/Mar/Renewable-capacity-statistics-2025">Renewable capacity statistics</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> But not as much sun with about half the solar irradiation of the Middle East</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3a2697b32347" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Powering The Transition: Delivering Clean Power by 2030 (-ish) — part 2]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@julian_critchlow/powering-the-transition-delivering-clean-power-by-2030-ish-part-2-cc9e490a2b41?source=rss-60a56b2ec20d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cc9e490a2b41</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Julian Critchlow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2025 11:04:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-07-09T11:04:41.111Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Powering The Transition: Delivering Clean Power by 2030 (-ish) — part 2</h3><p><em>In my last </em><a href="https://medium.com/p/1b2a3acb8077"><em>article</em></a><em>, I looked at the historic context for the current energy transition and industrial revolution, and what we need to build to have secure, low cost and clean electricity by 2030.</em></p><p><em>In the second part of this article, I will look at where we need to build our new capacity and who will build it. And finally what this implies for policy makers and industry to make it happen.</em></p><h3>Challenge #2: Where to Build?</h3><p>If the scale of the capacity required wasn’t enough of a challenge, the geography doesn’t help.</p><p>The best renewable generation resources — offshore wind off the east coast of the UK and onshore in Scotland — are not where demand lies. Key demand centres are in the major metropolitan centres, particularly London, and the key industrial clusters.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/864/1*rvlD67zl__SfskKKvspfaQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: UK Wind Power Density (<a href="https://globalwindatlas.info/en/">Global Wind Atlas</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>So system designers are faced with 3 options: (i) try to locate the supply of electricity — i.e. the wind and solar farms — close to the demand; (ii) locate the demand — e.g. data centres or industry — close to the supply; or (iii) locate the supply and demand in their respective optimal locations and then link them with grid. The worst option (which is often the case currently) is to locate supply and demand far apart with insufficient interconnection so that the renewable generation has to be curtailed wastefully.</p><p>Since April 2022, the Government has been reviewing the Retail Electricity Market Arrangements, including considering ways to change our current single national pricing model to incentivise capacity to be built close to demand; or demand to be built near to supply.</p><p>In 2023, the regulator Ofgem commissioned research (“FTI: Assessment of Locational Based Pricing for Great Britain”) which looked at the lessons from the international case studies (e.g. Sweden, Norway and Australia as examples of pricing in regions aka “Zonal Pricing”; and US PJM &amp; Ercot, Germany, New Zealand, Singapore and Ontario Canada for pricing in local nodes aka “Nodal Pricing”). The report concluded that there is significant value in incentivising proximity between supply &amp; demand through either Zonal Pricing or the more granular Nodal Pricing.</p><p>Industry experts broadly agreed. But the experts also raised a few important implementation concerns: (i) that any transition not cause a hiatus in investment or increase the risk premium — particularly critical in keeping the costs down in capital intensive projects like renewables; and (ii) that it be possible to locate generating plant nearer customer demand (or move demand closer to sources of supply)… otherwise known as the elasticity of supply or demand to price signals.</p><p>On the first of these concerns, international case studies appeared to provide some comfort — no systematic hiatus in investment was seen in geographies that introduced more granular locational based pricing.</p><p>However it is notable that, <strong>in nearly every case study</strong>, the changes in regulation occurred during periods of normal, steady capacity growth. <strong>By contrast, the UK is facing the challenge of attracting an unprecedented level of investment to deliver clean power by the 2030’s and cannot afford any hiatus however small.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bh4BT3a_gGJxDUPPDn3wnw.png" /></figure><p>The second caveat is equally challenging for the UK in that wind and solar farms have typically been located where the quality of the renewable resources is optimal; there is land or seabed available; and the planning consent is feasible!</p><p>In most cases (but not all) demand centres are located based on different criteria (e.g. proximity to London’s Financial Services hub or the M4 Tech Corridor) and have limited flexibility in their location.</p><p>These conclusions are supported by recent UK Energy Research Centre<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> modelling that showed higher strike prices in auctions (£20/MWh) and higher consumer bills if zonal pricing is introduced before transmission constraints are resolved. The Scottish Deputy First Minister similarly warned that the introduction of zonal pricing would be “hugely challenging”<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> for both the Scottish renewables sector and for consumer bills.</p><p>As a result, DESNZ had to indicate that it would look at ways to protect investors in AR7 from any introduction of Zonal Pricing — effectively conceding that there is indeed hiatus/pricing risk in the introduction of a new market mechanism.</p><p>The final challenge in moving away from national pricing mechanism is that, by definition, the policy would create distributional effects — some people would pay less for their power; others would pay more — and in the wake of the Russia induced energy crisis, there is NO appetite for any further increases in electricity bills, even if for a subset of customers.</p><p>While the current market mechanisms might not be theoretically optimal, changing them at the current time would take time to bed in and create uncertainty for investors. And when the UK needs a tsunami of investment in its energy system, <strong>now is NOT the right timing for a change</strong>!</p><h3>Challenge #3: Who will build it?</h3><p>The UK offshore wind market presents a series of conundrums.</p><p>First conundrum — although the UK dominated global offshore wind in the late 2010’s with around third to a half of installed capacity (and it still second after China with 18%), the developers and supply chains of UK offshore wind farms have typically been outside of the UK, primarily the Nordics and Germany — albeit in recent competitions, the government has been keen to increase local content.</p><p>Second conundrum — the nature of the UK capacity auctions have favoured scale. The upfront costs of auction bidding and the ever-increasing scale of the wind farms required to be competitive have meant that a handful of large companies have come to dominate the UK market: Orsted (29%); SSE/Equinor (25%); Scottish Power (16%); RWE (12%); OceanWinds (12%) and Vattenfall (7%). On the other hand, the benefit of this scale has been to drive prices down from £117/MWh in 2014 to below £40/MWh in 2019.</p><p>The challenge is even more acute if you look in the supply chains. Turbines was split between Siemens Gamesa and Vestas Offshore before GE Renewable Energy was selected for Dogger Bank. Blades, towers, monopiles, jackets, cabling, substations and installation vessels are all highly consolidated. Again a few scale players enables huge cost savings and has contributed to the rapid economic tipping point being achieved in offshore wind. But when capacity needs to increase rapidly the chain is only as strong as its weakest link… and currently, the UK needs to increase offshore wind deployment by over 6x.</p><p>Third conundrum — all of this depends on capital — and a lot of it! To-date investors have spent around £50 billion constructing the 15GW of UK offshore wind and, depending on your inflation and learning assumptions, perhaps another £60–80 billion is required to build the additional 28–35GW required by 2030 with a further £60 billion in interconnection.</p><p>This investment has the potential to create large number of jobs in the green economy if the content is localised but the UK will still need to compete for those private sector funds against all the other countries around the world facing similar national imperatives to scale their electricity systems.</p><p>But here’s the rub: the recent “no bidders” in Auction Round 5 (AR5) and the withdraw of Orsted from the Hornsea 4 wind project both highlight how vulnerable the UK’s plans are to a small number of large suppliers — and the global pressures on supply chain costs, interest rates and interconnection risks.</p><h3>So what should the UK do?</h3><p>The scale of this challenge is unprecedented… and we need an approach that fit for purpose. This is where policy, investment and industrial strategy must work hand-in-hand.</p><p>If we are serious about the energy transition and the industrial opportunities that come from it then we must treat it not as just another infrastructure project but as a true national strategic mission.</p><p>Think wartime mobilisation of the industrial complex, rather than a peacetime infrastructure project like HS2.</p><p>Think mobilise for a global pandemic, rather than reform of the NHS.</p><p>In these moments in history, the success of the mission depends on five things.</p><h3>1. Recognise the scale of the challenge</h3><p><strong>We are not on track. </strong>Even under aggressive growth scenarios, we are falling behind. And every day we spend “optimising” a plan that hasn’t yet been delivered is a day lost.</p><p>Instead, we need to acknowledge this energy transition as a national strategic priority and grasp it. We need to mobilise national and local government, industry and the public to execute on the plan.</p><h3>2. Agree a plan — and stick to it</h3><p>As Churchill once said, “However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results”.</p><p>In the UK, we’ve known for years what’s required: massive deployment of solar, onshore and offshore wind, plus large-scale interconnection. Every review — whether from the CCC, DESNZ, or National Grid — has said the same thing.</p><p>So instead of debating the merits of different market pricing rules, we need to lock in on a single strategic spatial plan and “deploy, deploy, deploy”.</p><p>It won’t be perfect… but it will get close enough!</p><h3>3. Organise for speed</h3><p>This is all about leadership. It has to start and remain at the very top — and not be delegated down into the machinery of government. It has to be a whole of government: beyond Energy &amp; Security into Treasury, Business, Housing, Devolved &amp; Local Government. Everyone needs the same plan and to be marching to the same tune.</p><p>We saw this during the run-up to COP26. Glasgow represented a pivotal moment in time when the UK’s Net Zero Strategy would receive the scrutiny of the world at the UNFCCC global stocktake.</p><p>The Net Zero Strategy achieved this by being an integrated national plan, with sub-strategies in every department and every sector of the economy, adding up to the same pathway to net zero. It was about energy security as well as cost and sustainability. And it was integrated into Spending Review discussions as it impacted economic as well as energy policy. This was achieved by the Prime Minister, in partnership with the then BEIS Secretary of State, taking the helm at the monthly review meetings.</p><p>It also means operating in a more integrated way between government, investors and industry. “Mission Control” led by Chris Stark, previous CEO of the Climate Change Committee, has the mandate to work across government to deliver this mission — and the acid test will be whether they have the heft to blow through the walls of government departmental silos or (apparently) conflicting and changing government priorities. It will also be critical to have investors and industry inside the delivery tent to ensure fast feedback loops.</p><p>In the final reckoning this is about making Britain a clean energy superpower and turbo-charging economic growth (as in China)… to help pay for all the other missions including the reforms to health, education, childcare and criminal justice systems.</p><h3>4. Streamline planning and grid infrastructure build out</h3><p>Just as “policing by consent” is a core principle in UK law enforcement, so it is with Planning. On the one hand, we have economic and climate imperatives to deliver on the energy transition. On the other hand, we are a sea-locked set of nations with limited land resources that are highly competed. This makes Planning a highly contentious issue between Central Government and Local Communities.</p><p>In March 2025, the Government submitted its “Planning &amp; Infrastructure Bill” to Parliament. It aims to address some of the legacy issues in planning: it aims for faster consents for critical infrastructure; empowering strategic decision making; boosting planning capacity; accelerating clean energy projects; and enhancing community benefit and acceptance. These are highly laudable objectives but, in correcting decades-old planning failings, the Bill is not without its critics.</p><p>The criticisms are in 4 main areas: (i) it rolls back Environmental Protections substantially; (ii) it delegates power to central government where the details are “tbd” in subsequent legislation; (iii) it trades off efficiency for local democratic input; and (iv) it doesn’t explicitly align with the nature and climate priorities (e.g. the Carbon Budgets).</p><p>But the most significant open question is whether it is revolutionary enough. The Tony Blair Institute argued that a decade long planning process needs to be reduced by 80% if objectives like Clean Power by 2030 have any hope of being achieved<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a>.</p><p>Streamlined planning and grid infrastructure build out are pivotal to delivering Clean Power by 2030. As Parliament debates the Planning Bill, it is worth asking whether we are going far and fast enough: whilst changes to Nationally Strategic Infrastructure Plans (NSIPs) and bill discount schemes for communities along power lines are moves in the right direction are they enough to get the job done?</p><p>We should look again at international benchmarks. Like Denmark which is the “gold standard” for community participation and profit sharing in renewables projects, transforming the debate from “us and them” to “we’re in this together”. Or Germany where federal government works with states (Länder) to agree Federal Requirements Plan (Bundesbedarfsplan) for electricity grids that ensure nationally strategic infrastructure plans are aligned right down to the local plans.</p><h3>#5 Unlock Investment and Supply Chain Capacity</h3><p>Delivering a clean power system of twice the size in under 6 years will require an unprecedented surge in capital, equipment and skilled labour.</p><p>On the workforce challenges alone, Bain research<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a> showed that nearly 4 million workers will need re-skilling for the future fast growth clean economy. And the capital requirements (£60–80 billion required for renewable generation and a further £60 billion for interconnection) need to be financed by UK not overseas green finance. With scale manufacturing facilities — for turbines, blades, cabling etc — built in the UK both to deliver on our domestic build out but also to export those products and services globally.</p><p>Again this is a whole of government imperative. DESNZ needs to provide the clarity on the spatial plan, the stable pipeline of wind auctions and the delivery of interconnection to give investors the confidence to scale their supply chains locally. Treasury and the FCA/TPR needs to continue to encourage UK pensions funds — to augment overseas pension and infrastructure funds — to finance the solar &amp; wind farms as well as the supply chains. The Department of Education and Industry need to work to enable the training of the workforce of engineers, project managers, and construction workers (as well as the electric vehicle technicians and domestic heat pump engineers).</p><h3>Final Thought</h3><p>This is not about the scale of our ambition. The UK has plenty of that. This is about <strong>delivery at scale, under huge time pressure, with equally enormous capital requirements</strong>.</p><p>A perfect plan on paper fails if engineers, offshore workers, turbines, blades, cables or ships aren’t available; or if interconnection is tied up in the courts for decades. The 2030 vision is all about the literal nuts and bolts of delivery — money, manufacturing, and manpower.</p><p>History won’t judge us by the quality of our plans and market reform consultations. It will judge us by how fast we built, how much we delivered, and how well we sustained investor trust to do it.</p><blockquote><em>Unless indicated otherwise, the views expressed in posts here are my own, and not those of Bain &amp; Company, Guernsey Electricity, Nyobolt or the Cambridge Centre for Better Futures.</em></blockquote><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <a href="https://ukerc.ac.uk/publications/zonal-pricing-volume-risk-and-2030-clean-power-target-working-paper/">UKERC: “Zonal Pricing, Volume Risk and the 2030 Clean Power Target” (Mar 2025)</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a><a href="https://on.ft.com/4iyT0VY"> FT: “Zonal pricing could undermine Scottish energy sector, warns Forbes” (25 Apr 2025)</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> <a href="https://institute.global/insights/economic-prosperity/building-the-future-of-britain-a-new-model-for-national-infrastructure">Tony Blair Institute: “Building the Future of Britain: A New Model for National-Infrastructure Planning” (June 2023)</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> <a href="https://www.bain.com/insights/accelerating-together-how-the-uk-workforce-can-get-net-zero-done/">Bain: Accelerating Together: How the UK Workforce Can Get Net Zero Done (Jan 2024)</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cc9e490a2b41" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Powering The Transition: Delivering Clean Power by 2030 (-ish) - part 1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@julian_critchlow/powering-the-transition-delivering-clean-power-by-2030-ish-part-1-8156b8987ac4?source=rss-60a56b2ec20d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8156b8987ac4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[renewable-energy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy-transition]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[industrial-revolution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[poweringthefuture]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Julian Critchlow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 29 May 2025 12:36:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-06-06T13:38:48.395Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>In my last </em><a href="https://medium.com/p/1b2a3acb8077"><em>article</em></a><em>, I looked at the changes that would be required to deliver the UK’s Carbon Budgets and Net Zero by 2050. Front and centre amongst the imperatives is for the UK to decarbonise and grow the electricity system as the core enabler of decarbonised transport, homes and businesses. <br> <br> Just as the first Industrial Revolutions was powered by a disruptive energy transitions to coal/steam in 1800’s, today the UK faces another fundamental energy revolution: delivering clean power by 2030.</em></p><p><em>In my next 2 articles, I will look at what is driving the transition and the 3 key challenges to delivering a clean electricity system, namely: what to build; where to build it; and who to build it? Finally I will look at what policy makers and industry can do to make it happen.</em></p><p><em>To start with, I will look at the economic context for this energy transition and what a future clean electricity system needs to look like.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OjtzWCI0y39lcaTyXBAydA.png" /></figure><h3>The role of Clean Electricity in the UK energy system</h3><p>The first Industrial Revolution (c. 1760–1840) was built on the back of an energy transition — coal and steam — and the UK invested early and very profitably in the new cities &amp; factories, alongside the rail &amp; sea infrastructure to transport and trade the products globally. Over the 100 years of the Industrial Revolution, the UK roughly doubled its national investment rate, redeploying its workforce from the fields to the factories and nearly trebling the GDP growth rate and productivity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3Lv93kjlib4qrE4DASkdAg.png" /></figure><p>When President Xi came to power in 2012, he saw the exact same opportunity in the clean energy transition to transform the China industrial economy and used the 13th &amp; 14th Five Year Plans to double down on the emerging technologies of solar panels, wind turbines, batteries and their supply chains. He used the large domestic market to kick start the transition off fossil fuels, investing in renewable generation capacity, the electricity grid and the electrification of high-speed rail and cars.</p><p>The scale deployment of these technologies drove costs inexorably down through scale and experience, allowing China to export these technologies globally — just as the UK had done in the First Industrial Revolution. Clean energy has contributed up to 40% of China’s economic growth<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a>, allowing China to achieve dominant positions in many of the key sectors.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DktftGMiBLExv4GY77gWEw.png" /></figure><p>China has now accelerated past the US, Europe and the UK in its electrification<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a>. The UK is set to follow over the next 25 years, transforming a system that is ~20% electricity; ~40% gas and ~40% oil to one that is 70% powered by electricity in 2050; supplemented by hydrogen, ammonia and other synthetic fuels; and a small amount of fossil fuels abated through Carbon Capture &amp; Storage (CCS).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/814/1*ijawGmT81bzwjPd8AMgB-A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/857/1*_wcPFAMps0JHSht_7Dzvsw.png" /></figure><p>This is not, any more than it was in China, a pursuit of the goal of “net zero” at any costs — but instead a recognition that this clean energy revolution is already at the economic tipping point for electricity generation and for transport — with heating &amp; cooling and many industrial applications to follow. Moreover the global energy crisis precipitated by Russia’s war in Ukraine has reinforced all nation’s focus on delivering secure energy, with renewables increasingly as the “silver bullet” for the energy trilemma as it offers secure, low cost, clean energy.</p><h3>How does this transition compare to the past?</h3><p>Let’s be clear — energy transitions are nothing new for the UK electricity system which has reinvented itself many times over the last 100 years!</p><p>In the 1950–60’s, the recently nationalised electricity system invested heavily in coal and oil generating plants, supplemented by the early civil nuclear stations. During the 1970’s as the global oil crisis crippled the UK, the nuclear fleet expanded steadily to supply baseload electricity and forced oil generation up the merit order to focus on the few peakiest days. Then post privatisation in the late 1980’s, the electricity system saw another wave of investment with the “dash for gas”, taking advantage of the plentiful UK Continental Shelf natural gas reserves and creating a competition between the “dark” (coal) and “spark” (gas) spreads.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*I7Uwz9v-exSk6hTPnBne4g.png" /></figure><p>More recently since the start of the new millenium, renewables — primarily onshore wind and solar — have begun to creep onto the system but it wasn’t until 2014 when offshore wind auctions using “contracts for difference (CfD)” forced price down precipitously that offshore wind could finally take off and contribute to relegating coal generation to the history books.</p><p>But none of these transformations comes even close to what we are facing today. We are looking to take the energy system and economy that took a hundred years to build and transform it in less than 30 years. This lighting transition raises 3 fundamental challenges: what to build, where to build and who to build it.</p><h3>Challenge #1: What to build?</h3><p>The good news is that we are increasingly clear on what a future secure, clean and lowest cost electricity system should look like. This is non-trivial statement — as technology costs aren’t determined by local policy decisions but depend on the rate of global deployment of each technology to drive the costs down to parity with existing power sources.</p><p>To forecast an optimal future energy system, you first need to forecast global deployment of each potential technology — and as we all know, it is tough to make predictions, especially about the future!</p><p>For the last 20 years, the IEA has assembled the “stated policies” for the deployment of renewables — wind and solar — and every year without fail the new forecasts are higher than the previous year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*b1fW7K65RPMT9Fate7BLiw.png" /></figure><p>As a result of higher deployment, costs fall faster than previously projected. Which in turn feeds back into higher deployment for future years.</p><p>Today in nearly all geographies, we have passed the economic tipping point, where the best policy decision is always the right renewables since these will be cheaper than all conventional thermal plants (92.5% of net new capacity is renewables in 2024!<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a>)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q-X28mA8R-3FzGUJehXvZw.png" /><figcaption>Source: IRENA Renewable Capacity Highlights (26 March 2025)</figcaption></figure><p>As a result of declining renewables costs, the National Energy System Operator (NESO) was able to work out two scenarios for clean power in 2030 where unabated gas generation was less than 5% of the mix. The scenarios differ slightly in how they meet the peak demand: with one (“Further Flex and Renewables”) relying on batteries, demand response (e.g. smart EV charging) and long duration storage; and the other (“New Dispatch”) adding 2.7GW of new clean dispatchable power (hydrogen or gas with CCS).</p><p>But as the Figure 15 from the NESO report shows[4], the future systems are more the same than different.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nwCSCIcQk3-xhWFwa_gymA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XWoEK8mOuXiANy3LPWcx6Q.png" /></figure><p>This future electricity system is, however, very different from today’s. First after years of slow decline due to energy efficiency, power demand is 11% larger by 2030, as electricity increasingly powers the economy. Second renewable power has nearly fully substituted for today’s gas generation. Finally — and most importantly — the 2030 electricity system is <strong>TWICE</strong> the capacity of today’s.</p><p><strong><em>Technology Detour: Dispatchable backup — Hydrogen Gas Turbine vs Gas Turbine + Carbon Capture</em></strong></p><p><em>With no sense of schadenfreude, another German phrase has begun to enter the energy lexicon — Dunkelflaute. Strictly translated as “dark doldrums” dunkelflaute are periods of low sunlight and wind which, although infrequent, can last for a matter of weeks. During these periods, the electricity system requires “dispatchable backup” i.e. plant and associated fuel that can be instructed to generate to fill the gap left by dormant renewables.<br> <br>Today the backup and peaking role is performed by efficient Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGTs) and the gas is “stored” in either fields/pipelines or in LNG cargoes. In the future, the carbon emitted by these turbines could be abated through Carbon Capture &amp; Sequestration (CCS) technology (“post combustion carbon capture”) with the CO2 transportation and storage being provided by the Track 1 Carbon Capture projects in the north-west (Hynet) and north-east (Teeside &amp; Humber) clusters. However carbon capture equipment would either need to be retrofitted to the power plants or built into new plants.</em></p><p><em>There are two implications for the system: Carbon Capture equipment is capital intensive; and it reduces the efficiency of the power station. Therefore the ideal operating environment would be to run the plants continuously or at high utilisation operations — to maximise efficiency and leverage the high capital investment. Unfortunately (but fortunately for renewables), Dunkelflaute’s are low frequency occurrences so not ideally suited to Gas Turbines + Carbon Capture.</em></p><p><em>The alternative is to remove the CO2 “pre-combustion” by creating blue hydrogen from methane in a Steam Methane Reformer (SMR) or by generating green hydrogen through electrolysis. This hydrogen can then be stored in salt caverns and burnt in a hydrogen ready CCGT when required. The end-to-end thermal efficiency of this process can be less than a Gas Turbine + Carbon Capture but the capital cost can be a lot less if the production and storage of hydrogen is required for other purposes (e.g. high grade heat) in the economy.</em></p><p><em>In practice, the dispatchable power source that we use will depend on timing. Early doors retrofitting Carbon Capture to Gas Turbines is likely to be the most expedient until hydrogen production &amp; storage is plentiful — which will in turn depend upon other uses such as industry and blending.</em></p><p>Let’s put all this new capacity into some historical context. In the last 9 decades, the maximum capacity that we have ever added is <strong>30GW</strong> in a single 10 year period. Yet in this decade, we need to add <strong>126GW</strong> of new capacity. And we are already 5 years into that decade, adding only <strong>~11GW</strong>, leaving a (mere) <strong>115GW</strong> to add in the next 5 years.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*96WULu2bG-ga3v3FpN7y-w.png" /></figure><p>So with this increasing clarity on what we need to build, in my next article I will look at where the new capacity is built and who we need to build it, as well as the implications for policymakers and investors.</p><blockquote><em>Unless indicated otherwise, the views expressed in posts here are my own, and not those of Bain &amp; Company, Guernsey Electricity, Nyobolt or the Cambridge Centre for Better Futures.</em></blockquote><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-clean-energy-was-top-driver-of-chinas-economic-growth-in-2023/">CarbonBrief: Clean energy was top driver of China’s economic growth in 2023 (Jan 2024)</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <a href="https://on.ft.com/3F4QFol">FT: How Xi sparked China’s electricity revolution (12 May 2025)</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <a href="https://www.irena.org/Data/Downloads/Tools">IRENA: StatsTool (10th April 2025)</a></p><p>[4] <a href="https://www.neso.energy/publications/clean-power-2030">NESO: Clean Power 2030</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8156b8987ac4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The CCC’s advice on 7th Carbon Budget — time for a pivot?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@julian_critchlow/the-cccs-advice-on-7th-carbon-budget-time-for-a-pivot-1b2a3acb8077?source=rss-60a56b2ec20d------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1b2a3acb8077</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[decarbonisation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[energy-transition]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Julian Critchlow]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2025 17:45:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-26T17:45:37.089Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The CCC’s advice on 7th Carbon Budget — time for a pivot?</h3><p><strong><em>In 2018, after over 30 years with Bain working with energy businesses, I left and joined the UK Civil Service as the Director General responsible for UK climate action</em></strong><em>. The next 3 years were some of the most professionally and personally rewarding of my career, encompassing the turbulent times of Brexit, a General Election and the global Covid pandemic. I remain in awe of the passionate, public servants that I had the pleasure of working alongside.</em></p><p><strong><em>Then on this day, exactly 4 years ago, I retired from the Civil Service.</em></strong></p><p><em>My final meeting on my final Friday involved a Cabinet discussion of the 6th Carbon Budget informed by the advice from the Climate Change Committee (CCC) in the previous December. In June 2021, the UK laid into law a global leading (and Paris-aligned) 78% reduction by 2035, throwing down the gauntlet to the parties in COP26 in Glasgow in October/November 2021.</em></p><p><em>Roll on 5 years and the carbon budgeting cycle is back — with the CCC recently publishing its advice on the 7th Carbon Budget (2038–2042) recommending an 87% reduction on 1990 or 535MtCO2e for the period, including aviation and shipping. The Government is required to respond by June 2026 with the level that it recommends alongside the detailed plan to deliver.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/748/1*Nfq5e6oNmZ7Km4qPC-VnGg.png" /><figcaption>Source: Climate Change Committee “The Seventh Carbon Budget” (Feb 2025)</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>So what has changed in the CCC advice in the last 5 years?</strong></h3><p>Back in 2021, the 6th Carbon Budget was revolutionary, bending the UK emissions curve to align with the Paris Agreement and deliver net zero by 2050 and reinforcing the UK global leadership on climate. Although that budget covered a period more than a decade out, it could only be delivered through significant near term action and so (just) ahead of COP26 in Glasgow, the UK published the UK Net Zero Strategy, a comprehensive and integrated set of policies to deliver the carbon budgets all the way to 2050, with a host of detailed decarbonization strategies in all the major sectors of the economy.</p><p>In 2025, the CCC, led by Piers Forster and Emma Pinchbeck, has once again published a comprehensive 394-page analysis of the optimum pathway to net zero by 2050, reinforcing the CCC’s global reputation for robust, independent analysis.</p><p>The key headlines are important: the cost of delivering net zero has fallen, once again, to 0.2% of GDP and savings will exceed investments as early as 2040. Pathways have also become clearer over the last 5 years as global deployment of key technologies has accelerated, allowing the CCC to present a single Balanced Pathway scenario e.g. underlining the role of electrification in home heating; and the use of hydrogen/CCS in industry.</p><p>As the <a href="https://climate.leeds.ac.uk/review-of-the-cccs-7th-carbon-budget-by-the-climate-evidence-unit/">Leeds Priestley Centre for Climate Futures</a> points out, the CCC Balanced Pathway includes some implicit choices. For instance, modal shifts to public transport, cycling and walking remain modest with the primary mitigation being electrification of road transport. Similarly dietary changes and aviation demand management are kept relatively restrained, reflecting Chris Stark’s statement as the previous CEO of the CCC that under net zero “you can fly off on holiday and eat steak”.</p><p><strong>Overall the advice is pragmatic and consistent with the advice 5 years ago on the 6th Carbon Budget — and therein lies the challenge.</strong></p><h3><strong>Today’s challenge is not in the “what we do?” but in the “how we do it?”</strong></h3><p>The hard work to deliver a Paris aligned pathway to net zero is firmly in the “here and now”. If you achieve the momentum required to hit the 2035 target then it should be relative “downhill” to the 2040, 2045 and 2050 net zero (excuse the metaphor!). Unless something changes dramatically in the global deployment of the fundamental technologies, the advice on the 8th Carbon Budget should look much like the 7th, which has a strong resemblance to the 6th!</p><p><strong>Today the focus is pivoting from “what to do”, to “how to make it happen fast enough”.</strong></p><p>In 2019 when the legislation for Net Zero by 2050 was laid, the Cabinet Secretary, Mark Sedwill, recognized that climate action was an “all of government” priority so asked me to lead a Climate National Strategy Implementation Group (NSIG) to implement the cross-government governance to ensure the climate actions happened.</p><p>Although the BEIS Secretary of State (now DESNZ) was nominally responsible in the 2008 Climate Change Act for delivering the Carbon Budgets, most issues crossed department silos: for instance, electrification of road transport was an issue for the car industry, electricity generators and networks, integrated transport plans, emergency services vehicles and air quality amongst others — so involved many departments, such as DfT, DESNZ and DHSC amongst others. Home heating involved energy efficiency and low carbon heating systems (DESNZ), and building regulations, new homes targets and planning reform (DLUHC).</p><p>Today the UK is grappling with the energy transition in parallel to a range of macro-economic transitions cascading over the global economy: including tariffs/de-globalisation of supply chains; changing demographics; tightening capital; automation of work; and AI/digital fundamentally challenging the historic definitions of many jobs.</p><h3><strong>To prosper in this incredibly fast-moving macro environment, all governments must work in an integrated, one-government way, not in silos.</strong></h3><p>The CCC has a key role to play in convening this integrated thinking. Let me illustrate with a few examples that go beyond the cross-government governance on climate:</p><ul><li><strong><em>Integrated Fiscal and Economic implications</em></strong>: The Treasury Net Zero Review (2021) highlighted a range of major issues: the loss of fuel tax and North Sea revenues; the need for a “just transition” incorporating generational and household distributional effects; the impact of energy prices and carbon border adjustments on industrial competitiveness; the investment in adaptation for physical climate risks; and the economic growth opportunities. But it is not just the end state that raises big questions — the journey there brings its own equally complex challenges. <br> <br>Take Electric Vehicles for example: Norway has led the world in transition to EVs with 88.9% of new vehicles sold in 2024 being fully electric. As the share of petrol or diesel cars in the estate falls, so does fuel duty creating a fiscal challenge. But there are also supply chain issues — in Norway petrol stations have seen the writing on the wall and have been closing faster that the decline in combustion cars. Soon “range anxiety” in Norway will fall on the petrol or diesel car owner, not the electric vehicle driver! <br> <br>During the transition, all governments will face tricky decisions on how and whether to maintain historic energy infrastructure whilst new energy canabilises it — in the case of road transport, whether to subsidise the remaining petrol/diesel supply chains so that the last non-electric vehicles can continue to move around; or whether to bite the bullet and introduce scrappage schemes to accelerate their demise.<br> <br>The last industrial revolution showed that an energy transition is not just a “ripple in the economic pond”, but a tsunami that wipe out everything before it.</li><li><strong><em>Infrastructure and Planning roadmap: </em></strong>The struggles that the UK has had delivering high speed rail will look like building a Hornby train set compared to what is required to deliver the energy transition. One of the less remarked upon aspects of the UK Net Zero Strategy (2021) is that it assumes decarbonization can be achieved at the same accelerated rate in every sector of the economy in parallel. Not renewables; then cars; then homes; then industry; then agriculture. All at the same time! <br><br>Imagine digging up every street in the UK to enable EV charging and then coming back in a few year’s time to dig it up again to electrifying heating. This will not only raise costs, miss the targets but also alienate voters. Casting our minds back to the most recent consumer mini-energy transition — the UK’s conversion to Natural Gas — it took over a decade (1967–77) despite all the Gas Boards being State owned and this transition is an order of magnitude more complex — across all parts of the economy, at the same time. <br> <br>The scale of the challenge is easily illustrated if you look at the numbers behind the NESO Clean Power 2030. Since the 1940’s we have never built more than 30GW in a single decade and yet we need to build 126GW in the 2020’s to hit the NESO Clean Power 2030 plan -and we are already half-way through that decade!</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KUIgIqxjcWM90qWyaNyEsw.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong><em>Just Transition and Green Skills:</em></strong> The energy transition offers an unparalleled investment opportunity, with the CCC calculating £670 billion needs to be deployed by 2050. saving £562 billion in operating costs. <a href="https://www.bain.com/insights/accelerating-together-how-the-uk-workforce-can-get-net-zero-done/">Bain recently estimated this investment will create 400–500,000 new jobs</a> but require the reskilling of nearer 4 million workers or 1-in-8 of the UK workforce. To put this into context, at the start of the Miner’s Strike, 40 years ago last year, there were around 187,000 miners in coal mining.<br> <br>Similar to the NHS Long Term Workforce Plan, we need a UK Long Term Workforce Plan that takes the “Industrial”/Economic Growth strategic priorities and turns them into the resources and skills required to deliver; and then integrates those into the action plans in departments as diverse as DFE, DBT and HO (for prioritisation within migration policy).<br> <br>And critically we need to ensure that is more “just” and does not leave the societal scars that still can be felt in those mining communities.</li><li><strong><em>Economic Growth Strategy:</em></strong> In the coming weeks, the Government is due to publish its “Industrial Strategy” to (hopefully) re-start economic growth. But when 80% of your economy is in Services, re-industrialisation is only a small part of the solution. .<br> <br>Where the UK built a globally leading financial centre on the back of the industrial revolution, globalization and deregulation, there is a similar once-in-a-generation opportunity to double down on the back of the energy and AI/digital transitions. <br> <br>Again this requires a “one-government” approach, encompassing DBT (for business and industry); HMT (for the competitiveness of financial services); infrastructure departments like DESNZ, DFT and DLUHC; departments like DSIT for AI regulation; MOJ for the efficient operation of the Courts; and regulatory bodies like the FRC — all of whom will impact key service sectors like UK Professional Business Services.</li></ul><p><strong>In its advice on Carbon Budget 7, the CCC has provided a compelling economic, environmental and national security case for powering ahead to deliver net zero. It has strengthened its recommendations on “what we need to do”. Now our collective focus needs to pivot to “how to make it happen” — at unprecedented speed!</strong></p><p>I will come back to these themes in future posts.</p><blockquote><em>Unless indicated otherwise, the views expressed in posts here are my own, and not those of Bain &amp; Company, Guernsey Electricity, Nyobolt or the Cambridge Centre for Better Futures.</em></blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1b2a3acb8077" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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