Risk situation for LinkedIn during its expansion to China in 2014

When LinkedIn decided to enter China in 2014, there was already a precedent of other major American technology firms failing in the same endeavor. In 2010, Google pulled out of the Chinese market after refusing government censorship requests; this followed Facebook and Twitter’s 2009 banning after its purported usage in anti-government protests[1]. At the time, it became clear that compliance with governmental requests was the primary barrier for any tech firm to do business in China. (Uber, the first major Western tech company to be outright outcompeted by domestic firms in China, would not exit until two years later in 2016[2].)

Direct compliance opens a whole new can of worms, too- for example, the government requires internet firms to store data on Chinese users within servers physically in the country, which allows the government possible access to data on dissidents. Yahoo’s pulling out of China was driven by this specific clause- in 2002 and 2004, the Chinese government forced Yahoo to hand over emails belonging to two anti-government journalists, which resulted in their arrest and imprisonment[3]. The World Organization for Human Rights later successful sued Yahoo on this matter in 2007, resulting in an undisclosed settlement. Morally, this means that tech firms complying with the Chinese government must be willing to compromise on the ideals of freedom and transparency that many are founded upon- at a grander scale, this (rightfully, in my opinion) erodes trust back ‘home’ (USA/Europe), where these same liberties are taken for granted. (If Google didn’t pull out of China and went along with censorship, a Western consumer may think to themselves- ‘this same censorship may happen here too!’.) Financially, this means that if a certain incident ‘crosses the line’ (so to speak) and forces a company out of China, it would likely take a loss on prior investment in the country (ex. data centers, staff).

Since the moral and financial risks are intertwined here, it’s important for a Western technology firm to carefully consider its own risk appetite and moral standing (on the human rights issue of being an internet company in China) before entering the Chinese market.

Steps taken by LinkedIn to address risk

Given the risk context explained in the previous section, LinkedIn took the surprising (relative to precedence) stance of full government compliance even in the face of angering its Western userbase; this was a direct shift from companies like Google, Twitter and Facebook, which preferred leaving the Chinese market to compromising on core corporate/product values of transparency and freedom. The major part of this compliance meant three things: censorship of information, removal of certain features, and partially giving up control of the expansion through a forced joint venture.

Censorship wise, LinkedIn agreed to block politically-sensitive (more likely to mean anti-Communist Party) posts from being viewed on either the Chinese-language or English-language sites in mainland China. In 2014, LinkedIn said that their enforcement process was to notify users through email that their ‘posted item contains content prohibited in China’[4]- it’s unclear whether that only applies to China-based users or all global ones, and also if LinkedIn is taking the further step of providing the government with names and information of offenders (which may lead to another horrible Yahoo situation). Although this system seems to be working (as further elaborated in the section below- LinkedIn’s growth in China has been successful since launch), many worldwide users have experience gripes and bugs due to the firm’s seemingly overwhelming compliance to the degree of sacrificing usability for non-Chinese users. For example, early in LinkedIn China’s release many global users found that their posts were censored globally due to them not being ‘acceptable’ for the specific Chinese market- although LinkedIn immediately fixed the issue, it raises the previously described question of the firm’s compromising of Western freedoms to appease the Chinese government. Similarly, the same issue happened to global users who marked their work location as within China (despite not actually living there); although (I’m biased here, given my background in software engineering) LinkedIn probably didn’t mean for that to happen since the issue itself was likely due to a software implementation bug, it still raises the question of selective enforcement. If LinkedIn isn’t drawing a clear line on what and where it is censoring material, where is that secret line now? What if LinkedIn decides to take a leaf out of China’s book and start censoring anti-LinkedIn posts on the platform?

Alongside censorship of user-generated material, LinkedIn also agreed to restrict Chinese users from joining/creating groups and creating long-form posts on the platform. The former is a rather obvious restriction on the freedom of assembly, which is legally suppressed in China[5]- LinkedIn’s agreement makes sense given the precedent that Facebook was blocked following government activists’ usage to organize protests. Similarly, long-form articles have historically (including such famous examples like Martin Luther’s Ninety-five Theses and the United States’ Declaration of Independence) been used as a vehicle to enact change and convince people in some way- although LinkedIn is primarily a professional platform, it also makes sense for it to remove that feature to prevent Chinese users from airing grievances on an international scale (which LinkedIn’s network would allow). Overall, LinkedIn’s cooperation in media censorship and direct restriction of features makes sense, given the risk of user actions angering the Chinese government.

Finally, LinkedIn agreed to structure its Chinese subsidiary as a joint venture with two Chinese venture capital firms: China Broadband Capital and Sequoia Capital’s Chinese affiliate. Under their initial agreement, the two VCs held 7% of the entire venture, with an option to increase their stake to 28% in the future. This setup is disadvantageous to LinkedIn (I assume the VCs’ option to increase their stake is based on a successful launch of the venture- this system thus places the vast majority of risk on LinkedIn, not its domestic partners), but necessary for survival in China, as operating through a JV allows the firm to gain relative approval from the government.

LinkedIn China’s steps to limit risk obviously have downsides- on the censorship/restriction side it raises questions on the firm’s willingness to stand by Western freedoms in the face of the Chinese government, while the agreement to set up the venture as a JV limits possible financial profits. However, it seems that LinkedIn thinks the possible upside to entering the Chinese market is worth any global backlash it may face due to its relatively unique stance on full compliance with the Chinese government.

Current LinkedIn/China situation

Four years after LinkedIn initially entered the Chinese market, all signs have pointed towards general success. Out of the 140 million (2014 data point, but to my understanding hasn’t changed too much) professional workers in China, LinkedIn’s market share is a sizable 20 million (across all their products- English language site, Chinese language site, and Chitu), which sits at a healthy second place behind domestic firm Dajie’s 32 million. As China further urbanizes, globalizes and industrializes, that 140 million number of professionals increases, and so does the need for platforms to connect them- the future holds incredible upside for firms competing in this space, LinkedIn China included. However, LinkedIn China is still in a volatile position looking forward. This risk can be split into three main parts: previous risk that has existed since LinkedIn entered China, risk stemming from the Microsoft acquisition, and risk stemming from the changing economic and political climate of China.

First of all, the risk that LinkedIn carefully navigated when it first entered the Chinese market still exists. Although it’s rather clear that LinkedIn is willing to ‘play by the rules’ of the government even if said rules are against what the firm supports in Western markets (ex. freedoms of speech and assembly), there is no guarantee that this appeasement strategy will work out long term. If the Chinese government decides that LinkedIn is ‘bad for China’ in any way, it can take a wide range of seemingly unfair steps like straight up blocking of the website to refusing or delaying important permits for operation within the country. Similarly, the needs and wants of the government are volatile, too- for example, a new regulation requiring online job-posters to have verified identities (in a very genuine push to combat online fraud) caught LinkedIn by surprise, which had to take down that specific feature (job-posting) for individuals. Although these regulations obviously don’t only apply to LinkedIn, it is still at a disadvantage because domestic competitors may have better government guanxi (connections to officials, as explored in session 10- a major Western firm likely has more stringent ideals on what lines it does and doesn’t want to cross when navigating the Chinese guanxi-based system of doing business) and have already known about the change in advance, which would lead to a competitive advantage in the ever-changing internet landscape. It is dangerous for LinkedIn to rest on its laurels and assume that just because it hasn’t angered the government in the last four years it won’t happen in the future.

In the same vein, the acquisition of LinkedIn by Microsoft leads to both pros and cons, but the negatives can be especially dangerous in the overall Chinese climate. On the pros side, Microsoft is itself an established American tech firm in China- its Windows operating system has a 94% desktop OS market share in the country[6], which is incredibly high relative to its 80% hold in the USA. This is likely due to the high relative price of Apple computers in an emerging market such as China. Microsoft’s acquisition of LinkedIn will allow the professional network to be more integrated with existing Microsoft products, such as Windows and the Office suite of productivity software- this has already seen great success in other parts of the world[7], so this bundling will also likely increase LinkedIn usage in China. Outside of a purely product point of view, Microsoft also has a considerably larger investment in infrastructure in China, with the firm first entering in 1992, and today expanding to multiple offices and even a major research center (out of thirteen total, one of two outside of North America and Europe)[8]. Also, Microsoft has built five data centers in China[9], which support its growing Azure cloud computing business- although LinkedIn itself is not based on Azure, this shows Microsoft’s overall commitment to providing services, and cements the parent firm’s position as an important technology company within the country. If the Chinese government wants to drive LinkedIn out, it’ll be angering Microsoft in the process, too, which doesn’t seem like a good bet.

However, the negative part is that the opposite is true too- if Microsoft, which offers many dangerously (in terms of possible things that could go wrong) consumer facing products, does anything wrong, LinkedIn may be dragged into that same mess due to its association. For example, Microsoft found itself in hot waters from 2014 to 2016, when it was accused by the Chinese government of anticompetitive business practices (revolving around ending support for older versions of Windows and Office, many of which were used by Chinese organizations)[10]. The Chinese government isn’t bluffing, either- it raided Microsoft offices in China in 2014, and fined Qualcomm a whopping 975 million USD for similar anticompetitive issues. Regardless of how fair such accusations actually are, all firms are at the mercy of the Chinese government and any laws and regulations it lays out. Although Microsoft is similarly (to LinkedIn) fully cooperating within China, any reversal or pushback of that strategy may lead to troubles for LinkedIn, too. Being attached to the other major Western technology firm that is doing well in China isn’t necessary a good thing.

Finally, LinkedIn’s competitive advantage within the Chinese professional networking is based on domestic professionals’ want of Western opportunities, but this sentiment has changed (in both positive and negative directions) over the years. Although it’s likely true (based on the research I’ve seen in the linked articles) that Chinese workers are interested in higher paying, better quality jobs, these opportunities are no longer restricted to foreign countries as multinational corporations enter the Chinese market (and bring along new offices and a need for new staff). Similarly, the overall quality of living in China has improve greatly within the last decades- most Chinese are now content with their own career growth within the country, which can be seen by the recently decreasing rate of emigration[11] since the peak in around 2008. Although obviously the market for connecting Chinese professionals to foreign opportunities still exist, that need is lessened as the world comes to China instead. LinkedIn’s competitive advantage thus erodes a bit- Chinese users can turn to other platforms like Dajie that are more focused towards the domestic market. Since the government has made it abundantly clear that Western firms must adapt and play by China’s own rules if they want to do business in the country, it becomes a harder and harder sell to convince Chinese professionals to try foreign platforms when the same foreign companies and leaders are doing the opposite to cater to the Chinese market. For example, Hollywood has taken to marketing their latest blockbusters on platforms like Weibo (China’s version of Twitter), where Robert Downey Jr. made an account to promote Iron Man 3 in 2013[12]- this surprised Western journalist, since RDJ wasn’t even active on actual Western Twitter at the time. Why should Chinese move to foreign platforms when the West will be forced to come to China?

For the past thousands of years China has historically been the ‘middle kingdom’, a self-sufficient country that didn’t need to interface with the world because it itself was ahead on innovations and industry. Although China has waned in the past centuries, its incredible rise over the last few decades seems poised to place the country atop of the world once again. LinkedIn needs to assess why and how China wants to be connected professionally to the outside world as the country further globalizes, but also carefully understand the rising bubble of the domestic market. Nearly all American technology firms in China have failed- the first wave (Google, Yahoo, Twitter, Facebook etc) due to refusing governmental compliance, the second wave (notably Uber) being outcompeted by domestic firms. LinkedIn has to tread carefully into the future as it continues to do business in China.

[1] Washington Post article: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/07/AR2009070701162.html

[2] Uber CEO (at the time) Travis Kalanick’s announcement of Uber leaving China: https://www.uber.com/newsroom/uber-china-didi

[3] New York Times article: https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/08/business/worldbusiness/yahoo-helped-chinese-to-prosecute-journalist.html

[4] Page 3, on how LinkedIn is enforcing censorship: “To Reach China, LinkedIn Plays by Local Rules.” By PAUL MOZUR and Vindu Goel. The New York Times. October 5, 2014.

[5] Report by Freedom House, a major international human rights org: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-association-under-threat-new-authoritarians-offensive-against-civil-society/china

[6] Data based on website visits: http://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/all/china/2016

[7] 2018 q3 revenue breakdown: https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/26/17286900/microsoft-q3-2018-earnings-cloud-surface-linkedin-revenue

[8] Microsoft Research Centers: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/about/

[9] Azure Regions: https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/global-infrastructure/regions/

[10] New York Times article summarizing Microsoft’s legal troubles: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/business/international/microsoft-china-antitrust-inquiry.html

[11] Data from Migration Policy, a think tank focusing on international human movement: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM_Emigration-China-FINAL.pdf

[12] AdWeek article: https://www.adweek.com/digital/western-celebrities-on-sina-weibo/

Despite the current significance of aircraft carriers, I believe that in the near future they will be pushed into a marginal role because of new military innovations that jeopardize their safety defensively or obsolete their capabilities offensively. There are three main areas of inadequacy that make the aircraft carrier defensively obsolete: missile defense, submarine attacks, and protection against new offensive military technologies. Similarly, there are three major reasons why the carrier is offensively obsolete: the development of new military technologies that obsolete the carrier’s air wing, the possibility of moving command, control and communications (C3) capabilities to other naval vessels, and the development of other military systems that can replace the modern carrier group’s role as a quickly mobilized first response force. In this paper, I will analyze the effects of each innovation listed and also examine the reasons why countries continue to build new aircraft carriers despite their modern military shortcomings.

As a single ship, the aircraft carrier contains very few defensive capabilities outside of close-in weapons systems (CIWS) that are meant for destroying incoming missiles, but this weakness is supposed to be mitigated by the sole defensive nature of each carrier group’s supporting destroyers, cruisers and submarines. However, an internal investigation by the American Department of Defense (DoD) found that overall shipborne missile defense (in the form of the Aegis Combat System on American and other NATO ships) is inadequate against modern short range missiles (Department of Defense, 2010). Despite it using impressive modern technology like heat-seeking missiles and automated cannons that can destroy enemy missiles, another DoD report from 2011 found that the Aegis platform was too heavily reliant on automation and communication (through satellite/GPS tracking) for its success — the destruction of the overhead GPS network or a direct electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) against an American surface fleet would render it heavily vulnerable to attack (Department of Defense, 2011). Also, direct tracking systems (like the Aegis) are unable to separate decoy missiles from real ones (Department of Defense, 2011). If an enemy were to launch a significant number of missiles at once, the Aegis platform would be overwhelmed trying to shoot every single one down, and several actual threats would very likely pass the carrier group’s defensive support ships and possibly cripple the aircraft carriers, thus disabling the offensive capabilities of the entire fleet. Aircraft carriers operated by non-NATO nations (Russia, China, India etc.) likely have this weakness to anti-ship missiles, too. As more and more navies around the world invest in naval, land or air based anti-ship missile technology, this weakness among aircraft carriers can and will be more easily exploited, thus decreasing the safety of any carrier group at sea.

Similarly, the aircraft carrier has a glaring weakness to submarine attack. Modern submarines are quieter and harder to detect via sonar than before, while submarine detection and defense hasn’t innovated much in recent years — surface carrier groups are still heavily reliant on sonar to find submarines, and torpedoes (from surface ships and friendly submarines) and depth charges (from planes and helicopters) to either destroy or deter them. In multiple modern naval exercises, submarines have been able to get close enough to carrier groups to be able to take out aircraft carriers via torpedo, a fact photographically proven by the Canadian navy in 2007 (Axe, 2007). In non-exercise scenarios, a Chinese Song class diesel submarine surfaced undetected “within five miles” of the USS Kitty Hawk in 2006 (Gertz, 2006), a range well within that needed to score a direct torpedo or missile hit. Submarines also indirectly affect the movement and positioning of aircraft carriers, too — the new Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning is currently based at Qingdao (a well-protected port in the north of China) instead of Hainan (the closest Chinese naval base to the South China Sea) because Qingdao’s naval base provides better protection from United States or Japanese submarines. As an offensive tool, the submarine limits the usage of aircraft carriers (despite anti-submarine technology present in carrier groups), and even less technologically advanced ones (like the Chinese Song class) has been proven to be capable of crippling or destroying them in a wartime setting if one may arise.

The final defensive justification against aircraft carriers is the rise of new military technology that cannot be easily countered by current conventional defenses. The greatest modern threat is the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), the most well-known of which is the Chinese-developed DF-21D. ASBMs differ from current anti-ship missiles by following a ballistic trajectory that closely resembles that of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); they are launched from inland sites and travel to a high altitude before falling back to Earth to strike their targets. ASBMs cannot be easily destroyed by anti-missile defenses (such as the Aegis system on NATO ships), and can reach a range of up to 1700 kilometers (Fisher, 2016). Although unproven in combat, the operational range of ASBMs deters aircraft carriers from approaching enemy shores, while their ability to be launched from well inland protects them from airstrikes or missile attack. Although only China has developed and operates ASBMs right now, the Chinese DF-21D will likely be exported to other countries, thus limiting the usage of any aircraft carrier around the globe.

Offensively, the aircraft carrier’s main (and unique) role is to provide a platform to launch aircraft to support any military action. In the past, this role was extremely important because aircraft was the most versatile medium in which to engage in long distance warfare, whether that be flying conventional airstrikes and reconnaissance flights, securing aerial supremacy, or delivering a nuclear weapon. However, the development of new technologies means that there are more specialized options to replace aircraft for specific military roles.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones) can deliver similar payloads to conventional manned aircraft in the Air-to-Surface (ASM) offensive role (Allison, 2016), while decreasing the risk to airmen due to their unmanned nature. Also, drones can linger in a specific area to provide reconnaissance, while jet aircraft must make multiple sweeps due to their high speed, which increases their chance of getting shot down. Finally, drones can be launched and recovered by almost any class of modern warship, not just aircraft carriers (Patt, 2014), which allows for increased flexibility and autonomy in their wartime use if an aircraft carrier is not available for a certain military operation. Although drones are technologically less advanced and defensively more vulnerable than traditional jet aircraft, their cheaper price, larger numbers and increased flexibility more than justifies their use. Similarly, innovations in technology has made the missile a viable vehicle for both anti-air attacks and long range bombing. Current missiles are accurate enough (with the use of sensors and GPS) to hit moving jet aircraft, which reduces the need for specific aerial supremacy fighters. In the context of bombing, intercontinental and short range ballistic missiles have replaced the long range bomber — missiles respond faster to a crisis, and are also harder to detect and shoot down.

Although aircraft is still necessary for any modern day military campaign, the aircraft carrier is not necessarily required to support them. Modern day amphibious assault ships are capable of launching and retrieving short/vertical takeoff and landing (S/VTOL) aircraft (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2015), such as the new F-35 line. Because of the replacement of aircraft roles with other technologies and the capability of other ships to handle modern jet aircraft and drones, the aircraft carrier is unnecessary.

Alongside its specific military role, the aircraft carrier also currently acts as a flagship in most modern armadas, meaning it must handle command, control and communications (C3) capabilities for the entire fleet. Proponents of aircraft carriers suggest that no other ships have the survivability and resources to support the C3 role, but there have already been instances of dedicated command ships in the twenty-first century — the United States Blue Ridge class and Soviet/Russian Kapusta class ships are both purpose built to fill the C3 role in fleets today (Jane’s, 2000). Unlike aircraft carriers, these ships do not carry the bulk of each fleet’s offensive armament; the destruction of one in wartime will result in the loss of C3 capability only.

Finally, a major current role of the aircraft carrier is to lead the first response task force to any global conflict. Right now, it can take up to two weeks for a carrier to be recalled to base, restocked, and finally arrive at its target destination (Ayik, 1998). On the other hand, missiles (ballistic and cruise) launched from ships or submarines already at sea can arrive at any destination within hours, allowing the launching country to make a direct military impact almost immediately. This capability obsoletes the aircraft carrier as a first strike platform; by the time the carrier group arrives offshore days later, their target will already be destroyed.

Despite the many reasons why aircraft carriers are militarily obsolete, many countries still continue to design and build aircraft carriers; as an expensive and militarily unused technology, they are thus similar to nuclear weapons. in 1996, Scott D. Sagan describes the three major reasons for the continued development of nuclear weapons — military defense, domestic politics, and national identity (Sagan, 1996). This overarching framework can also be applied to the modern aircraft carrier. However, all three overarching reasons are based upon archaic foundations that do not apply to the twenty-first century. I will address the development and usage of aircraft carriers in all three of Sagan’s frameworks below.

Militarily, the aircraft carrier is obsolete defensively and offensively for reasons already given — there are better tools to accomplish the goal of national defense. However, the aircraft carrier is still used in military conflicts today as a long term force projection platform. A recent example is the Syrian Civil War, during which the United States, France and Russia based carriers in the Mediterranean Sea to launch airstrikes against different targets in Syria (Bandow 2016, O’Brien 2016). Military and civilian leaders of each country correctly believe that no Syrian military organization has the capability to attack the offshore carriers, but said groups in Syria do have the ability to target and shoot down aircraft (Perry, 2014). Flying airstrike or reconnaissance sorties in such an environment places pilots in unnecessary danger, which is why countries militarily involved are also seeking alternative options that are just as effective as airstrikes, such as the Russian navy’s launching of cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea (Cavas, 2015) or the United States’ usage of drones. The operation of these non-aircraft based options does not require the usage of aircraft carriers in the Syrian conflict at all.

Politically, the development and maintenance of aircraft carriers is complicated due to the military-industrial complex of capitalistic countries. The new American Ford class carriers cost over ten billion dollars each when factoring in overall research and development costs (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2015), which directly benefits the civilian defense contractors tasked to build the carrier along with its supporting air wing. The modern “supercarrier” design (that focuses on quality over quality, a reversal from World War Two ideologies) is inherently expensive due to the push for more and more technologically advanced features in each successive design iteration, due to the relatively slow rate of replacement of said ships. As the aircraft carrier’s military role can be replaced, the development of these expensive ships benefits no one but the corporations that seek to profit off governmental contracts.

Finally, aircraft carriers are built today for the purpose of upholding and achieving national prestige. As naval flagships, they symbolize the ability of a country to develop and operate blue water navies, and a blue water navy symbolizes a country’s ability to project its military abroad. However, outside of a select few world powers, the majority of carrier-operating countries have little to no military need for their aircraft carrier(s) — Brazil’s sole aircraft carrier is over fifty years old and plagued by maintenance issues (Sanchez, 2014), while Thailand ran out of funds to furbish its carrier with an air wing (Bender, 2015). While some countries such as India (threat of conflict with a regional neighbor, Pakistan) and Great Britain (need to protect overseas assets, ex. the Falklands War) have a real military need to maintain an aircraft carrier, most do not. Although carriers can also represent a country’s national identify in peacetime by making port calls or supporting international humanitarian crises, both of those roles can be assigned to other classes of ships; besides, specialized military hospital ships are better suited for responding to disaster stricken areas than aircraft carriers in terms of capability. Although a gigantic aircraft carrier may look good on the front page of newspapers, their primary role is not suited for peacetime actions. If a nation’s aircraft carrier cannot find a military role to fill, similar to Germany’s battleship program before World War 1, the final goal of obtaining such warship is ironically negative for the country as a whole (Murray, 2010).

The aircraft carrier has no place in a modern navy — it is militarily obsolete. Countries that continue to develop and build carriers for military, political and domestic reasons need to understand the often-hidden risks and costs involved. In the future, I believe countries will phase out the aircraft carrier as a weapon in favor of newer technologies that fulfill and even surpass the current role of naval aviation.

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