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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Katja Hemmerich on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Katja Hemmerich on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Katja Hemmerich on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@k_hemmerich?source=rss-163d81092efd------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[UN Funding Cuts, Adaptation & Diverging Operating Models]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@k_hemmerich/un-funding-cuts-adaptation-diverging-operating-models-5394ea3bdb5c?source=rss-163d81092efd------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[multilateralism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[un]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-aid]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unreforms]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Katja Hemmerich]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 15:18:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-09T14:25:21.196Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/0*OBJnb3NHbOkO3kPU.jpg" /></figure><p>The UN Chief Executive Board’s (CEB) financial data for 2025 is now out and shows an 8% decline in overall UN system revenues from 2024 to 2025. The actual decline are in fact steeper because UN accounting rules assume that all assessed funding (about a fifth of total revenues) are fully paid — yet, the Secretariat, FAO, ILO, WHO, UNESCO and even the IAEA among others are all struggling with late or nonpayment of assessed funding by many member states, not just the US. The bigger take away is that UN system revenues have declined every year since their peak in 2022, a cumulative contraction of more than 15% between the end of 2022 and the end of 2025. With further declines expected for 2026, 2027 and possibly beyond, it is clear that cost-cutting measures alone cannot address the financial crisis, UN organizations need to adapt more broadly, and many of them already are.</p><p>Our spotlight this month explores the emerging research from the Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN) and the International Peace Institute (IPI) about adaptations undertaken by UN entities in response to funding cuts. What both studies highlight is that organizations are using a combination of cost-saving measures and transition or drawdown techniques to try and minimize the impact on vulnerable populations, but these are nevertheless falling short. New operating models are being actively pursued by some UN organizations, or in the case of peacekeeping missions, evolving as a result of the contingency planning exercise. These individualized shifts in operating models not only represent fundamental changes for the role of the UN and how it engages with member states, but they also create decision-making dilemmas for leaders and governing bodies. We propose some concrete ways that managers, leaders and UN delegates at all levels can manage these dilemmas to facilitate better decision-making on how the UN system as a whole should move forward.</p><h3>UN Entities’ Adaptations to the Funding Cuts</h3><p>The International Peace Institute’s publication is a note summarizing workshop discussions, reporting from missions and additional third party research on how UN peacekeeping has adapted primarily to the ‘contingency exercise’ in late 2025 to address the late or non-payment of assessed peacekeeping dues. The MOPAN study combines survey responses from 25 development and humanitarian organizations and open source documentation from and additional 14 such organizations, predominantly in the UN as well as multilateral development banks, multi-stakholder partnerships and trust funds and the ICRC. Despite the differing mandates, both studies find that organizations are trying hard to adapt to their financial constraints while maintaining as much coverage to support the populations they are serving as possible.</p><p>In its survey responses, MOPAN found that numerous entities reported increases in the use of multi-country arrangements and shared-service centres, as well as some regional and technical or knowledge hubs, as organizations reduce their numbers of personnel while trying to maintain a comparable level of service provision to existing countries and regions they serve. Surge and response capacities, and the ability to provide sustained technical support are noted to be weakening according to MOPAN as organizations struggle to maintain as much of their current support as possible.</p><blockquote>“Funding pressures have not yet produced widespread changes in organisations’ geographic foot-print, but selective closures, relocations and new regional configurations are starting to be visible.”<em> — MOPAN, </em><a href="https://www.mopan.org/en/our-work/performance-insights/biennial-synthesis/biennial-synthesis-output-1.html"><em>Multilateral Organisations’ Response to the Current Funding Environment — 2026 Stocktake</em></a><em>, October 2026</em></blockquote><p>IPI’s study of peacekeeping missions notes a similar response of closing field offices accompanied by efforts to expand temporary or mobile operating bases, surge capacities and rapid response capabilities in order to try and provide a comparable level of coverage. It’s interesting that peacekeeping missions are trying to increase their organizational agility, as humanitarian are being forced to reduce theirs, and it remains to be seen which may be more effective in their respective contexts. Those in peacekeeping already recognize there are shortcomings to their approach given the reduction in aviation and other physical assets, which will shorten response times.</p><p>Peacekeeping missions are also reportedly increasing their partnerships with local authorities and UN Country Teams (UNCTs) in an effort to hand over some tasks, expand information gathering and early warning inputs as their own capacities are reduced. In many cases, these are standard tactics for mission drawdowns and withdrawals, just with much less time to strengthen those relationships and map out what gets handed over. In South Sudan, the mission (UNMISS) and the UNCT even reactivated the transition planning working group to guide the handover of certain tasks to the country team and other partners.</p><p>Data on the geographic location and numbers of UN personnel validates these drawdown tactics across the system, while also highlighting their limitations, particularly given how UN presences expanded in recent years. UN system funding data from 2011 until 2025 shows that the UN system saw its largest single year increase from 2021 to 2022, up by 13%, driven largely by humanitarian crises and UN responses to conflicts in Ukraine and Sudan, the earthquake in Turkey and the Taliban’s consolidation of power in Afghanistan. As a result, 2022 also saw 41 new duty stations (cities) in which the UN operated (+4%), followed by an increase of 8,093 staff of one year or longer in 2023 (+7%) in part to replace surge and temporary capacities initially deployed to the crises. Yet, in all those countries except Turkey, the need for humanitarian and recovery assistance remains.</p><p>But as the graph illustrates, the system is managing those protracted crises with less money than in 2021, comparable duty station coverage and slightly more personnel than in 2021. Between 2024 and 2025, the number of duty stations declined by 85, more than twice as much as the 2022 increase, and the overall number of staff declined by 10,922 — all while maintaining the same level of country presence as in 2024. The number of staff of one year and longer is able to remain higher than 2021 in part due to the reconfigurations of workforces. For many organizations in programme countries, the number of international professional staff fell at a faster rate than National Professional Officers -11.8% as compared to -7.3%, illustrating efforts at treating the funding cuts like a planned drawdown.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/0*35Bbak53NyNGfYQc.jpg" /></figure><p>Both MOPAN and IPI highlight that there are some positive aspects in how organizations are adapting to this financial pressure. Organizational resistance to shared services, Common Back Offices and Common Premises is declining with fifteen of MOPAN’s 25 respondents reporting consolidating common or shared services within their organisation, while nine reported increased use of services provided jointly or by other organisations. Among humanitarian respondents, nine of 17 indicated that <em>‘shared services and system efficiency — including pooled logistics and procurement, common services and shared data and platforms’</em> — were advancing through deliberate change. Peacekeeping missions and 19 of MOPAN’s 25 survey respondents report leveraging digital technologies, automation and AI as part of their adaption.</p><p>Yet, despite these positives, both IPI and MOPAN conclude that these primarily cost-saving measures are insufficient to allow the UN to provide the same level of coverage and quality services to the populations they serve — and unfortunately, those most in need of the UN’s help appear to be bearing the brunt.</p><blockquote>“As noted by one UN official, “POC is proving to be among the most exposed mandated tasks under these contingency measures,” as reduced presence has increased risks to civilians, particularly in contexts with intercommunal violence.” <em>— IPI, </em><a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/IPI-E-RPT-Contingency-Measures4P.pdf"><em>How UN Peacekeeping Missions are Adapting to Contingency Measures</em></a><em>, July 2026</em></blockquote><p>Humanitarian organizations responding to MOPAN’s survey similarly cited protection, as well as early recovery, as the programme areas that were most affected by personnel reductions. In terms of cross-cutting priorities, almost half of MOPAN’s survey respondents indicated that gender and women’s empowerment as well as ‘Leave No One Behind’ were most impacted by reduced capacities (12 and 11 out of 25 respondents respectively).</p><h3>The Emergence of New Operating Models</h3><p>The maximization of cost efficiency measures, adoption of transition measures and the ultimate inability of the UN to protect the most vulnerable highlights the need for new operating models. In peacekeeping, the business model is evolving by attrition with IPI’s study noting that missions are losing their deterrence capacities as they are forced to reduce their physical presence in communities. Research has frequently documented the positive effects of UN peacekeeping’s deterrent impact, while also documenting the UN’s struggle to use robust force in peacekeeping consistently and effectively. There are many reasons for these struggles, including how the Security Council designs those mandates and how they are perceived and implemented by mission leadership and troop contributing countries that will not change because of funding constraints, so the shift towards greater use of force at the expense of deterrence is risky both for missions, and the civilians they are meant to protection.</p><blockquote>“Peacekeepers through their sizable local presence can increase the political and military costs for warring actors to engage in civilian targeting.” <em>— H. Fjelde, L. Hultman, D. Nilsson, </em><a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/protection-through-presence-un-peacekeeping-and-the-costs-of-targeting-civilians/050CE5EC7C4D8049FD3973241EC0F97D"><em>Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians</em></a><em>. 2019</em></blockquote><p>The new operating model that is evolving in response to liquidity and funding challenges therefore represents a fundamental change to the nature of UN peacekeeping. According to IPI study, UN leadership in missions appear to be recognizing this shift and what it means for the future, but it is less clear whether this has been well understood at headquarters level, given that the contingency exercise was framed as a temporary exercise that should be designed as reversible.</p><blockquote>“One UN official noted that ‘if we do not see a marked change and reversal of the current context, we will have to fundamentally reexamine how we design and deploy peace operations.’” <em>— IPI, </em><a href="https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/IPI-E-RPT-Contingency-Measures4P.pdf"><em>How UN Peacekeeping Missions are Adapting to Contingency Measures</em></a><em>, July 2026</em></blockquote><p>The MOPAN study indicates similarly mixed recognition and responses to the changing financial context by the 17 humanitarian organizations participating in their study. The most common adaptation has been ’hyper-prioritization’ by most affected communities or geographies (76%), by most severe needs (65%), and/or by focusing on life-saving activities (59%). A minority of organizations reported exploring or strengthening new operating models around anticipatory action (41%) and resilience work (29%). Interestingly, only a handful of organizations indicated a change in the use of partners for programme delivery (one organization increased while 2 decreased implementing partnership, +5% and -10% respectively) while 37% reported no change to their implementing partnerships.</p><p>These shifts in operating models come with significant operational and organizational risks — the reduction of preventive and deterrent capacities in peacekeeping risks civilian and peacekeepers’ lives, and by extension organizational credibility, while investment in anticipatory action and resilience requires governments, donors and other stakeholders to take greater political risks by investing limited resources in preventive capacities that may not be needed. These are fundamental changes to how member states and the UN engage with each other, and yet it seems UN entities and field missions are being left to decide these questions on their own. As a UN University (UNU) review of the UNMISS contingency response noted:</p><blockquote>This creates a fundamental problem of accountability. In effect, strategic choices about where and how the UN can operate are being made indirectly, through budgetary constraints rather than through political deliberation. As a result, decisions taken (or not taken) in financial terms are shaping the realities of peacekeeping missions on the ground, without a corresponding framework for political accountability. <em>— E. Gaston &amp; C. Nickel, </em><a href="https://unu.edu/cpr/blog-post/defaulting-transition-how-financial-cuts-are-affecting-peacekeeping-realities"><em>Defaulting into Transition: How Financial Cuts are Affecting Peacekeeping Realities</em></a><em>, March 2026</em></blockquote><h3>The Related Decision-Making Dilemmas and How to Address Them</h3><p>The lack of a political framework, particularly at system level creates dilemmas for leaders as well as member states. As MOPAN highlights the lack of system-level coordination of how organizations are adapting is potentially creating gaps in how it is serving populations. The risks and opportunities of shifting operating models is therefore also not being captured or strategically considered. And that means if and when something goes wrong, leaders in the field or within individual organizations will be blamed for trying to find the best way forward in the absence of strategic level guidance and accountability. While the new Secretary-General has a role in addressing this, top down approaches are unlikely to solve these dilemmas.</p><p>One bottom up strategy that can be leverage is supporting and using data and analytics to make these shifts, and their consequences, more obvious at heaquarters and to system-level governance and decision-making bodies. MOPAN’s stocktaking is just one example, and more organizations should participate in this regular exercise. The CEB’s already invaluable data should also start including more data not just on the category or location of personnel who stil exist in the system, but the functions which they carry out so that there can be more qualitative analysis of the UN system’s capacities. Data on the effectiveness and efficiency of current and emerging operating models in different contexts is sorely missing, as the Joint Inspection Unit has often highlighted. As we found in our own research commissioned by C4UN, neither UN evaluations nor MOPAN have been comparing data or analyses on direct UN delivery versus implementation partnerships and their respective costs.</p><p>Too often data in the UN is presented and analyzed vertically. Reporting to legislative bodies like Executive Boards, tends to compile data on what that one organizaton did at country, regional and global level, how many people it served, how many partners it worked with, and increasingly how many in need it was unable to reach or what activities were curtailed. A more horizontal, integrated analysis would facilitate not just a better understanding of what is happening on the ground but also better decision-making of how organizations within the broader system should or shouldn’t be changing. Coordinated decision-making across Executive Boards and in the General Assembly, as well as UN system policy-making fora, like the Executive Committee or High Level Committee on Management, is more likely if all UN entities started reporting a consistent, shared baseline of which populations in countries and regions are most in need of what, such as the different forms of protection, for instance, which of those needs their own organization was able to fulfill, what tasks it actively transitioned to other UN entities, local authorities or partners, and which groups no one is able to reach because of reduced capacities. Some of this integrated analysis is being done by entities like the UN Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) or the UN System Evaluation Group, but it is rarely systematically shared across governing bodies. This reinforces the governance disconnects that have constrained system-wide change in the UN80 process.</p><p>Part of the challenge in this approach is that UN organizations will need to shift from a reporting style to member states that emphasizes how much they alone have achieved (and by implication to why they deserve more money) to one that emphasizes the limitations of what they and the broader UN system can achieve, and therefore when, where and why those organizations and their member states need to shift into new operating models and how these complement adaptations by others. This reporting change comes with political risks for senior leaders, and by extension a prisoner’s dilemma if only one organization starts to make this change alone.</p><p>Evaluation functions can start to pave the way for this reporting, as can the managers who are directly experiencing the system’s overstretch everyday. If they continuously present the data and analysis through a horizontally integrated lense it becomes easier for senior leaders to figure out the least risky way to share that data. Delegates to Executive Boards and other legislative bodies should also be requesting horizontally integrated analyses, thereby increasing the political risks of not providing that information. All of which can faciliate the shared decision-making and accountability that the UN system clearly needs to proactively direct the development of new operating models and the related political accountability, instead of letting change happen by attrition.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.reformworks.org/post/un-funding-cuts-adaptation-diverging-operating-models"><em>https://www.reformworks.org</em></a><em> on November 8, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5394ea3bdb5c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Communication Reforms: In a Polarized World, Should the UN Take Sides?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@k_hemmerich/communication-reforms-in-a-polarized-world-should-the-un-take-sides-51689cbae674?source=rss-163d81092efd------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[public-opinion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media-strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unreforms]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Katja Hemmerich]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 11 Oct 2026 16:15:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-12T13:13:06.372Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/0*_yHtKajfdYXdR3x2.jpg" /></figure><p>In recent weeks, I’ve participated in a growing number of discussions that are questioning how the UN, and the next Secretary-General, should communicate. <a href="https://www.un.org/sg/sites/default/files/document/2026-06/carolyn-rodrigues-birkett-vision-en.pdf?utm_source=copilot.com">Carolyn Rodrigues Birkett </a>, one of the candidates for Secretary-General has emphasized the SG’s role as the organization’s chief spokesperson, who needs to communicate clearly about the UN’s achievements, challenges and modernization efforts that make it fit for purpose in order to build trust and mobilize support and resources. <a href="https://youtu.be/8hkxNihK17U?si=u3Y-S125l0gGwbIs">Thant Myint-U and Mark Malloch Brown </a>have indicated that less communication by the SG might actually be more effective, because it helps to keep some mystery of the office and increases the impact of communications when they are issued. UN80’s work package 21 highlights the importance communicating the UN’s results in the <a href="https://www.un.org/un80-initiative/sites/default/files/2026-09/UN80_WP21_System-Wide-Results-Management.pdf">SG’s Information Brief </a>issued in September 2026.</p><p>But what communication techniques actually work in a world that is increasingly polarized and where the UN, multilateralism and international assistance have become highly politicized? For the UN’s Department of Global Communications the answer was to take on a greater advocacy role, particularly on social media, as part of the reforms undertaken when Antonio Guterres took office. When the Department of Global Communications (DGC) replaced the Department of Public Information (DPI) in 2019, its mandate included leveraging social media as a key tool for “cause communications” whereby the aim is “not just to inform, but also to inspire people to care and to mobilize them for action” (See DGC’s proposed programme in <a href="https://docs.un.org/A/76/6(Sect.28)">A/76/6, Part VII, Section 28 </a>). Our spotlight this month explores the research assessing how well this reform has worked and emerging research on how public opinion on international cooperation can be influenced and changed.</p><h3>Social Media’s Communication Dilemma for the UN</h3><p>The shift towards ’cause communications’ may seem minor but it is actually a significant departure from the traditional public information role of DPI. From its inception, public information was seen as a key function of the UN Secretariat with the Office of Public Information as one of the original departments. But while it was mandated to provide public information on the work of the of the organization and promote the values of the Charter, it was also expressly forbidden from engaging in ‘propaganda’. There is an inherent tension in promoting the values of the UN Charter, but not taking on an advocacy role that could be perceived as propagandizing. While the UN has generally managed to toe this line, the advent of social media and its instantaneous and continuous information flows have aggravated this tension.</p><p><strong><em>“Social media pose new challenges for IO [international organization] communication such as a highly competitive economy of attention and the fragmentation of the audiences driven by networked curation of content and selective exposure. In this context, communication departments have to make tough choices about what to communicate and how, aggravating inherent tensions between IO [international organization] communication as comprehensive public information (aimed at institutional transparency) — and partisan political advocacy (aimed at normative change).”</em> </strong>— M. Ecker-Ehrhardt, ‘<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-023-09517-0">Building bridges or digging the trench? International organizations, social media, and polarized fragmentation</a>’, 2025</p><p>The DGC reforms appear to have made the tough choice in favor of greater political advocacy to mobilize public support not just for the values of the UN Charter but also emerging international policies and norms, to demonstrate the value of the UN as a venue for collective problems solving and international agreements. One key example of this was its support on social media of the the negotiation and adoption of the Global Compact for Migration, which has been analyzed by Dr. Mathias Ecker-Ehrhardt of Goethe University in Germany.</p><h3>Attention vs. Attitudinal Change</h3><p>Dr. Ecker-Ehrhardt specifically focused on Twitter/X communications in relation to migration because both the issue and the platform demonstrate high levels of polarization. The study provides useful insights into the extent to which the UN was able to bring attention to the issue of orderly migration norms and whether it was able to penetrate different sides of the debate and build support potential change attitudes and opinions on the Global Compact for Migration.</p><p>DGC’s advocacy strategy on Twitter/X was operationalized in several ways. DGC published 270 tweets directly related to the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) between Oct. 2017, early in the negotiation process, and December 2018, when the UN General Assembly formally endorsed the Compact. 94.8% of those tweets contained content with an explicitly positive framing of order migration, migrants, multilateralism and the UN, for instance by stating that migration is an essential ‘part of our humanity’ and that migration has benefits for host and home countries alike. In addition to the positive framing, DGC’s tweets also reshared other migration content from UN accounts (more than half of which were also run by DGC) and added specific mentions in their tweets of other UN accounts focused on migration, often also run by DGC, as well as those run by IOM and UNHCR. Finally, early on UN accounts run by DGC and others shifted from neutral hashtags like <a href="https://www.reformworks.org/reformworks-issue-spotlight/hashtags/migration">#migration</a> or <a href="https://www.reformworks.org/reformworks-issue-spotlight/hashtags/GCM">#GCM</a> to prioritize the hashtag <a href="https://www.reformworks.org/reformworks-issue-spotlight/hashtags/ForMigration">#ForMigration</a>. <a href="https://www.reformworks.org/reformworks-issue-spotlight/hashtags/ForMigration">#ForMigration</a> presents migration as something good and worthy, making the UN’s advocative position obvious, unlike <a href="https://www.reformworks.org/reformworks-issue-spotlight/hashtags/migration">#migration</a> which is essentially just a topic marker.</p><p>The impact of this strategy is evident in the scatter plot below. DGC’s @UN Twitter handle and that of key UN leaders are very much driving key content and authoritative voices in Twitter discussions in favor of migration (in blue on the right). Those in support of migration and the Global Compact shared content from or mentioned UN content or accounts over 80% of the time. <a href="https://www.reformworks.org/reformworks-issue-spotlight/hashtags/ForMigration">#ForMigration</a> is the most frequently used hashtag in all the migration debates in Twitter, yet it appears almost exclusively (97.7% of the time) in retweets and shares by those in favor of migration, in blue. It appears that <a href="https://www.reformworks.org/reformworks-issue-spotlight/hashtags/ForMigration">#ForMigration</a> was in fact a signal for those critical of migration of the type of content and accounts to avoid, as highlighted by Dr. Ecker-Ehrhardt:</p><p><strong><em>“DGC succeeded in making its hashtag a main device for signaling a positive stance and an act of advocacy. At the same time, it made it fairly easy for other users to curate respective content along partisan lines, including efficiently avoiding UN communication entirely.” </em></strong>— M. Ecker-Ehrhardt, ‘<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-023-09517-0">Building bridges or digging the trench? International organizations, social media, and polarized fragmentation</a>’, 2025</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/0*IQcesjsk-lP7-HS8.jpg" /></figure><p>Source: Ecker-Ehrhardt, M. Building bridges or digging the trench? International organizations, social media, and polarized fragmentation. <em>Rev Int Organ </em><strong>20 </strong>, 157–187 (2025). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-023-09517-0">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-023-09517-0</a></p><p>DGC’s communications did have an immense resonance on X/Twitter, and it was clearly recognized as a thought leader on the issue — but only with those already positively pre-disposed to support migration. The scatter plot also illustrates the depth of the echo chamber of those for and against migration on Twitter/X. DGC’s communications did not penetrate the anti-migration echo chamber, much less change the minds of those skeptical of the Global Compact for Migration. In fact, the UN’s success as a thought leader on the pro-migration side of the debate appears to have made it even more of a target for those critical of migration, with researchers finding a significant number of tweets that frame the GCM as an attempt by the UN to illegitimately force states to open borders for migrants. The advocacy strategy clearly had limitations and also created legitimacy risks for the organization on such a hotly politicized issue.</p><h3>Can Opinions Really Be Changed?</h3><p>In the highly polarized world that we seem to be living in, it is easy to assume that positions are deeply entrenched, and that trying to change them is futile. Consequently, even just building up the UN’s authority and voice amongst like-minded viewers should be a positive result.</p><p>But there is a growing body of research that demonstrates conservative or right wing opinions can be changed, and international organizations and aid agencies can and should aim to do that. Specifically, several academic and thinktank studies focused on public opinion on foreign assistance in key donor countries (the US, UK and Germany) have shown that public information strategies, rather than advocacy, can build support for more international assistance, including amongst the most skeptical and distrusting of public institutions.</p><p>In a series of survey experiments in the UK, researchers assessed how public reactions changed when they were provided with different kinds of information about international assistance programming by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Cooperation Office (FCDO) and found that:</p><p><strong><em>“Across the experiments, we find strong evidence that transparency increases support for the aid agency. In the monadic experiment, we find that simply providing more details on the FCDO’s transparency efforts increases support for aid through the agency by close to 12%. This is a sizable swing for a minor alteration in the information presented to respondents. Moreover, we find that treatment effects are largely driven by those who least support foreign aid and trust the civil service the least. That is, transparency works best when citizens are the most skeptical about aid and the civil service….Transparency reforms boost aid support even more than a stronger emphasis on aid being in the national interest and are on par with stronger aid conditionality on human rights.”</em></strong> — M. Heinzel, B. Reinsberg &amp; H. Swedlund, “<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/gove.12863">Transparency and Citizen Support for Public Agencies: The Case of Foreign Aid</a>”, 2024</p><p>A 2026 survey by the Rockefeller Foundation finds similar results amongst the US public following the destruction of USAID. Not only did the survey find that 54% of those surveyed are favorable towards foreign aid, that number went up as more detail on the types of programmes was provided, i.e. whether it was provided as humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping or health interventions, and even more so when information was provided on accountability and transparency measures. As in the UK, even the MAGA participants in the survey, who started the survey opposed to foreign aid (-17 points) indicated that, after being provided more information, preferred reforming aid programmes over cutting them (by a 68 point margin).</p><p><strong><em>“When asked what would change their mind, Americans who answered “unfavorable” or “unsure” toward foreign aid at the end of the survey said they would be more likely to support it if they saw greater accountability measures in place. Those include independent audits of programs (49%), evidence of impact on threats to the U.S. (47%), and clear end dates for programs (41%) — just 16% said none of the proposed ideas would change their mind. This is reflective of the strong support for rebuilding foreign aid with greater safeguards in place. It also outlines things the foreign aid industry already did, but where there is an opportunity to highlight these existing measures more in the future — such as receiving U.S. foreign aid grants meant publishing evidence, undergoing independent audits, and establishing program close-out procedures.”</em></strong> — The Rockefeller Foundation, “<a href="https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/reports/an-american-perspective-on-foreign-aid/">An American Perspective on Foreign Aid</a>”, June 2026</p><p>Another interesting point highlighted by many of these studies is that inundating audiences with performance data — even if it demonstrates strong achievement of results does not do much to change public perceptions.</p><h3>Maybe the Department of Public Information was Fit for the 21st Century</h3><p>While much of the current UN reform discussions have rightly pointed out that the UN was built for a world that no longer exists, it does seem that the architects emphasis on public information over advocacy in UN communications remains fit for purpose even in a digital world. And, sometimes less really is more. UN leaders, the next SG and UN communications departments may be more effectively judged not by the number of views, shares or comments, but by their ability to build bridges across polarized audiences. Building support for multilateralism and the work of the UN may be more effective when it focuses on sharing information about what the UN is actually doing, how it ensures that its resources are being used as intended and providing value to citizens across its member states. This isn’t to say that advocacy is entirely misplaced, but it may bring greater returns and fewer risks when it is focused on the values of the UN Charter, rather than on emerging policy areas — a point also highlighted by one of the guests in our first podcast series “Test the Evidence” coming out in November 2026.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.reformworks.org/post/communication-reforms-in-a-polarized-world-should-the-un-take-sides"><em>https://www.reformworks.org</em></a><em> on October 11, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=51689cbae674" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[If there’s no trust, how can the UN transform?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@k_hemmerich/if-theres-no-trust-how-can-the-un-transform-53a992dc7f11?source=rss-163d81092efd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/53a992dc7f11</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[unga-81]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[un]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unreforms]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Katja Hemmerich]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 13 Sep 2026 13:14:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-14T13:57:50.074Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Updated: 21 minutes ago</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/0*xqSJFdPzCJteoq6G.jpg" /></figure><p>The 81st session of the UN General Assembly was formally opened on 8 September, as the role of President of the General Assembly (PGA) was transferred from Germany to Bangladesh’s Khalilur Rahman. The new PGA’s opening address, and the subsequent last opening address of Secretary-General (SG) Antonio Guterres, provided somewhat competing analyses of the current challenges facing multilateralism and how the UN should navigate them, in keeping with this year’s theme: “Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: A United Nations that Delivers for All”. These differences raise questions about the extent to which transformation is actually possible as divisions between member states grow and the legitimacy of multilateralism is increasingly being questioned.</p><p>The SG’s analysis notes that states are increasingly flouting the rules of the multilateral system, which makes it difficult for international organizations to meet the moment, as geopolitical mistrust blocks agreement on the effective reforms needed to restore people’s faith in multilateralism. In this view, there is not much the UN can do to change or address current global challenges until member states return to the rules-based international order, and are able to agree on what they want the UN to do — a theme that is also evident in the recently published UN Peace Operations Review. The fundamental premise underlying this perspective is that international organizations and collective action only works when they are accorded legitimacy, or trusted, by their stakeholders, whose goodwill is required for implementation in the absence of enforcement mechanisms. But the PGA’s take is that both multilateralism and the UN need to change together to meet the moment, with trust in the UN being rebuilt as it demonstrates that it can deliver both for member states and the global public. There is an implicit acceptance that the multilateralism and the UN no longer enjoy the legitimacy they once did, and that this needs to be rebuilt through adaptation and delivery of results for two disparate and broad audiences.</p><p>The PGA’s vision is less defeatist than that of the SG, and portrays a world where constructive change and a return to some form of an effective multilateral system is possible — if the UN can deliver. But is that delivery even possible if the UN’s legitimacy is declining? We explore this question, and how UN staff and delegates will need to engage with reform during the 81st session of the General Assembly in this month’s spotlight.</p><h3>Are Trust and Legitimacy Required for the UN to Demonstrate Effectiveness?</h3><p>Both scholars and practitioners working on and with international organizations recognize that most international organizations do not have enforcement mechanisms and are therefore dependent buy-in from their member states and other stakeholders to implement their mandates. This can include actions as complex as member states incorporating internationally agreed standards into their own legislation, or as simple as according UN staff visas to be able to work in their countries or engage with local actors. Traditional wisdom is that this buy-in comes when decisions, programmes and the institution itself are considered legitimate — a key reason why consensus-based decision-making dominates in international organizations. The implication is that international organizations can never have too much legitimacy, and the greater their legitimacy, the greater their effectiveness.</p><p>But two Swedish scholars have recently called this into question, arguing that any political institution can have too much legitimacy, which in turn creates complacency, thereby undermining its effectiveness and its ability to adapt. They validate their argument through a case study of the first fifteen years of the African Union, which enjoyed extremely high levels of legitimacy in the early years, but lacked effectiveness, which led to a loss of legitimacy that spurred reforms that increased its effectiveness in the late 2010s. Their study includes a great quote from a high level official in the AU’s Institutional Reforms Unit:</p><blockquote>“Everything that matters is performance and delivery… and legitimacy is not helping us to achieve this….Look at the IMF or the World Bank, they are highly effective organizations but they are not legitimate….This shows that legitimacy means ineffectiveness, and that legitimacy is not needed for an effective organization.” <em>— Cited in H. Agné &amp; F. Söderbaum, “</em><a href="https://academic.oup.com/isagsq/article/2/1/ksac003/6524933"><em>The Costs of Legitimacy for Political Institutions</em></a><em>”, 2022</em></blockquote><p>What the case study highlights is that in the early years, when the AU’s legitimacy was high, there were a lot of high level conferences committing the AU to carry out collective action, while member states, the African public and civil society, as well as donors failed to see this materialize into tangible results. The increasing disconnect between the rhetoric and reality eroded stakeholders trust and ultimately the organization’s legitimacy. It was this lack of legitimacy and results that was called out publicly by several African leaders, including Rwandan President Paul Kagame, who was then elected as head of the AU and led its member states to agree to a series of effective reforms in 2016–17 focused on implementation and performance.</p><p>The new PGA’s vision and his focus on delivery as a means of rebuilding trust and legitimacy is very much aligned to this case study. And interestingly, he also explicitly calls out the problem of complacency and a lack of genuine criticism in allowing the UN to adapt to the new global reality:</p><blockquote>“The achievements of the United Nations should not be an excuse for complacency, nor should it’s shortcomings obscure how essential it remains… We must continually examine our work with honesty and humility, unhesitatingly identify the deficiencies, and relentlessly work together to enhance our capacity and efficiency so that our organization is able to credibly respond to the challenges of today and tomorrow.”<em> — </em><a href="https://transcripts.un.org/en/ga/81/1"><em>Opening address of the 81st session of the General Assembly</em></a><em>, 8 Sept. 2026</em></blockquote><h3>Effecting Change in the Face of Declining Legitimacy</h3><p>Legitimacy, and past achievements, are therefore not always assets when change is needed, and a loss of legitimacy and trust can be a tool to push political institutions and their very diverse stakeholders to change. But how exactly does this happen? We see two concrete implications of the PGA’s vision for change for delegates, UN staff and how the reform process needs to evolve.</p><p>First, if, as posited by Drs. Agné and Söderbaum, the high levels of legitimacy accorded to the old rules-based order also had negative impacts in the form of complacency, then it’s ok not to defend that old order at all costs. Contestation of the old order and its norms is therefore not inherently bad, and there is room for dialogue with those who contest it. As one of our guest contributors last year, Andraž Melanšek, outlined, contestation of norms is a healthy part of their evolution:</p><blockquote>“recent findings in norm research show that such contestation is not necessarily a sign of failure. Rather, it is an essential part of how norms evolve. Their meaning and application are constantly debated, questioned, and interpreted differently by various actors. Even when there is broad agreement on a principle, such as the protection of civilians, there is often disagreement about what it entails in practice: who should be protected, by whom, and under what conditions. These disagreements are not just noise; they are the mechanism through which norms remain dynamic and relevant.”<em> — A. Melanšek, </em><a href="https://www.reformworks.org/post/un80-beyond-mere-technocratic-solutions"><em>UN80: Beyond Mere Technocratic Solutions</em></a><em>, 2025</em></blockquote><p>For this debate and adaptation of norms to be constructive, there needs to be a recognition at all levels that these are inherently political debates, and they need to be fed with the appropriate information, analysis and context, which goes beyond the purely technocratic approach that has defined reform processes over the last decade. An example of this would be, for instance, to address the question of stabilization mandates in the Peace Operations Review. The mandating of UN peacekeeping forces to carry out operations with local security forces to stabilize areas, sometimes in the absence of a viable peace process, has put pressure on the principles of peacekeeping (consent of the parties, impartiality and use of force in self-defence and defence of the mandate), leading in some cases to adaptations of how they are implemented on the ground. There are political reasons why these mandates have come about, and there are political (and operational) consequences of this type of engagement by the UN on countries hosting peacekeeping operations that should be explored and debated to update or reinforce those fundamental norms of peacekeeping to ensure they are fit for the future. Yet, although the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations in 2015, the 2017 ‘Santos Cruz report’ on Improving the Security of Peacekeepers, OIOS evaluations of MINUSMA (A/76/698) and MONUSCO (IED-24–024), as well as numerous academic and thinktank publications that have flagged the need to revisit these norms as contexts and mandates change, this is absent from the Peace Operations Review report. It’s as if raising questions on the principles of peacekeeping would undermine their legitimacy. Yet this complacency means that stakeholders lack direct information from the UN’s own operations and experience on the challenges facing peacekeepers in adhering to those principles and the negative and positive implications of evolutions that are already happening.</p><p>This in turn highlights to the second implication of the PGA’s vision for change, which is that reform processes need to be designed in a way to facilitate such comprehensive and critical political analysis. In a highly political organization like the UN that depends on the goodwill of its member states for its mandates and funding, critiques of the organization’s effectiveness or of member state actions, create <a href="https://www.reformworks.org/post/will-the-un-ever-learn-to-reform">risks</a>. But it is precisely that critique that drives change in organization — and why reform processes need to bring in informed and independent perspectives and actors.</p><p>When Kofi Annan was Secretary-General, he did this very effectively through the use of independent panels, made up of a mix of former UN staff, member state representatives and occasionally think tanks or outside experts familiar with the issue and the UN. These panels provided a critical analysis of a challenge and how the UN as an organization and its member states were addressing it with related reform proposals, that were presented to the SG and member states simultaneously. This meant that member states and UN leadership could accept or reject proposals without it leading to a perception that UN leadership and member states were in disagreement. More importantly, the often slow process of having panels consult and develop proposals, followed by review and debate amongst member states and within UN leadership allowed for an understanding of areas of mutual agreement and red lines from key stakeholders, paving the way for the SG to formally propose what reforms he wanted to implement based on a strong understanding of what would gain consensus agreement in the General Assembly.</p><p>This is an inherently different approach to that of Secretary-General Guterres, who tends to put forward his preferred proposal. This approach has often led member states to feel they have insufficient information, and in turn led to non-action when member states have reservations, as in the case of the UNDP-UNOPS or UNFPA-UNWomen mergers, or a begrudging approval of the UNITAR-UNSSC merger despite member states misgivings — all of which leaves a bad taste in everyone’s mouth, and doesn’t foster the trust that further collective problem-solving requires. For those designing and leading reform processes during this General Assembly and the tenure of the next SG, therefore, it would be useful to consider how to formally build in broader independent perspectives and critiques into reform reports and discussions while creating the time and space decision-makers to engage with the information and each other on areas of mutual agreement and their respective red lines.</p><p>Inevitably change will be difficult, and there will never be a perfect reform process. But the new PGA does appear to have charted a vision for the way forward that, based on the evidence, could work.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.reformworks.org/post/if-there-s-no-trust-how-can-the-un-transform"><em>https://www.reformworks.org</em></a><em> on September 13, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=53a992dc7f11" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Who got hit hardest by the 2025 UN staff cuts?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@k_hemmerich/who-got-hit-hardest-by-the-2025-un-staff-cuts-b07017accfb1?source=rss-163d81092efd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b07017accfb1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[un]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Katja Hemmerich]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 09 Aug 2026 14:21:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-12T20:03:46.827Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/856/0*xDdz44qG-dAEnF7q.jpg" /><figcaption>Size of bubbles reflect numbers of staff reduced from 2024 to 2025, based on UN CEB data.</figcaption></figure><p>The UN Chief Executives Board (CEB) has started to release some of its personnel data about the number of staff in the UN system in 2025, in preparation for the next High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) meeting in late September. The data finally allows for a preliminary analysis of which staff were hit the hardest by last year’s budget cuts.</p><p>While the financial data for 2025 is not yet available from the CEB, the OECD has already indicated that 2025 saw a historic decline of overseas development assistance (ODA), which appears to have hit the UN particularly hard, with a 27% decline in core voluntary contributions already recorded for 2025. But did this translate to commensurate declines in staffing across the UN system or were some parts of the UN hit harder than others? Staff unions also raised concerns in various fora that senior level positions were disproportionately protected at the expense of junior level staff, reinforcing more general concerns voiced by some member states and stakeholders that the UN is too ‘top heavy’.</p><p>This month’s spotlight unpacks these questions — and confirms that, as is so often the case, there is no ‘One UN’. Some entities endured deep cuts; a surprising number of others actually increased their staff. In some entities, the numbers suggest intentional, equitable workforce planning. Elsewhere, the shifts raise more questions than answers.</p><h3>Which UN entities suffered the largest staff cuts?</h3><p>IOM and UNHCR were by far the hardest hit, both in terms of absolute numbers of staff cuts and the proportional decline of their workforce. The number of staff in IOM fell by 4,471 people from 2024 to 2025, reflecting a 29.5% decline. UNHCR is the only other UN entity to have decreased its staff by more than 20%, losing 2,932 staff, equivalent to a 22% decline, according to CEB data. UNAIDs and UNICEF were the other two UN entities that cut more than 10% of their workforce. The significantly smaller size of UNAIDS means its 19% decline translated into 118 staff, whereas UNICEF’s 10.5% decline comprised 1,614 staff.</p><p>With all the often contentious negotiations about cutting budgets and posts in the UN Secretariat and WHO last year, it is perhaps surprising that they only saw a 6% and 5% reduction in their staffing respectively in 2025. While UNHCR and IOM are funded through voluntary funding, which disappears (and in other times appears) much more quickly, both the Secretariat and WHO are funded through a combination of assessed and voluntary funding, meaning more reductions will happen in 2026 which is not yet evident in the CEB’s figures. The WHO restructuring which had a clear timeline from January 2025 to 30 June 2026 anticipates an overall staff reduction of 23% (or 19% if prioritized vacant posts are filled) due to restructuring, according to its annual report on human resources presented to the World Health Assembly (A79/21 Add.1). Consequently, this year’s CEB figures only reflect an interim stage of WHO’s restructuring and next year’s CEB figures will likely reflect a much larger reduction in staff numbers. The Secretariat will also likely see greater reductions in 2026, although it remains to be seen by how much as the 2025 staff reductions appear to reflect efforts to anticipate 2026 reductions in ‘regular budget’ positions, in addition to reductions resulting from a loss of voluntary funding.</p><p>What is perhaps more surprising, is that despite all the negative financial development, UNDP actually grew by 5.6%, adding 411 staff between 2024 and 2025. In fact, 20 of the 39 entities sharing data with the CEB saw an increase in their staff in 2025.</p><p>Like UNDP, several of these are entities that are being proposed to be merged, to create efficiencies. UNSSC grew by a surprising 19% increase (11 staff) and UNITAR by 9% (7 staff). By contrast, UNWomen and UNFPA, which are also being proposed for a merger, remained close to the status quo. They both saw a 1% decrease in staff, as if their respective management is waiting to redesign its workforce based on whatever decision is taken by member states on the merger.</p><p>It’s possible that the modest increase in staff numbers in UNSSC and UNITAR reflects managers filling vacant posts to put themselves in a stronger position to navigate the restructuring that will inevitably following a merger. A similar pattern can be observed prior to the restructuring of both DMSPC and DOS, and DPO and DPPA, which all saw modest increases in their staffing number in 2017 and 2018 as member states discussed the proposed changes to those departments.</p><p>Or, the UNSSC and UNITAR increases may be part of a broader trend of all the training and research institutes growing in 2025 for some reason. The UN University growing by 13% (20 staff) and the ILO’s Training Center in Turin also adding 6 new staff in 2025, amounting to a 3% increase.</p><h3>Which staff categories were hardest hit?</h3><p>Of all the staff categories, the General Services staff were the hardest hit by the budget cuts. In terms of absolute numbers, they saw the greatest decline in staff (7,500) across the UN entities reporting to the CEB — more than International Professional, National Professional, and Field Service losses combined (3,270). This was driven primarily by the cuts in IOM and UNHCR, where GS staff faced the largest proportional decline by category, as well as sizable reductions in in UNICEF, WFP and the UN Secretariat. The graph below shows the % change in each of those organizations by category.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/939/0*TfIaZ1F5hsrEn7V2.jpg" /></figure><p>It’s striking that the UN Secretariat, which generally has disproportionately fewer National Professional Officer positions than field-based UN agencies, funds and programmes actually saw a net increase of NPOs in 2025.This may be a reflection that parts of the Secretariat, like several UN agencies, funds and programmes made an effort to use National Professional Officers to to take on some of the work previously done by junior level international professionals. From the raw data which does not include information on functions, it’s hard to tell if there really was a substitution effect, but it is noteworthy that IOM, UNHCR and UNICEF cut their National Professional Officers at a lower rate than junior level international professionals (P-1 to P-3). WFP, whose staff declined by 7% overall, spread that out amongst General Service and International Professional staff equally, while cutting less than 1% of their National Professional Officers.</p><h4>How did junior levels fare compared to senior staff?</h4><p>Considerable concerns were raised by staff unions during WHO’s restructuring exercise last year that senior level staff were being protected from the budget cuts. Maybe they were wrong, or maybe those complaints had the desired effect. P-5, D-1 and D-2 staff in WHO declined collectively by 8% in 2025 as compared to a 3.7% decline for P-1-P-3 levels. The only level which saw an increase in staff in 2025 in WHO were P-2s, albeit only an increase of 2 persons.</p><p>In addition to WHO, WFP’s cuts in 2025 also hit senior levels harder than junior levels, but as highlighted in the graph, these organizations were the exception rather than the rule. The 12.5% decline of senior level positions in WFP was driven primarily by a reduction of 61 P-5s, the largest % decline of any international professional level, followed closely by D-2s. By contrast, IOM, the small decrease in P-5 to D-2 positions is in large part due to the fact that they actually increased their overall number of D-1 staff from 2024 to 2025 by a shocking 19% (12 additional people).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/937/0*KdopgYhXEZ7YGNq3.jpg" /></figure><p>Workforce impacts</p><p>There have been growing criticisms in recent years that the UN is ‘top heavy’, which supposedly has also contributed to a lack of trust in the UN and funding declines. While the causality of this argument is somewhat oversimplified, the personnel data does indicate that the UN workforce is not a pyramid. Ironically, the staff reductions in 2025 appear to have made that problem worse.</p><p>IIn the big UN entities, like the Secretariat and UN agencies, funds and programmes, P-1s are a rarely used level and P-2s, considered to be the entry level, never outnumber the next level up (P-3). When I was designing the mobility policy for the UN Secretariat almost 15 years ago, it was noticeable that in many functional areas there were often the same or sometimes even more P-4s than P-3s, who themselves vastly outnumbered P-2s. The CEB data from 2018 indicates that the Secretariat was starting to shift that dynamic with P-3s as the fastest growing level of international professionals — until 2025, when P-3s saw the highest proportional reduction in staff.</p><p>While Kofi Annan was initially recruited as a P-1, there may be a legitimate argument that the P-1 level staff is no longer useful to attract the right staff and one that HR practitioners may want to research and confirm with data and evidence. But P-2s do seem to be relatively widely used across the system albeit with significant variations. The ICC is the only organization that actually had a workforce pyramid from P-2 upward in 2025. IOM has also been better at using P-2s than other large UN entities so that even with junior level staff being disproportionately hit by the cuts, P-2s still outnumbered P-5s in 2025. WHO which added P-2s in 2025 still has P-5s outnumbering P-2s, as does WFP despite its heavy cuts to the P-5 level. The graph below demonstrates how different the international professional workforce was in UN entities in 2025. IOM’s structure is closer to that of ICC, with the UN Secretariat, WFP and UNHCR in between IOM and WHO’s egg shaped workforce.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/0*vds1JNz6Tid-kPbT.jpg" /></figure><p>Given the criticisms and how the staff cuts have played out so far, these are some important issues that the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) may want to discuss at the end of September when they are presented with the personnel statistics. The financial crisis has forced workforce restructuring, and maybe this is finally the time for management to determine why P-2s (and P-1s) are so underutilized in larger UN entities, but seem to be a useful part of the workforces in the ICJ, UN Tourism, the International Criminal Court (ICC), UNITAR, UNSSC and UNU.</p><p>On a final note, not all the workforce impacts are negative. In a world where the goal of gender parity is increasingly being called into question, the UN has continued to stay true to its values. Despite all the cuts, the overall UN workforce has actually moved closer to gender parity in 2025, and it is now 1.7% away from that target as compared to 2.3% in 2024. Most entities saw relatively equal or comparable declines in their male and female staff. WFP and the UN Secretariat are two entities, which still had some way to go in achieving gender parity, and appear to have guided the staff reductions so that women were less impacted than men. In the UN Secretariat, women were 59% less likely to be impacted by staff reductions than men in 2025, and in WFP women were 50% less likely to be impacted.</p><p>These positive gender impacts highlight how the current budget crunch can also be an opportunity to address some of the workforce challenges that have faced the UN. But that’s only possible if leadership takes a strategic approach to how it downsizes and restructures its workforce — which has clearly happened inconsistently across the system, as this spotlight article has demonstrated. It’s unfortunate that the personnel data that the CEB publishes comes out so late in the year, making it hard for organizations to learn and course correct, or reinforce the positive consequences, because they have already put together most of their plans for 2026. There is clearly a lot more to unpack as further data gets published by the CEB. Nevertheless, we hope this preliminary analysis provides some food for thought for the HLCM, managers and HR professionals across the UN system.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.reformworks.org/post/who-got-hit-hardest-by-the-2025-un-staff-cuts"><em>https://www.reformworks.org</em></a><em> on August 9, 2026, and further updated on August 12, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b07017accfb1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Does the UN Need Civil Society?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@k_hemmerich/does-the-un-need-civil-society-b7ceeea4fab7?source=rss-163d81092efd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b7ceeea4fab7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[multilateralism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[civil-society]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[global-governance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Katja Hemmerich]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 12 Jul 2026 18:33:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-13T15:21:36.790Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="Globe with diverse stick figures connected across it." src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bJLP9pANNHefrUvVzFtAPg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Article 71 of the UN Charter authorizes the Economic and Social Council to consult non-governmental organizations on matters within its competence while implicitly reconfirming that it is member states who are the only and real decision-makers, who ultimately determine how much — or how little — to engage with civil society. Systematic engagement of civil society organizations (CSOs) was begun primarily by UNDP and UNEP in the 1970s who sought their inputs in policy negotiations. While engagement between the UN and civil society has overall increased and expanded since then, it has been subject to ups and downs, depending on how willing member states are to involve them and potentially dilute their own decision-making authority. This tension is captured in the UN80 resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 2025, which makes a point of <em>“Recognizing the central role of Member States in the reform process, which should be inclusive and transparent”</em> (<a href="https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/79/318">A/RES/79/318</a>).</p><p>This tension was also evident at the Global Futures Forum, hosted by the <a href="https://c4unwn.org/">Coalition for the UN We Need</a> (C4UN) on Saturday, where many of the NGO participants wanted to assert a stronger role for civil society, while trying to glean from UN and member state participants what they needed from civil society in order to open the door to their participation. This month’s spotlight flips this debate around, to explore whether the UN actually needs civil society, and if so, why. The evidence from UN evaluations and independent research indicates that civil society provides a unique contribution that strengthens the UN’s accountability as well as its ability to deliver. For those engaged in UN reform who want a more effective and accountable UN, there is therefore a need to consider how and when a reformed UN should engage civil society — not just through consultative meetings but through clearly defined and managed processes and procedures that leverage their unique value-add.</p><h4>Civil society’s contribution extends beyond policy inputs</h4><p>Discussions in New York, including the Global Futures Forum on Saturday, naturally tend to gravitate towards arguments about how civil society participation has improved policy outcomes. Examples include how CSO advocacy led to the inclusion of SDG 16 on peace, justice and accountable institutions, which some member states were reluctant to include in the Sustainable Development Goals, or as the Permanent Representative of Jamaica, Ambassador Wallace noted, educating decision-makers on new issues, which led to the inclusion of the Declaration on Future Generations in the Pact for the Future. This influence on policy can be perceived as an additional channel for Global North injects, but as a recent study by the Latin American thinktank CEPEI has highlighted, the most successful influencers are transnational networks and Global South coalitions.</p><blockquote>“Civil society actors — especially those embedded in transnational networks and Global South coalitions — play a pivotal role in informal diplomacy. Through technical briefings, annotated drafts, and real-time consultations, CSOs influence member state positions and shape the framing of resolutions. Their advocacy often determines which issues gain traction, how language is negotiated, and which constituencies are represented.”<em> — CEPEI, “</em><a href="https://cepei.org/en/documents/the-triple-disconnect-power-money-and-voice-in-the-un-development-system-mapping-influence-and-informality/"><em>The Triple Disconnect</em></a><em>”, 2026</em></blockquote><p>A key area where international organizations have seen a direct organizational benefit from civil society influence on policy-making is with respect to the adoption of more effective accountability mechanisms. Despite member states’ rhetoric about improved accountability, it is actually civil society organizations whose lobbying has driven their expansion in particular in multilateral development banks (MDBs), as well as in the UN, where they successfully pushed for UNDP to adopt Social and Environmental Standards, and a related accountability mechanism for complaints and compliance reviews. Most research on the effectiveness of these complaints mechanisms is focused on MDBs, all of which now have a grievance procedure for community complaints. And that research demonstrates that the power imbalances between MDBs and the countries receiving loans or grants from them have been mitigated by the ability of communities or individuals to seek redress through complaints mechanisms, like the World Bank’s Inspection Panel (IP). These mechanisms improve the accountability of MDBs, by ensuring compliance with their own standards and improving the quality of programme outcomes:</p><blockquote>“[The Inspection Panel] has reduced errors and at times corruption within Bank management, and made it harder to conduct shoddy analysis or rush projects to meet deadlines and lending targets. Transparency from the IP has facilitated the involvement of displaced and indigenous communities in WB policymaking through formal Action Plans, and functionally made the WB more accountable to the lives of those affected by projects.” <em>— B. Sovacool, ‘</em><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320377678_Cooperative_or_Inoperative_Accountability_and_Transparency_at_the_World_Bank&#39;s_Inspection_Panel"><em>Cooperative or Inoperative? Accountability and Transparency at the World Bank’s Inspection Panel</em></a><em>’, 2017</em></blockquote><p>Research also demonstrates that this accountability effect is most consistent when local communities are supported in submitting their complaints by national and international NGOs, each of whom provide a different but complementary function that moves them from advocates for accountability mechanisms to enablers of actual accountability of MDBs. This is good for all of their member states, while also increasing accountability to those countries receiving grants or loans.</p><blockquote>“These [grievance mechanisms] can compensate for — and complement — weaknesses in a state’s administrative sovereignty, but also bypass — and threaten it. This is because grievances may not be just viewed as challenging the actions of the MDB, but potentially viewed as an act against the sovereign state, who agreed to the loan. Although this emphasizes the importance of transnational administration for states, the power of these mechanisms to substantively alter national-level policy arrangements is limited; there are only a handful of isolated cases where grievances have contributed to changes in national law.”<em> — E. Gunaydin &amp; S. Park, “</em><a href="https://academic.oup.com/policyandsociety/article/43/1/83/7224299"><em>Accountability enablers? The role of transnational activism in the use of the multilateral development bank grievance mechanisms</em></a><em>”, (2024)</em></blockquote><h4>Why the UN needs civil society to deliver on its mandates</h4><p>Civil society’s positive impact on international organizations’ performance and accountability is also demonstrated through their engagement in operational activities in a variety of different UN contexts. Both <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/german-law-journal/article/dissecting-stakeholder-participation-in-un-human-rights-treaty-body-activities-with-normative-and-empirical-approaches-a-comparison-of-ngo-and-nhri-participation/BD91B5D62D4E16509FE679C942306087#fn9">academe</a> and the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/treaty-bodies/ccpr/information-civil-society-ngos-and-national-human-rights-institutions">UN</a> have recognized that civil society participation in the work of UN human rights treaty bodies improve their fact-finding capacity and by extension the quality of their recommendations, and that CSOs are key enablers of effective monitoring and implementation of those recommendations on the ground — something both I and the founder of <a href="https://cedawtt.org/">CEDAW’s Committee of Trinidad and Tobago</a>, who participated in Saturday’s Global Futures Forum have seen firsthand in our work with treaty bodies. In addition, the accountability effects of individual complaints mechanisms of human rights treaty bodies are also strengthened when civil society supports petitioners, according to a <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-024-09564-1">2024 stud</a>y, much in the same way as with the MDB grievance mechanisms.</p><p>Strangely, there has been a lot less analysis about the impact of CSOs on the UN’s development and humanitarian work. While putting together a <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Z-4aBd71pox7elGzyoCJFde7Q39h47G9/view?usp=sharing">synthesis of evidence</a> on the impact of NGO implementing partners for C4UN, I was surprised to discover that UN evaluations — and those of the Multilateral Organization Performance Network (MOPAN) never systematically compare the effectiveness of implementation modalities. Yet, a closer review of evaluations highlights that NGO implementing partners have clearly contributed to improved outcomes for UN organizations, in particular because of their local knowledge and established relationships and trust with local communities — assets that the UN cannot readily recreate. As one of the only UN evaluation documents to systematically collect information on the effectiveness of implementing partnerships, WFP’s 2023 “Synthesis of evidence and lessons on WFP’s cooperating partners from centralized and decentralized evaluations” (<a href="https://www.wfp.org/publications/synthesis-evidence-and-lessons-wfps-cooperating-partners-centralized-and-decentralized">OEV/2023/022</a>) noted that implementing partners provided invaluable contributions to all four of WFP’s strategic objectives with NGOs providing strong contributions to the provision of lifesaving assistance, the improvement of nutrition, health and education outcomes, and improved and sustainable livelihoods.</p><blockquote>“The evaluations found that cooperating partnerships were key to WFP’s life-saving assistance, enhancing its ability to reach vulnerable people, access hard-to-reach areas and improve targeting.”<em> — WFP, “Synthesis of evidence and lessons on WFP’s cooperating partners from centralized and decentralized evaluations” (</em><a href="https://www.wfp.org/publications/synthesis-evidence-and-lessons-wfps-cooperating-partners-centralized-and-decentralized"><em>OEV/2023/022</em></a><em>), para. 13, (2023)</em></blockquote><p>The data point that many UN evaluations do pick up on quite systematically is that NGO implementers often have different levels of capacity, and those with weaker capacity can create performance risks or challenges. Many of these capacity challenges are exacerbated by how the UN manages those implementing arrangements, for instance due to delays in finalizing agreements and disbursing funds; poor two-way communication and sharing of project and administrative information; and limited or ineffective support for NGO overhead costs or training, often resulting from donor conditions. When the UN works with NGOs to address their capacity gaps, in particular through feedback mechanisms that are becoming more commonplace in UN agencies, funds and programmes like WFP, UNICEF and UNOPS for example, the UN also tends to improve its own procedures for managing NGO implementers and gains evidence that it can take back to donors to sometimes negotiate a reduction of the conditions that undermine strong performance.</p><h4>UN reforms should leverage civil society’s value-add</h4><p>This brings us full circle to our initial assertion that anyone interested in an effective and accountable UN should find ways to facilitate civil society engagement in the work of the UN. The evidence demonstrates that engagement of CSOs in different contexts and aspects of the UN’s work is already adding value to how well it delivers, how accountable it is, and how ambitious it can be in setting international goals and standards — all of which is key for rebuilding trust in the UN across stakeholders. Accordingly, engagement of civil society in UN structures and processes should be part of the current reform processes, and should leverage their unique contributions that are derived from their role as independent stakeholders not just in the policymaking realm, but also in the delivery of results. Leveraging these contributions should rely on evidence to understand not only the best modalities for how to engage civil society, but also how to leverage their diversity, in particular the complementary but often diverse benefits and competitive advantages of local, national and international NGOs and related coalitions and networks.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.reformworks.org/post/does-the-un-need-civil-society"><em>https://www.reformworks.org</em></a><em> on July 12, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b7ceeea4fab7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Global Public Knows What it Wants from UN Reform & the next SG]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@k_hemmerich/the-global-public-knows-what-it-wants-from-un-reform-the-next-sg-ca37cd05890c?source=rss-163d81092efd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ca37cd05890c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[un-secretary-general]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unreforms]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[multilateralism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Katja Hemmerich]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2026 13:33:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-06-16T13:30:56.592Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/0*sL352Sv1DloHtNnV.jpg" /></figure><p>Given the general pessimism about the direction of multilateralism and the UN, I was struck by a recent LinkedIn post featuring new public opinion polling across 31 countries in March and April 2026 indicating a resurgence in public support for international cooperation. A little further digging found that this was not just a one off. Another opinion poll undertaken for the Rockefeller Foundation across 34 countries in August and September 2025 that found <em>“a majority (55%) globally agree their country should cooperate on global challenges even if it means compromising on national interests.”</em></p><p>Although slightly different, the surveys have the same analysis of why global public opinion on international cooperation is shifting. Aside from providing a rare positive perspective on the future of multilateralism, the surveys provide surprisingly tangible insights into global public perceptions about effective international collaboration and international institutions. And this in turn, starts to map out a vision to guide UN reform discussions — which has been a major gap to date. Our spotlight this month explores what the global public expects from UN reform and how this translates into some fundamental — and easily implementable — leadership priorities for the next SG.</p><h4>How and why global public opinion is shifting</h4><p>The questions posed by the two surveys, commissioned by the think tank Global Nation and the Rockefeller Foundation respectively, are quite different, yet their responses both highlight a recognition by people across the globe that they are personally affected by what happens on the global stage, in part because so much has changed there over the last year and a half. In the Rockefeller survey, undertaken by Focaldata, 54% of respondents expressly indicated that their lives are affected by events in other countries. Of note, is that in this survey, which was conducted in August and September 2025 after the various US Liberation Day and other tariffs had kicked in, the link between global developments and respondents’ personal realities was highlighted most strongly in the economic sphere.</p><p>Global Nation’s analysis of its data collected in March and April 2026 by Ipsos references a similar linkage between global events and respondents daily lives:</p><blockquote>“Trade Wars and the US-Iran conflict are bringing geopolitical instability directly into people’s daily lives, particularly through cost-of-living pressures. Issues like international law violations and the state of the global economy may once have felt abstract, but when consequences are felt in everyday life, they become immediate and personal. The data suggests that this is reinforcing public awareness that external shocks require international cooperation and collective resilience.”<em> — Global Nation, </em><a href="https://globalnation.world/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/At-its-darkest-hour-is-internationalism-back-1.pdf"><em>‘At its darkest hour, is internationalism back?</em></a><em>’, 2026</em></blockquote><p>Global Nation comes to this conclusion because they’ve been running this poll annually and 2026 is the first time in recent years that declining commitment to global solidarity across their three questions has been reversed across all demographics. They ask three simple questions which gauge the extent to which people feel part of a global community, are willing to pay for it and are willing to have their country bound by global rules as outlined in Figure 1 below.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*f9Z1Y_7NzhJuXKK_.jpg" /></figure><p>That a growing number of people think that global rules should be enforced and that their taxes should be used to solve global problems directly contradicts the growing rhetoric that national interest justifies ignoring global rules and the 23% decline in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in 2025, recorded by the OECD. And it made me optimistic that that people are seeing the consequences of these policies, and don’t necessarily support the growing global disorder.</p><p>But as the Rockefeller Foundation poll highlights, this does not directly translate into a desire for a return to the old rules-based order or greater trust in international organizations. The support appears largely conditional on people perceiving that international cooperation gets results that impact the world, their country and their own lives. And even more interestingly, results are significantly more important to people than the cost of such international collaboration.</p><blockquote>“People care less about whether cooperation is cheap, and more about whether it delivers real results. When asked what would increase their support for international cooperation, people respond far more strongly to proof of effectiveness than to promises of lower costs. Globally, support is 15–18 percentage points higher when cooperation is framed as solving problems — whether globally or in their own country — compared to when it is framed around reducing costs.”<em> — Rockefeller Foundation, ‘</em><a href="https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/reports/demanding-results-global-views-on-international-cooperation/"><em>Demanding Results: Global Views on International Cooperation</em></a><em>’, Sept. 2025</em></blockquote><h3>How the surveys inform UN reform</h3><p>And this is precisely where these surveys can start to inform UN reform processes. Cutting costs without also making the UN more effective won’t actually get the organization on a more sustainable footing. While UN80 discussions keep highlighting the importance of effectiveness in addition to efficiency, the reality is that recent funding cuts are so extreme that the UN will need to do less with less — doing more with less is simply impossible. The UN therefore needs a vision around which it can prioritize its limited resources and political capital. Neither the 36 page Pact for the Future resolution or other processes have been able to provide such a focused direction or vision of the future. But these opinion surveys shed light on what the public sees as a priority, and how effectiveness is likely to be judged, which can — and should — inform reform processes and UN priorities.</p><p>Effectiveness, as highlighted in these surveys is about managing and addressing global problems that affect people’s every day lives across all countries, regions, income levels, genders and other demographics. It’s not about better log frames, or streamlined mandates, or using AI instead of people for interpretation — its about getting countries to work together in a way that their own people and the global public at large feel has a positive impact on their lives irrespective of whether they are in a developing or industrialized country.</p><blockquote>“For most, cooperation is not about abstract ideals or diplomatic prestige. When asked what should motivate countries to work together, one in three people worldwide say ensuring peace and stability is the top reason for countries to cooperate, making it the undisputed first motivation in every region surveyed.”<em> — Rockefeller Foundation, ‘</em><a href="https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/reports/demanding-results-global-views-on-international-cooperation/"><em>Demanding Results: Global Views on International Cooperation</em></a><em>’, Sept. 2025</em></blockquote><p>The important nuance here is that people want peace and stability, which goes beyond how the UN defines ‘peace and security’:</p><blockquote>“People see global cooperation as essential for managing both everyday needs and global risks. There is overwhelming agreement that international cooperation is important for addressing key issues. At the top are food and water security (93%), trade and economic development (92%), conflict prevention and peacekeeping (92%), human rights protection (92%), and global health and pandemics (91%). A second cluster of priorities includes poverty and inequality (90%), jobs (90%), and strengthening national security (90%), showing the strong link people make between cooperation, livelihoods, and stability.”<em> — Rockefeller Foundation, ‘</em><a href="https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/reports/demanding-results-global-views-on-international-cooperation/"><em>Demanding Results: Global Views on International Cooperation</em></a><em>’, Sept. 2025</em></blockquote><p>These are all global challenges even if they affect different countries in different ways. I’m writing this spotlight from Canada, where many people I talk to perceive the current US administration’s interest in making Canada the 51st state not just as a way to access Canada’s oil resources, but also its fresh water reserves. There are citizens in many other countries with different levels of development that likely share similar concerns about their neighbours. If multilateralism is going to be perceived as effective, these opinion polls are telling us that it’s time to start demonstrating results for all of these people.</p><h3>What the next SG needs to prioritize and reform at the UN</h3><p>All this data and analysis therefore provides a useful roadmap for what the next Secretary-General should prioritize. As conflict between countries impacts not only the people caught in those conflicts directly, but the economic and food security of billions more across all regions, there is clearly a desire for the UN to return to basics and focus on what it was set up to do: enhance global ‘peace and stability’ by facilitating cooperation between states, even when that is difficult and resisted by some member states.</p><p>There are concrete ways to do that. One simple way is for the next SG to show up in “the hard places where the UN is most needed”, as a recent IPI article has suggested, and something that has apparently been de-prioritized in recent years.</p><blockquote>“As secretary-general, Guterres has not visited South Sudan, Sudan, Kosovo, Cyprus, or Western Sahara, all of which hosted a long-standing UN presence during his tenure and were visited by his predecessors. In fact, he has made no visits to peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan Africa in his second term. Nor did he travel to East Africa in 2023 when Sudan collapsed into chaos, Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, or Southeast Asia in 2025 during the Thailand–Cambodia conflict. After the Iran war started in February 2026, he conducted his response entirely from New York apart from one short solidarity trip to Lebanon.”<em> — Daniel Safran-Hon, </em><a href="https://theglobalobservatory.org/2026/06/where-does-the-secretary-general-go-travel-as-a-proxy-for-effort/"><em>Where Does the Secretary-General Go? Travel as a Proxy for Effort</em></a><em>, 2 June 2026</em></blockquote><p>This lack of engagement may be a reflection of the growing sense of futility that seems to be pervading the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs as a result of the growing political deadlock in the Security Council. It’s as if those working in the UN have forgotten that for the first 45 years of its existence, the UN navigated the divisions of the Cold War, ‘inventing’ peacekeeping and even convincing the Security Council to approve the first ever transitional administration UNTEA in West Irian less than a month before the Cuban missile crisis broke out. Such achievements are also going to be rare in this new era, but that is all the more reason why they need to be pursued. Part of that will be accepting that sometimes there are failures, as Daniel Safran-Hon has pointed out. Yet even in failure there can be positive improvements in peoples lives. A study published in the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jpr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jopres/xjaf023/8527750?login=false">Journal of Peace Research</a> in March demonstrates that SG visits to a country lead to measurable improvements in human right protection in those countries, even in the absence of coercive authority or the signing or any formal agreements.</p><p>This lack of enthusiasm for engaging member states is not just a personality specific issue of this SG, or those working with the Security Council, it is institutionalized in the UN’s current leadership framework. Nowhere does the <a href="https://unsceb.org/sites/default/files/imported_files/Leadership_0.pdf">UN’s leadership framework</a> indicate that facilitating agreements with and between member states is a core leadership function. In fact, the only mention of member states in the 16 page documents is to emphasize that leaders should engage <em>“the multiplicity of stakeholders beyond the Organization and its Member States”</em>.</p><p>All of these things are within the purview of the SG’s authority to change relatively quickly and easily to start demonstrating the value of the UN from the start of her or his new term. They can focus their time and energy on engaging with member states for peace and stability that affect peoples realities across the Global South and North. Other stakeholders become an important source of influence in addressing resistance to these efforts, as that same <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jpr/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jopres/xjaf023/8527750?login=false">Journal of Peace Research</a> article shows: <em>“by meeting with and publicly recognizing domestic civil society organizations, the UNSG strengthens their legitimacy and visibility, thereby increasing their capacity to maintain advocacy efforts and exert pressure on governments”</em>. That means just showing up where the UN is needed most needs to be another priority for the SG. And thirdly, make sure these priorities trickle down consistently to leadership across the organization, by recognizing this is a core function of UN leader and selecting and rewarding them on the basis of their willingness and abilities to engage with member states on the most difficult negotiations, while accepting that some of these initiatives might end in failure.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.reformworks.org/post/the-global-public-knows-what-it-wants-from-un-reform-the-next-sg"><em>https://www.reformworks.org</em></a><em> on June 14, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ca37cd05890c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[UN80: Better Mandate Information, Same Governance Disconnect]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@k_hemmerich/un80-better-mandate-information-same-governance-disconnect-f2e2496c1657?source=rss-163d81092efd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f2e2496c1657</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[un80]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unreforms]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[global-governance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Katja Hemmerich]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 17 May 2026 14:09:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-19T13:35:19.762Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/0*bcQ2ZnVGM_lc9IPe.jpg" /></figure><p>The new UN80 Adhoc Working Group on Mandate Implementation Review (AHWG) has shared its initial <a href="https://www.un.org/un80-initiative/en/media/613">draft templates</a>for a Concept Note and standard clauses on creating, reviewing and retiring mandates, and scheduled a consultation on these for 20 May 2026. On the surface the concept note template appears to be a useful tool to enhance collective decision-making by member states, by summarizing the context and rationale for a mandate, objectives and intended impact, mandate landscape, proposed activities and timelines, UN system implementation lead and indicative financial implications. Yet, all of this generally already exists when the UN General Assembly (UNGA) or other legislative bodies create mandates to be fulfilled by the UN Secretariat — begging the question: what is the ‘reform’ that UN80’s additional mandate information requirements achieve?</p><p>The main novelty appears to be the designation of a UN system lead. While this appears intended to limit bureaucratic competition and potential duplication, it is also likely to reinforce the governance disconnect that has plagued past efforts to reform the UN Development System, as mapped out in a recent study by the Colombian thinktank <a href="https://cepei.org/en/home/">CEPEI</a>. Our spotlight uses this research to explore the likelihood of UN80’s efforts at improving mandate-related information to change the UN system, and proposes some practical ways to mitigate rather than amplify the governance disconnects. We’ve also included some sample questions that member state delegates may wish to ask at the 20 May consultation.</p><h3>What problem is the concept note trying to solve?</h3><p>The rules of procedure of both the General Assembly (Rule 153) and the Economic and Social Council (Rule 31 para. 3) require that the Secretary-General, or more specifically the head of the department that will lead implementation, to present those bodies with an estimate of the programme budget implications before any resolution can be voted on (see rule 105.8 of the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspect of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (ST/SGB/2000/8; GA res. 53/207). Even if there are no obvious programme budget implications, or PBIs, this must be confirmed by the Secretariat’s Programme, Planning and Budget Division (PPBD). PPBD has nicely <a href="https://www.un.org/en/ga/second/78/docs/PBI_Process.pdf">mapped</a> out this process as set out in the graphic below, demonstrating that there is already a functioning system in place to identify lead departments in the Secretariat for implementation and ensure that member states are aware of any financial implications before they vote. Moreover, when the Secretary-General (SG) proposes a new mandate through one of his or her reports, in my experience, it always contains an explanation of the rationale, planned activities and timeline (although sometimes this can be quite vague).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/0*p9azc11gwkkLQ_fb.jpg" /></figure><p>Source: UN Programme Planning and Budget Division (PPBD)</p><p>So what problem is the concept note trying to solve? Sure, there are likely mandates being proposed by member states in the absence of a Secretary-General’s report, and the concept note will force them to put down in writing the aim of this new mandate, which one would hope is already being explained in the various informal discussions as the resolution is negotiated. UN80’s aim is reportedly to reduce the duplciation across the UN system. So the key new element that the draft concept note brings to the process is identifying a lead implementer for the entire UN system. Thus, the reform that the concept note appears to be initiating is to broaden the existing procedures from the Secretariat to agencies, funds and programmes, as well as specialized agencies.</p><p>Yet, it does so quite tentatively. Indicative financial implications are not required to be provided consistently, but only upon request. The process for how a lead entity is identified is not clearly spelled out, and there is no space in the note to indicate the reasons why this entity should lead implementation, i.e. in relation to comparative advantage, capacity or existing access to funding. Perhaps more importantly, there is no way to indicate whether the designation of a particular entity as the implementation lead has been discussed, much less agreed by the leadership or the governing body of that entity. All information on the technical lead comes solely from the UN Secretariat’s technical focal point supporting the mandate process.</p><h3>The governance disconnect that UN80’s mandate information doesn’t resolve</h3><p>This is unfortunately a typical shortcoming of efforts to implement UN system-wide reforms. These efforts consistently fail to openly acknowledge the limited authority and power of the UNGA and the SG over UN entities outside the UN Secretariat. The UNGA and SG really have no authority to make decisions over the specialized agencies, like WHO, UNESCO or the ILO. And while Agencies, funds and programmes have a nominal reporting line to the GA, it is not as direct as the line between Department heads of the Secretariat and the UNGA — and most importantly, and there are no real accountability mechanisms to ensure UNGA guidance is implemented.</p><p>This became evident when the development system was most recently ‘repositioned’ in 2017 and all governing boards received different levels and types of reporting on the changes made by each entity, impeding alignment and coherence of systemic change. Even once the UNGA adopted resolution 76/4 in 2021 mandating that the Chair of the Sustainable Development Group create a “UN Development System Reform Checklist for UNSDG Entities’ Governing Bodies”, it took several years for many of the specialized agencies to start using it.</p><p>The much larger problem beyond the incoherence of reporting lines and formal authorities is the lack of power that decision-making bodies have because they don’t actually control the money outside the UN Secretariat in the way that the Fifth Committee reviews and approves each PBI and each programme of work and related budget. This disconnect has been mapped out for the UN Development System in a new study by the Colombian thinktank CEPEI, which it calls:</p><blockquote>“a system in which no single body has a full picture of UN finances, and no forum can align resources with collectively agreed priorities across all funding streams.”<em> — P. Schönrock et al., ‘</em><a href="https://cepei.org/en/documents/the-triple-disconnect-power-money-and-voice-in-the-un-development-system-mapping-influence-and-informality/"><em>The Triple Disconnect: Power, Money, and Voice in the UN Development System</em></a><em>’, 2026</em></blockquote><p>The efforts to reform the development system by member states and the UN through the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (QCPR), the UNGA’s central instrument for guiding the UN Development System, provides useful lessons for the Adhoc Working Group on Mandate Implementation Review.</p><p>The QCPR is negotiated every four years in the General Assembly’s Second Committee, which lends it significant legitimacy given that the Committee is the only legislative body dealing with development that has universal membership. This is the same legitimacy that the Adhoc Working Group and hopefully the templates will have once approved by the General Assembly.</p><p>But the power to implement and effect change is where the money is. The Second Committee only has the authority to consider the financial implications of their decisions when the Secretariat is a lead agency and a PBI is required. With respect to development programming, CEPEI estimates that consists of only about 5% of the UN system’s development funding. As a result, the Second Committee has very limited power to actually operationalize any new mandates, and by extension to constrain development mandates that may be duplicative. Even the Executive Boards, if they choose to be guided by the UNGA mandates, only have decision-making power over about 13% of the development system’s funding which comes in the form of core funding. The reality is that 80–85% of development funding is channeled outside those governance systems through earmarked voluntary funding, subject to the decision-making of funders and UN leadership, when it feels it can exert some influence on how that funding is used. It should therefore not be surprising that the positive reform intentions embodied in the QCPR have not seen a corresponding level of change in how the UN development system works. As CEPEI has highlighted:</p><blockquote>“the Second Committee embodies the UNDS legitimacy paradox in concentrated form: universal participation without corresponding influence, formal authority without operational impact, and comprehensive guidance without implementation mechanisms.”<em> — P. Schönrock et al., ‘</em><a href="https://cepei.org/en/documents/the-triple-disconnect-power-money-and-voice-in-the-un-development-system-mapping-influence-and-informality/"><em>The Triple Disconnect: Power, Money, and Voice in the UN Development System</em></a><em>’, 2026</em></blockquote><h4>The lessons to be learned</h4><p>In many ways, the Adhoc Working Group, as a body of the General Assembly, is analogous to the Second Committee. It has legitimacy and the concept note and templates should provide comprehensive guidance and information. But at the same time, it lacks an implementation mechanism and the power to create operational impact outside the UN Secretariat. Ultimately, there is a need for member states to address these disconnects between authority, governance mechanism hierarchies and power — a point which has also become obvious in discussions around the SG’s proposal to merge UN entities whose governing bodies are outside his authority. As a first step in trying to create real coherence in the governance of the UN system, the Adhoc Working Group may want to formally request all other governing bodies of UN system entities to adopt comparable templates and standard clauses for when they adopt, review and retire mandates.</p><p>In the absence of the political will to tackle these more controversial governance issues, the Adhoc Working Group can also learn from the UN Development System (UNDS) reforms and mitigate some of these weaknesses. If integrating UNDS reform objectives into forward planning, i.e. in strategic plans across the UN system, needed to be supplemented by standardized checklists on reporting what has actually been accomplished that inform both governing bodies and the UNGA, then perhaps a similar reporting approach should be considered as part of the AHWG’s templates. Rather than replicating the PBI process — for which the UNGA really has no authority outside the Secretariat, perhaps member states should have discussions about the anticipated mix of funding that will inevitably be needed for any new mandates, and the implications of relying on predominantly earmarked, core or assessed funding.</p><p>These are practical lessons that can be learnt from past reforms, which member states have repeatedly requested. To start translating these lessons into concrete actions, ReformWorks suggests that delegates may want to ask some or all of the following questions at the 20 May consultation on the templates:</p><ul><li>Can standardized language on UN system-wide evaluations that assess what lead implementers and any other parts of the UN system have achieved in implementing that mandate, and any related operational, financial or governance impediments be included in the standardized review clauses for active operational mandates, long-term programme mandates and/or mandates whose continuation depends on situational progress?</li><li>Can a standardized checklist be created or be required when there are multiple UN entities implementing a mandate, so that information contained in reports of the Secretary-General requested by the UNGA are aligned with reports that non-Secretariat entities provide to their governing bodies?</li><li>Can the concept note include a summary of the planning assumptions on how the mandate will be funded to clarify expectations around assessed and voluntary funding, and whether voluntary funding will be from an entity’s core funding or other sources subject to earmarking?</li><li>Can the concept note indicate why a particular UN entity has been chosen as the system lead through a summary of that entity’s comparative advantage and its access to funding, or ability to raise funding for the mandate being considered?</li><li>Can the technical focal point be required to confirm whether and with whom in the lead entity the designation as such has been discussed?</li></ul><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.reformworks.org/post/un80-better-mandate-information-same-governance-disconnect"><em>https://www.reformworks.org</em></a><em> on May 17, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f2e2496c1657" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[UN80 Stagnation: An Opportunity for Bureaucratic Entrepreneurs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@k_hemmerich/un80-stagnation-an-opportunity-for-bureaucratic-entrepreneurs-bd13b38259d6?source=rss-163d81092efd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bd13b38259d6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unreforms]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[un80]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[multilateralism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Katja Hemmerich]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 15:30:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-19T19:44:46.570Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/666/0*2o7bzKeq60JY2LnK.jpg" /></figure><p>On 31 March 2026, UN reform watcher, Dr. Ronny Patz and the Global Governance Institute published a <a href="https://www.globalgovernance.eu/publications/the-un80-initiative-as-a-productive-failure-between-geopolitical-disruptions-and-organizational-path-dependency">comprehensive review </a>of the UN80 initiative after one year, deeming it a ‘productive failure’. While it produced UN system-wide reform discussions around systemic challenges beyond the current lack of funding, UN80 failed to converge the reform ideas into a real vision of the UN’s role in a changing global order. Political divisions and an inability to manage them are at the root of this failure, according to formal analyses and informal conversations I’ve had with UN staff and member states. This in turn appears to have led to a resignation amongst UN leadership and many member states that change is impossible in the current context. But is that really true?</p><p>Faced with these new realities, UN leaders seem to have found it acceptable, and perhaps even appropriate, to give up on delivering existing mandates or exploring ways to adapt to the new reality with the reasoning that money and/or political agreement they require is missing. This along with member states’ inability to find consensus on key issues, like solutions to the liquidity crisis, sets up a dangerous pattern of stagnation, if no one is willing to find alternative paths to change. I’ve been struck by how many people have told me that the UN can’t do much in terms of peace and security given the gridlock in the Security Council. OHCHR and UNOG hold public <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ptedDTbsPEU">briefings</a> to indicate they can’t run meetings or deliver mandated reports because of the funding crisis, with no indication that they are exploring options to combine those reports, or different working methods to allow meetings to continue in different ways. And even in the few areas where member states find agreement, like on the UN80 mandate review resolution, the Secretariat simply <a href="https://www.un.org/un80-initiative/sites/default/files/2026-03/Ruth%20De%20Miranda%20Talking%20Points.pdf">indicates</a> it cannot deliver the enhanced support requested by member states without additional staff — with no indication that it explored alternative methods of implementation. Everyone seems to be waiting for the next SG to arrive and create a magical vision for the future around which member states and UN leadership will coalesce — but this will not happen. So our spotlight this month explores an alternative pathway to change.</p><p>Waiting for the next SG to be appointed to develop a new vision for the UN condemns the UN to waiting for a kind of global consensus that previously characterized in the liberal international order. so that reform can happen at the systemic level. The wait is likely to be long — even if member states appoint the most capable SG. The wait and see approach therefore prevents the UN from adapting to the new global order that still requires multilateral action, even if some countries try to go it alone. As a new study highlights, the current systemic dysfunction and UN80 stagnation can actually be leveraged by bureaucratic entrepreneurs for an incremental (and realistic) pathway to change. As we explore in this month’s spotlight, this allows the UN to find ways to adapt what it works on and how by operationalizing the minilateralism that is increasingly characterizing the global order. We look at how it works and the enablers needed to start developing a bottom-up change process.</p><h4>Space for change in the face of political gridlock</h4><p>Much has been <a href="https://collections.fes.de/publikationen/ident/fes/21124">written</a> about how earmarked funding allows donor countries to redirect the work of UN organizations in their interest , ultimately undermining multilateral agreement on UN priorities. But as a new comparative study of WHO and UNODC’s policies and programming on narcotic drug outlines, earmarked funding can also be leveraged by bureaucratic entrepreneurs to adapt and evolve UN entities when multilateral consensus or agreement is lacking.</p><p>In their study of WHO and UNODC’s, Drs. Kortendiek and Zimmermann found that both organizations faced a policy impasse between competing views of member states on zero-tolerance versus harm reduction approaches. Both organizations had civil society partners (and some member states) providing evidence and advocating for harm reduction approaches — yet while WHO got stuck into a status quo policy of zero tolerance, UNODC was able to implement programmatic innovations focused on harm reduction, building evidence and practice for how and when it is most effective.</p><p>The key difference, according to Drs. Kortendiek and Zimmermann is that UNODC had access to earmarked funding from donors open to harm reduction processes, as well as operational capacity in the field to implement innovative programming and bring the data and evidence on their results into organizational learning. WHO by contrast only had access to assessed funding for its programming related to narcotic drugs, for which agreement amongst member states remained squarely focused on the zero tolerance status quo (particularly in the face of periodic threats of withdrawing US funding if the policy changed).</p><p>The comparison highlights not only that UN entities are able to address challenges, even in a world that is evolving rapidly and facing growing divisions between powerful member states and decision-making blocs. It can do so through incremental changes at field level and the building of minilateral coalitions of like-minded states rather than through systemic level change. Examples exist beyond those studied by researchers in the health field — much of the UN’s climate security work was developed through the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) partnership through UNDP using earmarked voluntary funding long before the Security Council could even agree to put it on their agenda, for instance.</p><h4>Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship’s Enablers and Risks</h4><p>More than demonstrating that such bottom up change is possible, the study also identifies key enablers for evolving the UN’s work in the face of political gridlock. The most important enabler is the existence of bureaucratic entrepreneurs, who are more than just innovators, but who also have a strong understanding of how their organization functions as well as the relevant substantive area. These bureaucratic entrepreneurs have access to operational capacities to implement innovative approaches — meaning this strategy only works in operational entities, rather than purely normative ones. This operational capacity also needs to be matched with the capacity and willingness to capture the learning from these innovations in tools such as after action reviews, evaluations and codifying them in internal guidance on best practices and lessons learnt.</p><blockquote>“Bureaucratic entrepreneurs in different thematic units have a deep understanding of the organizational environment they are embedded in and know how to make it work toward change…They use their direct access to the field and broker coalitions with sympathetic donors to work with target groups on the ground and develop practical guidance that changes the policy status quo. Without the combination of earmarked funding and a broad portfolio of operational activities, this type of policy change would not be possible.”<em> — Kortendiek &amp; Zimmerman, </em><a href="https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/70/2/sqag021/8651050"><em>“Walking the Walk, Not Talking the Talk: Project Features and Policy Change in International Organizations”</em></a><em>, 2026</em></blockquote><p>By implication, such a strategy for change also requires leadership that is willing to take on the related risks — which are not insignificant. In addition to the general willingness to try new things and take on the risk of changing the status quo, leadership needs to absorb and proactively manage the risks associated with relying on earmarked funding from a small group of donors, as well as the risk of direct resistance by other member states. These risks are inherently mitigated by moving the change process to the field, which is farther away from the entrenched member state politics of headquarters. Collaboration between UN entities with different political dynamics, such as the UNDP and DPPA collaboration on climate security can also mitigate some of the political risks. Similarly, efforts to build coalitions of like-minded member states should focus on more than just who has the most money. Building diverse coalitions of member states across regional groupings and negotiating blocs mitigates the political risks within UN decision-making while also helping to build broader political coalitions when there is an appropriate opening to scale successes and effect more systemic change. Moreover, diverse coalitions of donor states also mitigate the financial risks created when domestic political conditions in certain regions affect the willingness to fund the UN and/or international assistance.</p><p>These are strategic risks to be managed, and not just funding risks to be delegated to the partnerships unit or checked off in a risk matrix. It requires an understanding of political dynamics, operational and organizational processes and stakeholder management, which is likely why the change process outlined by Drs. Kortendiek and Zimmermann centres around mid- to senior-level bureaucratic entrepreneurs.</p><blockquote>“Entrepreneurial bureaucrats in these units can informally adapt their organization’s policy stance to pressures for change in the organizational environment by implementing new projects in the field and developing the correlative organizational guides and policy scripts — if they manage to convince sympathetic donors and avoid attracting the attention of powerful status quo states.”<em> — Kortendiek &amp; Zimmerman, </em><a href="https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/70/2/sqag021/8651050"><em>“Walking the Walk, Not Talking the Talk: Project Features and Policy Change in International Organizations”</em></a><em>, 2026</em></blockquote><h4>How Bureaucratic Entrepreneurs re-envisage the UN’s role in the face of UN80 stagnation</h4><p>While the study articulating this incremental process for change is new, history reinforces that much of the UN’s role evolved through incremental change and bureaucratic entrepreneurialism. Peacekeeping was not envisaged in the Charter, but developed in the face of Cold War divisions through collaboration between UN leadership and smaller coalitions of like-minded member states that ultimately built support for consensus. The UN’s role in monitoring and investigating serious human rights abuses evolved incrementally with voluntary funding often supporting the development of new methods of work and investigative techniques. This not only helped improve the UN’s capacity and credibility in this area, but also convinced enough member states to form the unique <a href="https://iiim.un.org/">IIIM mechanism</a> for Syria to support justice processes for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in spite of UN staff not being able to access Syria and political gridlock in the Security Council.</p><p>The reality is that there will be no global UN meeting at which all member states agree on their vision of the UN for the future, and create a coherent systemic reform process to enable that role. But if the UN and like-minded member states can create space for bureaucratic entrepreneurialism, the UN will be able to adapt to new realities and demonstrate how it can add value in the emerging global order.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.reformworks.org/post/un80-stagnation-an-opportunity-for-bureaucratic-entrepreneurs"><em>https://www.reformworks.org</em></a><em> on April 19, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bd13b38259d6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[UN80 Insights: Assessing the Value of a Merger of UNFPA & UNWomen]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@k_hemmerich/un80-insights-assessing-the-value-of-a-merger-of-unfpa-unwomen-5133604ddcb9?source=rss-163d81092efd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5133604ddcb9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[unreforms]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[un-women]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unfpa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[un80]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Katja Hemmerich]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 15 Mar 2026 17:55:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-16T21:10:12.880Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Testing an analytical framework based on comparative advantage</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/0*IF0WQVt81wBmvSEm.jpg" /></figure><p>At their most recent meetings in January and February, the Executive Boards of UNFPA and UNWomen received an update on the assessment of their potential merger, and this month, UN80 has published a <a href="https://www.un.org/un80-initiative/sites/default/files/2026-03/260306_As-Is%20Analysis%20as%20a%20baseline%20for%20the%20UNFPA%20UN%20Women%20Strategic%20Merger%20Assessment%20_WP4%205.pdf">baseline analysis</a> of UNFPA and UNWomen as part of Work Package 4 to help assess the implications of a potential merger. The Executive Board <a href="https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/unfpa-unw_slide_deck_-_for_pre_meeting_sharing.pdf">briefing</a>outlined the process and methodology for the assessment and some of the initial findings on benefits and risks. It is not a comprehensive presentation of the issues intended to support a decision at this stage. But somewhat inadvertently, it also demonstrates that there really are no clear or established criteria for determining when a merger of UN entities does or does not make sense.</p><p>In anticipation of this challenge, the Multilateral Performance Network (MOPAN) recently published a new <a href="https://www.mopan.org/en/our-work/performance-insights/multilateral-effectiveness-in-a-shifting-landscape/comparative-advantage-un80-summary.html">thematic brief</a> that provides a framework to compare the strengths of UN entities based on their comparative advantage. In this month’s spotlight, we test out this framework to assess the comparative advantages of UNFPA, UNWomen and OHCHR. Our analysis highlights an interesting set of complementarities and differences, and the importance of understanding what reforms are trying to achieve through mergers.</p><h3>Assessing Benefits and Risks of a UNFPA &amp; UNWomen Merger</h3><p>The approach followed by LEAD+, the consulting firm assessing the benefits and risks of a potential UNFPA and UNWomen merger, appears to use the typical approach to evaluation, mapping out specific questions to evaluate whether a merger can enhance impact, relevance, coherence, efficiency and credibility of the UN’s work on gender equality. It frames many of these questions around the concerns that have been raised by several member states and civil society groups that a merger would dilute the mandates of both UNWomen and UNFPA and make it a target for even greater contestation by stakeholders opposed to gender equality or reproductive rights (see PassBlue’s recent <a href="https://passblue.com/2026/01/29/doubts-and-risks-abound-over-a-possible-merger-of-2-un-entities-focusing-on-women/">summary</a> of these concerns). All of this seems to be a correct and reasonable approach but the preliminary conclusions reached are somewhat unsatisfactory.</p><p>The assessment finds that a merger will result in a stronger more unified voice on gender equality and sexual and reproductive, unlocking a ‘seamless value chain’ of impact from global standards to tangible change in communities while also providing greater resilience protecting hard won norms and backlash against gender equality. These are not wrong conclusions per se, but similar benefits could be cited for merging UNWomen with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and UNFPA with the World Heath Organization (WHO) or even UNICEF both of whom also work on sexual and reproductive health and preventing sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls.</p><p>This is where MOPAN’s approach focused on identifying what gives UN entities a comparative advantage in a particular area can add more value, because it provides a framework for comparing the relevant strengths of different entities. Based on its own evaluations, MOPAN notes that UN entities have increasingly been using the concept of comparative advantage to differentiate and coordinate their roles across the UN system, particularly at country level in order to minimize duplication and address policy and programming gaps. Yet, MOPAN also highlights that UN entities all define comparative advantage differently, with some focusing on the comparative advantages derived from mandates, while others focus on their operational capacities and expertise etc. For that reason, it sets out a framework to identify an entity’s comparative advantage across seven core functions which exist across the UN system:</p><ol><li><strong>Normative support</strong> for the implementation and monitoring of global agreements;</li><li><strong>Policy advice</strong> to assist countries in translating global commitments into national and local plans and budgets;</li><li><strong>Data analysis</strong> to inform evidence-based, context-specific and inclusive policy choices;</li><li><strong>Convening power</strong> across constituencies;</li><li><strong>Direct support</strong> and delivery of specific goods and services, particularly for countries in crisis; and,</li><li><strong>Financing</strong>, including provision of resources, ability to mobilize international and domestic resources, and supporting countries to leverage and align diverse funding streams and investments.</li></ol><h3>Testing the Comparative Advantage Framework</h3><p>MOPAN provides a test case of how this framework can be used to understand UNFPA’s comparative advantage. ReformWorks has expanded MOPAN’s table to identify the comparative advantages of UNWomen and OHCHR, given the concerns around the backlash against women’s rights. It’s not a thorough assessment, but uses information about what these organizations do best and demonstrate impact provided in current strategic plans and their 2024 annual reports. You can check out our full analysis <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1t4muBKpNR9wCA6DlWwTtSq9zRBTvxiE6aPct7SCpr5Q/edit?usp=sharing">here</a>.</p><p>What becomes very obvious when considering MOPAN’s different elements of comparative advantage is that merging UNWomen with OHCHR would bring together significant and largely complementary normative, policy support and convening powers. OHCHR has a mandate, expertise, and established partnerships for human rights protection that extends to judicial systems and national human rights institutions that are crucial for protecting ‘hard won norms’, and which UNFPA simply cannot offer. Both UNWomen and OHCHR have significant convening power across similar but slightly different civil society and governmental actors aimed at protecting civil spaces and reinforcing non-discrimination. Combining that power and leveraging it collectively could allow the UN to remain a relevant normative and policy support actor, despite significant reductions in resources. At the same time, the analysis highlights that there appears to be significant overlap in UNWomen’s and OHCHR’s mandates to coordinate and mainstream human rights and gender equality across the UN system. Combining this function and having one entity that speaks with a unified voice could strengthen or weaken this function — that is unclear from this level of analysis. But it could certainly rationalize the number of UN staff needed to coordinate these mandates and the amount of time that entities being coordinated dedicate to a single mainstreaming approach as compared to the dual approach that currently exists.</p><p>The comparative advantage analysis demonstrates that UNFPA adds limited value to a merged gender equality entity in terms of normative and policy support and convening powers. UNFPA does however have important comparative advantages in direct delivery and support services and financing in relation to sexual and reproductive health and sexual and gender-based violence. Particularly in crisis settings, UNFPA has a unique ability to procure and deliver goods and services for victims of sexual and gender-based violence and in support of sexual and reproductive health. OHCHR also has a comparative advantage in crisis settings — albeit a very different one — to investigate and report on serious human rights violations when mandated by the Security Council or Commission on Human Rights. MOPAN’s analytical framework highlights these very different comparative advantages, and makes it easy to understand that these are generally incompatible. The collaborative relationships, expertise and logistical capacities needed for UNFPA to deliver in crisis cannot be combined with the mandate authority, impartiality and expertise needed for OHCHR to report on human rights violations committed by state and non-state actors.</p><p>But what about UNWomen? It does not appear to have a unique comparative advantage in crisis situations, and yet according to the <a href="https://www.un.org/un80-initiative/sites/default/files/2026-03/260306_As-Is%20Analysis%20as%20a%20baseline%20for%20the%20UNFPA%20UN%20Women%20Strategic%20Merger%20Assessment%20_WP4%205.pdf">UN80 Work Package 4 Baseline Analysis </a>for the merger, it invests a third of its programmatic resources in crisis and conflict settings, as the UN system lead on Women, Peace and Security. This leads to an immediate question of whether that really is the best investment of those funds, or whether this investment could in fact have a stronger impact by exploiting UNFPA’s or OHCHR’s unique comparative advantage in crisis and conflict settings. Answering this question will also require some reflect about what member states and beneficiaries need most in crisis settings. Does a merged entity add more value in providing direct support and service delivery for women in crisis settings, or by monitoring, investigating and reporting on violations of women’s rights? Finding stakeholder consensus on these types of questions may be an easier way of facilitating multilateral agreement than trying to have stakeholders make value judgements about whether the current assessment is correct in projecting that a merger between UNFPA and UNWomen will be “better equipped to withstand backlash, protect hard-won norms and drive progress even in crisis, conflict and climate-affected contexts” (Slide 15 of the LEAD+ briefing).</p><h3><strong>What Decision-Makers Need to Know about Potential Mergers</strong></h3><p>Our experiment demonstrates the value of MOPAN’s comparative advantage framework in considering mergers and other reforms. But it also needs to be supplemented by two similar analytical tools that do not yet exist in the UN system.</p><p>As the LEAD+ assessment implies, there is significant change management work that needs to accompany mergers and other reform efforts. The UN’s own evaluations have highlighted that too little attention is paid to implementation planning and leadership of reforms to ensure that hidden costs don’t outweigh the benefits (see for instance the JIU’s reports on change management, <a href="https://www.unjiu.org/news/jiurep20194-review-change-management-united-nations-system-organizations">JIU/REP/2019/4</a>, and consolidation of administrative services, <a href="https://www.unjiu.org/sites/www.unjiu.org/files/jiu_document_files/products/en/reports-notes/JIU%20Products/JIU_REP_2016_11_English.pdf">JIU/REP/2016/11</a>). The current merger assessment has already highlighted some of these concrete risks around managing legislative decision-making on the merger and impacts on host country agreements, as well as workforce and culture integrations. Not only do these need to be mapped out, but there needs to be an assessment of the leadership capacity to manage these change issues and an effort to quantify these indirect and hidden costs.</p><p>And this in turn means there need to be some system-wide definitions and methodologies for calculating direct and indirect costs and efficiencies — a point made last year by the ‘cluster’ of UN leaders providing inputs to UN80’s Workstream 3 last June. In the absence of baseline data on current efficiency levels, it is impossible to measure the impact of mergers on efficiency and determine whether mergers really do add value to the UN in these challenging financial times. The <a href="https://www.un.org/un80-initiative/sites/default/files/2026-03/260306_As-Is%20Analysis%20as%20a%20baseline%20for%20the%20UNFPA%20UN%20Women%20Strategic%20Merger%20Assessment%20_WP4%205.pdf">UN80 baseline analysis</a> provides a very good overview of the governance mechanisms, structures, workforce and finances of both UNFPA and UNWomen to help readers understand the technical aspects and implications of a potential merger. But the only way that data can be used to measure efficiencies that might be gained is by calculating whether a merged entity results in fewer personnel overall or a reduction in the number of field offices. There is no way to measure the extent to which a merger might slow down delivery, or the costs involved in implementation and change management which the Executive Board briefing has highlighted.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.reformworks.org/post/un80-insights-assessing-the-value-of-a-merger-of-unfpa-unwomen"><em>https://www.reformworks.org</em></a><em> on March 15, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5133604ddcb9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Unpacking the Dilemmas of the UN Compensation Package]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@k_hemmerich/unpacking-the-dilemmas-of-the-un-compensation-package-3d494688870d?source=rss-163d81092efd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3d494688870d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[un-compensation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[unreforms]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[un80]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Katja Hemmerich]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Feb 2026 21:30:52 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-21T21:13:54.911Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Updated: Feb 9, 2026</p><p>Over the next few months, debates over how the UN compensates its workforce will intensify with the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) aiming to complete its review of the compensation package by July, and the Fifth Committee considering the proposal to provide financial support to unpaid interns in March. Competing social‑media narratives from the U.S. Permanent Mission and staff unions have pushed salary levels and benefits into the spotlight, with narratives focused on the link between adequate compensation and workforce engagement versus the need to cut costs. The entrenched positions of different stakeholders coupled with heated nature of debates will make this a particularly difficult challenge for the ICSC to resolve.</p><p>Our spotlight this month unpacks how important the compensation package is in shaping the quality and effectiveness of the UN’s workforce, and explores data that highlights where there are areas for compromise that won’t undermine workforce quality and diversity. Our analysis also highlights that new approaches to how member states and the UN leadership manage staffing allocations and incentivize effective and efficient management may provide more impactful solutions to the current financial crisis and longstanding concerns about the effectiveness and adaptability of the UN workforce.</p><h3>Is the UN compensation package the key into attracting talent?</h3><p>While ICSC discussions reflect concerns from staff unions as well as the HR Network that reductions in the compensation package will exacerbate difficulties in attracting specialized expertise, this is unfortunately somewhat of a red herring for two reasons. First, there is little evidence to support that the UN is having trouble attracting talent. ICSC debates reflect statements of concern but the annual report provides no data to support the assertion. Conversely, the UN Secretariat, as the largest employer within the UN system indicated clearly in last year’s human resources debate in the General Assembly that it is not struggling to attract candidates. Data from 2017–2020 shows that the Secretariat consistently received an average of more than 300 applications for each vacancy, except during during the pandemic in 2020 where it dropped to an average of 188 applicants per vacancy (A/77/590, para. 42). Even more telling is that despite not compensating interns, the UN Secretariat has managed recruit an average of 2,200 interns per year (A/79/566/Add.1, paras. 5).</p><p>The second reason that the transactional link between compensation and ability to attract talent is a red herring, is that it generally assumes that salary levels motivate potential talent for the UN in the same way as in the private sector. But there is considerable evidence that talent interested in working for the UN is motivated differently. Understanding these nuances of what the UN’s real employee value proposition is can create new options on how to resolve the current compensation debates.</p><p>In 2024, ReformWorks together with Talentum Consulting surveyed 635 Millennials and GenZ from 117 countries, 93% of whom indicated they were actively pursuing an international career. Our study highlighted not only that this group was motivated differently than typical GenZ and Millennial jobseekers, but also that benefits, job security and good management were key to retaining a diverse, engaged and adaptive workforce.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/704/1*DEdU0mUXmYUxO-WWzgEsUg.jpeg" /></figure><p>The graph compares the top reasons why Millennials and GenZ choose to apply to an employer generally, as per Deloitte’s 2024 employment survey, versus our international job seekers. The mandate of an organization, and the ability for an employee to have a positive impact on society rank ask key priorities for international job seekers that don’t factor into domestic job seekers calculations. And when we asked our respondents to indicate their employer of choice: 90% indicated it was the United Nations, which ranked considerable higher than INGOs and regional organizations, which were the next most popular choices.</p><p>While compensation is not irrelevant it is on the bottom of the list of key considerations for international job seekers. The picture changes dramatically however, when we asked international job seekers to rank what they perceive as the most important elements that make up a ‘good job’ (see graph below). A comfortable salary was ranked first, with additional qualitative responses highlighting that this also included some reassurance of job security and continuity of that salary. This is particularly salient in the current context in which the erratic and unpredictable nature of funding cuts have made job security a serious concern for all UN personnel. Many in our survey indicated in 2024 that the lack of job security and the need to constantly chase new contracts was a key reason for exploring employment options outside the UN. This is likely an even bigger concern now, and will lead high performers with other employment opportunities to consider leaving the UN.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/717/1*R6TVhenk0sAqFe0Tu_t7hA.jpeg" /></figure><p>At the same time, our analysis indicates that even with the current financial constraints, if member states and UN leadership can create a level of predictability in funding levels and future changes, and contribute to some sense of job security, there is also probably room for reductions in the compensation package. Key to this would be ensuring proper and timely communication of changes to compensation and future job security, which has been lacking in the approach to date.</p><h3>What is the talent that the UN needs to attract and retain?</h3><p>A more appropriate question to guide current human resources debates is what type of talent and skills does the UN need, and what compensation elements and HR practices will achieve this?</p><p>Ensuring the UN workforce is representative of its membership, as outlined by the architects of the UN Charter, is an important starting point. Despite significant improvements in geographic and gender balance of the UN workforce there are still gaps. Considering adjustments to the compensation package on the basis of regional and gender concerns may also help to find compromise solutions. These issues have been raised in ICSC discussions, but the extent to which data and evidence is informing these discussions is unclear. As the graph below shows, respondents in our ReformWorks survey from the Western European and Other Group (WEOG) place different emphasis on the importance of work-life balance, salary levels and job security than other regions, reinforcing our point above that there is room for compromise in reducing the desirable UN vs US civil service comparator range, if balanced with job security and work-life balance improvements. The ICSC may want to request similar data disaggregated by region for its upcoming session.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/322/1*wv9MYUSFavDVW-LtpsRmhQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>ReformWorks Survey Respondents Job Satisfaction Elements by Region</figcaption></figure><p>There are similar opportunities for compromise to address the lower retention rates among mid- and senior level female staff, which have been a key concern in the ICSC debates. An academic study of women with international careers in Austria, Canada, Colombia and Taiwan consistently highlighted that accessibility to quality childcare was their top priority for balancing family across all four countries (I.C. Fischlmayr &amp; K.M. Puchmüller, ‘Married, mom and manager — how can this be combined with an international career?’, 2016). Respondents in our ReformWorks survey indicated that support for spouses or partners to find jobs when moving to a new country and the ability to periodically work from their home country were important mechanisms to support their international careers, with female respondents prioritizing access to child care at the same level as spousal support. So if the priority is to retain a mobile and gender diverse workforce, there are potential compromises that can be made in reducing mobility allowances if accompanied by mechanisms to move dual UN career couples and families, or by shifting expenditures on education grant at the tertiary level to child care for children between the ages of 0–5, for instance.</p><p>A much bigger concern, which seems absent from many of the ICSC debates, it the UN’s ability to attract and evolve its workforce to ensure it has the skills and competencies to meet the current challenges of the multilateral system, technological changes, and changing perspectives on how the UN should deliver on its mandates. While this is particularly salient now as UN entities are forced to dramatically reduce their workforces, it was already a concern of the General Assembly in 2023. At its 77th session, the Fifth Committee requested the Secretary-General to ‘rejuvenate’ the Secretariat workforce by bringing in younger talent with ‘new perspectives’ through talent management and an increase in P-1 to P-3 level posts with a commensurate reduction in senior level positions at D-1 and above. A surprisingly lack of progress was made prior to the financial crisis, and the resulting workforce reductions have further compounded the problems in bringing in new perspectives and young talent. A closer examination highlights not only shortcomings in the benefits or career development opportunities offered to young talent, but larger weaknesses in longstanding human resources management practices. Current debates on how to reduce and reshape the UN workforce and compensation package provide an opportunity to fix the current business model which fails to incentivize the continuous evolution of the workforce with financial realities and skill requirements.</p><h3>What impedes fresh perspectives at the UN?</h3><p>Evidence from efforts to ‘rejuvenate’ the Secretariat highlight that 1) there are limited posts or vacancies available to recruit fresh talent, and 2) that once recruited, even with the current compensation package, the UN struggles to retain them.</p><p>Although the Fifth Committee reviews every individual request to create, abolish or reclassify a post to a different level, entry level posts at the P-1 and P-2 level have consistently had the lowest numbers of approved posts. As the ACABQ has pointed out, entry level posts are also proposed less often, and in the 2026 revised budget they were disproportionately proposed for abolishment. It is hard to reconcile the repeated refrains for rejuvenation and efficiency from UN leadership and member states with the lack of proposals and approvals for cheaper, entry level positions. The current processes for designing an efficient workforce composition are clearly not leading to desired outcomes.</p><p>Additionally, existing efforts at finding cost-efficient solutions for bringing in young talent have actually made the workforce less representative and undermined geographic balance. Unpaid internships and the ability for individual countries to sponsor Junior Professional Officers are two of the main ways that the Secretariat and other UN entities bring in new talent cost-effectively. While the Secretariat has been able to attract an average of 2,200 unpaid interns annually over the last 10 years, almost one third are from three countries that provide structured opportunities for stipends and financial support for interns, i.e. China, the US and Germany ((A/79/566/Add.1, paras. 5 &amp; 15). A similarly negative impact on geographic balance is evident with P-2 posts. Prior to 2025, Fifth Committee agreements on the number of P-2 posts under assessed funding result in approximately 50 new Young Professionals joining annually, whereas wealthy member states manage to find money to fund approximately 180 Junior Professional Officer positions annually in the Secretariat almost exclusively for nationals from their own country.</p><p>Internally, the downsizing policies agreed between UN management and staff further compound the problem. These policies generally prioritize length of service over other factors with limited flexibility to adjust them based on a specific local or organizational context, or in the face of massive workforce reductions as the UN is currently experiencing. There are many complaints from managers that they are losing capabilities for innovation, digital transformation and agility. To be fair, there are also indications that the UN struggled to attract and maintain these capabilities even before being forced to use the downsizing policies. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) found that very low turnover rates across the Secretariat were a major barrier in evolving the workforce and addressing skill gaps in the Secretariat (OIOS 2025/053, para. 20(d)).</p><p>The usual human resources practices have proven that they are unable to create real change in the composition of the UN’s workforce. Doubling down on past solutions for cost-efficiencies won’t fix these problems. Creating a more adaptable, innovative and modern workforce with cost-efficiencies that do not undermine representation or performance requires changes to how member states and senior leadership design the composition of their workforce. Eugene Chen has also highlighted this point calling for Fifth Committee agreement on a staffing allocation rather than a rigid staffing table, which allows managers to decide who is the most suitable candidate based on skills rather than whether they are international or local staff. Not only would this make Fifth Committee negotiations more efficient, it would remove the current disincentive for adjusting levels, categories or profiles of posts in line with labor market market changes or to create efficiencies because these changes require renewed negotiation with the Fifth Committee.</p><p>Ironically, while many member states will perceive this as reducing their oversight and control, it is most likely to lead to the type of effective management that they expect, and that staff themselves would like to see. Providing an allocation or envelope of funds for a workforce (including both staff and non-staff resources) would force managers to continuously seek out strategies for maximizing the impact of that envelope. Delivery innovations could be spurred through specialized contractors or vendors and shifted to staff positions when institutionalized. Local expertise could be prioritized in contexts where it exist and shifted to international expertise when delivery moves to a new context where local expertise is unavailable. The incentive to ignore underperformance by an incumbent of a particular post that is considered ‘protected’ by member states in the Fifth Committee would be eliminated. Managers who stick to the status quo would be exposed by their inability to keep pace with evolving norms, standards and technologies or their ability to deliver within the existing funding envelope.</p><p>Many of the UN specialized agencies already have this autonomy to varying degrees. The Secretariat and UN agencies, funds and programmes which use the UN Dispute Tribunal mechanism could derive new indicators for managerial accountability which could be a more efficient way of monitoring and overseeing how effectively managers are using their workforce allocations. The number of management cases lost in the administrative justice system by individual departments and offices would be a concrete and quantifiable indicator for assessing how well managerial autonomy is exercised, and where unfair practices related how contract types or levels would be exposed. To further incentivize effective management, departments and offices should be responsible for paying compensation determined by the UN Dispute Tribunal out of their own allocation, rather than the current practice which delinks liabilities from departmental budgets.</p><p>Even more importantly, by facilitating progressive management for results rather that compliance with bureaucratic processes, the UN is more likely to retain the fresh talent it clearly needs. Career development opportunities and the current compensation package have not prevented P-2s from having some of the highest resignation rates among all international professional staff in recent years. Tinkering with the non-financial incentives under consideration by the ICSC is therefore unlikely to help attract agile and fresh talent.</p><p>Rather, our ReformWorks survey indicates that poor management and an inability to innovate and continuously improve how the UN is working may be a reason for these resignations. The ability to innovate and improve one’s organization was ranked as an important element of a good international job by 55% of our ReformWorks survey respondents (see graph above). This was further reinforced by qualitative feedback that highlighted poor management as a key frustration for those who had previously worked in the UN, as well as positive feedback highlighting good managers as the most valued part of past UN experience:</p><blockquote><em>“The most rewarding aspect of working for the organization was contributing to a collaborative and innovative environment where my skills and ideas were valued, leading to both personal and professional growth.” </em>— ReformWorks survey respondent</blockquote><p>For all stakeholders, investing political capital in these larger changes to human resources management procedures that improve the quality of management across the UN system are likely to prove more effective than focusing exclusively on the different elements of the UN staff compensation package. The latter are necessary discussions, and change is inevitable. But only if that change is made through evidence-based decisions about where cost reductions do not undermine diversity or quality of the workforce can they help the UN navigate this crisis.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.reformworks.org/post/unpacking-the-dilemmas-of-the-un-compensation-package"><em>https://www.reformworks.org</em></a><em> on February 8, 2026.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3d494688870d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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