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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Karan Aggarwal on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Karan Aggarwal on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@karanagg1001?source=rss-2c21be9aead------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Karan Aggarwal on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@karanagg1001?source=rss-2c21be9aead------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Republic Day  Edition :]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-stratagems/republic-day-edition-3a022c8c639e?source=rss-2c21be9aead------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[constitution]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[republic-day]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Karan Aggarwal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jan 2023 18:21:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-01-26T06:52:24.334Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Republic Day Edition :</h3><h4>Constitution as Equilibria</h4><blockquote>“However good a Constitution may be, if those who are implementing it are not good, it will prove to be bad. However, bad a Constitution may be,<br>if those implementing it are good, it will prove to be good”.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/474/0*SAv0x2sID3ITAS3Q.jpg" /></figure><p>Let’s explore how a social contract comes to emergence between a ruling body and its service providing citizens, from a pre-constitution era and how it self-enforces itself in the post-constitution era,</p><p>~ through the lens of Game Theory</p><h3>1. INTRODUCTION</h3><p>We when modelling the constitution as an equilibria try to understand it through a game where the society is diversified into two groups. The first group represents the service providing civilians while the other is the ruling body which provides security , stability , law and order in exchange for a particular share on the commodities produced by the former group.</p><p>We propose a contract between the two players where the worker or the service providing civilians put an effort <em>(e) </em>while the violent group or the ruling body takes a percentage of the goods produced <em>(q).</em></p><p>We start observing the game from a pre-constitution era to the emergence of the social contract and its stability in the post-constitution era therefore visualising the self-enforcibility of the contract.</p><h3>2. MODEL</h3><p>The game can be considered in the following way :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TUY9gSM_xzV2i-N1JNxB2A.png" /><figcaption>Extensive View of Game</figcaption></figure><p><strong>W</strong> denotes the group producing goods and service , <strong>V </strong>symbolises the violent group.</p><p>The model begins with <strong>W</strong> having the first move, <em>e </em>showing his effort varying from high<em>(h)</em> to low<em>(l). </em><strong><em>Y </em></strong>represents the goods produced and E is the extra effort needed to produce high output.</p><p>The game shifts towards the autocrat’s group <strong>V</strong>. The autocrat group now decides its share in the goods produced varying from <em>q = q</em>₀ to <em>q = 1. </em>For the share where <em>q &gt; q</em>₀ the group V must produce some violence to extract extra share which bears them additional cost of <em>k .</em></p><p>In response to the share demanded by the V , W can choose whether to revolt or not. The outcome of the revolt modelled as nature (N) has the probability of <em>p </em>for the win and in both cases the service group will have to pay extra cost <em>c </em>termed as the revolution cost. If they decide to revolt and the revolt comes out to their success then they will get the complete share of the products (Y) whereas the violent group will be robbed of the share they had earlier. On the other hand if the revolt doesn’t comes out to their will then the service group has to give group V the demanded share (q*Y). The outcome of each possibility is shown in the above diagram.</p><h3>3. BACKWARD INDUCTION</h3><p>Refer to this link to know more about <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backward_induction"><strong><em>Backward Induction</em></strong></a><strong><em> </em></strong>.</p><p>The model can be simplified using the technique of backward induction where we progress from the end towards the begin while simulating the conditions for every step.</p><h4>3.1 The revolution decision</h4><p>First we will analyse the decision for W whether to attempt a revolution or not. While analysing we will ignore <em>E </em>for our understanding.<em> </em>Assuming the probability for the success of revolt to be <em>p</em>ₑ then the payoff of group <strong>W</strong> will be</p><p>Payoff 𝓌 = <em>p</em>ₑ<em>[Y</em>ₑ<em> − c] + (1 − p</em>ₑ<em>)[(1 − q</em>ₑ<em>)Y</em>ₑ<em> − c] (Refer to the Extensive View of Game )</em></p><p>W will only choose to revolt if <strong><em>p</em>ₑ<em>q</em>ₑ<em>Y</em>ₑ<em> &gt; c </em></strong>as then the revolution will be the dominant strategy<strong><em> </em></strong>and this is called the<em> revolution condition.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qPvjPe2JFy14FdKdPnVjdQ.png" /><figcaption>Revolution Condition</figcaption></figure><h4>3.2 The exploitation decision</h4><p>Here the group V chooses whether to exploit the workers or not by raising their ask <em>(q &gt; q</em>₀<em>)</em> . From the above observation we can deduce that that the workers will revolt only if <em>q &gt; c/ p</em>ₑYₑ . Hence group V has 3 possible decisions :</p><ul><li><em>q = q</em>₀<em> </em>, they cooperate and their payoff is <em>q</em>₀.Yₑ</li><li><em>q = qₗ’</em> = <em>c/ p</em>ₑYₑ , i.e moderate exploitation that avoids revolution and thus getting payoff <em>qₑ’Yₑ − k .</em></li><li><em>q = 1, </em>signifying the maximum exploitation resulting to payoff equal to <em>(1 − pₑ)Yₑ − k</em></li></ul><p>Thus we can propose that → Given a social contract <em>(q</em>₀<em>, h)</em>, an effort choice e ∈ {h; l}, probabilities of success <em>p </em>and the<em> </em>revolution cost <em>c</em> then the optimal action of V will be :</p><ul><li><em>q = q</em>₀ if, and only if, <em>k &gt; (qₗ’ − q</em>₀<em>)Y</em>ₑ and <em>k &gt; (1 − p</em>ₑ<em> − q</em>₀<em>)Y</em>ₑ</li><li><em>q = qₗ’</em> if, and only if, <em>k &lt; (qₗ’− q</em>₀<em>)Y</em>ₑ and <em>qₗ’</em> &gt; <em>(1 − p</em>ₑ)</li><li><em>q</em> = 1 if, and only if, <em>k &lt; (1 − p</em>ₑ<em> − q</em>₀<em>)Y</em>ₑ and <em>qₗ’</em> &gt; <em>(1 − p</em>ₑ)</li></ul><h4>3.3 The effort decision</h4><p>Now we finally arrive to our first stage where group W has to make their effort decision. There can be multiple possibilities based on the effort choice made by the workers i.e {h; l} . Lets view one of the possibility :</p><ul><li><em>(e = h, qₕ = q</em>₀<em>)</em>, thus in compliance with the social contract</li><li>(e = l, <em>qₗ = qₗ</em> ‘ ), stating stable exploitation in response to low effort</li></ul><p>For this possibility to be the dominant strategy the following 4 conditions must be satisfied based on our above observations for the group V to make the choices mentioned above (<em>qₕ = q</em>₀ ; <em>qₗ</em> = <em>qₗ’</em> ) :</p><ol><li><em>k &gt; (1 − p</em>ₑ<em> − q</em>₀<em>)Y</em>ₑ</li><li><em>k &gt; (qₗ’ − q</em>₀<em>)Y</em>ₑ</li><li><em>qₗ’</em> &gt; <em>(1 − p</em>ₑ)</li><li><em>k &lt; (qₗ’ − q</em>₀<em>)Y</em>ₑ</li></ol><p>For the worker to make high effort decision the following condition must be met :</p><p>5<em>. E &lt; (1 − q</em>₀<em> )Yₕ − (1 − qₗ’ )Yₗ</em></p><h3>4. Conclusion</h3><p>For the social contract to be stable and self-enforcing we must ensure that the parameters (<em>k , c , Y, q , p ,E ) </em>must be aligned in favour of the social contract <em>(e = h, qₕ = q</em>₀<em>) </em>to be the dominant strategy .</p><p>Let us begin with the conditions for <em>qₕ = q</em>₀. The conditions (1) and (2) are more likely to be fulfilled when :</p><ul><li>Higher<em> k , pₕ ,</em> <em>Yₕ </em>and <em>q</em>₀</li><li>Lower <em>c</em></li></ul><p>Finally, we analyse condition (5), which is equivalent to <em>E &lt; (1 − q</em>₀<em> )Yₕ − (1 − qₗ’ )Yₗ </em>. This condition is more likely to be fulfilled when :</p><ul><li>Higher <em>Yₕ </em>and <em>c</em></li><li>Lower<em> E , Yₗ , pₗ </em>and<em> q</em>₀</li></ul><p>On employment of the model in real world scenarios , we observe that the parameters align in such a way that the democratic constitution emerges out as a dominating and self-enforcing force for a nation to attain stability , law and order among its citizens .</p><p><em>Bibliography</em></p><ul><li><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46459037_Constitutions_as_Equilibria_A_Game-theoretic_Approach_to_Positive_Constitutional_Economics">Approach to Positive Constitutional Economics</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3a022c8c639e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems/republic-day-edition-3a022c8c639e">Republic Day  Edition :</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems">The Stratagems</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[MichaelNew Year Party !!!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/the-stratagems/michaelnew-year-party-d34ef2680ec0?source=rss-2c21be9aead------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d34ef2680ec0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[intellectual-property]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[drinking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[game-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2023]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mathematics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Karan Aggarwal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 31 Dec 2022 05:41:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-12-31T05:41:00.074Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Michael’s New Year Party !!!</h3><p>It is the time of the year when you will want to groove to the music with a jug of beer in your hand and dancing with your mates around. Yes it’s the new year’s eve party.</p><p>This year Michael is raising a new year’s eve party. But alas his lounge can serve to a crowd of 120 people apart from him and Michael being silly in his approach invites all of his office network summing to 200 people. Since it is a huge festive occasion so everyone wants to have fun but under some certain conditions :</p><ul><li>If <strong>more than 60%</strong> of the total invitees turn up for the party, you will have rather have more fun staying at home.</li><li>If <strong>less than 60%</strong> of the total invitees turn up for the party, you will have less fun staying at home.</li></ul><figure><img alt="People having hell lot of fun at the party !!!!" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/650/1*Y-u5wruEG9JJvUvrEM1M9A.jpeg" /></figure><p>Overcrowding has never been a problem to Michael . Wondering why ? So here in this article we will see how Game Theory helps us to understand it through an example.</p><h4>THE EL FORAL BAR :</h4><p>This problem was created by Brian Arthur in 1994 based on The El Foral Bar in New Mexico, where there is where there is regular Thursday special party and crowd wants to have fun over there unless it’s too crowded. So if more than 60% of the population go to the bar they will have more fun staying home unless they will have more fun in bar.</p><figure><img alt="The El Foral Bar,New Mexico" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*b_iMMwruozMZSyEU1jxy6g.jpeg" /><figcaption>El Foral Bar, New Mexico</figcaption></figure><p>Since the situation is symmetric for all, so a pure deterministic strategy will fail as either no one will attend the program or everyone will come making it disappointing for all.</p><p>Let the attendance of past <em>m </em>Thursdays be available to the everyone in their memory and each person is assumed to have <em>N </em>different strategies which uses the past Thursday’s footfall to decide about the upcoming Thursday. Let <em>A(t)</em> denote the footfall of the upcoming Thursday and <em>t-1,t-2,…..,t-m</em> be the timestamps of previous Thursdays in past M weeks. So a strategy S may look like :</p><p>S(t) = 100[ w₁A(t-1) + w₂A(t-2) + ……………….. + wₘA(t-m) + c]</p><p>where wᵢ is the weight given by any individual to a particular experience on that Thursday. If S(t) &lt; 60 then only that person will go to the bar otherwise he will stay at home.</p><h4>THE DOMINANT STRATEGY :</h4><p>Each person has N such different strategies and now has the task to deduce which strategy he should choose. So according to this model an error based approach is used to select the best strategy for a particular person. Thus we determine Error(S) which is the difference between the predicted model’s attendance and the actual attendance of past week Thursdays.</p><p>Error(S) = | S(t-1)-A(t-1)| + |S(t-2)-A(t-2)| + …………… + |S(t-m)-A(t-m)|</p><p>The best strategy (<em>S*</em>) will be the one with the lowest error.</p><p>Let us model these m Thursdays assuming everyone follows their dominant strategy. On taking an enough value of<em> m</em> and <em>N </em>we observe that the footfall at the El Foral Bar remains around 60%.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Rpj5iTC36ezfVhQycTyPQw.jpeg" /></figure><h4>CONCLUSION :</h4><p>Thus the El Foral model demonstrates that self-organized cooperation and “efficiency” are possible without perfect rationality, complete knowledge and deductive reasoning. Hence we understand why overcrowding was not hindering Michael from inviting more people.</p><p><em>Bibliography</em></p><ul><li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Farol_Bar_problem">El Foral Bar Problem — Wikipedia</a></li><li><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QB6GmQ2AK1o&amp;ab_channel=ComplexityExplorer">The El Foral Problem — Complexity Explorer on Youtube</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d34ef2680ec0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems/michaelnew-year-party-d34ef2680ec0">MichaelNew Year Party !!!</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/the-stratagems">The Stratagems</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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