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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Abdelakarim Benabdallah on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Abdelakarim Benabdallah on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@karim2k?source=rss-4b983644307c------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Abdelakarim Benabdallah on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@karim2k?source=rss-4b983644307c------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Read-Only to “This Account Doesn’t Exist”: My X Account Suspension Journey (October–November…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@karim2k/from-read-only-to-this-account-doesnt-exist-my-x-account-suspension-journey-october-november-ca41422758f7?source=rss-4b983644307c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ca41422758f7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[twitter]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdelakarim Benabdallah]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 19:36:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-07T19:36:04.527Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>From Read-Only to “This Account Doesn’t Exist”: My X Account Suspension Journey (October–November 2026)</h3><figure><img alt="Twwteup August 1st 2009, Sidi bousaid, Tunisia" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PqMbPhTZbOzCUktQDKw14g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Twwteup August 1st 2009, Sidi bousaid, Tunisia</figcaption></figure><p>On or around 19 October 2026, my long-standing X account (<a href="http://twitter.com/karim2k">@karim2k</a>) was suddenly restricted. What began as a permanent read-only mode quickly escalated into a full lockout where the public profile displayed “This account doesn’t exist,” password resets returned “Internal error,” and the official appeal form became inaccessible because login was impossible. Over the following three weeks I submitted five support tickets, sent multiple emails, and received only limited automated replies.</p><p>This account is not just a social media profile. I created it on **31 December 2007**. For nearly 19 years it has been a source of joy, a living community, and a place where I met my wife and many good people who became part of my life. Losing access to it felt personal, not just technical.</p><p><strong>Timeline of Events</strong></p><p>Around 19 October 2026 <br>The account entered permanent read-only mode. The official notice stated that the account had broken X Rules and was permanently restricted from posting, reposting, or liking. An appeal was filed immediately.</p><p>Late October <br>The public profile changed. Searching for <a href="http://twitter.com/karim2k">@karim2k</a> began returning “This account doesn’t exist.” The username remained reserved when tested from other accounts. Password reset emails still arrived, but attempting to set a new password produced a persistent “Internal error.”</p><p>Multiple Support Tickets <br>I opened five separate tickets through the Account Access forms, all framed as access/recovery issues rather than pure suspension appeals (because the normal appeal form required being logged into the restricted account).</p><p>Typical replies received were automated or semi-automated:<br>- Requests for username, associated email addresses, last successful login date, and phone number.<br>- Generic statements that X does not monitor certain support addresses and that users should use the online forms.<br>- Occasional “Your original case is already in the queue” messages.</p><p>Two or three replies asked for clarification or additional details, but none provided a clear explanation of the original rule violation or a concrete resolution path.</p><p>Early November <br>Attempts to appeal while logged into a different working account created a login loop. The form repeatedly demanded login with the suspended account. The mobile app produced the same result.</p><p>5–7 November 2026 <br>A new development appeared. After further ticket activity, the account partially reactivated. A “Welcome back — your X account has been reactivated” message was received. However, full functionality was still blocked. Accessing the account now presented a mandatory action screen requiring the deletion of a single post from 19 October 2015.</p><p><strong>The 2015 Post</strong></p><p>The flagged post read (translated) datng back to 2015: <br>“Poorly educated/supervised young people with free access to social media: a nude photo of a 17-year-old high-school girl is circulating on Facebook.”</p><p>X classified it under the Child Sexual Exploitation / Child Safety policy. The post itself was critical of the circulation of such material, not promotional. Nevertheless, under current enforcement the mere mention of the content was treated as a violation. Deletion of the post was presented as a required step to proceed.</p><p><strong>Attempts to Get Outside Help</strong></p><p>Even though I have long-standing connections with people and organizations involved in human rights and digital rights work, those contacts were ultimately unable to help. This was not because they lack expertise or willingness. Since Elon Musk took over Twitter (now X), the internal structure of the platform has become significantly more complicated. Large-scale layoffs in Trust &amp; Safety and support teams have reduced the number of people who can intervene on individual cases, and the pathways that once existed for escalation have largely disappeared or become opaque. As a result, even well-connected advocates found themselves unable to open effective channels on my behalf.</p><p><strong>Remaining Issues</strong></p><p>As of 7 November 2026 the following problems are still unresolved:</p><p>- Full restoration of posting, liking, and other interactive features is not yet confirmed after the required deletion.<br>- The original reason for the October restriction has never been clearly stated by Support.<br>- Password reset reliability and consistent backend status remain uncertain.<br>- No detailed human review explanation has been provided despite five tickets and multiple follow-ups.</p><p><strong>Why my Account Matters</strong></p><p>I created <a href="http://twitter.com/karim2k">@karim2k</a> on 31 December 2007. Over almost two decades it became far more than a username. It is where I found community, shared ideas, laughed, argued, learned, and built real relationships. It is how I met my wife. It is where I connected with many good people who remain important in my life. Losing access to nearly 19 years of history, conversations, and connections is not a minor inconvenience — it is the sudden disappearance of a significant part of my digital and personal life.</p><p>Lessons and Observations</p><p>1. Automation-heavy support — Most replies were template-driven. Meaningful progress only appeared after repeated tickets and persistence.<br>2. Visibility vs. existence — An account can show as “does not exist” publicly while still existing in the backend (evidenced by reserved username and partial password-reset emails).<br>3. Old content risk— Content posted more than a decade earlier can still trigger modern enforcement actions.<br>4. Appeal accessibility problem— When login itself is blocked, the standard suspension appeal form becomes unusable, forcing users into the slower Account Access ticket route.<br>5. Post-acquisition reality — After the change of ownership and the subsequent reduction in support staff, even users with human-rights and digital-rights networks found limited practical avenues for help.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>What started as a permanent read-only restriction on approximately 19 October 2026 evolved into a multi-week lockout involving five tickets, several email exchanges, and contradictory system states (“does not exist,” internal errors, then partial reactivation). The most recent step required deletion of an 11-year-old post under the Child Safety policy. While the account has shown signs of reactivation, full functionality and a clear explanation of the original enforcement action remain outstanding.</p><p>For an account created on the last day of 2007 — one that carried nearly two decades of community, friendships, and the story of how I met my wife — this experience has been both technical and deeply personal. The difficulty of obtaining meaningful human review, even with external connections in the human-rights space, reflects the broader changes that have taken place on the platform since 2022.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ca41422758f7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The War That Starts in the Dark: Why Governments Are Telling You to Own a Torch]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@karim2k/the-war-that-starts-in-the-dark-why-governments-are-telling-you-to-own-a-torch-8942cf887d82?source=rss-4b983644307c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8942cf887d82</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[iran]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ww3]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdelakarim Benabdallah]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 19:17:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-01T19:17:41.671Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xuNiEuG_Q4t6scZw3KQ6yg.jpeg" /></figure><p>If you’ve been asking yourself why so many countries, around thirty by some counts, have suddenly asked their citizens to store water, food, a radio and a torch, you’re not imagining things, and you’re not alone. Governments don’t normally tell ordinary families to prepare for blackouts. Something has changed in how they see the next few years, and this is why.</p><p>Ask most people how a war between Russia and Europe would begin, and they picture tanks rolling across the Oder river. According to a scenario in a recent video by Shoaib Nimri, that picture is wrong. The war would begin quietly, at night, and in some sense it has already begun. The scenario’s figures are the video’s own claims, not independently verified facts.</p><h3>A war that doesn’t look like one</h3><p>Picture a ship drifting through the Baltic with its transponder switched off. It belongs to Russia’s so-called shadow fleet, and it is dragging a heavy anchor along the seabed. Hours later, a data cable that carries a large share of a country’s internet goes dark. Nobody fires a shot, and nobody declares anything. Investigators later say it was probably an accident, and the story fades.</p><p>That, the video argues, is how it starts. Cables are cut in the Baltic and North Seas, and pipelines are threatened. At night, swarms of unidentified drones hover over LNG terminals, a nuclear site and air bases. From Kaliningrad, electronic jamming scrambles GPS for tens of thousands of European flights. Fires break out at munitions factories, always with a plausible explanation. Each incident is too small to justify a military response, but together they probe how far Europe will let things go.</p><h3>Waiting for the window</h3><p>The video’s deeper argument is about timing. A frozen front in Ukraine, it says, would not bring peace. It would free Russia’s factories, already working around the clock, to rebuild an army aimed at NATO’s northern flank. The danger window it names is the end of 2027.</p><p>On paper, Europe should win this contest, since its economy is roughly ten times the size of Russia’s. But money does not see over the horizon. Europe has fewer than thirty military reconnaissance satellites, while the United States has around 240, and it lacks offensive electronic-warfare aircraft. Washington, meanwhile, is looking toward the Pacific. Moscow is betting that Article 5, the promise that an attack on one is an attack on all, will turn out to be hollow when tested.</p><p>Russia would not be alone in this bet. The video describes a loose axis. North Korea supplies millions of shells and thousands of troops, and Iran supplies drones. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea push winter energy prices up, and China provides electronics and satellite imagery while rehearsing a blockade of Taiwan to keep the US Navy tied down in the Pacific.</p><h3>Manufacturing a reason</h3><p>Then comes the pretext. Estonia and Finland board a sanctioned oil tanker in the Gulf of Finland, and Lithuania halts military trains headed for Kaliningrad. The Kremlin announces that a million Russian citizens are under an existential blockade.</p><p>Within days, the last Baltic data cables are cut. Wiper malware freezes German rail signalling and shuts down the cranes at Rotterdam and Bremerhaven. Poland’s power grid is hit, delaying NATO’s heavy armour by two crucial weeks. At the Narva river bridge, irregular armed units stage a border clash. Hesitant capitals go silent in Brussels, so Poland, Finland, Sweden, Britain, France and Germany bypass the veto and form a coalition of the willing.</p><h3>Three ways the story ends</h3><p>At 3 a.m. on the day of the attack, hundreds of drones, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles slam into air bases in Poland and the Baltic states and take out bridges along the Oder. Russian armour pours out of Kaliningrad and Belarus into the 65-kilometre Suwałki Corridor. What happens next, the video says, depends on one decision in Washington.</p><p><strong>If America walks away,</strong> European pilots fly blind into the kill zones of S-400 batteries, and only about half of incoming missiles are intercepted. By day eleven the corridor is cut. By day forty, Europe’s Patriot stocks are empty, and its cities are open to attack.</p><p><strong>If America stays quiet but present,</strong> providing early-warning satellites, the Link 16 command network and a 250-billion-dollar ammunition bridge funded by Europe, interception rates climb above 80 percent. Polish HIMARS and Nordic F-35s strike Russian staging areas, and the armoured spearhead stalls eighteen kilometres short of the corridor. The Baltic turns into what the video calls a NATO lake, with Kaliningrad besieged and Finnish forces threatening the Murmansk railway.</p><p><strong>If American troops are killed,</strong> the picture changes completely. A Russian missile strike on a Polish logistics hub kills dozens of US soldiers. Washington answers with a four-day air campaign using B-21 stealth bombers, Growler jammers and Tomahawks. Facing collapse, Moscow deploys tactical nuclear weapons. The video says Russia holds around 1,500 tactical warheads against 515 for Britain and France combined. Without America, Europe faces a bloody war of attrition and a nuclear arms race. With America’s backbone and nuclear umbrella in place, the video concludes, Moscow’s gamble ends in strategic defeat.</p><h3>The quiet preparations already underway</h3><p>You don’t need to believe any one scenario to notice that governments are acting as if something like it could happen. Britain, the United States, Japan and much of Europe now urge households to keep supplies for at least 72 hours. The recommended items include drinking water, non-perishable food, a torch, spare batteries, a first-aid kit, cash, a power bank and a wind-up radio.</p><p>The reasoning is the same as in the scenario above. Attacks on electricity grids, transport networks and communications systems could disrupt essential services without a single soldier crossing the border. If the power and the phone network fail together, a battery radio may be the only way to hear what the authorities want you to do.</p><p>In Brussels, the European Commission’s first preparedness strategy asked member states to aim for 72 hours of self-sufficiency, in the words of Commissioner Hadja Lahbib. To show what she meant, she released a video of her own emergency bag, containing ID documents in waterproof casing, canned food, bottled water, matches, a Swiss army knife, cash, playing cards, medicines and a small radio. The message reached 450 million people. A later report by former Finnish president Sauli Niinistö went further, calling the threat of war from Russia a centrepiece of European preparedness.</p><p>The countries closest to Russia moved first. In Finland, a website called 72tuntia.fi asks citizens whether they could survive 72 hours, and its suggested kit includes bottled water, non-perishable food, a battery-powered radio, a flashlight, cash and a camping stove. Germany’s civil-defence booklet, first issued in 2022, tells citizens to hold ten days of food and five days of water, plus cash and medicine. Denmark advises three days of food and water and a crisis kit with torches, batteries, first aid and medicine. Sweden’s authorities recommend water, energy-rich food, blankets, alternative heating and a battery-powered radio. And in Poland, parliament passed a law requiring local authorities to hold 72 hours of food and water, alongside evacuation systems and shelters.</p><h3>What this means for an ordinary kitchen</h3><p>Think of it as a very short camping trip at home. The usual guidance is about three litres of water per person per day, so nine litres each for three days. Add food that needs no cooking, such as canned fish and beans, dates, nuts and biscuits. Keep a radio with spare batteries or a wind-up crank, a torch or headlamp, and a fully charged power bank. Put your medicines, a first-aid kit, small-denomination cash and your ID papers in one waterproof bag by the door. Warm clothes, a blanket and a camping stove cover the rest.</p><p>None of this is only about war. The same kit helps in a flood, a heatwave blackout or a winter storm. The scenario in the video is a projection, not a prediction, but the instruction from governments is real, and it costs very little to follow.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8942cf887d82" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[One Video, Five Channels, Gone Overnight]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@karim2k/one-video-five-channels-gone-overnight-96fa58a1e41b?source=rss-4b983644307c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/96fa58a1e41b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[youtube]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[palestine]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdelakarim Benabdallah]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 07:53:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-30T07:53:17.575Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qNK7ipLl_OjTlxpf36MFhg.jpeg" /></figure><p>I woke up to find my entire YouTube presence erased. One video, posted on one channel, ended with five channels terminated within minutes. No strikes. No warnings.</p><h3>What happened</h3><p>I uploaded a video about Palestine, made up of my own personal commentary. YouTube’s automated systems flagged it under the “dangerous organizations” policy and terminated the channel immediately.</p><p>Then the sweep spread. Four other channels tied to the same account were terminated too:</p><ul><li>A cooking channel</li><li>A book club channel</li><li>A beer channel</li><li>My 8-year-old daughter’s channel, which I manage</li></ul><p>None of them had strikes or policy-violating content. They had nothing to do with the video. They were collateral damage.</p><p>I filed an appeal through YouTube Studio, explaining that the video was never meant to promote violence or support any organization, and that the other four channels are innocent. I have not created any new channels, so I don’t trigger ban-evasion systems.</p><h3>Why unrelated channels go down together</h3><p>The answer I got from other creators is blunt: YouTube holds the <em>person</em> responsible, not the channel. Once a channel is terminated, the account holder is barred from owning, using, or creating other channels. Everything connected to you falls with it, guilty or not.</p><p>That may make sense against serious repeat abusers. It is brutal when the trigger is a single automated flag, and when that flag may be wrong.</p><h3>Automation and the human-review problem</h3><p>My case fits a pattern many creators describe:</p><ul><li><strong>Automation decides first.</strong> A classifier flags content, and enforcement follows before any human looks.</li><li><strong>Appeals feel like a black box.</strong> Creators report canned replies or silence.</li><li><strong>Sensitive topics raise the risk.</strong> Conflict and political violence are where automated systems struggle most to tell commentary from promotion.</li></ul><p>Not every story ends badly. A commenter on my post described a metal-detecting creator with over 100k subscribers who lost a main channel to a “circumvention” termination, one day after an old side channel was hit for “cyberbullying.” After 19 days of stonewalling, both channels were restored, with a notice that no problems were found and the pending payout released. It’s one anecdote, but it shows wrongful terminations do get reversed.</p><h3>Other Palestine-related takedowns</h3><p>I’m not the first, though the best-documented cases differ from mine.</p><p><strong>Palestinian rights groups, late 2025.</strong> Al Mezan said its YouTube channel was deleted on 7 October without notification, and Al-Haq said its own was deleted on 3 October. Together, the three groups’ terminations erased more than 700 videos, according to an Intercept tally. The trigger was reportedly different from mine: all three had been sanctioned by the US over their support for the ICC’s arrest warrants for Israeli leaders. Google confirmed it was complying with new U.S. measures. That was a policy decision, not a misfire on one video. It still shows that a whole channel archive can vanish overnight with no warning.</p><p><strong>Guy Christensen (YourFavoriteGuy).</strong> The political commentator’s YouTube channel was suspended. He says YouTube restored his entire channel and monetisation after rejecting his appeal, having promised he would stay banned forever. That is his own account, but it fits the pattern of reversals after public pressure.</p><p><strong>A rumor worth avoiding.</strong> A viral claim said YouTube went down globally in February 2026 over a video of Israeli war crimes. Fact-checkers found no evidence for it, and outlets described the outage as a technical malfunction.</p><p>None of these is a multi-channel sweep from one flagged video, so my case may be rarer, and more worth documenting. What they share is opaque, inconsistent enforcement: the same system produces permanent deletions and quiet reversals.</p><h3>The politics of it</h3><p>The comments turned into the argument you’d expect. Some saw bias against pro-Palestinian speech. Others said platforms are entitled to enforce their rules and that content supporting designated groups should come down.</p><p>Nobody outside YouTube can see the actual reason for the flag, so both camps were guessing. That is the real problem. When creators can’t see why a decision was made or reach a human to contest it, every outcome looks like bias to someone.</p><h3>What creators should do now</h3><p>The lesson is structural, whatever you think of my case:</p><ol><li><strong>Separate Google accounts by purpose.</strong> Keep family, business, and hobby channels on different accounts so one flag can’t sweep everything.</li><li><strong>Keep risky content away from valuable assets.</strong> Political or sensitive commentary belongs on an account you can afford to lose.</li><li><strong>Back everything up.</strong> Run Google Takeout regularly and keep original files off-platform.</li><li><strong>Own your audience.</strong> An email list or a website means a termination doesn’t erase your reach.</li><li><strong>Diversify platforms.</strong> Don’t let one algorithm control your income.</li><li><strong>If terminated, appeal calmly and don’t create new channels.</strong> You have up to one year from termination to appeal, and the number of appeals per termination is limited, so make each one count. Document everything and avoid anything that looks like evasion.</li><li><strong>Know the fallback.</strong> If an appeal fails, YouTube’s Second Chances pilot may let some creators request a new channel one year after termination. A successful appeal is the only route that restores everything.</li><li><strong>Escalate through legitimate channels.</strong> Use creator support if you have access. Public visibility sometimes earns a second look.</li></ol><h3>Where I stand</h3><p>I’m waiting on the appeal. If YouTube’s systems can erase five channels, including a child’s, over one flagged video with no human review, then your presence there is only as safe as your riskiest upload. I’ll update this post when I hear back.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=96fa58a1e41b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is Using AI Fair or Cheating?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@karim2k/is-using-ai-fair-or-cheating-c283cf9a58b0?source=rss-4b983644307c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c283cf9a58b0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdelakarim Benabdallah]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 18:05:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-29T18:05:50.924Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9r8Fv0SgpiEwYbtp4UWTjA.jpeg" /></figure><p>I asked my daughter Julia a simple question: is using AI fair, or is it cheating?</p><p>She answered without hesitation: “Cheating.” Her reasons were that AI is getting so realistic it fools people, and that it makes big mistakes. She isn’t wrong on either count. But I had just watched a video by Tarek Cheniti on this exact question, and my reflex, as always, was to compare it to the early days of the internet.</p><h3>We’ve seen this before</h3><p>I remember how it happened. Before we ever experienced a real internet connection, we browsed “websites” offline, delivered on CDs and in magazines. Then the connection arrived, and everything changed. First it was easy access to information. Then video, then productivity. Nobody today says that building a spreadsheet online is cheating. It’s a tool, like BI software.</p><p>The lesson is that a tool is not the problem. Using a tool with no regard for the main task is. That’s what spoils the whole scope of the work.</p><h3>The thin line</h3><p>As progress keeps moving, the line between intelligence and cheating gets thinner. Think of the tortoise and the hare. Was the hare cheated? No. It was circumstance.</p><p>Using a very reliable tool to work on your behalf is not cheating, unless you were explicitly asked to do the work yourself. And if you can still deliver, that’s what counts, doesn’t it?</p><h3>What Tarek Cheniti adds</h3><p>In his video, Cheniti describes a case that shows how messy this has become: an award-winning author whose book was run through an AI detector and flagged as roughly 95% likely to be AI-written. The consequences reportedly upended his life and cost him a major literary honor.</p><p>Cheniti’s argument is that the problem isn’t the use of AI, but <em>how</em> it is used. Some people think <em>with</em> AI. They use it to sharpen their work and improve their performance. Others copy-paste a prompt’s output and send it out, handing their responsibility to a machine. Same tool, very different use.</p><h3>Say it out loud</h3><p>His conclusion is the one I agree with most: <strong>if you used AI, say so.</strong> For writers, journalists, students writing theses, and designers, disclosure should be standard: state that you used it, and how. Then the audience decides for itself how to value the work.</p><p>Hiding it is the real fraud. Using it is not.</p><h3>My answer to Julia</h3><p>Julia, you’re right that AI can fool people and make mistakes. That’s exactly why honesty matters more than ever. It isn’t cheating to use a powerful tool. It’s cheating to hide it, or to use it when you were asked to do the work yourself.</p><p>So, fair or cheating? It depends on what was asked of you, and on whether you’re willing to tell the truth about how you did it.</p><p>I left out the author’s name and book title because the transcript was garbled and I couldn’t verify them. Add them if you’ve confirmed the details. I can also turn this into a Word doc or a short LinkedIn version.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c283cf9a58b0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Kleptocracy Comparison: What Tunisia’s Corruption Numbers Actually Mean Next to Africa, France…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@karim2k/the-kleptocracy-comparison-what-tunisias-corruption-numbers-actually-mean-next-to-africa-france-882d06327ed8?source=rss-4b983644307c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/882d06327ed8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tunisia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdelakarim Benabdallah]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 19 Sep 2026 18:12:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-19T18:12:05.584Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Kleptocracy Comparison: What Tunisia’s Corruption Numbers Actually Mean Next to Africa, France, and the US</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8LgEP7V-AlLAz6ve2jBKKQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>A post has been circulating in Tunisia for months now, listing the country’s biggest alleged treasury thefts across 150 years. It has the shape of a damning indictment. It’s also, on close inspection, mostly wrong about the specifics while being roughly right about the pattern — and almost none of the numbers in it come with any sense of scale. A figure means nothing on its own; it only becomes meaningful next to something. So every sum below comes with two things attached: what it was worth against the country’s actual finances at the time, and what it would be worth today. Where a comparison is genuinely uncertain, that’s said plainly rather than papered over.</p><h3>Tunisia’s 19th-Century Figures, Sized Up</h3><p><strong>Mahmoud Ben Ayed</strong> allegedly embezzled roughly <strong>60 million francs</strong> before leaving for France in 1852. For scale: by 1862, a decade later, Tunisia’s <em>entire</em> national debt — the debt that would eventually bankrupt the state — stood at 28 million francs, and even at its peak in 1869 (the point of actual bankruptcy) reached about 125 million francs. So Ben Ayed’s alleged theft alone was roughly double the size of the country’s total debt in 1862, and about half the size of the debt that ultimately triggered foreign financial control in 1869. In today’s money, using the roughest available franc-to-euro conversion benchmarks (around €2.50–€3 per 1850s franc), that’s approximately <strong>€150–180 million today</strong> — treat this as order-of-magnitude, not precise, since no clean inflation series covers this period.</p><p><strong>Nassim Chamama</strong> left in 1864 with an estimated <strong>20 million riyals</strong> — not francs, as the viral post claims; riyals and francs weren’t the same currency, and there’s no clean historical exchange rate or inflation series connecting Beylik-era riyals to today’s currencies, so a modern-money conversion here isn’t responsibly possible. What can be said: this was during the exact window (1862–1869) when the state’s total debt only reached 125 million francs, so a transfer of this size, in whatever currency, was clearly a major share of the state’s available wealth.</p><p><strong>Mustapha Khaznadar</strong> allegedly squandered <strong>300 million francs</strong> between 1862 and 1869 — a figure that needs a real primary source before being trusted. Taken at face value anyway, for scale: it’s more than double the 125-million-franc debt that bankrupted the entire state in 1869, which alone should raise suspicion about the number’s accuracy — it would mean one minister lost more than the whole country owed. In today’s money, roughly <strong>€750 million–€1 billion</strong>, again order-of-magnitude only, and doubly uncertain since the underlying figure itself is unverified.</p><p><strong>The Ben Ali family’s</strong> alleged <strong>120 billion dinars</strong> has no credible sourcing anywhere. For scale: Tunisia’s entire state budget in 2010, the last full year of Ben Ali’s rule, was about $13.6 billion. Converting 120 billion dinars at roughly the exchange rate of that era puts the figure at somewhere around $80–85 billion — meaning the viral number implies the family stole roughly <em>six years’ worth of the entire national budget</em>, a scale with no supporting evidence anywhere. What’s actually documented is smaller and more specific: World Bank research found that firms confiscated after 2011, most tied to the family, accounted for roughly 21% of private-sector net profits in Tunisia in 2010 alone — real distortion of the economy, just not a headline number.</p><h3>Africa’s Documented Cases, Sized Up the Same Way</h3><p><strong>Mobutu Sese Seko, Zaire (1965–1997)</strong> embezzled an estimated <strong>$4 to $15 billion</strong>, with his personal fortune assessed at roughly $5 billion by 1984 — built while the country’s roads and infrastructure fell apart from lack of maintenance and the treasury defaulted on Belgian loans by 1989. Adjusted for roughly 40 years of US inflation (about 3x since the mid-1980s), that range becomes <strong>roughly $12–45 billion today</strong> — several times the size of the entire Tunisian record above, real and inflated figures combined.</p><p><strong>Sani Abacha, Nigeria (1993–1998)</strong> diverted an estimated <strong>$4.3 billion</strong> by Nigeria’s own government’s count, in under five years. For scale: Nigeria’s total foreign exchange reserves were just $494 million in 1993, rising to $9.6 billion by mid-1997 — meaning the Abacha family alone moved a sum roughly equal to the <em>entire country’s</em> foreign reserves for much of his rule. Adjusted for inflation since the late 1990s (roughly 1.9x), $4.3 billion is <strong>around $8 billion today</strong>.</p><p><strong>The continental total dwarfs any single case.</strong> The Mbeki-chaired AU/UNECA panel found Africa loses an estimated <strong>$50–60 billion a year</strong> to illicit financial flows (a later UNCTAD study put it at $88.6 billion), with cumulative outflows of roughly $850 billion between 1970 and 2008 — already in present-day dollar terms, no conversion needed. For scale: that annual figure exceeds all foreign development aid the continent receives combined. About two-thirds of it is corporate — trade mispricing and tax evasion by multinationals — not dictators pocketing state funds, which is exactly why it rarely makes it into “biggest thieves” lists.</p><h3>France and the US, Sized Up the Same Way</h3><p><strong>Elf Aquitaine, France (scandal surfaced 1994, tried 2003).</strong> Roughly <strong>£2 billion</strong> was siphoned from the state oil company’s accounts; the criminal trial centered on nearly €400 million in political kickbacks. Adjusted for about three decades of UK inflation (roughly 2.3x), £2 billion is <strong>around £4.5–4.6 billion today</strong>. Elf operated, in prosecutors’ own words, as a “financing pump” funneling oil money into political payoffs across Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, and Angola — meaning some of this money and the African cases above were, quite literally, the same circuit.</p><p><strong>Teapot Dome, United States (1922–1923).</strong> Interior Secretary Albert Fall took roughly <strong>$400,000</strong> in bribes — for decades the worst cabinet-level corruption case in US history. Adjusted for over a century of inflation (roughly 19x), that’s <strong>about $7–8 million today</strong> — smaller than a rounding error next to any figure above, African or Tunisian. Yet it produced the first imprisonment of a sitting US cabinet official and a Supreme Court ruling establishing Congress’s power to compel testimony. The comparison isn’t about which country was more corrupt; it’s that a tiny fraction of the money produced disproportionately more institutional consequence.</p><h3>The Number Nobody Should Give You</h3><p>Adding Ben Ayed’s francs, Chamama’s riyals, Khaznadar’s disputed 300 million, and the Ben Ali era into one grand total — and then converting that into “years of Tunisian development lost” — isn’t something any of this data actually supports. The currencies aren’t cleanly comparable across 150 years, several core figures are unverified, and “stolen” keeps getting conflated with “lost to systemic financial crisis.” Anyone offering a single precise number is doing exactly what the viral post did with 120 billion dinars: manufacturing certainty, and a sense of scale, where neither exists.</p><p>What survives scrutiny is smaller and less satisfying: a handful of specific, partially-documented episodes across a century and a half — genuinely serious on their own terms, but modest next to what’s actually been measured in Kinshasa, Abuja, Paris, or across the continent as a whole.</p><h3>Sources</h3><ul><li>ADST, “Kleptocracy and Anti-Communism: When Mobutu Ruled Zaire”</li><li>TIME, “Leaving Fire in His Wake: Mobutu Sese Seko”</li><li>IOL, “Abacha Stole R26bn, Says Obasanjo”</li><li>Africa.com / GNA, “US to Return $23 Million Looted by Late Dictator Abacha to Nigeria”</li><li>Wikipedia, “Sani Abacha” (Nigeria’s FX reserves and external debt, 1993–1997)</li><li>Thabo Mbeki / AU–UNECA High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, via tralac.org, Daily Maverick, UN News, National Law Review</li><li>UNCTAD, “Illicit Financial Flows: Africa Is the World’s Main Creditor”</li><li>The Law Gazette, review of Eva Joly’s <em>Justice Under Siege</em> (Elf Aquitaine)</li><li>Global Witness, “Elf Trial Throws Spotlight on Oil and Corruption”; “Elf Verdict Jails the Guilty, But Their Bitter Legacy Remains”</li><li>Deseret News, “French Court Sends Oil Executives to Bastille”</li><li>HISTORY.com and Wikipedia, “Teapot Dome Scandal”</li><li>Guichet du Savoir / Histoire-Généalogie, historical franc-to-euro conversion estimates</li><li>OfficialData.org, France Inflation Calculator</li><li>Marxists.org (V. B. Lutsky), <em>Modern History of the Arab Countries</em> — Tunisian Beylik debt, 1862–1863</li><li>Wikipedia, “French Protectorate of Tunisia” — 1867–1869 bankruptcy, International Financial Commission</li><li>Journal of Tunisian Historical Studies (jtuh.org) — 1869 debt figure of 125 million francs</li><li>Ahram Online, “Tunisia Expects 5.4% Growth Rate in 2011” — 2010 state budget figure</li><li>World Bank, research on Ben Ali–era confiscated firms and private-sector profit concentration (2010)</li></ul><p><em>Note: several figures above — Chamama’s riyal figure, Khaznadar’s 300 million francs, and the Ben Ali family’s 120 billion dinars in particular — are either impossible to responsibly convert or are flagged as unverified/unsupported. They’re included because they circulate widely, not because they’re confirmed.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=882d06327ed8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[China’s Practical PhDs: When AI Forced Academia to Value Products Over Papers]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@karim2k/chinas-practical-phds-when-ai-forced-academia-to-value-products-over-papers-a68ffc1ec6aa?source=rss-4b983644307c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a68ffc1ec6aa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[doctorate]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stem]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[artificial-intelligence]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdelakarim Benabdallah]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 13 Sep 2026 19:35:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-13T19:35:32.306Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>China’s Practical PhDs: When AI Forced Academia to Value Products Over Papers</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*X7uPy7mLLpSo1H93KoFS1w.jpeg" /></figure><p>In early 2026, a civil engineer named Zheng Hehui stood before a doctoral defense panel at Southeast University in Nanjing. He did not present a traditional 100-page thesis packed with literature reviews and statistical tables. Instead, he talked about a set of Lego-like reinforced-steel blocks he had designed. Those blocks were already being used to assemble bridge pylons on a major Yangtze River rail-and-road bridge. He passed. He became one of the first graduates under China’s new “practical PhD” pathway.</p><p>Since late 2025, at least eleven engineers have earned doctorates this way. Their outputs include vacuum laser welding systems, firefighting equipment for large seaplanes, fiber-optic sensing networks for major water projects, and specialized coatings for high-temperature turbines. A 2024 revision to China’s Degree Law made it possible: master’s and doctoral candidates in engineering fields can now graduate on the basis of demonstrated practical achievements — prototypes, techniques, or deployed projects — rather than conventional research papers.</p><p>The change is deliberate. China has spent years wrestling with a publish-or-perish culture that produced mountains of low-quality or fabricated papers, paper mills, and a gap between classroom theory and the hands-on skills needed in strategic industries such as semiconductors and advanced manufacturing. Generative AI accelerated the reckoning. When large language models can draft literature reviews, generate plausible analysis, and polish prose at scale, the traditional written thesis loses much of its signal value as proof of original intellectual work.</p><p><strong>Impact on Scientific and Engineering PhDs</strong></p><p>For STEM fields — especially applied engineering — the shift is significant and mostly positive in the near term.</p><p>Traditional research PhDs still exist and remain the primary route for pure scientific inquiry. The practical track, however, creates a parallel, industry-aligned path. Students spend more time on real engineering sites and less time optimizing for journal metrics. Evaluation focuses on whether the work functions at scale, solves a concrete problem, and can be verified by external partners (companies, project owners, or industry experts). This narrows the notorious theory-practice gap that Chinese officials have repeatedly criticized.</p><p>Benefits include faster translation of research into deployed technology, stronger university-industry partnerships (dozens of new engineering graduate schools now involve more than 100 companies), and a clearer talent pipeline for national priorities. Critics worry about risks: reduced emphasis on fundamental theory, weaker training in peer-reviewed scientific communication, potential for uneven quality control when commercial partners influence evaluation, and the possibility that “practical” becomes a softer alternative rather than a rigorous equal.</p><p>In short, scientific doctorates are bifurcating. One track continues to produce researchers who advance knowledge through papers and theory. The other produces elite engineers measured by working systems. Both can claim the title “doctor,” but they now signal different competencies.</p><p><strong>Impact on Non-Scientific PhDs</strong></p><p>The practical pathway is currently limited to engineering-related professional degrees. Humanities, social sciences, pure mathematics, and many pure sciences remain tied to traditional written theses and peer-reviewed publications. That may not last forever.</p><p>Non-scientific fields face a different version of the same pressures. AI can generate competent historical analysis, legal argumentation, or literary criticism. Detection tools are imperfect, and the volume of AI-assisted student work is rising. Some universities already impose strict limits on AI-generated content in theses and require disclosure. Over time, pressure may grow for portfolio-style or practice-based doctorates in fields such as education, public policy, design, or applied social research — echoing professional doctorates already common elsewhere (EdD, DBA).</p><p>Resistance will be stronger in disciplines where the written argument *is* the primary contribution. A historian’s or philosopher’s originality often lives in the text itself. Replacing that with a “practical product” risks hollowing out the very skills those fields claim to cultivate. The likely outcome is dual tracks within universities: research doctorates that stay paper-heavy, and professional or practice-oriented doctorates that accept alternative evidence of mastery. Non-scientific fields may adopt the model more slowly and selectively, or not at all in their purest forms.</p><p><strong>Historical Parallels: Technology Has Always Rewritten the Rules of the Doctorate</strong></p><p>This is not the first time a technological leap forced academia to rethink what counts as doctoral-level work.</p><p>The printing press offers the deepest analogy. Before Gutenberg, universities centered on oral disputation and scarce manuscripts. Printing made books abundant, shifted emphasis toward written scholarship, expanded libraries, and gradually replaced pure oral examination with written work as the main route to a degree. Knowledge production scaled; the credential adapted.</p><p>The early internet produced a more recent, milder version of the same pattern. Broadband and digital search compressed the time needed to survey literature. Online journals, preprints, and digital dissertations emerged. In some technical fields, time-to-PhD actually declined as information access improved. At the same time, professional doctorates — Doctor of Education (EdD), Doctor of Business Administration (DBA), Engineering Doctorates — proliferated precisely because traditional research PhDs were poorly matched to practitioners who needed to solve organizational or applied problems rather than generate pure theory. These degrees already accepted project-based or portfolio evidence instead of classic monographs.</p><p>China’s move sits in this lineage. AI, like printing and the internet before it, lowers the marginal cost of producing certain kinds of text while raising the relative value of hard-to-fake practical competence. When the old currency (papers) becomes easier to inflate, institutions invent new currencies (working prototypes, deployed systems).</p><p>Other countries have experimented with similar ideas without going as far. Some European and Australian programs already allow practice-based PhDs in the creative arts or engineering. Industry-linked doctoral programs exist in several places. China’s version is distinctive for its scale, state coordination, and explicit pivot away from journal metrics in a high-stakes technological competition.</p><p><strong>What Comes Next</strong></p><p>China’s practical PhD is both a pragmatic response to AI and paper inflation and a strategic bet on applied engineering talent. It will not abolish research doctorates. It will, however, force a clearer distinction between those who advance fundamental knowledge and those who turn knowledge into working systems.</p><p>For scientific fields the immediate effect is greater pluralism and stronger industry relevance. For non-scientific fields it is a warning signal: the old exclusive reliance on the written thesis is no longer automatic or unchallengeable. History suggests the credential will adapt rather than disappear. The printing press did not end universities; it changed what they measured. The internet did the same. AI is now doing it again — this time with steel bridge blocks and laser welders standing in for the traditional stack of published papers.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a68ffc1ec6aa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[When a Facebook Post Becomes a Social Explosion: What Tunisia’s Reaction to Homosexuality Reveals]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@karim2k/when-a-facebook-post-becomes-a-social-explosion-what-tunisias-reaction-to-homosexuality-reveals-f356df5b96d5?source=rss-4b983644307c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f356df5b96d5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tunisia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lgbtq]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[facebook]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdelakarim Benabdallah]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 17:19:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-10T17:19:55.745Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9WAcSngMkdIIJOZQsaacBw.jpeg" /></figure><p>There is something particularly revealing about the way Tunisians react to certain subjects on Facebook.</p><p>After decades of political authoritarianism, censorship and ideological control, combined with centuries of religious and social conflict over morality, identity and acceptable behavior, some subjects seem to function like social detonators.</p><p><strong>Sexual orientation is clearly one of them.</strong></p><p>A few days after the controversy surrounding what appeared to be a police intervention involving people suspected of being gay gathering in an apartment in Lac, another Facebook post triggered a remarkably intense reaction. The original post was relatively simple: why should being gay or bisexual become a source of shame, humiliation or public exposure? And why should someone’s private sexual orientation be treated as public property?</p><p>The author argued that an adult’s sexual orientation does not determine his intelligence, morality, success or human value, and questioned whether Tunisian men fear homosexuality itself — or rather the reaction of society to anyone who does not conform to the traditional image of masculinity.</p><p>The reactions that followed provide something more interesting than a simple “pro-gay versus anti-gay” argument.</p><p>They reveal a series of recurring patterns.</p><h3>1. The first reaction: religion</h3><p>The fastest way to close the discussion was often to invoke Islam.</p><p>One commenter responded that God created humanity “from male and female,” described homosexuality as outside human nature and religiously forbidden, and went as far as arguing that it should be opposed “by every means,” including force.</p><p>Others immediately brought in the story of Lot.</p><p>References to the destruction of the people of Lot appeared repeatedly, with one commenter invoking the Qur’anic punishment of the people of Lot as an argument against accepting homosexuality. Another posted a religious argument about Lot’s wife, presenting her supposed openness toward the behavior as part of the reason for her punishment.</p><p>For some participants, therefore, the discussion was not about individual freedom at all.</p><p>The argument was already settled.</p><p>“حرام حرام حرام” — forbidden, forbidden, forbidden — becomes the end of the conversation rather than the beginning of a discussion.</p><p>One commenter explicitly rejected the concept of personal freedom in this context because, in their view, freedom cannot make something religiously forbidden acceptable.</p><p>This is an important pattern: <strong>religious prohibition is being used not merely as a personal moral position, but as an argument about what society should permit everyone else to do.</strong></p><h3>2. “Nature” becomes the second battlefield</h3><p>When the religious argument was not enough, many commenters moved to biology and “nature.”</p><p>One person compared heterosexual reproduction in humans, animals, plants and even electrical plugs, arguing that everything demonstrates a male/female principle.</p><p>Another commenter argued that homosexuality is a violation of “human nature” and suggested that people with such orientations should seek treatment and return to the supposedly original heterosexual state.</p><p>A particularly interesting contradiction appears here.</p><p>Some commenters simultaneously claimed that homosexuality is:</p><ul><li>a religious sin,</li><li>a biological abnormality,</li><li>a psychological or medical problem,</li><li>a social threat,</li><li>and a deliberate ideological choice.</li></ul><p>These are not necessarily the same argument.</p><p>But on Facebook they frequently become one large rhetorical package.</p><p>The purpose is less to establish a coherent scientific explanation than to establish one conclusion: <strong>this behavior is abnormal, therefore it should not be socially accepted.</strong></p><h3>3. The “slippery slope” argument</h3><p>Another striking pattern is the repeated movement from homosexuality to increasingly extreme scenarios.</p><p>Accepting same-sex relationships, some commenters argued, would supposedly lead to acceptance of relationships with animals, incest or even pedophilia.</p><p>One comment explicitly claimed that accepting relationships between two people of the same sex would eventually lead to accepting sex with animals and then pedophilia.</p><p>Another extended the argument by connecting homosexuality to abuse of children, murder, blackmail, political influence and corruption.</p><p>This is a classic <strong>slippery-slope pattern</strong>:</p><p>A → B → C → catastrophe.</p><p>Instead of discussing whether two consenting adults should have their private lives exposed, the conversation moves toward crimes involving non-consenting victims.</p><p>The effect is powerful because it changes the emotional object of the debate.</p><p>The reader is no longer being asked:</p><blockquote><em>“Should society expose someone’s private sexual orientation?”</em></blockquote><p>They are effectively being asked:</p><blockquote><em>“Do you want to protect children and prevent society from collapsing?”</em></blockquote><p>Once the discussion reaches that point, the original question has almost disappeared.</p><h3>4. Privacy is replaced by “public morality”</h3><p>Perhaps the most interesting response came from someone who did not necessarily defend homosexuality.</p><p>Their position was essentially:</p><p>“I don’t care about other people’s orientations. Everyone is responsible for themselves, provided they do not impose their behavior on others or harm anyone.”</p><p>The commenter summarized the position with the Tunisian expression:</p><blockquote><em>“كل شاة معلقة من كراعها”</em></blockquote><p>— roughly, everyone should mind their own business.</p><p>They nevertheless added limits concerning public behavior, influence over others and harm.</p><p>This represents a very different position from both extremes.</p><p>It does not require someone to approve of homosexuality.</p><p>It simply separates <strong>personal morality from the policing of another person’s private life</strong>.</p><p>That distinction, however, was difficult for many participants to maintain.</p><h3>5. “Freedom” itself becomes suspicious</h3><p>The original post deliberately focused on freedom and privacy.</p><p>But some commenters interpreted even discussing homosexuality as an attempt to “normalize” it.</p><p>One accused the author of trying to make homosexuality socially acceptable simply by opening a discussion about it.</p><p>Another wrote that even discussing a religiously forbidden act was itself a form of normalization.</p><p>This produces an unusual phenomenon:</p><p><strong>The debate is no longer about whether homosexuality should be accepted. The debate becomes whether homosexuality should even be discussed neutrally.</strong></p><p>For some participants, language itself is political.</p><p>Calling it “sexual orientation” rather than “sexual deviation” is already perceived as taking a side.</p><p>Calling it “gay” rather than using a religiously loaded term is interpreted as ideological propaganda.</p><p>Even the vocabulary becomes part of the battle.</p><h3>6. Masculinity enters the discussion</h3><p>The original post was particularly provocative because it did not only talk about homosexuality.</p><p>It questioned the Tunisian definition of masculinity:</p><p>“You have to marry a woman.”</p><p>“You have to have children.”</p><p>“You have to prove your masculinity.”</p><p>That seems to have touched another sensitive nerve.</p><p>Several comments responded not simply by discussing homosexuality, but by attacking the supposed masculinity of the person defending individual freedom.</p><p>Insults repeatedly used words associated with femininity, homosexuality, impotence and sexual humiliation.</p><p>One commenter essentially argued that the author’s defense of homosexuality demonstrated something about his own sexuality. Another attacked the author’s masculinity by using sexualized insults.</p><p>This suggests another important pattern:</p><p><strong>The accusation of homosexuality is being used as a weapon against anyone who challenges traditional masculinity.</strong></p><p>In other words, the subject is not only “Are you gay?”</p><p>It becomes:</p><p><strong>“Are you sufficiently masculine to be allowed to speak?”</strong></p><h3>7. The surprising connection with women’s rights</h3><p>One comment took the discussion somewhere else entirely:</p><blockquote><em>“كهو نكتوا شطر تونس بحقوق المرأة والنفقة والطلاق تو كملو ردو الشطر لآخر موبنة”</em></blockquote><p>The commenter essentially connected the homosexuality debate with previous conflicts surrounding women’s rights, divorce and child support.</p><p>That reaction is revealing.</p><p>It suggests that, for some Facebook users, these are not separate debates.</p><p>Women’s independence, divorce, child support, homosexuality and changing gender roles are perceived as parts of the same larger cultural transformation.</p><p>The underlying fear is not necessarily homosexuality itself.</p><p>It may be <strong>the erosion of a familiar social order</strong>.</p><h3>8. Westernization and conspiracy enter the conversation</h3><p>Once traditional morality becomes threatened, another familiar explanation appears:</p><p>“The West.”</p><p>One commenter argued that Tunisia would supposedly punish homosexuals violently if it were not controlled by Western influence.</p><p>Another long comment connected homosexuality, Western culture, American influence, scientific progress, military power and cultural decadence.</p><p>Another commenter argued that homosexuality is part of a broader strategy to dismantle society and make it easier to control, even introducing explicitly conspiratorial claims involving Israel and Jewish financial support.</p><p>This creates a fourth layer of the argument:</p><p><strong>Homosexuality → Westernization → cultural invasion → destruction of society.</strong></p><p>The subject therefore becomes much larger than sexuality.</p><p>It becomes a proxy war over Tunisian identity.</p><h3>9. From disagreement to dehumanization</h3><p>The most disturbing feature of the discussion is not that people disagree.</p><p>People can legitimately have religious, cultural or personal objections to homosexuality.</p><p>The disturbing part is how quickly disagreement becomes dehumanization.</p><p>The comments include accusations that people defending gay rights are “animals,” “filthy,” “traitors,” “hypocrites,” or mentally defective.</p><p>Some explicitly call for people to be expelled.</p><p>And one comment goes considerably further, imagining that the majority could publicly burn homosexuals and their supporters alive.</p><p>Another comment calls for violence against homosexuals “by every means.”</p><p>At that point, the discussion has crossed an important line.</p><p>It is no longer a disagreement about morality.</p><p>It becomes a question of <strong>who is allowed to exist safely inside society</strong>.</p><h3>10. Yet there are cracks in the apparent consensus</h3><p>It would be easy to look at the comments and conclude that Tunisian society is uniformly hostile to homosexuality.</p><p>The data in this discussion does not justify such a conclusion.</p><p>There are quieter positions.</p><p>Some people focus on privacy.</p><p>Some distinguish between personal beliefs and state intervention.</p><p>Some explicitly reject the idea that sexual orientation determines a person’s intelligence, morality or value.</p><p>And at least one commenter directly pushed back against the medicalization of sexual orientation, arguing that it is not a disease — even though that same commenter then reached a contradictory conclusion about morality and responsibility.</p><p>There are therefore several Tunisias visible in the same comment section.</p><p>One is religious and absolutist.</p><p>One is socially conservative but pragmatic.</p><p>One is aggressively nationalist.</p><p>One is suspicious of Western influence.</p><p>One is concerned primarily with privacy.</p><p>And another is trying to introduce a modern language of individual rights.</p><p>Facebook puts all of these Tunisians in the same digital room.</p><p>And then gives them a comment box.</p><h3>The real subject may not be homosexuality</h3><p>This is perhaps the most interesting conclusion from the discussion.</p><p>The post appeared to be about gay and bisexual men.</p><p>But the comments reveal a much larger conflict.</p><p>They are about:</p><p><strong>religion versus secular individualism;</strong></p><p><strong>traditional masculinity versus changing gender identities;</strong></p><p><strong>collective morality versus private life;</strong></p><p><strong>social conformity versus individual autonomy;</strong></p><p><strong>local identity versus perceived Western influence;</strong></p><p>and ultimately,</p><p><strong>who gets to define what a “normal Tunisian” looks like.</strong></p><p>That is why the subject is so explosive.</p><p>A question about one person’s private life suddenly becomes a referendum on Islam, masculinity, family, reproduction, national identity, Westernization, morality and the future of society.</p><h3>Facebook as Tunisia’s new pressure cooker</h3><p>There is also something specifically Facebook-like about this phenomenon.</p><p>The platform removes many of the social mechanisms that normally moderate disagreement.</p><p>People who would never shout these things at a stranger in a café can write them behind an anonymous account.</p><p>Religious quotations can sit next to vulgar insults.</p><p>A claim about genetics can appear next to a conspiracy theory.</p><p>A discussion about privacy can turn into a threat of public execution within a few comments.</p><p>And because Facebook rewards engagement, outrage becomes the fuel of the conversation.</p><p>The most nuanced argument is rarely the most emotionally powerful.</p><p>“Everyone should have privacy” is intellectually manageable.</p><p>“Your entire society is being destroyed” is emotionally explosive.</p><p>And “we should burn them” is even more explosive.</p><p>That is the architecture of outrage.</p><h3>What this Facebook thread tells us</h3><p>The most revealing part of this discussion may therefore not be what Tunisians think about homosexuality.</p><p>It is <strong>how quickly a disagreement over homosexuality activates deeper anxieties</strong>.</p><p>The repeated invocation of Lot, nature, masculinity, children, Westernization, women’s rights, national identity and social collapse suggests that homosexuality functions as a symbolic battlefield.</p><p>For some participants, defending homosexuality means defending a completely different model of society.</p><p>For others, opposing homosexuality means defending religion, family and Tunisian identity.</p><p>And for a smaller but significant group, the question is much simpler:</p><p><strong>Why should I care what another adult does privately?</strong></p><p>That last question may actually be the most disruptive one.</p><p>Because it does not ask society to approve.</p><p>It asks society to stop treating every difference as a threat.</p><p>And judging from this Facebook debate, that remains one of the hardest conversations Tunisia can have.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f356df5b96d5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Still Marveling at Facebook in Tunisia]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@karim2k/still-marveling-at-facebook-in-tunisia-d5b69a7a99c8?source=rss-4b983644307c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d5b69a7a99c8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[facebook]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tunisia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[meta]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kais-said]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdelakarim Benabdallah]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 10:21:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-02T10:21:00.964Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*YTJ5E1lC1y_n4rAq" /></figure><p>In Tunisia, Facebook has quietly become something closer to a town square than a social network. Under a political system where trust in traditional broadcast and print media runs thin, ordinary people have turned to Facebook groups to argue, vent, joke, and occasionally organize — filling a gap left by outlets many no longer believe.</p><p>A recent thread is a useful snapshot of how this works in practice. It began with a claim circulating in a Facebook group: that an upcoming legal change would eliminate post-divorce alimony (<em>nafaqa</em>) for wives, framing the law as holding a woman “responsible for her own choices” both at marriage and at divorce. Whether or not the claim accurately reflects any real legislative proposal, what followed underneath it is the interesting part — a compressed portrait of Tunisian public opinion, unfiltered and in dialect.</p><h3>A Cross-Section of Reactions</h3><p><strong>On the substance of the law itself</strong>, commenters split quickly. Several argued that alimony should only ever apply to children, not ex-wives — a position stated flatly and repeated by more than one participant. Others pushed back, framing spousal support as rooted in religious and customary obligation, something with a moral and legal basis (<em>shar’</em> and social custom, “<em>bel ma’ruf</em>”) that shouldn’t be casually discarded. One commenter listed child custody as the more pressing issue entirely, sidestepping the alimony debate to point at what they saw as the real fight.</p><p><strong>On the politics of the moment</strong>, a few commenters dismissed the whole topic as manufactured outrage — an attempt by opposition figures, whom they accused of having “sold out the country,” to stir up controversy rather than address anything real. This drew a sharp reply accusing that commenter of naivety, with a rhetorical jab asking whether they were secretly on the payroll. Another participant went further, calling on the president personally to intervene and consult the Mufti of the Republic on the matter — folding a family-law question directly into a call for top-down religious-political arbitration.</p><p><strong>On gender dynamics</strong>, the thread turned more personal. Some comments accused men of using ambiguous flirtation and mixed signals (“<em>taskbin</em>”) to manipulate women once they sense vulnerability, then later feigning confusion about what happened. Others countered by asking why a husband who <em>chose</em> to divorce his wife in order to remarry should still be entitled to sympathy or legal protection. A related strand worried aloud about rising rates of unmarried women, attributing it to young men increasingly avoiding marriage to Tunisian women altogether — a claim stated as fact but worth treating as anecdote rather than data.</p><p><strong>And then there’s the register the platform seems built for</strong>: dark humor, sarcasm, and dialect that would never survive an editorial process. One user quipped that the change would at least reduce the courts’ divorce caseload. Another, more bitterly, asked when people would finally be free of the whole discussion — “<em>only when we die?</em>” A comment written half in transliterated slang (“<em>kluo klam</em>” — “just talk”) prompted Facebook’s own translation tool to shrug. Someone else used the loaded word “<em>shiha</em>” sarcastically, code for old-fashioned or backward thinking. It’s the kind of commentary that only exists because there’s no editor and no byline — just a comment box and whoever happens to be scrolling.</p><h3>Why This Matters</h3><p>None of this is journalism, and none of it should be mistaken for it. There’s no verification, no attribution, no editorial standard — just claims stacked on claims, some sincere, some trolling, some clearly performing outrage for an audience. But that’s precisely why it matters. In a media environment where state and state-adjacent outlets are viewed with suspicion, a comment thread like this becomes a rare, if messy, window into what people actually think — their fears about family law, their political cynicism, their gender grievances, their gallows humor — all surfacing in real time, in the Tunisian dialect they actually speak, not the formal Arabic of a press release.</p><p>It’s not a substitute for a free press. It’s what fills the space when a free press can’t be fully trusted — a proxy public sphere, built out of reply threads and reaction emojis, doing a job institutions were supposed to do.</p><p><em>Note: this piece draws on a public Facebook group thread. Individual commenters have been described by the substance of what they said rather than quoted or identified by name, since they are private citizens rather than public figures.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d5b69a7a99c8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[When “Liking” Becomes Piling On: What One Facebook Post Reveals About Online Misogyny in Tunisia]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@karim2k/when-liking-becomes-piling-on-what-one-facebook-post-reveals-about-online-misogyny-in-tunisia-436d36b9f061?source=rss-4b983644307c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/436d36b9f061</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tunisia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[facebook]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[meta]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[womens-rights]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdelakarim Benabdallah]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 08:36:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-02T08:36:00.837Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*p9r0VHgAYIQuKp7K" /></figure><p>A woman writes a short, defiant post about independent Tunisian women — the ones who work eight-hour shifts, raise their children alone, pay their own rent, and still get asked “where’s your husband?” It isn’t a call to violence. It isn’t even, by most standards, provocative. It’s a rebuttal.</p><p>Within hours, the replies stop being a conversation and start looking like a coordinated dogpile.</p><p>That shift — from disagreement to dogpile — is the real subject of this piece. Not whether Facebook “causes” violence against women, which is too big a claim for one comment thread to prove, but something narrower and more measurable: how a platform’s design can take ordinary misogyny and turn it into something louder, more public, and harder for any one woman to withstand.</p><h3>The pattern, not just the post</h3><p>Scroll through the replies under this particular post and a pattern emerges quickly. It isn’t one angry man; it’s dozens of strangers, many posting under pseudonymous or anonymized handles, converging on the same woman with strikingly similar language. Some responses frame independence itself as a moral failing — one commenter suggested that a woman who won’t “let a man protect her” doesn’t deserve one at all. Others escalate into outright insults, branding her and women who share her views as promiscuous or morally corrupt. At least one reply is an open threat, invoking “a hand and a knife” as an answer to her words.</p><p>None of these commenters coordinated in a formal sense. But the platform did some of the coordinating for them: it surfaced the post to people already primed to be angry, let them see and build on each other’s replies in real time, and rewarded the most cutting responses with visibility. A slur that might once have stayed inside one household or one café conversation is now a public performance, cheered on by strangers, permanently attached to a woman’s name.</p><h3>Anonymity lowers the cost of cruelty</h3><p>A striking number of the harshest replies come from accounts with generic, randomly generated names rather than real identities. That anonymity does real work. Research on technology-facilitated gender-based violence has repeatedly found that perceived anonymity reduces the social cost of hostility — people say things online, to a stranger’s face, that they would likely never say in person. The Facebook thread bears this out: the most graphic threats and the crudest name-calling cluster disproportionately among the anonymized accounts, while commenters using their real names tend, though not always, toward more “restrained” — if still dismissive or condescending — disagreement.</p><h3>From insult to intimidation</h3><p>What makes this more than a bad-tempered argument is the presence of explicit intimidation mixed in with the ideological pushback. Alongside comments arguing that women’s rights were “given” to them by outsiders, or that a working woman has abandoned her family, sit comments that cross from opinion into threat: language that frames exposure, shame, or physical harm as legitimate responses to a woman’s opinion. When threats of violence sit in the same comment section as garden-variety political disagreement, normalized side by side, the effect is to make the threats look ordinary too — just one more voice in a very loud room.</p><p>This is the mechanism worth naming: platforms don’t need to invent misogyny to make it more dangerous. They just have to let it aggregate. A hundred men who each privately think a working woman is “asking for it” are a hundred private opinions. The same hundred men, replying to the same post within the same hour, become a wall of hostility that can follow a woman into her notifications for days — and that other women, watching silently, learn to fear provoking.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*gkzzMGeW5dzyBusE" /></figure><h3>Patterns in the replies</h3><p>Reading through several dozen replies to the same post, the hostility isn’t random. It clusters into a small number of recurring moves — different commenters, same script. (Quotes below are translated from Tunisian Arabic/French and shortened; usernames are omitted or generalized to avoid amplifying harassment against private individuals.)</p><p><strong>1. “You’re not a real woman” — policing the category itself.</strong> Several replies don’t argue with what she said so much as revoke her standing to say it. One commenter wrote that a woman who competes with men “ends up in the middle — neither female, nor able to become male,” quoting a well-known misogynist literary line as if it settled the matter. Another simply told her to go find “a proper origin” who “respects herself and values men” — the implication being that her post disqualifies her from that category. The move is consistent: reframe disagreement as evidence she isn’t a legitimate woman at all.</p><p><strong>2. “Real” independent women look nothing like you.</strong> A recurring rebuttal invokes a different, more sympathetic woman — the field laborer, the market vendor, the woman standing for hours in the sun — as a cudgel against the original poster. One long reply built an entire household budget, dollar by dollar, to argue that a working mother is actually exploited, not liberated, and that the “independent” framing is a lie sold to women by secular state policy. The rhetorical trick is the same each time: praise one kind of hardworking woman specifically to delegitimize another woman’s account of her own life.</p><p><strong>3. Rights as gift, not achievement.</strong> Multiple commenters insist that Tunisian women didn’t win their legal protections — someone gave them. One reply argued at length that women’s rights were “handed” to them by outside powers as a condition of loans and financing, naming a specific religious-ethnic group as the string-pullers behind global capitalism — an antisemitic conspiracy trope layered on top of the anti-feminist one. A shorter reply made the same basic claim without the conspiracy framing, crediting “Bourguiba and secularism” rather than women themselves for the Personal Status Code. Both versions erase decades of Tunisian women’s own organizing.</p><p><strong>4. Explicit threats, dropped into ordinary disagreement.</strong> Not every hostile reply is an argument. One of the very first replies to the post is five words that function as a threat: <em>“my hand, yours, and a knife.”</em> It sits in the thread beside comments about budgeting and Quranic inheritance law as if it were just another opinion — which is exactly the danger. Nothing in the platform’s response separates a threat of violence from a rhetorical jab; both get a “Reply” button and the same font.</p><p><strong>5. Sexual shaming as the default insult.</strong> When commenters run out of ideological argument, a large share fall back on branding the poster and women like her as sexually promiscuous — calling her a prostitute, accusing her of “selling herself” for a paycheck, or insisting real independence is just cover for infidelity. This isn’t a fringe reaction; it appears in some form in a majority of the hostile replies, regardless of whether the commenter is arguing economics, religion, or family structure.</p><p><strong>6. Religion invoked selectively, both ways.</strong> Scripture gets cited constantly, but on both sides of the same argument. Several replies quote the Prophet’s instruction to “treat women well” as proof that Islam already protects women better than any feminist movement could — while ignoring the same verses when women in the thread cite Islamic law’s guarantees on inheritance, work, and financial independence to make the opposite point. One woman’s detailed, verse-by-verse rebuttal — arguing that Islamic law already secures a wife’s mahr, housing, and financial autonomy independent of “the West” — draws no direct response; the thread simply moves past it to the next insult.</p><p><strong>7. Divorce and alimony reframed as female exploitation of men.</strong> A cluster of replies pivot from the original post to grievances about family court outcomes — alimony, child custody, housing after divorce — arguing that these laws prove men, not women, are the truly oppressed party. It’s a genuine policy debate in Tunisia, but here it’s deployed as a rebuttal to a woman describing her own workday, collapsing “some divorce laws favor women” into “this woman complaining about disrespect has no right to complain.”</p><p><strong>8. Dehumanizing comparison.</strong> A smaller but telling category swaps argument for imagery: comparing outspoken women to jackals, foxes, or snakes, or reducing the conversation to crude physical insults about her appearance or sexual value. These replies don’t engage with the post’s content at all — their function is purely to degrade.</p><p><strong>9. The counter-current.</strong> It’s worth noting the thread isn’t unanimous. A handful of women and at least a few men push back directly — one replies that the post “came down with respect” and was met with insults instead; another delivers a long, sourced rebuttal citing named women scientists and Islamic legal scholarship to argue that women’s achievements were never simply “given” by men. These replies get far fewer reactions and shares than the hostile ones, but they establish that the pile-on isn’t the only Tunisian voice in the room — it’s just the loudest one the platform’s engagement mechanics reward.</p><p>Taken together, these nine patterns show something more specific than generic “online hate.” They show a shared script — delegitimize her womanhood, invoke a more sympathetic woman against her, deny that rights were earned, shame her sexually, weaponize scripture, and drop in outright threats — being run by dozens of unconnected strangers within the same hour, on the same post, with the platform’s ranking and notification systems ensuring each new insult reaches the widest possible audience.</p><h3>What this doesn’t prove — and what it does</h3><p>It would be an overreach to say Facebook is turning individual men violent the way a trigger pulls a switch. The attitudes on display here — that a woman’s independence is a threat, that her body and choices are open to public judgment, that rejection or disagreement licenses insult — predate any app. Facebook didn’t write them.</p><p>What Facebook did do, in this thread, is give them an audience, a megaphone, and cover. It let strangers rehearse hostility toward women in front of each other, rewarded the cruelest lines with replies and shares, and left the woman who posted the original message to face all of it largely alone, with a report button as her main recourse.</p><p>That is a real and measurable harm, even short of the strongest possible claim. And it’s one platforms that build the architecture for pile-ons — visibility, virality, anonymity, weak consequence for threats — have a direct hand in shaping.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=436d36b9f061" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Tunisia Isn’t Broke Because of Bad Luck.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@karim2k/tunisia-isnt-broke-because-of-bad-luck-6128a38fb548?source=rss-4b983644307c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6128a38fb548</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tunisia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdelakarim Benabdallah]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 08:36:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-26T08:36:01.370Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Tunisia Isn’t Broke Because of Bad Luck. It’s Broke by Design — and We Need to Talk About Who Benefits.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*qTwazU8Ycx1-RWg-" /></figure><p>Let’s start with a number that should stop you mid-scroll: <strong>TND 24 billion.</strong> That’s roughly what Tunisia spent in 2025 just servicing its debt — not building anything, not paying a single teacher or nurse, just keeping creditors from the door. That’s close to a quarter of everything the state manages to collect in a year, gone before a single public service gets funded.</p><p>If that doesn’t alarm you, keep reading, because it gets worse. And if you’ve already seen the viral videos blaming “the rich families” and “the foreigners” for all of it — also keep reading, because some of that is closer to true than you’d think, and some of it is dangerous nonsense. Untangling which is which is the whole point of this piece.</p><h3>The gap nobody is closing</h3><p>Tunisia exported about <strong>TND 63.7 billion</strong> in 2025. It imported <strong>TND 85.5 billion</strong>. Do the subtraction and you get a trade deficit of nearly <strong>TND 22 billion</strong> for the year. 2026 isn’t just repeating that pattern — it’s accelerating it. Through the first seven months of 2026, exports rose a solid 9.9% to <strong>TND 40.6 billion</strong>, but imports jumped 13.7% to <strong>TND 55.6 billion</strong>, widening the gap to nearly <strong>TND 15 billion</strong> in barely half a year, up sharply from TND 11.9 billion over the same stretch of 2025. The coverage ratio — how much of what Tunisia imports it actually earns back through exports — has been sliding for two straight years, from close to 80% to under 74%. Energy alone accounts for more than half of that widening gap, alongside a surge in grain and vehicle imports.</p><p>This isn’t a country splurging on luxury. Much of what it imports is fuel and industrial inputs the economy actually needs. That’s the uncomfortable part: this isn’t waste, it’s <em>dependency</em>. Tunisia cannot generate, on its own, the hard currency its own economy burns through every month.</p><p>So what fills the hole? Borrowing. Public debt closed 2025 somewhere between <strong>TND 141 and 147 billion</strong> — the exact figure depends who you ask, and that disagreement between the Finance Ministry, the Central Bank, and outside institutions is itself a small scandal about how little the public actually gets to verify. Either way, it’s roughly <strong>80–84% of GDP</strong>, up from about 68% just seven years ago. That climb happened across multiple governments, multiple finance ministers, multiple “new eras.” Nobody has reversed it, and the money increasingly comes from a narrower place: domestic banks and the Central Bank itself now cover a majority of it, after the state effectively walked away from the international bond market and the IMF program it once negotiated. That’s not a footnote — it means the government is increasingly borrowing from the same banking system that’s supposed to be lending to Tunisian businesses, crowding out the private economy to keep the public one afloat.</p><p>To be fair to the numbers, not everything in 2025 pointed the same direction. Growth actually picked up — 3.2% in the second quarter of 2025, more than double the same period in 2024 — and inflation cooled to around 5%, down from over 6% a year earlier. The state even posted a rare budget surplus through the first eight months of 2025. None of that erases the debt trajectory or the widening trade gap; it just means the crisis isn’t a straight line downward, it’s a slow bleed that occasionally gets a tourniquet. That distinction matters, because pretending the picture is uniformly catastrophic is its own kind of misinformation — and it lets people dismiss the real, structural problem as just another cycle instead of the accumulating one it actually is.</p><h3>Who’s actually keeping the lights on</h3><p>Here’s the part that should get more attention than it does: Tunisia’s foreign-currency survival right now is being financed by ordinary people, not the state. Remittances from Tunisians abroad and tourism receipts together brought in roughly <strong>TND 9.7 billion</strong> through the end of July 2026 — remittances up about 5.2% year over year, tourism revenue up close to 5% — keeping net foreign currency reserves at around <strong>TND 23.1 billion</strong>, equivalent to roughly <strong>91 days of import cover</strong> as of early August 2026, down from about 100 days a year earlier because of a Eurobond repayment. That buffer is real, but it’s also thinner than it was twelve months ago, even with remittances and tourism both growing.</p><p>Read that again. The people holding this economy together are the ones who left, sending money back to families who couldn’t. That’s not a national success story. That’s a quiet, unpaid subsidy from the diaspora to a state that hasn’t fixed the thing that made them leave in the first place.</p><h3>Now — about the rumors</h3><p>If you’re on Tunisian Facebook or TikTok, you’ve seen the monologues. Coast guards intercepting remittance money. Specific salary figures for officials, thrown out like they came from a payslip. Foreign telecom and banking brands accused of quietly draining the country dry simply because of who owns them. Sub-Saharan migrants framed as a weapon deliberately “sent” by Europe.</p><p>Here’s my honest take, as someone who reads Tunisian media for a living: <strong>most of this specific content is false or unverifiable.</strong> There is no documented evidence the coast guard is intercepting remittances — the data shows the opposite, remittances are one of the only line items actually growing. Salary figures for officials circulate with zero payroll disclosure behind them; nobody sharing them can actually prove them, including the people making the videos. And the “migrants as a weapon” narrative isn’t just wrong, it’s the same narrative that helped fuel real violence and mass evictions against Black residents in Tunisia in 2023. That one deserves active pushback, not amplification.</p><p>But here’s the harder truth, and it’s why I won’t just tell you to dismiss all of it: <strong>in a country with a genuinely weak, underfunded, and increasingly pressured press, rumor is sometimes the only place a real pattern gets named before journalism catches up to it.</strong> Tunisia doesn’t have the investigative infrastructure — protected sources, funded newsrooms, freedom-of-information enforcement — to confirm or kill most of these claims quickly. So people fill the vacuum with whatever story fits what they already suspect. And what they suspect isn’t crazy. It’s centuries old.</p><h3>The foreign companies that actually matter — and it’s a messier picture than the videos suggest</h3><p>If you want real examples instead of vague accusations, they exist, and they cut both ways. Take Société de Fabrication des Boissons de Tunisie — SFBT — the company behind Celtia and most of the beer, soda and bottled water Tunisians drink every day. It controls something like 85% of the beer market and 90% of soft drinks. Its majority shareholder is Groupe Castel, a French beverage giant, which has spent the last few years quietly buying out the last Tunisian family shareholders to consolidate control. That’s a textbook case of a foreign group owning a dominant slice of everyday consumption — real, documented, no conspiracy required. Whether that ownership is “looting” the country or simply running a profitable local business depends entirely on the boring numbers people rarely check: how much of SFBT’s profit is reinvested locally, how much flows back to Bordeaux, and how much tax it actually pays here.</p><p>The banking story is more complicated than the rumor mill assumes, and it’s a useful correction in itself. BNP Paribas has been present in Tunisia since 1894, first through colonial-era predecessor banks and later through its majority stake in UBCI, one of the country’s oldest banks. But BNP Paribas isn’t the dominant foreign hand people imagine anymore — it sold down its stake in 2019–2021 to a Tunisian insurance group, and now holds a minority position of around 11%. The bank people picture as a symbol of French financial control has, in practice, already been mostly Tunisianized. Meanwhile the industrial side of foreign investment — automotive wiring-harness plants, electronics assembly, textile manufacturing — genuinely does employ tens of thousands of Tunisians and genuinely does export, which is closer to what the trade-deficit numbers above need more of, not less. The honest version of this story isn’t “foreigners own everything.” It’s uneven: some sectors more foreign-controlled than people think, others less, and the only way to tell which is which is to actually look, sector by sector, instead of assuming the worst from a brand name on a bottle.</p><p>Telecom is another sector foreign brands dominate visibly, and here the numbers are public because the parent companies report them. Ooredoo Tunisia — the Tunisian arm of the Qatari group that also owns the old Tunisiana brand — posted around QAR 1.7 billion in revenue for 2025 (roughly $470 million), up 12% year over year, with a healthy EBITDA margin north of 40%. Orange Tunisie, the French telecom’s local subsidiary, holds a comparable position in the market. Both operators, along with the state-owned Tunisie Télécom, were awarded 5G licenses in December 2024 and launched service in February 2025 — meaning two of Tunisia’s three mobile networks are now foreign-owned, collecting subscription payments from nearly every Tunisian household every month, with profits reported back to shareholders in Doha and Paris. That’s real money leaving the country every quarter, and it’s exactly the kind of number that should be public and debated — not because foreign ownership is automatically theft, but because everyone deserves to know the actual scale of it instead of guessing.</p><p>On the industrial side, the biggest name most Tunisians have never heard of is Leoni — a German automotive-wiring-harness manufacturer that has been in Tunisia since 1977 and is, today, <strong>the single largest private employer in the entire country</strong>, with more than 27,000 workers across ten plants. In 2025 its German parent was itself absorbed into a Chinese conglomerate, Luxshare — meaning tens of thousands of Tunisian jobs shifted ownership from Germany to China without most of the workforce even noticing. Alongside it sit Yazaki (Japanese, wiring harnesses in Gafsa), Kromberg &amp; Schubert (German, Béja) and a growing cluster of Chinese entrants — all producing components almost entirely for export to European carmakers. This is the honest counterpoint to the extraction narrative: these plants are one of the few places where foreign capital is genuinely creating jobs and export revenue at real scale, exactly what the trade-deficit numbers above say the country needs more of. The legitimate question isn’t whether these companies should be in Tunisia — it’s whether wages, local supplier development and tax revenue are growing in proportion to how much these firms are exporting, and that’s a question with an actual paper trail, not a rumor.</p><h3>The other side of the ledger: who’s actually draining the dollars</h3><p>Every company above earns or holds foreign currency inside Tunisia. But the trade-deficit numbers up top exist because other companies are doing the opposite — pulling hard currency <em>out</em> to pay for what they import, and that side of the ledger deserves just as much scrutiny, because it’s where the real pressure on reserves comes from.</p><p>Start with cars, since vehicle imports alone accounted for roughly TND 1.6 billion of Tunisia’s deficit in just the first four months of 2026 — nearly the entire year-on-year worsening of the trade gap came from this one category. Tunisia doesn’t manufacture cars; it imports nearly all of them, dollar by dollar, through a small number of exclusive brand-importer concessions. The largest, Ennakl Automobiles — the sole importer of Volkswagen, Audi, Porsche, Škoda and Seat — posted TND 678 million in revenue in 2024 alone. It’s publicly listed and currently controlled by the Ben Yedder family, but its history is a genuine case study in the “protected families” pattern people online keep gesturing at: Ennakl was acquired in the early 2000s by a holding company owned by Sakher El Materi, son-in-law of former president Ben Ali, who used it to build a documented near-monopoly across more than a dozen car brands during the Ben Ali years — the kind of state-granted market concentration that inflated prices and locked out competition long before “crony capitalism” became a hashtag. That specific history is well documented, not rumor. The current owners are a different story and shouldn’t be tarred with it — but the structure they inherited, a handful of exclusive import concessions controlling what an entire country drives, is exactly the kind of thing the Central Bank started restricting in March 2026 with new financing limits on vehicle imports, precisely because the category was bleeding reserves.</p><p>Retail works the same way at a smaller scale. Carrefour operates in Tunisia not as a foreign-owned chain but as a franchise run by UTIC, one of Tunisia’s largest private conglomerates — Ulysse Hyper Distribution posted around TND 1.26 billion in turnover in a recent year, and the same group also holds the Decathlon and Fnac Darty franchises. The French Carrefour Group itself only holds a minority 25% equity stake, so most of the profit legally stays Tunisian — but the stock these stores sell is heavily imported, and franchise and licensing fees on international brands still flow outward every year regardless of who owns the storefront. That’s the nuance the viral videos skip entirely: you don’t need a foreign name on the sign for hard currency to leave the country. You need an import-heavy business model, and Tunisia has plenty of those that are majority Tunisian-owned.</p><h3>This isn’t new. It’s just the current chapter.</h3><p>Long before Kais Saied, long before Ben Ali, long before independence — Tunisia’s rulers have had a habit of protecting a narrow circle of families and interests while the rest of the country absorbed the cost. Under the Beys and the French protectorate that began in 1881, taxation and land policy were structured to serve the treasury and colonial capital first. After independence, the pattern didn’t disappear — it modernized. The World Bank’s own post-2011 assessment of the pre-revolution economy documented, in detail, how a small, politically connected elite captured licenses, import permits, and market access, systematically locking out everyone else. That’s not a rumor. That’s a World Bank report with a name and a paper trail.</p><p>So when people online reach for “the families are protected and we pay for it,” they’re not inventing a new theory. They’re recognizing an old one, just without always having the receipts. The job of honest journalism isn’t to mock that instinct — it’s to give it the receipts, and to correct it loudly when it drifts into something false or, worse, something that gets innocent people hurt.</p><h3>And yes — Europe, France, and the US are part of this story too</h3><p>This crisis doesn’t happen in a sealed room. Tunisia’s economy has been entangled with Europe, and specifically France, since long before independence in 1956, and that entanglement didn’t end with the flag change. The EU remains Tunisia’s largest trading partner by a wide margin, France and Italy alone account for roughly a quarter of its imports, and European demand (and European tourists) is a huge share of what keeps hard currency flowing in.</p><p>That relationship has a harder edge too. In 2023, the European Commission, alongside Italy and the Netherlands, signed a memorandum with Tunisia built heavily around stopping migration to Europe — pairing border-control funding with promises of broader economic support, some of which Tunisia’s own presidency publicly rejected as “charity” even while accepting parts of it. Tens of millions of euros have moved for border management and “anti-smuggling” cooperation specifically, dwarfing what’s been delivered for the structural reforms Tunisia’s economy actually needs. Europe has real leverage here, and it has consistently chosen to spend that leverage on keeping people from leaving rather than on fixing why they want to.</p><p>The United States plays a smaller, quieter role — more security and diplomatic than financial, but not irrelevant. Washington has pushed, gently and inconsistently, for the IMF program Tunisia negotiated and then effectively abandoned after the presidency publicly rejected the conditions attached to it. That $1.9 billion lifeline has sat unused for years now, a debt Tunisia didn’t take that might have been cheaper than the debt it did take instead, from domestic banks and its own Central Bank, at a real cost to the rest of the domestic economy.</p><p>None of this means outsiders are secretly running Tunisia. It means Tunisia’s crisis sits inside a relationship where Europe needs Tunisia to hold migration at bay more than it needs Tunisia to grow, and where global lenders offer relief on terms the state won’t take and can’t replace. That’s not a conspiracy. It’s just power, exercised in the ordinary, well-documented way power usually is.</p><h3>So who do we actually blame?</h3><p>Nobody needs a hidden hand to explain any of this. What’s needed is much less cinematic: a decade of governments — regardless of ideology — that borrowed instead of reformed, protected instead of opened, and let a currency crisis quietly become permanent while the headlines stayed on politics. Add a European relationship that prices migration control higher than economic partnership, and a stalled IMF deal nobody in power wants to actually sign.</p><p>The rumors get the emotion right. The people sharing them are not wrong to be furious. They’re often wrong about the specific mechanism — and specific mechanisms matter, because a wrong story lets the real one keep hiding. Tunisia doesn’t need a viral villain. It needs a public willing to sit with a much less satisfying answer: this was built slowly, by people with names and job titles, over a long time, and it will only be undone the same way — slowly, and by naming the actual mechanism, not the nearest scapegoat.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6128a38fb548" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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