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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by kartikkktomarrr on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by kartikkktomarrr on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@kartiktomar112233?source=rss-de9704c708d0------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by kartikkktomarrr on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kartiktomar112233?source=rss-de9704c708d0------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Multisig Is Broken. Here’s How MPC and FROST Fix It.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kartiktomar112233/multisig-is-broken-heres-how-mpc-and-frost-fix-it-7bb3bd37ae4b?source=rss-de9704c708d0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[multisig]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ed25519]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[multi-party-computation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[kartikkktomarrr]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2025 09:12:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-12T09:12:42.010Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zeQLUFkR1KYDA0hEWh8LJA.png" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>There is frequent confusion in the blockchain and wallet ecosystem between multisignature schemes such as MuSig2 and true Threshold Signature Schemes (TSS) implemented using Multi-Party Computation (MPC). Both approaches allow multiple participants to jointly authorize a transaction and produce a single valid signature. However, their security models, cryptographic assumptions, and trust guarantees differ substantially.</p><p>This article compares MuSig2, TSS, and MPC from both a mathematical and implementation perspective.</p><h3>Background: The WazirX Multisig Case</h3><p>WazirX, one of India’s largest exchanges, used a <strong>multisignature scheme</strong> to secure its wallets. Their custody model relied on multiple keyholders, with transactions requiring approval from a set of signers.</p><p>In practice, this was an <strong>N-of-N (or M-of-N) multisig setup</strong>, where multiple independent private keys had to sign before funds could move. This design protected against unilateral compromise but also created bottlenecks and operational risks and <strong>WazirX hack (July 2024)</strong> did happen. Around <strong>$230M</strong> was drained from their multisig wallet.</p><h3>Lessons from WazirX</h3><ul><li><strong>Operational rigidity</strong>: In a pure multisig (like MuSig2 or simple M-of-N), if one signer is unavailable or compromised, the system can stall.</li><li><strong>Transparency</strong>: On-chain multisig schemes expose signer sets and thresholds, which can reduce privacy and sometimes create attack surfaces.</li><li><strong>Not MPC</strong>: Despite being called “multisig security,” the model did not involve distributed key generation or threshold signatures. Each keyholder still had a complete private key.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mPGHAaL_DvcI61XonBPmyQ.png" /><figcaption>A user loses his savings after hackers exploit a multisig setup. As seen in the WazirX case, multisig exposed weaknesses: once attackers controlled enough keys, they could drain the wallet.</figcaption></figure><h3>Schnorr/Ed25519 Signature Recap</h3><p>At the core, both MuSig2 and TSS build on Schnorr-style signatures (Ed25519 is a Schnorr variant). A standard signature is: s = r + k * x</p><ul><li>x: private key scalar</li><li>X = g^x: public key</li><li>r: random nonce</li><li>R = g^r: public nonce point</li><li>k = H(X || R || message): challenge hash</li></ul><p>The final signature is (R, s) and is verified by checking:</p><pre>g^s == R + k * X</pre><h3>1. MuSig2: N-of-N Multisignature Aggregation</h3><h3>Key Generation</h3><p>Each participant generates a <strong>full keypair</strong> (x_i, X_i). These are independent and equivalent to any standard Ed25519 keypair.</p><h3>Public Key Aggregation</h3><p>All public keys are collected and combined: X_agg = Σ (a_i * X_i)where coefficients a_i are computed via a hash of all public keys to prevent rogue-key attacks.</p><h3>Nonce Generation</h3><p>Each participant generates a nonce r_i and publishes R_i = g^r_i. These are combined: R = Σ R_i</p><h3>Partial Signatures</h3><p>Each participant computes: s_i = r_i + k * a_i * x_i, where k = H(X_agg || R || message).</p><h3>Signature Aggregation</h3><p>The final signature is: s = Σ s_i, σ = (R, s)</p><h3>Characteristics</h3><ul><li>Each participant holds a <strong>complete private key</strong>.</li><li>Security is enforced by requiring all N participants (N-of-N).</li><li>No secret sharing or threshold reconstruction.</li><li>Output is indistinguishable from a normal Ed25519 signature.</li></ul><h3>2. Classic Threshold Signatures (TSS with VSS/DKG)</h3><h3>Key idea</h3><p>One logical private key x is split into shares x_i using secret sharing. Signing is done by locally computing γ_i = r_i + k * x_i and then interpolating.</p><h3>Key Generation</h3><h4><strong>Dealer-based TSS</strong></h4><ul><li>A trusted dealer generates x.</li><li>Splits it into shares x_i using Shamir or Feldman VSS.</li><li>Distributes shares and deletes x.</li></ul><blockquote>Weakness: you must trust the dealer not to keep or leak x.</blockquote><h4><strong>Dealerless DKG (Feldman/Pedersen VSS)</strong></h4><ul><li>Each party proposes randomness and commitments.</li><li>Shamir-style polynomials are combined to define one global key x.</li><li>Each party receives their share x_i.</li><li>Public key X = g^x is derived collectively.</li></ul><blockquote>No one ever explicitly knows the full x.</blockquote><h3>Nonce Generation</h3><ul><li>Each party generates a nonce share r_i.</li><li>Nonce point: R = g^(Σ r_i).</li></ul><h3>Signing</h3><ul><li>Each party computes: γ_i = r_i + k * x_i</li><li>A combiner uses Lagrange interpolation over the subset of signers to reconstruct: s = Σ λ_i * γ_i,where λ_i are interpolation coefficients.</li></ul><h3>Properties</h3><ul><li>Works with t-of-n flexibility.</li><li>Heavy on communication (verification of shares, polynomial proofs).</li><li>Each signature requires a fresh round of communication.</li><li>Signers reveal partials that a combiner interpolates into s.</li></ul><h3>3. MPC-DKG with FROST (Flexible Round-Optimized Schnorr Threshold Signatures)</h3><h3>Key idea</h3><p>FROST is not just “secret sharing + interpolation.” It is an <strong>interactive MPC protocol</strong> designed for Schnorr/Ed25519 signatures that:</p><ul><li>Distributes the key during DKG.</li><li>Produces signatures in a way that minimizes communication.</li><li>Ensures robustness against rogue key and nonce reuse attacks.</li></ul><h3>Key Generation (FROST DKG)</h3><ul><li>Each participant samples a polynomial and commits to it.</li><li>Shares are exchanged and verified (like Pedersen VSS).</li><li>At the end, each participant has:</li><li>A private share x_i.</li><li>Knowledge of the collective public key X = g^x.</li></ul><blockquote>Security: no one ever constructs x explicitly.</blockquote><h3>Nonce Generation</h3><ul><li>FROST requires deterministic, verifiable nonces.</li><li>Each signer produces multiple nonces in advance and publishes commitments.</li><li>For each signing session, a subset of nonces is used (to avoid reuse attacks).</li></ul><h3>Signing</h3><ul><li>Each signer computes their partial: γ_i = r_i + k * x_i, just like classic TSS, but with carefully bound coefficients and commitments.</li><li>An aggregator collects partial signatures, verifies them, and computes:s = Σ γ_i, σ = (R, s), Verification is identical to Schnorr.</li></ul><h3>Distinctions from “plain” TSS</h3><ul><li><strong>Round efficiency</strong>: FROST is designed to minimize signing rounds (two rounds per signature: nonce commitments and signature shares).</li><li><strong>Robustness</strong>: Handles dropped or malicious signers gracefully.</li><li><strong>Security proofs</strong>: FROST is formally proven secure against concurrent sessions, rogue-key attacks, and nonce misuse.</li><li><strong>Interoperability</strong>: The output signature is indistinguishable from a standard Schnorr/Ed25519 signature.</li></ul><h3>4. Why FROST is preferred in modern MPC wallets</h3><p>No trusted dealer.</p><p>Threshold flexibility.</p><p>Compact and indistinguishable signatures.</p><p>Protocol designed to run at scale (fast, resilient).</p><p>Strong formal security proofs.</p><h3>MPC vs MuSig2</h3><p>The terms are often blurred:</p><ul><li><strong>MuSig2</strong> is a multisignature scheme. It is not MPC, even though multiple parties participate.</li><li><strong>MPC/TSS</strong> explicitly ensures no single party ever has the private key. This requires distributed key generation and verifiable secret sharing.</li><li>In MuSig2, the private keys are independent; in TSS, the shares are fragments of the same private key</li></ul><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>MuSig2, Threshold Signatures, and MPC are often conflated, but they serve different purposes and offer distinct guarantees. MuSig2 is an efficient multisignature aggregation scheme: it compresses multiple signatures into one, but requires every participant to hold a complete private key and to be online for signing. Classic Threshold Signature Schemes, built using verifiable secret sharing and interpolation, allow t-of-n flexibility, but involve heavy communication and are less efficient in practice. Modern MPC protocols such as FROST combine the strengths of both: no trusted dealer, threshold signing, resilience against faults, and efficiency with only two rounds of signing. For this reason, MPC-based FROST protocols have become the preferred foundation for secure and scalable wallet infrastructures.</p><h3>Common Mislabeling</h3><p>Many repositories and systems in the ecosystem (including some labeled “TSS” for Solana) actually implement <strong>MuSig2</strong>. They require N-of-N participants and use each node’s full private key. True threshold MPC, with DKG and t-of-n flexibility, is more complex and stronger in security guarantees.</p><h3>References</h3><ul><li><a href="https://wazirx.com/blog/preliminary-report-cyber-attack-on-wazirx-multisig-wallet">The WazirX official blog post on their multisig issue.</a></li><li><a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/852.pdf">The original FROST paper.</a></li><li><a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1261.pdf">MuSig2 paper</a>.</li></ul><h3>Further Reading and Code</h3><p>For those interested in exploring a working implementation, I have built an open-source repository that demonstrates <strong>MPC with FROST</strong> in practice: <a href="http://github.com/kartiktoogoated/mpc-frost">mpc-frost (GitHub Repo)</a></p><p>This repo contains a Rust-based implementation of distributed key generation and threshold signing using FROST, showing how MPC differs from multisig at the code level.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7bb3bd37ae4b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Proof of Reserves (PoR): The Future of Trust in Crypto Exchanges — Explained Simply]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kartiktomar112233/proof-of-reserves-por-the-future-of-trust-in-crypto-exchanges-explained-simply-86986cb77168?source=rss-de9704c708d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/86986cb77168</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[zero-knowledge-proofs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crypto-exchange]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[web3-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[kartikkktomarrr]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2025 14:59:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-08-19T14:59:33.513Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Proof of Reserves (PoR): The Future of Trust in Crypto Exchanges — Explained Simply</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*q540iIwldX2vVF5Ug-9YWw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Behind the tech, PoR is simply about one thing: protecting users by proving assets are safe and verifiable</figcaption></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>In the wake of crypto scandals like FTX, the phrase <em>“Don’t trust, verify”</em> has become more than just a motto — it’s survival advice. One of the key tools to rebuild trust in centralized exchanges is <strong>Proof of Reserves (PoR)</strong>.</p><p>But what is PoR really? Why does it matter? And if it’s so important, why aren’t all exchanges doing it daily? In this post, I’ll break down PoR step-by-step, answer the most common doubts, and explain how next-gen exchanges like <strong>Backpack</strong> are rethinking transparency from the ground up.</p><h3>What Is Proof of Reserves (PoR)?</h3><p>At its core, PoR is a simple solvency equation:</p><p><strong>Assets held by the exchange ≥ Liabilities owed to customers</strong></p><ul><li><strong>Assets</strong> = tokens held in the exchange’s on-chain wallets.</li><li><strong>Liabilities</strong> = balances the exchange owes users (from its internal ledger).</li></ul><p>This ensures that, at any moment, the exchange could handle <em>all withdrawals at once</em> without collapsing. Importantly, this check must be done <strong>per asset</strong> — if users deposited 1,000 BTC, the exchange must hold 1,000 BTC, not $60M worth of ETH.</p><h3>Why PoR Matters</h3><ol><li><strong>Prevents misuse of deposits</strong> — unlike banks, exchanges shouldn’t lend out or gamble with customer funds.</li><li><strong>User safety</strong> — reduces insolvency risk and makes shady practices harder.</li><li><strong>Transparency &amp; accountability</strong> — lets you verify your funds are really backed.</li></ol><h3>How PoR Works (Typical Process)</h3><p>Most PoR audits follow these steps:</p><ol><li><strong>Snapshot of balances</strong> — the auditor takes a live snapshot of all user balances.</li><li><strong>Merkle tree conversion</strong> — balances are hashed into leaves → combined into a Merkle root. Each user can later verify their balance was included without revealing others’.</li><li><strong>Wallet verification</strong> — exchange proves it controls the wallets holding the reserves, either by:</li></ol><ul><li>Signing a unique message with the private key, or</li><li>Moving funds in a small test transaction.</li></ul><p><strong>Comparison </strong>— check that wallet balances ≥ user balances on a per-asset basis.</p><h3>Are All PoR the Same?</h3><p>No. Different exchanges do PoR differently:</p><ul><li>Some do <strong>quarterly snapshot audits</strong>.</li><li>Some let users verify inclusion in the Merkle tree.</li><li>Stronger ones publish <strong>frequent, automated proofs</strong>.</li></ul><p>The frequency, transparency, and auditor credibility make all the difference.</p><h3>Limitations of Current PoR</h3><p>PoR is a step forward, but it’s not perfect:</p><ol><li><strong>Snapshot in time</strong> → only proves reserves at one moment; balances can change immediately after.</li><li><strong>Third-party reliance</strong> → audits depend on auditor competence and honesty.</li><li><strong>User balance trust</strong> → liabilities data (what the exchange owes) comes from the exchange’s own database, which could be manipulated.</li></ol><h3>Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), SNARKs &amp; STARKs</h3><p>To make Proof of Reserves bulletproof, exchanges are looking at <strong>Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs)</strong>.<br> A ZKP is a cryptographic method that lets someone <strong>prove a statement is true without revealing the actual data</strong> behind it.</p><h3>Example (simple analogy)</h3><p>Imagine you want to prove you know the password to a vault <strong>without telling me the password</strong>.</p><ul><li>A ZKP lets you convince me you know it, while keeping the password secret.</li></ul><p>Applied to exchanges:</p><ul><li>They can prove <strong>“We have enough assets to cover all balances”</strong> without revealing every user’s balance or wallet detail.</li></ul><h3><strong>Types of ZK Proofs in PoR</strong></h3><ol><li><strong>zk-SNARKs (Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge)</strong><br> • Succinct → proofs are tiny and quick to verify.<br> • Non-interactive → no back-and-forth between prover &amp; verifier.<br> • Widely used in Ethereum rollups (zkSync, Polygon zkEVM).<br> • Downside: requires a trusted setup (special keys generated at start).</li><li><strong>zk-STARKs (Scalable Transparent Argument of Knowledge)</strong><br> • Transparent → no trusted setup needed.<br> • Scalable → better suited for massive datasets like millions of exchange accounts.<br> • Downside: proofs are larger than SNARKs, though verification is still fast.</li></ol><h3>Why ZKPs Matter for PoR</h3><p>They fix the major weaknesses we discussed:</p><ul><li><strong>Snapshot problem</strong> → ZK proofs can be generated frequently or continuously, so reserves are always provable in near real-time.</li><li><strong>Auditor trust problem</strong> → You don’t need to trust an external firm; the math itself guarantees correctness.</li><li><strong>User balance verification</strong> → Each user can privately verify that their balance is included in the liabilities, without exposing others’ balances.</li></ul><p>In short: <strong>SNARKs are small and efficient, STARKs are more transparent and scalable.</strong><br> Both make PoR much stronger, moving it from a <em>“trust us” snapshot</em> to a <strong>trustless, cryptographic guarantee.</strong></p><h3>The Future of PoR</h3><p>Improvements coming to PoR:</p><ul><li><strong>More frequent proofs</strong> (daily or even real-time).</li><li><strong>Independent, crypto-native auditors</strong> with no ties to the exchange.</li><li><strong>Smart contracts + oracles</strong> to automate reserve checks.</li><li><strong>Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs)</strong> to make user balances verifiable privately.</li></ul><h3>How Backpack Reinvents PoR</h3><p>Backpack Exchange isn’t just slapping PoR on top of old infra — they’re building it <strong>like a blockchain</strong>:</p><ul><li><strong>Multiple nodes</strong> verify deposits, withdrawals, and trades (no single point of failure).</li><li><strong>Replayable history</strong> — every action on the exchange is auditable like blockchain transactions.</li><li><strong>Daily PoR updates</strong> — already live, verified by firms like OtterSec.</li><li><strong>Future: ZK proofs</strong> — users will be able to verify their own balances are included in reserves without revealing private data.</li></ul><p>This hybrid model keeps <strong>CEX speed</strong> but adds <strong>DEX-like transparency</strong>.</p><h3>Common Doubts Explained</h3><h3>“Can exchanges alter the Merkle tree?”</h3><p>They can try to publish a false one, but once a Merkle root is committed (anchored publicly and tied to user receipts), even one user checking can expose manipulation. Automated bots and watchdogs will check continuously, so tampering is very risky.</p><h3>“Do users really check daily?”</h3><p>Most won’t. But the system is designed so <strong>one check is enough</strong>. If a proof is wrong, anyone (auditor, watchdog, or bot) can detect and expose it instantly.</p><h3>“Isn’t moving an exchange onto blockchain too heavy?”</h3><p>Backpack isn’t logging every trade on Solana. That would bloat blocks and kill performance. Instead:</p><ul><li><strong>Deposits/withdrawals</strong> = on real blockchains (BTC, ETH, SOL).</li><li><strong>Trades</strong> = off-chain in Backpack’s own blockchain-like ledger.</li><li><strong>Proofs</strong> = small Merkle roots/ZK commitments anchored on-chain.</li></ul><p>So you get speed + verifiability without spamming public blockchains.</p><h3>“What about my trading profits?”</h3><p>If you trade and earn +0.1 BTC, your balance increases internally. But PoR still balances out, because another trader lost -0.1 BTC. The total liabilities across users don’t change — they just redistribute. PoR checks that <strong>assets ≥ liabilities for everyone combined</strong>.</p><h3>“Does this apply to DEXs?”</h3><ul><li><strong>DEXs</strong> don’t need PoR — all balances and trades are already on-chain.</li><li><strong>CEXs</strong> need PoR, because trades and balances live off-chain in their own systems.</li></ul><h3>Bottom Line</h3><p>PoR is about proving one simple truth:<br> <strong>the exchange really holds the assets it owes to users.</strong></p><ul><li>Today’s PoR = useful but limited snapshots.</li><li>Tomorrow’s PoR = real-time, zk-proofed, user-verifiable solvency.</li><li>Backpack is leading the way with daily audits and blockchain-like infra that makes manipulation far harder.</li></ul><p>As a user, the key takeaway is this:<br> Don’t just trust an exchange. Check if they publish Proof of Reserves. The ones that do — and do it well — are the ones serious about safeguarding your funds.</p><h3>Closing Thoughts</h3><p>Trust in crypto exchanges doesn’t come from marketing promises. It comes from <strong>math, transparency, and verifiability</strong>.</p><p>Proof of Reserves is still evolving, but it’s the best tool we have to prevent another FTX-style collapse. And exchanges like Backpack are showing what the future looks like: centralized services with decentralized levels of accountability.</p><p>So next time you leave assets on an exchange, ask:<br> <strong>Can I verify they really hold my funds?</strong></p><p>That’s the real power of PoR.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=86986cb77168" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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