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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Threat Hunt on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Threat Hunt on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Threat Hunt on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Open-Source Software Threat Report:
Intelligence to Protect Against Supply Chain Attacks]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@katymwwills/open-source-software-threat-report-intelligence-to-protect-against-supply-chain-attacks-2620c044eb98?source=rss-d237c8392f28------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Threat Hunt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 21 Nov 2024 05:48:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-21T05:48:33.288Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This semester, I was tasked with providing an intelligence report for a large tech company customer to assist with their cyber defenses. Come with me as we dive into the world of open-source software threats in the technology supply chain.</p><h3>Key Findings</h3><p><strong>Open-Source Code Vulnerabilities</strong><br> The intelligence collected through this project concludes that open-source code is laden with critical vulnerabilities, including those that are well-known and a decade old. At the same time, the vast majority of companies use open-source code containing vulnerabilities.</p><p>A large-scale study of codebases used in the computer hardware industry revealed:</p><ul><li><strong>100%</strong> contain open-source code.</li><li><strong>88%</strong> contain high-risk vulnerabilities.</li><li><strong>92%</strong> contain license conflicts.</li></ul><p><strong>Overall Trends:</strong></p><ul><li>“91% of surveyed codebases had components 10+ versions behind the latest version” [1].</li><li>“Eight of the top 10 vulnerabilities map to one pillar CWE, CWE-707, which addresses security requirements that are not being met” [1].</li></ul><p><strong>Actionable Insight:</strong><br> One immediate action a company can take is to scan the codebases it uses and identify which version of jQuery, a popular open-source component, is being used. The XSS vulnerability was patched in version 3.5.0, but <strong>one-third</strong> of the codebases Synopsys scanned were using a vulnerable version.</p><h3>Threat Actors in the Open-Source Landscape</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/941/1*6HHNvI1xmKDeTFjhr2J32A.png" /></figure><h3><strong>Attack Methods and Vectors</strong></h3><p>When an attacker wishes to interrupt a company’s software supply chain by injecting malicious code into their dependencies, they may create a new package or infect an existing one [6]. The software lifecycle has several points where an open-source package could enter, and companies use dependency managers to automate their use [6].</p><p>There are several ways for an attacker to infect an existing package [6]. In the case of the 2024 XZ Utils incident, an attacker used social engineering and patience to earn the role of maintainer and eventually deploy a backdoor with a new release. The attacker created benign pull requests during their two-year lead-up to the attack. However, an attacker can also create pull requests that are malicious but seem innocuous (e.g., a bug fix or helpful feature) [7]. A negligent yet benevolent developer may unintentionally insert a backdoor into a package.</p><p>Alternatively, an attacker could directly hack a legitimate developer’s account and contribute malicious code. Attackers can also include cryptominers in open-source packages [6] or modify source code to add protestware capable of deleting a user’s files [8].</p><p>If an attacker wishes to create a new package, they have several options. For instance, they can insert a trojan horse. Additionally, attackers may exploit developer errors through typosquatting [9]. Typosquatting is a very popular approach, with <strong>61%</strong> of malicious packages employing this tactic [6]. Furthermore, an attacker may take the “use after free” approach by assuming the identity of an account, package, or project when it is no longer in use [6].</p><h3>Timing of Malicious Code Execution</h3><p>Malicious code may execute at various phases in the software lifecycle. Users and dependency managers can trigger the code during the install phase when it is embedded into install scripts. The majority of malicious packages are initiated during installation rather than the test case or runtime phase [6].</p><p>One attack triggered at runtime is <strong>XCSSET</strong>, which runs CocoaPods’ target_integrator.rb files on RubyGems or searches for .xcodeproj folders. It then downloads a malicious script into the folder [10, 6].</p><p>Popular package repositories, such as npm, PyPI, and RubyGems [6], are frequent targets. Bear in mind that open-source attacks are not single-vector threats; they occur across an integrated network of vectors.</p><h3>Analyst Notes and Recommendations</h3><ol><li><strong>Prepare for OSS Audits:</strong><br>The <strong>CISA Open Source Software Security Roadmap</strong> highlights an increasing focus on OSS security within federal and critical infrastructure sectors [12].</li><li><strong>Generate a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM):</strong><br>Companies should maintain a detailed list of all components in their software. Many vulnerabilities arise from unrecognized or poorly assessed dependencies.</li><li><strong>Proactively Patch Vulnerabilities:</strong><br>Allocate resources to identifying and patching vulnerabilities, as OSS threats are widespread and often challenging to detect.</li><li><strong>Map Dependencies:</strong><br>Map all dependencies used to identify risks. Collaboration with the company’s privacy team, which likely conducts data mapping and manages sub-processor lists for compliance, could streamline this process.</li></ol><h3>Useful Resources</h3><ul><li><strong>Synopsys Open Source Security and Risk Analysis Report:</strong> <a href="https://www.blackduck.com/blog/open-source-trends-ossra-report.html">Read Here</a></li><li><strong>OWASP Top Ten OSS Risks:</strong> <a href="https://owasp.org/www-project-open-source-software-top-10/">Explore Here</a></li><li><strong>Malicious PyPI Packages Dataset:</strong> <a href="https://github.com/lxyeternal/pypi_malregistry">GitHub Repository</a></li><li><strong>Backstabber’s Knife Collection:</strong> <a href="https://dasfreak.github.io/Backstabbers-Knife-Collection/">Review Dataset</a></li></ul><h3>Works Cited</h3><p>[1] <a href="https://static.carahsoft.com/concrete/files/1617/1597/8665/2024_Open_Source_Security_and_Risk_Analysis_Report_WRAPPED.pdf.">https://static.carahsoft.com/concrete/files/1617/1597/8665/2024_Open_Source_Security_and_Risk_Analysis_Report_WRAPPED.pdf.</a> [Online].</p><p>[2] “Surge In Software Supply Chain Attacks Demands Heightened Third-Party Vigilance — Cyble. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://cyble.com/blog/surge-in-software-supply-chain-attacks-heightens-third-party-vigilance/">https://cyble.com/blog/surge-in-software-supply-chain-attacks-heightens-third-party-vigilance/.</a></p><p>[3] C. Morgan, “5 Critical Threat Actors You Need to Know About,” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/5-critical-threat-actors-you-need-to-know-about/">https://www.reliaquest.com/blog/5-critical-threat-actors-you-need-to-know-about/.</a></p><p>[4] Russian Military Cyber Actors Target US and Global Critical Infrastructure | CISA. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-249a.">https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-249a.</a></p><p>[5] FireEye, “Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor,” 13 December 2020. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.">https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.</a></p><p>[6] Ohm M, Plate H, Sykosch A, Meier M. Backstabber’s Knife Collection: A Review of Open Source Software Supply Chain Attacks. Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. 2020 Jun 11; 10.1007/978–3–030–52683–2_2., 12223:23–43.</p><p>[7] Akamai, “XZ Utils Backdoor — Everything You Need to Know, and What You Can Do,” [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/critical-linux-backdoor-xz-utils-discovered-what-to-know.">https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/critical-linux-backdoor-xz-utils-discovered-what-to-know.</a></p><p>[8] Trend Micro Research. “How Shady Code Commits Compromise the Security of the Open-Source Ecosystem.” Trend Micro Blog. July 11. [Online].</p><p>[9] Ladisa, P., Plate, H., Martinez, M., and O. Barais. 2023. SoK: Taxonomy of Attacks on Open Source Software Supply Chains. Proceedings of the 2023 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), San Francisco, CA, USA, pp. 167–184. doi: 10.1109/SP46215.2023.0</p><p>[10] MITRE, “XCSSET,” 5 October 2021. [Online]. Available: <a href="https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658/">https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0658/.</a></p><p>[11] <a href="https://owasp.org/www-project-open-source-software-top-10/">https://owasp.org/www-project-open-source-software-top-10/.</a> [Online].</p><p>[12] [Online]. Available: <a href="https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/CISA-Open-Source-Software-Security-Roadmap-508c.pdf.">https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/CISA-Open-Source-Software-Security-Roadmap-508c.pdf.</a></p><p>[13] [Online]. Available: <a href="https://checkmarx.com/blog/">https://checkmarx.com/blog/cuteboi-detected-preparing-a-large-scale-crypto-mining-campaign-on-npm-users/..</a></p><p>[14] Tal, Liran. “What is typosquatting and how typosquatting attacks are responsible for malicious modules in npm.” Snyk Blog. January 12, 2021. <a href="https://snyk.io/blog/typosquatting-attacks/">https://snyk.io/blog/typosquatting-attacks/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2620c044eb98" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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