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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Kevin King on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Kevin King on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Kevin King on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Introducing Kryptonite — the end of id_rsa]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/blog-krypt-co/the-end-of-id-rsa-d8fd2951d406?source=rss-c014a1aba188------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[ios]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[android]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ssh]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin King]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Apr 2017 23:42:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-01T18:53:55.749Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>the new home for your SSH private key on your phone</h4><p>Today we’re introducing Kryptonite — the end of storing your SSH private key in ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Kryptonite provides the best of both worlds: the <strong>security</strong> of having your <em>private key never leave your phone</em> with the <strong>convenience</strong> of using git and ssh as you normally do on your computer: git push or ssh root@server.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*I_EaBe7PqhBk7XUH5zHuUQ.png" /><figcaption><a href="https://get.krypt.co/">Kryptonite</a> — the new home for your SSH private key on your phone</figcaption></figure><h3><a href="https://blog.krypt.co/why-store-an-ssh-key-with-kryptonite-9f24c1f983d5"><strong>Why shouldn’t you store your key</strong></a><strong> in </strong><strong>~/.ssh/id_rsa?</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*s9PmVAk68_Yd5hhjkiJ5tQ.png" /></figure><p><em>Because it’s that easy</em> to read the private key that you use to push code, log in to production databases, and transfer files between EC2 instances. And if you can read it in plain-text without root access, then <strong>every application you run on your machine is able to read, use, and send off your SSH private key without you ever knowing. </strong>Even if your key is encrypted with a passphrase, <a href="https://blog.krypt.co/why-store-an-ssh-key-with-kryptonite-9f24c1f983d5#1269">every application can still use your private key</a>.</p><blockquote>Chrome, Spotify, and Slack don’t need SSH — why should they have access to your private key?</blockquote><p>The only way to isolate an SSH private key from other applications is to store it externally. Until recently, the easiest way to move a key out of ~/.ssh was to buy a USB Hardware Security Module (a dongle that is able to generate public/private keys), plug it into your laptop, and push the blinking light every time you SSH. But purchasing and carrying around another piece of hardware just to store an SSH key is unnecessary when everyone already carries a smartphone everywhere they go.</p><h3>Introducing Kryptonite</h3><p>We’re excited to introduce Kryptonite — the end of id_rsa.</p><p>The <a href="https://get.krypt.co/">Kryptonite app</a> generates an SSH key and pairs with one or more computers. Paired computers may request operations using the key such that <strong>the private key never leaves the phone.</strong></p><p>Every time SSH requests a private key operation, Kryptonite pushes a local notification for your approval showing the user and host being logged in to:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*P-Eo7PGsZtPMowrPdCpJNA.png" /><figcaption>Kryptonite Login Request Notification</figcaption></figure><p>If allowed, Kryptonite signs the login request using the private key and sends this signature back to your computer — <strong>the private key never leaves the phone</strong>. With the signature, your computer completes the SSH authentication protocol with the server.</p><p>Kryptonite also stores a <strong>complete audit log for each paired computer containing every SSH login</strong> the private key was used for. Login requests may be allowed once, for 1 hour, or always. Even when a request is automatically approved, a local notification is pushed to alert you and the request is stored in the log for later auditing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5FTgDUFwAVikXR2BUnZM6g.png" /><figcaption>Kryptonite Approval Policy and Audit Log</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Storing your SSH key with Kryptonite will always be </strong><a href="https://krypt.co/pricing"><strong>completely free</strong></a><strong>!</strong> Be on the lookout for more products from krypt.co to help teams better manage access to resources protected by SSH.</p><h3>Where to go from here</h3><ul><li>Head to <a href="https://get.krypt.co/"><strong>get.krypt.co</strong></a> to <a href="https://get.krypt.co/">download</a> the (iOS or Android) app!</li><li>Curious how exactly Kryptonite works? Check out our <a href="https://blog.krypt.co/the-kryptonite-architecture-a385e7aaa336"><strong>system architecture</strong> blog pos</a>t.</li><li>Learn about Kryptonite’s security and threat model in <a href="https://blog.krypt.co/why-store-an-ssh-key-with-kryptonite-9f24c1f983d5"><strong>Why Store an SSH Key With Kryptonite?</strong></a>.</li><li>To learn more about KryptCo, visit us at <a href="https://krypt.co/">krypt.co</a>. Also feel free to reach out to us at hello@krypt.co!</li><li>Looking for the source code? All of the code for Kryptonite is published on <a href="https://github.com/kryptco">GitHub</a>.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d8fd2951d406" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/blog-krypt-co/the-end-of-id-rsa-d8fd2951d406">Introducing Kryptonite — the end of id_rsa</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/blog-krypt-co">krypt.co/blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Store an SSH Key with Krypton?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/blog-krypt-co/why-store-an-ssh-key-with-kryptonite-9f24c1f983d5?source=rss-c014a1aba188------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cryptography]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[android]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ssh]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ios]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin King]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 12 Apr 2017 23:40:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-09T17:25:07.163Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Storing your SSH keys locally, encrypted or not, poses the risk of the plaintext key falling into adversarial hands, <strong>immediately compromising every server you have access to.</strong></p><p>With <a href="https://krypt.co/">Krypton Core</a>, even the worst compromise is limited to only SSH logins explicitly authorized by you. At the core, phone operating systems are built with better sandboxing than their desktop counterparts. This is why security experts like Matt Green <a href="https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2017/03/05/secure-computing-for-journalists/">recommend phones for your most sensitive data</a>.</p><p>New to Krypton? Check out <a href="https://blog.krypt.co/the-end-of-id-rsa-d8fd2951d406">The end of id_rsa</a>.</p><h3>Privilege Separation</h3><blockquote>The problem with storing an SSH key on your laptop boils down to how privilege separation works on laptops (by user) versus on phones (by app).</blockquote><p>Laptop operating systems (like macOS or Ubuntu) separate priviliges based on user name. Most applications you run execute with the same user privileges, meaning the files created by one can be read by the others. Just open Activity Monitor or run ps to see all of the processes running with the same privileges as your user account.</p><p>On the contrary, phone operating systems (iOS &amp; Android) separate privileges by individual application, meaning that files created by an application are only readable by that application. This separation is essential to Krypton’s storage of the SSH private key, which is safe from other applications that may be malicious.</p><h3>Threat Models</h3><p>We will analyze SSH private key storage under two different threat models:</p><ol><li><strong>Passive Adversary: </strong>the disk contents of the computer may be read or uploaded (i.e. simple malware or <a href="https://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/01/25/github_ssh_key_snafu/">accidental upload to GitHub</a>).</li><li><strong>Active Adversary:</strong> a process on the laptop can run arbitrary code (i.e. sophisticated malware, ransomware, or a malicious application).</li></ol><p>For both of these threat models, we will consider storing an SSH key (1) locally in plaintext, (2) locally encrypted with a passphrase, and (3) with Krypton.</p><h4>Plaintext id_rsa</h4><p>If a local key is stored unencrypted, the passive adversary simply uploads this key to a remote machine where <strong>it may be used any number of times without the owner’s knowledge</strong>. In this case, the passive adversary is powerful enough for a full compromise and the active adversary is irrelevant.</p><h4>Passphrase Encrypted id_rsa</h4><p>If a local key is stored encrypted with a passphrase, the passive adversary may upload the encrypted key. The strength of the key is now reduced to the strength of the password, which will be subject to unhindered brute-force attacks. Once the password is cracked, the <strong>key can be used without restriction and without the owner’s knowledge</strong>.</p><p>An active adversary can easily use or learn the plaintext key after the first time you use it. When you first enter your password to decrypt a key, SSH checks if an SSH agent is running, and if so, SSH adds the plaintext key to the agent. The agent stores the plaintext key in memory and will gladly perform any number of authentications requested by any process. <strong>An active adversary simply waits until the decrypted key is added to the agent and then uses the key freely.</strong></p><p><em>If you have a passphrase encrypted key, you can see this for yourself:</em></p><pre>$ eval `ssh-agent` # make sure an empty agent is running<br>$ ssh user@server  # enter passphrase on first login<br>$ ssh user@server  # passphrase no longer needed</pre><p>Alternatively, a malicious application may disguise itself as an SSH agent and <strong>receive the key in plaintext the first time it’s decrypted</strong>.</p><h4>Krypton</h4><p>A passive adversary present on a computer paired with Kryponite may read only the computer’s <em>session</em> keypair and Krypton’s <em>session</em> public key. With the computer’s session credentials, the adversary may send valid login requests to Kryponite and read any response. However, it cannot read the data of other login requests which contain session ids of other SSH sessions (since these are encrypted to Krypton’s session public key). If the Krypton user receives an unknown request, the user can unpair the computer (rendering the compromised session credentials useless) and re-pair once the computer is re-provisioned. <strong>Even if the user allows an adversary’s request, every authentication is stored in the Krypton audit log</strong>, allowing more accurate incident response.</p><p>An active adversary on a Krypton-paired computer can hijack any approved SSH login by replacing the path to the local SSH binary with a malicious one, but cannot perform new logins of its own without Krypton user approval.</p><blockquote>With Krypton, each of these compromises require the user’s approval per <em>username@host</em>. For every asset that an adversary might try to access, a new malicious request must be approved by the user. Without Krypton, the above compromises result in <strong>unauthorized access to all assets</strong> protected by the private key.</blockquote><h3>The Bottom Line</h3><p>Storing SSH keys locally, encrypted or not, poses the risk of the plaintext key falling into adversarial hands, <strong>immediately compromising every server the key has access to.</strong></p><p>In the presence of both passive and active adversaries, Kryponite limits a compromise to only the logins authorized by you, all of which are stored in the audit log.</p><p>At krypt.co, we are constantly working to increase the security and control provided by Krypton. Stay tuned for new features involving server verification (traditionally the known_hosts file), verified commands and more!</p><h3>Where to go from here</h3><ul><li>Head to <a href="https://get.krypt.co/"><strong>get.krypt.co</strong></a> to download the (iOS or Android) app!</li><li>New to Krypton? Check out <a href="https://blog.krypt.co/the-end-of-id-rsa-d8fd2951d406">The end of id_rsa</a>.</li><li>Curious how Krypton works? Check out our <a href="https://blog.krypt.co/the-kryptonite-architecture-a385e7aaa336"><strong>system architecture</strong> blog post</a>.</li><li>To learn more about krypt.co, visit us <a href="https://krypt.co/">here</a>. Also feel free to reach out to us at hello@krypt.co!</li><li>Looking for the source code? All of the code for Krypton is published on <a href="https://github.com/kryptco">GitHub</a>.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9f24c1f983d5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/blog-krypt-co/why-store-an-ssh-key-with-kryptonite-9f24c1f983d5">Why Store an SSH Key with Krypton?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/blog-krypt-co">krypt.co/blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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