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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Khazna Chami on Medium]]></title>
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            <title>Stories by Khazna Chami on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Are wild animals OK?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@khazna/are-wild-animals-ok-7213aab1df5b?source=rss-b5db0cf9ca0b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[animal-welfare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[effective-altruism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[wild-animals]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[life-sciences]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Khazna Chami]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 31 Oct 2022 22:18:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-04T10:52:39.840Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Note: an updated version of this post is available on </em><a href="https://fileundermisc.substack.com/p/are-wild-animals-ok"><em>Substack</em></a><em>.</em></p><h3><strong>Introduction</strong></h3><p>‘Are wild animals OK?’ is an embarrassing question for me, personally, to ask. I’ve been a pescatarian for 11 years. I cried twice at <em>Rise of the Planet of the Apes</em>. I’m not the kind of person who will always be taken seriously when talking about ‘bleeding heart’ issues. And there’s a reason we might think of this issue as ridiculous, beyond our attention, too soft.</p><p>In their online course on Wild Animal Suffering, the non-profit Animal Ethics proposes this question — when you think of a wild animal, what do you see? They take a guess.</p><blockquote>Most people picture healthy, adult, big exotic mammals, such as a lion or an elephant (or maybe another big vertebrate). They think of happy animals, enjoying themselves without any human causing them harm. This is a view of the situation of animals in the wild that is prevalent today (Animal Ethics, 2020a).</blockquote><p>I thought of a happy, healthy adult zebra. After all — non-human animals (from here, ‘animals’) living in the wild — surely, that is where they are meant to be, where they have adapted to be? This is the way of things, hunting and grazing both. Beautiful, brutal, perfect.</p><p>This is the ‘idyllic idea’ of nature — that nature consists of ‘a balance of perpetually stable states, following from which wild animals live happy or contented lives’ (Soryl et al., 2021 p.5). According to this view, concern for or the study of individual wild animals’ welfare pales in comparison to their habitats, ecosystems, and the abundance of their species. If we can just go back to the <em>way things were,</em> whenever and whatever that might be, then animals will be okay. This view not only lends itself to conservation, but the field of animal welfare in its general focus on captive or farmed animals — if nature is idyllic, then it seems far more pressing to help animals who are being kept in ‘unnatural’ habitats and suffer directly at the hands of humans (Soryl et al., 2021).</p><p>But it does seem cold out there, doesn’t it? And we know that wild animals, though they’re more suited to their environments than we humans would be, lack the guarantee of their basic needs being fulfilled — food, water, and good health. The research on wild animal welfare indicates that most wild animals are not happy, healthy adults.</p><h3><strong>Wild animal suffering</strong></h3><p>I struggled whilst researching this post. It wasn’t only bleak to look at the different ways in which wild animals suffer, but partway through, I started thinking — what’s the interest here? Once you dig into the lives of wild animals, it seems nearly impossible to argue that there isn’t a problem. It was quickly becoming more of a list than a thinkpiece. There are some incredible resources available from <a href="https://www.animal-ethics.org/situation-of-animals-wild/">Animal Ethics</a> and <a href="https://longtermrisk.org/the-importance-of-wild-animal-suffering/">Brian Tomasik</a> if you want to dig in deeper, but this is a whistle-stop tour of some relevant issues.</p><p><strong>Predation</strong></p><p>Aside from any human activity, wild animals already have a lot to deal with. Though kills from predation can happen quickly, this is not always the case. For two examples, lions can kill large prey, such as zebras, by tearing through a muscle, and then asphyxiating them over several minutes (McGowan, 1972 in Tomasik, 2015). Wild dogs immobilise their prey, after which the pack descends to disembowel and tear chunks of meat from the animal before it dies (Soryl et al., 2021).</p><p><strong>Costs from evolution</strong></p><p>Evolutionary processes mean that the welfare of animals beyond their reproductive age can be poor, as traits that improve fitness and welfare are no longer selected for — think of human menopause as an example. Elephants can outlive their last set of molars, leading them to starve as they are unable to eat (Pearce, 2015). Other animals have evolved defensive mechanisms that are excruciating to those that they are used against, such as Arizona bark scorpion and platypus venom (de Plater et al., 2000; Sillar et al., 2016).</p><p><strong>Weather, natural disasters, starvation and thirst</strong></p><p>Animals can be adversely affected by weather and natural disasters, particularly in the face of extreme weather events from climate change. Even animals who survive natural disasters may suffer or die as a result of injuries (Animal Ethics, 2020b). These events can all lead to thirst, malnutrition and starvation. Juveniles also frequently starve to death, if they are born to a large clutch or litter size, or if they are born to a mother from a species who gives parental care, but rejects her offspring, or cannot feed it (Animal Ethics, 2020c).</p><p><strong>Diseases and parasitism</strong></p><p>Without the healthcare afforded to humans, wild animals tend to suffer from diseases and parasitism. There are too many of them to list, and many we do not yet know about — but they are wide-ranging, and may cause a great deal of pain (Animal Ethics, 2020d). For example, birds frequently carry a range of diseases including cholera and malaria. Bison, elk and deer can suffer from the highly contagious chronic wasting disease, which causes holes to form in the brain. It is always fatal (Salman, 2003).</p><p><strong>Animal emotions</strong></p><p>It seems that at least some animals can have experiences at least akin to emotions. They may feel, and face the long-term impacts of, fear and anxiety. Zanette et al (2019). found that black-capped chickadees in the wild exposed to the sounds of nearby predators had higher neurological and behavioural sensitivity to different predator sounds a week later — they experienced the symptoms of human PTSD. This, they argued, is likely to be relevant across animal species — predator attacks are frequent but often unsuccessful, meaning that there are likely to be similar impacts on psychological health (ibid.). This is backed up by evidence of PTSD-like symptoms occurring after rats were exposed to predator odour cues (Mackenzie et al., 2010).</p><p>Many animals — according to Numan and Young (2016, p.98), “virtually all mammals” — display strong signs of mother-infant bonding. Other animals may form relationships like friendships, preferring the company of some conspecifics over others for no clear reason — and social buffering, in which “animals recover better from aversive events in the presence of conspecifics”, is seen in a range of animals including mammals and chickens (Schukraft, 2020). This raises questions of possible suffering from the denial of social contacts or suffering as a result of affective states like grief if a loved one dies.</p><h3><strong>Human impacts</strong></h3><p>How humans impact the environment deserves its own section. Directly, we intervene in the environment by culling and using pesticides (Cowen, 2003; Tomasik, 2015). We also vaccinate some animal groups for our benefit — if the disease might spread to humans or farmed animals (Eskander, Wiblin and Harris, 2019). Indirectly, we change landscapes, cut down forests, change water levels, selectively use fertilisers and agrochemicals, and, of course, burn fossil fuels (Soryl et al., 2021; Cowen, 2003).</p><p>Anthropogenic climate change is one of the most obvious impacts we have on animal lives. It is happening at an unprecedented rate, which means that animal adaptation may not be able to keep pace, particularly given that the effects are multiple and combined (Thomas et al., 2004). For example, climate change can lead to droughts and malnutrition, which can cause immunosuppression. This may combine with further immunosuppression caused by pollutants or stress, and allow for diseases to spread more rapidly within animal populations (Acevdeo-Whitehouse and Duffs, 2009).</p><p>New diseases may emerge as pathogens jump between species that are forced into contact by anthropogenic habitat change, such as urbanisation. For example, many bats are carriers of coronaviruses. These bats are increasingly forced into contact with people in urban areas or farmed animals, such as pigs (Schneeberger and Voigt, 2015). This can lead to a novel disease, for which most animals do not have antibodies, spreading rapidly within and between populations.</p><p>Animals in urban areas also adapt to their environments. They might be less likely to starve or die from predation — but they may suffer from the effects of higher population densities, like higher disease transmission and higher competition for food. Scavenging animals like racoons and rats may group around food hotspots, like areas with accessible bins, causing areas of high population density. Urban animals can also be hit by vehicles and are exposed to domesticated predators (cats and dogs) (Ditchkoff, Saalfeld and Gibson, 2006).</p><p>In my opinion, we intervene in nature so much, mostly without explicitly aiming to, that there’s no clear line between ‘human-impacted animals’ and ‘non-human-impacted animals’ — so no divider as to who, exactly, is worthy of our help.</p><h3><strong><em>r</em>-selection — the great killer?</strong></h3><p>Even without all of these specific examples of how animals might suffer, some argue that reproductive strategies cause suffering to predominate over enjoyment in nature. Widely, animals have two reproductive strategies, termed ‘K-selection’ and ‘r-selection’. K-selected species invest many resources, including parental care, into a small number of offspring. These species include larger or long-lived organisms, such as elephants, dogs and arctic terns. This investment means that the majority of offspring will survive and reproduce. R-selected species, however, have very large clutch sizes — this is where the resources go, and parents then do not tend to care for or feed these offspring. The payoff here is that a few of these many offspring — for bullfrogs, 6,000–20,000 eggs per brood, and for houseflies, 75–200 eggs per female (Solbrig and Solbrig, 1979, in Ng, 1995) should survive. On average, <em>one</em> of the females per clutch will survive to maturity to reproduce (Ng, 1995).</p><p>The majority of the offspring in r-selected species, therefore, die, often in painful ways, such as being eaten or starving. Some of these offspring may grow to be old enough to be sentient when this happens (Horta, 2010; Ng, 1995). It is plausible, then, that the lives of r-selected species are dominated by suffering, or negative experiences, rather than enjoyment or positive experiences — they might simply not have the time to enjoy the latter. As r-selection predominates across animal species, particularly in small animals, this makes it likely that suffering is more prevalent than enjoyment (Horta, 2010).</p><p>However, this argument suffers from the divide between philosophy and life sciences. The r/K-selection paradigm is outdated — having been introduced in the 1950s and popularised in the 1970s — and was criticised for being oversimplified and lacking backing from empirical evidence shortly after (see Taylor and Condra, 1980). The formulation I have seen in discussions for wild animal ethics (Horta, 2010; Ng, 1995 as examples) is oversimplified still — it generally relies upon the reproductive strategies of <em>species</em> rather than <em>populations</em>, and lacks discussion of the impacts of population density, age-specific mortality, and resource availability, amongst other potentially relevant factors (see Reznick, Bryant and Bashey, 2002).</p><p>Ng (1995) also relies on an economic calculation to argue that suffering predominates in nature. This is based on the idea that the experiences of suffering and enjoyment are costly in evolutionary terms — that we would not be adapted to use up too many resources on having these experiences. However, this has been debated and lacks empirical backing (Groff and Ng, 2019), particularly considering that Ng assumes animals’ basic state is ‘neutral’ (Ng, 1995, p. 271). This does not align with human experience, at least according to one study which says humans report a feeling almost every waking moment (Lucas &amp; Diener 2008, in Schukraft, 2020), potentially indicating that the energy costs of experiencing enjoyment or suffering are not great.</p><h3><strong>The sentience question</strong></h3><p>That was a very long list of why animals might be in pain. But how can we know that these things cause the <em>experience</em> of pain, or suffering — that they result in felt experiences?</p><p>Sentience can be defined as the capacity to have positive or negative experiences — experiencing pain as unpleasant, for example (Animal Ethics, 2020e).*</p><p>Some such as Soryl et al. (2021) argue that sentience is not a prerequisite to an animals having welfare. Otherwise, it’s believed that being able to experience pleasure or pain (enjoyment or suffering) is part of a reward/punishment system that tells animals which activities increase their fitness, and which do not (Ng, 1995). Schukraft (2020) argues that if this is the case, it seems unlikely that any animal, including invertebrates, would have particularly mild experiences of pain/pleasure, as they have to be strong enough to influence learning.</p><p>However, this argument from evolution and others from inference and analogy are, so far, all we have to argue for animal sentience. From inference, we can say that animals, especially mammals and other vertebrates, <em>seem</em> to show behaviour that signals experiences of pain. The most simple explanation of pain behaviour is that pain is being experienced. Without significant defeaters — reasons why this would not be the case — we are licensed to prefer the simplest explanation (Schukraft, 2018). Otherwise, we can analogise — we can say that we, as humans, would find a certain experience painful, and with sufficient similarities between us and the animal in question, they will therefore find the same experience painful. This, however, does call into question what a sufficient similarity is. It seems like a neocortex is a good one, but it’s becoming clearer that it’s not the only one — human children born without a cerebral cortex seem able to have conscious experiences (Merker, 2007). Animal Ethics argue that a brain, or maybe just a central nervous system, seems necessary for the emergence of sentience — but they do not guarantee its presence (or show that its absence is evidence that sentience is absent).</p><p>Essentially, the evidence so far points towards most vertebrates being sentient — the question of invertebrate sentience remains open. But this is one of the many cases in which we lack empirical evidence, and have to rely on reasoning. Even if we do settle on animal sentience, we will need to agree on what constitutes a moral patient — who we are morally obligated to help — and if moral patienthood exists on a scale. As Persis Eskander (2018) says,</p><blockquote>That includes not just deciding between the moral weight of an ant versus a cow, but also an ant versus a nematode.</blockquote><p>Surely, this will lead to debates around anthropomorphism, and if the tiniest of organisms, if sentient, are cognitively or neurally similar enough to humans to be worth helping. This is an important question, particularly amongst Effective Altruists, who like to rate the pressingness of various issues to allocate resources — if only certain animals are sentient, or sentient ‘enough’ to be moral patients, it changes the scale of the problem of their welfare. Using the number of farmed vertebrates as a baseline (estimated at 123 billion) , Eskander estimates that there are approximately one quadrillion wild vertebrates and one sextillion invertebrates. This is Even on scales of biomass and neurone count, invertebrates dominate. I would argue that evidence currently points to mammals, and possibly other vertebrates being sentient. However, invertebrate sentience has barely been researched — if Effective Altruists want to accurately judge the scale of animal suffering, then this must be looked into.</p><h3><strong>A lack of empirical evidence</strong></h3><p>Reading about wild animal welfare from a life sciences background, I felt strange. It began with the focus on questions of scale from Eskander (2018). Yes, estimating the scale of the problem is necessary for judging the pressingness of the issue — but from a scientific perspective, it seems to be jumping the gun. We are trying to estimate the scale of the potential problem — how many animals are suffering — without knowing exactly what constitutes ‘suffering’ and how widespread it is amongst this gigantic number of animals in the wild. We are asking questions about how pressing an issue wild animal welfare could become if invertebrates are included, whilst knowing very little about invertebrate sentience (Soryl et al., 2021).</p><p>This made me realise that much of what I have read has been, essentially, based on conjecture. This isn’t at all to discredit the papers — they are key for a foundation to the questions raised by wild animal welfare — but we rely on assumptions rather than evidence. We, like Ng (1995), assume that there is a degree of evolutionary economising which means that suffering and enjoyment have concave functions, or we, like Groff and Ng (2019), edit these functions but recognise that their conclusions are ambiguous without empirical evidence. We, also like Ng (1995) or Horta (2010), cite r-selection, a theory outdated long before we wrote about it, as a reason why animals suffer. We, like Schukraft (2020), use reasoning from evolution to argue that animals will not have very mild positive or negative experiences — and, like me, cite the few evidence-based papers that we can. We look at arguments from philosophy to argue for the existence of animal minds (Schukraft, 2018). From the sciences, we reject policing nature because it sounds wrong (Cowen, 2003), or we argue huge paradigm shifts, like that habitat loss is a good thing from an animal welfare perspective (Tomasik, 2016) or that we should be less inclined to help conservation efforts related to carnivores (Cowen, 2003).</p><p>This work is foundational, but for wild animal welfare to become a real paradigm, it needs to be stronger. Since Ng (1995) proposed the field of welfare biology — ‘the study of sentient animals and their environment with respect to wellbeing’ — little has happened amongst scientists to advance the field. Whilst wild animal welfare seems to be a known issue amongst Effective Altruists, ethicists and other philosophers, it is ‘virtually unheard of’ (Soryl et al., 2021, p.18) outside of these circles. Eskander (2018) estimates that fewer than 20 people in the world work full-time on wild animal rights (Eskander, Wiblin and Harris, 2019). And perhaps for a good historical reason, too — the two related fields of conservation and animal welfare respectively have a chance to undertake interventions that seem plausible and might have good public backing. Conservation is a popular paradigm, as it relies in part on the idyllic ideal of nature that many of us hold, and offers to preserve the aesthetic value of nature, which many of us enjoy. Animal welfare tends to focus on captive or farmed animals and asks how we might improve our practices to better help animals — it asks for improvements within an already extant system (Soryl et al., 2021).</p><p>With wild animal welfare, or welfare biology more widely, we are asking not only for people to look at some uncomfortable truths, but to try to change them. We’re asking each other to recognise that nature is not perfect, often not even beautiful, and that we’re already intervening in a lot of it — that it’s our responsibility. We don’t know how interventions to improve animal welfare will impact ecosystems, and we must ask if we’re willing to undertake or at least begin to research them. These are very tough asks, and mean that welfare biology must be equally tough. It must have empirical backing, some cohesion amongst its proponents’ views, and some clear research questions.</p><p>These questions are not at all finite, but my first ideas are:</p><blockquote>1) What do, if anything, do animals feel?</blockquote><blockquote>2) How widespread is animal suffering?</blockquote><blockquote>3) How widespread is animal enjoyment?</blockquote><blockquote>4) What is sentience, and does it matter?</blockquote><blockquote>6) Are invertebrates sentient?</blockquote><blockquote>7) Are juvenile animals sentient?</blockquote><blockquote>8) Are there degrees of sentience?</blockquote><blockquote>9) What interventions are possible?</blockquote><blockquote>10) How would they affect ecosystems?</blockquote><p>These are not at all easy questions to answer — but by keeping them basic and clear, we can prioritise research accordingly. We surely cannot argue for stopping conservation efforts without knowing if animal lives can be improved — or how bad they really <em>are.</em> We also cannot argue for widespread interventions into animal lives without knowing their possible impacts.</p><p>Techniques to research animal welfare, too, need improvement. We can try to find neural correlates for pain, but this is difficult and unreliable even in humans, who can self-report their pain levels. We could look at neural oscillations, which seem promising. There are also physiological markers of pain and stress, but the evidence of the physiology of pain/stress does not guarantee the experience of pain/stress. Evidence from physiological markers should also be combined, as they may not be reliable alone. Such methods, in the case of stress, include faecal cortisol analysis, studies of weight change to try to determine whether stress has been a significant cost to other biological processes, or remote blood sampling devices (McLaren, Bonacic and Rowan, 2007). Behavioural studies are important sources of information, but this, too, is hard to obtain — pain behaviour doesn’t just vary across species, but can even vary between dog breeds (Dobromylskyj et al. 2000, in Schukraft, 2020). Animals may also be adapted to hide pain behaviour to avoid signalling to predators that they are weak and easier to catch (Schukraft, 2020). With better evidence of particular signals of pain, we can then begin work on modelling the state of animal welfare (Wild Animal Initiative, 2022).</p><p>There are some plausible interventions that are unlikely to change population levels drastically — so are unlikely to cause trophic cascades, or lead to under/overpopulation and resultant stressors within the ecosystem. We can make ongoing processes more humane — such as improving how wild fish are killed, introducing contraceptives into overabundant populations which might otherwise be killed more brutally (particularly urban animals like rats or pigeons), or improving pesticides or insecticides (Eskander, Wiblin and Harris, 2019). Animal Ethics (2020f) argue for helping small numbers of suffering animals directly — for example, caring for orphans, helping animals who have been caught in natural disasters and rescuing trapped and injured animals. We could also focus on preventative measures towards future animal suffering, like making sure that rewilding is properly managed to avoid overstretching resources in tough seasons (IUCN, 2021). This seems particularly relevant amongst social animals — if reintroductions go wrong, it may have to lead to killing a member of a social group, leading to changes within that group and even grief.</p><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>I feel confident saying that wild animals are most likely not OK. There are not only a huge variety of pressures that cause their suffering — from starvation to natural disasters and large clutch sizes — but these pressures are becoming more extreme as the climate changes. There is also good reason to think that many animals, especially vertebrates, are sentient and can experience pain as a negative state. I also feel justified in arguing that we have a moral responsibility to study and help wild animals. Humans intervene in nature constantly, mostly for our own benefit (Horta, 2010). Even those of us who don’t know we’re intervening are intervening, whether it is the hairspray we use or our carbon footprints, or feeding the pigeons at the park. We cannot reasonably argue that we should help the animals whose lives we ‘directly’ intervene in, like zoo and farmyard animals, but not those who are in the wild. We intervene in all of it.</p><p>Even without considering human entanglement in the lives of wild animals, I think we have a responsibility to help as we can — or at least direct some resources to studies with the potential to help in the future, such as those that can guide the development of new, useful technologies (Tomasik, 2015). As Peter Singer (1972, p. 231) said of global poverty relief,</p><blockquote>“If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it”.</blockquote><p>But if nature hurts, shouldn’t we just let it end? Well, I can understand this from a certain viewpoint. It doesn’t seem fair to keep ‘nature’ alive if it causes so much suffering. But if there are organisations like 80,000 Hours, or people like Toby Ord, arguing that the worst thing that can happen to humans is extinction — or depriving ourselves of our potential future — I believe the same is true of animals. There is hope to improve animal welfare if we look to start now — gathering evidence, modelling, and building the field of welfare biology so that it might stand up to scrutiny. Animals have a future, too, even if it looks different to ours. They deserve to be able to live it.</p><p>*This is far from the only definition of sentience, and may be considered to be different from the definition of ‘consciousness’. However, it fits the purpose of the sentience concept from an animal welfare perspective, separating those who can experience negatives states from those who cannot.</p><h4>Works cited</h4><p>Acevedo-Whitehouse, K. and Duffus, A.L., 2009. Effects of environmental change on wildlife health. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364(1534), pp.3429–3438.</p><p>Animal Ethics (2020a). Wild animal suffering: an introduction. Available at: <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Dp6gObE9eA&amp;ab_channel=AnimalEthics">www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Dp6gObE9eA&amp;ab_channel=AnimalEthics</a> (Accessed 31 Oct 2022).</p><p>Animal Ethics (2020b). Weather conditions and natural disasters. Available at: <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJNPuj-qhrI&amp;ab_channel=AnimalEthics">www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJNPuj-qhrI&amp;ab_channel=AnimalEthics</a> (Accessed 31 Oct 2022).</p><p>Animal Ethics (2020c). Hunger, thirst and psychological stress. Available at: <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jstp2-f4eFw&amp;ab_channel=AnimalEthics">www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jstp2-f4eFw&amp;ab_channel=AnimalEthics</a> (Accessed 31 Oct 2022).</p><p>Animal Ethics (2020d). Diseases and parasitism. Available at: www.<a href="http://youtube.com/watch?v=KCfjRhLGhI4&amp;ab_channel=AnimalEthics">youtube.com/watch?v=KCfjRhLGhI4&amp;ab_channel=AnimalEthics</a> (Accessed 31 Oct 2022).</p><p>Animal Ethics (2020e). What is sentience? Available at <a href="https://www.animal-ethics.org/what-is-sentience/">https://www.animal-ethics.org/what-is-sentience/</a> (Accessed 31 Oct 2022).</p><p>Animal Ethics (2020f). Helping animals in the wild. <a href="https://www.animal-ethics.org/helping-animals-in-the-wild/">https://www.animal-ethics.org/helping-animals-in-the-wild/</a> (Accessed 31 Oct 2022).</p><p>Cowen, T., 2003. Policing nature. Environmental Ethics, 25(2), pp.169–182.</p><p>de Plater, G. M., Milburn, P. J., &amp; Martin, R. L. (2000). Venom from the platypus, ornithorhynchusanatinus, induces a calcium-dependent current in cultured dorsal root ganglion cells. <em>Journal of Neurophysiology,</em> 85(3), 1340–1345.</p><p>Ditchkoff, S.S., Saalfeld, S.T. and Gibson, C.J., 2006. Animal behavior in urban ecosystems: modifications due to human-induced stress. <em>Urban ecosystems,</em> 9(1), pp.5–12.</p><p>Eskander, P. 2018. <em>Crucial considerations in wild animal suffering. </em>Available at: <a href="https://www.effectivealtruism.org/articles/ea-global-2018-crucial-considerations-was">https://www.effectivealtruism.org/articles/ea-global-2018-crucial-considerations-was</a> (Accessed 31 Oct 2022).</p><p>Eskander, P., Wiblin, R., and Harris, K. 2019. <em>Animals in the wild often suffer a great deal. What, if anything, should we do about that? </em>(podcast) The 80,000 Hours Podcast with Rob Wiblin. Available at: <a href="https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/persis-eskander-wild-animal-welfare/">https://80000hours.org/podcast/episodes/persis-eskander-wild-animal-welfare/</a> (Accessed 31 Oct 2022).</p><p>Groff, Z. and Ng, Y.K., 2019. Does suffering dominate enjoyment in the animal kingdom? 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