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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Kieron Turner on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Kieron Turner on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Kieron Turner on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Citizenship/Statelessness and Coloniality/Modernity: A comparative case study of International and…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kieronturner95/citizenship-statelessness-and-coloniality-modernity-a-comparative-case-study-of-international-and-e53c48367800?source=rss-a6001e812efc------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[israel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kashmir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tibet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[colonization]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kieron Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2019 14:57:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-17T14:57:35.859Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Citizenship/Statelessness and Coloniality/Modernity: A comparative case study of International and State policies concerning the status of citizenship and the rights of the stateless in regards to Palestine, Kashmir and Tibet</h3><p>Introduction</p><p>This case study will compare and contrast international and state policies concerning citizenship, rights and “statelessness” within a social policy context in regards to Palestinians residing within the occupied territories; Kashmiris within occupied Jammu and Kashmir; “stateless” Tibetans residing within India. Deviating from traditional social policy discussions, this case study shall explore these phenomena within the wider context of Mignolos (2011), concept of coloniality/modernity. It will begin with a discussion on the foundations of social-policy discussions in regards to citizenship, moving on to define and articulate Mignolos coloniality/modernity in relation to the general themes and discourses surrounding citizenship within social policy. This case study will then explore the three cases of Tibet, Kashmir and Palestine independently, before contextualising them within a comparative analysis in relation to the broader themes of this case study, concluding by discussing the importance of reconceptualising citizenship and rights-regimes.</p><p>Social-Policy/Citizenship</p><p>Within social policy Citizenship is viewed as being concerned with the relationship between individuals and the communities they inhabit, namely, the bounded national unit of the modern nation-state (Dwyer, 2016, p. 48). This relationship between individual and nation defined by citizenship is detailed as the key gateway between the individual and the enjoyment of rights and privileges such as healthcare, education, the right to vote, the right to security etc. which exist in a reciprocal relationship to the individual bearing certain social/political/economic responsibilities (Dwyer, 2016, p. 49). The most famous contribution to academic discussion within social policy contexts on citizenship is the work of T. H. Marshall (Aneesh and Wolover, 2016; Dywer, 2016; Revi, 2014). Marshall, writing in the post-war period, discusses Britain’s emerging welfare system as a “closed, rights based system of social welfare, which he called “social citizenship” (Revi, 2014, p. 432). This form of citizenship, Marshall conceptualised, was based upon a rights based regime of a contractual relationship between individual and the nation state (Aneesh, Wolover, 2016, p. 2). Revi (2014, p. 459–460), notes how this inclusive system of rights-based citizenship also has the ability to exclude individuals too, discussing ethnic minorities, women, migrants etc. However, the key example of this exclusionary apparatus which will be explored throughout this case study will be those outside the boundaries of the closed national unit. It is this bounded conceptualization of citizenship to the nation-state in which national, and international, rights based regimes and debates within social-policy contexts have been developed (Deckard and Heslin, 2016, pp. 295–296).</p><p>Generally, within social-policy &amp; wider political/legal discourses, the citizen is to enjoy “the right to have rights” in the words of Arendt (1951, cited in Deckard and Heslin, 2016, p. 295). This inclusive rights-based regime it is noted, contingent upon access to the nation-state system of recognised rights through citizenship, is dependent upon its dichotomous opposition to “statelessness” (Aneesh and Wolover, 2016, p.3). “Statelessness” Belton (2011, p. 59), claims is the “archetypal non-citizen”; unlike most refugees and asylum seekers the “stateless” are not recognised as nationals by any state and therefore exist outside the system of international law and protection, as rights and protections are dependent upon access to citizenship to nation-state rights-regimes. This means that, despite the development of an alleged universal rights based system in numerous UN conventions such as the UDHR (Universal Declaration of Human Rights) 1948 and the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) Convention relating to the Status of “Stateless” Persons 1954, because of the privileging of the nation-states rights-regime’s, millions who are “stateless” are not protected by such rights (Aneesh and Wolover, 2016, p. 3; Mayblin, 2014, p. 424–428).</p><p>Since the post-war period, the rise and fall of liberal-welfare rights-regimes in regards to citizenship has been a key area of debate within social-policy circles (McNevin, 2008; Revi, 2014). However, despite the often appraisal of the theoretical contributions of the likes of T. H. Marshall and the expanding of rights, within states and through the inter-state system of universal rights conventions through the UN (United Nations), the precarious and the legal non-existence of rights for “non-citizens” i.e. the “stateless” tend to be subsumed into discussions of refugees and not enough has been done to address this (Belton, 2011, pp. 61–62). Belton (2011, pp. 61–62), argues that despite the attempt at universalising citizenship to all human beings, the enjoyment of rights is still mostly tied to having citizenship from somewhere, and that somewhere being the bounded national unit of the nation-state. Deckard and Heslin (2016, p. 295–296), note how because of the dependency upon citizenship to nation-states, the “right to have rights” and the separation between “full human life” Arendt’s assertion that without political rights, humans are no more than “speaking animals”, is a continuous existing consequence of Universalist notions of citizenship. Because of this, “Statelessness” as Belton (2011, p. 62), claims is a “condition that is generated by a coercively imposed political structure” — the cosmopolitan Universalist international nation-state system.</p><p>Coloniality/Modernity</p><p>References to internationalist/universalist attempts at rights-based regimes within the inter-state system within social-policy debates are often discussed in reference to the concepts of globalisation and/or cosmopolitan notions of rights (Aneesh and Wolover, 2016; Deckhard and Heslin, 2016). However, this case study will make the case that the epistemic and legal origins of such philosophies, discourses and institutions, are not just ignored, but vital to understanding the social-policy contexts of citizenship and “statelessness” in the present. Mignolo (2011, p. 79), argues that the foundations of the liberal international legal system within modernity arose with the establishment of the treaties of Tordesillas (1484) and Saragossa (1529) which subsequently divided and appropriated the globe by the dictation of Pope Alexander VI between the emerging Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires. The logics of liberal cosmopolitanism, largely drawn from Kant, and the international legal system drawn up by Fransisco de Vitoria, coexisted and were underpinned by hierarchical, racist and colonial conceptions of rights, of man and of the world, and that subsequently, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, while claiming to be a universal project, was quite concerned with the European man, and the emerging European (colonial) inter-state system (Mignolo, 2011, pp. 258–259). Thus, Mignolo (2011, p. xxi), argues that to understand modernity, it must be understood that colonialism, or rather coloniality, was not just a part of modernity but was and is constitutive of it. The structures of coloniality/modernity exist as the context in which social-policy debates around citizenship must be understood; “statelessness” is the darker, constitutive side of modern citizenship.</p><p>It is quite clear that, when these re-positioning of the analysis of the emergence of the conception of universal rights and of citizenship are taken into account, the exclusionary apparatuses of the system of citizenship begin to make more sense. In fact Bhambra (2015, p. 102), argues that the general narrative within social policy circles in regards to citizenship, simplifies the historical narrative and rarely, if at all, addresses the racialized and colonial exclusions which constituted such rights-regimes. Citizenship is as much about “exclusion” as it is about “inclusion” (Bhambra, 2015, p. 105; Taylor, 2013, p. 600). Citizenship, this case study contends, within social policy has largely been interpreted through colonial relations (Rogers and Smith, 2016, p. 59), and the citizen more generally has been constructed as embodying the normative white, heterosexual, cisgender, rational, male European (Mayblin, 2014, p. 426). Therefore its oppositional positionality of “statelessness”, exists for all those outside of that embodiment and outside of the nation-state system; this area of existing outside the reciprocal positioning of Arendt’s “right to have rights”, is often identified within citizenship discourses as the status of “bare life” (Deckard and Haslin, 2016, p. 294). This case study contends that this state of “bare life” to which the “stateless” reside, is similar, and often have and are the same populations in which inhabit Fanons “colonial zone”, mainly inhabitants of the Global South (Fanon, 1963, pp. 30–31; Mayblin, 2014, pp. 426–427).</p><p>Deploying these conceptual themes, this case study will argue that the dichotomous construction of the Universalist interstate rights-regime between the citizen and the non-citizen side-lined existence of the “stateless”, represents what Santos (2014, pp. 118–119) conceptualises as the “abyssal line”; the radicalisation of invisible distinctions that divide social reality between “this side of the line” and “the other side of the line”. Santos describes the abyssal line as “the division is such that “the other side of the line” vanishes as reality, becomes non-existent” and exists similarly as Fanons “colonial zone” which is structured by lawlessness, violence, and the structures of imperialism and coloniality (Fanon, 1963, pp. 30–31; Santos, 2014, pp. 118–126). Belton (2011, pp. 59–60), argues that liberal political and legal theories have tended to ignore the existence of the “stateless”, which this case study contends as has social-policy, and that this is due to the dividing of social reality by the abyssal line. The UN Convention relating to the rights of “stateless” persons outline that “everyone has a right to a nationality” (Belton, 2011, p. 61). However, those who’s nationality has been stripped from them and fall onto the “other side of the line”, it is very difficult, and for some impossible, to gain citizenship to somewhere which will guarantee rights and protections under a nation-state’s rights-regime. The denial of rights to all human beings that do not fit within the context of the colonial European inter-state system Mayblin (2014, pp. 437–439) argues, was built into the inception of cosmopolitan philosophy and the modern human rights-regime (Mignolo, 2011, p. 259). This case study will now examine three modern examples of how these wider themes from global southern theory play out in the contexts of Palestine, Kashmir and Tibet, as examples of how “stateless” peoples exist on “the other side” of the abyssal line, within the wider context of coloniality/modernity.</p><p>Tibet</p><p>From 1950–1951 the People’s Republic of China invaded and subsequently occupied Tibet leading to the signing of the ”Seventeen-Point Agreement” which saw the establishing of the Tibetan “autonomous region” as part of the Chinese state (Bentz, et al. 2008). In 1959 the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and political leader of Tibet, fled to India along with thousands of refugees and established a “government-in-exile” in Dharamsala, India (Dennehy, 2016). Thousands of refugees, with the help of the government-in-exile, viewed as “guests” of the Indian state have set up a network of communities throughout Nepal and India, both of which however are not signatories of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Dennehy, 2016). It is estimated that over 100,000 Tibetans currently reside in India, none have Tibetan citizenship as Tibet is not legally considered an independent nation and/or state, and most do not have Indian citizenship (Hess, 2009, p. 209; Tibetan Review, 2017). Tibetans are considered guests by the Indian state, but “foreigners by law” who are dealt with under the 1946 Foreigners Act, and although are provided for as de facto refugees, exist outside of the legal structures of citizenship within India (Chandran and Madhukar, 2017; McConnell, 2013, p. 969–972). Because of the “stateless” nature of many Tibetans in India, they do not enjoy rights and privileges regarded as vital under T. H. Marshalls “social citizenship” model, such as education, employment, the right to vote, and the possibility of mobility and/or emigration (Chandra and Madhukar, 2017; Hess, 2009, p. 209).</p><p>It is in these circumstances in which the conceptualisation of citizenship as a reciprocal rights-based responsibility to the community and the nation breaks down. Tibetans live, are educated and work in India, however, due to the difficulties in accessing national citizenship, and the Government-in-exiles political call to maintain the disposition of a “stateless” Tibetan identity, as when citizenship is gained an individual loses their “refugee” status which is both a legal and political identity (Houston and Wright, 2003, p. 227), Tibetans in India therefore exist outside the formal legal relationship of the Indian rights-regime (Deckard and Heslin, 2016). McConnell (2013, p. 968), describes this situation as the case of an “individual who has found the boundary between two states — one recognized, the other “clandestine” — and slipped down the gap between them”. It is what structures this gap between the citizenship statuses of two states that this case study contends requires more explicit attention, that is, the space on the “other side of the line”, the state between civilised zones and legal confinements and the savage or “colonial zone” of violence and the “lawless destruction of life” (Fanon, 1963, pp. 30–31; Santos, pp. 127–128). This is the space in which “stateless” Tibetans conceptually and legally exist, despite the accommodations Indian society has made for them throughout the years, such as the 2014 Tibetan Rehabilitation Policy (Chandran, Madhukar, 2017).</p><p>Despite policies enacted by the Indian state to accommodate “stateless” Tibetans and refugees as “foreign guests” (McConnell, 2013, p. 967), it is clear that Tibetans maintain a lesser existence to those which maintain Indian national citizenship and are still unable to access certain protections and rights. The history of the formation of India as an independent nation-state is one of partition and post-colonialism (Gnosh and Duschinski, 2017). The dominance of colonial thinking, alongside the rise of the cosmopolitan, Universalist, liberal legal-system with the UN, has led to India itself exerting colonial notions of citizenship and inclusion, the case of “stateless” Tibetans being one example. As emphasised by Bhambra (2015, p. 106), modern citizenship is itself enacted through processes of exclusion; citizenship cannot simply be extended to other groups, such as Tibetans which exist outside the embodiment of the national-state, as from the outset inclusion to the rights-regime has been based upon the legal and epistemological exclusion of others in order to maintain it.</p><p>Kashmir</p><p>In the mid-eighteenth century the British signed a treaty transferring the lands currently existing as Kashmir to the Dogra dynasty rulers to be governed under British paramountcy as the independent princely state of Jammu &amp; Kashmir (Gnosh and Duschinski, 2017, p. 316). After the independence of the sub-continent from British rule and the development of the independent states of India and Pakistan, Kashmir maintained its independent sovereign status until both Pakistan and India went to war over the region (Gnosh and Duschinski, 2017, p. 316). Kashmir was subsequently divided up between Azad Jammu maintained by Pakistan, and Jammu &amp; Kashmir maintained by India, wherein the UN established a ceasefire and the LOC (Line-Of-Control) in May 1948 which divided the two regions which has largely, despite conflicts, been maintained since (Gnosh and Duschinski, 2017, p. 3126). Since the 1980s however, Kashmir has been in the grip of a protracted guerrilla war between Islamist “insurgents” and nationalist groups which wish to separate from the Indian dominated region, which has led to an increasing militarization of Jammu &amp; Kashmir by Indian military and security forces over the last few decades (Bose, 2007, p. 154–160; Gnosh and Duschinski, 2017; Mahmud and Rahman, 2006). There have been however successive UN Resolutions regarding Jammu &amp; Kashmir and the status of Kashmiri refugees on both sides of the LOC, the most widely cited being the Resolutions in 1948 and 1949 stating that all refugees have a right to return and have the right to exercise a decision on the future of Jammu &amp; Kashmir’s relationship to both Pakistan and India in a UN sponsored plebiscite (Mahmud and Rahman, 2006, p. 49–50). Mahmud and Rahman (2006) however, note how there has been a failure to institute a UN sponsored plebiscite to take place in Kashmir, stating that despite international agencies such as UNHRC, “known for taking care of the displaced the world over”, this does not take place in Kashmir.</p><p>Since the late 1980s and the start of the independent Kashmir movement, the emerging securitization of Jammu &amp; Kashmir, the subsequent violence and human rights abuses carried out by Indian security forces, alongside the swathes of de facto refugees who are “stateless” and cannot access Indian citizenship, this case study contends represents Kashmir as Fanons “colonial zone”, and exists on “the other side of the line” to the discourses and legal structures of citizenship and international rights-regimes (Fanon, 1963; Santos, 2014). Gnosh and Duschinski (2017), argue that India’s occupation of Kashmir is justified through a set of legal, social and spatial processes which follow the logics of colonialism and are entrenched within the constitution of the post-colonial Indian state. Their work focuses on the implementation of India’s PSA (Public Safety Act) 1978 which allows for the administration of the detention of individuals without charge, and how it has been deployed in Kashmir as a central legal and political weapon of India’s counter-insurgency, noting how the “lawless law” allows for the “revolving door” detention of many Kashmiris illegally without charges (Gnosh and Duschinski, 2017, pp. 320–321). The designation by Amnesty International (cited in Gnosh and Duschinski, 2017), of the PSA as a “lawless law” is that it is implemented through legal, illegal and non-legal applications of preventative detention, and acts as a modern reproduction of the exclusion of citizenship rights by the Indian state in Kashmir and exists as part of India’s “colonial constitutionalism”: the constitutionally sanctioned distinction between those that do and those that do not have rights.</p><p>Santos (2014, pp. 118–126), discusses how the epistemic, social, political and legal structures on “this side of the line”, can only exist by being constituted by the violence, coercion and power that exists invisibly on “the other side of the line”, much like the co-constitutive nature between coloniality and modernity (Mignolo, 2011, p. xv). Gnosh and Duschinski (2017, p. 321–322), note how the persistence of preventative detention and its continual deployment within Kashmiri, depriving Kashmiris of their access to rights granted through Indian citizenship (if accessible), exists as a “preventative detention system that runs parallel to the criminal justice system”. The operation of the denial of citizenship to thousands of “stateless” refugees in Jammu &amp; Kashmir, and the continual deployment of the “lawless law” and preventative detention upon Kashmiris, demonstrate another example in which the legal structures of rights-based citizenship, and the theoretical contributions of social policy on it, fail to account for “stateless” peoples and those who exist non-legally, politically and spatially, on the “other side of the line” of coloniality/modernity.</p><p>Palestine</p><p>In 1948, after decades of skirmishes across the region the British mandate withdrew from Palestine and Zionist forces who had been attempting to settle the land since the late 19th Century succeeded in defeating many of the Arab forces and after a UN armistice was brokered, the state of Israel was founded on May 14th that year (Esman, 2009, p. 53; Said, 1992). According to UN estimates, as a result of the establishment of the state, over 700,000 Palestinians were driven out from their land and became refugees in neighbouring Arab countries, specifically Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan; some managed to gain access to citizenship within these states, although many remained “stateless” wishing to return to their homes (Esman, 2009, p. 53; Said, 1992, pp. 34–35; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016, p. 305). In 1967 (Bar-on, 1996, p. 64; Bose, 2007, p. 207), war broke out between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states leading to the subsequent occupation of the Gaza strip, until 2005, and the West Bank to today. Most Palestinians living in both Gaza and the West Bank today exist as “stateless” peoples (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016, p. 205). Said (1992, pp. 28–30), notes how the establishment of Israel as a state, while deploying the structures of European colonialism and the logic of coloniality, was constituted upon the denial of the existence, let alone the rights, of Palestinians. In 1970 UN General Assembly Resolution 2627c recognised “that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” (Said, 1992, p. 7). However, due to the denying of self-determination by Israel, and the inability for many Palestinians to maintain citizenship, they continue to exist as “stateless” peoples and refugees in numerous refugee camps surrounding Israel, and within the Palestinian territories themselves.</p><p>The occupied Palestinian territories, divided through security apparatuses and controlled militarily, and the status of “stateless” Palestinian refugees which reside within them, exist as a extant example of Fanons (1963) “Colonial Zone”, and the “other side of the line” (Santos, 2014). Santos points to the annexation walls within the West Bank as material examples of “the abyssal line” dividing space between the “civilized” zone of Israeli settlements, and the “colonial” zone of arbitrary detention, arrests and violence within the territories (Santos, 2014, pp. 118–126). Bar-On (1996), discusses the difficulties of maintaining social-security programmes for Palestinians within the occupied territories, and how although Palestinians that work in Israel are covered by few employment welfare-schemes, do not enjoy access to any rights regimes as they are not citizens of Israel. Palestinians having to cross over the “abyssal line”, not just epistemologically, but materially through the security apparatuses Israel has constructed throughout the occupied territories, in order to gain access to employment within Israel without the same rights as Israeli employees, represents an extant example of the dividing line between Fanons (1962) Settler town and colonial zone, for Palestinians.</p><p>Despite the “stateless”, precarious, and more often than not, violent existence Palestinians live in within the occupied territories, they are excluded from many of the Refugee Conventions and UNHRC campaigns against “statelessness” due to the fact a Palestinian state has been recognised by the UN General Assembly, and as noted previously, the solution to “statelessness” argued by subsequent UN conventions, is for the “stateless” to be provided nationality (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016, pp. 305–306). The UNHCR therefore, argues that “the entire role of the United Nations is to help ensure that these people no longer be “stateless” and become nationals of a Palestinian state” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016, p. 306). Despite the de facto “stateless” existence of Palestinian refugees, the legal apparatuses of the Universalist, cosmopolitan legal structures of rights, bound to the inter-state logics of citizenship, instead of providing rights and protections for those who have lost them through the establishment of the state of Israel and its subsequent occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the structures themselves involve the excluding of Palestinians and the perpetuation of their existence on the “other side” of the abyssal line with the requirement of rights based upon national-citizenship (Bhambra, 2015, p. 106; Belton, 2011, pp. 68–69; Santos, 2014).</p><p>Comparative Analysis</p><p>This case study has attempted to provide present examples of the co-constitutive nature of coloniality/modernity within social policy and citizenship, within their wider contexts of Universalist, cosmopolitan legal structures and state/international policies. As Mayblin (2014, p 437) notes, the colonial origins and the exclusion of “others” outside of the protecting structures of the UDHR has not just been ignored by scholars, but was also an intentional act by colonial states. In order to understand the status of Tibetans in India, Kashmiris in Jammu &amp; Kashmir and Palestinians within the occupied territories of Palestine, the conditions that created the concept of modern citizenship, those based upon Western epistemological and cosmopolitan legal structures of exclusion, must be examined alongside the question of how citizens are “made” conceptually and legally speaking (Taylor, 2013, p. 398). Taking this into account, this case study contends that the only way to understand the displacement of Palestinians is to recognise the colonial structures of the Israeli occupation and its constitution by European logics of colonialism as outlined by Said (1992, pp. 28–30) and the continuation of “statelessness” is also partly a consequence of rights based upon national-citizenship (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016, pp. 305–307. To understand the “stateless” positioning of Tibetans is to understand the colonial and violent formation of the inter-state system upon which the “right to have rights” is constituted by, and how and why the “gap” between states where the “stateless reside”, can exist (Deckard and Heslin, 2016; McConnell, 2013). To understand the “stateless” positioning of Kashmiris and their violent coercion by a criminal justice system both existing on “the other side of the line” (Santos, 2014), is to recognise the context of coloniality/modernity in which the post-colonial Indian constitution was formed and the subsequent deployment of “lawless” legal structures upon Kashmir (Gnosh and Duschinski, 2016).</p><p>Debates within the discipline of social policy have been critiqued heavily from the de-colonial perspective for side-lining the history of the formation of the nation-state and of citizenship, of rights-based-regimes and of the inclusive/exclusive dichotomy of these structures, while also maintaining Euro-centric analyses which marginalise those that exist on “the other side” of the abyssal line (Bhambra, 2015; Mayblin, 2014; Taylor, 2013). In an attempt to re-conceptualise citizenship through the de-colonial lens, Rogers and Smith (2015, p. 67), discuss the attempt to “decolonize citizenship” by invoking the work of Maldonado-Torres, who argues that ontologically, we must view each-other as equal beings, not as existing in hierarchical relations of dominance. Continuing on this, Rogers and Smith (2015, P. 67), discuss invoking the idea of citizenship as a shared fate and shared belonging, rather than a legal reciprocal relationship to the nation-state. Recognising that our interdependence with each-other requires the acceptance of our obligation to maintain the rights of other citizens regardless of nationality or state-based identities (Rogers and Smith, 2015, p. 67).</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>In conclusion, it should again be emphasised the central project of this case study, that is to make the argument that “statelessness” is to citizenship what coloniality is to modernity, its darker, invisible, co-constitutive side. As discussed by the Likes of Bhambra (2015), Rogers and Smith (2015), and Taylor (2013), social policy theorisations and analyses concerning citizenship and rights require drastic overhaul, as do the institutions and legal structures which maintain the material consequences of rights based upon access to national-citizenship to a nation-state. Citizenship since its inception has not just been about inclusion, but has been maintained and constituted by exclusion. New theories and structures must be developed within social policy concerning the status of citizenship, the ability to have rights and what it means to be human in a globalised world, in order for the abyssal line, dividing who has and who does not have rights, to be dismantled. As Mignolo (2011, p. xxi), states “Inclusion is a one-way street and not a reciprocal right. In a world governed by the colonial matrix of power, he who includes and she who is welcomed to be included stand in codified power relations”.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e53c48367800" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
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            <title><![CDATA[Race, Coloniality & Higher Education: A comparative case study of higher education policy in the…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kieronturner95/race-coloniality-higher-education-a-comparative-case-study-of-higher-education-policy-in-the-20dcdf42db23?source=rss-a6001e812efc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/20dcdf42db23</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[racism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[decolonization]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kieron Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2019 14:53:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-17T14:53:54.886Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Race, Coloniality &amp; Higher Education: A comparative case study of higher education policy in the United Kingdom &amp; the United States</h3><p>Introduction</p><p>This case study shall compare and contrast higher education policies in the US and the UK within the wider structures of coloniality, drawing upon Mignolo (2011, p. 2), and the enduring existence of race within the neoliberal university. This case study will first discuss the current state of universities and higher education policy within the US and the UK and their continuing direction, moving on to explore the context in which these institutions and policies exist in; namely the structures of coloniality/modernity. This case study will then briefly explore policies which have defined modern HEI’s (Higher Education Institutes) within the US and the UK, to then provide a critical analysis of higher education social policy and its continuing ignorance of race and coloniality, before concluding by discussing the possibilities of “decolonising the university” (Bhambra et al, 2018) both materially and epistemically.</p><p>Higher Education &amp; Social Policy</p><p>Since the 1980s higher education in both the US and the UK have undergone rapid processes of change under the deployment of neoliberal structural policies, which have accelerated since the financial crises of 2008 (Holmwood, 2018, p. 37). Neoliberalism, in terms of structural and policy shifts in higher education, denote the promotion of competition, free markets, and the outsourcing of university apparatuses to private resources as opposed to government intervention, in an attempt to implement “market-logics” inside the workings of public and private universities (Lang and Hamer, 2015, p. 902). Universities are similar in both national contexts through the introduction of competition in terms of funding, students and academic prestige, institutions have been re-structured to be led by executives and/or chancellors, who’s main goal is the promotion of revenue and prestige through business planned structures (Marginson, 2018, p. 27). The lowering of public funding for higher education and the introduction of tuition fees in the UK in 1997 and their mass expansion in 2012 to £9000 after the Education Act 2011 are an example of this in the UK (Holmwood, 2018, p. 37; Marginson, 2018, p. 27). As well as being coupled with the US’s own public/private lenders system, successive policies have institutionalised marketization and neoliberal structuring within higher education in both countries which operate as businesses responding to “customers”, students (Holmwood, 2018, p. 37; Marginson, 2018, p. 27). The largest difference in policy structuring between the US and UK is that, despite some federal policy structuring, higher education is highly disaggregated by state, compared to the single centralised system that existed in the UK prior to Scottish devolution in 2000 and the reforms in 2011, but still largely maintains dominance within the British system (Holmwood, 2018, p. 37).</p><p>Despite the key difference between the federal and centralised policy structures, both higher education systems are grounded in a similar epistemic and pedagogic genealogy, namely institutional autonomy and academic freedom, and a Eurocentric canon that celebrates the university as a site for, what Kant termed, the “pursuit of knowledge”, as a public good (Bernal and Villalpando, 2002, pp. 38–39; Marginson, p. 27; Williams, 2016, pp. 619–621). Williams (2016), discusses the major shift of higher education policy structuring within the last few decades as the shift from the university as a “public good”, to a system that provides social and economic mobility to individuals in a consumer return based relationship. This marketised model Holmwood argues (2018, pp. 46–47), is based upon neoliberal principles of individual responsibility and meritocracy, which purports to be race-blind, as the university system is regulated by the market which is based solely upon efficacy and economic rationality. Both higher education models, similar in terms of domestic policy structures in regards to both marketization, neo-liberal restructuring and epistemic and pedagogic concepts of pursuing “truth” and “knowledge”, are also influenced by international OECD initiatives such as the AHELO (International Assessment of Higher Education Learning Outcomes) which seek to universalise and promote global education standards through development of global spaces of higher education comparisons and competition (Shahjahan, 2013; Williams, 2016). Higher education policy within both the US and the UK has expanded in recent decades to allow for all people to access higher learning, promoting both the pursuit of knowledge, and access to social mobility through qualifications, standardized by OECD frameworks such as the AHELO initiative. The implementation of market-logics and neoliberal restructuring, has increased the debt burden upon individual students, but has greatly expanded the number of people attending university in both national contexts (Holmwood, 2018, p. 37–47; Marginson, 2018, pp. 26–27).</p><p>Race, Coloniality &amp; Higher Education</p><p>In contrast to the narratives provided alongside higher education policy developments such as meritocracy, the pursuit of knowledge and providing greater access to HEI’s, the history and continuing existence of the university is built upon exclusion and was a key component of colonialism and the continuation of what Mignolo terms “coloniality” (2011, p. 2; Bhambra, 2018, p. 5). As Bhambra (2018, p. 5), states “It was in the university that colonial intellectuals developed theories of racism, popularised discourses that bolstered support for colonial endeavours and provided ethical and intellectual grounds for the dispossession, oppression and domination of colonised subjects”. The university was the site in which what Mignolo (2011, p. 111), terms the “modern/colonial matrix of knowledge”, that is, categories of thought and epistemic ways of knowing which were developed within colonial empires, and within their subsequent languages, which attacked and marginalised all knowledge that did not fit into its epistemic and ontological frameworks (Bhambra, 2018, p. 5). Similar to what Grosfoguel argues (2013, pp. 73–73), the knowledge that is foundational within the westernized university is based upon epistemic racism/sexism, and was constituted by four genocides underpinned by not only the material expansions of colonialism, but the epistemic expansion of Eurocentric ways of being in and knowing the world, the “modern/colonial matrix of knowledge” (Mignolo, p. 111). Higher education within the US and the UK was built upon these material and epistemic histories, with universities in the UK (the colonial metropolis) providing education to the would-be colonial administrators with knowledge of those colonised subjects they would rule over, such as the Orientalist discussed by Said (1978); universities in the US, which was colonised territory, were part of the very infrastructure of colonial land expansion and Empire, “an actor through which the totalising logic of domination could be extended” (Bhambra, 2018, p. 5; Tuck and Yang, 2013). The university, materially and epistemically, was built and financed by dispossession, enslavement, genocide, colonial plunder, and constructed as a site to develop and extend colonial knowledge outward, colonial knowledge built upon the subjectivities of a particular kind of social agent: white, male Christians residing within western Christendom (Bhambra, 2018, p. 5; Mignolo, 2011, p. 111). As Mignolo (2011, p. 111), notes, “the modern/colonial matrix of knowledge has been linked to a kind of subjectivity emerging from the lived experiences of white and Christian males”.</p><p>It is this subjectivity to which the university epistemically builds itself upon, and which is extended through the structures and pedagogy’s of the neoliberal university in both the US and the UK today. Due to this, the contention of the neoliberal university operating as a “race-blind” institution, falls squarely into Lentin’s concept of “post-race”, that is that “the dominant mode in which racism finds discursive expression today across a variety of contexts” exists through the vision that we live in a society that is now “post” the existence of racism and racializing structures, to which the modern neoliberal university has taken the mantle of upholding the “post-race” status (Ahemed, 2012, cited in Bagguley and Tate, 2017, p.298). It is through these lenses of post-race and the “modern/colonial matrix of knowledge”, in which the university and HEI’s and policy must be contextualised within; despite the contention that the university is a place of inclusion, universities in both the US and the UK continue to be defined by racialized exclusion in terms of student educational attainment (Mirza, 2018, p. 4; Wellman, 2017), admittance to higher universities (Mirza, 2018, p. 4; Libassi, 2018), and staff (Bernal and Villalpando, 2002). Universities and the recent neoliberal social policies have to be contextualised in their colonial histories, and neoliberal presents, as institutions of material and epistemic, racialized violence and exclusions (Bhambra, 2018; Hamer and Lang, 2015).</p><p>United States &amp; United Kingdom Comparative Analysis</p><p>As discussed previously, the defining policy difference between the US and the UK in terms of higher education policy, is the difference between the federal and centralised structures of the two policy systems, whereas University’s in the UK although legally defined as private are shaped by government policy, regulation and funding, whereas the US system is defined between the tension between public and private markets within higher education (Greer and Singer, 2016, p. 474–475; Marginson, 2018, p. 27). However the historical policy developments between both countries are more or less similar. The first major higher education policy development within the US was the Morill Act 1862 that provided federal endowment of land to establish state universities, although private Ivy League colleges and liberal arts colleges proceeded them (Holmwood, 2018, p. 39). For most states, this was the beginning of public HEI’s (Roumell, 2018, p. 6). From this period onwards numerous public universities were developed due to the implementation of “Land Grant” acts which stimulated numerous proposals and projects for HEI’s to be constructed (Berger et al, no date; Holmwood, 2018, p. 39). The “Second Morill Act” of 1890 further expanded the federal involvement of education by bringing federal funding into land grant university campuses, as well as extending university access to black students by requiring states that operated segregation to provide separate public HEI’s (Berger et al, no date; Holmwood, 2018, p. 40). Successive acts continued the expansion of public HEI’s in the US through the 19th and early 20th centuries (Roumell, 2018, pp. 6–10). Similarly, the UK during this period too throughout the 19th century began the mass expansion of “red brick” universities to educate emergent scientists and industrialists (and colonial administrators) through successive University Acts as well as implementing the Universities Tests Act 1871, removing the requirement of religious affiliation to attend universities (Gillard, 2018; Graham, 2008, pp. 13–14).</p><p>The next major higher education policy development was during the post-war period, wherein the US greatly expanded the amount of people attending university whereas the UK still maintained around 5% of young people attending University in the 1950s (Marginson, p. 27). With the Supreme Court decision of the Brown vs Board of Education in 1954 to desegregate schools, along with the implementation of civil rights legislation such as the 1965 Voting Rights Act and the 1965 Higher Education Act, university numbers greatly expanded and massively increased the number of BME (Black and ethnic minority) students attending HEI’s with much greater federal involvement in higher education such as the expansion of grants (Holmwood, 2018, p. 40; Roumell, 2018, pp. 10–12). Similarly, during this period in the UK, the Robbins Report 1963 commissioned the mass expansion of university education alongside the creation of more universities under local authority control as well as greater funding for students, which opened the door to “a postcolonial generation of Black and Asian British students from the former colonies” (Alexander and Arday, 2015, in Mirza, 2018, p. 5; Chitty, 2014, p. 201; Bell et al, 2009, pp. 4–6). The implementation of these two major policy implementations, the Robbins Report 1963 and the Higher Education Act 1965, ( Williams p. 625–628)</p><p>The beginning of the neoliberal restructuring of Universities in the 1980s reformed much of the central government involvement in universities and their internal structures in terms of student numbers and fees in both national contexts. The introduction of fees for overseas students in the UK with the Education Act 1988, and then the Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998 which introduced fees for all students followed a similar path of diminishing federal funding for US public universities and the increasing reliance of US universities on student fees in response to state cuts and the neoliberal outsourcing of public infrastructure to private stakeholders (Chitty, 2014, pp. 201–206; Bell et al, 2009, pp. 7–10; Greer and Singer, 2016, pp. 477–478). The continuing implementation of “market-logics” and neoliberal reforms has remained consistent throughout Higher Education Acts over the last few decades (Hamer and Lang, 2015; Holmwood, 2018). Higher education policy implementations such as the Higher Education Opportunity Act 2008 Reauthorization of the 1965 Act in the US, which has expanded state grant programmes for HEI’s and initiatives to reduce the overall cost burden of college education, mask the continuing implementation of neoliberal logics which reinforce consumer-based identities within higher education and rising student debt (Hamer and Land, 2015, p. 902; Roumell, 2018, p. 18) Similarly in the UK, the Education Act 2011 placing a “cap” on tuition fees at £9000, has seen student debt drastically rise with the original concept of a fee-based market being side-lined, alongside the removal of the cap on student numbers which universities could take in 2015, has led to a shuffling of as many fee-paying students in to HEI’s as possible along these same neoliberal, profit-based incentives (Chitty, 2014, pp. 216–219; Holmwood, 2018, pp. 44–47; Roumell, 2018, p. 18). These successive policies have “refashioned [higher education] into a marketized good rather than a public right”, and have subsequently created a “buyers’ market” within the university system, intent on developing a competitive base market in both national contexts (Hamer and Land, 2015; Holmwood, 2018; Pells, 2017).</p><p>As previously discussed, these domestic neoliberal reforms exist within an international context of neoliberal competitiveness between national contexts based upon OECD initiatives (Shahjahan, 2013). According to the AHELO, the initiative has over the last decade attempted to develop “internationally comparative measures of higher education learning outcomes”, based on four areas of measurement focused upon student and university performance including generic skill assessments and “value added measurements” (Shahjahan, 2013, pp. 676–678). The AHELO is an attempt to develop an international standard of neoliberal higher education measurements and competition tied into the global capitalist labour market, based upon the same material and epistemic structures on which both US and UK HEI’s have been developed upon historically and presently (Shahjahan, 2013, pp. 676–678). Both the US and the UK higher education models of universities have shifted dramatically over the past few decades, from the “public good” described by Williams drawing upon Kant (2016, pp. 619–621), to a market-based system operating on neoliberal principles of individual responsibility, and competition (Holmwood, 2018, p. 47). Government policy since the 1980s has successively redefined the “Public good” of higher education away from the “pursuit of knowledge”, towards social and economic outcomes and the public/private benefits of individual economic gain (Williams, 2016, p. 622). The commitment to widening participation in higher education of people from disadvantage social groups whether they be from a lower social-class or a BME backround, Williams contends (2016, p. 622), is presented in government discourse in the UK as a “means of increasing access to the private benefits of HE (Higher Education) reaped by graduates which take the form of a higher earnings and increased job security”. As discussed, this framework can be applied to the US model also, of increased material benefits of individuals through a cost-benefit analysis framework, rather than notions of the “public good” or “pursuit of knowledge”.</p><p>Critical Analysis:</p><p>Returning to Bhambra (2018, pp. 5–6), despite the material fall of “formal empires”, the structures, logics and pedagogy’s of western universities still remain principally governed “by the west for the west”, reproducing the subjectivities of the “pale, male (and often stale)”, which maintain and justify racist/sexist colonial hierarchies of knowledge (Grosfoguel, 2013, pp. 73–75; Mignolo, 2011, p. 111). When the historical timeline of higher education policy implementations are examined through these post-colonial/decolonial lenses, it is then that these alternative (hidden) realities behind the policy developments arise to be scrutinised. As discussed previously, drawing from Mignolo (2011, pp. 16–19), the violent racialized/colonial histories that constitute the university and continue to reproduce its own internal material and epistemic hierarchies exist as the darker side of the modernizing projects of higher education social policy. Or in other words, the violent racialized/colonial realities of universities constitute the coloniality/modernity split between the ideal of the progressive, autonomous, democratic, modern university which serves a public good in the critical pursuit of objective knowledge as outlined by Williams (2016), and its darker, constitutive side maintained by the colonial matrix of power (Mignolo, 2011, pp. 16–19, p. 111).</p><p>Returning to critically examine the policy discussions around the 1962 Morill Act, its extension in 1890 and the successive “Land Grant Acts” from 1862 to the early 20th century, the mask the colonial nature that was constitutive of their design. As Holmwood notes (2018, pp. 39–40), “the very term, “land grant” indicates that they were part of a settler-colonial project involving the extension of the US border to the wet and building up local infrastructure to exploit lands from which native Americans had been dispossessed”. The very founding of the university in the US was built upon not only the de facto racialized exclusion of African-Americans both in the south and the north, but the violent, genocidal, dispossession of Native Americans and theft of their land (Holmwood, 2018, pp. 39–40). Infact the praised Morill Act Extension of 1890 was dependent upon the “Jim Crow”, racist segregation of African-Americans from entering HEI’s designed with intent, for white students (Holmwood, 2018, p. 40). It is here that Tuck and Yang’s (2012), demand to recognise that “decolonization is not a metaphor”, that decolonisation must be understood as the material act of repatriating land back to the indigenous peoples from who it was stolen, must be foundational to any movement in the US which attempts to dismantle the inherent structures of racialized and colonial exclusions on which the US university system is built. Similarly in the UK as mentioned previously, the mass expansion of the university system beyond the formerly religious institutions of Oxford and Cambridge, were not only financed by the wealth that had been extracted from institutions such as the Trans-Atlantic slave trade and capitalist-colonial extraction projects globally (Bhambra, 2018, p. 5). But universities became the principle site of empire, justifying the global political and economic hierarchies through philosophical, ethical and scientific endeavours by applying the subjectivities of the dominant model of the “human” that is, the white, heteronormative, male, rational, Eurocentric subject (Bhambra, 2018, p. 5; Mignolo, 2011, p. 111). Infact, Williams (2016), drawing upon rationalist enlightenment philosophers such as Kant and Mill to designate the university as a preferred site of the “public good” in its relation to the objective “pursuit of knowledge”, continues this genealogical lineage to the colonial matric of knowledge (Mignolo, 2011, p. 111). As discussed by Williams (2016, p. 620), the foundational concept of the university as a site for the “pursuit of knowledge” described by Kant, and the university as a key aspect of (European) national governments that would improve societies by developing a sense of critical and pure reason, is grounded within universalist, colonial epistemologies. As Dussel states (1995, cited in Baker, 2012, p. 4), “Modern (European) civilization understands itself as the most developed, the superior, civilization; This sense of superiority obliges it, in the form of a categorical imperative, as it were, to “develop” … the more primitive, barbarous, underdeveloped civilizations”; the modern/colonial university’s role, as conceived by Kant, is constituted by these ideals.</p><p>Moving on to the post-war shifts in education policy, despite the contention that the 1963 Robbins Report “opened the door to a post-colonial generation of Black and Asian British students from the former colonies”, these policy implementations were operating at a time of increasing racist national movements in the UK and emerging debates around “coloured” immigration, as well as the beginning of successive restrictive British Citizenship Acts, such as the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962, restricting accesses to non-white British citizens in the colonies, while retaining an “ancestral” claim for descendants of white settlers in the colonies (Holmwood, 2018, p. 42). Infact, Holmwood (2018, p. 42), argues that it is possible, due to the context, that the Robbins reforms were in part, a part of the “race-blind” project of modernisation discussed by Lentin (2012), which attempted to mask the racialized exclusions of the British state while claiming to promote wider accessibility to universities. Infact, Holmwood (2018, p. 42), makes us take note, that despite the discussion of problems of access to higher education in the Robbins report, there is no discussion of ethnic minority disadvantage and no mention of race. Furthermore, despite the civil rights legislation throughout the 1960s and the implementation of the 1965 Higher Education Act, similar to the UK, the US education system is highly segregated in terms of who is accessing what universities, with the private, high-charging private “Ivy League Universities” maintaining and overrepresented white-student cohort, with the lower fee public universities maintain and overrepresentation of BME students, especially African Americans (Holmwood, 2018, p. 45; Libassi, 2018; Wellman, 2017). Infact, as mentioned previously, the same is true for BME students in the UK, with BME students under represented at Russel group universities and in areas of high BME populations, with white students overrepresented at Russel Group universities (BBC, 2018; Bloch et al, 2013, p. 160; Johnson and Williams, 2010, p. 18).</p><p>It is not only in terms of student numbers that divides the university upon racialized/colonial grounds of exclusion either, the existence of interpersonal and institutional academia at a social, political and material level, are reproduced by the Eurocentric and whiteness of the epistemic canon and pedagogy’s on which HEI’s are built (Bernal and Villalpando, 2002; Richardson, 2018, p. 237). What Bernal and Villalpando (2002, pp. 80–81), define as an “apartheid of knowledge”, “Higher education in the United States is founded on a Eurocentric epistemological perspective based on white privilege and “American Democratic” ideals of meritocracy, objectivity and individuality”. Far from the “race-blind” character presented as the neoliberal university, as Holmwood notes (2018, p. 47), “but insofar as racialized difference and inequality is a product of social structures and disadvantage those structures will be reproduced in any arrangements that make change a matter of personal responsibility”. Richardson (2018, p. 232), invites us to contend with these epistemic realities of racialized and colonial exclusions upon which the university knowledge systems are constituted by, while also considering how marginalised communities and decolonial scholars need “not only to intervene in epistemic debates but also intervene politically in the physical spaces in which these debates often take place”.</p><p>Concluding this section on the interconnections of global higher education social policy, Shahjahan (2016, pp. 105–106) draws upon both Mignolo and Fanon to argue that the neoliberal AHELO international policy initiatives reproduce the modern/colonial structures and knowledge’s that have been discussed at the national levels of higher education policy development in recent decades. Projects of international higher education competition which intent to assess and measure different countries upon the same universalist frameworks built upon Eurocentric knowledge’s and spaces of racialized exclusion (the university), will only ever reproduce the same historically epistemically privileged positions, that is, the subjectivities of the white, male, rational European subject (Mignolo, 2011, p. 111).</p><p>It is clear that as a product of Eurocentric colonial/modernity, higher education policy, and the structuring of HEI’s today under the guise of “race-blind” market frameworks. Merely attempt to legitimise and obscure the inherent structures of violence, death, and oppression that go hand in hand with the “civilized/civilizational complex from the fifteenth century to the present” (Baker, 2012, p. 5). To overcome this, a project of decolonising higher education social policy, as well as the university must be performed, one that promotes a pluriversal education that “is an alternative to the current Eurocentric educational system of assimilation/marginalization in a monoculture project disguised as universal that has reached its limits and is breaking down” (Baker, 2012, p. 16).</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>In conclusion, it is clear that not only does social policy as a discipline require a reorientation of its own epistemological and ontological considerations regarding the interrelationships between race, coloniality and higher education policy, the university itself requires drastic overhaul if the racial disparities in terms of access, attainment and pedagogy are to be overcome (Bhambra et al, 2018). Bhopal (2018), provides us with an initiative that can attempt to provide a more inclusive university including reforms such as more diversity at the top, unconscious bias training, better accountability and most importantly, the acknowledgement of racism. Dennis (2018, pp. 196–198), provides us with a potential outline for decolonising the university by developing a “pedagogy on multiplicity” drawing upon Santos (2014, cited in Dennis, 2018, pp. 200–202), concept of an “ecology of knowledges”. However, for those wishing to implement epistemic and structural “decolonising” of higher education, Tuck and Yangs claim that “decolonization is not a metaphor” must always be present, especially for those operating within HEI’s in the United States developed explicitly upon settler-colonial projects. De-racialising and decolonising the university will require overcoming “settler moves to innocence” (Tuck and Yang, 2014, p. 1). This must be done by confronting the reality of the university, and acknowledging the histories, the violence and the sexist/racialized exclusions on which the modern university is constituted on and continues to be constituted by, and engaging with a wider plurality of knowledge’s and pedagogy’s that exist rather than the monocentric, universal Eurocentric models of education and learning (Baker, 2012, p. 16). As Emejulu notes (2017, cited in Mirza, 2018, p. 4), “To speak of universities is to recognise them as spaces of exclusion and discrimination which hide their epistemic violence behind a rhetoric of meritocracy, collegiality and the “free exchange of ideas”.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=20dcdf42db23" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Provincial Knowledge . Universal Power: The Hegemony of Occidental Knowledge]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kieronturner95/provincial-knowledge-universal-power-the-hegemony-of-occidental-knowledge-94b4d56e09f9?source=rss-a6001e812efc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/94b4d56e09f9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[occident]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sociology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kieron Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jan 2019 13:13:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-23T13:13:05.277Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Provincial Knowledge . Universal Power: The Hegemony of Occidental Knowledge</h3><p><strong>The invention of the Occident</strong></p><p>In everyday discourses terms such as the “West”, the “developed world”, the “first world”, and the “East”, the “underdeveloped world”, and the “third world” are used to identify geographic parts of the world and often classify them along hierarchical lines of “development” (Coronil, 1996, p. 52). Coronil (1996, p. 52), states that it is not always clear what these terms specifically refer to, it is clear however they are used to correspond to distinct external realities. However, these terms are not merely just useful categories deployed in order to identify existing geographical entities, but are historically, politically, epistemically, ontologically and conceptually underpinned by what Amin (cited in Coronil, 1996, p. 57), refers to as the “specifically modern phenomenon” of Eurocentrism. In this context, the term “discourses” refers to a particular way of representing reality, a collection of statements, ways of speaking which produce knowledge and create what Foucault refers to as a “discursive formation” (Hall, 1992, p. 291). Foucault contended that truth did not exist outside of power, that truth is a production of power, and that this power is produced by discourses, ways of talking, thinking, representing or producing knowledge on particular topics, and these would in-turn produce a “regime-of-truth” (Hall, 1992, p. 295). Hall (1992), refers to the ways in which the “West” is discussed as a discourse, and that the “West” or the “Occident” is a discursive and conceptual, not geographical, construct of modernity that exists as a regime-of-truth.</p><p>The invention of the Occident is contingent upon the philosophical claim to a “European intellectual tradition” stretching back to Greco-Roman antiquity, to which Chakrabarty (2007, p. 5), contends is “a fabrication of relatively recent European history”. Amin (cited in Charkrabarty, 2007, p. 5), notes on and criticises the Eurocentric assumption that the existence of the “West” can be traced back to an unbroken historical intellectual tradition. In-fact, Amin (2012, p. 66.) points out how the term “Renaissance”, meaning re-birth, is dependent upon the claim to an existing “European intellectual tradition” in Greco-Roman antiquity being “re-discovered” in Europe, and that this is not only a mythical view of Antiquity but also the basis of the invention of Eurocentrism. Amin (2012, p. 66.), contends that the Renaissance, the European precursor to the advent of “modernity”, the “1492 event”, is in-fact a break with Europe’s own history, rather than an extension of its tradition (Wynter, 1993, p. 5). The construction of the “Occident” as a geographical entity was not just dependent upon the entrenchment of an epistemological canon however, but an ontological one too. In order to construct the “West”, Europe had to be constructed as a bounded geographic entity separate from the “rest” (Hall, 1992). This was dependent upon creating objects which existed oppositionally to Europe (Amin, 2012, p. 103). The beginnings of objects of opposition were first developed from the view of the world across the Mediterranean, that is the construct of the “Orient”; both of which, Occident and Orient, are not facts of geography, but are man-made conceptual creations (Amin, 2012, p. 103; Said, 1978, p. 4–5). Said (1978, p. 5) argues that the Orient was created alongside the construction of the Occident, claiming “The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each other”. This construction however, was dependent upon conceptually annexing Europe’s historical origin, claimed to be Greece, to the “West”, despite its own historical contingency and relationship to the Mediterranean and the “Orient” (Amin, 2012, p. 250). Amin (2012, p. 250), argues that this move is itself tautological however, due to the fact that the birthplace of much of Greek civilization, from language, religion to philosophy, was dependent upon its links to the “Orient”, an object which Greece had now been geographically, historically and intellectually broken from by Renaissance thinkers, writers and artists.</p><p>Similar to this epistemic and ontological annexation developed within the Renaissance, the creation of the Occident was also contingent upon the conquest of Al-Andalus (Muslim Spain), by the Spanish monarchy in the 15th century and its subsequent “Europeanization” (Grosfoguel, 2013, p. 78). Both the forced expulsion of Jews and Muslims and the forced conversion of those that remained, can be considered both a prototype of modern settler-colonialism based upon material genocide, as well as cultural and epistemological genocide of spirituality and knowledge (Grosfoguel, 2013, p. 78). This method of settler-colonialism was then exported over to the Americas where the colonization of land, resources and peoples allowed for the conceptual-geographical crystallization of the Occident as an existing phenomenon (Hall, 1992; Quijano and Wallerstein, 1992). The “discovery” of the Americas by Columbus and its subsequent European colonization shifted the conceptual mapping of the known world to shift the centre of the world from Jerusalem, to the Occident (Hall, 1992, p. 289). This too, was not an expression of geographic reality, but an ontological move which placed Europe not only at the centre of the known world, but at the top of it (Hall, 1992, p. 298). This is important to note because, Europe began to define itself not only in relation to the Islamic-Orient, but in relation to many “other” worlds profoundly different to itself, to which it sat upon an ontological hierarchy of its own creation thereby justifying its domination of the “other worlds” external to itself (Hall, 1992, p. 298).</p><p>These emerging colonial endeavours were underpinned not only by material domination and genocide, but also by a phenomena quite distinct to the emerging Occidental world-system, a cultural and epistemological genocide, to which Santos (2014, p. 92), refers to as “Epistemicide”, the murder of knowledge. As Quijano (2007, p. 170), notes, the extermination of entire complex socio-political entities from the Aztec to the Inca throughout the Americas maintained not only a demographic catastrophe, but a cultural and epistemological repression which turned “high cultures” into illiterate, peasant sub-cultures. The material and epistemic genocides committed by European powers throughout the 15th and 16th centuries further crystallized the boundedness of the Occident as a unit, and by extension the emerging concept of “man” as distinctly European (Kaiser and Thiele, 2017, p. 408). Both of these were dependent upon an emerging ontological classificatory schema which allowed Europeans to “re-birth” themselves through creating an opposition, similar to the invention of the Occident through its mirror of the Orient, by comparing themselves to the non-european “other” (Said, 1978; Wynter, 1993, p. 28). This first began as a Judaeo-Christian schema which defined the indigenous American populations as idolaters, those who worshipped idols, to which Columbus contended were people without God and were therefore sub-human (Wynter, 1993, pp. 28–35). This ontological schema later evolved into a secular-scientific schema of classification for non-European “Others”, the biological concept of “race” (Wynter, 1993, pp. 28–35). The developing conception of the Occident and the “human”, dependent on the European man, solidified in the 17th century with the development of the European paradigm of rational knowledge and the presupposition of Descartes subject-object relation (Quijano, 2007, p. 172). The Cartesian “I think therefore I am”, developed a relation to the world that presumed oneself a subject, a category that was self-justifying, and that this was mirrored by the external world which was defined as objects separate from the subject individual (Atkinson, 2011, pp. 118–123). This relation however, Grosfoguel (2013, p. 77) contends, was dependent upon 150 years of “I conquer therefore I am” and “I exterminate therefore I am”, which the subject-object relation was contingent upon. The individual subject, is the European man, the object is the world outside the world of the European Occident, and those that happened to reside within it (Quijano, 2007, pp. 172–174). The “I” of “I think therefore I am” exists as an imperial “I”, to which the subject is granted a monopoly over truth and reality, and by extension, a monopoly over the world and the people’s that reside within it (Grosfoguel, 2013, pp. 75–77; Santos, 2014, p. 63).</p><p>It is this form of knowledge and way of thinking to which Santos (2014, p. 119, p. 153), contends is a form of abyssal thinking; a mode of thinking which grants European rationality the monopoly over truth and reality, while discarding all other ways of knowing as a form of ignorance, or enacting their intentional destruction. Because of this, European rationality expresses itself as what Quijano (cited in Boatca and Treitler, 2016, p. 163) terms “coloniality of power”, and exists as a form of colonial knowledge unable to exist alongside other knowledge’s, therefore they must be dominated or exterminated (Grosfougeul, 2013). From the 15th to the 19th century, the emerging European-white-supremacist-capitalist-colonial-world-system dominated not only in terms of geo-political and economic power, but also in epistemic power. Grosfoguel (2013) cites four major Epistemicides which crystallized the hegemony of European knowledge globally: the extermination and conversion of Jews and Muslims in An-Andalus, as mentioned previously; the genocide of Native Americans; the enslavement and genocide of Africans; the systemic extermination of European women as witches. It is important to note here, that it was not only knowledge’s outside the boundaries of the recently invented “Occident” that were destroyed, but knowledge’s within the boundaries of “Europe” too faced Epistemicide. As Bordo (1987, p. 361) argues, the extermination of women claimed to be witches throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, rather than just an extension of a superstitious and religiously dominated society, was a philosophical murdering of female knowledge’s that coincided with the masculinization of European knowledge from the spread of Cartesian rationality to the development of Baconian empiricism and the “birth” of modern science.</p><p>The occident itself, as stated by Said (1978, p. 5–9), does not exist as an extant geographic entity, but has been conceptually invented in order to underpin Eurocentric domination of the world-system, not just materially, but epistemically. The European conception of “man” as the individual rational subject, too, is as Foucault states “the invention of a recent date” (Atkinson, 2011, p. 103; Cited in Wynter, 1993, p. 42). European knowledge, as is the existence of Europe as a bounded entity, is provincial, not universal, and is a recent invention of modernity (Amin, 2012; Chakrabarty, 2007). Yet, due to its violent relation to knowledge’s outside of its own, it has come to maintain universal power over the world-system it has created from 1492 onwards.</p><p><strong>Provincial Knowledge as Universal Power</strong></p><p>Unequal exchanges among cultures have always implied the death of knowledge of the subordinated culture (Santos, 2014, p. 92). However, the unique phenomenon of the hegemony of European knowledge’s globally was underpinned by European expansionism to which Epistemicide was one of the key conditions of genocide it enacted through its imperial and colonial dominations globally (Santos, 2014, p. 92). These Epistemicides post-sixteenth century, and the maintaining of the epistemological domination of Europe globally, were dependent on the invention of the European-man, and the subject-object relation of Cartesian rationality, as Quijano (2007, p. 174) states “the European paradigm of rational knowledge, was not only elaborated in the context of, but as part of, the power structure that involved the European colonial domination over the rest of the world”. The subject-object paradigm of European subjectivities created a system whereby the existence of individual “subjects” could only exist within Europe, and those that existed outside of Europe could only exist in relation to Europe as either objects of knowledge and/or of domination practices (Quijano, 2007, p. 174).</p><p>This model of rationality, feminists such as Bordo (1986) contend, is not merely a European subjectivity, but a masculinized one, dependent on the extermination and subduing of pre-modern female knowledge’s that existed within Europe. Bordo in the “Masculinization of Thought” (1986, pp. 356–357), argues that before the epistemological break of Cartesian rationality the natural world was described with “organic cosmology” in which more feminine modes of meaning and understanding were deployed to create knowledge, with feminine traditions of birthing, healing and religious spirituality existing alongside the domination of Christian scholastic metaphysics. However, the invention of Cartesian objectivism, and what Bordo refers to as the mechanization of nature into an object of rational inquiry, ousted the subjective understandings between knowledge and nature, and developed a rational subject-object relation between the individual and the external world (Bordo, 1986, pp. 356–359). This ousting of feminine knowledge Bordo notes, coincided with the Epistemicide of feminine knowledge’s within Europe within what she terms the “gynophobic century” of 1550 to 1650 which saw an intensification of the persecution of women as witches (Bordo, 1986, pp. 361–362). Merchant in the “Death of Nature” (2006, p. 515), explores how during this gynophobic period modern science as an empirical endeavour emerged through the methodological inquiries of Francis Bacon who built his methodology upon the conceptual domination of the “female earth”. Merchant (2006, pp. 515–518), notes how Bacons empiricism is contextualised in a period of the material and epistemic subjugation of the female and the extension of male domination over femininity not only within society, but also intellectually with the use of the scientific method. As Francis Bacon himself noted, that the emergence of the domination of scientific and rational epistemology inaugurated “a truly masculine birth of time” (Bordo, 1986, p. 358). Due to this, it is fair to argue that the domination of the European subject-object relations in the universalization of Occidental knowledge’s, and by extension Quijano’s notion of the coloniality of power, is not only a colonial way of knowing, but a masculine way of knowing dependent on Europe’s own masculinization of dominant thought throughout the 16th and 17th centuries.</p><p>The subject-object relation of the European man to the rest of the world, including European women who do not fit the characteristics of the rational “subject” within modernity (Bordo, 1986), as it is a colonial relation to the world as quijano (2007) notes. Could more accurately be described as a relation between the “self” the European, and the “other” the non-european (Coronil, 1996, p. 56). Coronil (1996, p. 56–57), argues that the domination of European knowledge within the world-system should be understood as “Occidentalism”. An epistemological and ontological practice that participate in conceptions of the world dependent upon creating bounded geographical units (Occident/Orient); disaggregating diverse and relational histories; turning difference into hierarchy and naturalizing these representations of the world (Coronil, 1996, p. 56–57). It can be argued here, that Coronils concept of “Occidentalism” can too be discussed in the context of a regime-of-truth as mentioned previously; a way of talking, thinking about and producing knowledge on the rest of the world from the position of Occidental rational-colonial subjectivities (Hall, 1992, p. 295; Wynter, 1993, p. 20). Coronil (1996, p. 57), contends that this mode of thinking “Occidentalism”, is inseparable from Western hegemony “not only because as a form of knowledge it expresses western power, but because it establishes a specific bond between knowledge and power in the west”. The relationship between power and knowledge production here relates back to Wynter’s work previously referred to, and the development of racializing classificatory ontological schemas in which to codify non-european “others” (Wynter, 1993, 24–40). The racial hierarchy embedded into the white-supremacist-capitalist-colonial-world-system has been noted on by the likes of Quijano and Wallerstein (1992). It is not a coincidence that global resources are redistributed along a racializing line from Sub-Sarahan Africans to Europeans, as Boatca and Treiler (2016, p. 163), note “While local variations exist, there is a global racial system organized by forces that keep races … in a relatively stable <em>global racial hierarchy</em> that defines each racial category the freedom they will feel from economic deprivation”. However, this too is underpinned by an epistemological and ontological classificatory schema that represents another aspect of the universality of power Occidental knowledge’s have within the world-system.</p><p>West (1982), explores the way in which racism is embedded throughout modern western thought, by analysing the unique relationship between the Renaissance “re-birthing” of Hellenistic-Greek aesthetics and metaphors within literature, art, sculpting and also its effects on intellectual thought. West (1982, pp. 3000–303), argues that, as the development of European rational thought coincided with the emergence of Greek romanticism, the Cartesian “primacy of the subject and pre-eminence of representation”, identified the European subject as contingent upon Greek aesthetics as the ideal standard, and therefore it’s “objective” outward gaze upon the external world as per its subject-object relationality, constituted a “normative gaze” of white-supremacy. This West claims (1982, pp. 302–303), provided the acceptable authority for the idea of white supremacy, an acceptable authority that was “closely linked with the major authority on truth and knowledge in the modern world, the institution of science”. Because of this, West contends (1982, p. 302–303), the classificatory categories used within scientific taxonomies such as those of Natural History, based upon the observation of different identifiable characteristics, began from the premise of European white-supremacy as the subject to which all observed “others” would be standard to in its scientific ordering schemas. This “objective” rational classificatory ontology, used to observe and place others to a hierarchical standard developed by Occidental markers, is dependent upon the romanticising of Greco-Roman aesthetics and thinking within modern Europe, as Nietzsche (1979, p. 112), disapprovingly notes on the formulaic schema of modern-rationality “the great edifice of concepts displays the rigid regularity of a Roman columbarium and exhales in logic that strength and coolness which is characteristic of mathematics”. As noted previously however in the work of Wynter (1993, p. 34–35), this classificatory schema was already being developed before the emergence of Cartesian rationality through the symbolic representations used by the Christian-idolator classificatory schema used to delineate between human and non-human within the Americas and Africa. It could be argued that this conceptual edifice of racializing hierarchical classification was already presumed a-priori within European, before the domination of the Cartesian subject-object relation (Wynter, 1993, pp. 34–35).</p><p>The representation of the “other” through the universalization of Occidental knowledge’s extended on through the colonization of the 19th and early 20th centuries, most notably with the development of the subject of “Orientalism”, explored by Said (1978). Said (1978, pp. 6–7), claims that the subject of “orientalism”, much like “Occidentalism” discussed by Coronil (1996), or the “West and the rest” discussed by Hall (1992), exists as a discourse. A discursive practice that not only seeks to represent the experiences, culture and ways of living of those within the Orient, but that it also sought to reinforce the knowledge that Europe was itself a distinct entity that commanded a greater part of the earth’s surface and that the discourses of Orientalism gave European thinkers the “vocabulary, imagery, rhetoric and figures in which to say it” (Said, 1978, p. 41). As noted by Quijano previously (2007, pp. 172–174), the production of knowledge within modernity can only be constructed by the European subject, and those external are objects of knowledge to be studied and/or dominated. Orientalism is a unique form of this, as Said (1978, p. 300) notes, “we are reminded of the doubtless non-political fact that orientalists “are largely responsible for having given Middle Easterners themselves an accurate appreciation of their past” just in case we might forget that Orientalists know things by definition that Orientals cannot know on their own”. Europe’s epistemic Universal power over the world-system is mediated by these assumptions that people outside of Europe cannot possibly begin to understand the world outside of them, let alone themselves, therefore Europeans have to do it for them. The notion of “the white man’s burden” springs to mind (Chakrabarty, 2007). Fanon (1963, p. 24), notes on this to, and the way in which European psychiatry underpinned the view of the “under-developed” nature of the natives brain, which was claimed to explain the “criminal” and irrational nature of the native population of Algeria. Fanon notes on how European knowledge’s and disciplines underpinned the epistemological subordination of the colonized and that these knowledge’s and discipline aid in mediating the epistemic and ontological divide between the settler/native through colonial domination (pp. 20–24).</p><p>The epistemological underpinnings of these conceptions of “underdevelopment”, are dependent upon European conceptions of what Santo’s (2014, p. 173), refers to as “the monoculture of linear time”, the idea that history has a unique meaning and direction. Amin (2012, p. 251), criticises what he calls a “Eurocentric teleology” that arises a posterori after the emergent of modern capitalist development within Europe, which contends that no other society could have succeeded in reaching the stage of modernity by themselves. This line of thinking, Chakrabarty (2007, p. 8) claims, justified much of colonial thinking, citing John Stuart Mill who, despite arguing that self-rule was the highest form of government, argued that colonized peoples were not yet civilized enough to rule themselves and therefore colonial domination was a “civilizational” project. This, Chakrabarty contends (2007, p. 8), leaves the colonized to the “waiting room of history”, a room ironically invented by European thought to tautological justify its own domination over them. Hickle (2017, pp. 10–11, p. 21), notes how this “development delusion” is deeply engrained in modern European thinking concerning the global economy and development, and that it continues to be used in order to justify neo-colonial practices within the global economy.</p><p>Occidental knowledge is provincially contingent but maintains universal epistemic power over the world-system. The rational/colonial subjectivity and scientific models of classifications and “progress”, continue to underpin the epistemic as well as material domination over the rest of the world by tautologically self-justifying its own assumptions and subverting or dominating knowledge’s and peoples which attempt to subvert it’s coloniality of power. As Frantz Fanon (1963, p. 40), exclaims “The settler makes history and is conscious of making it … thus the history which he writes is not the history of the country which he plunders but the history of his own nation in regard to all that she skims off, all that she violates and starves”.</p><p><strong>Post-Occident knowledge?</strong></p><p>There have been attempts, through the intellectual traditions of feminism, post-modernism and de-colonialism, to challenge the epistemological dominance of modern science and western rational/colonial knowledge’s, alongside attempts to create counter-epistemologies that seek to emancipate those who have been dominated by the epistemic violence’s explored throughout this case study. Grosfoguel discusses the proposal of Dussel (cited in Grosfoguel, 2013, pp. 87–89), who cites “Transmodernity” as the project to fulfil the unfinished project of epistemological decolonization, outlining three proposals: the acknowledgement of the provincialism and epistemic racism/sexism that constitute the foundational epistemic structure of Eurocentrism; to break with epistemic universalism where “uni” defines for the rest of the globe; to create a pluri-verse of meanings and concepts to create epistemic diversity within the intellectual canon. Grosfoguel, (2013, pp. 87–89), similar to Wynters call for a “move beyond reason” (1993, p. 40–41) asks “what does it mean to go beyond Eurocentred modernity?” Wynter (1995, p. 40–41), explores this same question, citing Columbus’s own intellectual challenge to Christian Humanism, which bore the first development of Eurocentric thinking, asking for another such conceptual move beyond our realm of subjective understandings.</p><p>Quijano discusses the de-colonization of Occidental knowledge as an “epistemological reconstitution”; demanding for the liberation of the production of knowledge, epistemological self-reflexivity, and communication from the pitfalls of European rationality/modernity. Santos (2014, p. 164), proposes a direct challenge to the hegemonic western model of rationality, to which he designates “subaltern cosmopolitan reason”, the reason that grounds the epistemologies of the global south and the colonized world. This subaltern cosmopolitan reason, Santos claims (2014, pp. 174–175), must be understood in the context of the epistemic plurality of other knowledge’s outside of Eurocentric knowledge which are pronounced as either ignorant of pronounced non-existent, that he terms the “ecology of knowledge’s”. The ecology of knowledge’s, Santos asserts (2014, p. 190), does not entail accepting epistemic relativism, but accepting a plural relation between rational/scientific knowledge and other types of knowledge; rejecting a hierarchy among knowledge’s in favour of granting epistemic “equality of opportunity” to different kinds of knowledge involved in “even broader epistemological arguments”.</p><p>A “move beyond reason” as Wynter (1993) contends, will not only require the freedom of peoples to choose between various cultural orientations, ways of knowing and ways of orientating themselves to the rest of the world, but will also require the processes of social liberation from all forms of power and domination of inequality and exploitation, materially and epistemically (Quijano, 2007, p. 178). This requires Quijanos (2007, p. 178) call for the “liberation of intercultural relations from the prison of coloniality”.</p><p>Provincial Occidental knowledge’s continue to maintain universal epistemic power over all other forms of knowledge. The project of western modernity has been constituted, and maintained by, the systemic epistemicide of alternative ways of knowing. It is clear that the possibilities of epistemic emancipation, whether it take the form of Wynters (1993) “move beyond reason”, or Santos’s (2014, p. 139, p. 164) “subaltern cosmopolitan reason”, are achievable and it is crucial that we adopt Santos’s call for a shift from “knowledge-as-regulation”, the state of ignorance and chaos of colonialism and coloniality, to the practice of “knowledge-as-emancipation” to which he refers to as “solidarity”. Solidarity exists as a form of knowledge recognising the “other” as an equal and to produce a way of knowing that seeks social as well as epistemic emancipation (2014, p. 156). It is time to recognise Santos’s call to arms that “there is not global social justice, without global cognitive justice” (Atkinson, 2015, p. 150; 2014, p. 207).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=94b4d56e09f9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Global Inequalities and the Modern-World System]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kieronturner95/global-inequalities-and-the-modern-world-system-8fc98639a444?source=rss-a6001e812efc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8fc98639a444</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kieron Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Jan 2019 17:27:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-07T19:44:02.046Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“To cheers, applause and probably a tinge of relief, the 17 global goals that will provide the blueprint for the worlds development over the next 15 years were ratified by UN member states in New York on Friday” (Jones and Kweifio-Okai, 2015). This was the reaction to the setting out of the new fifteen-year long plan for global development and poverty reduction schemes ratified by the UN General Assembly after the success of the MDG’s (Millennium Development Goals), heralded as “the most successful anti-poverty movement in history” (Hickle, 2016b). This is underpinned by two claims: that since 1990 global poverty has been cut in half, and global hunger has been cut nearly in half (Beltekian and Ortiz-Ospina, 2018; Hickle, 2016b). At the time leaders from across the “developed world” from Prime Minister of the UK David Cameron to President of the United States Barack Obama spoke proudly of the efforts of their countries in contributing to this radical reduction in global hunger and poverty by providing “stability and security” to poor countries through development initiatives funded by foreign aid (Hickle, 2016a).</p><p>The other side of this “good news narrative” of global development has also been laid at the feet of the introduction of poor countries into the global capitalist economy. Due to economic liberalization through SAR’s (Structural Adjustment Reforms) coordinated by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the WB (World Bank). The story goes that since the implementation of these economic reforms guided by “developed” countries throughout and post-1980’s, “developing” countries have managed to finally climb on to the “ladder” of modernization in which the worlds rich “developed” countries previously did in order to become “developed” (Chang, 2010, p. 62). It is claimed that the free-trading system of the global economy has been a defining contributing factor in this poverty reduction story (Chang, 2010, p. 62). A recent study published by Oxfam however, notes how the richest global 1% cumulatively owns more wealth than the poorest 50% of the planet, 3.5 billion people (Neate, 2017). When further questioned about the nature of inequality between the richest 1% and the poorest 50%, or the divide between “developed” countries and “developing” countries, such as the “lack of development” of sub-saharan Africa, the response is that these are “natural” divides due to the modernization of the world-system. Technical or geographic issues of climate, or ethnic and religious conflicts are cited to lie behind Africa’s or South-East Asia’s underdevelopment (Chang, 2010, p. 62; Hickle, 2017b, p. 3). Economists routinely point out poorer countries problems of corruption, state-ownership, and an inability to democratize or liberalize their economies unlike rich developed western states did, as the reasoning behind the divide between “developed” and “underdeveloped” countries (Chang, 2010, p. 62; Hickle, 2017b, pp. 3–18).</p><p>These are the discourses that maintain contemporary discussions and much of the academic and international analyses on global inequality. They inform both policy, trade negotiations and international relations between countries. The discourses of the Sustainable development goals (developed countries aiding developing countries), are dispersed throughout our political (Hickle, 2016), economic (Beltekian and Ortiz-Ospina, 2018), media (Nelson, 2017), and even academic institutions (Canterbury Christ Church University, 2018), and frame the “Wests” social/cultural views of the rest of the world through this lens in order to view the rest of the world as “the developing world”. The idea that these countries are just lower down the ladder of modernization is as convincing as it is all encompassing (Chang, 2010, p. 62). However, not only is this not an honest representation of the nature of poverty, development and inequality globally today, this “good news narrative” as Hickle (2016b) refers to it, is dependent on ignoring a key element of the story of how global inequality came to be as it is today; its own history.</p><p>The modern dominant narrative espoused by international institutions such as the UN (United Nations) and the WB, in regards to this story of poverty, inequality and global development, only goes back as far as 1990, the baseline used by the Millennium Development Goals, or 1981 at earliest, when the World Bank published the first global poverty statistics (Hickle, 2017b, p. 65). These dates are not a coincidence, but have been cleverly constructed to promote the dominant neo-liberal narrative and mask the social, political, economic and historical circumstances which led global society to such an extreme divide between the “Global North” and the “Global South” (Hickle, 2017a).</p><p>Quijano and Wallerstein (1992, p. 549), claim that the modern world-system was “born in the long sixteenth century” as a result of the creation of “The Americas” by European colonial powers, specifically Portugal, Spain, France and England. The story of Global inequality this essay will be exploring however starts a little further back, at the end of the fifteenth-century in 1492, Columbus’ first voyage to the “New World” (Hall, 1992, p. 281). Due to a wealth of complex social, cultural, religious and geo-political factors going back to the emergence of “Islam” as a dominant religious, military and political society from the Middle-East to southern Spain, Europe sought to “break out” of its geographical boundedness of the European continent (Hall, 1992, pp. 280–281). Columbus set out in 1492 with a mandate from the Spanish Monarchy to find an alternative westerly route to the “treasures of the East” (Hall, 1992, p. 283). It is important to note in a discussion about the emergence of contemporary global inequalities that up to this point the order of global political, territorial and economic dominance was much more equal. In-fact, through much of the “Middle-Ages”, the arts of civilization had been more developed in China and the “Islamic World” than in Europe, with India and China dominating the major economic markets (Hall, 1992, p.281; Hickle, 2017b, p. 90; Thompson, 2012). Markets which Europe was keen to access but being prevented from doing so by the Ottoman Empire (Hall, 1992, p. 289).</p><p>Returning to Columbus, after landing he was quick to recognise the ability of Europeans to be able to aggressively overcome the peaceful indigenous inhabitants of what is now Cuba, writing “With fifty men we could subjugate them all and make them do whatever we want” (Hickle, 2017b, p. 69). That’s essentially what occurred for sixty years, exploitation of the indigenous peoples and the environment, slavery of populations, and genocide across South and Latin America mainly by Portuguese and Spanish Conquistadors (Explorer/Soldiers). The campaign saw the eradication of entire complex, social-geo-political societies from the Aztecs in Mexico, the Inca’s in Peru, and the Mayans of mainly Central America, in modern Guatemala and Belize (Hickle, 2017b, pp. 69–72). The numbers vary extensively, but there is a general consensus that pre-1492 the region had a combined population from anywhere between 50 to 100 million (Hickle, 2017b, p. 72). By the mid-1600’s the continents population had dropped to around 3.5 million people, effectively 95% of the population of the continent had been wiped out in under two-centuries (Hickle, 2017b, p. 72). Throughout this bloody period other European powers began colonizing the “New World” of the Americas too, mainly the Dutch, French and English, drawn to the sheer wealth rushing into Europe from the exploitation of the region. To get a scale of the amount of wealth flowing into Europe from the mining of mainly mineral exports (Silver and Gold), between 1503 and 1660, 16-million kilograms of silver and 185,000 kilograms of gold was shipped to Europe, mostly gathered through the usage of slave labour (Hickle, 2017b, p. 71).</p><p>The usage of slave labour throughout this period was essential to the maintaining of the levels of ecological extraction European powers were undertaking in the Americas, yet it is also related to another fundamental feature of the modern-world-system which was being developed, the centrality of race (Boatca, 2017). Throughout the first-half of the fifteenth century the populations of the indigenous Americans were utilised as the main slave-labour force for Europe’s extractionist projects throughout the region. This was dependent upon the centrality of the newly forming system of racialization under the system of coloniality that started with Columbus’s original voyages. A system of ethnic-cultural-religious classification dependant on developing hierarchies of humanness through interaction with the “other”, and the “oppositional, yet mutually dependent, relationship between Europeaness and non-Europeaness” as Lentin frames it (2008, p. 493; Quijano, Wallerstein, 1992, pp. 550–551). Hall (1992, pp. 309–310), discusses the way in which the early colonizers tackled with the question of whether the native populations were “true men” made within God’s image, the truth of such a question having high importance as if they were “true men” with souls, they could not be enslaved. The debate raged heavily in the Catholic Church for most of the century, in 1551 it was concluded however, (after over half a century of genocide, slavery and exploitation of labour land and resources) that the indigenous populations were in-fact men, created in God’s image, and that it was the church’s job to educate them of the “true” faith (Hall, 1992, pp. 309–310). Although the debate did not majorly alter the treatment of the indigenous populations, they could no longer be exploited to such an extent and as such Europe’s labour force in the “New World” diminished. The answer however, had been utilised by the Portuguese since the mid-15th century, that was the buying and kidnapping of West and South Africans to be exported to the Americas as the primary work-force of the rapidly expanding European Empires, which the Catholic Church had less of a problem with defining as “un-human” (Hall, 1992, p. 3010; Hickle, 2017b, p. 73). Thus beginning the largest industrial scale of human trafficking in history, the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade that would not formally end until the mid-nineteenth century, all to the benefit of European colonial powers. The centrality of the system of racialized classification in the ability to commodify human beings under the emergent system of global-capitalist relations cannot be underestimated in understanding the development of the world-system today (Boatca, 2017; Boatca and Treitler, 2016). It is not a coincidence that the lines of global poverty are drawn up along the colour line, with white-Europeans at the top, and sub-saharan Africans at the bottom, as Boatca and Treitler (2016, p. 163) note “While local variations exist, there is a global racial system organized by forces that keep races … in a relatively stable <em>global racial hierarchy</em> that defines each racial category the freedom they will feel from economic deprivation”. Quijano and Wallerstein (1992), discuss how this process of colonization throughout the sixteenth century of the Americas, is key to understanding the development of the modern-world-system. “Americanity”, it is claimed, is key to the development of a system which placed Europe at the centre of the emerging dominant, colonial-white-supremacist-capitalist world-order, to which the rapidly expanding colonies (soon to, or already spreading to the Indian-Sub-Continent, East-Asia and the Pacific) were the “peripheral zones” (Quijano and Wallerstein, 1992, p. 549).</p><p>Hickle (2017b, pp. 72–74), notes how the “ecological windfall” — a transfusion of land, labour and resources — allowed the economies of European colonial powers to expand far-beyond their limits, with 25 to 30 million “ghost acres” of productive land used by Britain alone throughout the 16th to 18th centuries in the Americas (Hickle, 2017b, p. 74). This allowed Europe to catch up and even surpass in some cases, the former dominant markets of China and India by the end of the 18th century. Without these factors, it would not have been possible for Europe, especially the newly formed Britain, to shift their economic capacities toward industrialization (Hickle, 2017b, p. 74). To put it bluntly, as Andrews (2017) notes, “The Wests wealth is based on slavery”. Without the wealth extracted from the brutalization, exploitation and forced labour of indigenous Americans and then the industrial-scale trafficking of Africans to the Americas, Europe would not have become the dominant political, military and economic hegemon by the end of the eighteenth century (Andrews, 2017). It was around this same period too, that European dominance began emerging in East-Asia and the Pacific, with Britain already largely dominant over India through the East-India Trading Company; the emerging colonial-white-supremacist-capitalist world system was beginning to globalize and orientate all economies toward its own benefit (Hickle, 2017b; Boatca and Treitler, 2015, pp. 161–163; Atkins, 2015, pp. 144–145). The outcome of rule over these regions is explicit. In both China and India exclusively, as a result of mass land and agricultural reforms instituted under European colonial rule, such as mass privatization of land and an orientation toward grain exports to Europe, it is estimated that around 60 million people perished needlessly as a result of starvation (all this while grain exports were rising dramatically to feed European industrial workers) (Hickle, 2017b, pp. 87–92). Pre-colonialization, India and China cumulatively produced 62% of global GDP, by the time of decolonization in the mid-twentieth century, their share of shared global GDP dropped to 10%, while Europe’s tripled (Hickle, 2017b, pp. 90–93). It is estimated that in India alone, Britain stole up to the equivalent of $45 trillion through labour, resources, taxation and free good’s extraction (Hickle, 2018). Through two-centuries of colonization, the continent was effectively de-developed. The global dominance of European colonial powers had almost reached global supremacy, although there was one major landmass that had, surprisingly, been left largely untouched by the emerging world-system. Only five years after the outlawing of slavery by the last major “Western” colonial power to do so, the United States, European colonial powers met at the Berlin conference with designs to colonize the African continent, at this point only 10% of the continent was under the control of European powers (Hickle, 2017b, p. 95). The practices of domination, exploitation and genocide were again, key factors in the subduing of populations and the extraction of wealth, land, labour and resources throughout the continent. One of the most notorious being the rule of King Leopold II of Belgium, whose rule oversaw the murder and deaths of 10 million indigenous people where the Democratic Republic of Congo now exists (Hickle, 2017). From 1815 to 1914 European direct colonial dominion expanded from about 35% of the earth’s surface to about 85% of it (Said, 1978, p. 41).</p><p>By the time of the de-colonization movements in the after-math of the second-world war, the entire political/economic world-system had been orientated towards the benefit of European-colonial-white-supremacist-capitalist powers. Wallerstein (Atkins, 2015, pp. 144–145; Boatca and Treitler, 2015, p. 162), explains this as the peripheral modern-world-system, whereby the core countries at the heart of the world-system (European-powers and the United States), have developed a global division of labour that is constantly reproduced by the semi-peripheral and periphery countries (the colonized countries of the created Global South), in order to unequally exploit their natural resources and labour for their own benefit, making them unable to “develop”. After almost five-centuries of colonization, the entire global political and economic order had been orientated towards the colonial-white-supremacist-capitalist world system European-Imperial powers had established.</p><p>It is not only of sociological interest, but a duty of what Inglis (2014), designates a truly emancipatory and socially useful Sociology, to note the historical implications of this. Global poverty is not a natural phenomenon, it had been created. Global inequality is not natural, it had been created. “Un-development” is not natural, it had been created. As Boatca and Treitler note (2017, p. 161) “Colonization reorganized the colonized peoples cultures, economies, and political and social systems by marginalizing the indigenous, taking away their control of their land, extracting labour and other local resources, and creating and international division of labour designed to stimulate the industrialization and enrichment of the colonizer and force the decline of native industries. Together, these actions caused the colonies’ under-development”.</p><p>There was however, a period of hope. The destruction wrought upon the European continent by the first and the second world wars shattered many of the former colonial boundaries. Not only did the wars break the power of European-colonial states over colonized spaces. But the importation of colonized peoples from the West-Indies, Africa, India and East-Asia into the war for the means of labour reconstruction or direct military service, broke many of the white-supremacist myths that bounded European-Supremacy over most of the globe, and saw integration of the racialized and colonized into formally European and white spaces (Eddo-Lodge, 2018, pp. 9–22; Lentin, 2008; Santos, 2015). The British government even assured Indian soldiers that their country would be free from colonial rule if they aided in the war effort (Eddo-Lodge, 2018, p. 11). Due to these structural changes as a result of the wars, a wave of de-colonization movements took place across the historically created “Global South” from South-east Asia to Africa to Latin America (many countries there were still colonially dominated by the US during this period such as Cuba). Although still integrated into the colonial-white-supremacist-capitalist world-system, many chose different paths of development, opting for state-led developmentalist policies, and even electing Socialist leaders promoting democratization, strong-worker unions, social justice, wealth redistribution and high import tariffs in order to protect developing domestic economies (Hickle, 2007, pp. 110–114). The period saw “miracle” growth throughout the “Global South”, with more equitable income distribution, rising living standards and far fewer financial crises (Chang, 2010, p. 63). For the first time in centuries the unequal global divide had started to shrink. However, simultaneous to the loss of wealth being imported from the now independent colonies, while seeing their own wealth being expropriated and redistributed within their own countries which had begun enacting many similar policies following the new economic paradigm of “soft-capitalist” development and Keynesian economics, the upper echelons of Western political institutions decided this could no longer continue.</p><p>Almost immediately “Western states” oversaw the destabilization of countries, assassinations of democratically elected leaders, and the establishing of military dictatorships across the recently self-emancipated “Global South”. From Iran in 1953, to the assassination of Pan-Africanist Patrice Lumumba after only two-months of being in office in 1960, to the famous military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in Chile in 1973, the “post-colonial” “West” mainly led by the dominant political, economic and military hegemon the United States, made it their primary mission to dismantle any attempts at dismantling the world-system they had created (Hickle, 2017, pp. 104–144). As Hickle (2017, p. 124) notes, “Africa is stereotyped as a continent plagued by corrupt dictators, with the supposition being that Africans are perhaps too “primitive” to appreciate the virtues of western style democracy. But the truth is that ever since the end of colonialism, Africans have been actively prevented from establishing democracies”. Apply this quote to the entire colonized world, the picture becomes even clearer.</p><p>Despite these decade-long campaigns however, the “Global South” continued to emerge out of the poverty and “de-development” in which they were forced. That is until the institutions leading the drive of the emerging Neo-Liberal economic order in the “West”, the IMF and the WB (backed by the countries spearheading the re-orientation of “Global North” economies to accept the dominance of “Free-Markets”, namely the United Kingdom and the United States) devised a new way in which to enforce the colonial-white-supremacist-capitalist world-system on the “Global South” forever. This would be operated through the “third-world debt crises”. The debt crises was fuelled by the 1973 oil-crises, a response to the Yom-Kippur War, whereby an Arab-Coalition opposing Western support for Israeli aggression in the Middle-East imposed an oil embargo on the US and Western-Europe (Hickle, 2017b, p. 149). The results sent Western economies into shock, with bank loan repayments skyrocketing, many of the international loans as it happens had been handed out to “Global South” countries in order to invest in development projects; many loans had also been taken out by the same dictatorships the US had been supporting over the last two-decades (Hickle, 2017b, p. 151). The consequences of this lead to the “third-world debt crises”, whereby most countries were unable to pay off the debts, and many were thinking of defaulting on the loans, the example of Thomas Sankara comes to mind “Debt is a cleverly managed re-conquest of Africa” (Hickle, 2017b). However, sensing this, the IMF, WB and a few other “post-colonial” countries, mainly the US, offered to bail out the countries of the “Global South” with a catch, mass economic structural reform entitled SAR’s “Structural Adjustment Reforms”. Through the diplomatic, economic and military hegemony of those offering this “olive branch” encouragement, “Global South” countries reluctantly accepted. The results saw mass liberalization of “Global South” economies, privatization of public utilities and natural resources (more often than not by “Western” corporations), lowering of trade-tariffs, and introduction into the “Western” Neo-liberal economic order, later to be underpinned by the WTO (World Trade Organization) (Chang, 2010, pp. 62–73; Hickle, 2017, pp. 153–157). The IMF and the WB had effectively, in one fell swoop did want a hundred military coups could not, re-incorporated the formally colonised back into a neo-colonial world-system based on the exploitation of Wallerstein’s “periphery” countries, by the “core” countries (Boatca and Treiler, 2015, pp. 161–162).</p><p>Arriving back at the present, it is clear that the state of global inequalities today is not a natural phenomenon, but has been systematically constructed. As Quijano and Wallerstein noted in 1992, after most countries had been re-incorporated into the world-system throughout the 1980s “The Americas are preparing to begin the twenty-first century with virtually the same inequalities as those with which they began the nineteenth. With one difference however: they will not begin it separately or follow separate paths, but as part of a single world order”. It is appropriate to apply this standard to the other ironically entitled “post-colonial” countries of Western Europe, namely Britain, Spain, France, Portugal and Belgium. It is not only important to discuss the history in creating modern global inequalities however, but also how they are perpetuated by this historically contingent system and the modern discourses of global aid and development. The success of the Millennium Development Goals rely upon the myth of not only ignoring the past five-centuries, but also ignoring the present. As Hickle (2016b, p. 755) outlines, the UN’s claims about poverty and hunger are at best misleading, at worst intentionally inaccurate. Pointing out how if the absolute poverty standard is shifted from the current $1.90 a day line to an “ethical standard” of $5 a day, over 1 billion people have been added to the ranks of those in absolute poverty since 1981, if the standard is at $10 a day, it’s risen by 2 billion (Hickle, 2016b, p. 755). In-fact, the only areas that have seen mass poverty reduction since the MDG’s baseline year of 1990, is China, with 73% of the gains made against global hunger also coming from China, and 70% of those gains occurring in the 1990’s before the MGD’s even began in 2000 (Hickle, 2016b, p. 760). It’s worth noting here too, that China was one of the few places not incorporated into the global-economy through the SAR programmes. Even when we analyse the benevolence of foreign aid, the suggested main economic driver of “development” for “developing” countries set with conditions by the IMF and the WB (Boatca and Treiler, 2015, p. 161), the picture looks even bleaker. Studies have shown how for every $1 of aid the “Global North” sends to the “Global South”, $24 goes back the other way through unequal trade relations, capital flight, and interest repayments on the same loans forced upon countries as a result of the “third-world debt crises”, which, ironically, was produced due to geo-political actions of the “West” in the first place (Chomsky, 2016; Hickle, 2017a). The modern world-system is still the colonial-white-supremacist-capitalist system which impoverished the “Global South” for centuries. “Developing” countries cannot succeed, and global inequality cannot be reduced, because the system was built in order to produce and maintain inequality for the benefit of the “core” countries of the world-system. As Hickle (2017a), notes “poor countries don’t need charity. They need justice”.</p><p>Santos (2014, p. 106), discusses how the very epistemological underpinnings of the current world-order are based on this denying of history, by only looking towards the present, pointing to Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” as an example of this line of thought. Lentin (2008, p. 489), notes how Europe’s “silence about Race” is dependent on this forward looking episteme too, discussing how the “West” after the humanitarian catastrophe of the Nazi Shoah, has rewritten its racialized and colonial history. Basing itself upon an idea of itself that it is inherently non-racist or even anti-racist, despite the world-system it benefits from is based explicitly on racialized/colonial hierarchies it created (Hall, 1992; Boatca, 2017; Boatca and Treitler, 2015). Ultimately, the modern discourses around global inequality, aid and development, are a self-perpetuating myth and form what Foucault designated a “regime of truth”; a system of statements, language, and thought which produce knowledge about a subject, i.e global development, and are constructed as “true” by being organized and regulated by the contemporary power dynamics of the “general politics” of the time, currently that of the dominant Neo-Liberal paradigm (Hall, 1992, p. 295). Global inequality is not the result of modernization, but the systemic invention of it by a racist, patriarchal, imperial, colonial, political and economic world-system.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8fc98639a444" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lion King, Private-Property, and neo-colonialism in the 21st century]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kieronturner95/lion-king-private-property-and-neo-colonialism-in-the-21st-century-bab0dbfe0f45?source=rss-a6001e812efc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bab0dbfe0f45</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tpp]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kieron Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Dec 2018 18:21:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-20T18:21:04.468Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A recent article circulating social media today has highlighted what to some, who’s love of the Disney classic Lion King knows know bounds, may seem as a success story for those who indulge in the Disneyization of modern consumer-culture (On Disneyization see Bryman, 1995; 2004), and the shareholders who seek to gain a profit from the re-make of the cultural-classic being released next year. That is that after twenty-four years Disney has successfully won the case to Trademark the iconic phrase “Hakuna-Matata” loosely translating to “no worries” in American-English (Stidhum, 2018). The trademark approval coming just in time as an array of consumer products from clothing, toys, musicals and video-games have began to be marketed for the upcoming CGI-remake. Stidhum outlines the response to the controversial approval and the activism in response to it here which I would advise reading to provide more context about this move: <a href="https://thegrapevine.theroot.com/disney-successfully-trademarks-hakuna-matata-from-the-l-1831228242?fbclid=IwAR0j0BS98nRjpc7n7bqHRooNg9aVa1WXlz-QBzAgelWUsnrlwu9GRgFrGM4">https://thegrapevine.theroot.com/disney-successfully-trademarks-hakuna-matata-from-the-l-1831228242?fbclid=IwAR0j0BS98nRjpc7n7bqHRooNg9aVa1WXlz-QBzAgelWUsnrlwu9GRgFrGM4</a></p><p>The purpose of this article however, is not to discuss the trademarking of a Swahili phrase (a language utilised by millions of people in and around the African “Great Lakes” region in the centre-east of the continent) by one of the largest media content creators on the planet specifically. But to place it within a wider-context of the growing plunder and theft of languages, cultures, knowledges and practices of indigenous people’s across the “Global South” by international corporations through neo-colonisation and intellectual-private-property rights underpinned by international trade treaties maintained by the World-Trade-Organization.</p><p>Recognising that the rules of the WTO underpinned by GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) set up by Western-Colonial powers in the aftermath of the Great Depression at the Bretton Woods Conference in order to promote low-tariff trade liberalization, were set up on unequal terms which allowed the rich “Global North” countries to exploit the still colonised “Global South” countries through unequal trade relationships, is not new knowledge. In the wake of neo-liberal reforms throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s which accompanied the long list of SAR’s (Structural Adjustment Reform) programmes forced upon Global South countries by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World Bank, the WTO was designed to open up the world to capital flows that effectively benefitted “developed” countries at the expense of “developing” ones (Hickle, 2017, pp. 184–188).</p><p>One interesting, yet often unheard of agreements required in order to sign up to the WTO, is the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (or TRIP’s), focusing on copyright and patent rules. Ironically one of the key features of neo-colonisation and pain that “developing” countries must suffer under the global neo-liberal economic order has infact, got nothing to do with “Free-Trade” at all, like most international “Free Trade” treaties (NAFTA, TTIP, are two examples of this). As Hickle (2017, p. 200) puts it “One might think that trade would be enhanced by *lowering* patent standards: making it easier for countries to share technology is surely a good way to spur technological development and make trade more efficient. It would increase productivity, innovation and exchange. But TRIP’s is designed to do exactly the opposite. The point of TRIP’s is to *raise* patent standards and enshrine them in international law — and this is being conducted, ironically, under the banner of liberalisation”.</p><p>In recent years, rich countries of the “Global North” (who maintain all of the political, economic, diplomatic and military bargaining power within the WTO and throughout the global economic system), have succeeded in imposing a twenty-year standard on patents. This means that individuals, companies and governments which own the patent get to sit back and extract rent from the patents for a longer period, often at the expense of poorer countries, as patent licensing fees can be so expensive poor countries are unable to afford the technologies or knowledges needed for a wealth of social, economic and political requirements such as computer programmes, agricultural implements and medicines (Hickle, 2017, p. 200).</p><p>This is where we get onto the subject of neo-colonisation and the theft of indigenous products under the guise of “Free-Trade” and Private-Property rights.</p><p>Patents and Private-Property have, throughout history, been associated with colonization, and its consequences of dislocation, appropriation, and theft. In-fact, the first of such charters was legitimised under the Spanish monarchy to Christopher Columbus in order to create property rights over conquered lands in the 15th Century. In the modern context, the same project of colonization is operated through patents and intellectual-property rights and the TRIP’s agreements of the WTO. As Shiva (2007, pp. 273–274), outlines “These patents for discovery and conquest provide the background for the contemporary conflicts over patents generated by GATT/WTO, which are often viewed by the Third World as tools of recolonization, while Western powers view them as a right that is as “natural” as conquest was during colonialism by Western Powers”.</p><p>One of the way’s in which this new form of neo-colonization operates is represented by the concept of “biopiracy”, defined as “the patenting of biodiversity, its parts and products derived from it on the basis of indigenous knowledge”. Patents based on bio-piracy are an instrument of the enclosure of the intellectual and biological commons that make survival possible. There are thousands of examples that demonstrate the way in which these sorts of neo-colonial tactics have been operated, by governments, corporations and individuals. By appropriating indigenous languages, cultures, knowledges, and historical/social practices, patenting them under intellectual-property regimes and incorporating them into the system of global-economic trade-relations and consumer markets (the most recent example being that of Walt Disney’s Trademarking of the Swahili phrase “Hakuna-Mutata”).</p><p>The one I will speak to in order to demonstrate the cruel, colonial tactics operated under the guise of Private-Property and the WTO treaties though is discussed by Shiva (2007), who discusses the attempted patenting of the Neem Tree. The Neem Tree is indigenous to the Indian-sub-continent, and it’s biological produce has been utilised by those indigenous to it for thousands of years with texts dating back over 2000 years ago discussing its medicinal properties and usage in Indian medicinal practices. In 1990, a patent had been filed by the USDA (United States Department of Agriculture) and the multinational W. R. Grace, and in 1994 it was granted by the European Patent Office for the extracting of neem oil and the ability for the company to develop and sell the product. Effectively this would mean that, under the rules of TRIP’s under the treaties binding member states under the rules of the WTO, it would be illegal for Indian firms to develop, produce and sell Neem related products, despite the practice being utilised for thousands of years (Shiva, 2007, p. 280). Indian firms, including governmental institutions, would either have to purchase the products back from W. R. Grace, at whatever market cost they decided to sell it at, or purchase licensing fees allowing them to produce the product themselves in accordance with the Patent laws under the TRIP’s agreements, and this is what happened.</p><p>The consequences of the company&#39;s demand for the Neem products had some primary effects outlined by Shiva (2007), mainly:</p><ol><li>The price of the Neem products rose beyond the reach of ordinary people; in fact, Neem oil itself, used by local people to light lamps, became practically unavailable</li><li>Poor people, who had been utilising the traditional methods for millennia, lost access to a resource which was vital for their survival, once widely and cheaply available to them through local producers</li></ol><p>Some of the most epistemologically and historically insulting aspects of this neo-colonial theft of an indigenous plant product are outlined by Shiva (2007, p. 282) “For centuries the Western world ignored the Neem Tree and its properties; the practices of Indian peasants and doctors were not deemed worthy of attention by the majority of British, French and Portuguese colonialists. However, in the last few years, growing opposition to chemical products in the West, in particular pesticide, has led to a sudden enthusiasm for the pharmaceutical properties of the Neem”.</p><p>In 2000 the European Patent Office, after years of international protest and activism, struck down the Patent jointly held by the US Government and the multinational W. R. Grace, finding that it was based on “pirating of existing knowledge and was lacking in novelty and inventiveness” (Shiva, 2007, p. 280). This was a win for millions of people who’s social and cultural heritage, as well as their medical and economic lives, relied upon the indigenous plant. However, this is one of thousands of examples of the use of TRIP’s agreements and Patent regimes by governments and international corporations as instruments of theft and neo-colonial practices of indigenous socio-historical practices, languages and knowledges. From South America, to Africa to South-East Asia under the guise of “Free-Trade” in order to acquire a profit at the expense of the “Global South” and the rights, freedoms and knowledges of indigenous peoples.</p><p>The trademarking of “Hakuna-Matata” by Walt Disney, is one but of a web of stolen products from the oppressed, imperialised and colonised across the world.</p><p>As Shiva (2007, p. 287), notes that we must recognise “the value of every species, every person, every culture, every community, and every country on its own terms, rather than on the hegemonic calculus of piracy, profits, and predation”.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bab0dbfe0f45" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[If we are now in a ‘post-race’ society does this mean that racism is no longer a problem: why…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kieronturner95/if-we-are-now-in-a-post-race-society-does-this-mean-that-racism-is-no-longer-a-problem-why-bc9aeb2d87d3?source=rss-a6001e812efc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bc9aeb2d87d3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[racism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[post-race]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sociology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kieron Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Apr 2018 20:34:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-04-19T20:34:55.505Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>If we are now in a ‘post-race’ society does this mean that racism is no longer a problem: why ignoring race aids racism.</h3><p>Over the last two decades, it is generally considered by politicians, media commentary and much of the public, that race and racism, within liberal, democratic western post-colonial society, are of the past, and that we live in a “post-racial” society (Gallagher, 2015; Lentin, 2008a; Valiente-Neighbours, 2015). In 2007, former Prime Ministers of the UK Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, both declared that the UK is a fair and tolerant country, wherein there exists no toleration of racism in any form (Lentin, 2008a, pp. 487–488). After the election of Barack Obama in 2008, there has been a declaration from politicians, the media and academics alike that that the “racial barrier” within America had fallen and that we have now reached the end of the history of racism within the United States (Bonilla-Silva, 2015, pp. 57–58; Gallagher, 2015, pp. 43–46). Polls published by American news outlets in 2009 and 2010, found a significant shift in views of the problem of racism facing modern society. Where in 1996 an ABC News poll found that 52 per cent of ethnically “white” people that responded saw racism as a “large societal problem”, that number had dropped to just 22 per cent in 2009 (Gallagher, 2015, p. 47). A New York Times poll in 2010, found that 60% of all Americans believe that blacks and whites have an equal chance of getting ahead in today’s society (Gallagher, 2015, p. 47). The pervasiveness of ours being a “post-race” society, has infatuated public discourse to the extent where debates are being had asking “Is Britain still a racist country?” (BBC One: The Big Questions, 2018). It is largely accepted by many, not only within the realms of our political and media establishments but also in wider society, that our society is in-fact post-race, and the barriers facing non-white individuals have been systematically dismantled. Race, is a thing of the past.</p><p>The concept of “post-race”, denotes to the commonplace contention that modern society has transcended the logics of race and racism, and that racial inequalities are merely a residual echo of a fast fading legacy (Valluvan, 2016, p. 2241). Post-race as a concept and ontological tool for examining the current socio-political culture of the “West”, namely countries within the EU especially the UK, the US and Canada, is of vital importance. Post-race allows for the deconstruction and disentangling of narrow and unsophisticated liberal conceptions of race upheld by politicians and the social-political commentaries for broader and more sophisticated theoretical anti-racist understandings. Post-race facilitates the exposing of the conceptual shifts of racial understandings and logics in the “post-race” age, that take neo-liberal individualised and culturalist forms in contemporary society.</p><p>Grosfoguel (2016), states that racism is “a global hierarchy of superiority and inferiority along the line of the human that have been politically, culturally and economically produced and reproduced for centuries by the institutions of the “capitalist/patriarchal western-centric/Christian-centric modern/colonial worldsystem”. This definition of racism allows for broader conceptual understandings of racism which include an array of social, economic, cultural and political actions, discourses and institutions globally, as opposed to reductionist and individualist definitions which usually constitute mainstream socio-political discourse. Furthermore, it is also of vital importance that in order to understand “post-race”, credit must be given to understanding Stuart Hall’s conception of racism as a “floating signifier” (Stuart Hall 1997, cited in Lentin, 2008a, p.488), a system which is insidious, constantly adapting to prevailing norms and values and consistently taking new forms. Despite the flurry of calls of “post-race”, late-modern, liberal, democratic western post-colonial society is still one which is heavily marked by racial stratification. Whether it’s the disproportionately high representation of African Americans within the criminal justice and penal systems (Louis, 2015, p. 115); the criminalization of asylum seekers and other “uninvited” migrants across the UK and Europe (Lentin, 2008a, p. 488; Virdee, 2014, pp. 162–164); the deportation and detainment of genuine British Citizens still marked both by the colour of their skin and the UK’s colonial past as has been recently exposed by the “Windrush Generation” scandal (Young, 2018); rising islamaphobic institutional policies across Europe (Lentin, 2014a, pp. 1272–1273), it is clear that contemporary society is still one marked by racism.</p><p>One of the main interventions in which contemporary “post-race” society and policy makers have attempted to deal with modern racism, if they concede that it is still an extant problem, has been to adopt a liberal, individualist “colour blind” egalitarianism approach to social life and public policy (Jensen, 2011, p. 26). These “colour-blind” perspectives attempt to “transcend” traditional race and anti-racist politics as the likes of Obama attempted, by adopting Neo-liberal ontologies where all people start from a level-playing-field and should be treated solely as individuals and not part of any particular racial/ethnic category (Gallagher, 2015, pp. 50–52; Lentin, 2008b, pp. 311–313; Louis, 2015) These type of colour-blindness strategies have been adopted by European Institutions and implemented through campaigns such as the “All Different — All Equal” Campaign (Lentin, 2008b, pp. 311–312) as well as governments which, until the “Failure of Multiculturalism” expressed by political leaders such as David Cameron and Angela Merkel (Lentin, 2014a, p. 1270; Weaver, 2010), endorsed. These liberal multicultural policies sought to promote inclusiveness and assimilation to “Western values”, where newcomers would be granted acceptance and citizenship if they assimilated to prevailing European norms and values, and potential rejection if they “did not make the effort to integrate”, as in, if they did not replicate the view of society such “colour-blind” egalitarian policies required (Bloch and Solomos, 2010, p. 213). This new liberal multicultural “colour-blindness” is also discussed by Gilroy, albeit in different terms, where he argues that what has developed over the last two decades is a type of “corporate multiculturalism”. This cooperate multiculturalism takes the Neo-liberal individualist “colour-blind” perspective and adopts it to a market-consumer one, wherein it views everyone as individual consumers, able to express themselves and their own identity through consumer products and brands, while openly making non-white individuals visible through corporate and consumer advertising in order to be viewed as post-racial (Williams, 2013, p. 57). As Williams (2013, p. 57) quips, “Want your company to seem tolerant, welcoming, moving with the times in international markets? Go multicultural”. Gallagher (2015, pp. 41–43), contends that “colour-blind egalitarianism” has now in-fact shifted from an abstract cultural ideal, pushed by politicians and media outlets, to a social fact which is now normative; anti-racist scholars and activists are now met with opposition and sometimes even contempt if race is brought into the discussion, often even by impassioned liberals intent on taking a “colour-blind” perspective, where anti-racist activists are accused of racism themselves for bringing race into the discussion (Lentin, 2008b; Valiente-Neighbours, 2015).</p><p>These “post-race” and “colour-blindness” policies however, are ineffective, not only because racial-inequality has actually become more pervasive since Obama’s election (Bonilla-Silva, 2015, pp.63–69), or the extent to which Europe’s asylum and immigration policies have become increasingly securitised and aggressive towards non-Europeans (Lentin, 2008a), or the rising tide of Far-Right politics and racist politics (Bloch and Solomos, 2010, pp. 222–228). But there also remains a more insidious discursive and ideological shift that has occurred under the surface of liberal “colour-blindness” and “post-racial” perspectives and ideologies, a shift which not only delegitimises and side-lines anti-racist voices and perspectives, but also aids in reproducing modern and new forms of racism.</p><p>As Lentin (2008a, pp. 495–497), discusses, post-WW2 conceptions of race have been built upon the UNESCO statements, that race and racism are purely pseudoscientific biological concepts, denoting to biologically reifying peoples and treating them with prejudice and discrimination and that this should be banished from scientific, social, cultural and political life. Furthermore, racism in “post-race”, liberal, democratic western society, through the utilization of “colour-blind” perspectives, has been constructed in individualised terms, where instances of such attitudes are dismissed as individual cases of “bad” people, with no connection to the structures and forms of modern society (Lentin, 2017, p. 15; Louis, 2015, pp. 121–124). However, by constructing racism in this way it allows people to reject other instances of racism that have developed from wider social, cultural, political discourses, ideologies and practices; by understanding racism only in terms relating to explicit ideologies of biological race, eugenics and in some cases the horrors of the holocaust, it allows modern racist and white supremacist discourses and social, cultural political practices and institutions to go unchallenged (Bonilla-Silva, 2015; Gallagher, 2015; Jensen, 2011, pp. 26–27; Lentin, 2008a, pp. 495–497). Lentin (2008b, p. 325) states that, in-fact, declaring society “post-race” has actually done nothing to address the fact that race and socio-economic disadvantage are almost completely synonymous, and more importantly making such a pronouncement merely attempts to side-line this fact and ignore it. As Jensen (2011, p. 26), remarks, “To claim to be colour-blind, then, is to endorse blindness when assessing the effects of colour and, therefore, lend tacit support to white supremacy”. Ultimately, not only have “post-race” declarations and “colour-blind” liberal policies not actually aided in combatting racism, they have in fact constituted the foundations of a white-supremacist society by side-lining and ignoring race as an extant feature of socio-political life.</p><p>Because of these ways in which racism has been constructed within the mainstream of post-colonial, liberal, western, democratic, “post-racial” society, new forms of racism and racialisation have been able to be established, and are ignored or rejected as “harping on about race” where it is believed to not exist (Lentin, 2014, p. 1269). However, it could be argued that racial inequality today is worse than it has been for decades or even more so in our “post-multicultural” or “post-immigration” society (Lentin, 2008a). The development of a new form of “cultural-racism” in the last two decades has been aided by the biological and liberal individualised definitions of race, as contemporary discussions of “culture”, which inextricably tie race and culture together as a classificatory tool in which to construct civilizational identities, and “biological race” have been conceptually separated, although they have always existed in unison (Lentin, 2014a, p. 1273; Lentin, 2014b, p. 72). Furthermore, contemporary political and social discourses which understand racism in these individualised terms allow ethnically “white” people to claim “reverse racism”, not only diluting what racism is, but it also aids in the rejecting or even vilifying of anti-racist perspectives, activism and arguments (Jensen, 2011, p. 26; Valiente Neighbours, 2015, pp. 331–332). Modern “cultural-racism”, is in-fact a double-edged sword. Cultural-racism has been utilised by the contemporary Far-Right to justify intolerance, vilification and suspicion of migrants, most notably Muslims, on the basis of cultural incompatibility rather than biological inferiority (Lentin, 2014a, p. 1273). In reality, this system adopts the logics of “old racism”: that there are immutable differences between groups of human beings (Lentin, 2014a, p. 1273). However, because of the “colour-blind-egalitarian” and “post-race” ideologies of modern society, this form of racism has not only been protected from legitimate scrutiny from anti-racist voices, by “post-race” and “colour-blindness” perspectives which reject “race” as a conceptual and ontological tool in which to analyse social-stratification, but it has also been legitimised. As these cultural-racist arguments do not explicitly argue along the biological or colour line, although their logics are in-fact racialized, they are therefore judged to be a part of acceptable social, political discourse (Lentin, 2014a, p. 1273). Ultimately, as Lentin (2014b, p. 72), argues, “The determination to sweep race under the carpet by underscoring its lack of scientific utility and its political dangerosity … led to a failure to engage with the trace left by race throughout social, political and economic systems”.</p><p>It is not just the case that racism is still an existing and pervasive feature of contemporary society, but we have not, and may not ever reach a “post-race” society. Racism is a pernicious, yet adaptive system, a floating signifier constantly adopting new forms to fit with contemporary norms and values. Because of this, post-race is not only a vital concept for analysing modern racisms, but colour-blind perspectives must be disregarded for anti-racist perspectives, that recognise race and racisms enduring effect’s on late-modern, liberal, western, democratic society. As Meer and Nayak (2015, p.NP 15), remark “race is very installed in the here and now. It remains ever present in late-modernity and strangely solid in liquid times … “racism is a scavenger ideology” that draws selectively upon the past, present and imagined future, distilling complex fears and anxieties”.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bc9aeb2d87d3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Challenging the charges heralded at Monroe Bergdorf and the white-washing of Liberal Feminism’s…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kieronturner95/challenging-the-charges-heralded-at-monroe-bergdorf-and-the-white-washing-of-liberal-feminisms-617380acd70f?source=rss-a6001e812efc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/617380acd70f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[black-feminism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[feminism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kieron Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2018 14:58:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-26T14:58:35.253Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Challenging the charges heralded at Monroe Bergdorf and the white-washing of Liberal Feminism’s history within the UK.</h3><p>This is merely an elongated rant I thought of while indulging in black-feminist literature, which I thought it would be easier to write in this format.</p><p>So recently there was a lot of uproar made by the media, political commentators and MP’s alike by the appointment of Monroe Bergdorf on the Labour Party’s LGBT advisory board due to former comments she has made online, most specifically about racism, white-supremacy, feminism and the suffragettes. A flurry of MP’s and journalists jumped on this as another excuse to attack the Party and Bergdorf herself with accusations of “racism”. MP’s such as Helen Grant, James Cleverly and Kemi Badenoch, signed letters to the Leaders office and Shadow Minister for Women and Equality’s Dawn Butler asking for a condemnation of her previous statements and to “reconsider” her appointment on the LGBT advisory board.</p><p>Cleverly tweeted on February 27th claiming that Bergdorf had stated “unpalatable things about “white people, … and even women who fought for the right to vote” <a href="https://twitter.com/JamesCleverly/status/930459500427075584">https://twitter.com/JamesCleverly/status/930459500427075584</a>. Helen Grant asked specifically for condemnation of the claim that “The suffragettes were white supremacists”, and the claim that “white people are “socially conditioned to be racist” <a href="https://twitter.com/HelenGrantMP/status/968524813831680000">https://twitter.com/HelenGrantMP/status/968524813831680000</a> . Following a long week of relentless vilification and trans-phobic abuse, Bergdorf has since stepped down from the position <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/transgender-model-munroe-bergdorf-quits-labour-role-amid-racism-row-11278316">https://news.sky.com/story/transgender-model-munroe-bergdorf-quits-labour-role-amid-racism-row-11278316</a>.</p><p>Now, beyond another attempt to seemingly smear Labour as a racist party that is against “white people” in order to promote a culture war for purely electoral reasons (another argument), I would like to point out how utterly ignorant, politically, historically and sociologically these MP’s are, and many others who frothed at Bergdorf’s comments. (This is obviously forgiven for the average person that is most likely not familiar with such studies and concepts, but political representative, especially from ethnic backgrounds, indulging in white-washing and a fundamental misrepresentation of what racism is and how it has been created, developed, enacted, institutionalised and reproduced historically, especially for, in my eyes, political gain, is particularly infuriating). Bergdorfs comments, to those not familiar with such studies (and because of our reproduction of the white-washing of what racism is and how we are socialised to believe what it is), probably come across as racist and an unreasonable attacks on “white people” and the “suffragettes”, for those unfamiliar with study into the subjects of feminism, Race &amp; Ethnic studies, and sociology.</p><p>However, I think it is important to note that not only are Bergdorfs comments sociologically sophisticated, they are also historically accurate and supported by a century of social scientific research and theorisation. Racism is not merely the narrow, historically and conceptually ignorant definition provided by most mainstream dictionaries, such as “ Prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against someone of a different race based on the belief that one’s own race is superior” <a href="https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/racism">https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/racism</a> , it is, in-fact, dependent on much wider historical, political, economic, cultural and sociological trends over the last five-centuries. A definition I usually cite is Professor of Ethnic Studies Ramón Grosfoguel’s, that racism is “a global hierarchy of superiority and inferiority along the line of the human that have been politically, culturally and economically produced and reproduced for centuries by the institutions of the “capitalist/patriarchal western-centric/Christian-centric modern/colonial world-system”. Now, evidence of the social, cultural, historic reproduction of racism through “whiteness”, is evident throughout the works of many anti-racist theorists such as Du bois (1903); Gilroy (1987); Grosfoguel (2016); Hall (1992); Nayek (2007); West (1982) etc.</p><p>However, here, I wish to focus on the white-washing of “First-Wave” Liberal Feminism, which includes the Suffragettes, and the ludicrousness of objecting to the notion that they were, in-fact, White-Supremacists, which engaged in oppressing Non-White and Non-Middle-class women in order to benefit themselves.</p><p>Many notable Second-Wave Black-Feminists such as Bell Hooks (1984); those involved within the Combahee river Collective such as Kimberly Crenshaw; as well as Valeria Amos and Pratibha Parmar (1984); have all written extensively on not only the reproduction of racism through whiteness and by white-people, but also the reproduction of racism and white-supremacy through many feminisms.</p><p>This is more of a rant than a piece, so let me just provide a few examples:</p><p>The Vote:</p><ul><li>As Bergdorf claims, it is correct that the Suffragettes were not, in-fact, fighting for the rights of “all women” or their “sisterhood”. The Suffragette movement was built largely out of white, Middle-Class Women of property, fighting for their own rights by standing on the backs of working-class and non-white-women. Emmeline Pankhurst’s famous quote “I would rather be a rebel than a slave”, is interesting as it is important to note that, while slavery had been abolished by the UK, at the time of the movement the UK still maintained an Empire based upon white-supremacy, and the colonial system which created colonial subjects as inferior to that of the white-British (Frantz Fanon’s concept of the “Zone of non-being, is useful here). Across Europe women’s liberation’s movements and campaigns for voting-rights sidelined the voices of Black-women.</li></ul><p>Black women&#39;s voices:</p><ul><li>There has been a systemic invisibility and sidelining of black-women and black-women’s voices within academic feminist analysis, as well as the first wave of feminist civil rights campaigns for things such as: voting rights; introduction into the labour market; reproduction rights.</li></ul><p>Reproductive Rights + Eugenics:</p><ul><li>Feminist campaigns for birth-control clinics, birth control, bodily-autonomy and reproductive freedom within the 1920’S and 1930’S were first and foremost eugenics movements. Marie Stoopes, founder of the first UK Birth Control Clinic, was a committed eugenicist, and the name of her organisation “The Society for Constructive Birth Control and Racial Progress”, clearly stated her racist and white-supremacist position. Many of the major UK’s women&#39;s organisations which fought for voting rights such as “The Women’s Co-operative Guild”, and “The National Society for Equal Citizenship”, supported campaigns of legalised sterilisation for certain groups of “unfit persons”, i.e, working class and non-white women. Many feminist groups indulged in white-supremacist and eugenicist ideals which recommended contraception as a way to prevent the “deterioration of race”, through the proliferation with those who were “unfit”.</li></ul><p>Empire and Feminism:</p><ul><li>Ironically, many of the trans-phobic charges thrown at Bergdorf, (the assumption that femaleness and womanhood is necessarily tied to reproduction), was inherent to imperialist, eugenicist, white-supremacist ideologies and movements to which many white-feminists in the earlier half of the twentieth-century belonged to or supported. As women were being defined as the breeders of the imperialist “white-race”, to which they would operate in bearing and rearing the next generation of soldiers and workers of the imperial race of the Great British Empire. A responsibility only provided to particular groups of women, most notably white-middle/upper-class women. As Davin (1978), notes “In many cases, the terms in which reforms to do with marriage, child rearing and bearing were proposed, also involved reference to the nation, the empire, or the race”.</li></ul><p>There is plenty more literature on this area, and an endless array of incredible and insightful works written by black and anti-racist theorists on racism within the feminist movement. Most of this has been taken from the work of Amos and Parmar (1984), “Challenging Imperial Feminism”.</p><p>This does not mean to de-legitimise the UK Suffragette movement. I actually think the utilisation of violence by women that had been oppressed and created from birth to be submissive housewives and child-rearers is an inspiring symbol of emancipatory social movements. It’s that these things cannot be viewed through rose-tinted glasses or a vacuum,and require more sophisticated and inter-sectional historical and sociological analyses which include class-antagonisms and racism as well as perspectives of patriarchy.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=617380acd70f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Enlightenment project was characterised by a masculinization of thought and a flight from the…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kieronturner95/the-enlightenment-project-was-characterised-by-a-masculinization-of-thought-and-a-flight-from-the-a097a220d4e6?source=rss-a6001e812efc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a097a220d4e6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[feminism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kieron Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 07 Feb 2018 16:10:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-07T16:10:29.115Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>The Enlightenment project was characterised by a masculinization of thought and a flight from the feminine. Feminist interpretations of Scientific epistemology.</h3><p>Rene Descartes is usually credited as being one of the fathers of enlightenment thought and of the Scientific-Revolution, viewed now by many as the historical head of the materialist, mechanistic, scientific doctrine (Bordo, 1999, p. 1; Sorell, 1987, pp. 1–5). Descartes dealt heavily with metaphysics and mathematics, doubting the epistemological certainty gained by the corporeal senses he developed a theory whereby he distinguished between a sense based conception of the material world, and a mathematical conception, of which he committed himself to the view that the latter was the more objective of the two (Sorell, 1987, pp. 1–5). Descartes sought to explain all that exists in terms of two substances: mind and matter (Gatens, 1991, p. 92). The spiritual and the corporeal were to be viewed as two separate substances in opposition to one another: res cogitans “a thinking and un-extended thing”, and res extensa “a thinking and un-extended thing” (Bordo, 1986, a p. 355; Stern, 1985, p. 30). Due to this, Descartes asserted that the only way to access the truth of material reality was through objectivity and detachment from the material world; only by separating oneself from all bodily senses and philosophically purifying the independent mind could clear and distinct knowledge, through the application of reason, be developed (Bordo, 1986, a, pp.354–356; Fiumara, 1994, p. 34). This approach to criticising sense-based beliefs is understood as “rationalism”, the foundation of Cartesian epistemology, and his dichotomous separation between the sense-based body and the privileging of the purified mind is understood as dualism (Gatens, 1991, pp. 92–93; Sorell, 1987, p. 64).</p><p>Descartes’ re-birthing of western epistemology gave way to other developments which came to be understood as Enlightenment thought, such as those of Francis Bacon. Following on from Cartesian objectivist epistemology, Bacon believed that the only way to access the truth of the natural world was to take a detached and objective view of material objects (Sorell, 1987, p.4). Although, Bacons doubts about the sensory world were not as far-reaching as Descartes and developed a more objective way of examining the natural world, namely the scientific method based off of an empiricist ontological framework (Merchant, 2006; Sorell, 1987, p. 4). From these pillars of foundational philosophy Enlightenment thought emerged, alongside it the hegemony of science as a means of extracting and creating knowledge. However, despite Descartes privileging of the independent mind and foundational reasoning, the historical-cultural context in which Descartes and Bacon developed their ideas was in-fact conducive to their creation.</p><p>Seventeenth-century culture is much described as an intellectual beginning, a fresh confidence, with a new belief in the ability of science, aided by the new developments in philosophy from the likes of both Descartes and Bacon, to decipher the language of nature (Bordo, 1986 b, p. 439). However, numerous feminist scholars argue this period was wrought with both epistemic anxiety and increased oppression of the female form (Bordo, 1986 b; Merchant, 2006). The period from 1550 to 1650 was a particularly gynophobic century obsessed with the untamed natural power of female generativity as well as a period of cultural anxiety, in which the discoveries, inventions and events which created the conditions for a transition from the Middle Ages to early modernity were major and disorientating not only in terms of material society but epistemologically too (Bordo, 1986 a, pp. 354–356; Bordo, 1986 b, p. 453). This Psycho-cultural separation anxiety from previous medieval reality, and its isolation of individuals, experienced as an estrangement between the self and nature as a result of increasing scepticism toward the ability to grasp the truth of external reality and the ever-growing cosmos, was felt strongly by the likes of Descartes, who, Bordo argues (1986 a, pp. 354–356; 1986 b, 453–455), developed his rationalist epistemology as a response. Descartes, Bordo argues (1986 a, pp. 356), utilised metaphysics in order to transform this separation anxiety of the organic ties between the individual and the natural world, into a confident requirement for the growth of human knowledge and progress.</p><p>Concerning the heightened gynophobia of the period, Merchant (2006), discusses how within the Western tradition, prior to the Scientific-Revolution, nature was conceptualised as a female organic cosmology in which the natural world mothered the earths materiality. However, the cosmology presented by both Descartes and Bacon, allowed for a philosophical re-visioning of the universe as a machine, which necessarily required the submission of the female earth and the extraction of secrets from “her” bosom through the utilization of science and technology (Merchant, 2006, p. 515). During this same period of the philosophical re-visioning of nature, the superstitious beliefs of the British monarch James I concerning witches, and his frequent utilization of torture on women alleged of the crime of witchcraft, lead to a demonization of the female form as well as many roles taken by women within society such as those within early medicine and childbirth (Merchant, 2006). This vilification of the female form, the purging of the female cosmos, which was transferred into Bacon’s empirical orientations towards the study of nature, alongside the cultural-separation anxiety which lead to the development of the Cartesian rationalist project, built the foundations for, in Sterns words (1985, p. 46), “a pure masculinization of thought”.</p><p>The medieval cosmos was a mother-cosmos, the soul of which Descartes drained from the world was therefore a female one (Bordo, 1986 a). The Cartesian anxiety, although expressed largely as an epistemological concern contained within the inability to accurately extract the truth of material reality, was also a separation between the self and the organic female cosmos of the Middle-Ages and the Renaissance (Bordo, 1986 b, p. 50). Because of this fragmented relationship, the Cartesian reconstruction of thought sought to reject the relationship to the female-organic material earth, and developed a rebirthing of nature as a machine, and knowledge as objectivity (Bordo, 1986 a, p. 356; Bordo, 1986 b, p. 50). As a consequence of this reorientation towards reality, more sympathetic and feminine ways of knowing were purged from dominant intellectual culture, replaced by a super-masculinised model of knowledge which favoured detachment, clarity and the transcendence of the mind over the body (Bordo, 1986 a, p. 356; Bordo, 1986 b, p. 50).</p><p>It would be possible to conceive of aspects of the Cartesian rationalist project, such as his dualist ontology, purely on their own intellectual grounds without maintaining it as a masculinization of thought, as Gaten’s points out (1991, pp. 92–93), dichotomies tend to be presented by philosophers as logical or theoretical tools which are neutral, objective descriptions of actual divisions in the world. However, this would ignore the historical-intellectual tradition of Western thought which not only sought to present dichotomies as unequal to one-another, but would gender them too (Gatens, 1991, p. 92). Jay argues (Jay cited in Gatens, 1991, pp. 92–93) that the mind body distinction presented by Descartes is presented as a self-evident distinction, however, the mind is given a positive value over the negative body which culturally was tied to conceptions of female reproduction and the mother-cosmos. Moreover, Williams (1994, pp. 165–167), argues that Cartesian rationalist dualism is a form of phallogocentrism, where the stability represented by the masculine mind is supported by its dichotomous opposition to the inherently unstable feminine body. To further this argument, Bordo (1986 b, pp. 453–455), points to Seventeenth-Century imagery of an untamed and mysterious female-nature which influenced the development of Baconian empirical praxis, with its intent of penetrating and torturing female nature to extract truths. It is always important to note, that many of the fathers of enlightenment thought proclaimed that they had developed a more masculine epistemological relation to the world and that the Enlightenment paradigm that began with the Cartesian re-birthing of the individual-self in the world was a “truly masculine birth of time” (Bordo, 1986 a, pp. 358–359).</p><p>It is argued however, that this masculinization of thought concerned with the aggressive repression of feminine orientations towards knowledge and the material world, was not merely a confident decision inspired by Descartes, believing that an objective epistemological stance would provide a cleaner and purer access to knowledge, but was an un-stable psycho-developmental response to an uncontrollable and changing world. Psycho-analysis can be a useful framework to work with when analysing philosophical positions, emphasizing that it is the unconscious of the knowing subject which should be the focus, proposing that we should “reconsider the concept of the sovereign subject and attempt to reveal beneath its fixed abstractions and complex dynamics” (Williams, 1994, pp. 166–167). Bordo (1986 a, pp. 359–361), employs a Freudian psycho-development framework to make the case that Descartes epistemological “re-birth”, was in fact a reaction-formation to the loss of “being-one-with-the-world”, which was brought about by the “disintegration of the organic, centred, female cosmos of the Middle-Ages and Renaissance”. A reaction-formation is a psychological defence mechanism in which emotions and beliefs which are deemed socially-unacceptable or are anxiety-producing, are mastered by an exaggerated conversion into their opposite, often alongside a conscious rejection of unconsciously held impulses (Baumeister et al. 1998; Bordo, 1986 a, pp. 359–361). Bordo (1986, a, p 359), equates the Cartesian separation anxiety to that of Freud’s “fort da” game, where a child, helpless as a result of his mother leaving him, invents a game whereby he takes objects and discards them flippantly declaring “gone”, to which Freud analyses as a reaction-formation to revenge himself from his mother leaving him. Bordo (1986, a, pp. 359–361), argues this is a similar scenario to the anxiety felt by Descartes as a result of the separation between himself and the female-cosmos; Descartes responds to his epistemic crises with a masculine “rebirthing” of the world and the self, where the privileged mind can conceive of reality a priori, and rejects the corporeal relationship to the world which was then delineated as an inferior female domain. The fact that Descartes within the Meditations, began to muse on rejecting and doubting the existence of all material objects may expose just how unstable the Cartesian mentality was, and how aggressive it’s rejection of former corporeal reality was (Sorell, 1987, p. 57). Klein (cited in Bordo, 1986 a, p. 360), utilizes a Freudian psycho-sexual-development framework and discusses the aggressive, destructive and envious impulses directed against parts of the mothers body within Freud’s oedipal complex by the child, to which Bordo, contrasts with Baconian imagery of the sexual assault and aggressive overpowering of a wilful and unruly female nature.</p><p>Psycho-analytic theory is a useful framework for analysing and performing meta-epistemological critiques of knowledge that may be repressed or exist as un-conscious reactions to psycho-development. By weaving a historical, epistemological and psycho-analytic argument through the Cartesian re-birthing of western thought, feminist writers such as Bordo present a detailed narrative of the Seventeenth-Century masculinization of thought and a flight from former feminine ways of orientating ourselves towards knowledge and the material world.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a097a220d4e6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Knowledge is not made for understanding, it is made for cutting.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kieronturner95/knowledge-is-not-made-for-understanding-it-is-made-for-cutting-956f536fc779?source=rss-a6001e812efc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/956f536fc779</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[epistemology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[knowledge]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foucault]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[postmodernism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kieron Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jan 2018 15:18:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-07T16:05:13.856Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In his essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, Foucault maps out the argument put forth by Nietzsche that criticises “traditional history”. He begins with a discussion of particular phrases used by Nietzsche in his critique of traditional historical analysis. He explores the use of terms such as Herkunft, meaning descent, and Entstehung, designating genesis or more specifically emergence, in relationship to their opposition to the term Ursprung, translating to source or origins (Foucault, 1977, pp. 242–246). These phrases are made sense of within the context of Nietzsche’s construction of “wirkliche Historie” understood as “effective history”. Nietzsche argues that history in a traditional sense is concerned with Ursprung, discovering the truth of historical origins, whereas effective history should be concerned with the mapping of Herkunft, the descent, of a phenomena through history and Entstehung, its historical emergence (Foucault, 1977, pp. 242–245). This is because Nietzsche questioned the form of history that reintroduces a suprahistorical perspective, a linear trajectory that can be traced back through time to a phenomena’s origins, immutable as it was in the past as it now exists in the present, escaping the marking of history on it. This perspective, Nietzsche argues, encourages subjective recognitions, and attributes a form of reconciliation to all the displacements of the past; a history that implies the end of history as a completed development which allows for a manipulation of metaphysics for its own purposes (Foucault, 1977, p. 246). This type of history Nietzsche argued, allows for the development of immortal notions of truth, morality, specifically Christian, and of man, as if they existed timelessly without historical moulding. Effective history displaces these notions of a continuous and timeless development by introducing historical discontinuities into our very being (Foucault, 1977, p. 147).</p><p>Foucault draws on the work of Nietzsche and his proposal of an effective history, utilizing his term “Genealogie”; denoting to the historical analysis of descent through history, and the exposing of forms of phenomena such as truth, morality and objects such as the body, and history’s destruction of them. Genealogy to Foucault much like Nietzsche’s effective history, seeks to affirm knowledge as perspective and composes history as a vertical projection from its own position (Foucault, 1977, p. 248). However, to further understand Foucault’s conception of genealogy as effective history there must be an examination of Foucault’s concepts of discourse, and power/knowledge. Discourse, exists as the organising principles of thought within a particular epoch or episteme, allowing for the production of knowledge (Danaher et al, 2000, p. 21–22). Discourse operates as the general domain of all statements, referring to utterances which have some kind of symbolic meaning, or effect, in the forming of regulated sets of statements regarding particular groups or ideas in society such as that around femininity and racism (Danaher et al, 2000, p. 21–22; Mills, 2003, pp. 53–53). Discourse, Foucault argues, allows for the development of knowledge within particular boundaries of thought which are regulated by these discursive formations. Genealogical history allows for the exposing of these discourses and their relationship to the moulding of historical phenomena. Foucault explored the way that, in order for something to be established as true, other equally valid statements have to be discredited and denied (Mills, 2003, p. 67). Foucault therefore focused not on how individuals developed certain knowledge’s, but the institutionalised practices which governed the rules of knowledge production, the “material conditions of thought” which he coined as discourse (Mills, 2003, p. 67–68). Because of this, Foucault argued that all forms of knowledge are therefore subject to regulatory practices and are in conjunction with power relations and information-seeking, which he terms power/knowledge (Mills, 2003, p. 68–69).</p><p>For Foucault, genealogy allows for the exposing of these orders of discourse and their relationship with power/knowledge. By examining phenomena such as morality, the body, and racism by studying their emergence and historical development through the discursive conditions which made such discourse possible reveals the power/knowledge relationship produced from such discourse (West, 1982, p. 299). Genealogy allows for an uprooting of traditional foundations and a disruption of pretended historical continuity. (Foucault, 1977, p. 247). This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting. Genealogy takes historical knowledge and inverts its critique on ourselves and the conditions in which our own knowledge has been produced in (Mills, 2003, p. 25). By asserting that knowledge is made for cutting, not understanding, is to reject the suprahistorical perspective that history has existed as a teleological process culminating in our own study and rediscovery of our historical origins. By introducing discontinuities and cutting history, we are able to uncover the orders of discourse which have produced power/knowledge of previously immutable and consistent phenomena such as truth, morality and the body and reveal the historical mappings inscribed onto them (Foucault, 1977, p. 247).</p><p>Genealogical history has been deployed in various ways upon a variety of phenomena in order to examine the material conditions in which certain discourse and knowledge’s have emerged to produce them in. By cutting the history of these phenomena and creating discontinuities when examining previously immutable objects such as the body or the discourses of science or racism, it allows for the mapping of the historical conditions which aided in their historical descent, or emergence, to the present. Foucault’s genealogical approach towards the body is one such example, where he attempts to locate the body as the locus of power relations throughout history where political events and decisions have material effects on the body which can be analysed (Mills, 2003, p. 83). In his genealogical analyses on the body and its historical relationship to bio-power, Foucault argues that it is at the level of the body that much regulation by the authorities from the nineteenth century onwards is enacted. His work found that sexuality, forms of punishment, insanity, deviancy, were all inscribed onto certain bodies as the products of certain power/knowledge’s produced by orders of discourse within the newly developed social sciences such as psychoanalysis and criminology (Danaher et al. 2000, pp. 140–143). The examination of the “perverse adult” or the “hysterical woman” were products of particular historical discursive formations which rejected those bodies which did not comply with respectable Victorian standards and were othered, then examined, classified and more often than not imprisoned (Danaher et al. 2000, pp. 140–143). Thus, the body emerged from history as the locus from which power/knowledge under the surveillance and authorities of experts, was produced (Danaher et al. 2000, p. 142). Rasmussen (2011), furthers this notion of the body as the locus of power relations, and explores Foucault’s work on the genealogy of modern racism and its relationship to the emergence of bio-political practices of governmentality. Rasmussen (2011, p. 40), states that biopower seeks to affirm the life of the population, whereas racism operates a biological caesura, or break, within a population between worthy and unworthy life. In mapping the des</p><p>cent of modern racism as a product of bio-power, Rasmussen (2011), points to Foucault, with his focus on the emergence at the end of the nineteenth-century of the population as an object of political intervention. She states that Foucault argues that racism is not primarily prejudice, discrimination or ideology, but operates as a technology of the modern state that wishes to maintain its own sovereign power and that this form of racism operates within the boundaries of biopower (Rasmussen, 2011, pp. 38–41). Rasmussen (2011, p. 41), notes how genealogy allows for the grasping of phenomena in its state of becoming, in the context of racism, it is the emergence of bio-political interventions and an attempt by governments to express bio-power through the deployment of the technology of racism.</p><p>Using genealogical history, and through the cutting of historical knowledge, this emergence of the body as the location of bio-power, and its relationship to the emergence of modern racism as a product of governmentality, can be revealed and its place in the present can be seen to be determined by its social, cultural and political history that has a discontinuity to its previously held historical understanding.</p><p>Another example of genealogical history, and the practice of knowledge as made for cutting, is West’s “A genealogy of modern racism”. West (1982, pp. 299–300), asserts that, genealogy allows for the mapping of the discursive conditions, epistemologies, metaphors, norms and categories which produced the object of the modern discourse of white supremacy. West (1982), follows the work of Nietzsche’s effective history and Foucault’s genealogy, to argue that the emergence of white supremacy within the west does not denote to a single individual, group or class, but due to the power/knowledge produced within the structures of modern discourse with his focus consisting of the examination of the institution of modern science. West (1982, pp. 300–303), reveals the infusion of Greek aesthetic and cultural ideals of beauty, proportion and moderation, with the epistemological foundations of the scientific revolution and the enlightenment. He asserts that “The creative fusion of scientific investigation, Cartesian philosophy, Greek ocular metaphors, and classical aesthetic and cultural ideals constitutes the essential elements of modern discourse in the west” (West, 1982, p. 301). He continues, noting that the guiding principle of natural history is to observe, compare, measure, and order animals and human bodies based on visible physical characteristics into classificatory categories. This, West argues, inevitably leads to the development of racialized models of human populations, and that this practice used through the framework of Greek aesthetics, provided an acceptable authority for the idea of white supremacy, namely through the institution and authority of modern science (West, 1982, pp. 302–303). By creating knowledge not for understanding, but as a tool for cutting, West’s genealogy maps the emergence of white supremacy and allows for the revealing of the discursive formations which produced the modern discourse of racism and white supremacy. Consequently, disrupting and uprooting the traditional foundations and continuity of the historical existence of race and the emergence of modern science as a victory for reason and objectivity.</p><p>There exists however, opposition to Foucault’s contention that knowledge is not made for understanding, that it is made for cutting, and his conception of genealogical history as an effective methodological and historical tool. Stevens (2003), argues that Foucault misunderstands Nietzsche’s terminology and critique surrounding genealogy. She argues that Nietzsche does not celebrate genealogy as an alternative to history which can be cut and disconnect the processes of the past, but that he deploys the term to mock socio-biological pseudo-historians which attempted to draw a relationship between modern morality and Darwinian evolution (Stevens, 2003, p. 570–575). Stevens (2003, p. 580), also argues that followers of Foucauldian genealogy are at odds with Nietzsche’s approach of philosophical improvisation, as the aftermath of the development of genealogy as a method heralded a rejection of the old orthodoxy merely to be replaced with a new one, the correct method of examining history. It is noted by Hook (2008, p. 27), however, that it is difficult to charge Foucault with this critique that he or followers of his methods are advancing their own ontology when the intention of genealogy itself combines a set of de-ontologizing procedures. Hook (2008, p. 27), asserts that, genealogy as a set of de-ontologizing procedures would be likely to take on different sets of critical suspicions and analytical strategies on “how the world is”, depending on the given socio-historical location in which the phenomena is active. This perspective of genealogy as a set of de-ontologizing procedures is better understood within the context of viewing knowledge as a tool not for understanding, but cutting, and for creating historical discontinuities, rather than developing a set authoritative ontological understanding of how we should view the past.</p><p>In conclusion, despite opposition from traditional historians and critique from contemporary philosophers, genealogical history is an effective analytical tool for revealing the accidents and discontinuities of the past, as well as the historical conditions from which modern phenomena and discourse emerged. By creating knowledge not for understanding, but for cutting, it is not constrained to historical landmarks or events, and can liberate the historian from what is understood as a natural continuity or an immutable product of history and opens up the conditions of possibility. Knowledge, not made for understanding, but made for cutting, allows for the veneration of monuments to become that of parody and the respect for ancient continuities to become that of systemic dissociation (Foucault, 1977, p. 251).</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=956f536fc779" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
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            <title><![CDATA[“Are contemporary UK policy responses to immigration a result of a modern crises, or a linear…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kieronturner95/are-contemporary-uk-policy-responses-to-immigration-a-result-of-a-modern-crises-or-a-linear-90ee47a9b521?source=rss-a6001e812efc------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/90ee47a9b521</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[colonialism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[britain]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kieron Turner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Dec 2017 19:21:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-19T19:21:33.177Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>“Are contemporary UK policy responses to immigration a result of a modern crises, or a linear trajectory from a colonial past?”</h3><p>The purpose of this case study is to shed light on the historical relationship between contemporary UK immigration policies and it’s colonial past. Dismantling the illusions of presentism held by the modern liberal state, and the “myth of difference” proposed by academics, politicians and commentators on the subject of contemporary immigration. This case study will begin by mapping out the current landscape in which any study of the UK’s immigration policies exists in. Proceeding to explore the history of the UK’s modern immigration policies to the present; to then offer a discussion on the conceptual explanations for Britain’s immigration politics and the historical relationship of Britain’s post-colonial, or post-racial policies, and it’s not-too-distant colonial past. This case study will conclude by tying together both the historical and conceptual evidence to affirm that the contemporary policy responses and political climate immigration exists in is historically situated in Britain’s illusions of being a post-colonial society.</p><p>According to the United Nations Population Fund, in 2015 244 million people, or 3.3 percent of the world’s population, lived outside their country of origin, with increasing numbers of people being forcibly displaced as a result of conflict, violence and human rights violations (UNPF, 2016, cited in Bhattacharyya et al. 2017). It is claimed that we are in a new era of immigration, characterised for the most vulnerable by a form of “necropolitics”, a term used to describe the state where “vast populations of people are subject to the conditions of life as the living dead” (Gunaratnam and Patel, 2015). In the last few decades, highly restrictive immigration and asylum policies have been implemented by “Western” states (Mayblin, 2014; Bhattacharyya et al. 2017), as a response to what has been popularly and politically described as Europe’s “refugee” or “migrant crises” (Bhattacharyya et al. 2017; British Broadcasting Company, 2016). In recent years there has been increasing public and political discussion across Europe with how to deal with this “swarm of people” as described by David Cameron (Elgot and Taylor, 2015), with calls across EU states for stricter controls on immigration (Geddes, 2003, p. 1–4). The growth of harsh new border regimes has been titled “border imperialism”, noting on the increasing development of the fortification of land-based borders (Bhattacharyya et al. 2017). The biopolitical abilities of a post-industrial modern society has fundamentally reshaped how antagonisms towards immigration play out with the moving of the border from the edges of state sovereignty into domestic spaces, where citizens are increasingly required to check the visa status of their tenants, employees and associates (Bhattacharyya et al. 2017). With the advent of ever more harsher Immigration Acts in recent years and the Home Offices anti-illegal immigration, dubbed publicity campaign, “Operation Vaken” (Bhattacharyya et al. 2017), where memorable “GO HOME” vans drove the border through London Boroughs with high numbers of ethnic minority populations for a few weeks in 2013 (Gunaratnam, Patel, 2015), the landscape in which the politics of immigration is currently situated in has never been so intensified. Or has it?</p><p>The purpose of this case study is to shed light on the historical relationship between contemporary immigration policies and its colonial past. In order to do so two concepts need to be utilised. The first is the concept of presentism. Inglis (2013, pp. 100–101), claims that presentism involves the “unintended and unremarked privileging of contemporary concerns and dispositions within specific modes of analysis”. Inglis (2013, p. 100), argues that a sophisticated sociological understanding of the contemporary world is made possible only through an equally sophisticated understanding of the long-term historical processes which underpin the contemporary social world. The second concept is deployed by Mayblin (2014), in reference to Chimni’s work on the “myth of difference”. Mayblin (2014), addresses the popular and academic discourse which places current responses to immigration in a vacuum of presentism, that the reasons such strict immigration and asylum policies have emerged is due to the “newness” of the phenomena, and the scale of migrants which have been entering and settling in Europe since the 1980s. This is what Chimni (1998, cited in Mayblin, 2014), calls “the myth of difference”; where in fact the scale of migration and refugees to Europe in this period was no more unprecedented or unmanageable than any previous period, but that the political nature of refugees and the discourse refugees and migrants were situated in changed. Mayblin (2014), argues that a historical approach to these claims can de-mystify their privileging of contemporary concerns and discourses, by revealing the historical, racialized and political nature of these claims. Both of these concepts intertwine, and form the conceptual basis from which immigration policies past and present must be analysed.</p><p>The history of Britain’s immigration spans centuries, with records of African slaves and soldiers arriving from 55 BCE accompanying the invading Roman Armies (Craig, 2012, p. 42). However, migration to the UK in the 20th century can be seen as a direct consequence of British colonisation, with the history of the UK’s modern immigration policies being traced most notably back to the Post-war settlement and the implementation of the 1948 British Nationality Act (Craig, 2012, p. 52; Mason, 2000, p. 25). After the destruction wrought on Europe and Britain by the Second World War, there existed major labour shortages, due to this, post-war governments encouraged immigrants from their colonies to settle and work in order to fill the gap (Craig, 2012, p. 53; Geddes, 2003, pp. 32–33). The 1948 British Nationality Act formally gave all subjects of the British Crown throughout its Empire the ability to move to Britain in order to live and work; it is worth noting however, this act was largely a shoring up of the relationship between the Old Commonwealth colonies such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia aswell as an invitation for non-European migration (Hansen, 2000, pp. 17–19). Examples such as the Empire Windrush, where a British ship docked at Jamaica advertising cheap transport for anyone wishing to live and work in the UK were supported by the likes of political figures such as Enoch Powell (Craig, 2012, p. 53). New Commonwealth citizens from India, Africa and the Caribbean began to arrive in the UK with their families in increasing numbers from 1948 to the early 1960s with the promise of a better life (Mason, 2000, p. 25). It was within this period that Britain, as well as a plethora of other nation-states, reluctantly signed the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in 1951 signed the Convention on Refugees, some of the first pieces of legislation which enshrined the rights of particular groups of people under international law (Mayblin, 2014). It was seen as an era of economic and individual freedom which would create the world anew from the ashes of Fascism.</p><p>Gradually throughout the 1950’s however, as a response to the increase of non-white immigration from New Commonwealth colonies, a campaign for immigration control began to emerge (Craig and Flynn, 2012, p. 74). This eventually bore fruit with the implementation of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act by the Conservative government which for the first time established controls on all commonwealth citizens and distinguished between citizens of the UK and citizens of the commonwealth (Craig and Flynn, 2012, pp. 74–77; Geddes, 2003 p. 35). These controls called for assessments of migrant’s skills and work vouchers being issued, which existed as a requirement before permission to leave the colonies was given (Craig and Flynn, 2012, pp. 74–77; Mason, 2000, p. 26). The next major piece of anti-immigration legislation was introduced with the 1971 Immigration Act, which sought to restrict Commonwealth immigration further by replacing the 1962 temporary measure with permanent legislation which placed Commonwealth immigrants on the same footing as aliens, with the need to apply for work permits instead of employment vouchers (Boyce, 1999, p. 250; Mason, 2000, pp. 27–28). This legislation effectively ended primary immigration from the New Commonwealth, with family reunification existing as the prime source of New Commonwealth immigration (Boyce, 1999, p. 250; Mason, 2000, p.28). By 1981 however, the British Nationality Act 1981, reclassified UK citizenship into a three tiered system, where those qualifying for right of settlement under the 1968 and 1971 Immigration Acts, became British citizens, and those under the other two classifications maintained no right of settlement (Flynn and Craig, 2012 p. 80; Mason, 2000, p. 28; Boyce, 1999, p. 251). In 1988 another Immigration Act was passed, removing the right of certain British citizens the right to be joined in the UK by their spouse (Boyce, 1999, p. 251), drawing an almost indefinite closure on the immigration of non-European colonial migrants to the UK.</p><p>Since the 1970s, with the purposeful decline of New Commonwealth immigrants to Britain, the architecture of Britain’s immigration policies were built on a need to thwart the migration of workers from outside the EU, this was done for both economic, and racialized reasons (Kundnani, 2007, p. 61; Mason, 2000, pp. 28–29). The turn of the millennium and the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded “the end of history” and a new post-industrial economy for Britain which would bring prosperity. The UK under the New Labour government of Tony Blair largely followed the footsteps of EU member states promoting immigration as necessary to the workforce and that an upholding of the rights of asylum seekers should be maintained (Fekete, 2009, p. 20). However, strict controls on immigration still applied in the UK compared to other EU states and immigration reforms were routinely implemented by the New Labour government, such as reforms to family visas in 1999 and 2001, heavily regulating access for the spouses of British immigrants to join them in the UK (Turner, 2015, p. 634). The EU in this period, while attempting to harmonise asylum policies with member states, had also been simultaneously undermining asylum legislation such as the 1951 Geneva convention with successive policies which sought to measure and control “migration movements” (Fekete, p. 20, 2009). Kundnani (2007, p. 71), notes that since the 1980’s to the early 2000’s, both the EU and Britain’s treatment of asylum seekers as well as general immigration, had become increasingly militarised, with public and political discourse evolving to treat the seeking of asylum as an illegal offence when it is in-fact enshrined and protected by the Geneva Convention. Kundnani (2007, p. 71), notes how the increased policing of asylum seekers by the UK from the 1980s onwards was developed at the expense of any attempt to ensure the welfare of people in desperate situations the UK had pledged back in 1951 to protect. These advances in harsh asylum policies, coupled with the development of the “War on Terror” in the aftermath of 9/11 and the 7/7 bombings, and Tony Blairs claim that Europe was facing a “global threat” due to “Islamic extremism”; the UK as well as other EU states began a campaign of increasingly securitising their borders and implementing highly restrictive asylum policies (Kundnani, 2007, pp. 66–71; Fekete, 2009, pp. 43–48).</p><p>After the 2008 financial crash, and the consequences of economic catastrophe were felt across Europe, after not even a decade of relatively smooth EU migration from new member states such as Poland and Romania, calls for immigration controls reached new heights. In 2010, the coalition government of both the Conservative and Lib-Dem parties headed by David Cameron made swift advances in settling public discontent and once again took a heavy handed approach to immigration. The reforms to the family migration Visa legislation in 2012, which had already been altered under the New Labour government, sought to alter how “genuine” spousal relationships were defined and developed more stringent rules on immigrant family settlement in the UK (Turner, 2015). The implementation of “Operation Vaken” in 2013, saw vans plastered with “In the UK illegally? GO HOME OR FACE ARREST” venture through heavily migrant and ethnic minority populated areas, with the intent of persuading undocumented migrants to leave of their own volition (Bhattacharyya et al. 2017). With the implementations of both the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts, the UK’s border has seemingly entered various domains of public life while deploying new techniques and spaces of surveillance of immigration enforcement (Gunaratanum and Patel, 2015). These recent policies all existing within the context of Europe’s “migrant crises” which has already seen hundreds of lives lost on the dangerous passage to Europe and has left thousands displaced across Europe.</p><p>It is clear that the UK’s contemporary responses to immigration and the “refugee crises” are situated within a long and hostile history with immigration and asylum seeking. This case study will now offer a discussion on the conceptual explanations for Britain’s historical and contemporary responses to immigration and asylum seekers, by exploring the racializing and othering of its own colonial subjects while interrogating it’s own complicated history with it’s colonial past.</p><p>Britain’s wealth is based on racism (Andrews, 2017). The expansion of Britain as a colonial Empire alongside other European societies, and the gradual emergence of Industrial capitalism exist historically hand in hand, and Britain claims its place as a political and economic global hegemon due the slave trade and the expropriation of the wealth of its former colonies (Andrews, 2017; Dabashi, 2016; Mason, 2000 p. 19–24). Modern racisms emergence, in part, is owed to Britain’s domination of the slave trade and colonising of foreign lands and the justifications it developed in order to do so (Kundnani, 2007, pp. 11–15). It is generally understood now, that contemporary, Western, liberal, post-colonial societies are tolerant, democratic and by association, non-racist (Lentin, 2008, p. 488). An exploration of Britain’s treatment of its colonial subjects, and contemporary treatment of immigrants and asylum seekers however, begs to differ. Through its colonial engagements, Britain developed a sense of national identity that was necessarily based on othering perceived difference and classifying it as inferior, or in some cases, the enemy (Craig, 2012, pp. 47–48). Throughout the period of open Commonwealth migration this sense of national identity differentiated between “insiders” and “outsiders” mostly on coloured grounds, with increasing Caribbean, African and Asian immigration being met with constant hostility at public and governmental levels (Geddes, 2003, pp. 32–33; Mayblin, 2014).</p><p>It is well noted that successive immigration acts from 1962 onwards were developed with the intent of limiting non-white immigration from Britain’s colonies (Craig and Flynn, 2012, pp. 74–79; Fekete, 2009, p. 27; Geddes, 2003 p. 33–34). Mayblin (2014), citing Chimni’s work, argues that this was in-fact the reasoning behind the change of discourse surrounding asylum seekers from the 1980’s onwards. Prior to the decline of the Soviet Union and its eventual collapse in 1991, most asylum seekers traveling to the UK and other European states were white Europeans fleeing the Eastern Bloc and held both political and ideological value in delegitimising the cause of communism (Chimni, 1999, cited in Mayblin, 2014). After the collapse of the Soviet Union Mayblin argues (2014), asylum seekers were no longer valuable political assets, and were increasingly non-European, and were escaping persecution in former European colonies in Africa, India and the Middle-East, explaining the increased restrictions of asylum seeker policies. Fekete (2009, pp. 27–30), voices a similar argument, when arguing that modern state racism towards asylum seekers and immigrants has shifted and is now not only developed at the national, but international level. State racism now exists as a form of European globalist racism that separates new waves of asylum seekers not as deserving of rights and privileges under international law, but treats them as a suspect community, a rightless group, within a framework designed to contain and other them from insiders (Fekete, 2009, pp. 27–30).</p><p>Stuart Hall (1997, cited in Lentin, 2008, p. 488), argues that racism in the UK now takes the form of the “floating signifier”. Hall (1997, cited in Lentin, 2008, p. 488), argues that racism both socially and politically takes different forms, denoting to the increased criminalization of asylum seekers and other unwanted migrants, linking them to generalised themes of an external threat predicated on the existence of unwanted “others” in our midst. Modern polices and political campaigns such as “Operation Vaken”, utilise such ideas in their messages such as “Go Home”, and overtly target non-white immigrants as unwanted “others” (Bhattacharyya et al. 2017; The University of Warwick, 2014). It could be argued that Britain’s harsh contemporary responses to both immigration and asylum seekers is due to the operation of an administrative colonial gaze, that utilizes the floating signifier in developing policy responses that separates insiders from outsiders, wanted migrants from unwanted migrants usually on the basis of race. It is argued by some, that this approach taken towards migrants exists within the context of Britain attempting to cleanse its colonial past, by denying that it ever existed. Britain in recent years has developed an identity which claims to espouse liberalism, tolerance and democracy, while ignoring that its wealth and political influence was built on slavery and colonialism (Andrews, 2017; Dabashi, 2016; Lentin, 2008). By denying this, Britain and other European states engage in an illusion that both erases the fact that their successes are built upon their colonial pasts, and erases any moral or political obligation to tolerate migrants or refugees. Colonialism in effect, Lentin claims (2014, p. 495), was “someone else’s tragedy”. There is an argument to be made that Britain’s harsh contemporary policy responses to immigration is part of this attempt to erase its colonial history, and the people who helped make it. Gilroy (Williams, 2013, pp. 61–72), takes a different conceptual approach to Britain’s treatment of immigrants, arguing that Britain as a national community maintains a melancholic relationship with its colonial past. Gilroy (Williams, 2013, pp. 61–72), claims that Britain post-World War Two could not compete with the two emerging global superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union. Faced with its declining Empire, its international influence and national identity as a global colonial power was stripped away from it and that Britain has still not come to terms with its collapse in status (Williams, 2013, pp. 61–72). Because of this, Gilroy claims (Williams, 2013, pp. 61–72), Britain’s attitude towards immigrants, and their children, has been forever tainted as a symbol of what it once had, and lost, and uses immigrants as a scapegoat for Britain’s shrinking sense of itself on the global stage. Both of these conceptual arguments give explanation for Britain’s recent and consistent attempts to implement hard-line anti-immigration and asylum policies, demonstrating its hostile approach to immigrants is heavily situated in its attempt to cleanse itself of its colonial past and to pass on the myth that it exists as a post-colonial society.</p><p>In conclusion, this case study has set out to affirm the fact that Britain’s contemporary policy responses to immigration are still preoccupied with undertaking the gaze of a colonial administration that attempts to separate insiders and outsiders, deserving from undeserving migrants. Britain’s modern policy responses to the current “crises” are situated in its history of racism and apologism for its colonial past, whether that take the form of abjection towards it or melancholia. This case study has insisted on the dismantling of presentism when engaging with the contemporary social world and the pervasive “myth of difference” pertained by the modern discourse of immigration politics. In order to truly reveal the sociological truths of contemporary immigration policies espoused by both Britain and Europe, the modern liberal state must turn a critical reflection on itself in order to break down the myth that Britain is in fact a post-colonial or post-racial society. Colonialism and the racializing of others is not only Britain’s past, it is its present, and any concern with immigration it currently faces can only be blamed on itself. As Sivanandan (2008, p. 95) remarks “Quite simply, we came to Britain because we were occupied by Britain. Colonialism and immigration are part of the same continuum. We are here, because you were there”.</p><p>E���I�</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=90ee47a9b521" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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