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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Katherine Reilly on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Katherine Reilly on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Data, the Sharing Economy and Canadian Federal Regulation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kmareilly/canadian-federal-government-regulation-data-and-the-digital-platform-economy-22da446f0dc4?source=rss-1720b2adc3ec------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[canada]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[platform-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sharing-economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Katherine Reilly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Feb 2018 02:46:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-14T00:39:29.470Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1FgD-FhrLGgfaJB5wpn-cQ.png" /></figure><p>Theory tells us that data is central to digital platform capitalism, so there is growing interest in creating policies that protect consumers and foster innovation given new data-driven business practices. But data is not new to digital capitalism, and there are existing policy regimes in place that address privacy, intellectual property, competition, and consumer and human rights. Establishing new data policies is not as simple as updating the old data policies. This article explains why, with reference to Canadian federal regulations.</p><p><strong>Data and the Digital Platform Economy in Theory</strong></p><p>Data is central to the sharing economy. Srnicek (2017) explains that <em>digital</em> platform business models are distinguished from analogue platforms by their intensive use of data. A digital platform positions itself “as the ground upon which [users’] activities occur, which gives it privileged access to record them” (ibid., p. 43). Platforms also grow rapidly and establish market dominance through network effects: “the more numerous the users who use a platform, the more valuable that platform becomes” (ibid., p. 44). Companies then assert “control and governance over the rules of the game” (ibid., p. 47) by manipulating the algorithms used to manage user interactions (Grossman 2015; Just &amp; Latzer 2016), a phenomenon known as ‘design-based regulation’ (Yeung 2017). Finally, the data is a commodity that can be leveraged or sold (Schiller 2007).</p><p>This means that data and algorithms are key to understanding how the digital platform economy (DPE) is reshaping participation in economic and social processes. Emerging research has identified several DPE digital rights issues including discrimination (Ert et al. 2016; Edelman et al. 2017; Rosenblat et al. 2017), growth in inequality (Schor 2017), anti-competitive outcomes in markets (Reilly 2017), and a new balance of power between platform owners and platform users (Calo &amp; Rosenblat 2017), including workers (Rosenblat &amp; Stark 2016; Becerril 2017).</p><p>Of particular concern, the reputation management systems that govern users’ participation in digital platforms decide who gets to take up jobs, unlock cars, or access accommodations (Hearn 2010). These findings raise questions about the transparency of reputation systems, access to personal data, and the portability of reputational data across platforms (Stewart 2014). In addition, data may be used for anti-competitive service and pricing practices, that discriminate against new market entrants, or reduce consumers’ freedom of choice in the marketplace.</p><p>As a result, governance of the DPE “is increasingly seen as an important regulatory issue” (ITforChange 2017, n.p.). The new business practices introduced by the digital platform economy are putting stress on existing policies, but it is not clear how to update them.</p><p><strong>Policy Context for the Digital Platform Economy in Canada</strong></p><p>You would be forgiven for thinking that the sharing economy is a new ‘sector’ of the economy, given how digital platform enterprises are talked about. This is likely an effect of early research on the sharing economy, which has tended to focus on case studies of iconic new companies. But conversations with experts at Statistics Canada convinced me that we are actually facing new types of business <em>practices</em> that cut across the economy at different scales of activity, to different extents, and with subtle variations in form. This makes regulation of new data intensive practices very complex.</p><blockquote>You would be forgiven for thinking that the sharing economy is a new ‘sector’ of the economy. We are actually facing new types of business <em>practices</em> that cut across the economy. This makes regulation of new data intensive practices very complex.</blockquote><p>In Canada, ‘data intensive sharing practices’ interact with a variety of different regulatory frameworks.</p><p>Canada’s most <em>obvious</em> data policy was established in the early 2000s to support our trading relationship with the European Union. The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) addresses the collection, use and disclosure of personal information by private sector actors in the course of commercial activities. PIPEDA made Canada a ‘safe harbour’ for European data. Basically it establishes a set of principles for use of private data, particularly the need to obtain consent as it pertains to specific uses.</p><p>Canadian competition policy is also relevant to data-intensive platform-based practices. Companies have long gathered intelligence about their client base. But platform-based practices may make it possible for companies to gather or acquire information about their clients in new and concerning ways. For example, the knowledge that companies amass about their clients may enable them to engage in anti-competitive pricing practices, or forced loyalty schemes.</p><p>Surprisingly, intellectual property law is also relevant to digital platform practices. In 2016,<a href="http://www.teresascassa.ca/index.php?option=com_k2&amp;view=item&amp;id=214:court-decision-finds-copyright-in-compilation-of-seismic-data"> as reported by Teresa Scassa</a>, a Canadian court upheld a decision to apply copyright protections to a compilation of data, as if this data were a cultural product (such as a book or movie). The application of copyright law to databases of consumer data would provide companies with a tool to avoid public scrutiny of their data practices.</p><p>There is also the suggestion that federal actors are taking an interest in updating Canada’s innovation, labour and taxation policies to accommodate new business practices. Statistics Canada recently published the results of a Labour Force Survey that sought to <a href="http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/170228/dq170228b-eng.htm">approximate the size of the ‘sharing economy’ in Canada</a>. StatsCan is also considering how to <a href="https://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/13-605-x/2017001/article/14771-eng.htm">update national accounts</a> to better capture the economic value of these activities. And finally, the 2018 Canadian Internet Use Survey will include questions about the use of platforms to supplement or replace traditional labour activities. This research raises new questions, such as: What is the value of data assets held by Canadian companies? Should they be included in corporate income tax filings? What supports or protections should the federal government offer to Canadian workers? How is innovation changing, and should incentives change to reflect new and different approaches production?</p><p>Finally, we cannot forget about international and trade law. The EU’s new privacy policy, plus ongoing NAFTA and TPP negotiations will have <a href="http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/12/canadian-position-data-localization-rules-trade-deals-revealed-protection-government-data/">important implications for Canadian data policy</a>. In particular, the two trade deals will prohibit any form of data localizations or any types of restrictions on the transfer of data between countries. This will allow Canadian companies to hire foreign firms to work with their data, and it will also allow foreign companies to hold Canadian data in foreign cloud banks or data bases.</p><p>Note that Canada does not have data localization laws <em>except</em> in the case of health data. There are also some small pockets of data localization <em>policy</em>, for example as it relates to research and some legal practices. Instead, Canada uses the accountability principle — data can be transferred anywhere, but the ‘owner’ is accountable for that data, wherever it is.</p><p>In total, updating federal policies for the sharing economy is not as simple as re-writing PIPEDA. In fact, there is a quiet movement afoot to engage in a more meaningful review of Canada’s data policies. In a January 2018 <a href="https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2018/01/30/jim-balsillie-canada-needs-a-national-data-strategy.html">Toronto Star opinion piece</a>, Jim Balsillie of RIM fame said “It’s critical that Canada designs and implements a National Data Strategy to protect our prosperity, security and values.” And in February 2018, Rohinton P. Medhora, President of the Canadian Centre for International Governance Innovation <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/events/roundtable-discussion-data-governance-and-strategy">hosted a closed-door round table</a> with Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs and David Lametti, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development to spark interest in the development of just such a strategy.</p><p><strong>Regulatory Considerations</strong></p><p>If it even gets off the ground, we don’t yet know what Canada’s National Data Strategy will look like. But after interviewing a dozen Canadian experts on the theme, I’ve identified four issues that should be taken into consideration in the discussion.</p><p><strong>Data versus Algorithms</strong> — Algorithms are fundamentally changing the game where data is concerned. The PIPEDA framework was created to protect <em>private</em> information, and is based on a fundamental distinction between private and public information. Unfortunately, it has been relatively simple for private sector actors to circumvent PIPEDA by anonymizing data. If the data is anonymous, they argue, then it no longer infringes on privacy. The difficulty here is that algorithms make it relatively easy to de-anonymize data. This means that algorithms take us into an entirely new realm, requiring entirely new approaches to privacy law and digital rights.</p><p><strong>Types of Data</strong> — When creating data policy, we need to categorize data according to its functional purpose. Based on my observations about the Canadian case, I believe it is important to distinguish between data that is used to influence people’s preferences, and data that is used to intercede in intermediation of goods and services.</p><blockquote>Data policy needs to distinguish between data that is used to influence people’s preferences, and data that is used to intercede in intermediation of goods and services.</blockquote><p>In the Canadian case, the networked <em>media</em> economy, <a href="http://www.cmcrp.org/the-growth-of-the-network-media-economy-in-canada-1984-2016/">as Dwayne Winseck calls it</a>, is the most vocal when it comes to regulating private data. This group includes both traditional ‘broadcast distribution undertakings’ (Bell, Rogers, Corus/Shaw, Quebecore) and new media actors such as Facebook and Google. What unites them is a desire to to influence people’s preferences so that they will be more inclined to engage in particular types of buying or voting behaviours. But the final choice is left up to the consumer or citizen, in a market place the offers many different options.</p><p>To my knowledge, businesses that engage in platform-based intermediation of goods and services have stayed quiet in Canadian policy circles that address data-related issues. Why is this? These actors view their data as a source of competitive advantage, so they are not inclined to share it with others. In addition, the data is collected under conditions that will necessarily engender the user’s consent, so PIPEDA is a generally agreeable policy framework for these actors.</p><p>This does not mean that the data-intensive practices of these companies are beyond regulatory scrutiny. Its just that the regulations would need to be quite different in this case. Trade policy is a more likely target for data intensive market intermediaries, because they are deeply affected by data-localization. And since digital platform intermediaries use data and algorithms to govern the exchange of goods and services in the economy, the primary concern is not privacy, but ensuring competition and digital rights. As <a href="https://twitter.com/mediamorphis">Dwayne Winseck</a> so eloquently put it in a recent conversation, we need policies that prevent digital actors from “thinking that they can construct the marketplace just because they own the network.”</p><p>One last word here — it may seem strange to combine media actors with intermediaries in this section, but I think it is essential to look at their data use practices in tandem. Data service companies like <a href="http://locationgenius.com/">ViaSense</a> may be capable of creating a bridge between data for intermediation and data for persuasion. Also, it is somewhat artificial to separate persuasion from market intermediation; the two processes may be more interlinked than I have suggested.</p><p><strong>Purpose, Scale and Reach</strong> —Given that novel business practices can be adopted throughout the economy, purpose, scale and reach are also important considerations in establishing new regulatory frameworks. Consider <em>just</em> the goods-sharing services active in the Vancouver area. They range from <a href="http://www.villagevancouver.ca/">Village Vancouver</a> and <a href="http://thethingery.com/">the Thingery</a>, which support new forms of community economic development, to <a href="https://www.urbanshare.ca/">Urban Share</a> and <a href="https://quupe.com/">Quupe</a> which are online marketplaces that help people capitalize on the unused capacity in their consumer goods. Purpose matters because it influences how initiatives collect, evaluate and leverage data.</p><p>It has been suggested to me that scale is essential to this discussion, because scale creates new or additional affordances for companies. I think that the effects of scale will depend on a number of factors. Clearly there are network effects attached to the size of a platform enterprise (as discussed in section 1 above). Larger networks may be better positioned to achieve market dominance, which would give them special kinds of influence. But the value of a data set is not necessarily proportional to its size. And small companies are just as likely as larger ones to engage in third party authentification, or work with credit card companies or cloud platforms. This means that their data footprint will be much larger than the number of people in their client base might suggest.</p><p>The same set of considerations also applies to reach, particularly in reference to data localization. Larger companies will often reach across regulatory jurisdictions, however they are also in a better position to adjust their practices to meet local regulatory demands. Smaller companies, on the other hand, are just as likely to work with third party service suppliers located in other markets, making data localization a significant issue for them. Very local companies, however, may be doing everything in house, which would make them fly under the radar of scale or reach issues. Clearly this set of considerations is ripe for empirical investigation.</p><p><strong>Types of Regulation — </strong>A final consideration concerns the enactment of data regulations for the platform economy. Are data-intensive platform-based activities best regulated by a government authority, through industry self-regulation, or some other approach? The current approach in Canada favours industry self-regulation overseen by a government watchdog within a particular set of legal parameters. For example, Canada’s Federal Privacy Commissioner (Daniel Therrien) can investigate privacy concerns that fall within the ambit of PIPEDA, and he can <em>recommend</em> criminal investigations, but he has has no powers of enforcement.</p><p>A similar approach seems to be taking shape with regards to the data-intensive activities of platform businesses. According to Grossman (2015; also Hazenberg &amp; Zwitter 2017) platform data could be regulated through data audits, mandated open access to one’s own data, protections for data pooling efforts, and the like. However, this is a major challenge since most private enterprises eschew data transparency, given that data and algorithms are central to their competitive advantage (Schiller 2007). Workarounds to this problem are emerging. Several Canadian experts I spoke with suggested that companies could be required to inform clients about the scope and intent of their algorithmic practices, without revealing the contents of their codes. And regular data audits by government approved third party practitioners could certify compliance with federal legal frameworks. Audits would then provide the basis for oversight, and if necessary, disciplinary measures.</p><p>Most Canadian digital rights watchdogs would decry this approach, however. They have been dissatisfied with the limited powers of the Privacy Commissioner, and feel that the case law solution puts too heavy of burden on public ‘Davids’ to pursue private sector ‘Goliaths’ in court. Instead, they would favour greater enforcement powers, plus regulations that empower citizens and consumers to access, share and audit private data themselves.</p><p><strong>Concluding Thoughts</strong></p><p>In total, establishing new approaches and frameworks for regulating data use in the sharing economy will almost certainly open up a new policy cycle in Canada that will cut across a range of different federal institutions and issues. The results of this policy cycle will establish the legal, cultural and social foundations for the digital economy in the coming 20 years.</p><p><em>Thank you to </em><a href="https://www.idrc.ca/"><em>IDRC</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://www.itforchange.net/"><em>ITforChange</em></a><em> for their generous support of this work.</em></p><p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p><p>Becerril, Josemaria. 2017. “The Sharing Economy Comes to Mexico.” <em>Jacobian</em>, January. <a href="http://jacobinmag.com/2017/01/sharing-economy-mexico-apli-informal-labor-precarity.">http://jacobinmag.com/2017/01/sharing-economy-mexico-apli-informal-labor-precarity.</a></p><p>Calo, Ryan, and Alex Rosenblat. 2017. “The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power.” <em>SSRN Electronic Journal</em>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2929643.">https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2929643.</a></p><p>Edelman, Benjamin Gordon, Michael Luca, and Daniel Alejandro Svirsky. 2017. “Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment.” <a href="https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/33045458.">https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/33045458.</a></p><p>Ert, Eyal, Aliza Fleischer, and Nathan Magen. 2016. “Trust and Reputation in the Sharing Economy: The Role of Personal Photos in Airbnb.” <em>Tourism Management</em> 55:62–73. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2016.01.013.">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2016.01.013.</a></p><p>Grossman, Nick. 2015. “Regulation, the Internet Way: A Data-First Model for Establishing Trust, Safety, and Security.” White Paper. Regulatory Reform for the 21st Century. Data-Smart City Solutions, Harvard University. <a href="http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/white-paper-regulation-the-internet-way-660.">http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/white-paper-regulation-the-internet-way-660.</a></p><p>Hazenberg, Jules L. J., and Andrej Zwitter. 2017. “Network Governance in the Big Data and Cyber Age.” <em>Zeitschrift Fur Evangelische Ethik</em> 61 (3):184–209.</p><p>Hearn, Alison. 2010. “Structuring Feeling: Web 2.0, Online Ranking and Rating, and the Digital ‘Reputation’ Economy.” <em>Ephemera: Theory and Politics in Organization</em> 10 (3). <a href="http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/structuring-feeling-web-20-online-ranking-and-rating-and-digital-%E2%80%98reputation%E2%80%99-economy.">http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/structuring-feeling-web-20-online-ranking-and-rating-and-digital-%E2%80%98reputation%E2%80%99-economy.</a></p><p>ITforChange. n.d. “The Emerging Power of Platforms.” <em>Decoding Digital Rights: A Primer for Activists and Practitioners</em>. Accessed November 8, 2017. <a href="http://itforchange.net/decoding_digital_rights/40-2/open-internet/the-emerging-power-of-platforms/">http://itforchange.net/decoding_digital_rights/40-2/open-internet/the-emerging-power-of-platforms/.</a></p><p>Just, Natascha, and Michael Latzer. 2016. “Governance by Algorithms: Reality Construction by Algorithmic Selection on the Internet.” <em>Media, Culture &amp; Society</em> 39 (2):238–58. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443716643157.">https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443716643157.</a></p><p>Reilly, Katherine M. A., and Juan P. Alperin. 2016. “Intermediation in Open Development: A Stewardship Approach.” <em>Global Media Journal — Canadian Edition</em> 9 (1):51–71.</p><p>Rosenblat, Alex, Karen E. C. Levy, Solon Barocas, and Tim Hwang. 2017. “Discriminating Tastes: Uber’s Customer Ratings as Vehicles for Workplace Discrimination.” <em>Policy &amp; Internet</em> 9 (3):256–79. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.153.">https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.153.</a></p><p>Rosenblat, Alex, and Luke Stark. 2016. “Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers.” <em>International Journal of Communication</em> 10:3758–84.</p><p>Schiller, Dan. 2007. <em>How to Think about Information</em>. 1st Edition edition. Urbana, Ill.; Chesham: University of Illinois Press.</p><p>Schor, Juliet B. 2017. “Does the Sharing Economy Increase Inequality within the Eighty Percent?: Findings from a Qualitative Study of Platform Providers.” <em>Cambridge Journal Of Regions, Economy And Society</em> 10 (2):263–79. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsw047.">https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsw047.</a></p><p>Srenicek, Nick. 2017. <em>Platform Capitalism</em>. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.</p><p>Stewart, Patrick J. 2014. “Why Uber Should Let People See Their Own Passenger Ratings.” Business Insider. October 23, 2014. <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/reputation-and-the-sharing-economy-2014-10.">http://www.businessinsider.com/reputation-and-the-sharing-economy-2014-10.</a></p><p>Yeung, Karen. 2017. “‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design.” <em>Information Communication &amp; Society</em> 20 (1):118–36. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1186713.">https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1186713.</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=22da446f0dc4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Monopoly versus the Platform Economy in Mexico]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kmareilly/monopoly-versus-the-platform-economy-in-mexico-a7108324d8b5?source=rss-1720b2adc3ec------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[mexico]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sharing-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[telecommunication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Katherine Reilly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 26 Oct 2017 06:53:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-07T03:56:47.564Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I’m just back from Mexico City where I had the opportunity to study its emerging sharing economy. If you’re imaging <em>Chilango</em>-styled hipster start-ups and <em>totopo</em>-infused maker labs, brace yourself, because when you push past the fancy talk and inspired design, what Mexico really offers is a master course in the political economy of peer-to-peer sharing.</p><p>Before heading out on my trip, I checked in with a friend from <a href="https://www.consumocolaborativo.com/">OuiShare, Barcelona</a>, who organized collaborative economy events in CDMX last year. He warned me that “Mexico isn’t as advanced” in the collaborative economy space as European nations.</p><p>So I hopped online to do some background research. I found all sorts of upbeat propaganda-style business stories about Mexico’s supposedly burgeoning innovation sector. But the startups in these stories were few and far between. A little investigation showed that they were often still-born. A Mexican friend at <a href="http://www.openmedia.org/">Open Media</a> pointed out that foreign investors balk at currencies that aren’t able to repatriate returns.</p><p>Meanwhile, I found all sorts of reports about Mexico’s 2014 Telecommunications Reform. The reform was clearly a really big deal, with wide-ranging effects, but its relevance to the platform economy was not immediately obvious to me. With little else to go on, I decided to take a leap of faith and explore further.</p><p><strong>Mexico’s 2014 Telco Policy Reform</strong></p><p>When Mexico privatized its state-run telecommunications company in the early 1990s, as part of the neoliberal reforms that swept the planet at that time, it was bought up by Grupo Carso which is owned by Carlos Slim, who later became the world’s richest person. By the early 2010s, Slim’s company, America Movil, had gobbled up large swaths of the cell phone market in Latin America, and alongside Telmex, held a near monopoly on landline, internet and mobile telecommunications services in Mexico. As a result, Mexican consumers faced some of the highest telecommunications prices in the world.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/580/1*k77Rg4f-1LXK8hdgONNl8A.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="http://www.economist.com/taxonomy/term/34/14587780?page=58">http://www.economist.com/taxonomy/term/34/14587780?page=58</a></figcaption></figure><p>And, unsurprisingly, telecommunications penetration reflected pricing:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/580/1*GpNJOLXkYSPqy-9p_x1w7g.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="http://www.economist.com/taxonomy/term/34/14587780?page=58">http://www.economist.com/taxonomy/term/34/14587780?page=58</a></figcaption></figure><p>When President Enrique Peña Nieto came to office in 2012, he faced slow economic growth, high unemployment, and a series of highly intractable social issues related to organized crime. Finding himself uncomfortably wedged between Criminals and Capitalists, he opted to take on monopoly economic power in Mexico. This invariably meant taking on Carlos Slim and his telecommunications monopoly.</p><p>The history of monopoly in Mexico is long and deep, reaching back into a period known as the Porfiriato (1884–1911), which foregrounds the establishment of the country’s modern democratic system. Why would Peña Nieto decide to lock horns with such a sacred cow?</p><p>For one thing, monopoly provision of basic services is strangling Mexico’s economy. High telecommunications costs undermine tech innovation, for example, and that has all sorts of negative implications for the Mexican economy, from slow job creation to brain drain. For another thing, monopolies mean high prices for consumer services like electricity. By lowering prices, Peña Nieto could achieve populist gains with voters.</p><p>The story of the 2012–2014 telecommunications battle is long and complex, and has been covered extensively <a href="http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=11843154003">elsewhere</a>. For our immediate purposes, we can focus on the outcome. The new telecommunications law obliged telecommunications players who held more than 50% of the market (i.e. Carlos Slim and Telcel) to provide competitors with open access to infrastructure until such time as the playing field became more level. These legal reforms paved the way for new entrants into Mexico’s telecommunications marketplace, causing prices to drop and subscriptions to increase (at least in urban areas — more on this later).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/420/1*OlXrQd0AVnvA91skd8-6aQ.png" /></figure><p>Certainly this is a good thing for Mexican consumers. Anti-monopoly policy has increased mobile penetration, and it has put money in people’s pockets (again, particularly in urban areas). But what does this have to do with the platform economy? I spent much of my time in Mexico trying to figure this out.</p><p><strong>Telco Reform and the Platform Economy</strong></p><p>At first I played with the idea that telco reforms were part of an effort to spark economic growth in Mexico. Lowering the cost of data and increasing cell and internet penetration rates would create a more favourable context for tech innovation. There is no doubt that this was an intention of the reforms. And indeed, Mexico has its share of sharing economy startups such as CarrotMX, Yaxi, Ergomotos, and Parkeo.</p><p>But the more I talked to <a href="https://twitter.com/antoniomarvel?lang=en">local experts</a>, the more I came to understand that the link between telecommunications and the platform economy is not a particularly virtuous one in the case of Mexico.</p><p>Partly this is the result of jurisdictional issues. You see, the sharing economy is predominantly an urban phenomenon in Mexico. Neighbours tend to share more readily in rural areas on the basis of face-to-face relationships. The lower density of people in rural areas makes peer-to-peer platforms less feasible. And in the case of Mexico, Telmex never did reach infrastructure into rural or marginalized areas, so telecommunications reforms have done little to change cell phone and internet penetration rates there. As a result, sharing economy initiatives tend to be most relevant to urban populations.</p><p>Enter the newly formed <a href="http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/760075/from-df-to-cdmx-mexico-city-changes-name-status">City of Mexico</a> (CDMX) under the leadership of Miguel Ángel Mancera. Mancera faces the same difficult economic conditions as Peña Nieto, but he faces these problems at the local level in one of the largest cities in the world. Certainly Mancera is under a great deal of pressure to promote economic growth, generate jobs, and improve service provision to <em>Chilangos</em>.</p><p>Unfortunately, his strategies are largely at odds with federal policy frameworks. Remember that Peña Nieto’s federal telecommunication reforms have made it much more possible for urban Mexican’s to have cell phones. These populations have embraced social media and sharing economy apps enthusiastically in the past 3 years. This could have been an excellent opportunity to promote innovation in Mexico City, along the lines of what has been done in <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0169796X17710076">Seoul, Korea</a>.</p><p>But when Cabify and especially Uber entered CDMX — with all the bravado that Uber is famous for — their informal economy jobs offered an easy solution to high unemployment rates, and their low rates offered a populist win with voters (see <a href="http://www.lapoliticaonline.com/nota/96675/">La Política Online</a>).</p><p><strong><em>The upshot is that CDMX allows international companies to profit by offering a service that is in direct competition with the very Mexican start-up companies that federal policy sought to incentivize.</em></strong></p><p>As if this were not enough, as competition has heated up among telecommunications operators in Mexico, they’ve sought new ways to distinguish themselves among consumers. One of their strategies is zero rating, which is the practice of waiving data charges associated with particular applications or services. Zero rating is widely considered to be an anticompetitive practice because it creates an unfair advantage for services that become effectively free to consumers (see <a href="https://r3d.mx/2017/05/16/se-profundizan-ofertas-de-zero-rating-en-mexico-el-ift-sigue-en-silencio/">Carlos Brito of R3D</a>).</p><p><strong><em>And yet, several telcos in Mexico zero rate Uber, giving it an unfair advantage over native sharing economy tech start-ups (such as Yaxi), not to mention the traditional taxi sector.</em></strong></p><p>Finally, there is the issue of the online payment systems that go hand-in-hand with sharing economy applications. Of course, one need only use a credit card to pay for sharing economy services. But what if you could use a mobile banking application such as M-Pesa, which is already right there on your phone? Mobile banking has been slow to evolve in Mexico, which is not surprising given the history of monopoly telecommunications pricing. But Telcel and Banamex have had a long-standing agreement in place to collaborate on mobile banking.</p><p><strong><em>This raises the possibility that telecommunications and banking companies will collaborate to create backbone infrastructure for sharing economy initiatives in Mexico.</em></strong></p><p><strong>Monopoly versus the Platform Economy in Mexico</strong></p><p>And so we come full circle to the issue of monopolies in Mexico. In the short term, it is certainly true that Peña Nieto’s telco reforms have introduced greater competition into the Mexican marketplace. But as that marketplace accommodates itself to the wave of disruptions caused by the platform economy, and new strategies emerge to position old companies, questions remain about deeply entrenched monopoly power in Mexico.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a7108324d8b5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Models for the Sharing Economy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kmareilly/models-for-the-sharing-economy-9bead0a964e9?source=rss-1720b2adc3ec------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9bead0a964e9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[model]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[platform-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sharing-economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Katherine Reilly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Oct 2017 02:25:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-26T06:59:55.321Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Review of Nick Srnicek’s <em>Platform Capitalism </em></strong>(Polity Press, 2017)</p><p>Given the hype surrounding the sharing economy, Nick Srnicek’s <em>Platform Capitalism</em> offers some much needed definitional grounding, and a welcome dose of historical analysis.</p><p>I don’t agree with everything Srnicek says, but the book helped me organize my thoughts, making it a must read for anyone trying to figure out this field.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/1*OdI9vaUuTAXx6Ko0q3tqPQ.png" /></figure><p>At its core, the book argues that “capitalism has turned to data as one way to maintain economic growth and vitality in the face of a sluggish production sector.” Given this trend, “The platform has emerged as a new business model, capable of extracting and controlling immense amounts of data, and with this shift we have seen the rise of large monopolistic firms.” These are companies like Google, Salesforce, Spotify or Airbnb, and they are referenced throughout the book.</p><p>In developing his argument Srnicek offers several useful models of the forces driving platform companies. He starts by establishing the three main characteristics of platform businesses:</p><ol><li>they are data-intensive digital intermediaries that bring together different types of users (including both people and things) and enable them to interact.</li><li>they grow through network effects, which work to solidify their position in a marketplace, and can produce monopolistic tendencies.</li><li>network effects are augmented by cross-subsidization of services across marketplaces and user groups, as well as algorithmic governance mechanisms, that are used to attract and maintain users.</li></ol><p>Given these forces, Srnicek argues that platforms have an in-build tendency towards monopolization. However he also recognizes that they must compete on the basis of control over data collection and analysis. This means that they are driven by a unique set of forces, which are sometimes at odds with each other.</p><p>Specifically, platforms grow by expanding their user base for data extraction. This can cause them to encroach upon each other’s markets/data spaces. Having said this, they also compete by occupying specialized positions within ‘the platform stack’ (more on this below). And this means that platforms also tend to enclose data ecosystems by locking users in. This can be done through a variety of strategies, such as undermining data portability, or making it very difficult to change service providers.</p><p>While these insights are welcome, I am less convinced by Srnicek’s decision to divide the world of platform businesses into 5 arch types according to their profit-making strategies. The models he identifies are 1) advertising platforms, such as Facebook, which extract information about users to enhance the sale of ad space, 2) cloud platforms, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), which rent out access to hardware and software, 3) industrial platforms, such as GE, which are reorganizing manufacturing, 4) product platforms, such as Spotify, which turn a good into a service through subscription fees, and 5) lean platforms, such as Uber, which engage in hyper outsourcing and profit through cost reduction.</p><p>I find this categorization problematic for several reasons.</p><p>First, Srnicek himself notes that platform businesses have a tendency towards convergence on the basis of their common data needs. As a result, they tend to distinguish themselves according to the service they provide, rather than their business model.</p><p>Second, Srnicek analyzes each category of business according to its potential for long term profitability. ‘Lean platforms’ (as he calls them) get the thumbs down: “Far from representing the future of work or that of the economy, these models seem likely to fall apart in the coming years.”</p><p>While the hyper outsourcing that characterizes companies like Uber is undesirable for many, many reasons, there is more to Uber than simply a profit play. As O’Reilly points out in a <a href="https://www.safaribooksonline.com/library/view/wtf-whats-the/9780062565723/text/9780062565723_Chapter_3.xhtml?imm_mid=0f71ab&amp;cmp=em-data-na-na-newsltr_20171011#_idParaDest-10">recent publication</a>, the peer-to-peer problem has been around for a long time, and there have been several attempts to solve it. While Uber may be a ‘lean platform,’ it is also experimenting with new forms of what I like to call ‘logistics brokerage,’ which is very important to the platform economy. (You can see me speak on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U68garIa2NE">logistics brokerage here</a>.)</p><p>This brings me to my third point: there are different layers of services at work in the platform economy, some of which are B-2-B and some of which are B-to-C. While Srnicek offers us an analysis of internal pressures and competitive dynamics, he tends to overlook the way in which ‘the platform stack’ is coming together at a macro level to solve the problem of transacting goods and services. At the macro level, platforms will want to make the link between the digital and the material, or between business services and consumer services.</p><p>This is especially significant to researchers who might want to leverage Srnicek’s models. He highlights the importance of data to the platform economy. But at the end of the day, data needs to do more than simply exist. It needs to do work! If it is to generate profits, it needs to organize itself around transactions. And when you order a cab from a logistics broker, several different platforms mobilize data around that transaction: geolocation platforms, banking platforms, insurance platforms, communications platforms.</p><p>This means that we cannot think of different types of platforms in silos, but rather should be thinking about the entire ecosystem, and the ways in which it is reorganizing production. In other words, we need to start doing industrial analysis of data pathways. In this way we can begin to understand how industries express power in the digital age. This will ultimately give us a much fuller picture of how the platform economy in general, and the sharing economy in particular, are reshaping the contemporary political economy.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9bead0a964e9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Theory for the Sharing Economy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kmareilly/theory-for-the-sharing-economy-bc66efb97b7?source=rss-1720b2adc3ec------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bc66efb97b7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[guyer]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[collaborative-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sharing-economy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[platform-economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Katherine Reilly]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 02 Oct 2017 22:41:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-26T07:07:53.193Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Review of Jane I. Guyer’s “From Market to Platform”</strong></p><p>In: <strong><em>Legacies, Logics, Logistics: Essays in the Anthropology of the Platform Economy, </em></strong>University of Chicago Press, 2016.</p><p>There is a growing body of work offering theoretical guidance on the collaborative economy and platform capitalism. In <a href="https://medium.com/@kmareilly/models-for-the-sharing-economy-9bead0a964e9">another post</a>, I discuss <a href="https://twitter.com/n_srnck">Nick Srnicek</a>’s <em>Platform Capitalism</em>, for example.</p><p>Here I want to explore a recent work by the economic anthropologist <a href="http://anthropology.jhu.edu/directory/jane-guyer/">Jane I. Guyer</a>, who offers a unique take on the platform economy. Her work has important implications for how we should talk or think about collaborative economy initiatives.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/333/1*c5E_rWZHXeCQC5QfH8KKUQ.png" /></figure><p>Guyer suggests that <em>platform</em>-based capitalism marks a fundamental break away from <em>market</em>-based capitalism, and that as such, we need new ways to think about every-day acts of exchange and price setting.</p><p>But Guyer does more than simply recognize a shift from market to platform. She also argues that the <em>idea</em> of ‘the market’ has become an abstraction based on the fantasy of a self-organizing system, and that this abstraction works to prop up institutions that serve entrenched interests, such as the “free market economy” and “neoliberal capitalism.”</p><p>Sure, there are ‘real’ institutions out there that regulate real processes of exchange, but the idea of ‘the market’ no longer accurately represents the reality of those institutions, or of people’s economic experiences with them.</p><p>A brief example from <a href="https://twitter.com/nielsvdoorn">Niels van Doorn</a> can be useful here.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> Van Doorn illustrates how digital platforms for labour exchange (i.e. gig economy apps) make labour processes less visible than they were in the market-based economy. They obscure the intermediaries, their clients and the labourers who interact on these apps, as well as the exchange process that happen between them. This has the effect of making the platform labour force seem fungible and superfluous.</p><p>This does not describe a ‘market’ for ‘exchange’ between ‘players.’ The lived experience of workers in the platform economy is substantially different from what it would be in a pre-platform marketplace for labour. If we were to study platform labour as “the market” for labour, it would be easy to miss the real effects of platforms of the lived experiences of labourers. In Guyer’s words, “Whereas a market is depicted as place, people and commodities, a platform is made up of built components and applications, from which actions are performed outward <em>into a world that is not itself depicted</em>.” In this way, the market abstraction gets in the way of grounded analysis of the ‘real’ activities of economic actors in a world of platform-based coordination.</p><p>So, Guyer argues, not only do we need to move past ‘the market’ as the focus of economic theorizing, but we also have to be more careful about ensuring that our theoretical abstractions represent something ‘real’ about the world we live in — that they capture the ‘real’ forces that shape our economic lives — and that these forces might not be ‘markets’ as such. She argues that the notion of platforms provides latitude for this agenda.</p><p>To see how this is so, we need to spend a few minutes with critical realism (CR), which Guyer leverages to make her point. CR is very complex philosophy of knowledge, which I cannot fully explore here.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> But in brief, CR produces theoretical abstractions that are a) based on empirical observations and experiences, and b) attempt to approximate <em>real</em> forces in the world that have causal power over social activities, and can therefore explain the empirical.</p><p>With this in mind, Guyer’s main point is that ‘the market’ abstraction is no longer firmly tied to our empirical experience of exchange. Therefore ‘the market’ is no longer necessarily something that has force over our lives.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> In place of ‘the market,’ we need to identify the platforms that actually <em>do</em> account for our economic lives.</p><p>How can we achieve this? Guyer leverages Bhaskar’s concepts of the empirical, actual and real<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> to develop a research agenda for economic ethnography:</p><p>· The empirical are <strong>performances</strong> through which people enact their economic world.</p><p>· The actual refers to the mechanisms that make performances possible — the ‘actualization’ of real forces. Guyer coins the term ‘<strong>apportunities</strong>’ (app/application + opportunity) to capture the “complex of acquisitive interests, cultural values, cognitive knowledge, and embodies skills” that shape the performance of economic acts within a particular context.</p><p>· Finally, the real refers to forces that are independent of both our mind and our society — that are real even when we do not see them, and even if are not enacted in a specific place and time. The job of the critically realist scholar is to approximate these real forces in the theoretical abstractions that we create. For Guyer, these forces are the economic <strong>platforms</strong> that give rise to the apportunities that establish a context for the performance of economic acts on the ground.</p><p>In total, <strong>apportunities</strong> are enactments or <strong>performances</strong> of mechanisms that reveal ‘real’ economic <strong>platforms</strong> to exist.</p><p>Bringing it all together, Guyer poses a classic CR question: What must the platform consist of to make the enactment of a particular apportunity possible?</p><p>What is the utility of Guyer’s approach? Take the case of the civil society group <a href="http://ethicalfashionguatemala.com/">Ethical Fashion</a>.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> These American actors are working with Guatemalan artisans to help them gain control over global sales of their handicrafts. They use bots to scan Etsy, Google and Shopify to identify cases of copyright infringement and examples of unethical business practices. They then put pressure on distributors to remove illegitimate sellers from their sites. In this case, visualization of global exchange dynamics becomes a mechanism of an allocative platform.</p><p>Guyer’s work shines a spotlight on novel acts of exchange, and the new kinds of forces that shape them. She leaves open the question of how and whether platforms of power, technology and regulation shape these acts, and whether these are market-based or otherwise.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1294194">http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1294194</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> See Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson, and Norrie’s <em>Critical Realism: Essential Readings</em>, (London: Routledge, 1998) or Collier’s <em>Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy</em>, (London: Verso, 1994).</p><p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> She does allow that it <em>might</em> in specific circumstances, but argues we need to demonstrate real effects through empirical work, and keep an open mind to alterative explanations.</p><p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <a href="https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2009/11/23/bhaskar-again-the-real-the-actual-and-the-empirical/">https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2009/11/23/bhaskar-again-the-real-the-actual-and-the-empirical/</a></p><p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> <a href="https://fashionista.com/2017/08/guatemalan-artists-etsy-copyright-infringement">https://fashionista.com/2017/08/guatemalan-artists-etsy-copyright-infringement</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bc66efb97b7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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