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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Tara Kola on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Tara Kola on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lessons for India from Uber’s Goodbye to China]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kolatara/lessons-for-india-from-ubers-goodbye-to-china-4ca44d6bae8?source=rss-501023e5009f------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[uber]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tara Kola]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Aug 2016 02:15:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-09T19:14:05.337Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/850/1*_TE1D2kdC8RAOEllzPJWJQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>As Uber leaves behind the Middle Kingdom, and its 1.4 billion people, it is widely speculated that the ride-hailing giant will redirect its resources to conquer the land of 1.3 billion next door: India. Uber follows in the footsteps of its American cousins Google, Facebook, and Amazon — raising the question: <strong>Why have US tech companies consistently failed in China, yet enjoyed relative success in India? What will this mean for India’s startups?</strong></p><p>There are 3 parties that have caused US tech companies to have different results in China and India: the consumers (the guys the companies fight for), the local competition (the guys they fight against), the government (the guys that decide whether they get to fight at all).</p><p><strong>1. Consumers: </strong>How much love can money buy?</p><p>As Yi Shi, CEO of Chinese startup Avazu, has said, “For a large market like China, you will need 100% localization to compete with local players.” Chinese consumers are so distinctly different from their American counterparts that localizing in China has either been too difficult or too costly for American companies.</p><p>For instance, when eBay and Amazon entered China, Chinese users, like American users, could only view seller reviews. The problem was that Chinese users wanted to talk to the seller, develop a relationship, and haggle — similar to an in-person shopping experience. eBay and Amazon failed to meet this need, perhaps because they wanted consistency with their American product, while Alibaba understood the Chinese consumer and incorporated a chat feature in their product, Taobao marketplace.</p><p>Amazon’s failure in China and Alibaba’s success are rooted in their underlying philosophy. Jeff Bezos has long claimed he wishes to build the most customer-centric company in the world. Jack Ma, instead, says “Our proposition is simple: we want to help small businesses grow by solving their problems through Internet technology. We fight for the little guy.” Amazon provides a great buyer experience via centralized control akin to the Chinese government. Alibaba provides a great seller experience and then lets the free market run as wild as the Wild West.</p><p>Amazon has only 2 million sellers worldwide. Alibaba has 8.5 million sellers. As a result, seller competition is fierce on Taobao — with small businesses differentiating themselves by service quality, delivery speeds, price, etc. As anyone who has used Taobao will tell you, there is the usual risk of fakes and scams that one often won’t find on TMall or even Amazon Marketplace — but that’s the point: Price-sensitive Chinese consumers are willing to invest the time to find the right product in exchange for a wider range of potential consumer experiences.</p><p>The Chinese value for variety manifests itself in WeChat, China’s most popular message app with 570 million daily active users. The app is stuffed to the brim with ride-hailing features, personal QR codes, video messaging, voice messaging, payments, location reporting, finding nearby users, and much more. If WeChat is feature-rich, WhatsApp is a feature-pauper. In truth, WhatsApp follows the American school of user interface design: a few, perfected features that meet the majority of user needs, over many, mediocre features that clutter the experience. Unfortunately, the American preference for interface simplicity is directly opposed to the Chinese preference for interface expressiveness.</p><p>Localization is easier and cheaper in India. At the outset, the prevalence of English in urban India means that often the American version of a company’s online product is already viable — which is not true for China. Unlike Chinese consumers, Indians are yet to be pampered to ordering a book and having it delivered to your door in 2 hours, or the joys of personal QR codes, or an infinitude of impossibly cheap products on Taobao. Which is to say, unlike Chinese consumers, Indians haven’t been spoilt enough to know what they want, and develop a truly distinct consumer identity in terms of <em>both </em>user experience and user interface. Amazon or Uber or WhatsApp in many ways has less to do and less to spend to wow and woo the Indian consumer and the Chinese consumer.</p><p><strong>2. Local Competition: </strong>How much market share can your money buy?</p><p>While Uber China’s deal with Didi Chuxing, which controls over four-fifths of the Chinese ride-hailing market, has been interpreted by many as an acceptance of defeat, the deal brings an amicable end to an unsustainable, 2-year price war. The <em>burn-cash-till-the-competition-burns-out </em>strategy that Amazon and Uber have taken in India couldn’t work in China. Uber is reported to have lost $1 billion per year subsidizing rides — sometimes discounting at 90%, or offering free rides. The casualties were high for Didi as well, which means both sides had a lot of pawns (i.e. cash) to kill before the armistice. Uber China had $1.2 billion in its wallet, Didi had $10 billion — which means Uber was fated to loose the price war.</p><p>Uber China’s resources paled next to Didi’s, Amazon China’s paled next to Alibaba. But Indian startups, even the unicorns, are still too small to fight as long and as hard as Chinese startups. In June of this year, Jeff Bezos announced that Amazon plans to invest an additional $3 billion in India, which brings Amazon’s total investment to $5 billion in the last 2 years. Snapdeal has raised a total of $1.54 billion in 5 years, and Flipkart has raised $3.15 billion in 7 years. In absolute terms, Amazon has more financial resources, and an incomparable technology infrastructure (while Flipkart has shown us that flowerpots and bombs are not the only things that blow up during Diwali).</p><p>Uber and Amazon entered India with perfect timing. The local competitors have already done the hard work of building understanding of market challenges, paving the infrastructure for logistics, and priming the consumer for product acceptance. But unlike Chinese companies, they have not surmounted the final challenge of establishing stable market dominance by refining their product and brand to perfection.</p><p><strong>3. Government: </strong>How much sacrifice does it take to appease the higher powers?</p><p>The mythology of many great civilizations has taught us that the Gods can be fickle, irrational, and angry — and when they are, lowly mortals better have someone willing to hold up a mountain with a pinky. So it goes with the Chinese Communist Party. Whether the company is Chinese or foreign, part of business is performing the necessary rituals to appease the right powers (in China this is known as “building networks of influence” or <em>guanxi </em>or 关系). Throwing Google-esque tantrums about such fine morals as anti-censorship means getting thrown out.</p><p>The Great Firewall has provided protection to many large Chinese tech companies by keeping out the likes of Google, Facebook, and Twitter. India has no Biadu or Weibo or Renren of its own because American companies filled the spot before local startups could grow enough to compete. Tech in China is like the highly regulated retail space in India — where IKEA, Walmart, Starbucks, and many other foreign brands struggled for over a decade to enter while they grew in China.</p><p>While Indian regulators have on the rare occasion stood their ground against foreign tech companies (e.g. Facebook’s Free Basics) — they have been far more hospitable, welcoming — and most crucially — detached. China Investment Corp, China’s sovereign wealth fund, is an investor in Didi — as well as in Alibaba, which is also an investor in Didi. The Chinese government had big stakes in Didi’s success. To substantiate this, the Chinese government announced last week that it would legalize ride-hailing in November, but would prevent setting rates artificially low “to push out competitors” — and that’s a finger pointing at Uber’s subsidized rides.</p><p>The foreign media has been keen to represent Uber’s exit as yet another indication of the selectively protectionist, free market throttling of China’s authoritarian government. In spite of the government’s clear preference for domestic firms, I vehemently disagree with the claim that American firms have failed <em>because </em>of the Chinese government. Handwaving away every foreign failure to the Chinese government presumes that companies like Alibaba and Didi get an 80% market share by nepotistic means while being equal, or inferior to their foreign competitors. Sounds pretty presumptuous — but let’s face it — democracy-dwellers love sticking their noses to the air when it comes to China.</p><p>Could it be possible that Uber was late to the game in China? Could it be possible that Uber is great for America, and Europe, and India — but just not for China? Could it be possible — and get ready for some scandalousness — that America, and Europe, and India are missing out on using Didi?</p><p>Of the hundreds of articles that have whined about how Xi Jinping personally slit Uber’s throat, how many have lauded Didi? Didi offered a far larger product line that included taxi, private cars, express travel, free rides, buses, and designated drivers — and we’ve already discussed how the Chinese consumer feels about variety. Didi enables users to pool together and provides affordable intercity rides comparable to train fares during Chinese New Year, when millions of people traverse the country to join their families. Didi’s app is easier to use under poor data conditions. Didi can be opened through Alipay and WeChat (thanks to shareholders Alibaba and Tencent). Didi has initiated plans to extend into car sales, insurance, financing, maintenance, etc. Unfortunately for Uber, this is not the end of the list.</p><p>So while government regulation has incubated Chinese tech companies, many of these companies have earned their market dominance by providing a great product uniquely suited to the Chinese consumer. Could Uber have eclipsed Didi with a better regulatory environment? Maybe.</p><p><strong>What will the rise of US tech companies in India mean for domestic startups?</strong></p><p>India will continue to face the risk of foreign players entering the market to usurp reigning unicorns. Some grieve — claiming India will never be able to grow great startups without some incubation from outside players with better access to capital, and established technology. Some speculate Ola will soon be wiped out, as will Flipkart. If we don’t want India to be a market colonized by foreign companies, what can be done without caging the free market in regulations?</p><p>Indian startups have two options: grow bigger, grow smarter. Either they get a ton of money (knowing foreign companies will almost always have more); and/or they accept that free market competition is good for the consumer, they get to know the consumer better, and they meet their needs more effectively. Needs can be met in one of two ways: spread wide or dive deep.</p><p>Spreading wide doesn’t just mean expanding services, but moving into complementary sectors. In moving towards incorporating car purchases, insurance, financing, etc. — Didi is building an ecosystem that enables it to be involved in the consumer’s full transportation life-cycle from ride-hailing, to owning one’s own car, to maintaining it. Chinese companies have historically built vast ecosystems that enable them to expand rapidly into new markets to augment the core business. Think Alibaba, which is involved in sports, health, travel, entertainment, etc. as a way to utilize and improve its data on users from its e-commerce and payments businesses.</p><p>Diving deep means investing heavily in perfecting the user experience. If you asked a Chinese user if she would prefer to buy a given product on TMall or Amazon assuming the price is the same, you would almost certainly hear TMall. If you ask an Indian user about Flipkart or Amazon? Personally — I prefer Amazon, and I know I’m not alone. And what about Ola versus Uber? Personally — I prefer Uber, and I’m definitely not alone here. The fact is that neither Flipkart nor Ola have built the brand loyalty, the service quality, and the predictably low prices that would make Indian consumers stand by them to the battleground. They built products that functioned, not emotional attachments that would stand the test of potential infidelity with a foreign competitor.</p><p>If there’s one lesson to be learnt from Uber’s exit from China — it’s that Indian companies need to watch their backs by watching their consumer’s needs.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4ca44d6bae8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Kika: Why this Chinese Startup is Struggling to Expand in India]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kolatara/kika-why-a-chinese-startup-is-struggling-to-expand-in-india-7e57be40e071?source=rss-501023e5009f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7e57be40e071</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[language]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tara Kola]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 23 Jul 2016 00:56:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-23T01:21:06.256Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/1*iGhSbv7r3EDGAktPsFdBrQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Kika Keyboard, a Chinese startup, is trying to expand to India despite significant roadblocks</figcaption></figure><p>On an average day in an Indian metro, one can spot a few Xiaomi phones, perhaps a Xiaomi battery pack or a Mi band. Xiaomi has brought Chinese startups to the Indian consciousness. What few Indians know, is that India too is rising in the Chinese consciousness as a hot new market.</p><p>APUS, the Chinese Android App developer, is beginning expansion into India, with the goal of having 80 million users in India by the end of 2016. Avazu, the digital marketing company, has already established a branch in Bangalore. News Dog, an app developed in Hong Kong particularly for the Indian market, is one of the top news aggregators in India.</p><p>While many Chinese companies are keen to explore the billion-person market next door, they also perceive India as a tough environment for expansion. Some investors I interacted with in Beijing and Shanghai were concerned about the slow government, the lack of business transparency, the cultural diversity that makes India feel like many markets, the fragmented data networks that reduce network effects, and the low internet penetration that cripples internet-dependent monetization strategies.</p><p>To learn more about the problems facing young Chinese startups in their expansion to India, I interviewed Ric Zhou, Co-Founder and Head of R&amp;D at Kika. Kika is the one of the most popular independent keyboards. It has over 20 million daily active users, and supports over 60 languages. Kika differentiates itself from other keyboards by offering thousands of emojis, GIFs, and better autocorrect algorithms. Kika has been keen to expand to India, and has already released Hindi and Bengali keyboards. Yet their initial foray into India has left them with the sense that India is a tough market.</p><p><strong>Q) What are the major challenges Kika faces in its efforts to expand to India?</strong></p><p>There are 3 major challenges. The first is language. India has so many languages, we had to stop seeing the country as a single market. I didn’t know until we started working on the Hindi keyboard just how many languages India has. When we make an English keyboard, or a Spanish keyboard, we can capture a huge market. It takes even more work to build an Indian keyboard, and we get fewer users from it.</p><p>The second issue is the algorithms. Once you’ve developed a keyboard for a romance language like English, adapting the algorithms for another romance language, like French, takes relatively little work. Indian languages are all very different, so even if we make a keyboard for one language in the North, it won’t necessarily help us develop a different language in the South.</p><p>The third problem is the internet. India is still a place where apps are preloaded or installed as opposed to being downloaded from Google Playstore. This is just like 5 years ago in China. Perhaps this is a short-term issue that will be resolved, but for now, it makes it hard for apps like ours to build a large enough user base.</p><p><strong>Q) You mentioned that Kika works to build keyboards for dying languages, or languages with smaller user bases such as Bashkir and Romanian. Why is it easier to build keyboards for these languages as opposed to Indian languages?</strong></p><p>Again, this is about the language families. Because we had already developed keyboards for languages closely related to Bashkir or Romanian, it is easy for us to adapt our existing algorithms. Indian keyboards require far more work than a dying Romance language!</p><p><strong>Q) Have you observed any unique phenomenon amongst Indian users that you have had to take into account in building your autocorrect algorithms for Indian languages?</strong></p><p>One of the most important phenomenon amongst Indian users, which Google keyboards still has failed to get, is that Indians mix English into their languages a lot. Sometimes they write English words in their native language, or write words in their native language in English. The weirdest part is Indian users switch between English and their native language almost unpredictably, and the script they use unpredictably. We are still struggling to meet this user need. This could be a way to differentiate our keyboard in India.</p><p><strong>Q) What is the primary bottleneck in your plans to expand to India?</strong></p><p>Monetization. Since the internet connection and penetration in India isn’t good, we would have to develop a different monetization strategy for India. Maybe we will need to work with a devices company like Micromax to preload our keyboards. We will have to decide if the Indian market is worth this trouble.</p><p>The second bottleneck is we need more linguists of Indian languages. We already have some Indian employees, but we will need to understand Indian languages better to build better algorithms.</p><p><strong>Q) Given these bottlenecks, do you have any next steps for your expansion into India?</strong></p><p>Indians mostly use internet in the big cities. We will try to build keyboards for the big cities — Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore — though even here there are huge cross-regional differences.</p><p><strong>Q) What change do you think needs to take place in India for it to become an easier market for Chinese startups?</strong></p><p>The main problem is Indian network carriers need to mature. They are like Chinese carriers 10 years ago. They are focused so much on immediate money and profit, they are not able to see the longterm benefits of lowering the cost of traffic, and monetizing on internet services. People in China used to dislike their telecom providers like Indians do. When the Chinese carrier mindset changed towards advertising and services, they began to earn more, and be better liked. If this change happens in India, a lot of doors will open for Chinese and Indian startups too.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7e57be40e071" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Aboard the Oriental Express: An Indian Perspective on China’s Startup Success]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kolatara/the-elephant-in-the-boardroom-an-indian-perspective-on-chinas-startup-success-7d15af4245b?source=rss-501023e5009f------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7d15af4245b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Tara Kola]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Jul 2016 19:30:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-07-16T12:11:17.163Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Last month, I accompanied Kalaari Capital, one of India’s leading VC firms, as a Chinese translator and intern on the firm’s first trip to China. We heard how the best of China’s VCs and large companies believe the Indian and Chinese tech ecosystems will interact in the coming years. Here, I discuss 5 salient observations from our trip.</em></p><p>Growing up in India, China always felt many miles farther away in spirit than in distance — the Himalayas rising like a fort to separate the two. That illusion broke for me in 2014, when I took a gap year between my 3rd and 4th year of undergrad in computer science to spend a year in China working, improving my Chinese, and backpacking with three pairs of clothes and little else through almost every province in the country. Near Guangzhou, I discovered a Parsi cemetery of 19th century opium traders from Bombay. In Beijing I discovered the long history of imperial exams that in spirit continues to this day, and because of which modern-day Chinese students find empathy for their woes in <em>3 Idiots</em>. In Xi’an, I met an Indian restauranteur seeking opportunity in the city where the Silk Road began, where Indians had sought similar opportunity thousands of years earlier.</p><p>Spending that year at the intersection of history and modernity, discovering forgotten interactions between China and India, helped me evaluate the claims about the future that I came across in the boardrooms of China with Kalaari. In this article, I will evaluate 5 salient claims with an eye to history and data.</p><h4><strong>1. India is just <em>x </em>years behind China</strong></h4><p>On our first day in Shanghai, we walked into a 35th floor conference room overlooking a landscape of skyscrapers and flyovers. “I could never imagine India like this,” someone said, to which the Chinese VC we were meeting responded, “China was not always like this. India is just 10 years behind.”</p><p>Claims that India is closely tailing China were repeated at almost every meeting. We told the CEO of Liweijia, a Chinese online furniture platform, that in India, traditional carpenters are the primary competition to online kitchen sellers like Urban Ladder. His response: “China was like that in the 80s or 90s, before local factories and distribution networks developed.”</p><p>When we met Alibaba, we were told that in the company’s early years, 80% of users didn’t have credit cards, an escrow system had to be created to ensure trust, and mobile payments had to be solved. India faces these same problems today, around 12 years after Alipay’s inception.</p><p>Behind claims like “India is just 10 years behind”, it is subtly implied, “In 10 years, India will be like China.” Many Chinese investors are betting on this by investing in Indian businesses that allow them to transfer their knowledge of what worked in China to the Indian context.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5bNrT7x2dLxUXiASDCrloA.jpeg" /><figcaption>India’s VC industry is still far behind China’s</figcaption></figure><p>For example, after Snapdeal’s first visit to China, the company learned more about the Alibaba model from Chinese investors, and decided to adopt it by dropping its original GroupOn model. One high-profile investor in Beijing had made 4 trips to India and was actively pursuing investments into Indian companies that matched his own Chinese portfolio companies. Large Chinese companies are also making strategic investments into their Indian equivalents: Alibaba invested into Paytm and Snapdeal, Didi Kuaidi into Ola, and Ctrip into Makemytrip.</p><p>An investor in Beijing even told us that he believes it might be possible to systematically transfer business models that do well in China over some fixed period of time to India. They had tested this successfully in Southeast Asia by investing in a mobile gaming business 2 years after its model had worked well in China.</p><p>Yet the same investor also expressed skepticism that India could develop similarly to China, questioning how a political system that brings competing parties in and out of power every few years could see through large-scale, decade-long projects, like building infrastructure and improving education. While many investors were optimistic about India’s development, and had already started taking exploratory trips to India, some were still critical of the global obsession with pairing China and India together.</p><p>Claims that India follows close behind China are often justified with cherrypicked pieces of history like “China’s reform and opening was 1978, India’s was 1991. India is roughly 10 years behind.” At a slightly more granular level, the differences become stark. A careful historical analysis of the claim that India is 10 years behind China will follow in the next column.</p><h4><strong>2. Manufacturing, Money, and Materialism</strong></h4><p>On our last night in Hong Kong, Kalaari hosted a dinner for friends that had helped put the trip together. At some point, the CEO of an online travel portal noted that “Indians just don’t spend on international vacations like the Chinese.” A few minutes into the conversation, another CEO from our group made a comment along the lines of, “Indians need to spend more. They need that drive and motivation to buy things for us to really grow like China.”</p><p>While such vehement support for materialism and excess may sound unusual, the contrast between Chinese and Indian consumerism still rings true. To return to the travel example, in 2015, Chinese tourists spent $215 billion abroad, making them the highest spending tourists in the world. In contrast, Indians spent only about $12.3 billion.</p><p>Chinese consumers spend a lot, they can and will pay for products they want, and this provides rich ground for startups to serve their needs better. In a 2013 survey on materialism, China topped the chart with 71% of Chinese respondents saying they measure their success by the things they own. India followed in second at 58%. Contrary to the conclusion of the dinner conversation, Indians are not too far behind the Chinese in terms of the motivation to buy and be represented by possessions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4-fqv2RiwFfbqQIgApJ-Zg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: Goldman Sachs (2015)</figcaption></figure><p>The claim that Chinese consumers spend more is also incorrect. On average, Chinese consumers save almost 30% of their monthly income, while Indian consumers save just under 12%. Though Chinese consumers spend 3% more of their income on travel and entertainment, Indians spend more on health and personal care, clothing, and other non-necessity expenses (Figure 1 and 2).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/430/1*QDh43HgLu3BqSk3UGhCNnQ.png" /><figcaption><strong>Figure 1 </strong>Chinese monthly spending by category as average % of income. Source: Credit Suisse</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/433/1*_TVufgbqFA9mU-QTrWJWGg.png" /><figcaption><strong>Figure 2 </strong>Indian monthly spending by categoryas average % of income. Source: Credit Suisse</figcaption></figure><p>The difference then is not how materialistic Indians are, nor their willingness to spend versus save, as the dinner conversation suggested, but perhaps in who is spending, and how much. India has one of the widest wealth gaps in the world, wider than China. In India, the richest 1% own 53% of the country’s wealth. In China, the richest 1% owns around 33% of the wealth.</p><p>A few Chinese investors we met attributed the differences in materialism, consumption, and wealth distribution between China and India to a choice made many decades ago, when China picked manufacturing and India picked services. Services develop a smaller, highly-skilled workforce. In contrast, manufacturing offers opportunities at all levels of society. One investor claimed that the profitability of e-commerce in China didn’t come with increased internet penetration, or broadband quality, but rather the rise in incomes through manufacturing across all classes. He thus projected a similar e-commerce bottleneck for India until it pushes manufacturing, or adopts some mechanism for lifting incomes at all levels.</p><p>Chinese writer Yu Hua claims there is an earlier historical root to China’s consumerism, before manufacturing brought money. In “China in Ten Words”, he claims, “Behind China’s economic miracle there is a pair of powerful hands pushing things along, and their owner’s name is Revolution.” When the Communist Party came to power in 1949, it rose with a promise to carry out a revolution — to dismantle China’s imperial past and to bring wealth to the people. The Revolution rose with violence, conquered with violence, and ruled with violence, culminating in the Great Leap Forward and the Tiananmen Square Protest of 1976. “Revolution never disappeared but simply donned a different costume.” Yu Hua claims the obsession with subservience to authority that characterized Mao’s Communist revolution was translated into an obsession with money during Deng Xiaoping’s economic revolution. And so it is, he says, “a China ruled by politics has transformed itself into a China where money is king.”</p><p>India may not be driven by such revolution, but nevertheless, the data shows that Indians are rapidly building a habit of consumption. A Credit Suisse survey found that between 2013 and 2014, India saw a 22% growth in the number of respondents that had purchased a holiday, compared to China’s 5%. In India there was a 15% growth in the number of respondents that had purchased a smartphone, compared to China’s 8%. Indians, like their Chinese counterparts, are spending, and increasingly can and will pay for what they want.</p><h4><strong>3. The Borders of the Internet</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*qmi3QIqSVNz1uXlUGcJTSg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Upon landing in China from Bangalore, I pulled out my phone to check my email. It took 5 minutes of unsuccessful attempts to reload my inbox for me to realize I was now in the realm of the Great Firewall, within which Google, Facebook, Twitter, The New York Times, etc. are blocked. Across India’s border into China, the internet is a different creature. At one level, China’s internet is constrained by the government. Yet at another level, speedy and cheap data/wifi have enabled it to touch the deepest corners of the country, and to be used far more frequently than we could imagine in India. The Great Firewall and high internet penetration enable businesses to succeed in China that, at least today, would not in India.</p><p>One investor in Shanghai told us The Great Firewall was key in enabling the early Chinese tech companies (Baidu, Tencent, etc.) to grow and flourish, by incubating them from global competition. These companies, in turn, played a crucial role in the growth of China’s tech industry. Another investor in Beijing said that India has not seen any large, purely online businesses like China has (Baidu, Youku, Weibo, etc.), perhaps because Indian startups must compete with big, well-resourced, purely online businesses like Google, Facebook, and Twitter.</p><p>Indian companies are not only constrained by global competition, but also by the limited data usage in the country. A 2015 Pew study reported that only 22% of Indian adults use the internet at least occasionally, compared to 65% of Chinese adults. Only 17% of Indian adults report owning a smartphone, compared to 58% of Chinese adults. Many Chinese investors were concerned that even after India rolls out 4G and internet speeds improve, high data prices and minimal wifi penetration would cripple monetization strategies requiring consistent internet usage.</p><p>3 listed companies we met — Alibaba, Xiaomi, and Qihoo 360 — all suggested that India’s data problem would prevent business models that had worked in China from expanding to India. Such models include monetization strategies based on advertisements, regular user data collection, and content. The data problem would not only be a barrier to expansion for Chinese companies, but as some Chinese investors noted, it also severely limits the types of Indian startups that can arise. Analyzing the underlying differences in the experience of the internet in China and India enables us to recognize the prerequisites for various types of internet businesses to succeed, and consider how India can meet these prerequisites to stimulate dormant startup opportunities.</p><h4><strong>4. Local Problems, Homegrown Solution</strong></h4><p>Chinese startups have long moved away from consistently adapting business models that have worked elsewhere, to solving unique local problems. As India’s startup ecosystem matures, and as entrepreneurs from more diverse backgrounds have access to the necessary resources, we may find a similar shift towards distinctly Indian problems in more localized niches.</p><p>An example of a local problem that Chinese startups are tackling is “Uber for long-distance trucking”, as one investor described it. In China, trucks are generally owned by the driver, who is responsible for sourcing clients. Once a driver has reached his destination, he usually struggles to find jobs that will take him back home, so he might drive empty. This app allows shipment companies looking for trucks to make requests, and for truck drivers to accept new jobs as soon as a job is completed.</p><p>Another example from the healthcare space is a platform that helps doctors at public hospitals manage a private practice. In China, the best doctors work at public hospitals, where they are rushed to care for many patients. In order to develop a more lucrative private practice, these doctors often want to offer better care to a few select patients outside the hospital. Recent Chinese legislation has allowed doctors at public hospitals to take on a private practice on the side. Now, Chinese startups are trying to develop platforms that enable doctors to find and keep in touch with patients they wish to include in their private practice.</p><p>The focus on local problems reflects a broader shift in the Chinese startup ecosystem towards more homegrown entrepreneurship. Like India, China’s startup ecosystem has historically had strong ties to the US. Many of the early Chinese startups and VC funds began with Chinese abroad returning to start something new. Global funds made the first foray into China, but today the VC scene is dominated by local funds. Chinese employees in the startups that succeeded have continued the startup cycle by starting their own companies. Thus, the ecosystem began with VCs and entrepreneurs who had global education and work experience, but is now almost entirely homegrown, with fewer Chinese returnees.</p><p>More diverse entrepreneurs are entering the Chinese startup scene as resources and information proliferate through the internet. Entrepreneurs from traditional businesses are creating a new generation of startups, called Internet Plus in China, bringing offline industries online. The lesson for India is the necessity of fostering more inclusive and homegrown entrepreneurship, as China has. Including people from diverse backgrounds, with diverse understanding of local problems, can produce solutions catering to niche markets, and disrupt traditional industries that would otherwise not come online.</p><h4><strong>5. The New Asian Tigers: Copycats of the East?</strong></h4><p>I’ve often overheard casual, politically incorrect comments in India and abroad along the lines of “Indians have a rote memorization education system, so they can’t be creative,” or “China can’t innovate, they can only steal.” Justifications of such statements sometimes suggest Alibaba, Snapdeal, and Flipkart are Amazon knockoffs, or Ola and Didi are just copies of Uber, or Xiaomi is relentlessly mimicking Apple. It is obvious that none of these claims is entirely true, but my recent trip to China illustrated to me just how untrue they are.</p><p>Firstly, the idea that Indian and Chinese startups are knockoffs that solve problems that American companies already have ignores the immense creativity required for localization. If this weren’t the case, Amazon and Uber should have handily dominated China — which they did not. If these companies are rapidly ramping up in India, it is in part because they’ve already learnt the pain of losing 1 billion people once.</p><p>Moreover, when one looks closely at the details of Chinese business models, there are marked differences from their supposed American equivalents. In particular, many Chinese companies have built massive ecosystems to enable rapid expansion into new sectors, and better monetization. When we visited Alibaba, they told us Jack Ma’s longterm vision for the company: “Alibaba is a data company.” Alibaba leverages cross-business data to monetize in new sectors. For instance, AliSports sponsors sporting events, operates stadiums, etc. and then targets users with tickets and merchandise based on purchase data from Taobao, and financial data form Alipay. Similarly, on AliTravel, you can check out of a hotel and pay later if your credit score on Alipay is high enough.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dxbO_qIOriNSVWq2D9eGvw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Xiaomi’s phone-controlled rice cooker</figcaption></figure><p>Xiaomi, too, has an extensive ecosystem. When we visited the Xiaomi office in Beijing, we were told, “Xiaomi isn’t a core technology company. We’re an online brand.” Xiaomi’s strategy is clear: sell good hardware with low margins, provide a great UI through relentless user-testing, and monetize through ads and games. Xiaomi is one of the largest game distributors in China, and has its own ad network and 20 apps which it uses to push ads directly to a user based on phone usage.</p><p>Xiaomi invests heavily into 2 areas: (1) music, media, unique content, etc. to improve the user experience; (2) hardware to increase the number of SKUs on mi.com (currently has ~1000 SKUs) to drive traffic to the site. Xiaomi makes roughly 70% of its sales through mi.com, and it tries to do so in order to engage the customer with their unique brand, and push their Internet of Things (IOT) products. These products include air purifiers, water purifiers, rice cookers, fitness bands, etc. that can be controlled through the phone. Their vast ecosystem in games, ads, content, and hardware thus enable the simple goal of being an online brand.</p><p>Apart from producing businesses of mammoth proportions in both breadth and depth, China is increasingly trending towards technical innovation. Almost every single investor we met said they are investing in AI, smart devices, and other hard tech companies. While it might be a while before India will be home to a culture of serious technical innovation, or even ecosystem companies, it will likely continue to develop unique businesses and products that break away from the mold of Western companies more and more, as China slowly has.</p><h4><strong>Conclusion: The Story of Tea</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/603/1*l2iI4VL4fI8zJe-uT7y_9Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>Consumed by the problems of the present and forecasts of the future, we often forget to observe that we forever stand on the border of history, from which the present can be observed in humor and irony. It was only about 200 years ago that claims of chronic intellectual property theft were directed Westward. By the 19th century, tea was a national addiction in England, and the British East India Company was struggling to fund its tea trade by selling opium produced in India to China. Tea production was a great technology in its time, and it was a Chinese secret by imperial orders from the Forbidden City. The EIC knew if it could discover how to grow tea in India and sell it to the British consumer directly, its profits would improve. In 1848, a Scottish botanist named Robert Fortune was sent dressed as a Chinese merchant into the heart of China, which was legally closed off to foreigners. He collected tea plants, transported them to India alongside some Chinese tea growers, and eventually set up the first plantations in Darjeeling.</p><p>What does the story of tea reveal to us about the present?</p><p><strong>5. The New Asian Tigers: Copycats of the East? </strong>Being a copycat is a critical ingredient in the process of cutting costs, adapting the copied to increase revenue, and reinvesting profits in innovation. Today, China is moving into the final stage of this process, while India follows close behind.</p><p><strong>4. Local Problems, Homegrown Solution. </strong>Masala Chai only became popular in India in the early 20th century, when the British-owned Indian Tea Association promoted tea breaks in factories in order to increase domestic tea consumption. Much to the Association’s chagrin, the Indian workers took the British-style tea (with milk and sugar) and added spices, even more milk and sugar, and reduced the tea content so that they had to buy less tea. The local problem was cost, the entrepreneurial chai-wallahs created a homegrown solution. Now, variants of their chai are enjoyed in a Starbucks in Beijing or a London cafe as much as on the streets of India. Enabling diverse entrepreneurs enables diverse solutions to niche problems, and sometimes, this can have global impact.</p><p><strong>3. The Borders of the Internet. </strong>Keeping out competition has its value, but keeping it out for good is difficult to sustain — particularly when your goods are being sold to a global market.</p><p><strong>2. Manufacturing, Money, and Materialism. </strong>The British tea obsession was spurred in part by manufacturing during the Industrial Revolution. While tea was already popular amongst the aristocracy, it reached the masses as a stimulant used by factories to increase the number of hours laborers could work. It was also manufacturing that drove consumption across all levels of society for aspirational goods, such as fine tea. This consumption is what ultimately drove the EIC to pursue manufacturing its own tea in India. Manufacturing and materialism, from the beginnings of industrial history, have been inextricably intertwined.</p><p><strong>1. India is just <em>x </em>years behind China.</strong> Chai is derived from the Chinese word for tea, <em>cha</em>. It is unclear whether India will follow China’s path, but it is without doubt that the two countries have influenced one another deeply through words, caffeination, and an intersecting history. As the internet brings these countries together through startups, perhaps the many centuries of looking to the West will slowly be reversed. Perhaps instead we will be peaking over the Himalayas for inspiration, collaboration, and mutual growth.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7d15af4245b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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