<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Kenneth S Rogoff on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Kenneth S Rogoff on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@krogoff?source=rss-780c55cfadd------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 17:28:22 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@krogoff/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[James S Henry’s important early approach to dealing with the big bills problem]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@krogoff/james-s-henrys-important-early-approach-to-dealing-with-the-big-bills-problem-61a5c1274a40?source=rss-780c55cfadd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/61a5c1274a40</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[crime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kenneth S Rogoff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 23 Oct 2016 20:13:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-10-24T00:49:21.324Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My new book <a href="http://www.kennethrogoff.com/"><strong>The Curse of Cash</strong></a>, calls for moving to a “less cash” society by very gradually phasing out big notes. Mention must be made of a closely-related approach due to James S Henry, who put forth a plan for rapidly swapping out $100s and $50s in a prescient 1980 <a href="http://www.unz.org/Pub/WashingtonMonthly-1980jun-00054"><strong>Washington Monthly magazine article</strong>.</a> Henry’s emphasis on the use of cash in crime is highlighted in <a href="http://www.kennethrogoff.com/"><strong>The Curse of Cash</strong></a>, but his snap exchange plan should have been noted early on (as it will be in the future printings.)</p><p>Rather than gradually eliminate big bills as I suggest in my recent book and in my earlier <a href="http://scholar.harvard.edu/rogoff/publications/blessing-or-curse-foreign-and-underground-demand-euro-notes"><strong>1998 article</strong></a>, Henry argues for having the government declare that large denomination bills are to expire and must be exchanged at short notice for new bills:</p><p><em>“…a surprise currency recall, similar to those that had been conducted by governments in post-World War I1 Europe, and Latin America, and by our own military in Vietnam.</em> <em>On any given Sunday, the Federal Reserve would announce that existing “big bills”-$50s and $100~- would no longer be accepted as legal tender, and would have to be exchanged at banks for new bills within a short period. When the tax cheats, Mafiosi, and other pillars of the criminal community rushed to their banks to exchange their precious notes, the IRS would be there to ask those with the most peculiar bundles some embarrassing questions.</em>” (Henry, “The Cash Connection: How to Make the Mob Miserable,” <em>The Washington Monthly</em> issue 4, p. 54).</p><p>This is certainly an interesting idea, and indeed, the US is something of an outlier in allowing old bills still to be valid forever, albeit most countries rotate from old to new bills very slowly, not at short notice.</p><p>Though Henry’s swap plan absolutely merits serious discussion, there might be significant problems even if the government only handed out small bills for the old big bills. First, there are formidable logistical problems to doing anything quickly since at least 40% of US currency is held overseas. Moreover, it is fine line between a snap currency exchange and a debt default, especially for a highly developed economy in peacetime. Foreign dollar holders would especially feel this way. Finally, any exchange at short notice would be extremely unfair to people who acquired their big bills completely legally but might not keep tabs on the news, for example an elderly person.</p><p>In general, a slow gradual currency swap would be far less disruptive in an advanced economy, and leave room for dealing with unanticipated and intended consequences. On idea, detailed in <em>The Curse of Cash</em>, is to allow people to exchange their expiring large bills relatively conveniently for the first few years (albeit subject to standard anti-money laundering reporting requirements), then over time make it more inconvenient by accepting the big notes at ever fewer locations and with ever stronger reporting requirements. True, a more prolonged period would give criminals and tax evaders lots of time to launder their mass holdings of big bills into smaller ones or into other assets, and at relatively minimal cost. This appears to have been the case, for example, with exchange of legacy European currency (such as German Deutschemarks and French Francs) for new euro currency. Of course, in most past exchanges (such as the birth of the euro), governments were concerned with maintaining future demand for their “product.” If, instead, governments recognize that meeting massive cash demand by the underground economy is penny-wise and pound foolish, they would be prepared to be more aggressive in seeking documentation in the exchange, since they would not have to worry about discouraging future underground demand.</p><p>Lastly, just to reiterate a recurrent theme from earlier blogs, the aim should be a less-cash society not a cashless one; there will likely always be a need for some physical currency, even a century from now.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=61a5c1274a40" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A world of difference between less cash and cashless]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@krogoff/a-world-of-difference-between-less-cash-and-cashless-88e102e034ae?source=rss-780c55cfadd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/88e102e034ae</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bitcoin]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[federal-reserve]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kenneth S Rogoff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 16 Oct 2016 11:57:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-10-16T11:57:58.303Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephen-g-cecchetti/has-paper-money-outlived-_b_5717607.html"><strong>Some have argued</strong></a><strong> </strong>that the costs of cash in crime and tax evasion are a “small price to pay” for civil liberties. Other say we need to keep cash to help with “transaction between consenting adults.” All that is fine but misses the main point of <a href="http://www.kennethrogoff.com/"><strong>The Curse of Cash</strong></a>, which is not to abolish paper currency but to phase out large notes that mainly serve to help criminals, tax evaders and corrupt officials to hide, hoard and port massive amounts. The question is not whether to abolish cash, but whether society right now has the right balance between making it convenient for ordinary citizens and inconvenient for the underground economy.</p><p>It is surprising how many comments I get from people who just “know” that virtually all outstanding US $100 bills — 34 for every many woman and child) must be held abroad, and are therefore not really contributing to tax evasion and crime in the United States. It is true that back in the 1990s the Fed and Treasury held that view, though it was challenged in my <a href="http://scholar.harvard.edu/rogoff/publications/blessing-or-curse-foreign-and-underground-demand-euro-notes"><strong>1998 paper</strong> </a>that estimated that at least 50% of all US dollars must be held domestically. Indeed, the official Fed estimate today now has only about 40% of dollars are held abroad, implying that 60% are held domestically. Ergo, since 80% of all US currency is in $100 bills, at least half of all $100s must be inside the United States. Yes, $100s are used sometimes in legal US transactions, but surveys and studies suggest that the legal usage is minor and relatively unimportant. (And that is even including that some of the $100s used in retail stores “legally” are no doubt cash from the underground economy being recycled.)</p><p>As for US $100 bills being a boon to emerging markets, yes that is true in some instances. But then again, they are also widely used by nefarious groups ranging from Mexican drug lords to Colombian guerillas to ISIS. Even in Russia, there are growing doubts about whether US currency is a blessing or a curse. Russian news sources recently posted pictures of a <a href="https://www.rt.com/news/358891-russia-corruption-officer-dollars/"><strong>massive stack of $100 bills</strong></a>, over $120 million worth, found in the home of an official who was supposed to be in charge <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-14/russians-marvel-at-anti-corruption-cop-s-131-million-cash-pile">o<strong>f Russia’s anti-corruption agency</strong></a>.</p><p>The UK now has a group campaigning for the country to go <a href="http://www.gocashless.org.uk/"><strong>cashless by 2020</strong></a>. The group’s webpage echoes many of the arguments made in <a href="http://www.kennethrogoff.com/"><strong>The Curse of Cash</strong></a>, in particular highlighting how the bulk of cash is used to facilitate crime, tax evasion and black economy. The group makes the case that coordinated action by stakeholders can accomplish things relatively quickly and effectively without requiring any new legislation. They are definitely on to something, as my book argues, a key feature of cash that distinguishes it from other truncations media that criminals might use is that it can be spent virtually anywhere. If, for example, more and more retailers refuse to take cash (already a trend), that will have a direct impact. While this is very interesting and encouraging, my book argues that society will want to keep small bills indefinitely for a variety of reasons including privacy, dealing with power outages etc. (see my earlier blogs.) The group’s timeline might be too ambitious, again the book argues that it is important to go slow to allow time for adjustments, to implement policies for financial inclusion, and to allow time to deal with unanticipated issues.</p><p>Indeed, virtually all the recent reviews of the book (examples are linked above) are very attuned to the subtleties of why getting rid of big bills but not small ones might be a happy medium, and <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/ken-rogoff-harvard-economist-explains-advocating-eliminate-100-bill-2016-10"><strong>The Business Insider has produced an explainer</strong></a>. The recent print reviews also by and large recognize the manifold preparations that negative-interest-rate policy requires, and thus why the early experiences in Europe and particularly Japan might be less informative about how negative rates might work in the future than some commentators seem to believe. Still, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/a1bfea48-8fd0-11e6-a72e-b428cb934b78">D<strong>esmond Lachman</strong></a>, in writing a comment on my <a href="http://media.wix.com/ugd/493009_1560408caead48be9546bc10986f41cb.pdf"><strong>October 11 FT op-ed</strong></a><strong>,</strong> worries about bank profitability. He seems to miss the point that we are talking about a decade or two transition, enough time to make the regulatory adjustments so that bank profitability is not an issue. (As for political resistance,my plan shows how to exempt smaller deposits constituting the overwhelming majority of savers; pass-through of negative rates to insurance companies, pension funds, etc., has not been an issue in Switzerland or Sweden nor has bank profitability.)</p><p>Of course, there are still people glued to the past who think the US should go back on the 1800s gold standard (see my discussion of Jim Grant’s mostly <em>ad hominem</em> WSJ piece in my <a href="https://medium.com/@krogoff/my-new-book-the-curse-of-cash-has-provoked-a-vigorous-debate-of-transitioning-to-a-less-cash-5ca480491a8a#.az2g9cywu"><strong>previous medium blog</strong></a>). There are, however, also forward-looking thinkers who think that private digital currencies will put governments out of the central-banking business anyway. The book explains why this, too, is nonsense. The government gets to make the rules in the currency business, and it always eventually wins, albeit sometimes after adapting private sector innovations. The private sector probably first invented standardized coinage, but the government ultimately appropriated the activity. The private sector first invented paper currency, again the government eventually appropriated the activity. The same will almost surely happen with digital currencies, and already government around the world have taken many steps to hinder mainstream use of cryptocurrencies. (This is not to deny that modern blockchain technology offers huge potential more broadly in improving financial security.)</p><p>On a different note, there are a couple of otherwise very positive reviews of <a href="http://www.kennethrogoff.com/"><strong>The Curse of Cash</strong></a> which, in passing, allude to a controversy surrounding my 2009 Princeton University Press book with Carmen Reinhart. In fact, there is no controversy around that book. (The book spreadsheets and data are <a href="http://scholar.harvard.edu/rogoff/time-different%E2%80%94data-files"><strong>here</strong></a>, and have been used an replicated by hundreds of serious academic researchers since 2009.) In 2013 there was a <a href="http://scholar.harvard.edu/rogoff/publications/faq-herndon-ash-and-pollins-critique"><strong>disingenuous misrepresentation</strong></a> of a short, un-refereed 2010 conference proceedings note that also gave the impression that the substantial ensuing literature on debt and growth did not exist. For an interesting recent discussion of the perils of debt complacency by <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/skidelsky-wrong-on-debt-by-carmen-reinhart-2016-09"><strong>Reinhart 2016</strong></a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=88e102e034ae" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[My new book The Curse of Cash has provoked a vigorous debate of transitioning to a “less-cash”…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@krogoff/my-new-book-the-curse-of-cash-has-provoked-a-vigorous-debate-of-transitioning-to-a-less-cash-5ca480491a8a?source=rss-780c55cfadd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5ca480491a8a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[book-review]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[financial-industry]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kenneth S Rogoff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 08 Oct 2016 20:45:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-10-08T21:13:13.656Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My new book <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10798.html"><strong><em>The Curse of Cash</em></strong></a> has provoked a vigorous debate of transitioning to a “less-cash” albeit not a cashless society. <a href="http://freakonomics.com/podcast/still-using-cash/"><strong>Freakanomics</strong></a><strong> </strong>recently did a terrific job of explaining the issues, while an excellent new piece by the New Yorker’s Nathan Heller <a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.newyorker.com_magazine_2016_10_10_imagining-2Da-2Dcashless-2Dworld&amp;d=CwMFaQ&amp;c=WO-RGvefibhHBZq3fL85hQ&amp;r=noI31MYbU7l9sX97hFGamxsVkLlVesLCs9YTrk4Ed9s&amp;m=vH6bjVso1QZuW_oT63IVYBjrEynx9Sriyqel5m3qQWw&amp;s=IjOb6LDwhupv-zx7POl9wlRNs_vGA72G6yMC2nhNfTk&amp;e="><strong>Imagining a Cashless World</strong> </a>explains that the Scandinavian countries are already far along this path. The book has been well received by many reviewers in the mainstream media (for example <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-it-time-to-do-away-with-cash/2016/09/21/459fa5b0-5f5a-11e6-af8e-54aa2e849447_story.html?utm_term=.51ae932bc110"><strong>here</strong></a><strong>, </strong><a href="http://time.com/money/4502259/100-bills-ken-rogoff-curse-of-cash/?xid=homepage"><strong>here</strong></a><strong>, </strong><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/09/27/maybe-its-time-america-gets-rid-of-most-of-its-cash/"><strong>here</strong></a><strong>, </strong><a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/five-pound-note-bank-of-england-a7341386.html"><strong>here</strong></a>, and<strong> </strong><a href="http://www.macleans.ca/culture/books/a-economists-denunciation-of-cash/"><strong>here</strong></a>). True, there is strong pushback from some quarters, for example <em>American Thinker</em> piece is entitled “<a href="http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2016/09/washingtons_endgame_first_your_guns_then_your_cash.html"><strong>Washington’s Endgame: First Your Guns Then Your Cash</strong></a>.” I can only say I am not too sympathetic.</p><p>In this Medium post, however, I discuss an emotional review by Jim Grant in the <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/hostage-to-a-bull-market-1473456611"><strong><em>Wall Street Journal</em></strong></a>, which is long on <em>ad hominem</em> and short on logic, and contains both simple errors as well as profound misconceptions. Grant, who was Representative Ron Paul’s choice for Fed chairman in his unsuccessful 2012 Presidential campaign, has little patience for modern central banking, and would rather see the world return to a gold standard. Never mind that putting a gold straight jacket on monetary policy is about as good an idea as having the US, Japan, and UK irrevocably join the euro.</p><p>Grant’s review displays scant interest in the main part of the book. There, in addition to providing history, facts and context, I point out that large notes such as the US $100 dominate the advanced countries currency supplies, and do far more to facilitate tax evasion and crime than legal transactions. Grant dismisses the whole idea by asking why not just legalize narcotics and simplify taxes, as if that would be enough. He goes on to say that “Mr. Rogoff considers neither policy option.” A curiously strong statement, as in fact I do discuss legalizing marijuana. Anyway, as the book details, cash facilitates plenty of other illegal activities including racketeering, money laundering, human trafficking, extortion, corruption, you name it. Simplifying taxes is a great idea for many reasons but it is naïve to think that any realistic plan would end evasion,</p><p>Grant saves his main ire for the concept of negative interest rates: “<em>You rub your eyes. You can recall no precedent. There has never been one in 5,000 years of banking</em>.” This statement is at best profoundly misleading. Before paper currency, governments routinely paid negative interest rates on metallic currencies by calling in coins and shaving them (as my book discusses at some length in chapter 2). If your debt is repaid in physically debased pence that have much less silver than the ones you lent, it is a negative interest rate in any meaningful sense.</p><p>In modern times, the existence of paper currency prevents any significant negative rate on government debt because central banks fear a chaotic flight into cash, which pays zero interest. So the fact that significant negative rates have not been seen in the modern period is hardly a profound insight, Keynes wrote about it in his <em>General Theory</em>. But anyway this ignores the countless episodes of massive negative <em>real</em> interest rates on government bonds, when the nominal (face value) interest rate was not nearly enough to keep up with inflation. Remember the 1970s? And of course, real rates are what financially literate savers should care about.</p><p>By the way, my plan excludes small savers. Moreover, If the Fed could engage in effective monetary policy in a deep recession, most savers will gain far more than they will lose. It would bring back jobs more quickly, restore house and stock prices faster, and it would actually raise nominal rates on long-term bonds through restoring expected inflation to target. Negative rate policy would not just lower short-term rates, it would tilt long term rates up by raising inflation to target, a problem that has paralyzed Japan. The suggestion that negative rates are just a ploy to <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8973.html">rob</a> savers is empty polemic. Importantly, they are device to call on in a deep recession or financial crisis, not as a routine matter.</p><p>Arguing for a return to the gold standard may have entertainment value, but it would be catastrophic if adopted in today’s world (again as my book discusses.) First and foremost, a credible return to the gold standard is virtually impossible today because people would know that governments have always abandoned any such scheme in the past. Any quixotic attempt to return to gold would surely end as disastrously as the interwar gold standard that helped spread the Great Depression of the 1930s. Even the halcyon days of the gold standard (roughly 1870 until World War I) were hardly a period of financial tranquility, as readers of my 2009 book<em> This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly</em> (joint with Carmen Reinhart) would well know. (By the way, in his blanket dismal of all academic economists for not anticipating the 2008 financial crisis, Grant might have forgotten about chapter 13 of our book which had been extremely widely circulated and read long before the crisis.)</p><p>On <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rv2ApOhFt6Q"><strong>CNBC Squawkbox</strong></a> in 2012, during Ron Paul’s presidential campaign, Grant compared Fed chair Ben Bernanke to the head of Zimbabwe’s central bank, because he was just sure that all the “money printing” Bernanke was doing would lead to high inflation. Aside from being a spectacular wrong call, this statement represents a profound misunderstanding of the difference between money and bonds at the zero bound. In fact, what Bernanke was doing was not so much printing money as exchanging short-term central bank reserves for long-term government debt, as a reader of chapter 9 would understand. (And critically, the government fully owns the central bank.) Readers of chapter 8 will know that I am not a big believer in the wonders of quantitative easing, but will also understand why confident predictions of catastrophe got it wrong. By the way, Grant not only hates negative rates, he does not seem to be much of a fan of zero rates either. Back then, he urged the Fed to promptly raise them. Many other central banks, including the European Central Bank, followed such advice; the results were disastrous.</p><p>Lastly, it is worth mentioning that by and large the financial industry has lobbied heavily against negative rates. Some of their arguments about existing frictions are completely legitimate, which is why my book views open-ended negative rates as mainly something for the future, after manifold preparations, which include not just phasing out large bills but dealing with tax, legal and market frictions. Ultimately, banks make money off the difference between the rates they pay to borrow and the rates they charge to lend. Once adequate preparations are made, they will not have cause to complain.</p><p>In the end, if global real interest rates stay low for the next decade, there will likely be occasional periods of negative rates during recessions in most advanced economies, whether we like it or not. Part II of the book explains how to make negative rate policy better and more effective. Anyone who wants to understand it should read <em>The Curse of Cash</em>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5ca480491a8a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hi, my name is Ken Rogoff, I am a professor of economics at Harvard University.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@krogoff/hi-my-name-is-ken-rogoff-i-am-a-professor-of-economics-at-harvard-university-4aa7c98509a1?source=rss-780c55cfadd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4aa7c98509a1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kenneth S Rogoff]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2016 12:33:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-09-22T12:33:19.896Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi, my name is Ken Rogoff, I am a professor of economics at Harvard University. I am new to Medium. (You can find my brief bio and cv at <a href="http://scholar.harvard.edu/rogoff/biocv">http://scholar.harvard.edu/rogoff/biocv</a> and my Project Syndicate columns at <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/kenneth-rogoff)">https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/kenneth-rogoff)</a> My work normally is on mainstream global macroeconomic issues such as central banking, exchange rates and international financial crises; my 2009 book with Carmen Reinhart “This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Crises” and my 1996 book with Maurice Obstfeld Foundations of International Macroeconomics are representative.</p><p>But I do also write on some quirkier lines of research on topics most people (certainly economists) don’t think much about, but perhaps should. I have just published a book “The Curse of Cash” (Princeton University Press, September 2016) on why it might be a good idea to very gradually phase out large denomination notes. My argument centers around the fact that all the advanced countries have collectively pumped out trillions of dollars in paper currency, the vast bulk in large denomination notes that are increasingly unimportant for ordinary retail transactions, but are highly valued by those engaged in tax evasion and crime. For example, notes of $10 and below account for only 3% of the US currency supply.</p><p>Secondarily, the book also talks about how phasing out large bills would be a major step towards more effective negative interest rate policy, although a number of fairly straightforward tax, legal and institutional changes would also have to be made. Negative interest rate policy is not for everyday use, but for dealing with very deep recessions and financial crises; the book argues that if negative rate policy were done right, it would be rare and short-lived, and vastly preferable to a decade of near zero interest rates. There would be many other benefits as well in terms of clearing the air of a lot dubious policy ideas that have been advanced because of the paralysis central banks currently face precisely because they cannot effectively use negative interest rate policy.</p><p>None of the suggestions in the book can be executed overnight, nor should they, this is a book is about where we might want to be in one to two decades. Importantly, I am definitely not in favor of a cashless society anytime soon, rather my approach aims at a “less cash” society.</p><p>I try to give all sides in the debate a balanced discussion, but I appreciate that the book touches on some very emotional issues. (See my blog at <a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__blog.press.princeton.edu_tag_Kenneth-2DRogoff&amp;d=CwMFAw&amp;c=WO-RGvefibhHBZq3fL85hQ&amp;r=noI31MYbU7l9sX97hFGamxsVkLlVesLCs9YTrk4Ed9s&amp;m=HMMPEbl-ajH19hTwOMcNLP_YGFfGdNL-9u-4KS6c1O8&amp;s=vwwqxAGz4smnwgjFIE01PCLAfbDXsFvcbF0bA6qwBk8&amp;e=">http://blog.press.princeton.edu/tag/Kenneth-Rogoff</a> ) I plan to take up some of these up here along with the mainstream global economic issues that are my usual territory, and I look forward to your comments.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4aa7c98509a1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>