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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Keren Weitzberg on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Keren Weitzberg on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Keren Weitzberg on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kweitzberg?source=rss-fc30655d2e31------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Gateway Or Barrier? The Contested Politics of Humanitarian Biometrics]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kweitzberg/gateway-or-barrier-the-contested-politics-of-humanitarian-biometrics-85f3ed8b2c8b?source=rss-fc30655d2e31------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/85f3ed8b2c8b</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Keren Weitzberg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Jun 2025 13:25:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-26T08:06:42.623Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This piece was originally published on 11 January 2021 on the Datafication and Digital Rights blog. See below for updates.</em></p><p>‘I do not have any documentation that shows that I am a Kenyan,’ Adan lamented. ‘My children have a birth certificate that says: “single parent”. It’s like I had died. And yet I am alive.’</p><p>Adan is among tens of thousands of northern Kenyans who cannot obtain a national ID because their details appear on the government’s biometric refugee database. The Somali civil war brought hundreds of thousands of refugees into neighboring Kenya in the early 1990s. The influx of asylum seekers coincided with periodic droughts in northern Kenya, one of the country’s most politically and economically marginalized regions. In the intervening years, many ethnic Somali Kenyans slipped into the refugee system, falsely claiming to be escaping the civil war in order to access vital food aid, education, health care, or the coveted opportunity to relocate abroad. Now, because their fingerprints are captured on refugee databases, the very system responsible for protecting asylum seekers has effectively rendered them stateless.</p><figure><img alt="People having their fingerprints taken by UNHCR staff and Kenyan civil servants from the National Registration Bureau (in hope of being deregistered from the refugee system). Photo by Klein Ongaki" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*KVawTvoYRZxR3BWud2fiaA.png" /><figcaption>People having their fingerprints taken by UNHCR staff and Kenyan civil servants from the National Registration Bureau (in hope of being deregistered from the refugee system). Photo by Klein Ongaki</figcaption></figure><p>Without an ID in Kenya, many basic economic and political rights are <a href="https://namati.org/news-stories/suleimans-story/">out of reach</a>. One cannot move about freely, open a bank account, register a SIM card, access an M-Pesa mobile money wallet, enter into government and corporate offices, or gain formal employment. To prevent their children from experiencing a similar fate, Adan and his wife decided not to declare paternity on their birth certificates.</p><p>According to many civil society groups, Adan is a victim of double registration. The problem of double registration greatly accelerated after the Kenyan government, with support from the UNHCR, <a href="https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/refugees-in-nairobi/recognising-nairobis-refugees.pdf">took over the refugee registration process in the country</a>. This facilitated greater data consolidation and interoperability across the refugee and national systems. Nowadays, Kenya’s Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) includes the <a href="http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/575001469771718036/pdf/Kenya-ID4D-Diagnostic-WebV42018.pdf">biometrics of all registered refugees</a>, which can be run against the citizen registry. The National Registration Bureau is able to cross-check the fingerprints of those who apply for a national ID, effectively shutting the door of citizenship to anyone found on the refugee database.</p><p>Those caught between the refugee and citizenship systems have few modes of redress. This speaks to <a href="https://www.ohioswallow.com/book/We+Do+Not+Have+Borders">longstanding patterns of discrimination</a> against northerners and Somalis, who are widely perceived to be a demographic and security threat within the country. Only amidst mounting pressure from northern MPs and civil society groups did the Kenyan government agree to vet those claiming to be citizens. Late last year, Adan was one of thousands of Kenyans who passed through this vetting process in the hopes of being deregistered from the refugee database. But in spite of years of government promises, Adan and many like him are <a href="https://www.pd.co.ke/lifestyle/double-registration-tale-of-girl-registered-as-refugee-57823">still awaiting</a> a resolution to their insecure, liminal status.</p><p>With funding from Privacy International and support from the civil society group Haki na Sheria, I have been tracking the ongoing dilemma of Kenyan citizens caught between these two databases — considered neither citizens nor refugees. As a member of this Datafication and Digital Rights in East Africa Network, I’ve shared and discussed this ongoing research with my fellow partners. Made up of academic researchers, civil society organisations and tech sector actors, this GCRF-funded network explores ways in which datafication in East Africa is reshaping the relations between citizens, states, and the wider market.</p><p>The problem of double registration in Kenya is yet another example of the dangers and risks of exclusion posed by centralized biometric systems, which have become increasingly ubiquitous in the humanitarian and development sectors in recent years. But it’s much more than just the latest case of techno-solutionism gone wrong.</p><p>The problem of double registration in Kenya is yet another example of the dangers and risks of exclusion posed by centralized biometric systems, which have become <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/publication/identification-development-biometrics-revolution-working-paper-315">increasingly ubiquitous</a> in the humanitarian and development sectors in recent years.<strong> </strong>But it’s much more than just the latest case of techno-solutionism gone wrong.</p><p>Over the last decade, international actors across the humanitarian and development sectors, including the UNHCR, the UNDP, and the World Bank, have become vocal proponents of digital identity systems. Remarkably, technologies long associated with securitization, criminality, and surveillance (such as compulsory IDs and biometrics) have, in recent years, become constitutive of a politics of recognition and inclusion. Digital identity has <a href="https://undp.medium.com/why-the-world-needs-good-digital-id-81d5688a3b68">transformed into</a> “a solution for greater economic, social, and political inclusion” and, among its most quixotic proponents, a <a href="https://id2020.org/digital-identity">universal human right</a>. Even scholars who are less than sanguine about these developments have suggested that biometric technologies and digital identity systems may open the door for new <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/03057070500109458">modes of redistribution</a> and <a href="https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2018-4-page-5.htm?WT.tsrc=cairnEmailAlert&amp;WT.mc_id=POLAF_152">‘post-social’ forms of care</a>. The problems that have arisen in Kenya raise fundamental challenges for those who see in digital identity technologies the prospect for a ‘post-social’ politics of inclusion and redistribution.</p><h3>Biometrics and exclusion</h3><p>At the most basic level, the problem of double registration in Kenya serves as a cautionary tale about the rush towards centralized biometric systems and growing interoperability in the humanitarian sector. Scholars and civil society groups have long expressed concerns about the collateral damage caused by <a href="https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/2544/exclusion-and-identity-life-without-id">exclusion from ID initiatives</a>. “Incessant proof of legitimate identity”, as <a href="https://eclass.uoa.gr/modules/document/file.php/LAW357/0.%20KEIMENA%20%CE%A4%CE%A9%CE%9D%20%CE%A0%CE%91%CE%A1%CE%9F%CE%A5%CE%A3%CE%99%CE%91%CE%A3%CE%95%CE%A9%CE%9D/%20%CE%A5%CE%9B%CE%99%CE%9A%CE%9F%20%CE%95%CE%A1%CE%93%CE%91%CE%A3%CE%99%CE%A9%CE%9D/%287.1%29%CE%A3%CF%87%CF%8C%CE%BB%CE%B9%CE%BF%20%CF%83%CE%B5%20%CE%9D%CF%84%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%AD%CE%B6.pdf">Nikolas Rose argues</a>, has become increasingly important for “conditional access to circuits of consumption and civility”, raising the stakes of exclusion. Kenyan citizens trapped in legal limbo have joined the ranks of marginalized populations worldwide who have been <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2019/09/12/a-new-layer-of-exclusion-assam-aadhaar-and-the-nrc/">denied key government services</a><strong> </strong>due to automated biometric systems. The Kenyan ‘double registered’ are the victim both of longstanding, systemic discrimination as well as the unforeseen effects of new forms of datafication.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*D3Og7dKvb1hJJHsoAPJ_yA.png" /><figcaption>Photo by Klein Ongaki</figcaption></figure><h3>Data and institutional tensions within the humanitarian refugee sector</h3><p>The problem of double registration in Kenya also exposes key institutional tensions at the heart of the refugee sector. Caught between host and donor countries, international bodies like the UNHCR must navigate a complex landscape of interstate sovereignty. The data-collection practices of humanitarian organizations often diverge or directly conflict with those of governments. While the UNHCR is primarily concerned with reducing fraud, host and donor countries are often most anxious about securitizing their borders. Host and receiving countries do not always share the UNHCR’s avowed commitment to humanitarian protection.</p><p>These entanglements result in contradictory, inconsistent views on data protection. Given Kenya’s <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/11/kenya-halt-crackdown-somalis">poor record</a> of refugee protection, UNHCR officials <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/5551f3c49.pdf">have long been hesitant</a> to share information with Kenyan officials. Nevertheless, as part of an effort to shift greater responsibility onto host countries, the UNHCR <a href="https://www.qeh.ox.ac.uk/people/claire-walkey">funded and trained</a> Kenya’s Department of Refugee Affairs (now the Refugee Affairs Secretariat). After much deliberation and under government pressure, the UNHCR also<a href="https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2016-KCRP5.13fv.pdf"> provided</a> the Kenyan state partial access to its IT case management and biometric enrollment system. The agency’s centralized biometric infrastructure has enabled opaque data-sharing with third parties, such as the <a href="https://findbiometrics.com/dhs-unhcr-sharing-biometric-data-refugees-082304/">US Department of Homeland Security</a>. Katja Jacobsen <a href="https://www-tandfonline-com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/doi/pdf/10.1080/17502977.2017.1347856?casa_token=p8QAZp773WwAAAAA:8sB-V64B9598iNKypp426vG-RQuQpm0-YxW_aXmFi_OZO1H-VmyChF8DloNZg-F3gE6CEIUdkb7GFw">argues</a>: “The very nature of digitalized refugee data means that it might also become accessible to other actors beyond the UNHCR’s own biometric identity management system.” Ironically, data collected for the purposes of humanitarian protection has now become grist to the mill of the Kenyan state bureaucracy.</p><p>This has also led to enormous ambiguities over data ownership and data responsibility. While the Kenyan government has ostensibly taken over responsibility for refugee registration and refugee status determination, the UNHCR continues to be involved in the day-to-day bureaucracy in myriad ways. Consequently, it’s unclear which government or international body is ultimately accountable for the undesired outcomes and unintended side effects of biometric data collection.</p><h3>Fraud and the biometric ‘fix’</h3><p>The UNHCR has painted biometric technologies as a fool-proof solution to the <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/innovation/using-biometrics-bring-assistance-refugees-jordan/">problem of fraud</a>, an issue that has long troubled the agency. However, the concept of ‘fraud’ (and its pejorative connotations) often <a href="https://academic.oup.com/jrs/article-abstract/17/1/1/1557483?redirectedFrom=fulltext">fails to capture</a> the contingencies of refugee’s lived realities and the <a href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2020/september/machine-readable-refugees">range of survival strategies</a> adopted by those who skirt the boundary between citizen and refugee. Activities that one might label ‘fraud’ can also be understood as the outcome of national and global inequalities. With few legal options for travelling and relocating abroad, many people strategically engage with the refugee resettlement process. Others slip into the refugee system out of desperation. Accusations abound about refugees <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/asylum-sale-refugees-say-some-u-n-workers-demand-bribes-n988351">paying bribes</a> to be resettled abroad. But this speaks as much to the corruption of UNHCR staff as it does to the fraudulent actions of refugees. Fraud is simply too blunt a term to contend with the moral ambiguities and moral imperatives of refugee identification.</p><p>As the problem of double registration in Kenya shows, there are merits to clunky, inefficient analog systems. The turn towards biometric and digital identity has not been as<strong> </strong>straightforwardly empowering<strong> </strong>as <a href="https://medium.com/id2020/our-manifesto-78c6969ca960">proponents often suggest</a>. For decades, Kenyan Somalis could slip in and out of the refugee system with few consequences, taking advantage of much-needed aid and services from the UNHCR. The embrace of centralized, interoperable biometric systems may have helped in closing the data gaps between host countries, humanitarian organizations, and donor states. However, deduplication efforts have also reduced the strategies available to populations who occupy such liminal positions. Datafication forced northerners into either/or categories, eliminating the informational voids through which many navigated precarity.</p><p>The assumed objectivity of biometrics has also trumped locally produced forms of identification. While many double registration victims have ample documentary evidence of citizenship (including birth certificates and school leaving certificates), the fingerprint has become the preeminent mode of ascertaining citizenship. As one of my interlocuters explained: “You can’t bypass the power of that fingerprint. It is a blockade.” Biometric scanners have become talisman-like objects, often used at the expense of other, potentially more reliable forms of narrative and documentary evidence. Datafication has shifted power in favor of a global technology embraced by the international humanitarian sector.</p><h3><strong>The Biometric Turn</strong></h3><p>It remains to be seen whether biometric and digital identity initiatives can be fully divorced from the gatekeeping mechanisms of the nation-state — including its exclusionary desire to police its borders and separate ‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’. The UNHCR may have introduced biometrics to prevent citizens from slipping into the refugee system and refugees from registering multiple times. But the same techniques used to clean up the refugee database were then used to purge people from the citizenship registry.</p><p>As the case of Kenya shows, the introduction of centralized biometric systems increases the risk of function creep. Even if intended for humanitarian protection, data can be shared and technologies co-opted by donors, host states, and security agencies, leading to the further securitization of refugee policies. In Kenya, techniques intended to eliminate fraud and offer more efficient service delivery to refugees have become a means for the government to keep people out. However unintentionally, biometric data-sharing and data consolidation have barred some of Kenya’s most marginalized populations from accessing the benefits of citizenship, as though the refugee system were working in reverse.</p><p>This raises troubling questions for those who see biometrics as a potential <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=TLW7CAAAQBAJ&amp;printsec=frontcover&amp;dq=ferguson+biometrics+give+a+man+a+fish&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=2ahUKEwir0_Cx5_DsAhWbgVwKHc4oBe8Q6AEwAHoECAYQAg#v=onepage&amp;q=biometrics&amp;f=false">technology of inclusion</a>, capable of paving the way for a new politics of recognition and redistribution. It also reveals fundamental tensions around identification. To gain rights, one must be recognized. But for northerners in Kenya, being recognized on one database has led to expulsion from another. Biometric accuracy at the technical level has caused significant bureaucratic errors. As the case of Kenya shows, there must be more consideration for the ways that biometric registration alters the stakes for the most vulnerable, shifting the balance between inclusion and exclusion, visibility and invisibility.</p><h3>UPDATES</h3><p>I have a forthcoming article on this topic: Keren Weitzberg. ‘Keeping people out of camps: Biometric technologies, contested sovereignty, and border practices within humanitarian spaces.’ <em>The Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies</em> 51:14 (August 2025).</p><p>Thanks to work of civil society organizations like <a href="https://hakinasheria.org/">Haki na Sheria</a>, many double registration victims have finally received their national IDs. Haki na Sheria recently won a pivotal <a href="https://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/haki-na-sheria-press-statement-on-the-double-registration-court-judgment/">High Court case</a>, which judged the denial of nationality documents to double registered people to be unconstitutional.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=85f3ed8b2c8b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[To AI or Not to AI? Insights from the Biometrics Institute Congress, 2024]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/caribou-digital/to-ai-or-not-to-ai-insights-from-the-biometrics-institute-congress-2024-0e2668418bd3?source=rss-fc30655d2e31------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/0e2668418bd3</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Keren Weitzberg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Nov 2024 15:47:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-01T17:01:11.230Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Keren Weitzberg &amp; Aaron Martin</h4><p>AI is on everyone’s lips. So perhaps it’s not surprising that <a href="https://www.biometricsinstitute.org/event/biometrics-institute-congress-and-side-events-2024/">this year’s Biometrics Institute Congress</a> was filled with much hand-wringing about AI. A self-described “non-profit,” the Biometrics Institute is probably best understood as part industry lobbying group, part think tank, part research institute. Each year, it holds a conference in London, which brings together policymakers, vendors, regulators, privacy rights groups, and the occasional not-so-undercover academic (like ourselves).</p><p>Here are some of our key insights from this year’s congress:</p><h3><strong>Biometric vendors are currently debating how to define themselves vis-a-vis AI and how to engage with the current AI hype cycle</strong></h3><p>“AI” is a notoriously slippery term, so much so that scholars, civil society groups, and policymakers continue to argue over its <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2022/10/one-of-the-biggest-problems-in-regulating-ai-is-agreeing-on-a-definition?lang=en">very definition</a>. Such debates are not purely semantic; rather, they shape how an industry is regulated, how it approaches funders and clients, how it is publicly understood, and how it understands itself. In their annual ‘<a href="https://www.biometricsinstitute.org/state-of-biometrics-report-2024/">state of the industry’ report</a>, the Biometric Institute tackles this question, asking <a href="https://x.com/BiometricsInst/status/1852365480574730340">“To AI or not to AI”</a>? (We would attempt to summarize the key points for blog readers but alas it is proprietary knowledge that is only available to paid members…) At the Congress, panelists and keynote speakers raised what seemed almost existential and ontological questions. One session, for example, was entitled “What is the relationship between AI and biometrics?”</p><p>From one perspective, the relationship between AI and biometrics may seem obvious: AI is expected to enhance the functionality of identity checks. Thanks to machine learning and artificial neural networks, biometric systems have become <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/artificial-intelligence-biometrics-irreversible-couple-veridas-yfhtf/">far more accurate and precise </a>in recent years, improving their technical performance and increasing their spread and market share. More recently, generative AI is posing new risks and vulnerabilities for the sector, including sophisticated forms of synthetic identity fraud, such as <a href="https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC5362102/">face morphing</a>, which has the <a href="https://www.biometricupdate.com/202409/fraunhofer-develops-a-system-to-address-face-morphing-attacks-in-border-control">potential</a> to disrupt the security of the travel sector. OpenAI’s release of its real-time voice API, for example, has renewed alarms about fraudsters <a href="https://x.com/BiometricUpdate/status/1851739442547224825">circumventing voice recognition software</a>.</p><p>But AI is also part of a powerful tech and regulatory imaginary. At the Congress, AI seemed less a technology (or set of technologies) to be adopted than a loaded, polyvalent term to be contended with. Generating a kind of “hyperreality,” AI seems to be everything and nothing at once, invoking both dystopian and utopian futures, producing vociferous proponents, equally vocal detractors, and a growing (if sometimes quieter and more measured) group of skeptics.</p><p>The biometrics industry has long been anxious with its public reputation, particularly in the wake of a string of controversies over <a href="https://amnesty.ca/features/racial-bias-in-facial-recognition-algorithms/#:~:text=Facial%20recognition%20is%20less%20accurate,positive%20matches%20in%20image%20databases.">encoded racism</a> within facial recognition algorithms and in light of mounting resistance to the use of biometric systems for policing, migration control, and <a href="https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/4528/biometrics-collection-under-pretext-counter-terrorism">state repression</a>. A <a href="https://www.biometricsinstitute.org/congress-to-tackle-risks-of-ai-and-facial-recognition/">recent industry survey</a> by the Biometrics Institute revealed concerns that public mistrust with AI would spill over into the sector, further inflaming public opinion: “A significant 80% of respondents believe public opinion on AI will directly impact their views on biometrics. This highlights the need to address public concerns about AI to build trust in biometric applications.” This is one of many reasons why vendors and clients may seek to distance themselves from the AI moniker, or at least carefully navigate how they relate to the capacious and ambiguous term.</p><h3><strong>Regulators and industry are not necessarily at odds with one another</strong></h3><p>The Biometrics Institute is a space of engagement — one where regulators and industry can speak productively and where regulators can make a case for compliance. This is in contrast to common understandings about the relationship between regulation and business, whereby the regulators are thought to be adversarial and mistrusting of industry operators.</p><p>Several representatives of governmental regulatory bodies were in attendance at this year’s Congress, including the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). Other key public stakeholders in attendance were the EU’s DG CNECT, which oversees the EU’s AI Act, and the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties at the US Department of Justice. The tone struck in their presentations was one of cooperation and assistance. As John Edwards, UK Information Commissioner, told the audience, “we are on the same side.” Emphasizing that the UK is a space where biometric technologies can flourish, he argued that regulators can help industry: “We want you to be able to use biometric data that add value to society and protect people’s privacy.”</p><p>This is not necessarily a story of regulatory capture, but it does speak to the way that industry and regulatory bodies are actively shaping one another. It certainly reflects an increasingly accepted mode of regulation that emphasizes cooperation and highlights the benefits of technological innovation, potentially at the expense of fundamental rights protection.</p><h3><strong>Rather than restrict biometric use cases, AI regulations may, in the long run, facilitate (and legitimate) their spread</strong></h3><p>Rather than necessarily inhibiting the biometrics industry, AI regulation can help the sector identify and manage risk, benefiting corporate players.<em> </em>Take, for example, the <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20230601STO93804/eu-ai-act-first-regulation-on-artificial-intelligence">EU AI Act</a>, which has recently begun to come into force. Several presentations at the Congress were devoted to the new Act and its implications for industry. Irina Orssich, Head of Sector AI Policy at DG CNECT, explained that the Act takes a risk-based approach to biometrics. It divides use cases into a taxonomy of risk — from unacceptable to high-risk to limited to low/minimal risk. Compliance with the EU AI Act and adoption of this taxonomy can be seen as a form of risk mitigation — a means for companies to limit their liability and exposure in ways that will keep regulators at bay. Importantly, however, it also legitimates those applications that are deemed to be less risky according to the rules.</p><figure><img alt="Biometrics Institute Congress, panelists discuss EU AI Act" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*_rvrE9qpi10Vdr2q" /></figure><p>“Besides minimising risks,”<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2021.1898300"> notes legal scholar Nathalie Smuha</a>, “regulation could facilitate AI’s uptake, boost legal certainty, and hence also contribute to advancing countries’ position in the…‘race to AI.’” The same could be said about biometrics and how emerging regulations will facilitate their further adoption and acceptance in different contexts, including consumer applications and more security-oriented spaces like borders. It is therefore incumbent upon critical voices to assess how regulators, and the rules they are mandated to enforce, further entrench biometrics in our everyday lives (whether or not they are ultimately understood to be AI) and the implications of this legitimization for our societies and polities.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=0e2668418bd3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/caribou-digital/to-ai-or-not-to-ai-insights-from-the-biometrics-institute-congress-2024-0e2668418bd3">To AI or Not to AI? Insights from the Biometrics Institute Congress, 2024</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/caribou-digital">Caribou Digital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Digital Identity Wallet: From Cape Town to Amsterdam]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/caribou-digital/the-digital-identity-wallet-from-cape-town-to-amsterdam-57e61718f967?source=rss-fc30655d2e31------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/57e61718f967</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[id4africa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[identity-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-identity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-wallet]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Keren Weitzberg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Jun 2024 11:33:33 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-06-20T11:55:19.768Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>“A wallet is going to be an integral part of the experience of users going forward.” This was the bold announcement made by Ramesh Narayanan,<strong> </strong>CTO of MOSIP (the Modular Open Source Identity Platform), at this year’s ID4Africa Annual General Meeting (AGM) in Cape Town.</p><p>Founded in 2014, ID4Africa — which <a href="https://id4africa.com/about/">describes itself</a> as a “Pan-African movement” — is a multi-stakeholder body that promotes and supports the development of digital identity systems on the African continent. Every year, it holds its annual meeting in a different African city. At these events, biometric and digital identity providers, UN bodies, financial institutions like the World Bank, funders such as the Gates Foundation and Co-Develop, and African ministers and government officials intermingle, make deals, and discuss the latest developments in the field. The events are, in no small part, marketing opportunities for digital identity and biometric vendors.</p><p>What was notable about this year’s ID4Africa AGM were the sheer number of presentations and marketing pitches about digital wallets and mobile- and cloud-based verifiable credentials. Narayanan, for example, introduced MOSIP’s latest project: the <a href="https://docs.mosip.io/inji/inji-mobile-wallet/overview">Inji wallet</a>. We learned about the Thai Health Pass (a mobile wallet used for travel and entry into Thailand) and heard from representatives of Mauritius and Bhutan, both of which are rolling out a national digital ID wallet. This “wallet turn” can be at least partly attributed to the launch of the EUDI wallet (the European Union’s new digital wallet), whose <a href="https://www.brusselseffect.com/">influence</a> and impact have been evident across many industry spaces and conferences of late.</p><p>On several occasions in Cape Town, digital wallets were touted as a way to “future proof” national identity systems. The future, however, is notoriously unpredictable.</p><p>Which raises a number of questions: In a continent dominated by centralized registries for civil registration and national identification, where smartphone penetration and digital connectivity are often spotty, will digital wallets and verified credentials take off? Or are wallets simply part of the latest hype cycle in the sector? And if and when they are adopted, will wallets be confined to a very specific and limited set of use cases, such as e-KYC or international travel–services designed mostly for the relatively privileged?</p><p>While on stage moderating one of the plenaries on digital wallets, Joseph Atick — who often appears like the one-man show behind ID4Africa — suggested that wallets and verified credentials could serve as an “additive” that would complement identification systems without disrupting existing ecosystems, thus offering citizens more options. In response to Atick, one panelist described wallets as a way of producing a “digital twin” of a physical ID card, which would supplement (but not replace) traditional IDs.</p><p>Perhaps this is the future: the growing use of digital wallets as an additional layer on top of existing national ID systems. But this, in turn, leads to other questions: Who are the intended users of digital wallets? And who are wallets really designed for?</p><figure><img alt="A advertisement for French national digital identity wallet, featuring a Tweet from Emmanuel Macron. The Tweet reads “Simplify, simplify, simplify: making your ID and and driver’s license accessible directly on your smartphone to facilitate your procedures, is now possible with france-identite.gouv.fr. Tested and approved!" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*WkHnHsvtGfiKsL1t" /></figure><p>In Europe, we are already seeing a clear differentiation emerge. When, in 2021, the European Commission proposed the creation of the EUDI wallet — a mobile app that will store identification documents such as driver licenses; education credentials; health cards and prescriptions; and travel documents — it clearly had “digitally literate” European <em>citizens </em>in mind as potential users. The underlying ethos behind the EUDI is its promise to “give back control” to individuals, enabling them to manage their personal data and identity through their mobile phone. The EUDI wallet is currently <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/eudi-wallet-implementation">being piloted</a> across Europe and its exact <a href="https://www.sonicbee.eu/state-of-the-eu-digital-identity-wallet-2024-expert-survey-report/">use cases</a> are still to be determined.</p><p>We heard <em>a lot</em> about the EUDI wallet at this year’s <a href="https://www.terrapinn.com/exhibition/identity-week/Conference.stm">Identity Week Europe conference</a> in Amsterdam–an annual industry event that brings together policymakers, consultants, and vendors working across Europe. But, as I learned in Amsterdam, very few of the people involved in the pilots seem to be thinking about third country nationals, beyond perhaps permanent residents of EU member countries. It is far from clear whether the EUDI wallet will be accessible to people or third parties from outside Europe or whether it will be interoperable with other national digital wallets. And it will likely be completely inaccessible to irregular migrants and asylum seekers, as well as to many citizens who either lack smartphones or simply struggle to obtain traditional forms of identity documents and credentials.</p><p>At the same time, as presentations by Frontex at Identity Week made clear,<strong> </strong>the EU also has ambitious (some might say unachievable) <a href="https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/interoperability-of-european-centralised-databases-another-nail-in-the-coffin-of-third-country-nationals-privacy/?print=print">plans to integrate and expand</a> its use of centralized, non-voluntary, and (in many cases) highly invasive biometric systems for third country nationals. See, for example, <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/spotlight-JD21/file-jd-recast-eurodac-regulation">recent regulations</a> that will enlarge the scope and amount of data collected in EURODAC (the European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database). Under the EU’s <a href="https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2024/03/resistance-is-futile-new-eurodac.html">new Pact</a> on Migration and Asylum, EURODAC will include biometric data on a broad array of irregular migrants and asylum seekers, including children as young as six. Civil society and human rights groups have <a href="https://edri.org/our-work/civil-society-calls-for-an-end-to-the-expansion-of-eus-eurodac-database/">raised alarms</a> about this new and invasive surveillance regime.</p><p>These differential identification regimes speak to what Lydia Morris (drawing on David Lockwood) refers to as <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Citizen-Rights-Migrant-Rights-and-Civic-Stratification/Morris/p/book/9781032349817">civic stratification</a> — the systems of stratified rights for migrants and citizens across different EU member states. They also point to an emerging regime in Europe where differential political membership is reflected in and (re)constructed through different identification infrastructures.</p><p>What patterns will, in turn, emerge in Africa? Will ostensibly privacy preserving, consumer- and citizen-centric digital wallets be made available only to a select few: for example, those with high-quality smartphones and recognized citizenship or permanent residence in a relevant state? Despite an increasingly loud chorus championing digital and financial inclusion, will wallets be deployed only for select use cases, such as onboarding at banks or accessing e-visas? Such services tend to be available only to those from certain class and national backgrounds, who have clear legal status.</p><p>And is such stratification in user experience even something to be concerned about? Is it okay if digital wallets remain confined to a select (and perhaps largely elite) group of users on the continent? Or can digital identity wallets be made as accessible as Kenya’s <a href="https://www.vodafone.com/about-vodafone/what-we-do/consumer-products-and-services/m-pesa">M-Pesa</a> financial wallet, which has been widely adopted across East Africa, partly because it can be used on feature phones? (There is, for example, talk of having users interact with wallets on the cloud through USSD text messages.) Such accessibility, however, may be neither necessary nor desirable.</p><p>These are some of the many questions and issues that we will continue to explore as part of our <a href="https://www.cariboudigital.net/identity-and-migration/">ongoing project</a>. What is critical is to keep an eye on developments in the increasingly hyped digital wallet space and to remain attentive to potential exclusions. The success of projects like the EUDI wallet will depend on many things, including user uptake, private sector and relying party buy-in, and the dominance of Big Tech (namely, Apple and Google, which have popular wallets of their own). But if the EUDI (or equally influential state-led digital identity wallets) do end up taking off, where will that leave the many people who may not have access to them–from migrants to the under-documented to the digitally excluded?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=57e61718f967" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/caribou-digital/the-digital-identity-wallet-from-cape-town-to-amsterdam-57e61718f967">The Digital Identity Wallet: From Cape Town to Amsterdam</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/caribou-digital">Caribou Digital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Mute Calculus of Distant Algorithms]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kweitzberg/the-mute-calculus-of-distant-algorithms-aa9dd3ada201?source=rss-fc30655d2e31------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aa9dd3ada201</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[kenya]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[biometrics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[credit-score]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fintech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[credit]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Keren Weitzberg]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 16 Sep 2019 22:17:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-16T22:17:25.465Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Millions of cash-strapped Kenyans now have access to credit. But what does it mean to give previously ‘credit invisible’ people a digitally generated financial scorecard?</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cfOHvKVeRikNI3RudE9_BA.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>This blog post is based on research for a forthcoming piece in </em><a href="https://codastory.com/authoritarian-tech/"><em>Coda Story</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>What kind of work does a credit score do in the world? And what does it mean to give previously “credit invisible” people a digitally generated financial scorecard?</p><p>In countries like Kenya where residents have long been excluded from formal banking, people are now receiving credit scores through the culling of mobile data. This has largely been enabled through the advent of digital credit. Millions of cash-strapped Kenyans have turned to the seductive ease of mobile lending, which was first introduced to the country in 2012. Download an app, fill in some basic personal data, agree to the terms and conditions, and money will appear almost instantaneously in your M-Pesa mobile money wallet.</p><p>Companies ranging from multinational telecoms, like <a href="https://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/do-more-with-m-pesa/loans-and-savings">Safaricom</a>, to Silicon Valley-based startups, like <a href="https://tala.co.ke/">Tala</a> and <a href="https://branch.co.ke/">Branch</a>, are lining up to offer Kenyans loans at the touch of a button. They have also developed novel ways of assessing people’s credit worthiness.</p><p>These algorithms prize various kinds of data: Does this person call their mother? How often do they buy phone credit? Do they make frequent payments with their M-Pesa account? How many followers do they have on Twitter? In a feature on Tala, <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2019/08/21/tala-series-d-india/">TechCrunch explai</a>ns that the company “looks at a customer’s texts and calls logs, merchant transactions, overall app usage and other behavioral data….Based on these pieces of information, its machine learning algorithms evaluate the individual risk and provide instant loans in the range of $10 to $500 to customers.”</p><p>Proponents argue that such methods enable companies to provide non-collateral loans and offer credit to the “unbanked” — those long excluded from financial services. But talk of financial inclusion tends to silence the background noise: the quiet operations that make these digital apps function.</p><p>Mobile technology is not only enabling greater and, in many ways, unprecedented state and corporate surveillance of Kenyan consumer habits in the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/kenyan-citizen-private-data-safe-190221150702238.html">absence of robust data protection</a> laws. It is also opening people up to the mute calculus of distant algorithms.</p><blockquote><em>Financial inclusion, which rests on the larger fetish for choice and freedom, has opened people up to the depersonalized logic of the algorithm.</em></blockquote><p>Digital lending companies claim to “know” a customer through the use of fine-grained personal details gleaned from their mobile phones. But customers are also made legible to fintech through a set of highly depersonalized and statistical assumptions. One assumption is that the lendee is, in fact, the person they claim to be.</p><p>Mandatory SIM card registration laws in force throughout Africa have made it easier for mobile credit providers to digitally identify their customers and appear compliant with Know Your Customer (KYC) regulations. But the reliance on digital and biometric IDs is often highly performative, creating avenues for fraud and mimicry within bureaucracies of verification. The speed and ease of mobile transactions have greatly accelerated the <a href="https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/business/2018/10/over-10m-mobile-users-in-kenya-hit-by-sim-fraud/">problem of identity thef</a>t. In Kenya, it remains relatively easy to register a SIM card in another person’s name using a forged or stolen ID. Consequently, many Kenyans have found themselves erroneously listed as defaulters with Credit Reference Bureaus with few avenues of redress available to them.</p><p>Credit Reference Bureaus (CRBs) are relatively new to Kenya, but they have become increasingly important in the age of digital credit. While CRBs are allowing the previously “credit invisible” to build financial identities, they are also producing <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267901735_The_Global_Infrastructure_of_Biometric_Citizenship_Civil_Registration_in_the_Aftermath_of_Empire">new inequalities</a> and barriers to entry by sorting people into the creditworthy and the delinquent. According to one study, <a href="https://www.tuko.co.ke/300920-over-400k-kenyans-blacklisted-crb-loans-ksh-200.html#300920">2.7 million Kenyans</a> are now blacklisted by CRBs — 400,000 for loans under $2. Many don’t realize that they have been quietly assessed through automated processes and digital traces.</p><p>Such digital operations can quickly move from the depersonalizing to the dehumanizing. This was put into sharp relief at the Tatua Center, one of Kenya’s only agencies offering alternative CRB dispute mechanisms (a small, under-funded, ostensibly independent operation doing valuable work for consumers). The Tatua Center is also where one can meet those most negatively impacted by the credit-scoring process. There, I was told the story of a man who wanted to send his ill son abroad for treatment. The father discovered he was ineligible for a bank loan, having been mistakenly listed as a defaulter. Despite pursuing multiple avenues to clear his name, he couldn’t acquire a loan in time and his son died. “I had to leave the room for thirty minutes so he could cry,” the registrar recalled.</p><p>Efforts to remedy one’s credit score are often frustrated due to the “inaccessibility of many of these mobile lenders,” the registrar explained. One woman had taken out a loan for emergency services for her son. In the end, her son had died and she knew she’d be unable to repay the loan until after his funeral. “This is someone a lender ought to listen to,” the registrar lamented. But many companies have no local offices; their headquarters are in distant locations. Some simply say: “We don’t see customers”.</p><p>These cases of desperate parents seeking treatment for their ill children not only highlight the global inequalities in access to health care and the problems of an unregulated fintech sector. They also reveal how algorithmic scoring systems can distance multinational companies from their customers and from the “externalities” of their business models.</p><p>Machine learning is transforming routine aspects of people’s lives into commodified data points amenable to statistical analysis. This is at once highly personal (culling phone records, payment histories, social media accounts) and deeply depersonalized (assessing individuals based on <a href="https://nyupress.org/9781479837243/algorithms-of-oppression/">often biased assumptions</a> and on probabilities gleaned from large sets of aggregate data). Dispassionate, algorithmic decisions about someone’s credit-worthiness can have deeply impactful, sometimes heartbreaking effects on people’s lives.</p><p>Fintech is allowing a statistical, calculative logic to take hold behind the fetish of consumer choice and freedom. By transforming people into probabilities, digital lending algorithms fail to capture the complex, highly personal, often emotional choices that underly people’s financial decisions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aa9dd3ada201" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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