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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Security Gripes on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Security Gripes on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@kwestin?source=rss-f240c1f610f3------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Security Gripes on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kwestin?source=rss-f240c1f610f3------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[$37,500 Oregon Emergency Rental Fund Fraud via Public Partnerships LLC]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kwestin/37-500-oregon-emergency-rental-fund-fraud-via-public-partnerships-llc-8f225a28df05?source=rss-f240c1f610f3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8f225a28df05</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Security Gripes]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 04 Feb 2022 22:53:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-04T22:53:42.095Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am a landlord in Portland, Oregon. Recently I received a tax document from <a href="https://www.publicpartnerships.com/">Public Partnerships LLC</a> who handles the application process and payment disbursements for the Oregon Emergency Rental Fund, which is a fund to help Oregonians who are not able to pay rent due to COVID-19. In the tax document they show that I was paid $37,500 for back rent for one of our tenants. The problem is that this tenant never applied for assistance, she has paid rent on time every month for over 5 years, and never applied for rental assistance.</p><p>I discovered this last weekend and when I tried to call Public Partnerships LLC I have to go through the same process every time where they get my information, they contact a supervisor apparently via chat. They then tell me that a supervisor will get back to me, but they never did until I was able to finally talk to a supervisor regarding the issue on Thursday after spending 5+ hours on the phone trying to reach someone in charge.</p><p>The small bits of information I have been able to pull together is that a fraudster used an email address with my name in it, but it wasn’t mine registered with Microsoft via Outlook.com. The rental assistance applied for was exactly $2,500 per month from September 2020 through November 2021. The actual rent for the property is $1,620.68. The fraudster had the SSN of both myself and the tenant and that is apparently all that was needed to commit the fraud. As all of the documentation is handled online, it appears to have been easy to forge documents such as driver’s license, the tenants W2s etc. The fraudster filled out a self-verification card with a signature…that was it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zbqBA3E0vNqrEqmnUYS5yg.png" /></figure><p>Public Partnerships LLC paid full $37,500 via an ACH transfer to <a href="https://www.metabank.com/">MetaBan</a>, which is a a bank based in <strong>South Dakota with branches in South Dakota and Iowa, with not a single branch in Oregon. </strong>This seems like it would have been a key red flag amongst others.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/562/1*vjCcUVip_0pKPjBDHxb4LQ.png" /></figure><p>I have reported the incident to both Public Partnerships LLC, as well as the FBI. I have had to call Public Partnerships LLC 10 times to try and talk to a supervisor and every time have to go through the same process, where they say they will have someone call me back, it wasn’t until Thursday that a supervisor got back to me, however they could not provide information regarding steps taken in the investigation, or what they will be doing with the W9 they submitted. I suspect that we are not the only landlord/tenant hit with this scam against the Oregon Emergency Rental Assistance Fund and that a lot of tax dollars ended up in the pockets of fraudsters.</p><p>Based on the incompetence and apathy I have experienced with the Public Partnership LLC and the State of Oregon, I believe that fraud may have been easy to commit. The entire application and disbursement process is done online, the fraudster doctored our tenants driver’s license, social security card, W2s and as well as a ledger from me showing rent owed. All of the agents at Public Partnership LLC work from home and there is only one number to call to get routed to various agents. There does not appear to be a department that is focused on fraud.</p><p>How much of our tax dollars have been lost due to fraud due to the incompetence of the State of Oregon and Public Partnerships LLC? It’s been a week since I reported the incident, but still don’t know what if anything will be done to remediate the issue.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8f225a28df05" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Time I Built a Friendly Persistent USB Trojan for Fun and Profit]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kwestin/the-time-i-built-a-friendly-persistent-usb-trojan-for-fun-and-profit-64b4c005cb9b?source=rss-f240c1f610f3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/64b4c005cb9b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[info-sec-writeups]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[endpoint-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Security Gripes]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Jun 2021 19:48:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-06-21T19:53:28.811Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/1*wQUabczinlA6s5BCY94xcA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Reconnaissance</strong><br>Years back when Windows had all sorts of fun vulnerabilities that could be exploited via USB I was approached by a vendor who made high end thermal imaging cameras. These cameras were expensive ranging in price from $3K to $300K. The problem was that these devices were often stolen, they were also on embargo/sanctions lists as they can be used for nefarious purposes so they fall under ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) and cannot be exported to certain countries. However, some unscrupulous distributors may have been circumventing these restrictions and selling these devices to intermediaries with the devices ending up in places they shouldn’t.</p><p><strong>Resource Development &amp; Initial Access</strong><br>The trick with the cameras at the time was they had no internet connectivity, but they did store the images either on internal storage, or the more advanced ones at the time had SD cards (this was before the iPhone kids). At the time most workstations and laptops were Windows, so it made sense to build a Windows executable that would be triggered by an autorun file. Sometimes companies had competent IT staff that would disable autorun on these systems, so I also disguised the executable so it looked like a thermal image (I took a thermal photo of my cat Nabi).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0dL2EHi7h6RSbpv6oaPRew.png" /></figure><p><strong>Execution</strong><br>The friendly USB trojan didn’t do anything nefarious, it simply gathered information about the system it was connected to such as: username, network data, computer serial number, as well as the serial number of the camera and some other basic data like IP address which I ran through IP geolocation on the receiving server.</p><p><strong>Persistence</strong><br>One problem I ran into is that SD cards are removable. So if we installed the executable on the SD card and it was swapped out, no more tracking. I ended up working with their developers to build an embedding process at the firmware level. The firmware would have the executable stored and would check to see if it was present on the SD card, if it wasn’t it would load the binary.</p><p><strong>Defense Evasion &amp; Exfiltration</strong><br>After the executable gathered data it sent it to a random set of URLs from a list. If it couldn’t connect it would change the URL until it sent. It was sent over SSL so evaded most security measures at the time.</p><p>Nothing too fancy, particularly by today’s standards, but hey it worked. I don’t think it would work today.</p><p><strong>Impact</strong><br>I should point out that customers would pay extra for the service and the executable was not deployed to a camera unless they signed up for it. It was deployed to hundreds of cameras and I was told useful in a lot of cases including a few where the cameras ended up in places they shouldn’t have, but they were able to track to the distributors. That’s all I can say.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=64b4c005cb9b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Vigilante Cyber Justice]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kwestin/vigilante-cyber-justice-95c9630a6476?source=rss-f240c1f610f3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/95c9630a6476</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law-enforcement]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Security Gripes]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 May 2021 20:56:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-28T21:06:21.088Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Why Vigilante Cyber Justice Is a Bad Idea</h3><p>Watching the <a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/y3dpyw/inside-crime-app-citizen-vigilante">crime app Citizen debacle </a>and attempts to build a privatized police force has been horrifying. Not only is it dystopian, it’s just plain stupid. Years back when I was working with law enforcement on investigations my job as a civilian was to provide evidence, it was law enforcement who made the decisions to arrest and prosecute. If I didn’t provide enough evidence, or if it was circumstantial and not strong enough to build a case then the case was dropped. Sometimes the police were lazy and it took a bit of prodding, but for the most part they were responsive.</p><p><strong>Protect the Investigator<br></strong>I’m glad that these protections were in place because it protected me as an investigator in many cases. In one case I was working on, I tracked a laptop that was stolen from a high school in Portland, Oregon, which ended up being part of a larger investigation that unveiled a local organized crime ring that was repeatedly stealing equipment from schools and businesses. At one point I was outside the house of where the laptop was and was sniffing wi-fi networks to verify the data I gathered was correct.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/777/1*uwwmmBEGtaOeUVMAo9lZxw.png" /><figcaption>Laptop location and photos captured from laptop camera</figcaption></figure><p>When I was able to confirm the data and the detectives were involved, they found that some of the culprits were “very bad and dangerous” people, one was apparently a suspect in a double homicide. Luckily the detectives were able to trick the thieves into believing each had turned on the other so I didn’t even have to testify. Seven people were arrested along with a lot of stolen property, firearms and even a stolen car.</p><p><strong>Innocent Until Proven Guilty<br></strong>In another case I had tracked down $9K worth of camera equipment, but the person who had it was not the one who stole it. We tracked the camera down using the EXIF metadata that is embedded in the images, a year after the camera was stolen someone uploaded a photo taken by the camera to Flickr. The LAPD were involved and tracked down that person and recovered the camera. The thing is he had bought it from someone on eBay (he ended up getting his money back), the person that sold it on eBay bought from someone on Craigslist. Luckily the Craigslist buyer remembered the address and police went to the location and found the thief along with an apartment full of stolen property. So it’s another example where you want law enforcement involved in these types of situations, as they have the ability to follow the trail and to do so safely and ensure people’s rights are protected.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/728/1*NVkSFffz6mI9szpruHS2zQ.png" /><figcaption>EXIF data tracking and camera recovery</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Case of Citizen</strong><br>The case with Citizen where they jumped the gun and targeted someone who was innocent of the crime is a prime example of why a private company should not be allowed to arrest folks, in addition it opens up a can of worms when it comes to liability for the private company. If I am arrested by a private security company and I am found to be innocent, odds are I would sue the shit out of the private company and would probably win. That is not a sustainable business model and if I was an investor in Citizen I would be very concerned that they were even considering something like this.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=95c9630a6476" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Cybersecurity Doesn’t Have a Staffing Problem…It Has a Gatekeeping and Training Problem.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kwestin/cybersecurity-doesnt-have-a-staffing-problem-it-has-a-gatekeeping-and-training-problem-ba844b4d64af?source=rss-f240c1f610f3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ba844b4d64af</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hr]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[training]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Security Gripes]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 24 May 2021 17:42:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-24T18:20:06.202Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*FVi_0ZZgDZM-ErZUqAt6VQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>A <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cybersecurity-job-openings-united-states/">recent report from CBS News</a> highlighting that there are 465,000 open positions in cybersecurity has caused some uproar on the Twitters. In the article they state that getting into cybersecurity is as easy as getting a Network+ or Security+ certificate. This is fake news folks.</p><p>The problem is much deeper than basic certifications. I know folks who have a laundry list of certifications who can barely write a SIEM rule and couldn’t find a threat if their lives depended on it. I also know incredibly bright folks who have gone back to school to get a Master’s degree in cybersecurity only to be turned away from jobs because they lack experience.</p><p>Also if you read some of the open positions they are often asking for the impossible, not only are you to function as a security analyst, you will also need to be a developer, system administrator and DevOps guru. Oftentimes this is due to lack of understanding of the role that is being hired for, so a shotgun list of requirements are listed that only a few folks fall into (and the majority of them are faking it).</p><p>What organizations lack is training or mentorship program to bring in entry level folks who have a passion for security. If I were a CISO today and building a team I would be less focused on certifications and more on folks’ willingness to learn and work within a team. Some of the brightest security people I know don’t have CS degrees, they came from liberal arts backgrounds and often with a diverse skillsets. Security needs people who are passionate about learning new skills. It also isn’t just a technical exercise, but requires a high degree of creativity, and communication skills.</p><p>The roles in security also very diverse and different areas require different skills and focus, sometimes you don’t know what your speciality will be until you work in the industry for a bit.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*LDlgShh0nGAqvF6Jq_uVKA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Before we say we have a shortage, maybe we should look at the unrealistic expectations. This is an opportunity for us to also include more people that may have the willingness and passion to start a career in security, but who may lack the resources to get certifications and training right away. SANS for example costs $6,000 for a single course, most folks who take those classes are reimbursed by their employers, kids out of high school can’t just pay that out of pocket. How can we train folks on the job so they get both the training they need as well as the experience?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ba844b4d64af" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[10 Signs You’ve Been Working In Infosec Too Long]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kwestin/10-signs-youve-been-working-in-infosec-too-long-dc74d26baf?source=rss-f240c1f610f3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dc74d26baf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[geek-culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[computer-security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Security Gripes]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 23 May 2021 20:10:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-23T20:10:00.948Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*-O5zl0WE7oUQwavsUbJShA.jpeg" /></figure><ol><li><strong>When your mom calls you ask her three security questions to verify her identity</strong></li><li><strong>Your pet’s name consists of at least 20 characters and contains a mix of numbers, uppercase letters, and at least one special character</strong></li><li><strong>Your wallet is wrapped in an aluminized mylar faraday cage</strong></li><li><strong>You run background checks and request employment verification before every date</strong></li><li><strong>To open the door to your house requires two keys, a combination as well as a fingerprint and retinal scan</strong></li><li><strong>You use so many acronyms in your everyday speech that people ask if you speak English</strong></li><li><strong>J00 k4n R34d thi2 4nd 4CTU4LlY UND3R5T4nD WH@ It 54y2</strong></li><li><strong>You have more security clearances and certifications than the President of the United States</strong></li><li><strong>Sometimes you can’t understand your own thoughts because they are encrypted</strong></li><li><strong>You have more security conference badges than Mr. T has gold chains</strong></li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dc74d26baf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Centennial School District in Portland Hit with Babuk Ransomware]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kwestin/centennial-school-district-in-portland-hit-with-ransomware-fc85158e05ea?source=rss-f240c1f610f3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fc85158e05ea</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[babuk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[infosec]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Security Gripes]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 May 2021 13:56:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-15T07:47:40.591Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It appears that the Centennial School District in Portland was hit by the Babuk Ransomware Group. However, the data compromised is quite a bit less severe than say a gas pipeline’s IT infrastructure that caused it to shut down. 10GB of data was compromised the sensitivity of the data is still up for debate. The ransom was not paid, so the Babuk group has posted at least some of the data on their website. While some ransomware groups have a code-of-conduct and make it a point to not target schools or hospitals, this is not shared amongst all groups.</p><p>The same group has also hit the Washington D.C. police and as they couldn’t negotiate a price the group <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/dc-police-hackers-ransomware-babuk/2021/05/13/d0280fb4-b3f7-11eb-a980-a60af976ed44_story.html">released hundreds of pages of internal documents</a> putting officers at potential risk.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4SQVBs7EeFbQKX83EUhJyg.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://www.kgw.com/article/news/education/centennial-school-district-data-posted-to-dark-web-after-ransomware-attack/283-c9c8edfb-048d-4510-9740-fead9c96c5c9">Centennial School District data posted to dark web after ransomware attack</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fc85158e05ea" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Black Hats & White Collars: Hacking, Insider Trading, Ransomware and Bitcoin to the Moon]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kwestin/black-hats-white-collars-hacking-insider-trading-ransomware-and-bitcoin-to-the-moon-ec676435927c?source=rss-f240c1f610f3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ec676435927c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[insider-trading]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[white-collar-crime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ransomware]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Security Gripes]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 07 May 2021 20:59:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-14T20:56:24.188Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>O</strong>ver the years, I have been <a href="https://www.zdnet.com/article/black-hat-hackers-white-collar-criminals-snuggle-up-to-operate-insider-trading-schemes/">researching and presenting</a> research at security conferences regarding the increasingly cozy relationship between “black hat hackers” or cybercriminals and white collar criminals. One of the cases I researched was a group of cybercriminals targeting PR firms for non-public insider information that could be monetized by trading stock based on the results of a company’s earnings and other factors. Individuals from the same group of criminal hackers and traders had become much more brazen and were also <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2019/01/15/sec-charges-hackers-who-broke-into-edgar-database-and-traded-on-stolen-secrets/">involved in the hacking of SEC’s EDGAR system</a> targeting similar information. Now we are seeing Ransomware Gangs leverage insider trading as another revenue stream, selling information about their targets knowing that when it is public a company has been hit, it will have an impact on publicly traded companies’ share prices.</p><h3>Cybercrime is Big Business</h3><p>Over the years I have helped law enforcement with a number of criminal investigations as a result of developing various tools and techniques to track criminals online. One of the most critical aspects of crime in general is to understand intent; from there, we can better understand what they’re targeting and then gain a better understanding of how they do it.</p><p>The primary motive of criminal hackers is the monetization of data — data that can be sold or used directly to make a profit. As tools and techniques are developed to thwart criminal hacking, it doesn’t cease, but simply evolves. Several years ago retail was targeted due to the value of stolen credit cards on the black market, but as credit card fraud protections became more prevalent, it reduced the value of stolen credit card numbers in underground markets. Criminal hackers simply adapted, realizing that data is often more valuable to the targeted entity itself than trying to sell it through intermediaries; from there, ransomware was born.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*--QV2UxdnglnR_8jACBffQ.png" /></figure><h3>Cybercrime Evolved</h3><p>As criminal hacking has evolved, new tools have arose providing better anonymity through the use of Tor and hidden services, along with cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin which has helped facilitate a growing underground economy for stolen data, tools and services. While researching underground markets that were selling stolen credit cards and other illicit goods and services, I stumbled on a forum which was focused on the buying and selling of “insider information,” or non-public information from companies which could be valuable to stock traders such as earnings reports, merger and acquisitions, FDA approvals, patent data and other information. The forum was looking for information from insiders themselves or from criminal hackers who may have stumbled upon this type of data.</p><h3>Black Hats &amp; White Collars</h3><p>Through further research I found a number of hidden services and forums that were setup to trade on non-public insider information, offering payment through cryptocurrencies or a share in the trade earnings. I also found several interesting cases where organizations were targeted specifically for this type of data. One group in particular was led by hackers Ivan Turchynov and Oleksandr Ieremenko targeting PR firms specifically, where at least three major newswires were targeted and compromised. They then setup a hidden service and started advertising the press releases on various underground forums; this is where contact with their traders was initially made.</p><p>Initially, access to the data was provided for a fee. However, over time the traders set up accounts for the hackers so they could make more money from their exploits. The scheme was implemented over the course of several years and would have gone undetected had the hackers not become greedy and more brazen and branched into other areas of cybercrime, including the theft of stolen credit cards. The traders most of which were convicted netted more than $30 Million in the scheme, and were only caught because one of them made a mistake. You have to wonder how many other syndicates have been operating with impunity over the years, possibly making even larger numbers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*y5RZEO6y7gk7QOtC.png" /></figure><p>The interesting aspect of this investigation was the correlation of log sources across multiple organizations that ended up telling the large story of the criminal enterprise — the authentication logs, web application logs from the PR newswire companies, brokers and the hackers laptops themselves. Business records and trading history of the traders, their connections to hidden services, communication with hackers and other non-traditional data sources played a key role as well.</p><p>Often the data you collect may not be for your own investigation, but will play a critical role for law enforcement conducting a larger investigation. A friend of mine who conducts cyber security investigations at the FBI tells me the first thing he asks a company when they arrive is “show me the logs.” Pretty much every crime today has a “cyber” component, whether it’s data on phones, social media, laptops, IoT devices, security cameras, etc. Logs help tell a story for the data savvy investigator, but we need to ensure we’re collecting the right data.</p><p>After targeting PR firms, the SEC has stated that Oleksandr Ieremenko became more brazen and directed his efforts towards targeting the SEC’s EDGAR database which housed a wealth of insider data. Using similar techniques that were successful targeting PR firms with phishing emails and malware laden attachments, Ieremenko was successful gaining access to data being posted by companies to the EDGAR database.</p><h3>Ransomware Gangs and Insider Trading</h3><p>There has been a new <a href="https://www.scmagazine.com/home/security-news/ransomware/ransomware-gang-offers-traders-inside-scoop-on-attack-victims-so-they-can-short-sell-their-stocks/">disturbing trend </a>of Ransomware gangs mirroring this same pattern. These gangs have been advertising that they will tell traders who their latest victims are. The idea is that the trader can then short the stock before the the gang leaks data and makes the compromise public. There has not been any indication that traders have taken them up on the deal…but it may also just mean they just haven’t been caught yet.</p><p>If you’re interested in learning more about this case, I presented “Black Hats &amp; White Collars: Bitcoin, Dark Nets and Insider Trading” at BSides Edmonton and BSides Vancouver this past year, which you can watch in the video below.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FejHgaWIF1XU%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DejHgaWIF1XU&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FejHgaWIF1XU%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/495c27534761f87d421ed76fe7fec34d/href">https://medium.com/media/495c27534761f87d421ed76fe7fec34d/href</a></iframe><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ec676435927c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Stolen Target Credit Cards & the Black Market]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kwestin/stolen-target-credit-cards-the-black-market-ef5346e39588?source=rss-f240c1f610f3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ef5346e39588</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Security Gripes]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 27 Dec 2013 23:29:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-07T20:20:44.732Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>How the Digital Underground Works</h4><p>With the Target data breach, many are wondering how criminals can profit from the use of the stolen credit cards. The card holders themselves will not be responsible for any of the charges, so how is it that criminals are able to make money from stolen credit cards?</p><p>I have been involved with several cases where organized crime rings have been unveiled, many of these have had connections to Russian and Eastern European groups. These groups generate a significant profit through stolen property acquired through burglaries, shoplifting, identity theft, credit card skimming and carding. Many underestimate the complexity of some of these networks and the revenue they generate.</p><p>The United States is a mecca for carders, simply because of the fact we are one of the last countries to rely on magnetic strip credit cards that are easily cloned and lack the security of newer chip and pin. The reason the U.S. is still using the technology from the 1960′s is a topic for another blog post altogether.</p><p><strong>Buying Stolen Credit Cards Online</strong></p><p>First the card numbers are sold to brokers who acquire the stolen card numbers in bulk. These are then sold to carders. The price for valid credit cards can be as high as $100 per card depending on the amount of information available with the card, type of card and known limits of the card. Many of these sites offer guarantees on the validity of the cards and will provide a valid replacement if it is blocked. Now that is customer service.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*-bj_pHuchVQbupqC-z-YAg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Valid stolen credit cards for sale in the “deep web”</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Credit to Gift Card Shell Game — Find the Fraud!</strong></p><p>One lucrative method of “carding” involves a shell game, where stolen credit cards are used to charge pre-paid cards. These cards are then used to purchase store specific gift cards, such as from Amazon for example.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*FOIkHNtp8tRRuFi9eM4XJQ.png" /><figcaption>How stolen cards are turned into cash quickly</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Shopping &amp; Reshipping</strong></p><p>The carder then uses that gift card to purchase high value goods, usually electronics such as cell phones, computers and game consoles. This process makes it difficult for companies to trace. By the time it is figured out and the cards blocked the criminal is in possession of the purchased goods.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/635/1*6hJFLYKN0dhi3VoDjHYBAQ.png" /><figcaption>Gift cards transformed to cash, utilizing reshipping schemes it is tough to trace</figcaption></figure><p>These packages are usually then shipped via a re-shipping scam. Unsuspecting individuals are recruited as Mules (re-shippers) usually through legitimate channels such as Craigslist job listings promising “easy work-from-home jobs” and usually in the United States as it raises fewer red flags.</p><p>The re-shipper then assembles multiple packages and ships them usually outside the country, or directly to someone who purchases the goods from an auction site the fraudster has posted the goods to.</p><p><strong>Reselling Goods for Profit</strong></p><p>The carder may then sell the electronics through legitimate channels such as through eBay, or to avoid risk can sell the goods through a hidden underground “deep web” site. Most people know the “deep web” from the Silk Road, which was recently shut down by the FBI, reappeared and then vanished again.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*OfmkTn_FNo7pm3aC9NTDJA.png" /></figure><p>The Silk Road was a marketplace for illegal products such as drugs online. However the Silk Road had somewhat of a code of ethics, as certain products were restricted from sale such as pornography, weapons, personal data (stolen credit cards, passwords etc), poisons, or weapons.</p><p>There are many hidden services available that do not have such scruples. There are numerous places on the deep web that sell stolen credit cards and goods acquired through carding.</p><p>On these hidden illegal websites the goods are usually sold at deep discounts on the black market, usually around 50% of retail and reshipped or sent to a secure drop (vacant house etc) a purchaser has setup for this purpose.</p><p>Right now the entire carding underground is busy, as banks scramble to monitor fraudulent activity on the stolen Target cards, the carders need to stay a step ahead and move quickly. Much of the credit card charges have already been made and thieves have already cashed out.</p><p>This process of detecting fraud by the banks is furthered hampered simply because of the holiday season and the high volume of transactions that are occurring. It is going to be tough time for fraud analysts this holiday season.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ef5346e39588" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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