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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Kyle Mark on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Kyle Mark on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[AL QAEDA AFFILIATE RECRUITMENT STRATEGIES:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kyleamonson/al-qaeda-affiliate-recruitment-strategies-d8ff46ba6c2e?source=rss-c81f769d1565------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[international-security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[al-qaeda]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[counterterrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[extremists]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kyle Mark]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jun 2020 17:08:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-06T17:09:25.145Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS</p><p><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p>This research, entitled “al Qaeda Affiliate Recruitment Strategies: A Comparative Analysis,” will assess al Qaeda’s evolving growth strategies through their five primary affiliates: Jabhat al Nusrah in Syria; al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen; al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent in South Asia; al Shabaab in Somalia; and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa. The research purpose is to identify trends and disparities between the five distinct geopolitical situations of the five affiliates, how al Qaeda exploits each environment for growth, and whether such distributive strategies are consistent with the original growth strategy of the core al Qaeda network created from the mujahidin by Osama bin Laden. This article will provide a historical context to emphasize the religious and geo-political complexity of the Middle East; discuss the transformation of al Qaeda and relevant affiliates; examine each affiliate’s host state environment; and conclude with an analysis of al Qaeda’s continued international influence utilizing a decentralized network with a growth strategy tailored to the host country environment.</p><p>Hypothesis:</p><p>H1: As al Qaeda has further decentralized to empower their five main affiliates; they transitioned their growth strategy to specifically target the regional environment of the host state.</p><p>H0: As al Qaeda has further decentralized to empower their five main affiliates; they have maintained a consistent growth strategy focused on the original al-Qaeda principles and assumptions.</p><p><strong>Introduction</strong></p><p>Modern extremist ideologies have engrossed a world that does not understand, and therefore cannot effectively oppose, the social phenomenon culminating in violent extremism. Organizations, like al Qaeda (AQ), have learned to leverage societal grievances in less developed countries (LDCs), coupled with an increasingly contemporary approach to recruitment, in order to strengthen the ideological pull of extremism in volatile states. In spite of mounting international counterterrorism efforts throughout the early 21st century, al-Qaeda has adapted to grow as a globally disruptive enterprise Their strategy was born of necessity. AQ’s leadership in Osama bin Laden (later Ayman al-Zawahiri) recognized the only viable option to ensure AQ’s survival was to decentralize, empower their affiliate groups, and maintain strict lines of communication from a centralized core.</p><p>As AQ evolved into a complex terrorist network, linked by a common ideological foundation, its affiliate groups had to adapt to the host nation’s specific geopolitical environment (in countries like Syria, Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, and Algeria) to first preserve a critical mass and then to expand. Emboldened by the chaos of the Arab Spring in 2011, these affiliate groups transformed their recruitment strategies to exploit regional conflict and appeal to a more accessible and relevant target market, focusing on sectarian violence, corrupt governing bodies, and marginalized minorities to tailor their recruitment narratives for disenfranchised demographics.</p><p><strong>Research Question</strong></p><p>This research article, entitled “al Qaeda Affiliate Recruitment Strategies: A Comparative Analysis,” will assess al Qaeda’s evolving growth strategies through their five primary affiliates: Jabhat al Nusrah in Syria (AN); al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen; al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) in Pakistan; al Shabaab (AS) in Somalia; and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria to test the hypothesis that: as al Qaeda decentralized to empower their five main affiliates, they changed their growth strategy to specifically capitalize on the regional host state environment to both refine and exploit their target market. The research purpose is to identify trends and disparities between the five separate unique geopolitical situations that surround the five affiliates, analyze how al Qaeda exploits these countries current environment for their own growth, and whether that is consistent with the original growth strategies of the core al Qaeda network, evolved from the mujahidin by Osama bin Laden.</p><p><strong>Research Organization</strong></p><p>This research paper will provide a historical context to emphasize the religious and geopolitical complexity of the Middle East; discuss the transformation of al Qaeda and relevant affiliates through five separate case studies; examine each affiliate’s host state environment; and conclude with an analysis of al Qaeda’s continued international influence, utilizing a decentralized network, reliant on a growth strategy tailored to the host nation’s environment. For the five case studies, each primed with a historical context, a specific analysis will be placed on <strong>unemployment, age demographics, sectarian violence, </strong>and<strong> perceived government corruption</strong> as it relates to affiliate network recruitment.</p><p><strong>al Qaeda — A Historical Overview</strong></p><p>Al Qaeda (AQ), directly translating to “The Base” or “The Foundation” in Arabic, was founded in 1988 by a Palestinian-Jordanian named Abdullah Azzam (known as “The Father of the Jihad” by his followers). Created as a multinational Sunni terrorist organization, AQ has since evolved into a global multi-ethnic terrorist network. Four years prior to AQ’s founding, Azzam, Osama bin Laden (a wealthy young Saudi Arabian Arab of Yemeni descent), and third a man named Ayman al-Zawahiri, co-founded an organization called Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahidin al-Arab, translating to the “Afghan Service Bureau” or “MAK.” During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, MAK became the leading organization to fund, organize and train international fighters that formed the mujahidin, translating to “Warrior of God,” to oppose the ongoing Soviet occupation (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 4). Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1988, MAK would radicalize, seek new objectives, and be repurposed as AQ.</p><p><strong>Al Qaeda Pre-2001</strong></p><p>“<em>Until 9/11, Osama bin Laden never used the term “al Qaeda,” nor did his close cohorts. To them it is an enigma, a shadowy body that many aspire to “join” but which accepts only a tiny proportion of those eligible for enrollment</em>” (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 3).</p><p>As the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, Azzam and Bin Laden recognized that the multitude of Islamic fighters across Afghanistan, and the Middle East as a whole, now lacked a common purpose. Azzam and Bin Laden sought to redirect the efforts of the mujahidin, to what Bin Laden would describe as “another worthwhile cause,” following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 4). Azzam and Bin Laden utilized the existing MAK structure and funding as a framework to repurpose MAK into what they would name “al Qaeda.” Azzam served as the ideological leader of AQ, mentoring Bin Laden and writing AQ’s guiding document, the <em>al-Jihad. </em>Azzam’s ideologies served as the basis of AQ’s new form of Islamic extremism (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 4).</p><p>AQ popularized the term jihad, or what was recognized internationally as their “holy war.” In Arabic, ‘jihad’ simply means struggle. ‘Jihad’ can refer to a purely internal struggle to be a better Muslim, a struggle to make society more closely align with the teachings of the Koran, or a call to arms to wage war in self-defense of an Islamic community under attack. Moreover, in the last of these meanings there are various interpretations of what constitutes ‘attack’ and ‘community,’ and which methods can be used morally and spiritually for self-defense (Baylis et al, 2017, p. 539). AQ was created from the jihadist ideology of purifying Arab land of foreigners and establishing a religious society based on traditional Islamic principles.</p><p>Azzam, prior to his death by car-bomb in 1989, disseminated eight guiding principles to help establish the foundation of AQ via the <em>al-Jihad</em>:</p><p><em>1.</em> <em>It must jump into the fire of the toughest tests and into the waves of fierce trials. The training leadership shares with them the testing march, the sweat and the blood.</em></p><p><em>2.</em> <em>The leadership must be like the motherly warmth of a hen whose chicks grow under its wings, throughout the long period of hatching and training.</em></p><p><em>3.</em> <em>This vanguard has to abstain from cheap worldly pleasures and must bear its distinct stamp of abstinence and frugality.</em></p><p><em>4.</em> <em>In like manner it must be endowed with firm belief and trust in the ideology, instilled with a lot of hope for its victory.</em></p><p><em>5.</em> <em>There must be a strong determination and insistence to continue the march no matter how long it takes.</em></p><p><em>6.</em> <em>Travel provision is among the most important items on this march. The provision consists of meditation, patience and prayer.</em></p><p><em>7.</em> <em>Loyalty and devotion</em></p><p><em>8.</em> <em>They must be aware of the existence of anti-Islam machinations all over the world.</em></p><p>The mujahidin, having successfully ousted their Afghan foreign enemy (the Soviet Union) and winning their “holy war” as a unified Islamic front, began returning home to their respective countries ingrained with AQ’s ideologies and ready for their next “jihad.” As the mujahidin repatriated, Bin Laden further repurposed MAK’s remaining resources, directing funds and arms “away from Afghanistan into regional conflicts where Islamist guerrillas were involved, principally in Kashmir and Chechnya, but also in Mindanao, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Somalia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Algeria and Egypt” (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 5). Bin Laden and Azzam successfully recognized the shift in socio-economic and political conditions in the Middle East, paired with the weak government structure following the occupation in Afghanistan, to exploit the opportunity to “globalize” the jihad. AQ was now a multi-national organization with the capability to develop a network of affiliates, their sights shifting to international targets.</p><p>As AQ grew in the 1990’s, Bin Laden fostered this momentum by establishing ties with existing international terrorist organizations, “inviting representatives of Islamist terrorist groups and Islamic political movements to join AQ’s <em>shura majlis</em>, or consultative council” (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 6). Bin Laden inspired and, more importantly, funded and trained these terrorist organizations, internationally and in Afghanistan, developing a global network of AQ members and supporters. AQ differed from existing Islamic organizations at the time through their belief that they could never establish a suitable religious government in the Arab land without violence. Additionally, AQ believed that without disrupting the West, namely the U.S., they could never achieve meaningful change in their home countries.</p><p>Contrary to many modern terrorist organizations, AQ initially sought to remain covert, enabling existing terrorist organizations through resources and support to achieve AQ foreign and domestic goals. Intelligence reports state that “between 100,000 and 110,000 recruits graduated from AQ training camps in Afghanistan between 1989 and October 2001.” Of this total number, although many were funded by AQ, only 3,000 were accepted as a “full AQ members,” demonstrating the selective nature of AQ leadership (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 53). AQ did not claim any international terrorist attacks it planned, enabling the organization to avoid detection during the 1990s. When AQ recruited, trained and financed Ramzi Ahmed Yousef to bomb one of the World Trade Centre towers in New York on February 23, 1993, the international intelligence community failed to assess accurately and respond to AQ’s attack due to their regionalized network and deliberate secrecy (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 7).</p><p>AQ revolutionized the beliefs of modern radical Islam, the structure of terrorist networks, and the training regime of terrorist fighters. More than in any other Islamist group, “the culture of martyrdom is firmly embedded in the collective psyche of AQ. The indoctrinated bomber aims to inflict maximum damage on the enemy target by fearlessly striking it, in the process also destroying himself” (Gunaratna, 2002, p.7). AQ began to strike at home and abroad through their affiliates, employing attacks that inflicted the greatest possible damage, utilizing symbology when effective, be it calendar dates or high-visibility targets. AQ demonstrated the use of reconnaissance, surveillance, deliberate planning and rehearsals to execute their attacks at a level of sophistication not seen before in the typical non-State insurgent organization.<br> <strong>Al Qaeda Post-2001</strong></p><p>On September 11, 2001, AQ coordinated the single largest terror attack in international history against the United States. In a deliberate and coordinated suicide attack, AQ flew two hijacked planes into the World Trade Centers in New York, one plane into the Pentagon, and a fourth plane crashing in a Pennsylvania field, killing all onboard but never reaching its target. In Bin Laden’s subsequent address to the world he stated two questions to Americans, the first being “why are we fighting you?” Coincidentally, the vast majority of Americans did not know who conducted the attack, much less why. From this point forward, AQ and Bin Laden would be names recognized throughout the international community. This attack was the seminal moment of AQ’s history — bringing them out of the shadows and onto global headlines. 9/11 brought the threat of terrorism to the forefront of international security. Shortly after the attacks, the U.S., alongside a multinational coalition, began the hunt for Bin Laden and the AQ organization in Afghanistan.</p><p>In Seth Jones’ 2017 <em>Foreign Affairs</em> article titled “<em>Will Al-Qaeda Make a Comeback?</em>” he describes AQ in four separate “waves.” The first wave is considered the build-up of AQ during the 1990s, with attacks such as the USS Cole, multiple U.S. embassies, the initial World Trade Center attack, and culminating in the 9/11 attack (Jones, 2017). To this point, AQ had enjoyed relative freedom of maneuver in their area of operations due to their secrecy, relying primarily on affiliates to carry out their attacks. With AQ and Bin Laden now in the international crosshairs of Coalition forces, AQ was forced to retreat to the caves of Afghanistan. The initial Coalition intelligence on AQ resulted in the kill or capture of many AQ operatives and leadership. Had Bin Laden been killed following the 9/11 attacks, the organization would almost certainly have perished with him (Atwan, 2015, p.15).</p><p>The “second wave” began within two years of 9/11, when the U.S., concerned with the threat of regional terrorism and potential weapons of mass destruction, invaded Iraq. Inadvertently, this foreign occupation played directly into Bin Laden’s jihad narrative, now with worldwide audiences. Once again Bin Laden seized this opportunity, expanding influence into Iraq to fill the void left by Saddam Hussein and his Baathist party through an affiliate terrorist named Abu Musav al-Zarqawi. In 1999 Bin Ladin entrusted Zarqawi to establish AQ’s operations in Iraq, developing an organization called Jama’at al-Tawhi wa’al-Jihad (JTWJ). Zarqawi rapidly expanded JTWJ, enveloping local terrorist groups and integrating them into his organization through recruiting and strategic messaging. He formally pledged support to AQ in 2004 and reflagged JWTJ as al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI). This organization would eventually become the Islamic State (IS) (Lister, 2015, pg. 9).</p><p>As the U.S. focus transitioned to Iraq, AQI began to wane as AQ central in Afghanistan began to regroup, reengaging efforts alongside the Taliban and other regional affiliates. This “third wave” began external to Iraq and Afghanistan between 2007 and 2009, alongside the rise of al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), primarily originating in Yemen. This surge of AQ growth ended with the death of Bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in 2011. At this point, the third founding member of AQ, Ayman al-Zawahiri, took Bin Laden’s place and began leading AQ.</p><p><strong>Al Qaeda Post-Bin Laden (2011 — Current)</strong></p><p>AQ’s fourth wave, and its first without Bin Laden at the helm, began with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan in 2011 and coincided with the “Arab Spring.” Through mere attrition of Coalition forces, AQ saw the withdrawal as a success. To AQ, the U.S. withdrawal was reminiscent of AQ’s beginnings in the Soviet withdrawal of 1988, reigniting the narrative of expelling foreign occupiers from Islamic land. However, with the absence of U.S. forces, AQ now faced a much different competitor in their area of operations. AQ had grown uncomfortable with IS’ brand of extremism, having diverged from AQ strategy and values (McChrystal et al, 2015, pg.29). What had once been AQI under Zarqawi’s leadership had evolved into a much different organization, directly opposing AQ, resulting in their “fourth wave” diminishing as AQI grew rapidly and transformed into IS in 2014 (Jones, 2017).</p><p>However, IS’ regional growth in Iraq and Syria provided benefits for AQ. While not able to fully return to its previously shadowy existence, Zawahiri recognized the international community had shifted their counterterrorism efforts to oppose IS and seized the opportunity (again) to consolidate and reorganize AQ. Rather than focus on reestablishing AQ within Afghanistan, Zawahiri further decentralized the organization, allocating resources and control to regional affiliates, focusing on international operations growth based on AQ core values while promoting disciplined initiative for subordinate leaders. While Zawahiri directed this progressive decentralization, the Arab Spring began to light a flame of unrest across the Middle East.</p><p>On December 17th, 2010, a Tunisian produce vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself in front of a Tunisian governorate building in protest of the repressive regime and low standard of living in the region. Bouazizi’s death gained publicity in Tunisia, establishing him as a martyr. Through the power of social media, this event inspired others to take action against the oppressive Tunisian government, culminating in a revolution that ousted the Tunisian regime within 60 days of Bouazizi’s death. The success of the Tunisian protests incited follow-on revolutions in countries with similar disenfranchised people groups across the Middle East and North Africa, to include Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, and Yemen. In many of these countries, the population held limited power to leverage their popular representatives because there were no empowered representatives; the citizens were driven to protest out of necessity in areas where their corrupt regimes held the power. This regional revolution, starting in the winter of 2011, became known as the “Arab Spring.” It is important to note that each uprising was a <em>national</em> uprising, targeting a specific government against which protesters held specific grievances (Gelvin, 2012, p. 166). It is these <em>specific</em> grievances that AQ affiliates learned to navigate and exploit.</p><p>While many scholars have examined the common factors which contributed to state revolutions within the regional uprising, the Middle East has a unique antiquity, with tribal nuances and extensive individual histories. To fully understand these states’ revolutions, one must “probe the revolutionary dynamics at work — looking at actors in their particular settings and analyzing their practices in order to grasp the motivations for taking action, the innovations involved, as well as the continuities, recurrences, and legacies attributable to the old regime.” (Beinin et al., 2013, p. 228). “One size” never “fits all” when it comes to the Middle East. Ultimately, the Arab Spring was seen as a defeat to AQ (as a movement) throughout the Arab community. After years of struggling against corrupt regimes, it was non-violent protests that eventually lead to change in many countries, serving as a “proof of concept” that the average citizen could accomplish where AQ failed.</p><p>However, the international anti-terror community’s shift in focus to IS, in conjunction with the regional unrest of the Arab Spring, came as a blessing in disguise for the decentralizing of AQ. Currently, AQ is more fluid and difficult to track than ever, comprised of a core AQ leadership entity serving in an advisory role, and five primary affiliates: Jabhat al Nusrah in Syria; al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen; al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent in South Asia, primarily Pakistan; al Shabaab in Somalia; and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa, primarily in Algeria. In addition, the group retains an active relationship with groups across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia such as Ahrar al-Sham in Syria, the Taliban and Haqqani Network in Afghanistan, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in Pakistan, and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen in the Maghreb and West Africa (Jones, 2017). As of 2018, the CIA currently states that AQ core’s aim and area of operations are:</p><p><em>Aim(s):</em> eject Western influence from the Islamic world, unite the worldwide Muslim community, overthrow governments perceived as un-Islamic and, ultimately, establish a pan-Islamic caliphate under a strict Salafi Muslim interpretation of sharia.<br> <em>Area(s) of operation:</em> presence in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border (CIA, 2018).</p><p><strong>Al Qaeda — Pre-Decentralization Recruitment Strategy</strong></p><p>“Western nations have, quite literally, been invading the region since Napoleon’s defeat of the Mamelukes in 1798 outside Cairo. For over two hundred years, then, the people of the Middle East have had very little option but to respond to the Western ideas and capital that followed along with invading armies” (Exum, 2011, p. 11)</p><p>Al Qaeda was built on the jihad of the mujahidin, as a united Islamic force ousting “the foreign invader,” which at the point of origin were the Soviets. When Bin Laden effectively “repurposed” the MAK into AQ, he leveraged the foundation of strict Islamic fundamentalism paired with an underlying aggression towards foreign occupation, and funded the terror enterprise with billions of dollars in oil wealth. A common saying in the Middle East is that the occupiers “may have the watch, but the terrorists have the time,” meaning that any occupation can realistically be outlasted. The nihilistic violence of AQ was the product of a complicated union between Wahhabism and natural gas wealth. In a region that has few unifying factors, a successful terrorist network, perceived as effectively countering non-Muslims who wish to occupy Arab land was seen as a worthy cause to those looking for a purpose (Exum, 2017, p.11).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/888/1*Yov1yxF1LtxMk5iMaLgoxQ.png" /></figure><p>During the first decade of the 21st century, Bin Laden capitalized on U.S. rhetoric for the Global War on Terror, promoting AQ recruitment by fostering a narrative that the U.S. was waging a global religious war against Islam. Intelligence secured in the 2011 Abbottabad raid proved this to be accurate when analyzing Bin Laden’s correspondence with his top lieutenants:</p><p>He himself (Bin Laden) was fretting about the fact that Obama has shifted the lexicon of the war on terrorism away from this Islamic rhetoric because it was making it more difficult for Bin Laden to recruit. US intelligence sources found documents stating the Bin Laden considered a full rebranding to combat this challenge. Develop rhetoric for a self-fulfilling prophecy of a clash of civilizations. This is part of the reason that Daesh included “Islamic” in their name, so that they can perpetuate the perception of the jihad (Evans, 2017).</p><p><strong>Recruitment by Network Growth and Assimilation.</strong> To fully understand the pre-decentralization recruitment strategy of AQ, one has to examine <em>who</em> Bin Laden was to the organization and recognize what structural changes AQ had to make, <em>out of necessity,</em> after his death. Bin Laden was not just a figurehead, he was a revered leader, with many fighters pledging loyalty to him above sect, affiliate and religion. Bin Laden was seen as having sacrificed his lavish upper-class lifestyle in Saudi Arabia for the jihad and drew praise for his dedication, while maintaining his connections with wealthy Arab aristocrats of the region. This enabled Bin Laden to continue funneling funds to support his cause, even after repurposing MAK into AQ. This wealth, paired with the jihadi foundation (born of the mujahidin) newly diversified across the Middle East, provided prestige and legitimacy through the mere association to AQ. Bin Laden capitalized on this sentiment by prioritizing active AQ recruitment efforts through assimilation, with him as the figurehead. Bin Laden did not aim to recruit fighters; he recruited <em>entire organizations</em> to his network.</p><p>Rather than individualized passive or active recruitment, Bin Laden sought allegiance from Islamic fundamentalist groups from Africa to Asia, providing funds, weapons and training to those who would assimilate to the AQ umbrella. This strategy proved successful; gaining AQ hundreds to thousands of troops at a time, with an AQ core led by Bin Laden providing guidance and maintaining a strong central structure to expand the AQ network. Prior to 9/11, this affiliate assimilation strategy of recruitment alongside a disassociated tactical execution preserved AQ’s minimal intelligence footprint, enabling their leadership to operate in the shadows. However, among extremists, the AQ “brand” was becoming well known. Affiliates and regional terrorist organizations understood their pledges to AQ, embracing the concepts of martyrdom, a global jihad, and pursuing both the near and far targets.</p><p>Additionally, AQ supplemented growth in Afghanistan and Pakistan by forcing tribal leaders to marry their daughters to AQ fighters, and recruiting within these new “alliances.” This strategy displayed an attempt to increase depth, rather than breath, and was effective in many provinces. While AQ tried to appeal to their religious Sunni base, they often discovered that local tribe loyalty out-prioritized religious loyalties. This allegiance was demonstrated in Iraq, where AQ attempted to utilize marriage tactics and effectively elicited a “tribal revolt” (Meacham, 2011, p. 17).</p><p>After the death of Bin Laden, AQ leaders were forced to change recruitment strategy out of necessity, as much as it was transformed for even greater effectiveness. This was due to several factors. First, without Bin Laden, many of the previous alliances felt as though their commitment to AQ was fulfilled. While Zawahiri was charismatic, he was not the leader that demanded and garnered loyalty like Bin Laden, and was simply unable to control the remaining AQ affiliates. While an effective strategic choice at the time, Zawahiri <em>had</em> to decentralize. This fully transitioned AQ Core to their current advisory role. The affiliates recognized the need for a new approach to recruitment, that Bin Laden’s “recruitment by assimilation” model was simply not applicable as a primary recruitment strategy in their respective states.</p><p>Furthermore, the forced decentralization triggered by Bin Laden’s death soon coincided with the regional Arab Spring chaos. Although the Arab Spring triggered some violence, it demonstrated to Arabs the possibility of nonviolent progress to achieve their goals. The AQ decentralization forced their affiliates to establish a new target market, with an entirely new approach to growth and recruitment, designed to recognize regional demographics and leverage the host nation’s environment. Specifically, each regional affiliate must appeal to the local populace, cite their grievances, and capitalize on sectarian conflict and societal friction.</p><p><strong>Case Study One — al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula</strong></p><p><strong>Yemen</strong></p><p>“<em>Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has emerged as the most dangerous regional node in the global jihad</em>.”</p><p>- CIA Director David Petraeus, September 2011 (Atwan, 2013, p. 80).</p><p>Al Qaeda (AQ) capitalized on the chaos of the Yemeni revolution and civil war to expand their operations in the Arabian Peninsula. AQ rapidly gained influence by leveraging the intrastate conflict between the Sunni-Yemeni government and the Shia-Houthi rebels; in essence, they exploited Yemen’s power vacuum. Yemen’s frail government and fragmented military were preoccupied with countering the Houthi rebels in the north of Yemen, enabling Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to become AQ’s strongest affiliate group. AQAP increased their operational area in Yemen to over 30% of the total state territory, and with negligible opposition. Due to their growth in Yemen, AQAP is now the most influential al Qaeda affiliate in the world.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/303/1*jnkYdkhnYfwn5jZhqILZ0Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Demographics.</strong> According to the most recent CIA Fact Book assessment, modern Yemen is home to roughly 28 million people, making it the 48th largest country in the world, with 36% living in an urban environment. The nation is predominately Arab, speaking Arabic as the native tongue, with dispersed Europeans, Afro-Arabs and South Asians. The median age in Yemen is 20 years old, with 39.83% of the population between 0–14 years old, 21.21% 15–24 years old, 37.27% 25–54 years old, 3.94% 55–64 years old and 2.75% 65 years old and over. Life expectancy in Yemen is 65.9 years. Concerning religion, the population is 99.1% Muslim (65% Sunni and 35% Shia) (CIA, 2017). Yemen’s population growth rate is among the world’s highest, exceeding 3 percent per year. The faltering economy and poorly prepared workforce have raised unemployment to 27 percent, on par with the United States Great Depression (Boucek et al., 2010, p. 2). Over 54% of the Yemeni population is below the poverty line (CIA, 2017).</p><p><strong>Geography. </strong>Yemen is a small state of 528,000 square kilometers, roughly four times the size of Alabama. Yemen is located on the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula above the “Horn of Africa,” bordered by Saudi Arabia to the north, Oman to the east, the Gulf of Aden to the south and the Red Sea to the west. Yemen is primarily composed of harsh deserts, hot and humid to the coastal east, while dry and arid to the west. Geographically, rugged mountain ranges are dispersed throughout the landscape, with a large majority of the populace living in the Asir Mountain range on the western portion of the state (CIA, 2017). Yemen’s geography has been cited as one of the factors contributing to its weak political state. The varied landscape, ranging from mountain to desert to canyon, makes it a difficult country to control, particularly since 2/3rds of the population live in scattered and isolated villages (Gelvin, 2012, p. 89).</p><p><strong>Economy. </strong>Yemen has traditionally relied on oil and natural gas exports to maintain their economy, though it is currently the poorest country in the Arab world. Yemen’s annual GDP per capita is $2,500, making it the 199th worst GDP (out of 228 reported in the CIA World Factbook). Currently, Yemen’s primary exports are still oil and natural gas, in addition to coffee and fish. Exports are to Egypt 29.4%, Thailand 16.7%, Belarus 13.5%, and Oman 10.5% (CIA, 2017). Recently, intrastate conflict has halted almost all exports, as the government and private sector have been unable to preserve the commerce. The Yemeni Social Welfare Fund, a cash transfer program for Yemen’s poorest citizens, is no longer functioning and has not made any disbursements since 2014.</p><p><strong>Yemen — A Historical Overview</strong></p><p>The pre-Islamic history of the Arabian Peninsula depicted Yemen as a significant station in the early trading kingdoms. This was chiefly due to its strategic location along what was known as the “frankincense trail,” a critical land trading route. Additionally, Yemen controlled what is now named the Bab-El Mandeb Strait, a major global shipping lane adjacent to the southeastern tip of Yemen that was as important throughout history as it is in modern times. From 1200 B.C. to 630 A.D., Yemen linked Egypt and the Mediterranean world to the riches of South Arabia, East Africa, and the Indian subcontinent (Burrowes, 2010, p. 3).</p><p>Relative to the Arab Peninsula, the area that is now Yemen evolved through a particularly violent and chaotic existence, transitioning Islamic Caliphates every few decades. The Ottoman Empire conquered Yemen in 1547. Yemen regained its independence in 1597, and fell to the Ottoman Empire again in 1849. In 1839 the British established a protectorate at the port city of Aden, where they established agreements with the Ottoman Empire to hold this territory through the duration of their rule. These events began the process of bifurcation that culminated in the creation of two Yemeni states in the second half of the 20th century. In 1869 the Suez Canal opened, conferring new geopolitical significance of Yemen along the Red Sea (Burrowes, 2010, p. 5). The location of the two Yemens, on the world’s busiest sea-lane at the southern end of the Red Sea, where Asia meets Africa, gave them strategic significance from the start of the age of imperialism through the Cold War (Burrowes, 2010, p. 379).</p><p>The northern region of Yemen regained its independence after World War One and the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. The southern region of Yemen (including Aden) remained under British protectorate until 1967, when the British withdrew from the region, leaving the province in shambles, separated from its wealthier northern counterpart. The newly independent South Yemen soon found support in the form of the U.S.S.R. The southern region became the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, and was the only communist country in the Middle East, aligning itself with the U.S.S.R in 1970. During this time, the northern region was an Islamic State, known as the Arab Republic of Yemen. As the Cold War came to a close, the U.S.S.R. terminated their financial aid to the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, effectively crippling the state and forcing it to approach the wealthier Arab Republic of Yemen in 1989, seeking diplomatic ties and reunification. In 1990 Yemen was officially reunified as the Republic of Yemen and accepted Sana’a as the newly formed republic’s capitol.</p><p><strong>Modern Yemeni Conflict</strong></p><p>“<em>Arguably, the near future of Saudi Arabia and much of the rest of the Middle East turns significantly on the political stability and economic development of impoverished Yemen, results that were by no means assured in the first decade of the new millennium</em>”</p><p>(Burrowes, 2010, p. 379).</p><p><strong>Yemeni Revolution — 2011. </strong>The series of events that led to the<strong> </strong>Yemeni revolution, and subsequent civil war, can be traced to the Arab Spring in 2011<strong> </strong>At this time, Yemen’s president Ali Abdullah Saleh had been in office in North Yemen since 1978, having remained as president after the 1990 unification. As the sole Republic on the Arab Peninsula, Saleh supported free elections and multiple political parties. However, “political control was increasingly monopolized by a small group surrounding President Ali Abdullah Saleh, composed of relatives and close associates mostly from Sanhan, his home area” (Lackner, 2014, p. 47). Saleh sought to neutralize potential threats by filling powerful government positions with staunch loyalists (to him and his family). Corruption held the regime together and connected it to the broader society. Bribery has been endemic to Yemen — auditors estimate that 30% of the revenues do not make it to the government’s budget (Gelvin, 2012, p. 83).</p><p>As Yemen entered the 21st century, its stability began to erode as regional violence became prevalent. Since June 2004, the Saada region, in Yemen’s far north along the Saudi border, has intermittently been the epicenter of a violent war pitting the national army against a movement that calls for preserving the political and religious identity of the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam, known as the Houthi rebellion (Beinin et al., 2013, p. 229). In southern Yemen, turmoil increased by a secessionist movement progressed to armed conflict. This movement claimed insufficient representation in the unified Yemeni government, inciting civil divide along pre-unification tendencies, fueled by resentment against the wealthier northern representatives.</p><p>The Yemeni revolution centered on the ideas of anti-elitism and lack of representation in the state’s government. Various demographics within the Yemeni society sought change for different reasons, but their efforts shared a call for a change in government and the current political party system. The Yemeni Revolution joined “students, unemployed workers, tribesmen, women and children, human rights activists, and even unskilled workers, whose ideological and religious affiliations were as diverse as their geographic and social backgrounds.” This growing mix of violent and non-violent protestors promoted collective action at an unprecedented rate in Yemen, largely enabled by social media (Beinin et al., 2013, p. 229).</p><p>The primary protest method for these unified organizations was the use of mass organized sit-ins, throughout every symbolic and impactful public space, which at times contained one hundred different organizations calling for change in a single event. The sit-ins developed into camps that began to run as communal “micro-societies,” operating by values and behaviors, which defined their protests. The encampments continued to grow in every major city, conducting festivals, hosting concerts, distributing revolution stickers, all to the extent that they were described as a “family friendly atmosphere” (Beinin et al., 2013, p. 229). While their revolution was less violent than countries like Libya (culminating in the death of leader Muammar Gaddafi), Saleh succumbed to the pressure and stepped down as president in February of 2012. Saleh’s Vice President, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, assumed the role of acting President and currently remains in office.</p><p>Al Qaeda quickly identified the opportunity to exploit Yemen’s civil unrest for vast territorial gains in the region. While AQAP’s growth further accelerated during the 2015 Civil War, their ability to gain a foothold in the region coincided with the 2011 Arab Spring revolution and Zawahiri’s decision to further empower the affiliate groups. Among the AQ affiliates, AQAP was the prime candidate for growth, beginning with the Yemeni revolution and further capitalizing on the civil war. Concurrent with the U.K. and U.S. embassy closures in Yemen, U.K.’s <em>The Telegraph</em> stated, “before it (AQAP) was a fairly weak, loosely knit group. Today it is a fully-fledged organization. The question is could it be destroyed? It couldn’t. At best, it could be contained” (Blomfield et al., 2010).</p><p><strong>Yemeni Civil War — 2015. </strong>President Hadi recognized the growing Yemeni divide along sectarian and political lines. He addressed this issue by presenting a governing structure comprised of six balanced provinces. The chief opposition to Hadi’s government (as Hadi remained President after his provisions as Acting President had expired) was the Houthi movement, representing the Shia community. The Houthis had been waging a low-level insurgency in north Yemen against the Yemeni government since the early 2000’s. They also participated in the 2011 revolution, but were still not satisfied with the outcome. The Houthis felt disenfranchised, in that they were not allocated the appropriate authority and resources under President Hadi’s proposed governance. Consequently, they attempted a rebellion to overthrow the Yemeni government. The Houthi rebels’ ultimate goal was to achieve a larger role in the Yemeni government with greater autonomy.</p><p>The existing Yemeni governmental structure was weak. The fragmented military, opposed by the growing threat of terrorism, was also failing. On 21 March, 2015, the Houthi rebels took over the capitol city, Sana’a, with little opposition, seizing the Yemeni government and declaring an overthrow of President Hadi. Hadi relocated all of his remaining military forces to oppose the Houthis in Sana’a, leaving the southern regions of Yemen exposed and vulnerable.</p><p>Since 2015, the Yemeni Civil war plummeted the state into one of the greatest humanitarian crises on the planet. Yemen has the world’s largest cholera outbreak “currently at nearly 1 million cases, more than 7 million people at risk of famine, and more than 80% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance” (CIA, 2017). Economically, the country is in ruin, with severe inflation, infrastructure demolished through years of war, and exports screeching to a halt. As one of the most severe failing states in the world, the CIA describes that “Yemen will require significant international assistance during and after the protracted conflict to stabilize its economy. Long-term challenges include a high population growth rate, high unemployment, declining water resources, and severe food scarcity” (CIA, 2017). As Yemen disintegrates economically and politically, their people pay the price.</p><p><strong>AQAP growth — Post Arab Spring</strong></p><p><em>“Yemen has become the rear base for all jihadi work in the world.”</em></p><p>- Osama Bin Laden, April 2011 (Atwan, 2013, p. 80).</p><p>Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula was formed in January 2009 by a merger between the Saudi and Yemeni offshoots of AQ. It is considered the most significant terrorist threat to the region, to local western interests and to the West itself (Atwan, 2013, p. 35). The U.S. State Department Country Report on Terrorism stated that “Terrorist groups continue to exploit ungoverned territory and ongoing conflict to expand their reach, and to direct and inspire attacks around the world (The State Department, 2017, p. 9). AQAP in Yemen is the premier example of exploiting conflict, administrative chaos and political turmoil to establish a safe-haven for extremist operations. Additionally, AQAP developed new tactics to strengthen their foundation in the country, pursuing growth by appealing to the disenfranchised populace. AQAP affirmed that the Yemeni government could no longer protect their citizens, and integrated their radical ideology “deeply in the fabric of Yemeni society” (Atwan, 2013, p. 35). The US Central Intelligence Agency categorizes AQAP’s aim and area of operations as the following:</p><p><em>Aim(s):</em> overthrow the Yemen Government and Houthi forces and, ultimately, establish an Islamic caliphate; eradicate US and Western influence and presence from Yemen and the rest of the Arabian Peninsula.</p><p><em>Area(s) of operation:</em> a core Al-Qaeda affiliate; most active in southern, eastern, and central Yemen (CIA, 2017).</p><p>In Tunisia and Egypt, protestors used nonviolent means to oppose the existing government during the Arab Spring. Yemen however, is one of the most heavily armed populations in the Arab world, existing as a fragmented state with a fragile political system. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, protestors in Yemen observed that they could achieve their goals through violence, a mindset aligning directly with AQ ideology. The weakness of the state army, in all three examples, defined the tactics protestors had at their disposal (Gelvin, 2012, p. 100).</p><p>AQ’s success through AQAP in Yemen is a result of three key factors. First, the Yemeni government inadvertently shaped the social environment for AQ growth through the spread of Salafism. Although AQ only represents a fringe element of Salafists, this created an environment supportive of AQ (Gelvin, 2012, p. 105). Second, AQAP exploited the opportunity to establish operations in Yemen in the midst of a Civil War and a severe humanitarian crisis. Third, AQAP developed a strategy unique to Yemen, blending AQ core values to regional grievances and demonstrating a brand of terrorism tailored for effectiveness in Yemen’s cultural environment, while maintaining AQ’s foreign and domestic goals.</p><p>AQAP appeals on the platform that many Yemenis are “overwhelmingly negative about the current state of the peace process and the parties involved in it,” neither supporting the Houthis or the Yemeni government, believing that both parties are only pursuing their own political interests (Madison Springfield, 2017, p. 19). This sentiment creates a target audience that is impoverished, unable to support themselves, disenfranchised from the government, and with a large youth demographic that supports neither side of the Yemeni Civil War. Additionally, many in Yemen believe these parties are plunging the country into a deeper humanitarian crisis no longer centered on Yemen, “accusing foreign nations involved in Yemen as being involved solely for their own interests, to include Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia and the United States (Madison Springfield, 2017, p. 19). Such disillusionment creates the perfect environment for the growth of religious-based extremism, with the “Yemeni flavor” of AQ.</p><p>Gregory Johnsen, analyst and counterterrorism author stated in a Senate hearing, that as early as the start of the revolution “al Qaeda has been the most representative organization in Yemen. It transcends class, tribe, and regional identity in a way that no other organization or political party does” (Boucek et al, 2010, p. 33). AQAP has successfully aligned its societal narrative with Yemeni grievances. AQAP proffers a coherent grievance narrative that is consistent with the core tenets of al Qaeda’s ideology, and infused with themes that resonate locally, increasing its salience, credibility, and audience acceptance. This hybridity has blurred the local and global demarcation of relevant issues, resulting in what has been termed “glocalization” (Boucek et al., 2010, p. 35).</p><p>AQAP received insignificant conventional opposition in Yemen. Local law enforcement been taken over entirely by the Houthi organization or otherwise eradicated. The remaining law current enforcement has little to no funding, poor equipment and is staffed by ill-trained and inexperienced personnel. Yemen’s judicial counterterrorism framework and capabilities have crumbled, with “most courts having shut down and been replaced by Houthi run committees, and the majority of Aden’s courts being destroyed altogether (Madison Springfield, 2017, p. 22).</p><p>With no opposition, the growth of AQAP has been rapid, and they are able to increase their ranks through a number of outlets. Some families have become “so desperate for a means to fulfill their most basic needs that they have sold their children to terrorist organizations.” Many youth have joined the terrorist group for the simple glamour of fighting for change in their country, while many others have merely transitioned from a life of drugs and crime as a gateway to violent extremist organizations (Madison Springfield, 2017, p. 19).</p><p><strong>Case Study Two — al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in North Africa</strong></p><p><strong>Algeria</strong></p><p>“<em>Timbuktu may sound far away but it is only two plane rides from Manhattan</em>.”</p><p>- John Bolton, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, <em>New York Post, </em>2013</p><p>To most of the world, violent extremism in North Africa was as non-existent as AQ and the Taliban were obscure prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. AQ in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa stepped out of the shadows and onto the radar of intelligence agencies worldwide during the Benghazi attacks on September 11th, 2012, which killed U.S. Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens and three other Americans, followed by the Algerian Amenas gas facility hostage crisis. While AQIM was later shown to have played merely a supporting role in the Benghazi attack, the Armenas gas facility demonstrated AQIM’s reach and lethality, making their mark by murdering thirty-nine foreigners and taking 800 hostages (Venter et al., 2018, p. 29).</p><p>While AQAP in Yemen achieved progressive growth prior to the Arab uprisings and death of Bin Laden, AQIM was largely unknown to the international community, and presented international concern as one of the first affiliates to expose its existence <em>after</em> Bin Laden’s death, fueled by the Arab Spring in North Africa. While AQIM appears a success story in AQ affiliate growth following the Arab Spring, analysis clearly demonstrates that there was little-to-no change from the prior regional AQIM strategy, almost completely independent of AQ core, with the exception of fundamental ideologies.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/296/1*GV6Q-D6HFvEYkhGbhoBqzQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Demographics.</strong> According to the most recent assessments listed in the Central Intelligence Agency Fact Book, modern Algeria is home to roughly 41.6 million people, making it the 34th largest country in the world, with 72.6% living in an urban environment. Algeria is 99% Arab, speaking Arabic as the official language, with a large portion of the population fluent in French. The median age in Algeria is 28.3 years old, with 29.49% of the population between 0–14 years old, 14.72% 15–24 years old, 42.97% 25–54 years old, 7.01% 55–64 years old and 5.81% 65 years old and over. Life expectancy in Algeria is 77.2 years. Concerning religion, the population is 99 % Sunni Muslim, making Algeria the largest Sunni majority of the five case studies (CIA, 2017). Its population growth rate is 1.63% per year. Algeria’s current unemployment rate is 11.7%.</p><p><strong>Geography. </strong>Algeria is located in northern Africa and is 40% larger than the size of Alaska at 2,381,740 square kilometers. Algeria borders 7 different countries; Tunisia to the northeast, Libya to the east, Niger to the southeast, Mali to the southwest, Mauritania to the west, Western Sahara to the west, and Morocco to the northwest. Additionally, Algeria has 1000 kilometers of coastline on the Mediterranean Sea. Algeria’s terrain consists of primarily high plateaus and deserts, with mountain ranges to the north and south. As the Sahara desert encompasses a large portion of the southern half of Algeria, a majority of the populace lives in the northern third of Algeria, along the coast (CIA, 2017).</p><p><strong>Economy. </strong>Algeria’s annual GDP is equivalent to $15,200, making it the highest GDP of the five case studies. Algeria’s exports are 97% petroleum, petroleum based products and natural gas, with its top three customers being the U.S., Spain and Italy. Algeria has enjoyed a progressively improving economy since 2000 (CIA, 2017).</p><p><strong>Algeria — A Historical Overview</strong></p><p>“ Wherever the Middle East is going, Algeria will get their first (and probably with more violence)” (Gelvin, 2012, p. 110).</p><p>The territory now known as Algeria was part of the Ottoman Empire until 1830, when it transitioned to a French territory. The French conquest of Algeria (between 1830 and 1847) was initiated in 1827 by a minor dispute between the ruler of the Ottoman Regency of Algiers and the French consul (Venter et al., 2018, p. 46). France spent the next hundred years attempting to colonialize Africa in its image, justifying themselves as providing the gift of higher civilization to Africa, often by violent force. Algeria remained under French control for 132 years (1830–1962), eventually integrated to what the French considered a “department of France,” encouraging their citizens to immigrate to Algeria.</p><p>Native Algerians not only saw their political structures and lands vacated by the colonial administration and incoming European settlers, but frequently lost much more: the non-European population actually suffering a net decline in numbers over the first forty years of the French governance (Willis, 2014, p. 20). When compared to other North African countries, Algeria is typically noted as having endured the greatest consequences from colonization. Algeria was established in 1962, fighting an eight-year war to liberation from the imperial hold of France, and developing the reputation as a revolutionary state. Much like the other post-colonial states in this study, the Algerian culture holds an underlying anti-colonial, anti-outsider sentiment.</p><p>Algeria was one of the first Arab states to pursue free multiparty elections in 1989 (Gelvin, 2012, p. 110). This experiment quickly ended when Islamists won the popular vote. The outcome was opposed by the Algerian Army, sparking a violent civil war (1991–2002) that killed 150,000 citizens. The Algerian civil war was a fierce conflict between an Islamic insurgency and a counterinsurgency campaign spearheaded by the Algerian Army, more specifically by a unit known as “the Eradicators.” The Islamic Party hunted by the “Eradicators” founded an organization, born of the insurgency, known as Groupe Islamiste Armé (GIA) to lead their movement. Between the insurgency, led by the GIA, and the Algerian military, led by the Eradicators, Algeria was no stranger to violent extremism, even prior to the arrival of AQ.</p><p><strong>Modern Algerian Conflict</strong></p><p>The 1990s and early 2000s observed Algeria in a continued state of emergency. Rampant corruption and unemployment plagued the state, leaving as many as four hundred thousand without jobs between 1994 and 2000 (Gelvin, 2012, p. 111). The conditions in Algeria became so dire that over 50,000 Algerian youth attempted to immigrate to Europe in small boats, accepting a 10% survival rate to complete the trip. Algeria held elections in 1999 in an attempt to install an operational government structure. Although the elections were considered biased by Algerians and the international community, Algeria voted a new president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who is now in his fourth term, following a constitutional amendment which removed his term limits.</p><p>Following the 2011 Arab Spring protests in bordering Tunisia and nearby Egypt, Algeria quickly became the popular choice for the next social movement. The chief Algerian complaints were humiliation, poverty and corruption, many of the same grievances experienced throughout the broader Arab world. Protests in Algeria, while rich in oil and natural gas, began as an old-fashioned “bread riot” — protestors initially shouting “We want sugar!” — before shifting their focus from economic grievances to political demands (Gelvin, 2012, p.24). Similar to other Arab uprisings, Algerians eventually cited unemployment, high prices and housing as some of their chief complaints. Having the highest median age (among case studies) at 28.3, one key factor in the Algerian uprisings was the lack of young professionals to mobilize against the government. Many of Algeria’s youth population emigrated from Algeria during the early 2000s, differentiating the demographics of Algeria’s uprising from others across the Arab world.</p><p><strong>Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb growth in Algeria — Post Arab Spring</strong></p><p>The foundations of AQIM existed long before it emerged on the world stage as a potential actor during the 2012 Benghazi attacks. The earliest manifestation of Islamic extremism in Algeria was the GIA-led insurgency in the 1991 Algerian Civil War. Following the Algerian Civil War that slaughtered 150,000 Algerian citizens (and many Sunni Muslims), the GIA realized they had undermined their primary recruitment base, and found it necessary to rebrand to survive. In 1998 the GIA became the “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat,” or Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). In 2007 the GSPC pledged allegiance to Bin Laden and AQ, rebranding as AQIM, primarily based in Algeria. Bin Laden and Zawahiri relied heavily on the anti-colonial sentiments of the Algerian populace to incite allegiance and promote growth, specifically citing Islamic grievances against historical and modern day France. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency cites AQIM’s aim and area of operations as:</p><p><em>Aim:</em><strong> </strong>overthrow various African regimes and replace them with one ruled by sharia; establish a regional Islamic caliphate across all of North and West Africa<strong><br> </strong><em>Area(s) of operation:</em> leadership headquartered in Algeria; operates in Tunisia, Libya, and northern Mali (CIA, 2018).</p><p>AQIM has two primary leaders, Abdelmalek Droukdal and Mokhtar Belmokhtar. While they often sustain factional feuds inhibiting AQIM growth, they share a common unifying experience as former members of the anti-Soviet mujahidin, and both maintained contact with Bin Laden up until his death. The anti-European and anti-colonial dimension of AQIM’s history appears to be the group’s core driver, but the shared background of its leaders links it to a broader global current of Islamist militancy that also encompasses the core of al Qaeda (Civvis et al., 2013, p.2).</p><p>A 2013 RAND study by Christopher Chivvis and Andrew Liepman cited several main conclusions regarding AQIM, including that:</p><p>• Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is an amorphous, resilient, and adaptive terrorist organization that has shown extraordinary staying power in the face of counterterrorism operations.</p><p>• AQIM is focused almost entirely on Algeria and neighboring countries. Further attacks by AQIM in this region are very likely.</p><p>The key variance of AQIM, as exemplified by the Arab Spring, is that AQIM does not, and never has viewed the “West” as the distant enemy in the manner of AQ Core. AQIM has always recruited through an anti-colonial, anti-French narrative, citing historical grievances, and modern Algerian regime Arab Spring equivalents, the chief barriers in preventing the realization of true Islam in Algeria. Additionally, scarred by the civilian casualties of the Algerian Civil War in the 1990s, many insurgents (including AQIM leadership) now emphasize avoiding civilian casualties to preserve their recruitment base. This was a history lesson learned by studying the GIA: when an insurgency is located within a 99% Sunni state, attacking civilians will cause unrecoverable damage to the organizations recruitment strategy.</p><p>Algeria provides unique example to demonstrate that, while AQIM shares fundamental Salafist, Islamic, and anti-outsider sentiments with AQ core, it didn’t fully align with the AQ narrative, even before the Arab spring. The GSPC that became AQIM never sought to attack the West, primarily engaging targets in Algeria and the periphery of North Africa. This did not concern Bin Laden as he attempted to grow his AQ network, if only in the perception of expansion with the GSPC rebranding. Additionally, the GSPC had established a very successful smuggling business; its cash was a potential windfall, offering yet another reason for AQ to accommodate the GSPC (Chivvis et al., 2013, p.5). While the GSPC was interested in the prestige of rebranding as AQ, AQ was seeking new forms of funding as the international community focused anti-money-laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism-financing (CTF) operations on the AQ network.</p><p>The AQIM case study displays consistency with AQIM’s traditional recruitment methods, by focusing on Algeria, citing Algerian grievances, and leveraging similar Sunni discontent during the Arab Spring. It was a seamless continuation of the recruitment strategy of opposing the Algerian (and French) regimes used to promote the insurgency for the past fifty years. However, this case also reveals a shrewd and delicate balance. While AQIM pledged allegiance to AQ core, and maintains a “share” in the five main AQ affiliates, they appear to always maintain a locally focused recruitment strategy, relying less stringently with the tenants of the mujahidin through their leadership’s Core AQ participation and personal relationship with bin Laden (and al-Zawahiri).</p><p>Currently, AQIM operates throughout North Africa with a variety of local militias, including a loose alliance with Boko Haram. The instability and insecurity security of northern Africa — much of Libya, parts of Tunisia, increasingly Egypt and the Sahel geographic band — offer AQIM rich opportunities to transit, recruit, raise funds, plot, and conduct operations (Chivvis et al., 2013, p. 7). AQIM’s growth in North Africa is further motivated by regional French coalition military activities to fight terrorism. In a region that holds deep anti-colonial sentiments, especially French, AQIM is ready to exploit the narrative of “ousting the foreign invader” when it aligns with their own interests.</p><p>When AQIM provides resources to the local populace, earning favor in opposition to unstable and corrupt local governments, they are likely to experience continued growth. However, much like other AQ affiliates, even ISIS, AQIM will need to focus on depth of recruitment, rather than just breadth, or it will quickly overreach its own ability to provision and entreat the local populace. In addition facing similar challenges as IS in 2015–2017, AQIM’s recruitment strategy is further complicated by the brand recognition of African militias acting outside of AQIM values but alongside AQIM fighters.</p><p>In conclusion, while AQIM has grown in direct correlation with the regional Arab uprisings, such correlation does not indicate causation due to the global growth of AQ. AQIM and its predecessors have always ebbed and flowed with the grievances of Algeria’s Sunni population. Though AQIM remains a resilient violent extremist organization, it has not demonstrated that it is truly a member of the “global jihad,” but merely a rebranding of the historic Sunni insurgency of Algeria (and broader North Africa) that existed long before AQ. Had bin Laden or Zawahiri attempted to apply the general recruitment tactics of AQ to the Algerian demographic it likely would have been ineffective and ignored. AQ’s largest success in AQIM is accepting their allegiance as a mere union of convenience, and refraining from controlling their existing operations and values. From GIA to GSPC, AQIM has always grown from within, selectively motivated by the societal friction of their immediate environment.</p><p><strong>Case Study Three — al Shabaab</strong></p><p><strong>Somalia</strong></p><p>Somalia is a failed state that lacks central authority, enabling the local AQ affiliate al Shabaab (AS), translated “the Youths,” to operate freely in the region. Since there is no central authority to provide goods and services to the population, there is an almost unlimited potential for AQ recruitment. In a state unable to effectively collect taxes, it is not a challenge for terrorist organizations, wealthy from crime and extortion, to provide more than the government can as an incentive for membership. Somalia has destabilized to the extent that it is difficult to access accurate geopolitical statistics for a cross-sectional analysis. Of the countries in the case study, Somalia has the youngest median age, highest unemployment rate, lowest GDP and highest level of government corruption.</p><p>If there is one key differentiator in the case study of AS’s growth strategy, it is the reliance on social connections and clan politics to expand membership, rather than the traditional top-down ideological pull. Like the other AQ affiliates, AS in Somalia is able to cite local grievances of corruption and severe poverty in the vacuum of central authority. However, in the midst of a religious unification within the country, AS merely had to maintain its existing clan-based Somali growth strategy, mildly accelerated by the 2011 Arab Spring, and with minimal influence from Core AQ.</p><p><strong>Demographics.</strong> According to the most recent assessments listed in the Central Intelligence Agency Fact Book, modern Somalia is home to roughly 11 million people, making it the 81st largest country in the world, with 45% living in an urban environment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/320/1*WJjWZRZhm3JDjyvLx4_tYg.png" /></figure><p>The nation is predominately ethnic Somali, speaking Somali as the native tongue, with 15% of the population listed as Bantu or other. The median age in Somalia is 18.2 years old, with 39.83% of the population between 0–14 years old, 42.87% 15–24 years old, 31.23% 25–54 years old, 4.35% 55–64 years old and 2.19% 65 years old and over. Life expectancy in Somalia is 53.2 years. Religiously, the population is 99.9% Sunni Muslim (CIA, 2017). The population growth rate is 2.08% per year. Somali unemployment is estimated at 67%, which, if correct, would be among the three worst unemployment locations in the world (CIA, 2017).</p><p><strong>Geography. </strong>Somalia is a coastal state, slightly smaller than Texas, in northeast Africa. Somalia is bordered by Djibouti to the northwest, Ethiopia to the west and Kenya to the southwest. Additionally, Somalia has 3,025 kilometers of coastline, with the Indian Ocean to the east and Gulf of Aden to the north. Somalia’s terrain consists primarily of plateaus with rising elevations to the north. Its climate varies from arid desert to monsoons with irregular rainfall (CIA, 2017).</p><p><strong>Economy. </strong>Somalia has only recently started to recover from the loss of its central authority in 1991. Due to the unstructured and nomadic nature of its people, there is no official GDP reported; the government is unable to effectively collect taxes or maintain official records. The 2012 United Nations Human Development Report listed Somalia’s GDP per capita as $284 (United Nations Human Development Programme, 2018). Despite its anemic national governance, Somalia maintains an informal economy largely based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications (CIA, 2017). The lack of accurate economic data for Somalia is remarkable, as over 75% of their commerce uses unofficial transactions of agricultural services and products. Somalia’s primary exports are livestock, bananas, and animal hides to Oman 31.7%, Saudi Arabia 18.7%, and the UAE 16.3%. Somalia’s longstanding dismal economy is one of the primary factors driving the nomadic culture of its citizens. Given the central authority void and reliance on a trade-based economy, Somalia’s population is forced to constantly adapt to the near-term economic and environmental conditions to ensure survival and security.</p><p><strong>Somalia — A Historical Overview</strong></p><p>Similar to other terrorist organizations in the case study, understanding the nature of al Shabaab requires a summary review of the local and historical dynamics of Somalia. The collective Somali mindset views their culture as part of Arabian history, rather than African, citing their descendence from Islamic roots. Somalis specifically identify with the history and legend of their specified tribe, which many are able to trace by male bloodline. Clan mentality produces one of the most prevalent friction points in Somali culture today. The clans are Somali’s largest form of identity, operating from 10,000–100,000 members based on season and location. Somali political allegiances are determined by descent in the male line; and, whatever their precise historical content, it is their ancestry which directs political alliances and divisions. These genealogies define the basic political and legal status of the individual in Somali society, assigning them a specific place in the social system (Lewis, 2002, p. 18).</p><p>Among the many reasons that analysts cite Somalia as a failed state and terrorist stronghold is that Somalia is particularly susceptible to Islamic extremism. This is largely because Islam has served as a unifying factor in Somali society amidst the constant state turmoil of national changes during the past century. Somalia was initially populated by the Arabic diaspora, migrating from the Middle East to settle in the area known as the Horn of Africa. Much like the other countries in this study, Somalia surrendered to British rule during the colonial era, becoming a British Protectorate in 1887. During WWII, Italy captured Somalia and was subsequently made responsible for its post-war transition to independence by the United Nations. After achieving independence in 1960, Somalia trialed a democracy until 1969, which ended by Presidential assassination and military coup d’état, citing grievances in corruption. From 1969–1991, Somali was led by a Marxist regime that also eventually succumbed to the clan mentality, once again citing grievances in corruption.</p><p>During this century of shifting power centers, the Somali people learned several important lessons which endure on their national-psyche. First, they share the pervasive anti-colonial mindset, with a mentality to oppose the foreign invader. Second, their brief experiment in democracy proved unsuccessful and incompatible to their unique clan-based society. All of the clan leaders who were not represented readily dismantled the government that was self-interested and corrupt. Finally, their 22-year relationship with communist ideologies during the Cold War era was also unsuccessful, with the self-serving governing body alienating its citizens. Somalia emerged from these trials with an Islamic clan-based populace that identifies as an Arab nation, who oppose hierarchical forms of government, and holds little national coherence. The one remaining factor that unifies Somalia in all of their chaos is the Islamic religion.</p><p><strong>Modern Somali Conflict</strong></p><p>The predecessor to AS is identified as a group known as Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI), created in 1983 during the effort to advance an Islamic religious resurgence in Somalia. AS was initially formed by Somali fighters returning from fighting for the mujahidin in Afghanistan (which maintained their social ties with fighters who would eventually become AQ in Afghanistan). The veterans of the Afghan “defensive jihad” were many of the same Somalis who discovered their own opportunity at a violent “defensive jihad” against the U.S. and U.N. in the 1990s.</p><p>The lawlessness in the 1990s, paired with the resurgence of religion in Somalia, led to a formal government structure in the form of “Sharia Courts” which were popular with AS members. As AS grew in the 1990s, so did AQ in Afghanistan, sharing many of the same ideologies, with AS maintaining a more local focus, while AQ in Afghanistan fostered the idea of the “far enemy.” AQ extended its growth to East Africa, seeking support from the mujahidin veterans that were now AS leadership. AS valued the support by accepting AQ resources, enabling AQ to grow in the region and help realize their dream of a global jihad. However, after the pressure of 9/11, Somalia quickly became strategic geographic terrain for AQ to seek security and establish training sites in the ungoverned territory. While still affiliated with AQ, AS began to resource its own operations, primarily focused on African and Somalian grievances. AS continued to grow in the first decade of the 21st century, filling the power vacuum left behind by the warlords of the 1990s. AS was designated a terrorist group by the United States in 2008, Australia in 2009 and the United Kingdom in 2010 (Hansen, 2013, p. 2).</p><p><strong>Al Shabaab growth in Somalia — Post Arab Spring</strong></p><p>Al-Qaeda in East Africa was regionalized, as their larger area operations dwindled. Post-9/11 surveillance made it harder for Al-Qaeda to operate on a global scale. Consequently, Al-Qaeda in East Africa “went native” and grew more dependent on local sympathizers (Hanse, 2013, p. 39). Local support enabled AS to focus on local goals and challenges. The US Central Intelligence Agency categorizes the AS mission in their Somalia Smartbook:</p><p><em>Aim(s):</em> discredit and destabilize the Federal Government of Somalia and target any countries or entities that support Somalia’s fight against al Shabaab; establish Islamic rule across Somalia<br> <em>Area(s) of operation:</em> a core al Qaeda affiliate that maintains strongholds in rural areas in the south, where it controls a large swathe of the Lower and Middle Juba and Lower Shabelle regions; responsible for numerous high-profile bombings and shootings throughout Somalia and in the northeast in Puntland State (CIA, 2018)</p><p>AS recruits are motivated by a variety of factors, including financial gain, fear (forced recruitment), siding with “the winner”, anti-Ethiopian sentiments, clan grievances, a quest for justice through Sharia legislation, and an idea of offensive or defensive jihad<strong> </strong>(Hansen, 2013, p.13). Of these recruitment tools, and of the general grievances of the 2011 Arab Spring, corruption and financial gain played key roles in AS growth after the Arab Spring. AS easily exploited both Somalia’s sensitivity to corruption and their lack of central government authority to accelerate regional growth. However, like Algeria, these were not new tactics following the Arab Spring, but common recruitment points that facilitated AS growth since the organization’s founding.</p><p>As early as the 1990’s, terrorist organizations in Somalia matured to oppose large-scale corruption and misuse-of-funds by the Western-backed governments of Somalia. In addition, it was irrationally detrimental for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to train Somali police without ensuring their compensation when entering government service. This oversight contributed to a climate of corruption that elevated AS’s standing as a more credible alternative through its implementation of Sharia law and less exploitative police forces (Hansen, 2013, p. 17).</p><p>While AS recognized the need to transition to a more local service based recruitment in the 21st century, their methods were only slightly influenced by the Arab Spring and more by the trajectory of their continued progress and control in the region. Exhibiting administrative duties akin to Iraq’s IS in 2014, AS began to focus on “winning the hearts and minds of its people” by demonstrating that they were able to provide more for them than the struggling government. AS utilized their cash flow, based in crime and extortion, to serve the community and fund public works, including roads and plumbing. AS realized the growth potential of this method and sought to increase their revenue sources. AS entered the piracy business in 2010 and trained their fighters to seize existing piracy ports. Additionally, AS postured itself as a more effective option than corrupt government structures to act as an intermediary between international aid organizations and the Somali people. Similar to AQIM in Algeria, AS also functioned as the “glue” connecting other extremist factions and militias in Somalia, readily assuming an informal leadership role due to their success as an organization. The local people-centered, hearts-and-minds affirming mindset complements their locally based recruitment strategy, which proved effective in Somalia (as it was for IS in Iraq in 2014).</p><p>AS recognized the organic Somalian need for structure in its society. AS’s managerial competency gave it a marked advantage in the Somalian culture, enabling it to coalesce around and offer coordination for the various clans and militias. AS implemented structure in Somalia while also continuing to indoctrinate the society and introducecontrols, (e.g. training for NGOs, khat restrictions). AS developed favorable relationships with NGOs such as the World Food Program, the International Society of the Red Crescent, and UNICEF. Clan elders were also trained in order to help the recruitment efforts. Through their criminal business ventures, AS provided a reliable salary for their fighters. Estimated fighter earnings are between U.S. $60 and U.S. $200 for a fighter or low rank officer (Hansen, 2012, p. 93).</p><p>AS faced several obstacles to recruitment as it became a larger entity. In Somalia’s clan culture, it is natural for clan dynamics to drive clan leadership to align with AS as an ally. While this tendency supports AS recruitment efforts, it can also deter opposing clans from joining, thus undermining the overall AS strategy of remaining “bipartisan” and focused on the unity of shared strict Islamic principles. AS isn’t immune to the divisive fractures of Somali existence, as quarrels within AS have periodically stagnated growth. Infighting, ruthless application of Islamic law, and a refusal to allow international assistance to a starving Somali population have turned the citizens against AS on several occasions, which gave Somali Government Forces the opportunity to gain tactical victories against AS. These mistakes cost AS the support of local power brokers and the Somali populace, making it easier for counterterrorist efforts to recruit powerful clan allies (Chivvis et al., 2013, p. 7).</p><p>The organizational tension between global and local agendas constantly fractures AS. Local dynamics still dominate but ideological convictions are often blurred, self-contradicting and unclear (Hansen, 2013, p. 4). AS appears to have an identity issue: some within the organization acclaim themselves as the administrative power in Somalia to achieve consummate Islamic-based justice; others consider themselves as another arm of the global jihad; while other members adhere strictly to maintain a defensive jihad only within Somalia.</p><p><strong>Case Study Four — Jabhat al-Nusrah</strong></p><p><strong>Syria</strong></p><p>The establishment and growth of al-Nusrah (AN) in Syria is a very unique organization marked by local challenges in a historically complex region. The primary difference in AN growth in Syria (as opposed to other case studies), is the dual challenge presented by the dictatorial Bashar al Assad regime, whose brutal response to the Arab Uprising further fueled extensive intrastate conflicts, and the most concentrated territorial density of the emerging Islamic State. Consequently, AN shared many of the same IS obstacles, and only briefly maintained allegiance to AQ as they sought Syria-centric goals.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/233/1*HEqhoIA03G_noYuIFZ5S2Q.png" /></figure><p><strong>Demographics.</strong> According to the most recent assessments listed in the Central Intelligence Agency Fact Book, modern Syria is home to roughly 19.5 million people, making it the 62th largest country in the world, with 54.2% living in an urban environment. The nation is predominately Arab, speaking Arabic as the native tongue, with 15% Alawite’s and 10% Kurds. The ruling group in Syria primarily draws from the Alawite sect (Gelvin, 2012, p. 15). The median age in Syria is 24.5 years old, with 31.39% of the population between 0–14 years old, 19.52% 15–24 years old, 39.26% 25–54 years old, 5.52% 55–64 years old and 4.31% 65 years old and over. Life expectancy in Yemen is 75.2 years. For religion, the population is 87% Muslim (13% Shia and 74% Sunni), 10% Christian and less than 3% Druze (CIA, 2017). Its population growth rate, at 7.37% is the world’s highest. The Syrian Civil War has elevated unemployment to 35.8 percent, which, like Yemen, is over 10% greater than the Great Depression aftermath in the United States, making Syria the second highest unemployment in the world. As of 2017, approximately 13.1 million people were in need of humanitarian aid in Syria, with 6.3 million people displaced internally and 5.4 million refugees (CIA, 2017). As of 2014, 82.4% of Syrians are reported as being below the poverty line.</p><p><strong>Geography. </strong>Syria’s area covers 185,180 square kilometers, equal to the size of Washington State. Syria is bordered by Iraq to the east, Turkey to the north, Jordan to the south, Lebanon to the west and shares 83 kilometers of border with Israel to the southwest. Additionally, Syria has 193 kilometers of coastline on the Mediterranean Sea. Syria primarily consists of desert plateau with mountains in the western region (CIA, 2017).</p><p><strong>Economy. </strong>Syria’s annual GDP per capita is equivalent to $2,900, making it the 194th out of 228 countries recorded in the CIA Country Factbook (and second worst of the five case studies, being only $400 higher than Yemen’s $2,500). Syria’s primary exports are crude oil, minerals, petroleum products and fruits and vegetables to Lebanon 31.5%, Iraq 10.3%, and Jordan 8.8% (CIA, 2017). Syria’s economy has declined more than 70% during the last decade due to intrastate conflict.</p><p><strong>Syria — A Historical Overview</strong></p><p>The state that is now Syria was once home to the Mesopotamia of antiquity, being named for their former Assyrian residents, and boasting a rich Arabic history amidst the splendor of the Euphrates river. Between Aleppo and the capitol city of Damascus, Syria holds some of the most historically populated cities in the world. Once a territory of the Ottoman Empire, a key challenge facing the sultans was being unable to maintain loyal military forces across their provinces. Consequently, the local leaders, with their interests and militias, filled the void (Stansfield, 2016, pg. 63).</p><p>The Ottoman sultans and the Persians (ruled by shahs) faced similar challenges attempting to unify and promote cohesion through the region. The Ottomans over-prioritized empire expansion by exceeding their ability to apply state power to project and control domestic activities. As “outsiders,” they failed to emphasize internal development or appeal to existing tribal structures. Like many other ancient empires, the Ottomans were fueled by the simple concept of “the strong do what they have the power to do,” making significant errors in their Middle East conquest by misunderstanding the existing cultural, ideological, and ethnic demographic structures (Thucydides et al., 1805, pg. 402).</p><p>The Ottoman Empire ruled this region from 1299 until 1922, marking their defeat during the First World War, after which the British and French established the political boundaries of Syria, with Syria falling on the French side of the Sykes-Picot line. Tim Marshall describes this period of geographical division in his book, <em>Prisoners of Geography</em>:</p><p>When the Ottoman Empire began to collapse, the British and the French had a different idea. In 1916, the British diplomat Colonel Sir Mark Sykes took a grease pencil and drew a crude line across a map of the Middle East. It ran from Haifa on the Mediterranean in what is now Israel to Kirkuk (now in Iraq) in the northeast. It became the basis of his secret agreement with his French counterpart Francois Georges-Picot to divide the region into two spheres of influence should the Triple Entente defeat the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. North of the line was to be under French control, south of it under British hegemony (Marshall, 2014, pg. 146).</p><p>This “grease pencil drawn agreement,” lacking all acknowledgment of existing regional demographics, would be henceforth referenced as simply “Sykes-Picot.” Once again, an arbitrary demarche led to a chaotic period in the Middle East, of “states developed not out of logic of socio-economically driven conditions, but belatedly out of the ruins of empires…not as a “melting pot” within a cohesive national identity, but more as a powder keg of competing aspirations” (Stansfield, 2016, pg. 50).</p><p>The defining state boundaries, depicted by Sykes-Picot, are a key destabilizing factor that continues to affect the present conflict in the Middle East. When the European Powers created the territorial boundaries after WWI, they did so without regard to existing Arabic tribal boundaries or cultural environment, with many Arabs considering the state borders as “artificial.” This created a substantial challenge for any future democratic organization to govern among divided people groups, whose only commonality is their state boundary line. Naturally, this plagued national cohesion, resulting in resistance to weak governments, and providing opportunities for non-state actors to interfere.</p><p>The French granted Syria independence in 1946, as it continued in economic disrepair and significant instability. Enduring coup after coup, Syria finally achieved a modicum of stability when Hafez al-Assad took power as President in 1970. Although Syria achieved its greatest stability during the next 30 years, the regime was quickly assessed as corrupt, with Assad granting many key positions to personal friends and violently suppressing any opposition. After his death in 2000, Hafez al-Assad was replaced by his son, Bashar al-Assad without a democratic vote, and whose dominant authoritarian regime remains in power today.</p><p><strong>Modern Syrian Conflict</strong></p><p>Syrians have been living under a state of emergency since 1963. This repressive action strips citizens of fundamental rights such as habeas corpus and the right to assemble, authorizes extraordinary courts, suspends constitutional law, and expands the powers of the dictatorial executive branch.</p><p>Among the Arab nations, political scientists considered Syrian citizen involvement in the 2011 Arab Spring as unlikely due to the coercive strength of the Bashar al-Assad regime. The uprising in Syria began slowly, with a small demonstration of defying public dress codes. Anti-government protests first appeared in the southern province of Dar’a in March 2011, with protesters calling for “the repeal of the restrictive Emergency Law allowing arrests without charge, the legalization of political parties, and the removal of corrupt local officials” (CIA, 2018). After observing the success of other Middle East demonstrations, many Syrians hoped they could topple the Assad regime from their 40-year power fortress. Syrian citizens wanted representation in government.</p><p>The strength and nature of the Bashar regime, the very reason many doubted the emergence of Syrian uprisings, ended up fueling the Syrian rebellion. Syrian officials confronted minor offenses with extreme violence, torturing school children in one province for writing slogans (referencing Egypt’s revolution) on a wall. As citizens protested this excessive punishment, Syrian forces responded with lethal fire, killing and wounding dozens, including young children. This horror immediately incited mass riots against the Syrian government. The scope of the initial protests broadened to include national issues, citing the brutality of the regime, corruption, and the absence of government support to the Syrian people (Gelvin, 2012, p. 121). One major difference between the uprisings in Syria/Algeria, as contrasted to Yemen, was that the military sided with the existing government, as opposed to shifting allegiances to the opposition.</p><p><strong>Syrian Civil War — 2011. </strong>What began as the Arab Uprising in Syria quickly deteriorated into an all-out civil war, creating conditions for a grave humanitarian crisis, and a flood of refugees that demanded international attention. Since the government retained military loyalties during the uprisings, civilian factions and defectors from the military formed an opposition force called the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The consequences of the escalating the interstate conflict has left over half of all Syrians homeless or displaced (i.e. over 5 million refugees and an additional 6 million displaced). As the violence continued, more citizens affected by the conflict joined to oppose the Assad regime. Multiple militias and extremist groups had rapid growth. Reports have estimated up to one thousand different opposition groups since the start of the civil war, and 100,000 fighters. During this period, Islamic groups in the area developed their own strategies to exploit the Syrian civil war, the foremost being the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and AQ.</p><p>To supplement the violence, the IS spread and capitalized on the overall chaos. Initially IS supported the rebels, but eventually became an independent (and significant) non-state actor in the region. IS ultimately targeted both Assad’s forces and the rebels, seizing territory at an alarming rate in the conquest of their own caliphate. While the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is on par with Syria for the worst global tragedy, the Syrian Civil War has demonstrated the most violent and drastic measures taken by a government against its people. There have been multiple accusations of the government’s use of chemical weapons and, despite both U.S. and Russia involvement in Syria, the country remains an active warzone, punctuated by occasional ceasefires. By June 2013, 90 thousand had been killed in Syria. By August 2015, this figure had almost tripled to 250 thousand (Dicker, 2017, p. 9).</p><p><strong>Jabhat al-Nusrah growth — Post Arab Spring</strong></p><p>The chaos of the Arab Spring and subsequent civil war allowed AQ the opportunity to release hundreds of AQ leadership from detention in Syrian prisons. While many of these insurgents took up arms and resumed leadership in the IS, some who held closer ties to AQ core established al Nusrah (AN), a smaller entity than IS within the state of Syria.</p><p>The Assad regime blamed the Arab uprisings on Islamists, criminals and foreigners to justify their brutality against the Syrian populace. One decree Assad made was for membership in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood a crime punishable by death. Assad’s assertions, made early in his tenure, cited that his opponents were sectarian and violent, ultimately creating a self-fulfilling prophecy (Gelvin, 2012, p. 122). If anything, this cruelty and repression strengthened the resolve of Islamic extremist groups, and unified them against a common enemy. By necessity and opportunity, al Nusrah exploited this opportunity for growth, although they contained their focus on local challenges, and not on the global jihad. The CIA lists AN’s aims and area of operations as:</p><p><em>Aim(s):</em> overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, absorb like-minded Syrian rebel groups, and ultimately, establish a regional Islamic caliphate<br> <em>Area(s) of operation:</em> headquartered in the northwestern Idlib Governorate, with a minor presence in Halab Governorate; operates primarily in northern, western, and southern Syria; installs Sharia in areas under its control; targets primarily Syrian regime and pro-regime forces, some minorities, other Syrian insurgent groups, and occasionally Western interests (CIA, 2018).</p><p>AN was only able to achieve marginal success during their insurgency as they fought to share space, including recruits, with IS. After 2011, AN and IS shared many goals in the state of Syria, with IS displaying a slightly more brutal form of Islam and seeking to establish their caliphate immediately, utilizing Iraq as s simultaneous foothold. As described in the aforementioned “waves” of AQ, this was not a prosperous period for AQ, as IS was growing more rapidly and maintained a substantially larger cash flow in the area. AN’s only competitive advantage for recruitment was the prestige of the AQ affiliation. Both AN and IS cited all of the same grievances against the Assad regime, but IS was not only displaying more success in Syria, but could leverage their success in Iraq for the legitimacy of their expanded operations.</p><p>In AN’s January 2012 inaugural video, a masked representative outlined its regional objectives. He introduced the al Nusrah Front as “Syrian mujahidin” who have come “back from various jihad fronts to restore God’s rule on the Earth [Islamic law] and avenge the Syrians’ violated honor and spilled blood” (Counter Extremism Project, 2018). While AN asserted their origins from mujahidin heritage, they never used the “foreign invader” claim in recruitment (because it wasn’t relevant to their regional issues). They primarily cited the mujahidin narrative to attract those insurgents who maintained alliances with AQ, as that link was their only foothold AN could cite in opposition to IS.</p><p>AN successfully leveraged their AQ ties to create their organization. However, after assimilation into the chaos of Syria, AN concluded as just another insurgency group in the thousands of area factions. Although the U.S. still considers AN a AQ affiliate, AN publicly ceased all ties from AQ in 2017, when AN leadership declared a formal split from AQ after thanking “our brothers, the commanders of al Qaeda,” and announcing the group’s name change from Jabhat al-Nusra (“the Victory Front”) to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (“the Levantine Conquest Front”) (Counter Extremism Project, 2018). Six months later AN announced that its final dissolution to merge into an organization known as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (“Assembly for the Liberation of the Levant” or HTS).</p><p>The key takeaway in the case of the al Nusrah front is that they had failed as an AQ affiliate before they had even started. They achieved initial momentum after the Arab Spring, but were essentially attempting to launch the same “product” as IS, but without the credibility of the Islamic State in 2011. They were trying to leverage the mujahidin narrative of AQ’s historical ties and the AQ brand, none of which were relevant to the grievances of the Syrian opposition forces and the insurgency target market in the recruit competition against IS for premier growth. Additionally, AN’s nascent stage was during one of AQ’s largest declines in the 21st century, giving AN minimal support from AQ Core to oppose IS’s prodigious cash flow and rampant member growth.. Finally, aside from being a Sunni and Salafist extremist organization with congruous ideological values of AQ, AN never stated any interest in the global jihad or shared AQ values. AN was only interested in opposing the Assad regime to establish an Islamic government. While AN was in the right geography to exploit a growth opportunity, it was not the right time (or context) for their organization to succeed as an AQ affiliate in the imperial shadow of the Islamic State.</p><p><strong>Case Study Five — al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent</strong></p><p><strong>Pakistan</strong></p><p>Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) provides a unique perspective among the case studies because it is an outlier, as the least successful affiliate, and directly contradicting the growth strategies that otherwise proved successful. AQIS was founded to counter IS growth in the Indian Subcontinent, not merely to decentralize and empower the <em>existing</em> affiliate network. AQIS was the brainchild of Zawahiri in 2012–2014, attempting to foster growth and recruitment externally. Rather than growing AQIS from within, Zawahiri attempted to create AQIS from AQ Core in Afghanistan and Pakistan by creating a narrative citing the region’s historical ethic and sectarian tensions. For the exact reason the other case study affiliates’ growth was successful, this technique was unsuccessful in Pakistan. The only reason that AQIS is able to maintain a foundation is because of the continued “support” of Pakistan, the benefactor that requires a comprehensive focus for this case study.</p><p>Pakistan has built a reputation as a modern militant state, with enduring security concerns focused on India to the east, and China to the far east. Despite the weakening of AQ and death of bin Laden (depriving AQ of its brand symbol) the regional conflicts that allowed the exporters of terrorism to operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan have not yet been resolved (Dutta, 2012, p. 2). Pakistan is a notable outlier within the case study group for several reasons: large population, low unemployment rate and the distinction as the only nuclear power. Additionally, Pakistan is prone to terrorism not just because of fractures within its social structure, but because the state governance supports terrorism as a destabilization tool in their grand strategy of competition with India.</p><p>With a history of militancy, Pakistan has been a counterterrorism challenge since AQ’s creation, and will likely remain a difficult and complex problem in the future. If present trends hold, “the population of Pakistan will remain young, poorly educated, ill-prepared to compete in the global economy, and infested with terrorist networks and ideologies” (Markey, 2011, p. 39). An analysis of AQ operations in Pakistan and the Indian Subcontinent reveal a departure in strategy from the four other case studies, demonstrating a desperate attempt by AQ Core to achieve a foothold in the region through the unsuccessful use of generic recruitment tactics.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/256/1*AWR78Z6B02eMIxXFqKSd1g.png" /></figure><p><strong>Demographics.</strong> According to the most recent assessments listed in the Central Intelligence Agency Fact Book, modern Pakistan is home to roughly 207 million people, making it the 6th most populous country in the world, with 36.7% living in an urban environment. Pakistanis are primarily made up of Punjabi, Pashtun and Sindhi ethnicities, speaking Punjabi, Sindhi and Pashto. The median age in Pakistan is 24.1 years old, with 30.76% of the population between 0–14 years old, 20.94% 15–24 years old, 38.04% 25–54 years old, 5.7% 55–64 years old and 4.56% 65 years old and over. Life expectancy in Pakistan is 68.4 years. Concerning religion, the population is 96.4% Muslim (10–15% Shia and 85–90% Sunni), and less than 3.6% listed as either Christian or Hindu (CIA, 2017). Pakistan’s population growth rate is 1.41 percent per year, the 79th highest in the world. The current unemployment rate in Pakistan is 6% (CIA, 2017).</p><p><strong>Geography. </strong>Pakistan (undisputed area) consists of 770,875 square kilometers, roughly 10% larger than the state of Texas and is bordered by China to the northeast, India to the east, Afghanistan to the northwest and Iran to the southwest. Additionally, Pakistan maintains 1,097 square kilometers of coastline to the south on the Arabian Sea. Pakistan is primarily hot, with a dry desert, temperate northwest, and frigid north. Strategically, Pakistan’s 2670 square kilometer border with Afghanistan, the “Durand Line,” creates international challenges, with transnational terrorists transitioning back and forth between the two states (CIA, 2017).</p><p><strong>Economy. </strong>Pakistan’s annual GDP per capita is equivalent to $5,400, ranking 171st out of 228 countries recorded on the CIA Country Factbook, Pakistan’s primary exports are textiles, rice, leather goods, sporting goods, chemicals, manufactures, surgical instruments, carpets and rugs with the U.S. being the #1 importer of Pakistani goods, more than double the rate of the U.K. as the second highest importer (CIA, 2017). Recent trade deals with China have produced a more stable economy in Pakistan over the past decade. One of Pakistan’s largest economic challenges is the hesitancy of foreign backers to invest in Pakistani corporations, primarily due to regional instability.</p><p><strong>Pakistan — A Historical Overview</strong></p><p>Pakistan’s history and role in<strong> </strong>Southwest<strong> </strong>Asia have been marked by violence, conflict and the struggle for independence against imperial powers. Since the late 1700s, and 200 years thereafter, Pakistan and India were under British colonial rule. For Pakistan, British colonial rule laid the foundation for the enduring struggle against “the foreign invader,” an ethos permeated through their society even after independence. During the colonial epoch, the Muslim and Hindu societies united to revolt against the British, with the most severe uprising-taking place in 1857. The British responded with ruthless and humiliating force, “including indiscriminate mass slaughter, burning of villages, and collective punishment,” resulting in thousands of citizens publicly lynched, and numerous Hindu and Muslim holy sites destroyed (Dutta, 2011, p. 15).</p><p>Following World War II, British India was declared independent in 1947, creating two separate sovereign states, India and the Dominion of Pakistan (a Muslim majority nation). Much like the Sykes-Picot agreement in Iraq and Syria, creating nation-state borders in Pakistan superseded tribal and ethnic people groups, resulting in a society predisposed for discrimination and religious violence. In 1971, Pakistan’s cultural fault lines, steeped in colonial racism and exacerbated by disparate ethnic groups separated by the India land mass, resulted in the western Punjabi-dominated military committing mass genocide on their less represented eastern Bengali citizens, murdering over 300,000 Bengali Muslims. This extremely violent civil war led to the cessation of East Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh in 1971, aided by India. What had previously been “West Pakistan” was now just Pakistan, and found unification through their radical form of Islam.</p><p><strong>Modern Pakistani Conflict</strong></p><p>Incumbent on Pakistan’s motivation as a nuclear-tipped and militant state is to power balance against the neighboring country of India, also equipped with nuclear weapons. As an early Taliban stronghold, Pakistan cultivated jihadi groups in Afghanistan to expand influence and undermine Pashtun nationalism, thus neutralizing the potential for unifying Afghani and Pakistan Pashtuns and countering India’s influence in the region (Mackey, 2011, p. 41). Additionally, the Durand Line provided a convenient method for AQ members to maneuver from uncontrolled territory through Afghanistan, to Pakistan, where they can find relative security against US and allied opposition.</p><p>Modern<strong> </strong>Pakistan is best understood as a house divided, by different languages, regions, ethnicities, socioeconomic status, sect, tribe, ideology and political affiliation (Mackey, 2011, p. 42). Pakistan is also an insecure state, often resulting in the government neglecting the populace in favor of high-level security concerns, leading to failing infrastructure, healthcare and education. Additionally, Pakistan has disproportionate inequalities of wealth between social classes. A small elite prospers in a state where tens of millions are illiterate, impoverished and unhealthy.</p><p><strong>AQIS growth — Post Arab Spring</strong></p><p>“<em>[AQIS seeks to] establish sharia in the land and to free the occupied land of Muslims in the Indian sub-continent</em>.”</p><p>- Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeda, 2014</p><p>On 3 September, 2014, Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the formal establishment of AQIS in Pakistan, Myanmar, India and Bangladesh, in a 55-minute video posted in online AQ forums. Zawahiri focused on Pakistan and disenfranchised Muslim people groups in other Southeast Asian nations. He cited the region’s Islamic history, stating AQ sought renewal in “a region that was once part of the land of Muslims, until the infidel enemy occupied it, fragmented it, and split it,” alluding to the past colonial friction (Berry, 2014). Zawahiri noted the creation of AQIS was a two-year process of uniting various jihadi actions across the Indian subcontinent. The formation of AQIS in 2014 marked the last of their five main AQ affiliate groups. The CIA cites AQIS’s aim and area of operations as:</p><p><em>Aim(s):</em> establish an Islamic caliphate in the Indian subcontinent<br> <em>Area(s) of operation:</em> operates throughout the country, targeting military and security personnel; responsible for numerous attacks in Karachi; stages attacks in Afghanistan, India, and Bangladesh, where the group is the most active (CIA, 2018).</p><p>Several factors led to Zawahiri’s identification of the Indian subcontinent as a prime recruitment location. First, as ISIS began to recruit in the region, AQ recognized the need to counter IS growth. However, this approach deviated from AQ’s standard methods of “ousting the foreign enemy,” Instead, AQ sought growth merely for the purpose of countering the “caliphate.” Fortunately, AQ had two other advantages in the region to foster growth. Using their historical AQ Core narrative, AQ could easily relate their recruitment methods to Muslims in the Indian subcontinent who were culturally opposed to foreign actors, and colonial imperialism. Additionally, Pakistan government officials generally do not resist AQ, as AQ’s ability to destabilize other adversaries, like India, is perceived by Pakistan as a strategic benefit.</p><p>Unlike the significant degradation of government structures that contributed to the AQ growth of some other cases, Pakistan maintains a strong central government. Additionally, Pakistan displays protective, even supportive tendencies in regards to regional terrorism. Pakistan has historically supported the Taliban and operated through the Haqqani network, another AQ affiliate, to execute insurgency operations throughout Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and swaths of the country’s northwest grant al Qaeda and its allies safe haven (Dutta, 2011, p. 75). Evidence of these insidious relationships are the compound location of hidden Bin Laden in Pakistan and The 9/11 Commission Report concluding that Pakistani intelligence officials coordinated the first meeting between Bin Laden and the Taliban.</p><p>Among the four other countries in this case study, Pakistan was the least affected by the 2011 Arab Spring. While AQ attempted growth in Pakistan, it wasn’t because of favorable opportunities such as power voids or domestic unrest, but out of AQ’s desire to counter IS growth in the region. Given the absence of an Arab Spring regional movement and an existing AQ foundation in the area, AQ did not develop a customized recruitment strategy based on unique regional grievances of target people groups. In the effort to establish AQIS leveraging AQ Core and Zawahiri’s persona, they relied on historic AQ recruitment conventions appealing to past Muslim divisions and the unifying antagonism to colonial imperialism.</p><p>In conclusion, the AQIS case study remains an outlier for several main reasons:</p><p>1. Pakistan did not experience a significant destabilizing event in comparison to other countries during the Arab Spring.</p><p>2. While the Taliban and the Haqqani network hold influence in Pakistan, there was no significant pre-existing foundation for AQIS prior to Zwahiri’s announcement in 2014.</p><p>3. Because AQIS wasn’t a previously existing entity in the network of AQ, Zawahiri sought to grow it as a strategy to oppose IS in the region.</p><p>4. AQ core was the driving factor in AQIS recruitment, citing AQ historical recruitment narratives.</p><p>Due to these unique circumstances, AQIS did not relate to the disenfranchised people groups of the region to tailor their recruitment strategy in the manner of other AQ affiliates outside the region. There was also an ideological disconnect with AQ, because most Muslims on the Indian subcontinent have little sympathy for the Wahhabi religious movement followed by some violent extremists (Berry, 2014). AQ employed online propaganda, including videos, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, attempting to appeal to regional youth. However, they were not able to leverage societal grievances as a recruitment tool, conveying a perception of AQ being outsiders. A cleric associated with AQ in the Indian subcontinent issued a video statement that reprimanded Indian Muslims for their supposed lack of interest in “global jihad.” Though there are some signs of increasing radicalization in India, outside of marginal gains in Pakistan, recruitment to extremist networks is negligible (Burke, 2014).</p><p>Similar to the U.S. learning about the challenge of transplanting democracy to the Middle East in the 21st century, AQ learned through AQIS that unless a unless an organization has depth, developed through existing networked foundations, and fostered through a relevant narrative, it will quickly wilt. AQIS is valuable as an outlier to examine why it <em>was not</em> as successful as our other affiliates. AQIS is currently primarily in Pakistan, integrated into the operations of the Taliban and receiving funding from AQ Core.</p><p><strong>Comparative Analysis</strong></p><p>Restating the hypothesis:</p><p>H1: As al-Qaeda has further decentralized to empower their five main affiliates; they customized their growth strategy to specifically target the regional environment of the host state.</p><p>H0: As al-Qaeda has further decentralized to empower their five main affiliates; they have maintained a consistent growth strategy focused on the original al-Qaeda tenets.</p><p>This study’s analysis provides three clear findings that provide several key data points relating to the research problem. The first finding is that certain environmental conditions must exist within a state to support social nature of violent extremism. These underlying volatile dynamics prime a society to action, spurring violence and nonviolent resistance, as displayed in the Arab Uprisings, which also affirmed ideological narratives of extremist groups. The second finding is that the affiliate’s similarities end at the conclusion of shared demographic and societal grievances. Each state has a unique history. The case study examples of successful member growth indicate that violent extremist organizations manipulate the host state’s history to exploit chaotic social unrest for their own benefit. The third key finding is that these terror organizations often achieved success by departing from the historical AQ narrative, not by design, but by the expediency of aligning with their own local interests and organizational strategy. Al Shabaab and AQIM grew successfully because they had no intention to pursue the “mujahidin” and “far enemy” concepts of AQ Core.</p><p><strong>Key Finding One: Preexisting Geopolitical Conditions</strong></p><p><em>Al Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents rely on the physical sanctuary of ungoverned or poorly governed territories, where the absence of state control permits terrorists to travel, train, and engage in plotting…Persistent insecurity and chaos in some regions can undermine efforts to increase political engagement and build capacity and provide assistance, thereby exacerbating chaos and insecurity.</em></p><p>- US National Security Strategy (2011)</p><p>Two of the strongest indicators of the successful affiliate growth are the geopolitical and humanitarian conditions that promote extremism and the ideological overtures of extremist organizations. Conditions in unstable areas such as Yemen, Algeria, Syria and Somalia are well suited for inhabitants to embrace any ideology promising positive change; many extremists preach an ideology that can spread worldwide like an influenza (Suarez, 2015, p. 24). While Pakistan shares many of the same host country qualities of the other four states, it is susceptible to terrorism for outlying reasons, providing a notable contrast in this study.</p><p>Comparable to the HIV or AIDS virus in humans, state environmental factors such as weak-governmental systems, a lack of national identity and sectarian violence, weaken the host, indirectly strengthening and empowering violent extremists (McChrystal et al., 2015, p. 32). In Yemen, Somalia and Syria (arguably the world’s three largest humanitarian crises), the backdrop of intrastate conflict accelerates the virus of violent extremism. The primary shared demographics of the five states in the case study were median age, unemployment, gross domestic product, perception of government corruption, intrastate conflict, overall Muslim population and Sunni to Shia ratio.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/584/1*yRfMUr61V7Cs4OmH3kG9PQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>The Moderate Youth. </strong>One of the most important demographics in the Middle East (and in the case studies, as it relates to the growth of AQ affiliates), is the state median age. The average age of the five case studies is 23 years old. While this number seems youthful, it is skewed higher because of Algeria’s 28.3 median age, due to their mass youth emigration of the past two decades. The current demographic of the broader Middle East is often referred to as the “youth bulge.” While the youth was not the only segment called to action during the Arab spring, the youth bulge became the largest mobilization of grievances across the Arab world (Gelvin, 2012, p. 34).</p><p>Simply, unemployed 18–25 year olds comprise a majority of the driving force behind the Arab Uprisings, and are also the most “plugged-in” and networked generation in the history of the Middle East. Between 2008 and 2010, Facebook memberships increased in the broader Middle East 360%, to 3.5 million (Gelvin, 2012, p. 65). As a byproduct of globalization, this youth majority could share ideas at an unprecedented rate across the region. While promoting positive change in the coordination of non-violent protests across the Middle East, social media also facilitated communication in the same demographic likely to resort to violent extremism. One key tenet that AQ affiliates recognized was that the growing youth bulge trends in a more moderate direction as a whole, requiring adjustments in recruitment strategy by location.</p><p><strong>Unemployment</strong></p><p><strong>“</strong>Idle hands are the devil’s workshop.”</p><p>- Proverbs 16:27, The Living Bible</p><p>Unemployment is a statistic widely related to the youth bulge, but also affecting society as a whole. The average unemployment rate across the case studies is 32.34%. Removing Pakistan as the unemployment outlier at 6%, the average unemployment rate is nearly 40%. Although official unemployment in Pakistan was 6% in 2017, the true picture is unclear because much of the economy is informal and underemployment remains high (CIA, 2017).</p><p>Political scientists refer to the current state of Middle East employment among the youth demographic as “wait-hood.” In Syria, 81% of college graduates spend at least four years looking for employment before acquiring a job (Gelvin, 2012, p.34) This is a period in which youths “wait for good jobs, wait for marriage, and wait for full participation in society.” This is partially due to the customary expenses associated with marriage proposals in Arab culture. Given the youth bulge and the rates of unemployment, the average age for marriage in the Arab communities is the highest in the world (Gelvin, 2012, p. 34). Consequently, great numbers of unemployed and unmarried youth citizens are searching for a purpose, an identity, and an outlet for their energy.</p><p>Intrastate conflict, a factor in all the case studies except Pakistan, also has a major impact on unemployment and economic conditions. This inner turmoil not only generates in mass unemployment, but creates conditions for a refugee crisis, as shown in Syria. In the case of Somalia, when conflict-induced economic conditions degrade questionable survival and security, the populace, and especially the unemployed youth, resort to criminal and terrorist activities, regardless of ideological association. Economic development that results in employment opportunities for would-be criminals and jihadists in the region should unquestionably be part of any strategy for countering any violent extremist organization (Chivvis et al., 2013, p. 7).</p><p><strong>Gross Domestic Product. </strong>While GDP is a reference statistic for this study, it is not entirely trustworthy due to the economic nature of many of our states. In cases like Somalia, GDP is unreliable due to the market and trade-based nature of society. In conditions without an operative central authority and central bank, a society will continue trading goods and services in the general marketplace. While Somalia offers a global extreme of this situation, it also affects the other Case Study to some extent. The average GDP of this study is the equivalent $5,256 per year. Removing Somalia, listed as $284, the average GDP is still merely $6,500 per year (UN Human Development Report, 2012). This is strikingly low, even when compared to other regional states like Egypt ($12,100), Iran ($18,100), Israel ($34,800), Israel ($34,800) and Oman ($43,700) (CIA, 2017). Located in extremely destabilized economies, organizations like the five AQ affiliates are not only some of the most organized groups across the state, they appear to be wealthier. The revolutionary recruitment and growth tactics of AQIM, AS and AQAP feature winsome ability to provide services to the populace outside of the government’s impoverished resources or intent. Also successfully used by ISIS in Iraq and Syria, this tactic has been one of the most effective growth strategies for recruitment.</p><p><strong>Perception of Corruption. </strong>The mass of unemployed youth, had few opportunities in a destabilized economy, stimulating the desire for change. Supporting this catalyst for action was their widespread perception of government corruption, one of the traditional grievances which caused many countries to revolt against their colonial masters, engage in multiple coups in the 20th century, and was an underlying cause of the 2011 Arab Spring. In a melting pot of cultures, infused with a rich but chaotic history sustained with deep religious ties, conflict was inevitable. Superimpose the application of arbitrary borders following the Ottoman era, the regional governments were predestined to dysfunctional representation and a populace prepared to overthrow it (if able) at the first inkling of corruption.</p><p>The Arab Human development report in 2002 stated that:</p><p>There is a substantial lag between Arab countries and other regions in terms of participatory governance. The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most of Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and much of Central Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s has barely reached the Arab States. This freedom deficit undermines human development and is one of the most painful manifestations of lagging political development.</p><p>The corruption data for this study was derived from the Transparency International Corruption Index. The index, which ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of public sector corruption, uses a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean (Transparency International, 2017). The average score for perceived corruption among the Study states was 20.8. Overall, on a scale measuring the quality of political and social life, not one Arab state provided a high “standard of human welfare” to its population (Gelvin, 2012, p. 20). The worst performing states on the Arab index were Iraq, Libya Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. All of these countries, and others from the Study, suffer from weak public institutions, internal conflict and deep instability. Such situations allow corruption to become endemic, with insufficient checks on official abuse. Amid ongoing public violence, internal wars and external conflicts, all forms of ethical governance have eroded.</p><p>In states where there was no dynastic succession (including Algeria and Yemen), presidents normally adjusted constitutional term limits to extend their tenure. Corruption and poor governance play directly into groups with militant, anti-Western agendas. Generating broad-based development in areas like Yemen, Algeria, Somalia and Syria will be difficult; success stories can take decades to develop (Chivvis et al., 2017, p. 7).</p><p>Chiang Kai-Shek’s 1949 government in the Republic of China is cited in counterinsurgency theory as an example of how corruption erodes a regime, leading to victory by the guerrillas, and extremists seeking growth in the region (West, 2011, p. 23). The resistance to local corruption has been one of the largest driving forces in the Arab world, often superseding religious ideology as a motivation for growth (and creating a high-confidence affiliate recruitment tool, as demonstrated in the Case studies). Further complicating the presence of perceived government corruption is the progression of intrastate conflicts, or “civil war.”</p><p><strong>Intrastate War</strong>. As the frequency of interstate wars in the 21st century has declined, the analysis of intrastate war has received heighten focus by political and international scholars. Intrastate conflicts are typically indicative of the internal struggles of developing nations, with weak institutions, high income-inequality and ethnic friction (Murshed, 2002, pg. 388). The challenges that result in intrastate war are mainly prevalent in developing countries, whose economic imbalance creates perceived marginalization and eventual conflicts for a select people group or organization.</p><p>Masoob Murshed describes this institutional economic framework in his article “Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment.” He cites that societal friction produces conflict through grievances and greed, both intimately tied to corruption and the state’s economic condition. Grievances are a motivator based on the sense of social group injustice, relevant history, and greed. Collectively, there is an acquisitive desire similar to crime, albeit often on a much larger scale (Murshed, 2002, pg. 389). In this article, Murshed states:</p><p>Each society will tend to have different conceptions regarding what constitutes a desirable pattern of broad-based public spending and taxation: for some, the emphasis will be on the provision of public services that reduce the absolute poverty of the excluded groups, while others will demand a more comprehensive closure of the gap between the excluded and the favored groups.</p><p>Many developing countries have emerged from colonialism in the past century, establishing maturing governmental institutions and attempting to develop their economic strength through the resources that were once envied by imperialistic powers. A common scenario for these modern sovereign states, including Africa and the Middle East, is that national boundaries were dictated by their colonial past, often with total disregard to the historical ethnic societal architecture and indigenous territorial boundaries. This creates a substantial challenge for future representative governments to establish peace among divided people groups, whose only commonality is their state. A state with incoherent borders is easily destined — with or without government conspiracy — to economic inequality and internal conflicts.</p><p><strong>Islam. </strong>The intricacy of Islam’s relation to radical extremism is a complex topic. However, the case studies have presented several insights on Islam’s relation to modern extremist growth. First, the Arab world is experiencing a contemporary religious resurgence, partly driven by the youth bulge, as a means of recognizing their heritage and embracing their historical identity. This resurgence also serves as a tool for terrorists oppose “Western Values,” while adapting Islam to an ideological extreme.</p><p>Based on the CIA Country Factbook, the five case study states are 96.1% Muslim as a group. Aside from Yemen, each country is overwhelmingly Sunni. Yemen serves as the outlier, maintaining a 65% Sunni majority and 35% Shia minority. The data from these five host states is understandable considering that AQ is a Sunni Islamist group. What <em>is</em> worth noting is Salafi growth alongside the “Islamic resurgence.” Salafism is a revivalist branch of Sunni Islam that has roots in Wahahbism. “Salafism” is often equated with “orthodox Islam,” but in fact the movement rejects the Muslim religious traditions and schools of jurisprudence developed over many centuries — and hence a distinction from Islamic orthodoxy. In reverting to an idealized Islamic past based upon a literal interpretation of religious source texts, Salafism is actually fundamentalist in nature (General Intelligence and Security Service, 2015, p. 3).</p><p>While many Salafi Muslims are peaceful Muslims, a predominant sect within Safali Islam’s are the jihadists who advocate for armed conflict, the “violent jihad.” Intuitively, as more citizens draw closer to Islam, the higher the probability that Islamic extremist sects will also grow. Examples of Salafism, with the potential for extreme traditional values and the application of Sharia law, are prevalent throughout the case studies.</p><p>In the instances where AQ affiliates leverage ideology for growth, it often coincides with the existence and tenets of extremist Salafi groups. In affirmation of this concept, the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) in the Netherlands produced a report on Salafism stating:</p><p>The practice of orthodox Islam in the form of Salafism can clash with a democratic system. One of its core precepts is that of “tawheed,” (the “oneness of God”) where democracy as a political system is rejected on the basis that laws not handed down by God should not be recognized.</p><p><strong>Key Finding Two and Three: Leveraging Local Grievances to achieve Local Goals</strong></p><p>The second and third key findings are interwoven. The central factor promoting the successful growth of these five affiliate groups was their capacity to leverage local grievances for recruitment. However, the study found that the affiliates, as a whole, were not leveraging local grievances for recruitment in support of the “global jihad” of AQ Core, but were mainly fighting against the corruption in their own states with little regard to ideological contracts with AQ. As unique as each state’s history, the affiliate response to conflict and growth strategy were equally unique. The common Case factors perpetuated long standing conflicts and supported the maneuverability of violent extremism across territories.</p><p><strong>Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula — Yemen. </strong>AQAP provided one of the best examples to support the hypothesis H1. AQAP demonstrated the most deliberate “shift” in recruitment techniques to exploit regional conflict following the 2011 Arab Spring. AQAP was the largest pre-Arab Spring organization, sharing many of AQ core’s fundamental concepts and mirroring their recruitment strategy.</p><p>However, after Bin Laden’s death, Zawahiri’s decentralization, and the Arab Spring, AQAP was granted greater responsibility and authority to govern their organization. Demonstrated by their continued growth in the past decade, AQAP modified their recruitment strategy after the Arab Spring to leverage societal friction between the Houthi rebels, local governments, and separatist groups to capture the hearts of Yemeni society, and secure territory along the way. AQAP applied their learning from the parallel experiences of ISIS to assimilate into Yemeni communities and provide solutions to local economic and political problems. Of the five main affiliates, AQAP is AQ’s most acclaimed success story, based on the quick and deliberate pivot in their growth strategy that supplemented AQ core’s overall goals.</p><p><strong>Al Shabaab — Somalia. </strong>Much like AQAP,<strong> </strong>al Shabaab<strong> </strong>illustrates the necessity for a “state-centric” recruitment strategy. While AS was created by fighters returning from the mujahidin in the 1980s, they were entirely focused on East African grievances. That local framework endured past the 2011 Arab Spring, with no appreciable “shift” in recruitment strategy. Having no central authority and being a clan-based society, AS matured through personal relationships, eventually diverging from the historical ideological pull and AQ Core. In a state where personal bonds and clan allegiances are the most prominent powers in society, recruitment strategies based on impersonal ideals are incredibly limited.</p><p>Similar to Algeria, Somalia suffered through colonial occupation and a series of corrupt governments in the 20th century, with Islamic extremist organizations relegated to the periphery of society. While AS is now one of the wealthiest and most organized organizations in the country, coordinating with NGOs and providing regional services, their shift had more to do with the natural progression of Somalia than the consequences of the Arab Spring.</p><p><strong>Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb — Algeria. </strong>Though it began as a marriage of convenience, Algeria’s Sunni majority demonstrated successful growth in both Algeria and neighboring states. Born of the GIA and GSPC, AQIM always focused on local grievances, be it the French occupation, or a corrupt democratic government. It is incorrect to assert that AQIM “shifted” their recruitment efforts because AQIM never maintained a “historic” AQ recruitment strategy. The predecessors to AQIM merely adopted the AQ brand name and continued their own efforts in the region, focusing on African grievances.</p><p>While it is unlikely that AQIM will ever focus on the “far enemy,” their growth strategy in the region is successful, rapidly assimilating smaller African factions while preserving positive relations with existing local extremist groups. Core al Qaeda is a globally oriented organization with a multinational membership and a broad target market, dedicated to removing regimes considered apostate and accommodating a Western presence in the Muslim world. For the GSPC, and now for the main body of AQIM, the dominant organizing principle has always been to remove the regime in Algiers (Civvis et al., 2013, p.2). While listed as an AQ affiliate, AQIM merely perpetuates the perception of the “global jihad” while carrying the AQ brand. AQIM shares few strategic goals with AQ core.</p><p><strong>Al Nusra — Syria. </strong>Competing with AQIS as the most unsuccessful AQ affiliate<strong>, </strong>AN had no shift in growth strategy during the 2011 Arab Spring because it was created after the uprisings to directly oppose ISIS growth in Syria. However, AN does represent AQ’s recognition in the growing irrelevance of their historic growth strategy. Existing as an effort to oppose IS, AQ Core promoted AN, using their initial “mujahidin / foreign invader narrative” in their 2012 video, but quickly shifted to strictly regional issues as AN struggled for growth. The CIA listed AN goals as to “overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-ASAD’s regime, absorb like-minded Syrian rebel groups, and ultimately, establish a regional Islamic caliphate.” This shift demonstrated that AN completely adopted regional grievances in their operational objectives and growth strategy (CIA, 2017).</p><p>The purpose of AN’s strategy was to mirror the growth strategy of IS while attempting to leverage AN’s AQ affiliate status as a competitive advantage for territorial gains in Syria.. AN was ultimately unsuccesful in their growth, partly because of the region’s absolutechaos and also due to the international community’s military efforts to combat IS in Syria. While AN is presently listed as an AQ affiliate, they have disbanded and assimilated into the various terrorist organizations remaining in Syria.</p><p><strong>Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent — Pakistan. </strong>Finally, AQIM in Pakistan offers as an example of an ineffective and non-state or region-specific recruitment strategy.<strong> </strong>Like AN, AQIM was created through AQ Core to oppose IS growth in the region. AQIM had no major ideological ties to the region, attempting to use the historic AQ recruitment strategy, but was largely unsuccessful. Instead of targeting growth from within the state, Zawahiri attempted to grow the affiliate from AQ Core. Although Zawahiri cited the “anti-colonial rule narrative,” it did not resonate with a youth populace that felt little-to-no connection with archived anti-colonial rhetoric.</p><p>A completely unsuccessful venture from a recruitment strategy standpoint, the only advantage AQIM holds is proximity to Pakistan and AQ core, which supports its survival. Currently, AQIM is just a label representing AQ fighters in the Pakistan/Indian region, rather than a self-sufficient affiliate capable of growth.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>While al Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula (AQAP) supports the null hypothesis as a whole, al Shabaab (AS) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) support the alternative concept of a localized recruitment plan that leverages regional grievances: al Nusra (AN) and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) demonstrate failed results when a terrorist organization fails to apply a regionally-relevant recruitment strategy. While the 2011 Arab Spring produced a pivot point in AQAP’s strategy shift, it merely accelerated AS and AQIM’s existing successful narrative of caretaking the local population through criminally acquired wealth. AS and AQIM utilized these opportunities in contrast to the inabilities of area governments what were failing and perceived corrupt. Created after the Arab Spring, and merely as a reaction to oppose IS growth in the region, AN and AQIS’s inability to relate to local communities as an external organization, was their primary downfall.</p><p>Additionally, the case studies suggest the possibility that future historians will mark the Arab uprisings, not the assassination of Bin Laden, as the milestone event of al Qaeda in 2011 (Gelvin, 2012, p. 165). While the death of bin Laden created decentralization, the Arab Spring produced opportunity, when it was leveraged appropriately.</p><p>James Gelvin explains the effect of the Arab Uprisings on AQ operations by stating that:</p><p>It might seem that the uprisings afforded both ideological and tactical openings for AQ. They removed or threatened autocrats who had warred on their Islamist opposition, and on AQ… by fostering an environment in which repression was lifted and people could more freely debate a wide spectrum of ideas, they created an environment in which AQ could more openly compete for hearts and minds.</p><p>As the international community struggles to develop counterterrorism strategies to address host-states and regionally aligned affiliate groups, AQ has displayed the competency to develop and spread an extremist ideology through “glocalization,” specifically tailored to regional demographics and appealing to local grievances in support of the AQ affiliate’s goals. AQ operations in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) exemplified (as a H1 result) a thorough and complex ideological shift of transforming existing tenets of AQ to meet the needs of the disenfranchised populace during the uprisings, to greatly impact the local psyche.</p><p>This locally based recruitment strategy, adopted by AQAP, and previously exercised by AS and AQIM, leverages state grievances and garners popular appeal during civil unrest, enabling them to seize the countless opportunities for rapid growth.. However, this local empowerment of disciplined initiative is not only indicative of a weakening AQ Core unable to enforce its strict policies on affiliates, but also the need to decentralize strategic planning and member growth. A correct summation asserts the blend of a weakening AQ core and the recognition for affiliate growth. AQIM and AS merely continued their own successful recruitment strategies, with little concern for AQ Core’s marriage of convenience, categorizing their Case Study hypothesis results as an H1 variant.</p><p>Based on Yemen’s divided history, contested unification and tumultuous revolution spurred by the Arab Spring, AQ was able to extend operations into the power vacuum by taking advantage of the intrastate conflict between the Sunni-Yemeni government and the Shia-Houthi rebels. A society of majority youth, with indifferent loyalties in the civil war, unable to gain employment in an area with no legitimate law enforcement or judiciary, has created the perfect environment for AQAP expansion. In Algeria and Somalia, the Arab Spring merely added accelerant to an existing inferno of civil unrest and extremist growth. Overall, this assessment demonstrates one successful strategy shift (H1), two historically successful strategies not entirely dependent on AQ Core (H1 variant), and two failed strategies displaying a deficiency of factors that promoted success in the other Case Study affiliates.</p><p><strong>Analysis Applied to Counterterrorism</strong></p><p>The foundation of successful growth in global violent extremist organizations requires the ability for terrorists to maintain a relevant narrative, one with significant clarity, identification and fervor to reach a regional target market. The spread of violent extremism is a social problem demanding multifaceted counterterrorism solutions, integrating marketing counter-narratives, to supplement the developmental, military and diplomatic strategies.</p><p>A counter-message must be a proactive projection of force, and not limited to deprogramming or de-radicalization initiatives targeted against active militants. Due to the nature of terroristic ”revolutions” and their cultural claims to authenticity, the counter-message must embrace the broader communities to which Jihadism seeks to justify itself and make its appeal. These broader communities are no longer their own affair (Venter et al., 2018, p. 114).</p><p>As demonstrated by the coupling of shared community grievances and a savvy local-based terrorist organization’s ability to resist the opposition, this analysis shows that modern Middle East terrorism is not merely a military problem, or a counter-narrative / counter-ideology marketing problem, but also an economic developmental issue driven by high unemployment. A multifaceted counterterrorism approach requires:</p><p><strong>1.</strong> <strong>A critical analysis of the terrorism threat ideology.</strong></p><p>What is their narrative, what can they offer the society, and what is their competitive advantage in contrast to existing groups and militias?</p><p><strong>2.</strong> <strong>A thorough and deliberate geopolitical analysis of the target market.</strong></p><p>What are the historical touchpoints of the region (colonial past, democratic experiments, etc.) and what cultural nuances are present (such as Somalia’s clan-based society)?</p><p><strong>3.</strong> <strong>A developmental approach.</strong></p><p>How to increase education and decrease unemployment without creating a society reliant on foreign aid?</p><p>4. <strong>A diplomatic approach.</strong></p><p>Is the existing government corrupt? If so, this will be one of the largest recruitment tools for the terrorist network — the display of a common <em>local</em> enemy. The common <em>far enemy</em> is not as effective a recruitment tool, outside of extremist sects.</p><p><strong>5.</strong> <strong>A military approach.</strong></p><p>Standard contingency planning for surgical direct action to remove specific extremist leadership and assets. Such military plans may be remote contingencies, but useful to determine the actions of any outside (or internal) threats to the existing terror group leadership and sensitive facilities. Be mindful that the perception of staged forces in Arab land will perpetuate the extremist narrative of foreign invaders. Collateral damage and civilian casualties will be utilized and exploited extensively for terrorist narratives.</p><p><strong>6.</strong> <strong>A marketing approach.</strong></p><p>Develop a compelling counter-narrative to the extremist recruitment strategy; expand to mediums used by the target market. If the target market is youth, utilize social media. Identify and exploit the extremist competitive advantage, delegitimizing the organization at every opportunity. If their narrative displays success, expose their failures. If their narrative cites ideological ties, exploit their ideological shortcomings. Exploit their failures at every angle, through every available medium, using superior technology to control transmission of the narrative.</p><p><strong>7.</strong> <strong>A Financial Approach.</strong></p><p>We have identified in this Case Study, and also through IS, that cash flow enables a terrorist organization to win the hearts and minds of the people and promote member growth. An Anti-Money-Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorism-Financing (CTF) approach must complement the counterterrorism strategy.</p><p>References (Primary Sources)</p><p>Central Intelligence Agency. (2018). <em>The world factbook: Middle East: Algeria</em>. Retrieved from <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html.">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html.</a></p><p>Central Intelligence Agency. (2018). <em>The world factbook: Middle East: Pakistan</em>. Retrieved from <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html.">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html.</a></p><p>Central Intelligence Agency. (2018). <em>The world factbook: Middle East: Somalia.</em> Retrieved from <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html.">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html.</a></p><p>Central Intelligence Agency. (2018). <em>The world factbook: Middle East: Syria</em>. Retrieved from <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html.">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html.</a></p><p>Central Intelligence Agency. (2018). <em>The world factbook: Middle East: Yemen</em>. Retrieved from <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html">https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html</a>.</p><p>General Intelligence and Security Service. (2015). <em>Salafism in the Netherlands. </em>National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism.</p><p>Transparency International. (2017). <em>Corruption perceptions index 2017</em>. Retrieved from <a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017#table">https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017#table</a></p><p>United Nations Development Programme. (2018). <em>Human development report — Somalia.</em> Retrieved from <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/SOM.">http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/SOM.</a></p><p>References (Secondary Sources — Books)</p><p>Venter, A., &amp; Peducasse, Y. (2018). <em>Al-qaeda in the islamic maghreb: Shadow of terror over the sahel, from 2007 </em>(History of terror). Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen &amp; Sword Military, an imprint of Pen &amp; Sword Books.</p><p>Atwan, A. (2012). <em>After bin laden: Al-qaeda, the next generation.</em> New York, New York: New Press.</p><p>Baylis, J., Owens, P., Smith, S. (2017). <em>The globalization of world politics: An introduction to international relations.</em> New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 7th edition. Print.</p><p>Beinin, J., &amp; Vairel, F. (2013). <em>Social movements, mobilization, and contestation in the Middle East and North Africa: Second edition</em> (Stanford studies in middle eastern and i). Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.</p><p>Boucek, C., &amp; Ottaway, M. (Eds.). (2010). <em>Yemen on the brink.</em> Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.</p><p>Burrowes, R. (2010). <em>Historical dictionary of Yemen</em> (2nd ed. ed., Historical dictionaries of asia, oceania, and the middle east, 72). Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press.</p><p>Carter, J., Maher, S., Neumann, P., &amp; International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. (2014). <em>#greenbirds : Measuring importance and influence in Syrian foreign fighter networks</em>. London, United Kingdom: International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence.</p><p>Chivvis, C., Liepman, A., &amp; Rand Corporation. (2013). North Africa’s menace : AQIM’s evolution and the u.s. policy response (Rand corporation research report series, rr-415-osd). Santa Monica, California? RAND Corporation.</p><p>Day, S. (2012). <em>Regionalism and rebellion in Yemen</em>: A troubled national union (Cambridge middle east studies, 37). New York: Cambridge University Press.</p><p>Dicker, K. (2017). <em>The Syrian civil war</em>. New York, NY: Cavendish Square Publishing LLC.</p><p>Gelvin, J. (2012). <em>The Arab uprisings. What everybody needs to know</em>. New York: Oxford University Press.</p><p>Gunaratna, R. (2002).<em> Inside al Qaeda: Global network of terror. </em>New York: Columbia University Press.</p><p>Hansen, S. (2013). <em>Al-shabaab in Somalia: The history and ideology of a militant islamist group, 2005–2012</em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gunaratna, R. (2002). <em>Inside al qaeda : Global network of terror</em>. New York: Columbia University Press. doi:10.7312/guna12692</p><p>Lackner, H. (2014). <em>Why yemen matters: A society in transition</em> (Soas middle east issues) (H. Lackner, Ed.). London: Saqi Books, in association with London Middle East Institute at SOAS and British Yemeni Society.</p><p>Lewis, I. M. (2002). <em>A modern history of the Somali : Nation and state in the Horn of Africa </em>(Vol. 4th ed). Oxford: Ohio University Press. Retrieved from <a href="http://library.norwich.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&amp;db=e000xna&amp;AN=1548053&amp;scope=site">http://library.norwich.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&amp;db=e000xna&amp;AN=1548053&amp;scope=site</a></p><p>Lister, C. R. (2016). <em>The Syrian jihad : al-qaeda, the islamic state and the evolution of an insurgency</em>.</p><p>Markey, D. (2011).<em> Islamabad, Washington, and the long road ahead. Beyond Bin Laden: America and the Future of Terror</em>. New York, New York: Random House.</p><p>McChrystal, S., Collins, T., Silverman, D., &amp; Fussel, C. (2015). <em>Team of teams: New rules of engagement for a complex world</em>. New York, New York: Portfolio/Penguin</p><p>Meacham, J. (2011). <em>Beyond Bin Laden: America and the future of terror</em>. New York, New York: Random House.</p><p>West, B. (2011) <em>The AfPak opportunity now at hand. Beyond Bin Laden: America and the Future of Terror</em>. New York, New York: Random House.</p><p>Willis, M., (Lecturer). (2014). <em>Politics and power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and morocco from independence to the Arab spring</em>. New York: Oxford University Press.</p><p>Stansfield, G. (2016). <em>Iraq: People, history, politics</em> (2nd ed. ed., hot spots in global politics). Newark: Wiley.</p><p>References (Secondary Sources — Articles)</p><p>Barry, E. (2014). <em>Al qaeda opens branch on Indian subcontinent</em>. New York Times, 163(56615).</p><p>Bin Laden, O. (2002). “<em>Osama Bin Laden’s letter to America</em>.” Guardian.co.uk. The Guardian, <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver">http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver</a>.</p><p>Blomfield, A., Gardham, D. (2010) Britain and US close embassies in Yemen over fears of imminent attack from al-Qaeda. <em>The Telegraph</em>. <a href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/6927845/Britain-and-US-close-embassies-in-Yemen-over-fears-of-imminent-attack-from-al-Qaeda.html">https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/yemen/6927845/Britain-and-US-close-embassies-in-Yemen-over-fears-of-imminent-attack-from-al-Qaeda.html</a></p><p>John Bolton, “Al Qaeda on the Rise,” <em>New York Post</em>, January 21, 2013.</p><p>Burke, J. (2014). Al-Qaida video urges Muslims in Kashmir to wage jihad on India. <em>The Guardian</em>. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/14/al-qaida-video-muslims-kashmir-jihad-india">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/14/al-qaida-video-muslims-kashmir-jihad-india</a>.</p><p>Counter Extremism Project. (2018). <em>al nusra front.</em> <a href="https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/nusra-front-jabhat-fateh-al-sham">https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/nusra-front-jabhat-fateh-al-sham</a></p><p>Cordesman, A. (2017). Global trends in terrorism: 1970–2016. <em>The Center for Strategic and International Studies.</em> <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/patterns-global-terrorism-1970-2016">https://www.csis.org/analysis/patterns-global-terrorism-1970-2016</a>.</p><p>Cordesman, A. (2017). The uncertain trends in the “wars” on terrorism. <em>The Center for Strategic and International Studies.</em> <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/uncertain-trends-wars-terrorism">https://www.csis.org/analysis/uncertain-trends-wars-terrorism</a>.</p><p>Dutta, S. (2013). History as the architect of the present: What made Kashmir the nucleus of South Asia terrorism? India-Pakistan conflict and its impact on U.S. homeland security. <em>Naval Post-Graduate School.</em></p><p>Fatafta, M. (2018). Rampant corruption in Arab states. <em>Transparency International.</em> Retrieved from <a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/rampant_corruption_in_arab_states.">https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/rampant_corruption_in_arab_states.</a></p><p>Hashim, A. (2014). <em>The Islamic state: From al-Qaeda affiliate to caliphate</em>. <em>Middle East Policy</em>, 21(4), 69–83. doi:10.1111/mepo.12096</p><p>Heller, S. (2017). The strategic logic of hayat tahrir al-sham. <em>Perspectives on Terrorism,</em> <em>11</em>(6), 139–152.</p><p>Hellmich, C. (2013). The last refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda and the battle for Arabia<em>.</em> <em>The Times Higher Education Supplement</em>: The, 2088(2088), 48–48.</p><p>Hill, J., &amp; Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. (2010). <em>Sufism in northern Nigeria force for counter-radicalization?</em> Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.</p><p>Jones, S. (2018). Al-qaeda’s quagmire in Syria. <em>Survival,</em> <em>60 </em>(5), 181–198. doi:10.1080/00396338.2018.1518381</p><p>Jones, S., &amp; National Defense Research Institute (U.S.). (2016). <em>Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the campaign against al shabaab </em>(Research report, rr-1539-osd). Santa Monica, CA</p><p>Jones, S. (2017). Will Al-Qaeda make a comeback? <em>Foreign Policy</em>. Accessed from <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2017-08-07/will-al-qaeda-make-comeback">https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2017-08-07/will-al-qaeda-make-comeback</a>.</p><p>Madison Springfield Inc. (2017). <em>Solutions to evaluate Yemen’s counterterrorism frameworks and capabilities to inform and optimize foreign assistance programming.</em></p><p>Morris, L. (2013). In Syria, al-qaeda uses ice cream, family fun days to soften its image. <em>The Washington Post,</em> <em>A.11</em>, 11.</p><p>Murshed, S. (2002). Conflict, civil war and underdevelopment: An introduction. <em>Journal of Peace Research</em>, 39(4), 387–393. Retrieved from <a href="http://www.jstor.org.library.norwich.edu/stable/1555273">http://www.jstor.org.library.norwich.edu/stable/1555273</a></p><p>Naylor, H. (2015). Al qaeda rising in Syria, Yemen. <em>The Washington Post,</em> <em>A.1</em>, 1.</p><p>O’Neill, S. (2012). Arab spring is allowing al-qaeda to rebuild, mi5 chief warns. <em>The Times,</em> <em>6</em>, 6–6.</p><p><em>Yemen’s other war; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula</em>. (2017). The Economist, 423(9044), 49–49.</p><p>Reed, A., &amp; International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. (2016). <em>Al qaeda in the indian subcontinent a new frontline in the global jihadist movement?</em>(Icct policy brief). The Hague, The Netherlands: ICCT. doi:10.19165/2016.2.02</p><p>Robinson, E., (Policy analyst), National Defense Research Institute (U.S.), &amp; Rand Corporation. (2017). <em>what factors cause individuals to reject violent extremism in Yemen?</em> (Research report, rR-1727-OSD). Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation.</p><p>Sohlman, E. (2011). <em>Yemen fractures on the brink of civil war as al-Qaeda gains ground.</em> American Foreign Policy Interests, 33(5), 236–240. doi:10.1080/10803920.2011.620517</p><p>Suarez-Murias, A. (2013). <em>“Jihad is the way and death for the sake of Allah is our highest aspiration”: A narrative analysis of Sayyid Qutb’s milestones.</em> Retrieved from <a href="https://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/handle/10339/38576">https://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/handle/10339/38576</a>.</p><p>Ullah, H. (2013). <em>Vying for allah’s vote: Understanding Islamic parties, political violence, and extremism in Pakistan </em>(South Asia in world affairs series). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.</p><p>Evans, R. (2017). Counter-Terrorism from Bush to Obama to Trump. <em>War on the Rocks Podcast.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d8ff46ba6c2e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Company Level Leaders on Company Level Leadership]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@kyleamonson/company-level-leaders-on-company-level-leadership-aa96eb716d55?source=rss-c81f769d1565------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/aa96eb716d55</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Kyle Mark]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Feb 2015 21:47:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-02-24T20:29:01.805Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The following post was penned by Army First Lieutenant Kyle Amonson, a native of Northern Virginia and proud Virginia Tech Hokie. Recently returned from Iraq, he is a rotary wing aviator and AH-64D pilot stationed at Storck Barracks, Germany, where he is assigned as a Flight Platoon Leader. He spends his spare time attempting to find his Warrant Officers and becoming a connoisseur of Bavarian Hefeweizen.</em></p><blockquote><em>“The day the soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you stopped leading them. They have either lost confidence that you can help them or concluded that you do not care. Either case is a failure of leadership.” — Colin Powell</em></blockquote><p>They say you don’t know what you don’t know. Understanding that fact is daunting, yet motivating at the same time because there is so much progress yet to be made. Nonetheless, regardless of a lack of knowledge or experience one must be expected to be the best leader they can be to the peak of their abilities. Whether you are a freshly-pinned NCO, a newly-commissioned Lieutenant, or a Captain taking your long-awaited Command, you have one shot in that moment in time to make the greatest positive impact you can.</p><p>In my first year as a Cadet I developed a mantra to live by, a Steve Prefontaine quote: “<em>To give anything less than your best, is to sacrifice the gift</em>.” I often find myself asking, am I giving my best to my Soldiers, am I inspiring or just motivating, leading or just managing? I always have to pull myself back to ask myself if I am passionately caring… sometimes it’s praise of a job well done, sometimes it’s punishment to teach a lesson. If a decision is made in the best interest of the Soldier in relation to the unit and the mission is that giving your best? Or at least a pretty darn good attempt?</p><p>Don’t let me claim to be an expert, because that is far from the truth. What I am is a Junior Officer who is learning. Who is honored to have the opportunity to lead the citizens of America’s sons and daughters, fathers and mothers, sisters and brothers. I don’t take that lightly, no leader should. So you ask yourself… how can I give nothing less than my best to these Soldiers? They deserve it.</p><p>I will start out with what I feel is most important, the most complicated, yet the most simple. During my training, I heard many different tips on how to be a “great” leader. From “praise in public, criticize in private” to “don’t lose your cool on the radio,” and always “don’t ask anyone to do anything you aren’t willing to do yourself.” They were all great. However there are some that override all of these tips and tricks, and are at the core of what a leader is, regardless of rank or profession.</p><h3>Passion</h3><p>Not a word you hear in the military, kind of emotional, the type of word that might make you raise an eyebrow and call your SHARP rep. But passion is the most important, <em>a passion to take care of your Soldiers, </em>to look out for their best interests and their families as if they were your own, to make their problems your problems, to realize as a leader you might literally be the only one at all looking out for them and their well being. It’s putting in the extra effort. But how do you put that into motion?</p><h3>Get to know your Soldiers</h3><p>When I come in to a new job I sit down with every Soldier. We talk about 5 things: Their background, their experiences in the Army, their personal goals, their professional goals and expectation management. I write in a personal journal about each Soldier and reread it every couple of weeks. That way I can remember to ask SPC Smith how his run time is coming along or SSG Jones how his bachelors degree classes are progressing. I also expect this level of detail in knowing Soldiers out of their supervisors. I was excited to see some of the junior leadership in the Company adopt it…not all counseling has to be “counseling”. It can look a whole lot like informal mentorship.</p><p>It’s a little formal I know… but sometimes sitting down, writing goals and having a conversation is important. Maybe you aren’t into the formalities, that’s fine, you can get to know your Soldiers in a number of ways. Which leads me to the last step of passionately caring for your Soldiers.</p><h3>Be there, be present, be available</h3><p>I know work gets busy, the paper piles up on your desk and your Outlook won’t stop receiving incoming mail but just taking part in their day to day activities is important. When you are present it helps you learn so much about your Soldiers and how to <strong>serve them </strong>better. I know Officers are the biggest culprits of this, hand me a disorganized property book and I can vanish for a week without even knowing it, two weeks depending on the shortages. PT was always my saving grace to spend time with Soldiers when the days got the best of me. Earning respect while enduring the physical suck with them is always a money maker. PT is also my favorite low risk environment to push junior Soldiers into leadership roles.</p><h3>Use your resources, you aren’t in it alone</h3><p>It’s daunting and I have stressed myself out through self evaluation of whether or not my performance is my best but <strong>you aren’t in it alone. </strong>I have had some amazing Non-Commissioned Officers. They have taught me more than any leadership seminar by a General has. Some of my best memories in the Army have been working side by side, PL and PSG, to achieve a mission. It takes a hefty dose of humility and constant, honest, communication. You don’t know what you don’t know and you don’t have the experience. It’s a fact, just accept it. However you are responsible to give those men your best and you still have a lot to offer. What I considered my best was creating the most valuable training and efficiently managing their time through proper planning. The best way I’ve found to do that was for myself and the NCOs to have an open line of communication and ideas (and for them to be able to call out my occasional good idea fairies). Doing things right the first time, effectively, so that you get them home to their families. Soldiers need quality training and quality family time and you owe it to them. There is nothing that drives me up the wall more than inefficiency from a lack of planning that causes Soldiers to waste their time, resulting in less family time.</p><p>Also you have your Commander, he knows you don’t know everything. Yes he rates you but don’t be afraid to seek his input and admit you need help. He was in your shoes at one point too. A good Commander will mentor (and enjoy doing it), it benefits the unit and it benefits you. Heck, I had one Commander (a Rhodes Scholar), have me rewrite my OERs so many times we ended up staying late having an OPD on the proper use of parenthetical phrases and the Oxford comma. I have been lucky enough to have some great, intelligent, and selfless Commanders, all with different leadership styles that I take something away from.</p><p>I have always found even the worst situations are tolerable with the right people, and even the best situations are miserable with the wrong people.</p><h3>Train your Soldiers to be Leaders</h3><p>Lastly, my goal as a PL and Company level leader was to train my <strong>Soldiers to be Leaders. </strong>One day when my Company was running in a million directions to meet the unit mission and I was running around like a chicken with my head cut off I noticed we often got so focused on the 25 meter target that we forgot to take care of the people that make the mission possible in the first place. I stayed late, found some paint and painted above my Platoon’s door “Train your Soldiers to be Leaders.” It served as a reminder that in addition to their role to meet the mission they were also responsible for developing subordinates under their charge. Regardless of whether it was a PV2 straight out of AIT or a SSG with 20 years we all had a lot to learn and a lot to learn from each other. I did my best to help them live outside of their comfort zone to develop as a person, as a leader and a Soldier of character. I hoped that they would teach their Soldiers the same and pass it on. Fortunately that is something many NCOs are incredible at. I am a firm believer that when pushed outside of their comfort zone and given increased responsibility, 9 times out of 10 the Soldier will step up to the plate and excel.</p><p>The Army can get you down… that is inherent. There will be cruddy duty positions, missions and assignments. However, <strong><em>passionate</em>,</strong> <strong><em>caring</em></strong> leaders who <strong><em>inspire</em></strong> can change a culture and create a positive atmosphere affecting countless people’s work environments, families, and lives as a whole. Nobody is going to remember your impeccably-organized property book or sexy training meeting slides.</p><p>What they will remember is how you affected their lives. Most notably on arrival to the unit, during personal or family emergencies, and departing the unit.</p><p>I’m not offering up any complex theories or doctrine, just a simple guide to keep myself aligned with how I feel I need to be as a leader. It’s not easy, but it’s worth it and your Soldiers deserve it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=aa96eb716d55" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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