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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Laura M. Moy on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Laura M. Moy on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@lauramoy?source=rss-ee1f2ddbaa9e------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Laura M. Moy on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lauramoy?source=rss-ee1f2ddbaa9e------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[I used to track cell phone location information for prosecutors.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/hackernoon/i-used-to-track-cell-phone-location-information-for-prosecutors-b0dbd4325997?source=rss-ee1f2ddbaa9e------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[supreme-court]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[criminal-justice]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Laura M. Moy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Nov 2017 00:13:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-30T13:42:50.169Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>I used to track cell phone location information for prosecutors. My experience illustrates the overwhelming need for better technical resources for defense attorneys.</strong></h3><p>Tomorrow morning, the Supreme Court is hearing arguments in <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/carpenter-v-united-states-2/"><em>Carpenter v. United States</em></a>, a case that asks whether the Constitution protects the cell phone location data that wireless providers collect from their customers. When a law enforcement agency wants access to 127 days’ worth of this data, does it have to show a judge that it has “probable cause” to believe the records will reveal evidence of a crime? Or does it only have to meet a somewhat lower standard — that it reasonably believes the records are “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*B6h9HF0orrmKwhzkD7rONQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/jeepersmedia/14175438234/">Mike Mozart</a>, licensed under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/">CC-BY-2.0</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>There are lots of other articles and op-eds right now about the issue that is before the court — whether we have an “expectation of privacy” in location information that we’ve voluntarily shared with our phone providers in order to get service, especially now that due to changing technology, the information we necessarily share with our phone provider is far more revealing than it used to be.</p><p>I want to talk about a closely related and equally important issue people aren’t talking about: How advancing technology makes it extremely difficult for defense attorneys with limited resources to do their job.</p><p>I have an unusual perspective on the issue because before I was a lawyer, I analyzed this type of location information full-time as an analyst for the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office. In fact, my experience at the Manhattan DA is what helped me make the decision to go to law school and ultimately to become a privacy lawyer, and I’ll explain why.</p><p>But before we get to that, allow me to explain exactly what information is at stake in this case. Every time your phone connects to the network, such as to make or receive a phone call or text message, or to transfer data via an app, your phone company makes a record of it. You can view some of this information. For example, if you have a detailed phone bill, it might list out all the calls you’ve made, and look something like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m_ylhZyuKsXKwZfo0uvx6g.png" /></figure><p>What you might not realize is that there are missing columns here — your phone company stores more information about your communications than what appears on your bill. One of the things it stores is the wireless cell towers your phone connected to during each communication — your phone’s “cell-site location information.” In other words, on the phone provider’s end, the records might look like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4SyWjgh7INZYqKljXEAxpA.png" /></figure><p>(This example only shows the cell sites your phone was connected to at the beginning and end of each event. That’s what I was working with a decade ago, but recently the government has admitted that it also seeks access to cell-site location information generated by apps running in the background — which could be a tremendous amount of additional information.)</p><p>I used to examine this stuff firsthand, so take it from me: If someone wants to know not only who you’ve spoken to, but where you’ve been, those extra columns are data gold. Those numbers correspond to specific antennas, or cell sites, operated by the phone company. By looking up the geographic location of those cell sites, an analyst can approximate your movements over time. This is especially the case if you make and receive a lot of phone calls and text messages while you’re on the move or if you live in an area where towers are really densely packed, and therefore tend to be communicating with phones that are very nearby, like in an urban area. Analysis of tower locations can reveal highly private details of a person’s life. Someone like me might be able to use cell-site location information to figure out where you live, where you work, where your kids go to school, whether you’re having an affair, and where you worship.</p><p>As a 23-year-old college grad, that’s exactly what I was doing. I advised prosecutors on what information they should request to make their case or figure out where someone had traveled and I helped generate court orders for that information. Then when that information came in, I analyzed it, mapped it, and occasionally presented it in court.</p><p>There are few things as riveting — and damning — in a courtroom as a really nice graphic that suggests a defendant was right by the scene of a crime when the crime took place. Judges and juries would stare intently as I introduced my maps, and defendants’ faces would fall. When it came time for defense attorneys to cross-examine me, they struggled to produce cutting questions. Underwater as they were with incredibly heavy caseloads, little or no technical expertise, and few of the analytical resources that the prosecution had, the defense attorneys I encountered in court invariably were forced to cross-examine me without having performed an independent analysis of the data.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*vlbQWU4zjy9s1q0db79Www.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/762_photo/2233509492/">Captain Roger Fenton</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>The adversarial process in a trial is supposed to ensure that the evidence presented against someone accused of a crime — who could be deprived of their freedom for years or even decades to come — is carefully scrutinized, and that judges and juries are aware of evidentiary weaknesses. But because my evidence was technically complicated, that process broke down. I was seemingly invincible in the courtroom. Defendants and their attorneys felt blindsided by the evidence I presented and powerless to contest it.</p><p>It didn’t feel good to have that kind of power when it was clear that the power sprung from a failure of the legal system. That’s why I went to law school and, eventually, made my way into privacy law and policy. Because as technology develops, the law should keep up. Hopefully after listening to arguments tomorrow, the Supreme Court will agree and recognize that we have a right to privacy in our location, even as technology advances and more of that information is collected.</p><p>But in the longer term, we have to figure out how to deal with the growing challenges faced by defense attorneys who increasingly lack the necessary technical expertise to mount a defense. Among other things, defense attorneys are going to need the resources and trainings to develop their own technical expertise, as well as funding to hire outside experts when the need arises. And policymakers need to recognize that when they support law enforcement agencies’ acquisition of and access to advanced tech tools, they must support parallel enhancements for defense attorneys. Otherwise the already-long odds against criminal defendants — especially indigent defendants — will become completely insurmountable.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b0dbd4325997" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/hackernoon/i-used-to-track-cell-phone-location-information-for-prosecutors-b0dbd4325997">I used to track cell phone location information for prosecutors.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/hackernoon">HackerNoon.com</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Police surveillance helps keep Chicago’s gun violence rates tragically high]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lauramoy/police-surveillance-helps-keep-chicagos-gun-violence-rates-tragically-high-186cc27e6ffa?source=rss-ee1f2ddbaa9e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/186cc27e6ffa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blacklivesmatter]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[chicago]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Laura M. Moy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 17 Mar 2017 12:30:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-13T14:27:15.110Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M7KVPRRzQ-CnvbLDZ3lKJw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo courtesy of Flickr user <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/canreadme/32986861">canreadme</a> licensed under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/">CC BY-NC 2.0</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>On Thursday morning, Chicago Police Superintendent Eddie Johnson <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-top-cop-to-meet-with-jeff-sessions-about-gun-violence-in-chicago-20170315-story.html">met</a> with U.S. Attorney General <a href="http://dailydot.com/tag/jeff-sessions/">Jeff Sessions</a> to talk about what the federal government can do to help address violence in the city, which lately has been the subject of <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-donald-trump-chicago-crime-20170207-story.html">much discussion</a> about how to lower its high crime rates. As officials consider this important question, they should think about redirecting funding from police surveillance equipment that helps them observe violence, to non-police programs and community services that are designed to prevent violence from taking place in the first place.</p><p>When we think about curbing violence, we often think about augmenting the police force — ”I will send in the Feds!” President Trump <a href="https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/824080766288228352">tweeted</a> about Chicago crime rates in January. Chicago Police Superintendent Eddie Johnson <a href="https://www.google.com/amp/www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-trump-chicago-carnage-tweet-20170124-story,amp.html">responded</a> that “the Chicago Police Department is more than willing to work with the federal government to build on our partnerships with DOJ, FBI, DEA, and ATF and boost federal prosecution rates for gun crimes in Chicago.”</p><p>But we don’t have infinite resources (and infinite tax dollars) to throw at the problem, so we need to think carefully about whether those resources actually ought to go to law enforcement, or whether perhaps they should be used to support and expand non-police programs that prevent violence instead. At an <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/new-america/events/policing-new-political-era/">event</a> last week on challenges of policing in the 21st century, <a href="https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/lopez-christy-e.cfm">Christy Lopez</a>, a former high-ranked official in the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, relayed the remarkable story of the police chief in a high-crime area who said he would trade thirty officers for a boys and girls club. “Police officers will tell you,” Lopez explained, “‘we are forced to deal with all these problems that we didn’t create: the lack of mental healthcare system, lack of jobs, lack of housing, all these things.’ But what they won’t really want to talk about is the fact that part of the reason those problems exist is because all that money has gone to policing.”</p><p>It is well known that violent crime is often just a symptom of deeper social ills. For example, when Chicago’s top federal prosecutor, Zachary Fardon, <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-zachary-fardon-resigns-met-20170313-story.html">tendered his resignation</a> on Monday at Trump’s request, he handed an open letter of frustration to reporters as he walked out the door. He described the neighborhoods on the south and west sides of the city that have been neglected for decades. “The reasons for that historic run of neglect are rooted in ugly truths about power, politics, race and racism that are a tragic part of our local and national history and heritage,” he said. “And as a consequence of those ugly truths and the neglect they brought, these neighborhoods stand wrought with poverty and inadequate schools, businesses, jobs, and infrastructure.” Fardon painted a picture of an environment that prepares young people for gang recruitment by priming them with hopelessness.</p><p>Nevertheless, communities across the country are hemorrhaging money to support burgeoning police forces and the adoption of expensive and unproven new surveillance tools. The 2017 budget for the city of Chicago allocates nearly $1.5 billion to the Chicago Police Department, including an increase of nearly $48 million over the 2016 budget, a boost that reflects both the city’s intent to increase the size of its police force by nearly 1,000 by the end of 2018, and “new investments in technology including body cameras and shot-sensing cameras to help our police be more effective in solving and preventing crime.”</p><p>This “new technology” often has a hefty price tag. For example, in 2011, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) reported that “publicly available information show[ed] the expenditure of at least $60 million on Chicago’s [surveillance] cameras.” Body cameras are another high cost, with $10.8 million <a href="https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20161228/lakeview/police-body-cameras-expedite-shooting-officers">reportedly</a> allocated for their deployment in 2017 alone. According to the mayor’s 2017 grant detail document, the 2017 budget also includes a recommended $1 million for video surveillance and $640,000 for “optimizing video technology,” or software designed to process video captured by surveillance cameras. The police department also spends hundreds of thousands of dollars on legal fees fighting to keep aspects of its surveillance programs secret, with documents obtained in 2015 <a href="https://www.rt.com/usa/247597-chicago-police-stingray-costs/">revealing</a> $120,000 spent on two lawsuits.</p><p>In addition to state and local revenues, the funding for police technology often comes <a href="https://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/crime/item/24090-local-police-accept-federal-grants-to-expand-surveillance">from the federal government</a>. And at times it doesn’t even come from any official budget — rather, it comes from assets extracted from policed communities themselves. Last year, an investigation into Chicago police spending spearheaded by the <em>Chicago Reader</em>, Chicago-based transparency nonprofit Lucy Parsons Labs, and the public records website MuckRock <a href="http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/police-department-civil-forfeiture-investigation/Content?oid=23728922">revealed</a> that from 2010 to 2015, Chicago police had spent nearly $1.9 million in civil forfeiture funds on surveillance equipment, including controversial fake cell phone towers that essentially turn cell phones into tracking devices.</p><p>In addition, police surveillance equipment does harm to policed communities. Police surveillance <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/02/13/the_problem_with_asking_visa_applicants_for_social_media_passwords.html">chills free expression</a>, <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/01/what_the_fbi_s_surveillance_of_martin_luther_king_says_about_modern_spying.html">disproportionately in communities of color</a>. These tools even been used specifically to <a href="https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20160411/downtown/police-spied-on-protesters-after-ferguson-mo-laquan-video-city-admits">monitor protestors</a>, including participants in the Movement for Black Lives demonstrating against police violence. And some surveillance technology may have an <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2016/08/18/baltimore_police_use_surveillance_technology_to_target_black_neighborhoods.html">observable impact</a> on communications networks, for example by disrupting the cellular phone network and interfering with normal operation of mobile devices.</p><p>Yet while money flows from government coffers to fulfill police contracts with technology vendors, non-police programs that prop up communities, resolve conflicts, and encourage de-escalation are floundering. The amount by which Chicago is increasing police funding in 2017–3 percent of the police budget — is equal to the total amount of money allocated for youth services, which, among other things, “provides employment and training activities for youth and provides an alternative for youth entering the juvenile justice system through the Juvenile Intervention Support Center.” In other words, for every dollar the city shells out to support the police force, it spends a measly three cents on youth services. Chicago Public Schools are in the midst of a massive <a href="https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20170308/pilsen/chicago-public-schools-teacher-strike-rahm-emanuel-karen-lewis-claypoole">financial crisis</a>.</p><p>Perhaps most heartbreakingly, while funding has grown for police technology, it has all but evaporated for an organization called <a href="http://cureviolence.org/partners/illinois-partners/">CeaseFire Illinois</a>, which hires ex-convicts and former gang members who are from crime-ridden neighborhoods to be “violence interrupters” in those same neighborhoods, deploying them to de-escalate emerging street conflicts that could result in killings. As others have <a href="http://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/remaining-violence-interrupters-still-trying-to-make-a-difference/">written about</a>, the program is well respected in communities and appears to make a real dent in violent crime. Over the past few years, though, CeaseFire has seen its funding slashed, starting with the <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-ceasefire-funds-frozen-as-chicago-shootings-climb-20151009-story.html">state pulling funding</a> in 2014, forcing the organization to go from 55 interrupters at that time to only eight as of last month. As the <em>Economist</em> recently <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21718527-sending-feds-would-be-counterproductive-how-fight-guns-and-gangs-chicago">pointed out</a>, “The one district on the South Side where CeaseFire was not slashed was the only one that saw a drop in shootings.” CeaseFire needs only about $5 million to stay afloat, though proponents of the program <a href="http://www.fox32chicago.com/news/local/229988555-story">claim</a> that an annual investment of $25 million — less than 2 percent of the city’s police budget — could bring Chicago’s homicide rate down to the national average.</p><p>If the federal government is serious about helping out cities with high crime rates, it should start by taking a hard look at the money it is spending to support the acquisition and use of surveillance technology by state and local police departments. To get more bang for our taxpayer bucks, perhaps that money should be diverted away from technology that observes violence, to community programs that prevent it.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/chicago-police-surveillance-gun-violence-rates/"><em>www.dailydot.com</em></a><em> on March 17, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=186cc27e6ffa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Your Internet Provider Doesn’t Want You to Have Privacy Protections (and Is Lobbying Congress to…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lauramoy/your-internet-provider-doesnt-want-you-to-have-privacy-protections-and-is-lobbying-congress-to-e34f6aa1ade7?source=rss-ee1f2ddbaa9e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e34f6aa1ade7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Laura M. Moy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 09 Mar 2017 21:09:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-09T21:09:12.225Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Your Internet Provider Doesn’t Want You to Have Privacy Protections (and Is Lobbying Congress to Eliminate Them)</strong></h3><p>Every month, do you pay a company some of your hard-earned money for an internet connection? You’re reading this, so you probably do.</p><p>Paying an internet provider for service is a little like being 15 again and relying on other people to drive you places. “Take me to www.wikipedia.org,” you say — and away you go! Perhaps you read about something interesting on that site and want to head over to Facebook to post about it. Who will bring you there? Your trusty internet provider. So too for every site you visit, social media post you make, article you read, and video you watch. If you’re looking for a job, your internet provider will whisk you to indeed.com or craigslist.org with the click of a mouse. Want to check out what’s playing at the movie theater and buy some tickets? Just ask, and your internet provider will take you to the right place. Like a parent looking after a teenager, your internet provider may not know all of the details of what you do once you get there, but has a very good sense of where you’re headed.</p><p>Your mobile provider knows about what you’re up to on your phone, too. From OkCupid to Spotify, Allrecipes Dinner Spinner to Pizza Hut, your apps send and receive data on your behalf, with your mobile provider acting as the courier (and seeing where the information is going).</p><p>With all this information about your online activities, from the mundane to the embarrassing, you can imagine that your provider knows a lot about you. As one <a href="https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/12325-the-fccs-role-in-protecting-online-privacy/CPNI__web.d4fbdb12e83f4adc89f37ebffa3e6075.pdf">paper on the topic</a> explained early last year, your provider can easily use what it knows about your online habits to learn about your employment status and your health conditions. Depending on the sites and apps you patronize, a provider may even infer such intimate details about your private life as your family status, your financial health, and your sexual preferences.</p><p>Knowing this, you might expect or hope that there are protections in place to ensure your provider doesn’t sell or give that information away without your permission. If so, you’re in luck, because last year a federal agency <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/10/27/the-fcc-just-passed-sweeping-new-rules-to-protect-your-online-privacy/">passed rules</a> for that very purpose.</p><p>But your luck could run out soon, because on Tuesday 21 senators <a href="http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/congressional-move-invalidate-privacy-regs-introduced/163877">introduced a bill</a> that would invalidate those rules, and this morning 16 representatives <a href="http://thehill.com/policy/technology/323012-blackburn-bill-would-roll-back-broadband-privacy-regulations">introduced</a> one in the House. Why, you might ask, would they do that, when Americans <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-of-privacy-in-america/">overwhelmingly</a> are concerned about their online privacy, don’t trust companies to respect their privacy, and want the government to do <em>more</em>, not less, to protect privacy? Why, if invalidation of the rules would, in the <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/02/consumer_privacy_rules_for_internet_service_providers_are_under_threat.html">words</a> of two concerned federal regulators, “essentially leave the cable and phone companies without any privacy regulator”?</p><p>It could have something to do with the fact that the biggest cheerleader of the proposal to eliminate privacy protections for internet customers is the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/05/the-privacy-coalition-that-wants-to-trim-data-regulations-for-telecom-giants/456477/">deceptively named</a> “<a href="https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000067672">21st Century Privacy Coalition</a>,” a lobbying coalition of Comcast, AT&amp;T, Verizon, Time Warner Cable, DirecTV, and other industry players. In fact, this transparent Trojan horse of a “privacy” organization has been <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/03/23/data_security_and_breach_notification_act_would_eliminate_protections_for.html">lobbying for years</a> to shake off those pesky laws and regulations that force them to protect their own customers.</p><p>The question, then, is what our elected legislators will do. Will they make a stand on behalf of the little guy, and tell internet providers not to use private information without permission? Or will they slash consumer protections at the behest of industry lobbyists?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e34f6aa1ade7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Real Problem With Asking Visa Applicants to Hand Over Their Social Media Passwords]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lauramoy/the-real-problem-with-asking-visa-applicants-to-hand-over-their-social-media-passwords-5852fc1ecedf?source=rss-ee1f2ddbaa9e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5852fc1ecedf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Laura M. Moy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Feb 2017 15:59:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-13T14:45:04.853Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/550/1*bMKnfCQNQxL46RaHkgxRLw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image courtesy of Flickr user <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/vinayaketx/45146489064/">Vinayak SP</a> licensed under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/">CC BY 2.0</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>On Tuesday, Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly told Congress that the Department of Homeland Security is exploring the possibility of asking visa applicants not only for an accounting of what they do online, but for full access to their online accounts. In a <a href="https://www.c-span.org/video/?423321-1/homeland-security-secretary-john-kelly-testifies-us-border-security">hearing</a> in the House of Representatives, Kelly said:</p><blockquote><em>We want to say for instance, “What sites do you visit? And give us your passwords.” So that we can see what they do on the internet. And this might be a week, might be a month. They may wait some time for us to vet. If they don’t want to give us that information then they don’t come. We may look at their — we want to get on their social media with passwords. What do you do? What do you say? If they don’t want to cooperate, then they don’t come in.</em></blockquote><p>This is alarming to many. As <em>TechCrunch</em>’s Devin Coldewey <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/08/passwords-for-social-media-accounts-could-be-required-for-some-to-enter-country/">pointed out</a>, asking people to surrender passwords would raise “obvious” privacy and security problems. But beyond privacy and security, the proposed probing of online accounts — including social media and other communications platforms — would, if implemented, be a major threat to free expression.</p><p>It is already clear that Trump is no great fan of free expression. On the campaign trail, Trump <a href="http://www.theverge.com/2015/12/7/9869308/donald-trump-close-up-the-internet-bill-gates">suggested</a> talking to Bill Gates and others “about, maybe in certain areas, closing that internet up in some ways” as a way to combat ISIS. He then openly mocked those who would protest on behalf of free speech. Later, he <a href="http://www.politico.com/blogs/on-media/2016/02/donald-trump-libel-laws-219866">promised</a> to “open up” libel laws as a means of silencing media organizations. In November, one of his first public moves as president-elect was to <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/11/29/trump_s_flag_burning_tweet_is_an_attack_on_our_freedom_to_dissent.html">propose</a> “loss of citizenship” as a potential punishment for flag burning (an expressive act that the Supreme Court has <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/491/397">found</a> to be fully protected by the First Amendment). Not to mention his <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/34682/trumps-proposed-targeting-muslims-unconstitutional/">vow</a> to wield the power of the federal government against practitioners of an entire religion, and his <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/01/trump_s_executive_order_is_an_unconstitutional_attack_on_muslims.html">arguably unconstitutional</a> executive order banning immigration from seven majority-Muslim countries.</p><p>Government surveillance is always a threat to free expression. That’s because surveillance encourages people to <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/05/when-surveillance-chills-speech-new-studies-show-our-rights-free-association">censor what they say</a>. And this threat does not fall equally on all — our nation has a <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/01/what_the_fbi_s_surveillance_of_martin_luther_king_says_about_modern_spying.html">long history</a> of disproportionately subjecting people of color and other marginalized communities to government surveillance.</p><p>Even when surveillance tactics monitor all individuals equally, social science research suggests that awareness of surveillance leads to self-censorship disproportionately among those who are racial or ethnic minorities or who hold minority viewpoints. Elizabeth Stoycheff, the author of a <a href="http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1077699016630255">study</a> exploring “how perceptions and justification of surveillance practices may create a chilling effect on democratic discourse by stifling the expression of minority political views,” <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2016/05/03/mass_surveillance_chills_online_speech_even_when_people_have_nothing_to.html">explained</a> last year in <em>Future Tense</em>,</p><blockquote><em>I discovered that exposure to the terms of agreement [acknowledging surveillance] dampened individuals’ willingness to express or otherwise support their political views. These effects were found among people who felt they held political opinions different from those of most Americans, among those who thought these programs were necessary for the sake of national security, and in a recent follow-up analysis I conducted, among racial and ethnic minorities. These individuals refrained from expressing opinions that would alienate them from both their fellow citizens and from the government.</em></blockquote><p>And indeed, government surveillance has been used to monitor and chill minority speech and conduct throughout American history. It happened in the 18thcentury, when “<a href="http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/35086-the-surveillance-of-blackness-from-the-slave-trade-to-the-police">lantern laws</a>” facilitated vigilante surveillance of everything people of color did after dark. It happened after Sept. 11, when agencies ramped up targeted <a href="http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/Mapping-Muslims.pdf">surveillance of Muslims</a>, chilling speech, activism, organizing, and religious conduct. It’s happening right now to activists in the Movement for Black Lives, some of whom have <a href="http://fusion.net/story/358298/bree-newsome-social-media-monitoring-black-activists-blm/">acknowledged</a> that <a href="http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/07/homeland-security-surveillance-black-lives-matter">repeated</a> <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/11/aclu-geofeedia-facebook-twitter-instagram-black-lives-matter">revelations</a> about <a href="http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-disclose-surveillance-black-lives-matter-protesters-article-1.2967219">widespread</a> surveillance of activists has caused them to temper their speech.</p><p>So when a Cabinet member starts talking about compelling visa applicants from Muslim-majority countries to let his agency scrutinize both their public social media activities and their private communications, we should be very concerned. Even the threat of increased surveillance could lead to self-censorship — disproportionately of minority viewpoints — impoverishing our public discourse.</p><p><em>As first published in </em><a href="https://slate.com/technology/2017/02/the-problem-with-asking-visa-applicants-for-social-media-passwords.html"><em>Slate</em></a><em> on February 13, 2017.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5852fc1ecedf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Yet Another Way the Baltimore Police Unfairly Target Black People]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lauramoy/yet-another-way-the-baltimore-police-unfairly-target-black-people-34eceea00e8d?source=rss-ee1f2ddbaa9e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/34eceea00e8d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blacklivesmatter]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[baltimore]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Laura M. Moy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 18 Aug 2016 17:19:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-13T14:39:15.085Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*4zBiwOsU60GoqorzRhEyOA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo courtesy of Flickr user <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/29781381@N08/18649014262/">SCUBATOO</a> licensed under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/">CC BY 2.0</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>Law enforcement officers photograph Baltimore residents celebrating after authorities released a report on the death of Freddie Gray on May 1, 2015.</p><p>What do you get when you take a very segregated city with a history of high racial tension, give it a police department that is demonstrably racially biased against blacks, and arm those police with secret high-tech surveillance tools? The answer: Baltimore. This is a city where, through use of suitcase-size fake cellphone towers that can be used to track Baltimore residents, police disrupt the cellphone network on a regular basis, disproportionately — unfairly — focusing on black neighborhoods.</p><p>With all this in mind, on Tuesday I represented three national nonprofits in filing a complaint against the Baltimore City Police Department for its use of certain surveillance equipment that mimics cellular towers in order to track cellphones. That equipment, described as “cell site simulators” and often referred to in shorthand as “stingrays,” emulates real cell towers, sends out counterfeit registration signals to nearby cellphones, forces cellphones in the area to connect with it, and then enables law enforcement agents to catalog or track any cellphones within 200 meters — about a two-block radius. These devices are used by police departments around the country, but quite likely most heavily in Baltimore, and they have real downsides. They can cause disruptions to the cellular phone network, <a href="http://www.theglobeandmail.com/%20news/national/rcmp-listening-tool-capable-of-knocking-out-911-calls-memo-reveals/article29672075/">jam 911 and other emergency calls</a>, and directly <a href="https://www.eff.org/%20deeplinks/2016/05/when-surveillance-chills-speech-new-studies-show-our-rights-free-association">discourage First Amendment–protected speech and access to information</a>.</p><p>Cell site simulators have been challenged in the past, <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/eff-and-aclu-expose-governments-secret-stingray-use-wisconsin-case">primarily for Fourth Amendment violations</a> when police have failed to get warrants to use the devices. Less has been said, however, about how these devices fare under the Communications Act — which, as we point out in our <a href="https://na-production.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/CS_Simulators_Complaint_FINAL.pdf">complaint</a>, is not well. In order to masquerade as cell towers, cell site simulators transmit signals over the air to cellphones, just like real cell towers do. Unfortunately for the Baltimore City Police Department, federal law says you <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/301">need a license</a> to do that. The law also says you <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/333">can’t interfere</a> with legitimate communications between someone’s cellphone and the cellular network. Finally, the law directs the Federal Communications Commission to make emergency calling available, and to ensure that communications networks are available to all people equally, or at least that they are not discriminatorily only to some.</p><p>The FCC is going to have to do something about all of this, and soon. Interference with the cellular network — especially in an era when <a href="http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/%20wireless201512.pdf">more than half of households no longer have landlines</a> — is greatly concerning. But more than that, the FCC has the legal obligation to enforce the Communications Act, and this is a clear violation of the Communications Act. We’ve asked the FCC to stop Baltimore police from using these devices, and not to use them again unless and until they get the licenses they need under the law. Given the ways in which surveillance technology enhances police power, and in light of the recent <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2016/08/09/doj_report_finds_baltimore_police_routinely_violate_constitutional_rights.html">Justice Department report</a> demonstrating that the police are racially biased, asking the Baltimore Police to stop using the devices seems like a reasonable thing to ask for.</p><p>But what then? We’d like to see surveillance equipment specifically addressed in any consent decree reached between DOJ and the police of Baltimore or any other city over racially biased policing. And if police agencies also want the FCC to modify its rules to make licenses easier to obtain, as they might, the burden should be on law enforcement to explain clearly and compellingly to the public why we should support that, and how we can be confident the technology won’t continue to be used in a way that exacerbates racial disparities in society. From the <a href="http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/35086-the-surveillance-of-blackness-from-the-slave-trade-to-the-police">days of slavery</a>, to the <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/01/what_the_fbi_s_surveillance_of_martin_luther_king_says_about_modern_spying.html">Civil Rights Era</a>, to <a href="https://theintercept.com/2016/04/07/pregnant-on-medicaid-and-being-watched/">today</a>, communities of color have borne far more than their share of surveillance harms.</p><p>Also, future conversations between police and activists over racially biased policing simply must include a surveillance component. And conversations between police and activists about intrusive surveillance need to include a racial justice component. Because surveillance and racial justice are not two separate issues. These issues are one and the same, and we should scrutinize and treat them that way.</p><p><em>As first published in </em><a href="https://slate.com/technology/2016/08/baltimore-police-use-surveillance-technology-to-target-black-neighborhoods.html"><em>Slate</em></a><em> on August 18, 2016.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=34eceea00e8d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Congress Wants to Eliminate Protections for Some of Your Most Sensitive Records]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lauramoy/congress-wants-to-eliminate-protections-for-some-of-your-most-sensitive-records-783bfbda81c1?source=rss-ee1f2ddbaa9e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/783bfbda81c1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[congress]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[internet]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Laura M. Moy]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2015 17:13:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-13T14:33:47.586Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>How would you feel if your phone carrier accidentally leaked every record of every call you made — and didn’t even tell you? If you’re like most Americans, you would be livid, because the vast majority of us care deeply about the privacy of our phone records. A <a href="http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf">November report from the Pew Research Center</a> found that 82 percent of Americans consider location information gathered by their phones to be “sensitive” or “very sensitive,” and 75 percent feel that way about the numbers they have called or texted. But a forthcoming bill from Congress could dramatically reduce the security of that information — amid a number of high-profile data breaches.</p><p>The threat comes from a bill — scheduled to be introduced in the House this week — called (incongruously) the “<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/analysis/20150312DataSecurityDraft.pdf">Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015</a>.” As I explained in <a href="http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20150318/103175/HHRG-114-IF17-Wstate-MoyL-20150318.pdf">testimony</a> before the House of Representatives last week, counter to its name, this piece of legislation would actually <em>eliminate</em> key legal protections for phone, cable, and satellite records.</p><p>What would this mean for you? You could no longer assume that any information your phone, cable, or satellite provider collects about you is protected, and companies would no longer be obligated to tell you if that information is compromised. The results could be disastrous. Just a list of the phone numbers called by a customer would reveal not only information about that customer’s ties to other individuals, but also ties to organizations, health-related entities, hotlines, support groups, and so on. That list of numbers could reveal that the customer had called a hotline for suicidal thoughts or domestic violence. It could indicate that the customer likely had an abortion, needed 911 services, battled addiction, or struggled to come to terms with her sexual orientation.</p><p>And analyzing the records further would reveal even more intimate details, including, <a href="http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/continued-oversight-of-the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act">in the words of computer scientist Ed Felten</a>:</p><blockquote><em>[W]hen we are awake and asleep; our religion, if a person regularly makes no calls on the Sabbath, or makes a large number of calls on Christmas Day; our work habits and our social attitudes; the number of friends we have; and even our civil and political affiliations.</em></blockquote><p>Phone records also contain location information. Even when customers turn off GPS on their phones, carriers keep a record of which network antenna is communicating with the phone during every call. As computer scientist <a href="http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7521087284">Vitaly Shmatikov explained last year in a letter to the Federal Communications Commission</a>, this information can be used to reconstruct a customer’s movements, revealing the path someone takes to drive to work or walk to her children’s school, or the location of his gym or place of worship.</p><p>As for cable and satellite customers’ viewing histories, it’s hard to imagine a class of information with greater potential for humiliation than an account of what we watch in the privacy of our own homes. Indeed, Congress was so spooked by the publication of Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork’s innocuous video rental history in 1988 that they almost immediately passed the <a href="https://epic.org/privacy/vppa/">Video Privacy Protection Act</a>, which protects records about video rentals.</p><p>Right now, phone carriers have to train personnel on protections for these records, have an express disciplinary process in place for abuses, and annually certify that they are in compliance with the rules. Cable and satellite providers also have to carefully protect all of their customers’ information. The new bill would change all that.</p><p>Setting aside the absurdity of eliminating data security protections under a law that purports to improve them, this makes no sense. Strong protections for communications records — like the ones we have now — are appropriate. Phone customers have no choice but to share extremely sensitive information with their carriers about whom they call, when, and how long they talk. The <a href="http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phone-ownership-hits-91-of-adults/">91 percent of us who have cellphones</a> have no choice but to share even more information, including data about our physical locations and movements over time. Software that carriers have required manufacturers to build into phones could reveal even more granular information about us, as we learned from the <a href="http://www.androidcentral.com/more-research-shows-exactly-what-carrier-iq-can-and-cannot-do">Carrier IQ</a> controversy a few years ago.</p><p>In addition, we have very few options when it comes to choosing phone providers. Although the four major wireless carriers are nominally “national,” not one serves every area in the country. Americans who want a landline have even fewer options — there is often just one provider available for any given address.</p><p>And for the vast majority of us who have cable or satellite TV, we take it for granted that embarrassing information about what we watch will be kept private and protected.</p><p>Soon those protections could just disappear. And if, as a result, your private information falls into the wrong hands, you’ll never even know.</p><p><em>As first published in </em><a href="https://slate.com/technology/2015/03/data-security-and-breach-notification-act-would-eliminate-protections-for-sensitive-records.html"><em>Slate</em></a><em> on March 23, 2015.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=783bfbda81c1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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