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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Lavie Ohana on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Lavie Ohana on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Lavie Ohana on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lavieohana?source=rss-2f4504b51ce5------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Unknown Unknowns]]></title>
            <link>https://lavieohana.medium.com/unknown-unknowns-3e69c82550ed?source=rss-2f4504b51ce5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3e69c82550ed</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[space]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nasa]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lavie Ohana]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 07:07:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-05-29T17:42:07.444Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BZQl7KlySU3Q4abV4SJHEw.jpeg" /><figcaption>New Glenn on the pad for the first time. A photo I took early 2025.</figcaption></figure><p>I want to preface this story by restating its title:</p><p>I do not know everything. I only know what I know, and hope to know what I don’t know. We will be talking about something that, as of writing, happened just 6 hours ago. Please, keep that in mind.</p><p>At 9:00:00 p.m. on May 28, 2026, a New Glenn rocket attempted a “static fire” at Cape Canaveral’s Launch Complex 36. The test was a catastrophic failure, ending in an explosion highly likely to be one of the 5 largest non-nuclear accidental explosions in human history.</p><p>Launch Complex 36 was destroyed, with several complete structural failures of pad infrastructure. At the moment, Cape Canaveral — America’s premier spaceport, is completely without power. Liquid nitrogen is seeping up through the ground from cracked lines across the spaceport.</p><p>The United States is down to one functional method of accessing space: Falcon 9. It is likely that New Glenn will take years to return to the pad — should this version of the rocket ever fly again.</p><p>It is extremely hard to tell where we will end up from here. I do not know that much, nor am I going to pretend I do.</p><p>I have, however, had to write similar words before. I have had to represent a team that put in years of blood, sweat, and tears after a catastrophic failure, I have had to explain the worst possible outcome, and I have had to pay for it with my career before.</p><p>It doesn’t get easier the second time, but we are here, so let’s talk.</p><p>I am one of very few people that can say they’ve blown up a launchpad before, almost twice. I joined ABL Space Systems in 2023 with the primary task of <a href="https://ablspacesystems.com/news/faa-closes-rs1-mishap-investigation/">closing out the last parts of the Flight 1 failure</a> investigation (in which we dropped a rocket on the pad from 750 feet) and left after the Flight 2 failure, in which a pad fire destroyed our rocket and much of the pad. It was my job after Flight 2 to attempt to strategize a path forward for ABL as a commercial launch company and <a href="https://ablspacesystems.com/news/flight-2-static-fire-update/">to break the news to the public</a>, and then explain it. For that matter — ABL ceased operations in early 2025.</p><p>Losing the launchpad is generally the worst thing that can happen to a space program, short of killing your crew. Launchpads are massive pieces of infrastructure that take years of permitting, civil engineering, large-format fabrication, plumbing, utilities, and personnel to get working. Even for ABL — a company whose entire <em>raison d’etre</em> was to expedite, simplify, and mass produce the pad as much as physically possible, building and deploying a new one to support a 6-foot-wide rocket perhaps 3% the size of New Glenn took us a year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bSTx05vFqe6L733rhzpg0A.jpeg" /><figcaption>New Glenn flight 1 on the pad, as seen from the air. Also taken by myself.</figcaption></figure><p>New Glenn, for that matter, is a gargantuan rocket. It is about the same height as the Space Launch System, over a thousand tons in mass, a vehicle that dwarfs even a modern 747 jumbo jet. Launch Complex 36, the pad built from the ground up to support it, was the largest of its kind ever attempted, sporting the infrastructure to roll the rocket out to the pad via a quarter-mile ramp and physically tilt it 90 degrees until vertical. LC-36 came complete with direct natural gas, liquid oxygen, liquid nitrogen, and other large-scale utility hookups.</p><p>It took, from announcement in 2015 to first flight, about 10 years for LC-36 to come to fruition.</p><p>Importantly, New Glenn runs on liquid methane and oxygen (with an upper stage running hydrogen and oxygen). Methane (and/or natural gas/LNG) is a bit of an in-vogue new propellant choice for aerospace — and for good reason. Methane burns cleaner, is more efficient and energy dense, and is at about the same temperature as the liquid oxygen already used on practically all rockets, easing a lot of design constraints. Practically every new rocket debuted in America after 2020 switched to it, most famously Starship.</p><p>A new paradigm brings a lot of unknown unknowns, though. There is a saying that a lot of regulations are written in blood — aerospace perhaps the most. We all know of the sadly countless air crash investigations, or Challenger, or Columbia, or Apollo 1.</p><p>Details are still sparse, so I will talk from my personal experience, from what I’ve heard on the ground, and from what myself and many colleagues in this industry have feared for a while: there has always been a devil’s bargain with methane. To what extent, we did not know for sure.</p><p>The vast majority of prior “art,” so to speak, on rocket explosions to date has involved largely kerosene and oxygen. Back at ABL, this was what we dealt with. The napkin math/hand calc for a full-scale kerosene-based rocket explosion, over time, essentially was that you could expect at worst a 15% equivalent TNT mass yield. Thanks to a few factors (especially temperature), kerosene and oxygen just don’t mix all that well or that quickly. The ensuing explosion is definitely spectacular — but not the type of thing that’s setting any records, not until you reach the scale of the Soviet N1, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/N1_(rocket)#Second_failure,_serial_5L">incumbent “largest rocket explosion”</a> champion. Numbers are rough, but based on the best analysis of the era (the late 1960s!), it was assumed about 85% of the available propellant did not combust.</p><p>Methane is a different deal. It mixes extremely well with liquid oxygen, forming a mix that frankly explodes <a href="https://x.com/lrocket/status/1368314202264236032">if you look at it the wrong way</a>. To what extent a rocket <em>would </em>mix during a large-scale failure was an unknown. For a very long time, these estimates were somewhat adjusted above from their kerosene equivalents, but there simply was no real bounding factor. There were a lot of incentives to push methane through — and not much concrete data to support otherwise. So, accept the unknown unknown the industry did.</p><p>It’s hard to tell exactly what happened looking at the New Glenn failure. From what I know, and my best reconstruction looking at the videos available, it would seem that what we do know is:</p><ul><li>An explosion begins near the aft end of the vehicle at the immediate start of the failure</li><li>The entire lower end (first stage tank assembly) appears to be structurally compromised and the vehicle begins to implode, with some localized deflagration</li><li>Mid-way through the structural collapse, the majority of the vehicle propellant detonates, leveling the pad</li></ul><p>There are a couple hints about how vehicles like New Glenn are built that can start to tell us just how bad this really was, though nothing that points to a root cause. Rocket engines need both a fuel and oxidizer, but most rockets have one tank stacked on top of the other, meaning that there must be some way for whichever propellant is on top to reach the engines at the bottom, usually taking the form of a vertically running pipe or “downcomer.”</p><p>On vehicles with a high differential temperature between the two propellants, sometimes liquid oxygen and kerosene but often oxygen and hydrogen, these are relatively separated from the tanks themselves, often running externally down the side of the vehicle. However, with methane and oxygen, the nearly identical temperature allows for the downcomers to run through the tank of the other propellant, as well as easily allowing for a “common dome” style tank, in which only a single dome separates the two propellants.</p><p>This is an extremely efficient design, but carries the risk that if any part of this assembly is structurally compromised, propellant would be completely free to mix. Given that New Glenn experienced multiple seconds of structural collapse before completely detonating, it is not unlikely a majority of the propellant, if not all, mixed.</p><p>So, pad 36 is gone, New Glenn is gone. How much worse could it be?</p><p>I think — before sunlight has even risen at the Cape, it’s hard to tell. But my gut feeling is this.</p><p>The first order effects are relatively straightforward. It will take a long time to rebuild LC-36. Blue Origin is already working on a re-engined, upgraded version of New Glenn, with nine engines and a significant scale-up of the rest of the vehicle. I would not be surprised if Blue finds it more prudent to scrap the existing 7-engine configuration of New Glenn in favor of the “9x4” configuration. If you are already rebuilding the launch pad, and all of the supporting infrastructure, it does not make sense to do so for a vehicle you plan to deem obsolete in the next few years. So, it will take years for New Glenn to return to the pad. 2029 at the earliest, but very well likely into the 2030s.</p><p>The second order is… more complicated. We may very well come to find that the explosion seen tonight was larger than anyone anticipated — and that is what I am expecting. Cape Canaveral is home to a lot of critical infrastructure for the United States, including processing facilities for spy satellites, restocking facilities for nuclear submarines, the Naval Ordnance Test Unit, and lots of other space infrastructure critical for America’s continued operations in orbit. Not the least of which are the launchpads themselves.</p><p>Depending on the damage bill, there may very well be a case that every launch permit for a methane-based rocket may have to be completely re-evaluated. The initial reports — that of liquid nitrogen seeping through the ground at the Cape, of a complete loss of power, of several buildings being disrupted and structurally compromised — are not pretty. There are serious questions to be asked about whether New Glenn may ever be allowed to launch from the Cape again. There are also serious questions to be asked for United Launch Alliance’s Vulcan, which shares engines with New Glenn. And even more to be asked of Starship, which plans to launch just a couple miles from the Vehicle Assembly Building at Launch Complex 39, and which could yield in an explosion still four times larger should it suffer the same fate.</p><p>I think about how often we see Starship’s launch commentators watching from the penthouse of Mega Bay 2, a mile and a half from the pad. I’ve been up there, and I’ve had friends at SpaceX allowed to watch the launch from just as close on the ground.</p><p>I don’t think we’ll see much of that anymore.</p><p>The third order effects: America has one functioning, operational pathway to space right now. Falcon 9 out of Space Launch Complex 4-West at Vandenberg SFB, California. It is likely that necessary repairs to the infrastructure supplying Complex 40 out of the Cape will go relatively quickly, leaving two available pads. Including the Space Launch System rocket that flew Artemis I and II, that’s about all we’ve got.</p><p>(<em>Edit: 10:40 a.m. PT, May 29: — A Falcon 9 launch overnight from Cape Canaveral happened successfully after the disaster. SLC-40 has its own direct pad commodities/supplies and wasn’t directly affected.)</em></p><p>Much of the nation’s space program has been re-architected over the last few years to move away from state capacity to commercial vehicles. If you’ve read anything I’ve written before, you know this, and you know how I feel about it. You will also know how I feel about Jared Isaacman’s sets of reforms to the Artemis program — namely canceling upgrades to the Space Launch System in favor of commercial alternatives, canceling the Lunar Gateway space station in favor of accelerating lunar landings and a new “Moon Base.”</p><p>As China ramps up its program — both its civil space program toward the Moon and Mars, and its military space program, America finds itself lost, and the grip on our access to space is slipping.</p><p>It is time to face reality.</p><p>We do not have a pathway to the Moon’s surface by 2028. Likely not by 2030.</p><p>We do not have a lander that can carry crew to the lunar surface, not from Starship HLS, and not from Blue Origin.</p><p>We do not have a commercial alternative to SLS Block 1, or Block 1B. A true large-format cargo (<em>not</em> Starlink-dispenser) version of Starship is years off, and New Glenn may very well take years to return to flight.</p><p>We do not have a replacement for the International Space Station. We very well may not have the rocket to launch a replacement for the ISS with.</p><p>If America wants to remain a pre-eminent power in space, if America wants to remain at the forefront of humanity’s exploration of the stars, if America wants to continue to extend the light of consciousness, or have a million people living and working in space, it is time to look in the mirror and start asking the hard questions.</p><p>The last time I talked about my time watching a rocket explode was the time I talked of America’s gilded age of commercial spaceflight. I talked <a href="https://medium.com/@lavieohana/starship-iii-risk-8cb0adf24769">about risk</a>.</p><p>Each time a risk is taken, a debt grows. Done carefully, that debt can be paid in small chunks, learned from in controlled scenarios, on our terms, and iteratively reducing the next risk taken. That is why we test, and why we look for unknown unknowns, and why we hope for the best but still always plan for the worst.</p><p>But when priorities change — when schedule becomes more important than execution, when vanity becomes more important than vigor, when risks continue to be piled on with our hands over our eyes, that debt can and will be paid all at once.</p><p>It is not my first time here. I have already had to sift through the pile of debris before, I have already had to speak for many of my closest friends and apologize that our work wasn’t enough before, and I have already had to close the door on something I gave everything I had for before.</p><p>I do not want the same to come to pass for our space program as a whole. I do not know just where we are headed. I don’t think that we’re completely screwed yet, but the next few years will depend on some very, very hard decisions made over the next few days.</p><p>I don’t envy those making those decisions. I can only offer what help I can give of having been here before, and say what I still believe at the bottom of my heart:</p><p>A better world is possible. We just have to fight for it.</p><p>It will not be an easy fight.</p><p>— P.S. —</p><p>I do really truly feel sorry for all of my friends at Blue Origin. This, for lack of better words, absolutely fucking blows.</p><p>For Abby, a close friend who I know poured a lot into NG-4 before leaving Blue.</p><p>And for anyone else: if there is any way I can help, truly, just let me know. We can still do this.</p><p><em>Edited to reflect a successful launch of Falcon 9 from Florida overnight after posting.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3e69c82550ed" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Starship IV: The Future]]></title>
            <link>https://lavieohana.medium.com/starship-iv-the-future-cc07c4b66544?source=rss-2f4504b51ce5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cc07c4b66544</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[space]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[spacex]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[starship]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lavie Ohana]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2026 01:55:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-02-04T01:55:18.288Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Oh man, look at those cavemen go!</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*sHwtTK1gTk0huOmv" /><figcaption>A Block 3 Super Heavy booster (19) is transported at Starbase, TX. Credit: SpaceX</figcaption></figure><p>If you haven’t heard the news yet, SpaceX has <a href="https://www.spacex.com/updates#xai-joins-spacex">officially acquired xAI,</a> Elon Musk’s AI company. This understandably feels completely out of left field for most. You might’ve heard <a href="https://www.wsj.com/tech/why-elon-musk-is-racing-to-take-spacex-public-38f3de9b">some rumblings</a> along those lines, or even followed the space-based data center trend for a little while, but it probably never made sense. It probably still doesn’t, beyond being perfectly emblematic of how 2026 has kicked off so far.</p><p>Why would it make sense? On (or off) what planet does putting a bunch of computers in space to serve AI make sense? The easy answer is that it doesn’t. That — for any number of reasons, whether it be launch cost, or thermal management in space, or rad-hardening, or just the overall idea that all this AI stuff will pop when the bubble does and it’ll all be meaningless in a couple years — no serious player would ever actually attempt this, and it’d just be the fodder of startup pitch decks trying to claim a $1 trillion addressable market to easily duped VCs desperate for anything AI to throw their term sheets at. It’s an answer that checks out more than enough to comfortably throw into the pile of “well, that was funny” and never be thought of again.</p><p>The hard answer involves addressing the $1,250,000,000,000 elephant that just broke down our door and is in the room with us right now.</p><p>For those keeping score at home, you already know my opinion about Starship and how we got here. (If you’re not, I strongly suggest you read the previous piece in this series, <a href="https://lavieohana.medium.com/starship-iii-risk-8cb0adf24769">Starship III: Risk</a>, as this absolutely builds on that.)</p><p>I think a lot of that still rings true. In an attempt to distill it — the central theme is that we really are in a gilded age. I talked mostly about that in the context of aerospace — but run any of the numbers about America’s economy, subtract AI, and it’s not looking so hot.</p><p>Even the numbers around AI barely make any sense. <a href="https://www.wsj.com/business/openai-oracle-sign-300-billion-computing-deal-among-biggest-in-history-ff27c8fe">Oracle and OpenAI’s $300 billion deal </a>last year is one of many examples of massive transactions with extremely questionable real backing. Meanwhile, NVIDIA has become the most valuable company in history (leading some to even call it <a href="https://b100.ai/">God’s Chosen Company</a>), with its direct Q4 revenue alone representing <strong>about 0.13% of Earth’s total economic output!</strong></p><p>SpaceX already joins NVIDIA and few others in the rarified air this high up. It, too, processes some $18 billion in revenue, rougly a fifth of NVIDIA. Most of this comes from Starlink, the objectively less flashy side of SpaceX. While the incremental contracts NASA awarded SpaceX over the last two decades — many of them at great cost to NASA’s own state capacity — brought Falcon 9 to the point where it could crawl, then walk, it was building and launching the 10,000 satellites that power Starlink today that let SpaceX truly run.</p><blockquote><em>“You can’t get to the moon by climbing successively taller trees.” <br></em>— Akin’s Laws of Spacecraft Design, #31.</blockquote><p>Incrementalism can only take you so far. You can always make gentle iterations to a system, improve a process by X% here, speed up something else by that much there. It takes a radical change to exponentially improve a system. These are often enabled by massive, step-function changes that completely throw out our previous understanding and intuition of a problem.</p><p>I think this is something Tom Scott talks about beautifully in his video from around this time in 2023 about AI, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jPhJbKBuNnA">“I tried using AI. It scared me,”</a> perhaps one of the most prescient takes about how all this was actually going to go down from back then.</p><blockquote>“Useful technologies follow a sigmoid curve. You have a slow takeoff as the technology gets invented and the pain points get sorted out. Then you have this incredible explosion of growth as people find it useful and the technology gets better. Loads of competitors enter the market. More and more real-world uses get discovered. There’s a massive race to make newer, better, bigger things. And then you reach the limit of what’s possible and the rate of progress flattens out again.”</blockquote><p>Space is one of many fields that’s gone through the sigmoid curve. We knew how to build rockets before the 60’s, but we sure hadn’t done all that much with them beyond try to blow each other up on the same continent through World War II in the 40s. Then, in the late 1950s, we made our first baby steps to actually reaching space at all. Who would have guessed by 1969 we’d be walking on the Moon?</p><p>That curve did level off. By 1972, we’d found most of our uses for space travel. A weather satellite is still a weather satellite, a space station is still a space station, a TV satellite still is just for TV. The general lay of the land in space had been set — and perhaps all of these technologies would see incremental improvements that have come a long way by now, but they’re still incremental. They still represent a linear tail-off from that sigmoid curve — while it’s hard to represent the rate of progress, I don’t think I’ll get any flak for arguing the rate of change from 1970 to 2020 falters in comparison to the explosive growth spaceflight saw in the 1960s.</p><p>There were attempts to change this. It’s easy to imagine the new curve that tried to start with the Space Shuttle, the first real attempt at a new step change in how we saw spaceflight. It brought capabilities completely foreign to space then — and again now some 45 years later. The word “reusable” when it came to space hardware started with the Shuttle — and so did the thought of building permanent infrastructure in space — infrastructure that could be repaired in place, built out over time, by a massively growing crew. (This is, again, something far more extensively talked about in the last piece.)</p><p>But we do know how that ended — Challenger led to the Shuttle’s permanent knee-capping and near cancellation, leaving us back to incrementalism from the pieces we had left. Yet while it’s easy to imagine what could’ve been different back then — our consolation prize was still the entire International Space Station. The Shuttle still carried 852 people to space (if you count repeats, and there were many!), it still built out much of our national infrastructure in space, and it still laid the foundation for the next attempt at a rapidly reusable spacecraft that wasn’t just another incremental upgrade to our existing launch vehicles.</p><p>Fourty years later, we got Falcon 9 — arguably the ultimate increment of the launch vehicle as we know it today. Falcon is touted as the pinnacle of iterative development, refining its overall concept until there was nothing left to refine. Falcon boosters are now reaching the old Shuttles’ flight records, notching upwards of 30 missions, at the cheapest pricepoint spaceflight has ever been, well over a hundred times a year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/758/1*qyapGf7PMfaNQgKxjDk2ew.png" /><figcaption>Falcon 9 flight rate over time, as of Feb 2, 2026. Credit: Wikipedia</figcaption></figure><p>One would note though that Falcon 9 looked much of the same way it does today <em>before </em>its flight rate took off, though. Falcon 9 Block 5, the increment at which SpaceX called Falcon’s development largely complete, first launched in May 2018, notching 21 flights by the end of 2019 — a respectable, but linear improvement on its previous history, or that of any other launch vehicle.</p><p>If you look at the yellow section of the chart above — launches from external customers (not SpaceX payloads) — you’ll see that incremental trend increase to about 50 per year. Impressive, certainly.</p><p>Now, the green: SpaceX’s own payloads outdo that number by a factor of 3, placing Falcon’s flight rate at a near order of magnitude improvement from when Block 5 debuted.</p><p>It’s no secret at this point that the forcing function of that step change was Starlink — a mass producible, flat-packed satellite nearly completely vertically integrated within SpaceX’s ecosystem.</p><p>For decades, satellites were largely one-and-done deals, or packed into groups of less than a dozen. True constellations were quite rare, especially in telecom — by far the largest part of the space industry. Iridium, under Motorola, had notably tried during the .com bubble with 66 satellites in low Earth orbit and <a href="https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-space-magazine/the-rise-and-fall-and-rise-of-iridium-5615034/">famously went bankrupt for it</a>, leading the $5 billion constellation to be sold for a paltry $25 million.</p><p>The Iridium constellation managed to stick around because it represented capabilities totally foreign to customers of the space industry at the time — a global communications layer with latencies two orders of magnitude shorter than any existing one-off satellite in geostationary due to their proximity to Earth — as well as a pioneering use of inter-satellite links.</p><p>Yet, Iridium as-delivered was also rough around the edges at best. The modern launch vehicles of the time — Delta II and Proton — served as a major bottleneck, leaving much of the cost of the network relegated to simply getting it in space at all. Motorola’s engineers also capped the network at just 2.4 kbps, ridiculously slow even for the time, due to the original vision of Iridium as a satellite phone network. (Competitors, such as Globalstar, were offering closer to 10 kbps). It’s not a surprise Iridium came within a button press of being completely deorbited. It was saved for perhaps the most boring reason — just keeping it running would be cheaper than paying the insurance bill for if deorbiting it went wrong.</p><p>And so Iridium continued to tick — offering lightning-fast phone service anywhere on Earth, and some short-burst data… but that’s it. I think about that line in the article linked just above — “Conceived in the age of voice and woefully underequipped in today’s age of data, low-Earth-orbit satellites are now commonly acknowledged to have been a wrong turn off humanity’s highway to the colonization of space.”</p><p>Probably a valid take for 2004, sure — Iridium certainly was ahead of its time. But in hindsight, maybe a bit unimaginative.</p><p>Starlink did two things Iridium didn’t, beyond the inherent advantage of 20–30 years of (quite exponential) improvements in communications. Starlink was an objectively internet-first approach, broadening the list of use cases far more than Iridium ever envisioned, and returning to cellular services later. More importantly, Starlink was built by a company that already fully controlled the world’s most efficient launch vehicle — something Iridium could have only dreamed of. The satellites could be ruthlessly optimized to squeeze the most out of Falcon 9 as possible, and so too could Falcon itself, and all its associated infrastructure. Where Iridium nearly went bankrupt with 66 satellites, Starlink generates &gt;$8bn in profit every year with over 10,000.</p><p>This is what brought Falcon 9 to its ultimate status. But, the curve is slowing down. With each iteration of Falcon, the list of objectives left to improve the vehicle grow harder and harder to attain. And at some point, the curve will asymptotically reach a steady-state. There is only so much mass you can cut, so many processes that can still be sped up, only so quick you can turn around some systems. Linear scaling can ease some of these concerns — more boosters, more pads, more facilities — but the problems are still the same. You can make as many DC-3s as you want, but you’re never going to get a 737 by building successively better propellor engines.</p><p>At the same time, Starlink still has room to scale. Adoption of the system is showing no signs of slowing down, and similar constellations now make up a significant fraction of the rest of SpaceX’s demand too, from Amazon, OneWeb, and various military agencies.</p><p>At the end of the day, this is where Starship finally slots in. Despite all of the talk of the Moon (and boy, <a href="https://lavieohana.medium.com/starship-oft-thoughts-15573f6b9cea">have we</a> t<a href="https://lavieohana.medium.com/starship-ii-a-reprise-df3585d9e39d">alked about</a> <a href="https://www.spacescout.info/2022/09/second-lunar-lander-rfp/">the moon</a>) or Mars, Starship is just as ruthlessly optimized for one goal: maximum mass to orbit, maximum Starlinks to orbit. If anything, the Moon and Mars are along the way, and quite visibly not what Starship is optimized for when you run the numbers. No, Blue Origin wasn’t lying when they called Starship’s lunar operations “incredibly complex and high risk.” Neither was I when I cast doubt in the last few installments here that we’d ever even see a moon landing out of Starship as we know it.</p><p>So what’s with all the talk of a multiplanetary future, extending the light of consciousness, all the other things Elon loves? Why bother with any of that — why care?</p><p>Put simply, it’s an infrastructure problem. Mass to orbit is the lowest-level measurement of humanity’s capacity to put stuff in space and extend beyond Earth. What we do with that <em>stuff</em> is a whole other topic — the one that will be so extremely hotly debated after this acquisiton — but building the infrastructure that’ll get it there efficiently is a majority of the problem. The easier that access to space is — the more we can do in space, the more risks we can afford to take, and the more we can branch out.</p><p>This has been the core of SpaceX’s existentialist argument towards making life multiplanetary for a very long time. SpaceX also was hardly the first to notice this — the Shuttle itself was a very targeted attempt at solving access to LEO, standardizing payloads based on a pallet system and creating an architecture that provided an effective, nationally supported baseline for access to space. Lots of the initial planning for the Shuttle reflected this — the cancelled <a href="https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/19850008682/downloads/19850008682.pdf">Centaur-G</a> upper stage would have allowed the Shuttle to fly payloads that went far beyond LEO on a regular basis (later, some de-scoped kick stages would eventually fly on the Shuttle, such as the Inertial Upper Stage). The hope of the Space Shuttle was to make flying to space not much unlike flying an airliner, with many of its initial design choices expecting hundreds of flights. The Shuttle wouldn’t be optimal for every mission — but it wouldn’t matter.</p><p>45 years later, Starship seems on the verge of bringing that dream back to life. I think it is becoming safe to say we have hit the capacity limit of conventional launch vehicles, much as before Starlink, we had hit the capacity limit of individual, one-off geostationary satellites. Starship presents a radical change once again in how we think about accessing space, even if it’s best at the part we’d all consider boring.</p><p>At the end of the day, good infrastructure is boring. Great infrastructure is so boring, we hardly think about it at all. Every part of our world is driven by infrastructure that — before the exponential functions that brought them to life — would have been tremendous achievements even just as one offs. How many container ships cross the open ocean every day? How many aircraft zip across the Atlantic? Or, how many satellites zoom over our heads already at any given time, effortlessly linking every last square inch of the world?</p><p>Unfortunately, the best infrastructure does lead you to forget the cost with which it came. The jet age did not come about without the death and destruction of World War II, the dawn of modern shipping and logistics did not come without its role in colonization and the global slave trade, nor did the computer’s ruthless efficiency not play its own role in our very algorithm-controlled world, in which much of America’s social fabric is held up by the whims of an advertising algorithm. We know that all of this happened — and we put up with it because the end result was so revolutionary to our current world we couldn’t imagine one without it.</p><p>AI itself is the most timely example. You don’t need me to tell you the disappointment of seeing the world slowly turn AI-generated, and certainly taking people with it. How many jobs have been automated out of existence? How much human creativity has been replaced with lazy copies? (Hell, my last birthday, my own mom sent me a heartfelt 3 paragraph text… that was clearly AI-generated). How much more energy are we dumping into the Earth’s atmosphere — how many power bills are going up, how many datacenters are destroying the landscape, how much wealth is being transferred into a select few centers?</p><p>This is the cost of changing the world. A force multiplier is a force multiplier no matter which direction you use it in. But, we do not get to control what cards we are dealt. You either play them, or you don’t, but someone else will if you don’t.</p><p>Going back to that Tom Scott video, I think a lot about how he ends it:</p><blockquote>I’ve been complaining for years that it feels like nothing has really changed since smartphones came along. And I think maybe I should have been careful what I wished for.</blockquote><blockquote>At some point, I’ll look back on this video with hindsight and easily see where we were on the curve. We all will.</blockquote><blockquote>Part of me hopes I’m entirely wrong. That in a few years I’ll still be working like this.</blockquote><blockquote>The email thing is a metaphor, of course. It won’t be email folders for you. It might be something else you’re attached to. Maybe something minor, or maybe the whole industry you work in.</blockquote><blockquote>But right now, that feeling — that creeping horror, that dread — it turns out that was the worry that after years of being fairly steady and comfortable, my world is about to change.</blockquote><p>I think this is much of the same feeling I have had coming to terms with the state of the space industry since I’ve started being a part of it. Those of you who have been following me for a while will understand that this represents a pretty hard reversal of some of my takes from a few years ago. I had a bit of a following (positive and negative!) for being a pretty heavy supporter of SLS, Starliner, ULA, all the “underdog” legacy programs you’d have thought of back then.</p><p>This is something I’ve come to personally begin to address. I do think it comes down heavily to the cards you are dealt. I cared about Artemis I, or the Moon landers, or any of the programs from then having grown up a space enthusiast in a time where NASA was doing about nothing at all, between the Shuttle program and the programs of today. You took anything you could get. SpaceX was really really cool to me — I had a room full of posters of Falcon’s first landing, when I had toured SpaceX as a much younger self in 2016! — but as I started to form my opinions on the industry around me, it was hard not to feel the underlying paranoia that at any point all this could get cancelled once more.</p><p>I do think a lot of that has played out now, though. And sure, when we think incrementally and linearly about the state of America’s space program, there’s a lot wrong. I’m excited for Artemis II — but nobody does quite know what comes next. The lunar landers still aren’t ready yet. The ISS still doesn’t have a credible replacement. Starliner’s still broken, NASA’s state capacity has fallen through the ground, and “space as a service” still stands as a wrecking ball over any promise of building a real space-industrial base in America.</p><p>Building a real space-industrial base, for that matter, requires the ability to allocate resources on a level to which money stops really making much sense as a figure. I talk about state capacity when it comes to spaceflight because by and large, nation-states have tended to be the only entities vertically integrated enough across a wide enough base to command the resources necessary to enable any kind of infrastructure megaproject — and especially ones in aerospace.</p><p>But America as a state is hardly vertically integrated. America’s capacity to build infrastructure, to command resources, to move fast and build things is nowhere near what it was in the 60s, nevermind the 40s. America’s industrial base has given way to incrementalism again, regardless of how many “reindustrialize” El Segundo-posters you’ll see on Twitter. We just can’t fix this problem linearly, so long as America remains unable to adequately delegate its resources to its most critical problems. Try all you want, but there will be a wall. I still think this is one of America’s most critical issues, and I still worry this overall gilded age will get worse before it gets better as a result of it.</p><p>Sometimes, though, you do get a perfect storm, and something outside of that architecture gains enough momentum, capacity, and motivation to make the exponential moves that would render the rest of those concerns completely meaningless. I did talk a lot in Starship III about how we’d never get a second SpaceX. There will be a lot of companies that will continue to try, and Blue Origin may believe itself to be more of a “space agency” than a “space company,” but there’s no extra credit for second place no matter how many side-quests you complete along the way.</p><p>SpaceX has, for better or for worse, become one of those once-in-a-generation entities that can enact exponential change on that level, that can command and raise megaprojects that its parent state could only dream of doing on its own by now.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/0*OBVqr2unQ0UY-rf_.png" /><figcaption>Evolution of the R-7 to the Soyuz carrier rocket. Creidt: NASA</figcaption></figure><p>We have had our decades of decades of “fairly steady and comfortable,” and perhaps the biggest example of this is the R-7, Russia’s workhorse since it launched the very first satellite in 1957. If we had existed in a world of true, exponential change in our capability to put mass in orbit, the R-7 would have been completely obsolete decades ago, even by the Russians’ own standards.</p><p>1,991 launches later — the R-7 is still kicking in the form of the Soyuz-2.1a and 2.1b, rockets that effectively still have the exact same outer mold line and architecture of the Soyuz carrier rocket of 1966. Not only is it still around, it’s still completing useful missions — launching crews to the ISS and even some commercial payloads. It arguably is doing significantly better than a decent chunk of new-build American domestic vehicles!</p><p>Have we built more capable rockets than the R-7? Absolutely. But none of them so far have truly changed how we have thought about access to space any more than the R-7, especially at its peak, did for what came before it. As humans, we are still flying the very first rocket, from the very first launchpads, carrying some of our very first payloads, because nothing has stepped in yet to fundamentally create a step-change in how we see spaceflight.</p><p>I first felt that feeling that everything was about to change sitting with an old SpaceX buddy for a stupid late dinner at a Panda Express in Los Angeles about a month ago.</p><p>We’d been hearing about the whole idea of “space based data centers” for a while from some of our more tech-y friends, and on the whole dismissed it. So far, all of the conversation had come from no-name startups, companies that surely could never build the capacity to command the resources needed to follow up on their promises in anywhere near a timely manner. Cash can buy you a lot of infrastructure, but it takes a whole lot more than an impressive Series A to build <em>good</em> infrastructure, nevermind a megaproject.</p><p>And then we’d began to hear about it in the context of <em>SpaceX.</em></p><p>Like everyone else, him and I wanted to dismiss it as yet another Elon-ism, another crazy talk-of-the-day that’d be forgotten. But, sitting over dinner, we realized the math wouldn’t be that hard — especially when SpaceX already controlled the single largest piece of space infrastructure ever conceived.</p><p>The literal napkin math went as follows:</p><ul><li>We can assume SpaceX has access to incredibly cheap launch. I do not have access (nor would I share) the direct financials, but a Starlink mission could reasonably be as low as $10 million these days. It would not be outside the realm of possiblity for a Starship launch to be, say, $50 million?</li><li>The Starlinks themselves are pretty cheap. Let’s call a Starlink mission as we know it today $25 million. At 25 satellites a launch, that’s $1M delivered to LEO.</li><li>Going back using data from Wikipedia, a best-guess is that v1.5 Starlinks generate ~7.7 kW, v2 minis ~35.7 kW, and v2 mini DTC satellites ~42.5 kW. At the time, we just called it 20 kW.</li><li>At 25 satellites per launch with v2 mini, that’s almost 1MW for $25M. So, $25/W from this method.</li><li>Based on aggregate data of all Starlink launch history (<a href="https://planet4589.org/space/con/star/stats.html">from Jonathan McDowell</a>) — the current Starlink constellation is <strong>already at 248 megawatts of peak power! </strong><em>(Note: No, this does not include orbital night time. However, night-time power losses aren’t a given depending on the orbit a data-center optimized constellation is deployed in.)</em></li><li>SpaceX guessed the overall cost of the Starlink program to be about $10b at the start — ~$12bn in today’s numbers. From this method, we get $38/W (weighted for the original 12,000 satellite buildout being ~80% complete), remarkably close!</li></ul><p>So, today, the Starlink constellation already is about to break <strong>0.25 GW of total capacity — conservatively at $38 per Watt, </strong>including the actual end-to-end use cases. (ie, we’re quantifying the size of the constellation by power generation, but this actually includes everything else to make Starlink tick!)</p><p>For the record, current global datacenter capacity (for <em>all</em> use cases) sits at around ~125 GW. Starlink is already appreciably at <strong>about 0.2% of that number!</strong></p><p>Meanwhile,<a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/technology-media-and-telecommunications/our-insights/the-cost-of-compute-a-7-trillion-dollar-race-to-scale-data-centers"> some studies point at</a> the (moderate assumption of) the cost of AI-related datacenter buildout over the next few years sitting at about $5.2 trillion for 124 GW of new buildout.</p><p>Which would be… <strong>$42 per Watt. </strong>In other words, it already penciled out by today’s standards — and even though our math wouldn’t be perfect, we didn’t even expect a real, actual buildout of in-space infrastructure to even land in the same order of magnitude.</p><p>Sitting at dinner with my buddy, we must’ve felt that exact same deep, deep feeling the world was about to change in ways we could hardly think about.</p><p>At least it’d be good for his stock prices.</p><p>So are space-based data centers good now? I don’t know. But if you wanted a forcing function for humanity to build a real bridge to the stars, a real space-industrial complex, well, you got it.</p><p>From the moment Starship starts deploying Starlinks, it will be able to put &gt;10 MW of capacity on orbit with <em>each launch</em>, a 20x over Falcon 9’s current ability. At this point, getting to, say, maybe 50 GW is… actually not in the realm of impossibility?</p><p>The current power density we have for Starlink v2 (Starship-class) sits at about 50 kW/ton. A scale up to 100 kW/ton (what Elon quotes in the press release) would give 20 MW per 200-ton Starship launch. At that point, we get 2,500 launches. So, for a launch every single day, that’s about 7 years.</p><p>Not very long ago, “a launch every day for 7 years” would have been the type of talk that would have gotten you laughed out of the room. But we already launch Falcon essentially every other day! And the demand clearly exists — considering <em>current</em> Falcon 9 capacity already promises to be cheaper to put relatively complicated internet satellites in space cheaper than we can build datacenters on Earth!</p><p>This does not mean we’ll magically have a full buildout of a space-based datacenter tomorrow. The actual datacenter side might not even really be relevant in a few years. But the time to raise the capital investment to build the bridge to the stars <em>is now</em> — and if there was ever a shot to gather the resources needed to do it, this is it.</p><p>I am still worried about all of the same problems I have been talking about up to today. I still feel anxious about watching one corporate entity assume a level of control over the shape of our reality that largely slips comprehension. That said, those are the cards we are dealt.</p><p>AI will never go away forever. The bubble may pop — but much like Iridium lived past the .com bubble, so too will so much of what trillions of dollars are being poured into today. Take it or leave it — the vast majority of current western capital investment is going into the great matrix multiplier in the sky.</p><p>I left you with a very specific call to action last time:</p><blockquote>Immediately implement a super-heavy launch applications program under NASA. Subsidize both private and public development of payloads that take advantage of the tremendous capability afforded by SLS and Starship. Make both of these vehicles fly as often as possible.</blockquote><p>This was largely a cry to get <em>any</em> large-scale capacity to move mass to orbit moving, by any means possible. SLS represented the linear path, should the exponential one not have had a buyer.</p><p>But for once, we have a shot at starting another sigmoid curve. We have a payload with, as far as the spaceflight industry has ever been concerned, a near infinite demand. We have the means to allocate those resources, we have a vehicle that could ostensibly do it, and we’ve already proved that we could do it for cheaper than the terrestrial alternative.</p><p>We have a shot at seriously moving hundreds of thousands of tons to orbit. And at that point, it doesn’t really matter why. Build the bridge to the stars now — and we can move anything we want across it when we’re done.</p><p>Does that mean this’ll go perfectly? Of course not. Like that Smithsonian editor from 2004, I wouldn’t be shocked if come 2030, some other editor is laughing at an article much like this, about how all this overbuilt Starship infrastructure was funded by a bunch of stupid VCs who thought AGI would take over the world, and how much of a mistake that turned out to be. There’s no way to know how tall the curve will be when we start, or where it’ll end.</p><p>That said, I would caution against believeing that there’s any such thing as a hard “end,” here or anywhere else. Iridium still got the last laugh 20 years later, didn’t they? Every action we take is something someone in the future can pick up, progress is definitionally never linear. Three steps forward, two steps back is still a permanent leap forward.</p><p>On a personal note, I have had some friends — some of the smartest people I know — give in to the idea that we are nearing “the end” of some kind. That everything’s screwed, that there’s no reason to try, and nothing will be left when we’re done, so who cares? Why support a project like this if you feel like AI has never done anything good for you?</p><p>I understand that it can be hard to look at the vast scale of humanity’s problems and steel yourself for the idea that you could do <em>anything</em> to solve any part of it. But there is no such thing as a true end. Things might suck right now, but we’re far from the first or the last generation to feel like this. I’d like to look back in 30 years and say I did everything I could to keep the lights on.</p><p>And right now, we have the chance at making a real dent in humanity’s reach beyond Earth. We have a chance at seriously grasping the stars for our own, to actually make life multiplanetary. This shot may not be the perfect one, but anything to permanently move that needle forward is something someone in the future could build off of and keep the dream alive.</p><p>You and I both know, this isn’t how I envisioned it going either. But you can either play the cards you are dealt, or you can put them down, walk away, and hide your head in the sand.</p><p>If you want Starships to fly, by God, this is your chance.</p><p><em>for Julie, Mira, and Ava</em></p><p><em>P.S. — I did something earlier this week that led to me re-watching </em><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A0FZIwabctw"><em>the old Falcon Heavy test flight video</em></a><em>. It’s wild to think back to that and see where we are today (and ironically, Falcon Heavy was hardly ever a part of it at all!). Personally, this feels like a bit of a full circle moment for me. There’s never been anything quite like Starship to me, and I’m looking forward to do whatever I can to make a better future for humanity possible, lumbering into the stars one push at a time.</em></p><p><em>David Bowie said it better than I could — oh man, look at those cavemen go.</em></p><p><em>Get in, loser. We’re extending the light of consciousness!</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cc07c4b66544" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Starship III: Risk]]></title>
            <link>https://lavieohana.medium.com/starship-iii-risk-8cb0adf24769?source=rss-2f4504b51ce5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8cb0adf24769</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nasa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[exploration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[space]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[elon-musk]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lavie Ohana]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 Nov 2024 22:17:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-25T22:17:36.112Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>We must be bold.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*mHR0JQ4OMMxTb7t6.jpg" /><figcaption><em>Starship’s sixth test flight launches from Starbase, TX. Credit: SpaceX</em></figcaption></figure><p><em>This is a continuation of a series I started last year. If you haven’t read </em><a href="https://lavieohana.medium.com/starship-oft-thoughts-15573f6b9cea"><em>Starship I</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://lavieohana.medium.com/starship-ii-a-reprise-df3585d9e39d"><em>Starship II: A Reprise</em></a><em>, I would recommend reading those for a sense of perspective.</em></p><p>Welcome back. It’s been a minute. Let’s recap?</p><p>We left off at May of last year, just after Starship’s first test flight. In the time since — Starship has completed five more largely successful flights, not the least of which marked by a successful “catch” recovery in October. The program has come from crawling — to walking — and now running to a flight 7 in the coming weeks. This is, by all means, a good thing.</p><p>The world around Starship has also changed. The Biden-Harris administration is coming to a close, as America chose to return Donald J. Trump to the helm. With him comes Elon — far more politically vocal than ever before, and now seemingly involved in Trump’s every step.</p><p>Starship has by all means become a political symbol. Trump speaks of Starship extensively in his rallies and speeches. Right-wing influencers use it as a symbol of American progress and dominance. To much of the left, it represents waste and excess — a grandiose vanity project in the face of inequality.</p><p>There is a lot to unpack here. With it comes the future of America’s space program.</p><p>Let’s circle back for a second. I left you last time with a few calls to action and predictions in <a href="https://lavieohana.medium.com/starship-ii-a-reprise-df3585d9e39d">Starship II</a>. They boiled down to:</p><ul><li>Blue Origin’s team must be selected as a second option for the Artemis HLS under Sustaining Lunar Development to allow for dissimilar redundancy.</li><li>Relying on Starship to be capable of carrying crew to the Moon is a risk due to extreme program complexity and should be reconsidered as the sole option.</li><li>The timelines for Artemis III and IV must be reviewed and re-baselined as soon as possible to set realistic expectations for the Artemis program.</li><li>Starship would need to conduct around 18 launches per lunar sortie — a number that is untenable for two crewed missions and a demo by 2028.</li></ul><p>So how did we do?</p><p>Well, let’s start with Blue, which <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-selects-blue-origin-as-second-artemis-lunar-lander-provider/">was selected for SLD</a> within two weeks of that post, and are now developing their own lander to be ready for Artemis V, notionally targeted for 2029. Again, this is a good thing. But I do want to address the amount of weight I assigned to this.</p><p>Blue’s approach is not a perfect solution to Starship’s woes. It too is dependent on orbital refueling — a technology that remains untested. Blue has significantly less flight experience than SpaceX — which today is the de-facto launch provider of the United States. Just because we have both Blue and SpaceX competing does not mean we are guaranteed a functioning vehicle. It is, however, still better than nothing.</p><p>But I want to zoom out here. The thing about most of this — the refuelings, flight cadence, etc. — is that this is all <em>technical risk</em> — quantifiably in the physical realm.</p><p>The kicker for much of this lies in programmatic risk — an order up from technical. Starship’s successes over the last year or so have proven that from a technical perspective — yes, this will be challenging, but it’s not inherently impossible. 18 launches (a number that was months later confirmed by the <a href="https://x.com/SpcPlcyOnline/status/1725532267810836989">NASA Advisory Council as “high teens”</a> — you’re welcome) is quite difficult and does leave a lot of room for things to go wrong. But it isn’t existential.</p><p>Do you remember the quote I started that post with?</p><blockquote>As time has gone on, I’ve reflected a lot on how Starship’s first flight has been recieved and what actually happened. To put it bluntly, it’s not good. Compared to Artemis I? Well, the Artemis hype train has been going ever since that launch. Yet it feels like most of the people I know want to forget Starship’s test flight ever happened. Or if they don’t, they want to remember the cool launch, the awesome photos we got, but not the implications of what actually happened.</blockquote><p>Returning to this two years after Artemis I — it’s hard to feel the same way. SLS will likely not fly for at least another year — a number that is frankly untenable. Moreover, the excitement around Artemis, or really spaceflight at all — is slowing tremendously.</p><p>The golden age of American spaceflight may just be a<em> </em><strong><em>gilded age.</em></strong></p><blockquote><strong><em>gild·ed </em></strong><em>— adjective</em><br>/ˈɡildəd/<br><em>covered thinly with gold leaf<br>(alt.) given a specious or false brilliance</em></blockquote><blockquote><strong><em>gilded age<br></em></strong><em>a period in American history between the Reconstruction and Progressive eras marked by materialistic excess and corruption</em></blockquote><p>That’s a big claim.</p><p>It is important to say that yes, the space program of the 2020s is still one of progress. You can’t look at SpaceX catching a Super Heavy booster out of thin air and not believe that at least a little. You can buy an honest-to-god ticket to space from multiple companies. NASA is still intent on its return to the Moon under Artemis. Every other factory in El Segundo is a startup making spaceships. If you’d talk to them, they’d tell you “hard tech” is cool now.</p><p>It is still hard, though. And the track record of the median American space startup over the last few years shows it far more than what CEOs would like to tell their investors.</p><p>This is not a problem by itself. A free market will see entrepreneurs try their hand at the impossible all the time and convince investors to pay for it. Sometimes this even works. However, American space policy since the fall of Constellation and the Shuttle program in 2011 has largely pivoted to relying on these commercial enterprises as much as possible instead of in-house state capacity. These moves — which encompass practically everything NASA does with the exception of SLS and Orion— were lauded for their purported cost savings and early successes with SpaceX.</p><p>And… so far, just SpaceX.</p><blockquote>“For some time, [NASA] has been hoping that other new space companies would step up and similarly thrive like SpaceX in an environment of purely fixed-price contracts. To succeed over the coming decade in low-Earth orbit and on the Moon, the agency is counting on a new generation of companies, such as Axiom Space and Intuitive Machines, to take this next step.</blockquote><blockquote>But what happens if they don’t?” —<em> </em><a href="https://arstechnica.com/space/2024/07/spacex-just-stomped-the-competition-for-a-new-contract-thats-not-great/"><em>Eric Berger, Ars Technica</em></a></blockquote><p>The problem with many of the commercialized enterprises that the space policy of the Obama and first Trump administrations gave us is that beyond SpaceX, performance has been poor, yet beyond the occasional Inspector General report, these programs have come to dominate the American space sector without question.</p><p>To make matters worse — the little state capacity we do have left hasn’t been doing much better either. SLS and Orion are years delayed and billions over budget. On the uncrewed side, Mars Sample Return is stuck in a death spiral, and budget cuts have forced delays and cancellations for many, many missions.</p><p>What gives? How did we get here? And how do we get out?</p><p><em>Artemis — </em>despite being the most successful attempt so far — is not NASA’s first try at rekindling its lunar exploration program.</p><p><em>Constellation</em> was a program that roughly came to be with the 2005 NASA Authorization Act <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/senate-bill/1281">(2005 S. 1281)</a>, which directed NASA to “develop a sustained human presence on the Moon, including a robust precursor program to promote exploration, science, commerce and US preeminence in space, and as a stepping stone to future exploration of Mars and other destinations.” Supporting it was NASA administrator Michael Griffin, who set out to make the program <a href="https://www.space.com/1567-nasa-moon-plans-apollo-steroids.html">“Apollo on steroids.”</a></p><p>The program called for an orderly end to the Space Shuttle program — already in its final days due to waning support post-Columbia. Replacing the Space Shuttle were two launch vehicles derived from the Shuttle — Ares I and V. Ares I had the task of lifting the <em>Orion</em> capsule to LEO, regardless of whether the mission was to the ISS or beyond. Ares V, an uncrewed super-heavy lift vehicle, would meet Orion in LEO and ferry it and a payload to the Moon or beyond.</p><p>Constellation saw just one major flight — Ares I-X, a demonstration of the single Space Shuttle booster-derived launch vehicle’s first stage. When Obama took office in 2009, the Office of Science and Technology Policy under his administration requested a review of the nation’s human spaceflight policy in the name of ensuring a “sustainable path to achieving its boldest aspirations in space.” The <em>Review of United States Human Space Flight Plans Committee — </em>better known as the Augustine Committee of 2009— would release <a href="https://csps.aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/Augustine%20Final%20Report%2022Oct09.pdf">its report</a> on October 22 of that year, finding Constellation far too expensive, delayed, and underfunded.</p><p>When the Presidential Budget Request was released on February 1, 2010, Constellation’s budget — and the lofty goals it carried — were entirely struck out. <a href="https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/ppd/ppd-4-nsp.pdf"><em>Presidential Policy Directive-4</em></a>, released June 29, 2010, simply stated NASA’s exploration goals as:</p><blockquote>Set far-reaching exploration milestones. By 2025, begin crewed missions beyond the moon, including sending humans to an asteroid. By the mid-2030s, send humans to orbit Mars and return them safely to Earth.</blockquote><p>NASA was already looking at a near-inevitable gap in American access to space, unavoidable without an extension of the Shuttle program beyond 2011. The agency instead now found itself on the ledge of a cliff it would have to jump.</p><p>What does a space program do when the infrastructure, teams, vehicles, jobs, and plans it has spent years building become useless overnight? What do the people — the thousands upon thousands of highly skilled, critical workers a space program needs — do when their job no longer has a reason to exist?</p><p>For the people — that question is easy. When Space Shuttle Atlantis’ commander Chris Ferguson radioed over the words “wheel stop” on July 21, 2011 — the words that echoed the end of the Space Shuttle — three thousand workers across the Shuttle program packed their bags. They would go home July 22, taking with them everything they learned about flying the world’s only operational reusable spacecraft.</p><p>But for the program — it’s a different story. If you are a program manager or an executive, you are left with the pieces of billions of dollars and decades of work, though with none of the people that made it happen. Sometimes, it may even be your fault. Nonetheless, the only option left beyond failure is to try to put the pieces into something new and make a phoenix rise from the ashes. It starts with asking what pieces you have left to begin with.</p><p>The Augustine Commission did not fully abandon NASA in its reccomendation to cancel Constellation. It laid out what it called the “Flexible Path” — a proposed option that built upon work done with the Commercial Resupply Services program started in 2008 and called for commercially developed crewed vehicles to conduct flights to the ISS starting in the late 2010s. It then advocated for a new super-heavy launch vehicle — either related to Ares V, the Space Shuttle, or a derivative of a commercial heavy vehicle — to begin crewed deep-space flights in the 2020s.</p><p>This is, for the most part, the timeline we ended up on.</p><p>To a certain group of policy advocates, the commercial spaceflight work begun under the CRS program was the answer not just for NASA’s immediate woes — but the future. The program had already narrowly saved nascent SpaceX from bankruptcy by providing it a financial lifeline. Two years after contract award, SpaceX launched its first demonstration — Falcon 9 Flight 2, better known as COTS Demo-1, on December 8, 2010 — flying the capsule that would come to be known as Dragon twice around Earth before a successful splashdown.</p><p>Dragon’s first flight offered a glimmer of hope. Could commercial enterprises — with a bit of help — take on the brunt of the risk and do it better, faster, and cheaper? To NASA’s new Associate Administrator, Lori Garver —previously Obama’s top space policy advisor and a key leader in the 2008 presidential transition team for NASA — this was a moment to go all in, but not without consequences.</p><p>The death of Constellation and the Shuttle program simultaneously was not simply catastrophic due to a loss of capability or direction. Much of the biggest backlash to the programs’ cancellations stemmed from the second-order effects of their existence. NASA had to grapple with its existence not just as a program of raw spaceflight progress — but a high-tech jobs program across the United States.</p><p>To win support from Congress, NASA’s programs had to be architected to benefit all 50 states. To some extent it was just plain politicking — but the jobs program was (and remains to be) wildly effective. While not the most cost or time-efficient method, NASA returned far more to the economies of any locality that contributed than was ever put in — a net positive. Commercial enterprises did not have nearly as strong as an incentive to decentralize their operations.</p><p>This pitted the 111th and 112th Congress — which favored Constellation heavily due to its traditional approach — right against Obama’s executive branch and its heavy advocacy for a commercialized space program.</p><p><a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-bill/3729">2010 S.3729</a>, the 2010 NASA Authorization Act passed by the 111th Congress, therefore became the genesis of the Space Launch System program and extended a lifeline to Constellation’s Orion. At the same time, it reiterated support for NASA’s nascent commercial programs:</p><blockquote>(Sec. 302) Declares that it is U.S. policy that NASA develop a Space Launch System as a follow-on launch vehicle to the space shuttle that can access cis-lunar space and the regions of space beyond low-Earth orbit…</blockquote><blockquote>…for such System to be designed as a fully-integrated vehicle capable of carrying a total payload of 130 tons or more into low-Earth orbit in preparation for missions beyond low-Earth orbit.</blockquote><blockquote>(Sec. 303) Directs the Administrator to continue the development of a multi-purpose crew vehicle… for use with the Space Launch System. Requires the vehicle to continue advancing the development of the human safety features, designs, and systems in the Orion project.</blockquote><blockquote>(Sec. 401) Continues NASA’s support of the existing Commercial Orbital Transportation Services program which is aimed at enabling the commercial space industry in the development of a reliable means of launching cargo and supplies to the ISS.</blockquote><blockquote>(Sec. 402) Continues, and authorizes the expansion of the number of, participants and activities of the Commercial Crew Development (CCDEV) program in FY2011.</blockquote><blockquote>— NASA Authorization Act, 2010 (abbreviated excerpt for brevity)</blockquote><p>The Act, which also included clauses relating to the preservation of Constellation and the Shuttle’s workforce and contracts, was intended to try to smooth the transition to the incoming SLS program. However, the executive branch sought to obstruct the program from coming online in time to retain any of these workforces. As STS-135 flew out and much of NASA’s critical Shuttle workforces stared down layoffs, a critical decision on the final configuration for SLS was publicly stalled, forcing nearly the entire team that had built the Space Shuttle out.</p><blockquote>“The continued delays to the announcement are now causing numerous managers and workers — at least those remaining after the massive jobs losses shortly after Atlantis’ return — to question if the delay is based on politically-aligned tactics to kill the SLS…</blockquote><blockquote>In effect, those opposed to SLS — such as the architects of the FY2011 plan — only need to delay another month before they can cite the “difficulties and costs” of having to rehire workers to build a vehicle which could have been announced when the workforce was still in place.”</blockquote><blockquote>— <a href="https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2011/07/preliminary-nasa-evolved-sls-vehicle-21-years-away/">Chris Bergin, NASASpaceFlight, July 27, 2011</a></blockquote><p>SLS as a program persisted — but barely. The destruction of NASA’s workforce and infrastructure was so severe that the Michoud Assembly Facility — which had built everything from the first stages of the Saturn rockets to every Space Shuttle external tank — suffered such a total workforce loss that the <a href="https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2011/12/michoud-hollywood-movie-teams-utilize-facilitys-expanses/">empty facility was temporarily repurposed as a movie studio</a>.</p><p>There wasn’t much of anything for SLS or Orion to do anyway. In Obama’s <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-space-exploration-21st-century">speech to the NASA workforce</a> soon after Constellation’s cancellation in April of 2010, he’d openly dismiss the idea of a return to the Moon:</p><blockquote>“Now, I understand that some believe that we should attempt a return to the surface of the Moon first, as previously planned. But I just have to say pretty bluntly here: We’ve been there before.”</blockquote><p>Instead, Obama would opt to establish what would become the Asteroid Redirect Mission — a vaguely defined goal to send a crewed mission to an asteroid and return a small chunk in the late 2020s, in lieu of using the Moon as a stepping stone to Mars. To demonstrate the mission’s importance, NASA would also <a href="https://spacenews.com/nasa-creates-human-exploration-and-operations-directorate/">disband its Exploration Systems Mission Directorate</a> — the top-level office at NASA responsible for beyond-Earth human spaceflight, and roll it into its Space Operations directorate to create the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate. The move made sense — with the amount of actual planned beyond-Earth human exploration NASA aimed to do, there’d be no need for a separate top-level directorate.</p><p>With the complete lack of urgency now established, progress on Orion, SLS, and their related ground systems would move at a snail’s pace. One mission — Exploration Flight Test-1, would launch in late 2014 as a test of just the crew module of Orion.</p><p>It would be eight more years until Orion would take flight again.</p><p>The story from here — SpaceX’s rise to power — is what we all know.</p><p>CRS-1, the first operational Dragon mission, would launch just two years after COTS Demo-1 and re-establish American cargo capability to the ISS. Just two months later, in December of 2012, SpaceX would <a href="https://spaceflightnow.com/news/n1212/06spacexdod/">win two launch contracts</a> from the U.S. Air Force intended to certify Falcon 9 to compete for missions under the Department of Defense’s stringent and prestigious Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle launch acquisition contract.</p><p>By 2014, NASA would award industry giant Boeing — as well as up-start SpaceX — the long awaited Commercial Crew contract intended to close the gap in American human spaceflight capability. And by 2015 — Falcon 9 Flight 20’s first stage would make history by successfully returning to its launch site at Cape Canaveral — marking the beginning of the end of expendable launch. SpaceX quickly became unstoppable — and perhaps showed commercialization was the winning formula after all.</p><p>This was not without a lot of help, though. Many of SpaceX’s contracts were set up as public-private partnerships, with NASA offering heavy assistance both directly and indirectly via research, testing, and advisory capabilities. So too did the many highly experienced and skilled engineers that had left NASA, often involuntarily, after 2011 and the end of Shuttle. SpaceX hardware had even flown on the Shuttle — with <em>Endeavour</em> <a href="https://spacenews.com/spacexs-dragoneye-navigation-sensor-successfully-demonstrated-on-sts-127/">testing critical sensors for Dragon on STS-127</a> in 2009.</p><p>But while NASA had an unusually close-knit relationship with SpaceX — these were all still capabilities the agency once had on its own, especially some 30 years earlier in the early days of the Shuttle program, which saw the Space Shuttle launching as often as every other week, bringing crew and comsats up and down until it became almost normal.</p><p>Seven astronauts — the crew of STS-51L — would give their lives on Space Shuttle flight 25. NASA had rushed the mission, overlooking critical design flaws and launching on a day far too cold for the Shuttle, despite warnings. Ronald Reagan’s extremely conservative administration saw it as yet another failing of the state to do what private industry should do better. Reagan himself would sign <a href="https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-254.htm">National Security Decision Directive-254</a> into law in December of 1986 — barring the Space Shuttle from ever launching another commercial payload.</p><p>The aftershocks of that decision and the Challenger disaster as a whole would permanently stunt the Shuttle program and lead to the first Augustine commission — in 1990 — nearly entirely cancelling human spaceflight. A reusable launch vehicle would not routinely carry another commercial payload until Falcon 9’s first landing 30 years after Challenger.</p><p>Looking back — it’s clear NASA saw something valuable in outsourcing much of its capabilities to SpaceX. Should the Shuttle fail, it held extreme consequences — not the least of which due to the lives of the astronauts’ at stake with each flight. But failure would also generate tremendous negative sentiment towards the agency. When NASA failed, America failed. There was no room for iterative development — systems would have to be perfect on day one, a technical impossibility.</p><p>SpaceX showed a way out. Falcon 9’s many failures in its quest for routine reusability were hardly a sore spot — often, they were <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bvim4rsNHkQ">openly celebrated by the company</a>. The entirely automated nature of Falcon meant lives were hardly ever on the line when things went wrong. And SpaceX would learn how to fail fast <em>and </em>fail forward — returning to the pad in record time with another attempt. By decoupling operational capabilities from technological risk — in other words, ensuring Falcon 9 was still a perfectly good launch vehicle if the landings failed — SpaceX found a way to make failures pay for themselves.</p><p>SpaceX also simply would not be what it is without the leadership of Elon Musk — who assigned SpaceX the existential goal of making life multiplanetary. Critically, doing so was not just a catchphrase for SpaceX — but a simple goal every individual working at SpaceX — and many of its supporters — wholeheartedly believed. The spirit of the NASA of old was well and truly alive within SpaceX.</p><p>The incredible momentum behind SpaceX’s ascension would come to a crest at the International Astronautical Congress of 2016 — where <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WVacRKN1tAo">Musk took the stage</a> to unveil SpaceX’s next big thing — the <em>Interplanetary Transport System.</em> ITS was a vision for a massive evolution from Falcon 9 — a giant, rapidly reusable first stage that would return directly to the launch pad coupled with a multi-purpose reusable spacecraft doubling as a second stage. While the spacecraft would have exhausted nearly all of its fuel to get to orbit — it could then later be refuelled by a series of tankers, enabling deep space transport on a scale orders of magnitude beyond anything done since.</p><p>To an America that hadn’t even returned crew to orbit from its own soil since the end of the Space Shuttle — the scale of ITS was entirely incomprehensible. But it — and SpaceX’s willingness to make the impossible possible — was a welcome change to a country whose government still found the most worthwhile goal for the world’s most advanced space program was visiting an asteroid in the ambitious timeframe of “eventually.”</p><p>As Obama’s second term drew to a close — the administration that had overseen the end of Constellation and the Space Shuttle, and with it the systematic dismantling of NASA’s exploration goals — would have to go. But so too would the administration that brought SpaceX to power. Would an incoming Democratic administration preserve the status quo? On the other hand, would a Republican administration — whose voter base in the South benefitted disproportionately from the work done at critical NASA centers in that region — boost SLS and Orion instead?</p><p>America voted — and on November 9, 2016, Hillary Clinton conceded the race to be 45th President to Donald J. Trump.</p><blockquote>Presidential Policy Directive-4 of June 28, 2010 (National Space Policy), is amended as follows:</blockquote><blockquote>The paragraph beginning “Set far-reaching exploration milestones” is deleted and replaced with the following:</blockquote><blockquote>“Lead an innovative and sustainable program of exploration with commercial and international partners to enable human expansion across the solar system and to bring back to Earth new knowledge and opportunities. Beginning with missions beyond low-Earth orbit, the United States will lead the return of humans to the Moon for long-term exploration and utilization, followed by human missions to Mars and other destinations;”.</blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-reinvigorating-americas-human-space-exploration-program/">Space Policy Directive-1</a>, Donald J. Trump, December 11, 2017</blockquote><p>Space Policy Directive-1 marked the decisive end of the Obama era of space policy. It sent a clear message — that abandoning the goals of Constellation was a mistake, and that America still believed in those goals. But it also came with an acknowledgement of NASA’s current position — an agency that had increasingly become a client of SpaceX and the rest of the commercial sector to continue many of its spaceflight objectives — nevermind still dependent on Russia for crewed access to space for the coming years.</p><p>While NASA may have had a deep-space launch and crew capability in development, SLS and Orion were still half-baked and moving forward on a minimum viable yearly budget. They also were hardly being developed with any real urgency yet — nevermind by an agency that had for the most part institutionally forgot how to implement and operate a large-scale launch capability. However, they were still pieces to the puzzle that NASA had at their disposal.</p><p>SPD-1 came alongside other sweeping changes to the nation’s space program. Earlier in 2017, Trump had <a href="https://spaceflightnow.com/2017/06/30/trump-signs-order-re-creating-long-dormant-national-space-council/">re-established the National Space Council</a>, a cross-agency board that briefly existed from 1989 to 1993, with the goal of cohesively steering the nation’s space policy. But the first signals of Trump’s intent for space came with the<a href="https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/fy_2018_budget_estimates.pdf"> Presidential Budget Request for FY2018.</a></p><p>The budget continued increased funding for both SLS and Orion, as well as NASA’s commercial enterprises. It ended the nebulous Asteroid Redirect Mission in favor of a Moon to Mars path that would later be enshrined under SPD-1. However, it also called for defunding, delays, and cancellations across the board for NASA’s Earth science missions, and the full deletion of NASA’s Office of Education.</p><p>NASA got extremely lucky. During the FY2018 budget cycle, the 115th Congress — which had previously come to a near standstill on the budget including a minor government shutdown — decided to <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/07/government-shutdown-senate-budget-deal-395984">lift nation-wide spending caps</a>. NASA’s <a href="https://www.planetary.org/articles/20180322-fy18-omnibus">proposed funding increases for exploration passed </a>— without the cancellations and delays the Trump administration had proposed to incorporate to even out the budget.</p><p>With funding secured, a slate of commercial exploration programs began development under NASA as the agency set its eyes on a 2028 lunar landing. A <a href="https://sam.gov/opp/1819f62dc33f720f2d0eba972a3ec8ea/view">request for proposals</a> for privately developed small cargo landers — the Commercial Lunar Payload Services program — went out in September 2018. Later that year, studies began for a crew-capable lunar lander program, also privately developed, under <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/humans-in-space/nextstep-e-human-landing-system-studies-risk-reduction-development-and-demonstration/">NextSTEP-2 Appendix E</a>.</p><p>With this, it became clear SpaceX had changed NASA’s space strategy for good. Instead of taking end-to-end responsibility on its exploration programs, NASA could offload risk almost wholly to its contractors. It began using a new standard of contracting that embraced this— firm-fixed-price.</p><p>Firm, fixed price contracts are exactly what the name says on the tin. When a contractor submits a proposal against a request from NASA, they name their bid price. If the contractor ends up under-budget, they get to pocket the extra money as profit. If the project overruns — it’s the contractor’s to pay.</p><p>Furthermore, NASA issued many of these contracts as <em>services</em> contracts — similar to how launch services had been procured for many years. NASA was no longer owning and operating these spacecraft — but instead allowing private industry to. In this way, NASA saw itself as an <a href="https://spacenews.com/nasa-anchor-tenancy-change-encourages-commercial-space-backers/">“anchor customer”</a> for each service it procured — services that, while directly relevant to NASA’s goals, would also be open to other companies and private entities’ use. In theory — should the private sector be interested enough, NASA could save a lot of money on development costs that would instead be paid for by investors and shared across several customers.</p><p>While this approach had already been highly effective with launch services and had seen early successes with SpaceX and Orbital Sciences’ performance on the Commercial Resupply Services contract, firm-fixed-price would see its first outstanding success in 2019. SpaceX’s Crew Dragon, a massively upgraded descendant of the capsule first flown in 2010 — completed Demo-1, its first uncrewed mission to the ISS. The end of America’s nearly decade-long human spaceflight gap was in sight.</p><p>Just over a year later, in the midst of a new global pandemic, NASA astronauts Bob Behnken and Doug Hurley climbed onto what would become Crew Dragon <em>Endeavour. </em>Demo-2 would launch on May 30, 2020, and <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/history/flag-day-2020-one-small-american-flags-incredible-journey/">capture the American flag</a> the crew of STS-135 had left on the International Space Station 8 years and 10 months before. Critically — SpaceX would beat long-time industry giant Boeing to the punch, to which NASA had awarded billions more to develop the <em>Starliner</em> space capsule. Starliner would end up <a href="https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/loverro-no-decision-yet-on-repeating-starliner-oft/">failing its first test flight</a> due to several critical software errors.</p><p>Maybe it was time to bet on the underdogs.</p><p>Just one month before Demo-2, NASA would award the Human Landing System development contract to SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Dynetics — directing the three companies to spend the next 10 months developing the next American lunar lander. After the 10 month “base period,” NASA would select anywhere from zero to two proposals to be eligible for selection for Artemis missions.</p><p>One small catch.</p><p>When Space Policy Directive-1 was signed, NASA began planning for a 2028 deadline to return to the Moon. This was seen as the soonest politically and technologically viable date given the current funding and state of the space program, including private development. It also was the timeline established with the expectation of a <em>sustainable</em> return to the Moon — explicitly called out in SPD-1 to avoid another “flags and footprints” campaign like Apollo. NASA’s new program was a return to the Moon — to stay.</p><p>The 2028 deadline did not last long. On March 26, 2019, Vice President Mike Pence would <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/03/26/pence-calls-nasa-send-humans-moon-within-five-years/">call for it to be accelerated</a> by four years to 2024 under the program NASA would quickly soon brand as <em>Artemis</em>. Named for Apollo’s sister — it carried the goal of the next man — and the first woman — on the Moon by the end of 2024.</p><p>This sudden imposed schedule crunch forced large-scale change across NASA’s programs and their requirements. It would also have to be passed onto the HLS competitors — who now faced a near-impossible deadline that would need major funding to be feasible.</p><p>The Trump administration — namely NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine — once again returned to Congress asking for a $3 billion increase in funding to HLS for the FY2021 budget. He proposed achieving this by cutting funding to missions such as the Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope and PACE — missions NASA was actively committed to — seemingly with the expectation that the 116th Congress would be as kind as the previous and fund both.</p><p>Appropriators flatly <a href="https://spacenews.com/senate-bill-offers-nasa-only-a-fraction-of-requested-lunar-lander-funding/">rejected the request</a> — returning with a fraction of NASA’s proposed budget for the program. They also weren’t happy with Bridenstine’s attempt to cheat funding by putting otherwise safe programs on the chopping block. “Going forward,” a report accompanying the Senate’s markup of NASA’s funding bill stated, “NASA should refrain from requesting only part of the funding it requires to accomplish all of its missions.”</p><p>Bridenstine would not have the time to fight back. The first Trump administration would come to a turbulent end as 2020 closed out — seeing Bridenstine replaced in the interim by Associate Administrator Steve Jurczyk — standard during presidential transfers.</p><p>The Biden administration’s pick for Administrator would be Sen. Bill Nelson — one of NASA’s most vocal supporters in Congress. Nelson had even flown on STS-61-B, the last successful Shuttle mission before the Challenger disaster, to drum up support for NASA.</p><p>Nelson would not be confirmed in time. Jurczyk would oversee the <a href="https://spacenews.com/nasa-selects-spacex-to-develop-crewed-lunar-lander/">sole selection of Starship</a> for the HLS contract — and still commit to the 2024 deadline. He would hand the post to Nelson two weeks later.</p><p>This, for the most part, brings us to today. Sen. Nelson — and the Biden administration as a whole — would largely embrace the NASA programs that were left to them by the Trump administration. Privatization had become the norm, manifesting in many different forms.</p><p>Most visible was the slew of startups that would attempt to come to market — born from a period of near-zero interest rates in the United States meant to stimulate the economy, especially throughout the pandemic. Several different launch companies — all hailed to be SpaceX 2.0 — tried their hand. NASA would openly encourage these companies under the new <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/vadr-venture-class-acquisition-of-dedicated-and-rideshare-launch-services/">VADR (Venture-class Acquisition of Dedicated and Rideshare)</a> launch contract — assigning them payloads considered risk-tolerant enough to fly on unproven vehicles.</p><p>Success was few and far between. Rocket Lab, an early entrant, would manage to begin operationally flying its Electron vehicle it first tested in 2018 — likely the largest success story of the smallsat boom.</p><p>Relativity — a company praised for constructing its rockets via a novel method of 3D printing 85% of the rocket by mass — would test its Terran 1 vehicle from Cape Canaveral once, setting extremely low expectations of hoping the rocket survived peak aerodynamic pressure. The rocket would make it to space — and then fail to ignite its second stage.</p><p>Terran 1 was cancelled quickly after in lieu of a much larger vehicle. Rumor is that the 3D printed construction Relativity was hailed for was so weak that tank assemblies were regularly cracking along layer lines. It was also so inefficient that the rocket — despite being advertised as capable of over a metric ton to LEO — could likely only carry a couple kilograms of useful payload in reality. Terran R — the company’s supposed pivot — adopted a much more traditional construction.</p><p>Virgin Orbit — under Richard Branson’s multinational brand — would also try its hand. It would see some early success, going public via special-purpose acquisition company (SPAC), a move that seemed to pull nearly infinite funding from eager public investment. Virgin Orbit would have the most abrupt fall of any competitor — <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7u5k76wUddw">failing a critical and widely publicized launch</a> billed as the first from the United Kingdom via its 747-launched <em>LauncherOne</em> rocket. Just three months after the January 2023 launch, Virgin would file for bankruptcy and become nearly immediately defunct.</p><p>Next up — Firefly. The company has had five launches of its Alpha rocket so far in a 3-year span — most of which stretched the definition of success. Its first flight dramatically exploded over the Californian coast in late 2021. Flights 2 and 4 made it to an orbit — but a functionally useless one. Rumor states that Flight 3, a “tactical responsive” mission for the U.S. government, also reached a bad orbit. The company’s first decisive success was only in July of this year.</p><p>In that same three-year span, SpaceX launched north of 200 Falcon 9 rockets — and flew Starship, the single most powerful rocket ever built, six times in half that timeframe.</p><p>There is a truth in all of this that anyone serious about spaceflight must contend with and take to heart: SpaceX is decisively America’s space company.</p><p>The numbers are not kind to anyone else trying to claim second place. In just 2024 so far alone, of 137 launches carrying the American flag — 119 were SpaceX.</p><p>And of ~20,450 <a href="https://planet4589.org/space/gcat/data/cat/psatcat.html">payloads launched to space throughout history</a>, SpaceX’s Starlink satellites — built nearly end to end by the company — represent 7,337 of them — 36% of all payloads ever launched since the dawn of spaceflight in 1957. All of which in the last four years.</p><p>As for Commercial Crew — Dragon has flown 56 crews so far — taking over America’s human spaceflight capability entirely. Boeing’s Starliner — the spacecraft NASA paid more for to fill that same role — has so far only flown two astronauts.</p><p>Those two — Barry “Butch” Wilmore, and Sunita Williams — will be coming home on Dragon after a string of on-orbit faults led NASA leadership to lose confidence in the capsule’s safety.</p><p>But there is a second truth in this. The rise of SpaceX only fueled the large-scale privatization of NASA’s space programs which has been ongoing from the end of the Space Shuttle to today. SpaceX’s successes in every contract they’ve competed on have only fed into this feedback loop.</p><p>However, it really is just SpaceX.</p><p>Take for example the Commercial Lunar Payload Services contract — one of a slew of privatizing measures taken by the Trump administration throughout the initial Artemis program rush. The emphasis in this contract is on <em>services.</em></p><p>NASA is essentially hoping to procure a “service” to deliver a payload from Earth to the Moon — no different than shipping a package from A to B on Earth. The contract’s terms follow this too — bids are under firm-fixed-price terms, and structured as indefinite delivery — indefinite quantity (IDIQ), meaning NASA may issue any amount of “task orders” to competitors for transporting lunar payloads.</p><p>This isn’t a new approach to spaceflight — the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/house-bill/3942">Commercial Space Launch Act</a>, which enabled the full privatization of launch services away from the Space Shuttle, led to launch acquisition under several contracts on identical terms. However, by the time the Act was in effect, there were several launch vehicle families produced by private companies (even if owned and operated by the Government) that had reached a mature operational capability. Critically, the Government was not paying for development of a new vehicle — but individual flights with well established cost and schedule baselines.</p><p>This approach breaks down heavily when applied to new or bespoke programs. With firm fixed-price, the contractor bears the costs for any unpredicted risks that result in overruns — risks that are incredibly difficult to predict at the concept stages of a development program. At the same time, a contractor that hedges its bets and proposes the most realistic timeline or cost it can provide is likely to lose a competitive procurement — as established baselines to filter out unrealistically optimistic bids from companies looking to undercut simply don’t exist.</p><blockquote>“In [Boeing Defense &amp; Space], our performance on fixed-price development programs is simply not where it needs to be. We expect substantial new losses in BDS this quarter, driven by the work stoppage on commercial derivatives, continued program challenges and our decision to complete production on the 767 freighter. I will be providing additional oversight of this business and these programs.” —<em> </em><a href="https://investors.boeing.com/investors/news/press-release-details/2024/Boeing-CEO-Message-to-Employees-on-Positioning-for-the-Future/default.aspx/"><em>Kelly Ortberg, Boeing CEO</em></a></blockquote><p>Starliner may be the canary in the coal mine of firm-fixed-price programs. Boeing has lost an estimated $1.85 billion to date on the program — one which was arguably set up for failure from the start, and played even worse by Boeing. SpaceX was given a significant head start due to Dragon’s substantial flight heritage under Commercial Resupply Services — one the company leveraged heavily towards Crew Dragon development to save cost and timeline.</p><p>In several instances, lessons learned from the Dragon program also failed to transfer to Starliner — one major incident including a type of wire harnessing tape (P213) used extensively on both capsules but removed from Dragon after DM-2 due to a discovered flammability risk. It took nearly 3 years for NASA to inform the Starliner team of the same.</p><p>Starliner also took months of delays to allow Dragon time at the ISS to complete now operational missions —as the capsule frequently used both IDA docking ports on the ISS after the earlier Dragon 1 (which berthed to separate CBM-type ports) stopped flying.</p><p>This type of glacial inertia kills programs. Two years between flight tests raises much of the same institutional faults that doing nothing at all causes. Engineers that are truly passionate about their work flock to programs that operate and execute swiftly — not those that are mired in failure a decade later.</p><p>This is a lesson Boeing has had to learn across all of its programs. After a high-profile string of failures with the 737 MAX airliner, as well as massive cost overruns and delays across its aircraft, spacecraft, and other defense systems, incoming CEO Kelly Ortberg has promised large change to the company.</p><p>Ortberg’s first move was undoing the large-scale outsourcing of its programs by <a href="https://investors.boeing.com/investors/news/press-release-details/2024/Boeing-to-Acquire-Spirit-AeroSystems/default.aspx">buying Spirit Aerosystems</a>. Spirit was once just Boeing’s Wichita plant — but was spun off at the dawn of the 787 program in the name of a restructuring that would offload financial risk from Boeing to its subcontractors — of which Spirit became one of many, building airframes for the 787 and 737.</p><p>346 dead and a serious near miss on Alaska 1282 later, Boeing agreed to buy back Spirit — at a $4.7 billion dollar loss.</p><p>Ortberg’s second move? He doesn’t seem very keen on Boeing’s space systems, making <a href="https://payloadspace.com/boeings-new-ceo-doesnt-sound-bullish-on-space/">clear in his first earnings cal</a>l that “Boeing is an airplane company.”</p><p>“We’re better off doing less and doing it better, than doing more and not doing it well,” added Ortberg. “Clearly, our core of commercial airplanes and defense systems are going to stay with the Boeing company for the long run, but there’s probably some things on the fringe there that we can be more efficient with, or that just distract us from our main goal here.”</p><p>If Boeing chose to exit space systems, Starliner may very well be the first to go — an up to $5 billion failure for NASA.</p><p>Boeing’s billions in losses on fixed-price programs have also largely dissuaded other “prime contractors” — large military industrial complex corporations like Lockheed, Northrop, and other institutions — from competing on novel space systems.</p><p>When looking at any of NASA’s large commercialized programs — whether it be CLPS, or the ISS replacement program under Commercial LEO Destinations, or any of the other auxiliary Artemis programs — very few if any bids come purely from established contractors not named SpaceX. At most, primes have chosen to team up with startups to allow those companies to bear the risk instead.</p><p>These startups also make aggressive proposals towards many of these programs — as a contract won under tough and likely loss-inducing terms can still be a massive boon for an upstart company attempting to get their foot in the door, further dissuading established companies from competing.</p><p>These contracts, once won, provide every incentive for a startup to take as many shortcuts on cost and schedule as possible to attempt to deliver in time. No example more fitting exists than Astrobotic’s <em>Peregrine</em> lander — the first of the CLPS missions. The mission failed <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/18/science/moon-lander-peregrine-nasa.html">under an hour from separating</a> from its carrier rocket when a type of valve that was discovered to be unfit for use was <a href="https://www.astrobotic.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/PM1_Post-Mission-Report_2024-1.pdf">knowingly kept on Peregrine</a> due to concerns that work to replace it would stretch the timeline too far.</p><p>The valve in question controlled a tank of helium pressurant at several thousand psi to pressurize the lander’s fuel tanks. Upon commissioning, the valve failed open and subsequently ruptured a tank immediately.</p><p>NASA, however, had already issued a task order to Astrobotic for its next mission — to carry the VIPER rover to the surface of the Moon on Astrobotic’s <em>Griffin</em> lander. The work that would now be required to investigate and fully remediate the failure mode seen on Peregrine delayed VIPER to point where NASA could no longer contend with the cost overruns incurred from the delays — exacerbated by an extremely constrained budget forced by Republican austerity measures in the 118th Congress.</p><p>NASA notified the 118th Congress of its <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-ends-viper-project-continues-moon-exploration/">intent to cancel VIPER</a> on July 17, 2024. However, the agency was still on the hook for the $320 million task order it had awarded Astrobotic — for which it would now only fly a mass simulator (fancy space word for paperweight) to the lunar surface. NASA also refused to subsidize other science payloads for the mission — instead directing prospective teams to buy space from Astrobotic. It then decided to essentially auction off the $505 million nearly flight-ready rover <a href="https://science.nasa.gov/mission/viper/rfi/">to the best proposal</a>.</p><p>Added up — between the rover, Peregrine, and Griffin, NASA lost nearly a billion dollars between a lander that exploded on startup, a rover it’d never get to fly, and the paperweight it’d try to put on the Moon — all in the name of what was proposed as a services contract no different than asking FedEx to ship a package.</p><p>CLPS’ next mission, Intuitive Machines’ IM-1, also suffered major failures. The lander suffered several major navigation issues on its way to the lunar surface, leading to an off-target crash-landing that left the lander irrecoverably — and uselessly — tipped over.</p><p>When the program was <a href="https://oig.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/final-report-ig-24-013-nasas-commercial-lunar-payload-services-initiative.pdf">audited by NASA’s Office of Inspector General</a>, it found several faults in CLPS’ contracting method:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*wd4Fqfu84rZJfVr9.png" /></figure><p>If there were to be another SpaceX, it wasn’t here.</p><p>The same tone rang true with yet another program — the Exploration Extravehicular Activties Services (xEVAs) contract. xEVAs was a direct privatization of the xEMU spacesuit project required for Artemis moon missions. xEMU <a href="https://oig.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/IG-21-025.pdf">fell into hot water around 2021</a> in large part due to the unrealistic 2024 deadline imposed previously by the Trump administration, forcing the agency to search for a way to cut costs.</p><p>xEVAs was born — best described as “spacesuits as a service.” Under a similar FFP IDIQ based contract to CLPS — task orders would be issued for use of spacesuits privately developed and owned by contractors. <a href="https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-partners-with-industry-for-new-spacewalking-moonwalking-services/">Two companies won contracts</a>: Collins Aerospace — which led a team of contractors largely identical to those assisting NASA’s previous xEMU effort, and Axiom Space — a startup already competing under the Commercial LEO Destinations program that had never done any spacesuit work. Instead of a common path to flight, Collins was awarded a task order for ISS suits, while Axiom was entrusted with the lunar suits.</p><blockquote>“With these awards, NASA and our partners will develop advanced, reliable spacesuits that allow humans to explore the cosmos unlike ever before. By partnering with industry, we are efficiently advancing the necessary technology to keep Americans on a path of successful discovery on the International Space Station and as we set our sights on exploring the lunar surface.”</blockquote><blockquote><em>— Vanessa Wyche, Director of NASA’s Johnson Space Center</em></blockquote><p>It took just two years <a href="https://spacenews.com/collins-aerospace-pulls-back-from-nasa-spacesuit-contract/">for the Collins team to bow out</a>. According to SpaceNews, “industry sources said they believed that Collins had suffered delays and cost overruns and concluded that it was no longer feasible for the company to continue work on [xEVAs], particularly given the fixed-price nature of the contract.”</p><p>As for Axiom — the company was <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremybogaisky/2024/09/17/axiom-space-station/">struggling to make payroll recently</a>, strapped for cash after operating net-negative missions to the ISS alongside turbulent development of its replacement for the ISS. A real possibility emerges that Axiom, too, is forced to bow out — leaving NASA’s moon program without a spacesuit.</p><p>There is a lot more that could be covered here — but I hope the point is clear. Already, we are left with some clashing truths and harsh realities to navigate as we architect the space program of the 2020s and beyond.</p><p>NASA’s next step in the Artemis program is its Artemis II mission — currently forecast to happen about three years after Artemis I (late 2025). Stacking for Artemis II has just begun — while SLS has been ready, Orion faced significant delays due to time needed to understand excessive erosion seen on Artemis I’s heat shield.</p><p>A three year cadence between missions — even if they are between a first test flight and a first crewed flight — is untenable. Neither is the <a href="https://oig.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/IG-22-003.pdf">$4 billion life-cycle cost</a> of each SLS mission. Yet it is also the price of flying crew on flight number two, unless you aim to make the same mistakes as the Space Shuttle.</p><p>Should Artemis II fly in late 2025, I expect some 10–15 Starships to have already flown by then — a number that puts the existence of the Space Launch System justifiably in question. These are questions an incoming Trump administration — much more influenced by Musk this time — can and will ask. But striking down SLS — and in turn destroying any state capacity NASA has left — is not the answer.</p><p>The way the space program stands today — there are two major players: NASA, and SpaceX, in a relationship that blurs the line between symbiotic and parasitic. NASA and the Department of Defense are either largely or wholly dependent on SpaceX — which controls a vast majority of all American mass-to-orbit. SpaceX, in turn, is dependent on the billions given to it by the American government to fuel its massive momentum in the industry.</p><p>With this comes the first harsh truth. There will not be a second SpaceX — at least not in the ways American space policy has attempted to court one over the last decade. These attempts have cost the American taxpayer billions of dollars — and force often program-ending budget cuts on the missions that surround them. To sell off our space program for pennies on the dollar in the hopes of cultivating a space economy full of SpaceX-like juggernauts is delusional. A majority of these programs that have gotten far enough to show results have been large-scale failures. We must first stem the bleeding.</p><p>It does mean keeping SLS. And it does mean finding as many uses for SLS as possible, for SLS is just one example of America’s complete lack of real state capacity across infrastructure projects. Similar pains are felt in other high-tech industries in America — whether it’s nuclear power, or modern high-speed railways, or any other technologically or sociologically complex project in which it seems timelines and costs have only gone up higher and higher with less to show for it.</p><p>Are we truly incapable of building a Moon rocket efficiently even though we did it 50 years ago? Or have we systematically deconstructed our own capability as a nation to do so?</p><p>There was a time when the Space Shuttle flew every other week. That time was 40 years ago now. SLS — a vehicle that is overall far simpler, and builds on the knowledge of 135 Space Shuttle flights — has no excuse to not match that, especially when the risk to personnel is far, far lower (or practically zero on uncrewed missions).</p><p>That said — we do have SpaceX. Falcon 9 flies on a practically daily basis. I do fully believe that if realized, Starship will do so as well. That should not be a shock to anyone — not when you plot the trajectory America’s space program could have followed had the Space Shuttle lived up to its initial cadence. The Shuttle’s pitfall was the crew whose lives it invariably put in jepoardy with each flight. Starship, as an uncrewed system, solves this.</p><p>The solution to the problem of cost — and risk — is through flight rate. This is expensive at first — a reality difficult to square with the reality of yearly Congressional funding cycles in any industry. It may be the one saving grace of private investment — which can conjure large sums of money in one go to fund intensive development cycles. Perhaps we could learn a thing or two from long-term planning. This is a field China excels in — and one in which we should watch their behavior.</p><p>China is the only power that comes close to paralleling SpaceX’s might. The Long March rockets’ cadence is not quite SpaceX’s near-daily rate — but has still scaled aggressively in response. China, too, is planning a Starlink-like constellation. It is also rapidly adapting its future plans in response to Starship — with modern renditions of the super-heavy-lift Long March 9 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UiX_Qi_R-4k">looking increasingly like a Starship clone.</a></p><p>This lends to an interesting point. China does have its own semi-private launch sector forming. But these startups act more as ways of offloading risk for research and development in the launch sector without being given massive responsibility, as the country still conducts all of its key launches under its state-controlled space programs. What would be considered controlled proprietary information is also culturally irrelevant — with information freely shared across China’s aerospace sector.</p><p>This is a key role NASA had within the American aerospace sector — and one that is quickly diminishing due to privatization. Private companies working with NASA will mark anything they touch as confidential and proprietary — massively reducing the potential for information exchange across the American aerospace industry. During contract negotiations, companies will also aim to prevent the government from having any rights to their work that may be in question — as each technology handed to the government is something the company — or a competitor — could use for profit.</p><p>Yet, most of these companies would not be capable of performing without the vast sums of research freely available from NASA centers’ work — much of which dates back to the 1960’s. A long list of NASA spinoffs — many of which have become as fundamental to day to day life as modern microprocessors — would not exist without NASA research and development either.</p><p>In our top level discussions of space programs — those concerned with cost and schedule — this is often missed. But it is as critical as ever. How many key technologies did we miss out on from cancelling Constellation? How much was developed with NASA dollars, but plausibly under “private expense,” that will be forgotten to time once those programs or companies fold?</p><p>The Artemis program is not currently a serious space program. It is “sustainable” — in that SLS, Orion, Gateway, and the rest of the NASA-operated programs under that umbrella — can operate on a practically insignificant budget. Yet in terms of launch capacity, well, Starship runs laps around NASA.</p><p>It is true that SLS went to the Moon and back before Starship made it to step two of its contractual obligations for HLS. But Starship shows a real and true promise for a multiplanetary future. Will there be Starships on Mars? I couldn’t tell you. But reducing the cost of mass to orbit — even if just LEO — is step one. Starship may not be capable of what it claims it can do now — but it has ample room for improvements that will be made.</p><p>These vehicles do not have to be pitted against each other. They also may be critical to getting NASA out of the pinch it is in — with the looming end of the ISS and no real replacement lined up. Will we cede this too — to a private entity that will have to haplessly search for profit in running what is one of America’s most critical national labs — if it can even build a replacement? China, for its part, is rapidly deploying its Tiangong space station.</p><p>America can turn its gilded age of spaceflight into a golden age. It can also avoid ceding its 50 years of hard-earned leadership in spaceflight to China — or anyone else. But we cannot afford to cancel any more projects. We cannot afford to keep selling off our space program in the name of chasing short-term cost benefits or cargo-culting our way into getting a second SpaceX.</p><p>And a second thought: Outsourcing and competing everything does not work. If we can’t learn from SpaceX’s own incredible success with vertical integration — or Boeing’s fatal failures with Spirit Aerosystems and the like — maybe we can learn from our own achievements under the highly centralized Apollo program.</p><p>With this, I believe the American space program should:</p><ul><li>Immediately implement a super-heavy launch applications program under NASA. Subsidize both private and public development of payloads that take advantage of the tremendous capability afforded by SLS and Starship. Make both of these vehicles fly as often as possible.</li><li>Implement a plan to sunset the CLPS and xEVAs programs. Transition xEVAs back to a fully in-house project. Develop an in-house, low-cost lunar lander under JPL to avoid further staffing cuts and the loss of critical institutional knowledge within the Lab. Take advantage of high flight rates to rapidly develop, test, and iterate such a vehicle.</li><li>Begin planning and development of a true government-operated ISS successor as soon as possible. Take advantage of large-scale capabilities offered by access to super-heavy lift. Transition CLD from a sole ISS replacement to the option of procurement of modules for a new station, or lesser contracts to free-flying stations.</li><li>Issue a Commercial Cargo to Crew follow-on contract to CRS and Commercial Crew. Invite proposals to begin as cargo vehicles similar to Dragon that recieve the option for a conversion program if proven reliable. This may be a viable exit strategy for Boeing’s Starliner. It may also allow for new entrants to gain the ability to develop complex space systems without the overload of human-rating.</li><li>Push for further development and iteration for Starship to the extent that is feasible. SpaceX should not recieve a “get out of jail free” card for blatant offenses commited over development of the program — but the Government should continue to work closely with SpaceX to ensure compliance is achieved without excessive delay.</li><li>Strengthen the National Space Council and implement a joint applications board between the Space Force and NASA. Create more opportunities for national security and exploration missions to work hand in hand.</li></ul><p>These are not an exhaustive list of reccomendations. Nor do I promise you that they will all work on their own — or that any of them would be considered. But I do earnestly believe them to be key to a multiplanetary future that works for all.</p><p>SpaceX has shown incredible power. Musk remains a critical character — key to the creation of SpaceX, but potentially key to its destruction. That is a risk we run. These types of enterprises always crumble from the top down.</p><p>I leave you with a story of a launch company I didn’t mention — the one I worked for. I did a lot of concept design for entirely new space systems — proposals under contracts very similar to the ones discussed for what could have become entirely new space programs. My job was not just to tell the story — but to write it.</p><p>Practically everything we did depended on one rocket working. We struggled to test fast — taking a year and a half between a failed first flight due to a design misstep — to a second flight that never flew at all after a critical fire on the launch pad. Faces came, and then they went.</p><p>I wrote a large part of the final public statement for that program — an acknowledgement of our failure. I spent my last couple weeks there pouring over everything we had left — trying to come up with ways to pull out of the dive at first, but then just knee-deep in the piles of rubble left from both flights, all held in the decrepit wastes of a previous launch company that went under.</p><p>I held a melted, charred chunk of aluminum — the remains of a rocket we’d all poured our hearts into. I thought about the work some of the smartest people I’d met in my life put into it — friends that worked at early SpaceX before coming here would say we must’ve had more talent concentrated under our roof than SpaceX did when they were under that very same roof. We just didn’t know how to use it.</p><p>I looked back to the statement I wrote — and to one of its final lines that I was surprised had made it in. “This is not the outcome we wanted,” it said, “and it eclipsed the incredible endurance and execution of our team that got Flight 2 just short of the finish line.”</p><p>What would come of all the painful work everyone had put in — knocked down over decisions they had no part in? What would come of all the concepts for the future my team had created — of programs we knew were critical for a rapidly accessible future in space?</p><p>On August 29, 2024, myself and many of my friends got the same call those many others did in this industry. We went home. Many of our friends followed us soon after. I do still think about the statement that marked that company’s official end — at least of the launch program.</p><p>“However, over the past few years, we’ve seen our ability to make a meaningful impact in the launch industry diminish. Take a look around. U.S. rockets fly every couple of days, with perfect success. It’s revolutionary.”</p><p>It’s easy to say “U.S. rockets.”</p><p>It’s a lot harder to say that it really is just SpaceX.</p><p>P.S.</p><p>Thanks for reading. This is the culmination of years of work to tell a story that’s still continuing to be told. I couldn’t tell you how many initial takes I made at this — only that 10,000 words later, it still doesn’t feel like enough. I’d loved to have covered uncrewed spaceflight, especially <em>Mars Sample Return</em> more — or taken some time to look into the future. Companies like Blue still show a chance to disrupt — but it’ll be an uphill climb.</p><p>On the topic of personal stories — some thoughts I couldn’t find space to fit into this: Space systems are nothing without the people behind them. This incoming administration does present serious challenges to a lot of those folks, myself included. We should strive for a multiplanetary future, for all. American leadership in space is only worth anything if it’s a promise to do so under justice and liberty for all.</p><p>The industry is going to see some turmoil in the next few months. I don’t think we’ll be the last to fall. Should your friends get the call — take care of them. It’s tough to see something you were deeply passionate for collapse.</p><p>But — should you get the call. The most important thing you can do for a multiplanetary future is to persist and keep trying. There is no dollar value equal to the hard-earned lessons from actually trying something. Failure hurts. It often feels personal.</p><p>There <a href="https://images.ctfassets.net/s16ms59qcevs/CU7FeElKlVLAT5S15M0tO/f626c3a78f873a2a3091948314851df8/SpaceAgency-ABL-3up-2.jpg?q=80&amp;fl=progressive">was a poster</a> that I had helped steer the design of in our office. It was a FOD awareness poster — one that showed a giant bolt hanging over a rocket — and I found it weirdly emotional. It read: “Don’t let the small stuff keep us down.”</p><p>P.P.S.</p><p>For Nik, Sydney, Eva, Alex, Davide, Ashley, and everyone else I’m certain I’ll feel bad about missing here. Thank you.</p><p>And no, I don’t have a new role yet. You may see some more writing from me — or some other projects. You’re welcome to get in touch at hi (at) <a href="http://lavieohana.com/contact">lavieohana.com</a> if you’d like to work on things together. Until then — watch this space. The story’s just begun.</p><p>— Appendix —</p><p>There’s a lot that went into this article — and a lot of great sources that didn’t make the final cut. I’ve attempted to hyperlink as many of them as possible, but here’s the full list of those that did:</p><p><a href="https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-selects-blue-origin-as-second-artemis-lunar-lander-provider/">NASA Selects Blue Origin as Second Artemis Lunar Lander Provider — NASA</a></p><p><a href="https://x.com/SpcPlcyOnline/status/1725532267810836989">Marcia Smith, @SpcPlcyOnline — X</a></p><p><a href="https://arstechnica.com/space/2024/07/spacex-just-stomped-the-competition-for-a-new-contract-thats-not-great/">SpaceX just stomped the competition for a new contract — that’s not great — Ars Technica</a></p><p><a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/senate-bill/1281">S.1281–109th Congress (2005–2006): National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005 | Congress.gov | Library of Congress</a></p><p><a href="https://www.space.com/1567-nasa-moon-plans-apollo-steroids.html">NASA’s New Moon Plans: ‘Apollo on Steroids’ | Space</a></p><p><a href="https://csps.aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/Augustine%20Final%20Report%2022Oct09.pdf">Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee — Final Report</a></p><p><a href="https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/ppd/ppd-4-nsp.pdf">National Space Policy of the United States of America</a> — June 2010</p><p><a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-bill/3729">S.3729–111th Congress (2009–2010): National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 | Congress.gov | Library of Congress</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2011/07/preliminary-nasa-evolved-sls-vehicle-21-years-away/">Preliminary NASA plan shows Evolved SLS vehicle is 21 years away — NASASpaceFlight.com</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2011/12/michoud-hollywood-movie-teams-utilize-facilitys-expanses/">MAF goes Hollywood as movie teams utilize the facility’s once-busy expanses — NASASpaceFlight.com</a></p><p><a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-space-exploration-21st-century">Remarks by the President on Space Exploration in the 21st Century | whitehouse.gov</a></p><p><a href="https://spacenews.com/nasa-creates-human-exploration-and-operations-directorate/">NASA Creates Human Exploration And Operations Directorate — SpaceNews</a></p><p><a href="https://spaceflightnow.com/news/n1212/06spacexdod/">Spaceflight Now | Breaking News | SpaceX books first two launches with U.S. military</a></p><p><a href="https://spacenews.com/spacexs-dragoneye-navigation-sensor-successfully-demonstrated-on-sts-127/">SpaceX’s Dragoneye Navigation Sensor Successfully Demonstrated on STS-127 — SpaceNews</a></p><p><a href="https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-254.htm">NSDD 254 — National Security Decision Directives — Reagan Administration</a></p><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WVacRKN1tAo">IAC 2016 — Late Breaking News: Making Humans a Multiplanetary Species</a></p><p><a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-reinvigorating-americas-human-space-exploration-program/">Presidential Memorandum on Reinvigorating America’s Human Space Exploration Program — The White House</a></p><p><a href="https://spaceflightnow.com/2017/06/30/trump-signs-order-re-creating-long-dormant-national-space-council/">Trump signs order reviving long-dormant National Space Council — Spaceflight Now</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/fy_2018_budget_estimates.pdf">FY 2018 NASA PRESIDENT’S BUDGET REQUEST ESTIMATES</a></p><p><a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/07/government-shutdown-senate-budget-deal-395984">Congressional leaders reach budget deal — POLITICO</a></p><p><a href="https://www.planetary.org/articles/20180322-fy18-omnibus">NASA wins big in 2018 budget deal | The Planetary Society</a></p><p><a href="https://sam.gov/opp/1819f62dc33f720f2d0eba972a3ec8ea/view">Commercial Lunar Payload Services — SAM.gov</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nasa.gov/humans-in-space/nextstep-e-human-landing-system-studies-risk-reduction-development-and-demonstration/">NextSTEP-2 E: Human Landing System Studies, Risk Reduction, Development, and Demonstration — NASA</a></p><p><a href="https://spacenews.com/nasa-anchor-tenancy-change-encourages-commercial-space-backers/">NASA Anchor Tenancy Change Encourages Commercial Space Backers — SpaceNews</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nasa.gov/history/flag-day-2020-one-small-american-flags-incredible-journey/">Flag Day 2020 — One Small American Flag’s Incredible Journey — NASA</a></p><p><a href="https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/loverro-no-decision-yet-on-repeating-starliner-oft/">Loverro: No Decision Yet On Repeating Starliner OFT — SpacePolicyOnline.com</a></p><p><a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/03/26/pence-calls-nasa-send-humans-moon-within-five-years/">Pence calls for NASA to send humans to the moon within five years — The Washington Post</a></p><p><a href="https://spacenews.com/senate-bill-offers-nasa-only-a-fraction-of-requested-lunar-lander-funding/">Senate bill offers NASA only a fraction of requested lunar lander funding — SpaceNews</a></p><p><a href="https://spacenews.com/nasa-selects-spacex-to-develop-crewed-lunar-lander/">NASA selects SpaceX to develop crewed lunar lander — SpaceNews</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nasa.gov/vadr-venture-class-acquisition-of-dedicated-and-rideshare-launch-services/">VADR (Venture-Class Acquisition of Dedicated and Rideshare) Launch Services — NASA</a></p><p><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7u5k76wUddw">Virgin Orbit Employees — Start Me Up Launch Film</a></p><p><a href="https://planet4589.org/space/gcat/data/cat/psatcat.html">planet4589.org/space/gcat/data/cat/psatcat.html</a></p><p><a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/98th-congress/house-bill/3942/text">Text — H.R.3942–98th Congress (1983–1984): Commercial Space Launch Act | Congress.gov | Library of Congress</a></p><p><a href="https://investors.boeing.com/investors/news/press-release-details/2024/Boeing-CEO-Message-to-Employees-on-Positioning-for-the-Future/default.aspx">Boeing Company — Boeing CEO Message to Employees on Positioning for the Future</a></p><p><a href="https://investors.boeing.com/investors/news/press-release-details/2024/Boeing-to-Acquire-Spirit-AeroSystems/default.aspx">Boeing Company — Boeing to Acquire Spirit AeroSystems</a></p><p><a href="https://payloadspace.com/boeings-new-ceo-doesnt-sound-bullish-on-space/">Boeing’s New CEO Doesn’t Sound Bullish on Space — Payload</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/18/science/moon-lander-peregrine-nasa.html">Astrobotic’s Peregrine Moon Lander Burns Up in Earth’s Atmosphere — The New York Times</a></p><p><a href="https://www.astrobotic.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/PM1_Post-Mission-Report_2024-1.pdf">PM1_Post-Mission-Report_2024–1.pdf</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-ends-viper-project-continues-moon-exploration/">NASA Ends VIPER Project, Continues Moon Exploration — NASA</a></p><p><a href="https://sam.gov/opp/31284effc2ba4da4978a6dde931b6250/view">VIPER Rover Partnership Opportunity — SAM.gov</a></p><p><a href="https://oig.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/final-report-ig-24-013-nasas-commercial-lunar-payload-services-initiative.pdf">Final Report — IG-24–013 — NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services Initiative</a></p><p><a href="https://oig.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/IG-21-025.pdf">Final Report — IG-21–025 — NASA’s Development of Next-Generation Spacesuits</a></p><p><a href="https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/nasa-partners-with-industry-for-new-spacewalking-moonwalking-services/">NASA Partners with Industry for New Spacewalking, Moonwalking Services — NASA</a></p><p><a href="https://spacenews.com/collins-aerospace-pulls-back-from-nasa-spacesuit-contract/">Collins Aerospace pulls back from NASA spacesuit contract — SpaceNews</a></p><p><a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremybogaisky/2024/09/17/axiom-space-station/">Billionaire’s Space Unicorn Axiom Is In Crisis Amid Funding Struggles</a></p><p><a href="https://oig.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/IG-22-003.pdf">NASA’S MANAGEMENT OF THE ARTEMIS MISSIONS — November 15, 2021</a></p><p>And while I’m here — a couple other good reads that provided some great inspiration — even if they didn’t make the cut.</p><p><a href="https://spacecraft.ssl.umd.edu/akins_laws.html">Akin’s Laws of Spacecraft Design (umd.edu)</a></p><p><a href="https://waynehale.wordpress.com/2020/12/02/exploding-stovepipes/">Exploding Stovepipes | Wayne Hale’s Blog (wordpress.com)</a></p><p><a href="https://taylor.town/-10x">How to be a -10x Engineer</a></p><p>Thanks again, friends. Don’t let the stars burn out — we deserve a multiplanetary future.</p><p>— end —</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8cb0adf24769" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Starship II: A Reprise]]></title>
            <link>https://lavieohana.medium.com/starship-ii-a-reprise-df3585d9e39d?source=rss-2f4504b51ce5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/df3585d9e39d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[rockets]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[aerospace]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[spacex]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[space]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[starship]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lavie Ohana]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2023 01:11:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-04-10T21:04:47.474Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Et tu, Starship?</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5kWh-3Khkht7G4IJxCoHJw.png" /><figcaption>My remote camera for the ViaSat-3 Americas launch looks on at Falcon Heavy and the empty Starship tower at Cape Canaveral.</figcaption></figure><p>I wrote about Starship’s first orbital flight test just a week and a half ago, and that was recieved very well. I wrote from the heart — day of launch, experiences fresh and with a feeling of hope after watching what was a spectacular launch (at least, visually).</p><p>But as fate would have it, we always learn more as time moves on. I knew from day one that the flight was by no means a technical success. I concluded that first post with the following:</p><blockquote>If you had told anyone just two years ago that SLS would beat Starship, fly perfectly, and become the component of the Artemis program that contributed to delays the least<em>, </em>you’d have been laughed out of the room. And yet, here we are — of America’s two new and flown super-heavy launch vehicles, one has sent a deep-space crew-capable spacecraft to the Moon and back, while the other totaled its launchpad, struggled and failed the whole way up, and finally exploded not even a third of the way to space — nevermind orbit — carrying nothing more than the hopes and dreams of the Artemis generation.</blockquote><p>That was an understatement.</p><p>As time has gone on, I’ve reflected a lot on how Starship’s first flight has been recieved and what actually happened. To put it bluntly, it’s not good. Compared to Artemis I? Well, the Artemis hype train has been going ever since that launch. Yet it feels like most of the people I know want to forget Starship’s test flight ever happened. Or if they don’t, they want to remember the cool launch, the awesome photos we got, but not the implications of what actually happened.</p><p>When I showed up at the press site for the Falcon Heavy launch I’m currently covering, the #1 question people asked when they saw someone roll up is “how many cameras did you lose in Texas?”. It really felt like nobody had anything good to say for the launch, beyond just the experience of being there. I said much of the same.</p><p>We all shared the same feeling of anxiety for what would come next for Starship, while not a mile behind us, SLS’s Mobile Launcher-1 was lit up and clean, seemingly more than ready to support another launch when the time came. While at pad 39A for Falcon Heavy, I looked at the Starship pad under construction there in a much different light, as if it had lost its shine. The Starship pad wasn’t the pillar of the grand future to come anymore. Nor was it the towering behemoth it appeared to be at Starbase. No, it was now an overbuilt grave — condemned before it could even be finished, a reminder that the arrogance that enabled the flight at Starbase would no longer fly. Not here.</p><p>All that a look over to pad B down the road revealed was its three towers, each standing much taller than the Starship pad, invariably blinking as they stood ready to protect another super-heavy rocket. They made the Starship pad feel small, and really, so did everything else. It may have been the biggest and baddest in Texas, but Florida’s established spaceport brought some much needed context to the table.</p><p>So, what changed? Or what did we learn that wasn’t there on day one?</p><p>I think it is first most critical to set expectations for what the Starship system’s contractual obligations to NASA, and by extension the U.S. taxpayer, are. Context is critical, and if you’ll bare with me, there’s a lot needed here to understand the scale of the problem we are dealing with.</p><p>Starship has to land on the moon three times under the NextSTEP-2 contract. The first two, under Appendix H Option A, is the “Human Landing System” contract that was awarded to SpaceX for the landing currently scheduled for Artemis III, as well as an uncrewed landing demo before that mission. The second, under App. H Option B, is a demonstration of an evolved “Sustaining HLS” scheduled for Artemis IV.</p><p>We’ll get back to NextSTEP and sustainable landers in a moment, but the most important takeaway right now is three landings.</p><p>Each landing requires several launches to carry out. In my previous article, I named “at least sixteen times” as the number of landings per mission. That is the number that was revealed during a certain company’s lawsuit over the initial App. H contract award, in which they insisted that the number (released by the government) made SpaceX’s program “immensely complex and high risk” in some flashy infographics. A lot of folks openly joked about it then, but looking back, maybe they were right.</p><p>There’s been some doubt expressed about those figures since then, so to shed some light: it’s only worse now. I have to be careful with specifics as to not put any sources at undue risk for what is a personal blog post, but know that there are three general concepts of operations being studied.</p><ul><li>Concept 1 involves 16 tankers, a fuel depot, and an HLS. Both the depot and HLS are completely filled in low earth orbit, 8 tankers each, and then the depot fills the HLS in a higher orbit.</li><li>Concept 2 also involves 16 tankers, a depot, and an HLS. The depot is filled twice, with HLS only being filled by the depot. This presumably helps with boiloff.</li><li>Concept 3 involves 16 tankers, two depots, and an HLS. A depot is placed in LEO and a higher-energy orbit, and both are filled accordingly. HLS fills from the LEO depot first, then the high-energy depot, then continues to the Moon.</li></ul><p>You will have to take my word on the numbers here — while these are direct from program, I can only say so much for a personal blog post.</p><p>Throughout every mission type, the ships must contend with boiloff — on the order of about a ton per day, while each tanker only carries about 150 tons each. That doesn’t sound like much, but if you add up the losses, every 5 months of time-in-space per ship is a launch wasted. Factor in enough time to get 18 ships off the ground, and if you can pull that off in one year — that’s still at least two launches effectively wasted. We will assume 18 launches accounts for expected losses.</p><p>To get to the point where Starship can even start doing landing demos, there are 3 missions that still must be completed — the orbital flight test, a propellant-transfer test, and a long duration flight test. For the sake of illustration we will assume all launches go perfectly — akin to what SpaceX internally likes to call a “green light schedule.” (if all the traffic lights were green, how fast could you get there?)</p><p>This puts us at 4 launches for the initial demos, and 54 launches for the three landings required. That means that at minimum, for Starship to complete its contractual obligations by Artemis IV, the rocket must fly <em>fifty-eight times</em> with zero failures by 2028. That’s not zero failures in the “nothing blew up” sense, but in the sense that every test must go flawlessly — redesigns and lessons learned must fit within the schedule. The clock is ticking, and one thing’s for sure, those lights sure aren’t all green.</p><p>In summary, for SpaceX to meet its contractual obligations, we need 4 Apollo programs’ worth of super-heavy lift out the door by, well let’s be kind, the end of the decade.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EYkx1U86mhSlBbhFntJpBA.png" /><figcaption>A figure from a NASA OIG report on NASA’s management of the Artemis program, number 22–003. <a href="https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/IG-22-003.pdf">NASA’S MANAGEMENT OF THE ARTEMIS MISSIONS — November 15, 2021</a>. Credit: NASA OIG</figcaption></figure><p>Looking at the schedule of Artemis III alone here, have a look at the “Orbital Launch Test” milestone. SpaceX said they would have that milestone — literally step 1 — complete in Q2 of fiscal year 2022.</p><p>We are now in Q3 of FY23, 15 months behind <em>on step one</em> and counting. How long will it take for even one Starship to complete the test?</p><p>It really doesn’t get any easier from here, unfortunately. Musk did an after-launch report on Twitter Spaces, where he admitted a lot about the flight that really sent home just how bad it all actually went. I want you to keep the <em>baseline expectations </em>we just went over in mind as I go through just some of the faults he mentioned (with the assistance of Michael Sheetz’ reporting, linked <a href="https://twitter.com/thesheetztweetz/status/1652451971410935808">here</a>).</p><ul><li>Three engines did not light before liftoff due to faults detected at startup. (er, “chose not to start,” in Elon’s words, as if a human decided.)</li><li>Due to the engine failures at startup, the rocket experienced a “powerslide” and drifted several body diameters away from the center of the launchpad. Had the failures happened in a different location on the booster, it would have drifted directly into the tower.</li><li>Communications with another engine were completely lost at T+ 27 seconds, and the heatshields of engines 17 through 20 were knocked out due to an explosion around the same time.</li><li>Thrust vector control over the vehicle was completely lost at T+ 85 seconds — Starship was essentially uncontrolled for another two and a half minutes after.</li><li>At least 7 engines completely failed throughout the flight, with Musk stating that the “rock tornado” the rocket formed at liftoff did not damage the engines or heatshields in any material way.</li><li>Musk stated the damage to the launchpad was “certainly not expected” with the complete destruction of the concrete under the launch mount being “actually quite small” in terms of pad damage.</li><li>The rocket’s automated flight termination system took <strong>40 seconds<em> </em></strong>to terminate the flight from the command being sent. In other words, even though the vehicle was in an unsafe-to-public state where it should have been terminated instantly, it kept flying for nearly half a minute longer than it should have. Musk says the FTS must be re-qualified, adding that “it took way too long to rupture the tanks.”</li><li>SpaceX expects to spend $2 billion on Starship this year.</li><li>As a cherry on top, Musk’s expectation for the next flight is pad readiness in “6 to 8 weeks,” with the goal being “making it to staging and hopefully succeed(ing).” He also re-iterated that he does not believe Starship HLS will be the long-lead item for Artemis III.</li></ul><p>“We will be the first thing to really be ready.”</p><p>I have to ask, do you see this system successfully launching another 40 times before Artemis III’s SLS and Orion are ready? You know, the third SLS that’s well into production at Michoud, and the Orion whose pressure vessel is currently being outfitted at KSC right now, ahead of a flight just under three years from now?</p><p>Since he pulled from my last post, I’ll pull from his — Ben Kellie, CEO of The Launch Company and a SpaceX vet himself, <a href="https://thenext30trips.com/p/scrappy-special-edition#:~:text=Worse%2C%20their%20newest,in%20this%20industry.">wrote the following</a>:</p><blockquote>Worse, their newest contract with NASA stipulates landing humans on the Moon by 2024, which is next year. Keep in mind, that Starship has nothing inside of it except the tanks, valves, and wires needed to make it fly. There is no payload bay. There are no seats. There is no life support system. We don’t know if the re-entry tiles will work. Honestly, if this was any company other than SpaceX I would declare them toast. Companies have folded over much less, especially in this industry.</blockquote><p>SpaceX has three years to get Starship orbital, figure out how to not expend the pad in doing so, solve cryogenic refueling in space, prove re-entry and reuse of ships, prove the long-duration capability of the ships, develop an entire lander and all of the extra systems Kellie mentions, execute a successful test campaign with 18 launches, and then do it all again to have HLS ready for Artemis III’s arrival, if they are to meet Elon’s claim that they’ll be the first ready.</p><p>I told you SpaceX likes their green-light schedules.</p><p>I think Kellie’s article is a very grounded take on the whole situation. While he shows that yes, even in his own experience, SpaceX can and has done great things, this test is far more “crappy” than “scrappy.” And while the program may some day succeed, I have a lot of concerns for the now very real implications of how this test went in terms of the Artemis program.</p><p>Where SpaceX had room to fail and iterate with landing their boosters on barges, when it comes to Artemis and Starship, play time is over. Starship, and in turn Artemis, explicitly rely on the technologies SpaceX is testing, and crappy tests only lead to further delays for a program that has to keep a schedule. Remember that OIG article I mentioned earlier? Even in 2021, it was noted that “as a contingency plan, [NASA] Exploration Systems Development officials raised the possibility of using Artemis III to complete an additional fly-by of the Moon rather than a lunar landing mission should necessary systems not be available in time.”</p><p>To put it to you blunt, Artemis III will more than likely not land on the Moon. While I believe NASA has their own reasons they can’t make that official yet, I think as an industry we’ve at least got to start accepting that there is a problem, that problem now has real and significant implications for the Artemis program, and solutions must be found. NASA knows this too, which is why in 2022, the agency put out the <em>Sustaining Lunar Development</em> contract, under NextSTEP-2 Appendix P. (I told you we’d get back to NextSTEP.)</p><p>This is actually something I wrote about for Space Scout almost the day it happened, and if you want to read my day-of reporting without my opinions, you can do so here: <a href="https://www.spacescout.info/2022/09/second-lunar-lander-rfp/">NASA moves to procure a second crewed lunar lander — Space Scout</a>.</p><p>Otherwise, here’s the elevator pitch: SLD is about acquiring a second lander to be developed alongside Starship. That lander should be ready by 2028, anyone but SpaceX can bid, and that lander should be focused on being a sustainable solution for transportation, not a one-off. A risk reduction study, App. N, was completed with Blue Origin, Dynetics, Lockheed, and Northrop all showing interest.</p><p>The thinking behind SLD is sound. At best, if Starship is a success, we have two redundant ways to reach the Moon’s surface, one of them with significant capabilities. However, if Starship can’t be trusted, SLD offers a second chance and decouples the Artemis program’s success from Starship’s.</p><p>So who do we turn to for a second lander? Well, we know of one company that’s incredibly interested in putting humans on the Moon. They practically went down kicking and screaming when SpaceX won their current contract. They’ve been quiet, but they’ve assembled a world-class team and have access to much of the same resources as SpaceX.</p><p>Yes. Blue Origin’s National Team.</p><p>Now perhaps I am biased. I’ve seen inside Blue’s facilities, and while I can’t tell you what I did see, I can tell you everyone who shares that experience with me (including NASA’s exploration officials!) share much of the same final takeaway — that Blue’s doing pretty damn well.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/0*u7KqCiPwjcb_hvBU" /></figure><p>But I’ve also paid close attention to the company’s efforts to secure a lander contract over the years. A lot of folks will look back to the phrase “immensely complex and high risk” with humor and contempt, practically a meme from Blue’s lawsuits against the government for choosing SpaceX.</p><p>I ask you now, <em>were they wrong?</em></p><p>I am not going to pretend that a Blue Origin team would have performed perfectly. But perhaps it would have struck a finer balance, the line between crappy and scrappy Kellie talked about in his article. Blue has the nearly unchecked resources and power that SpaceX has, but so far, the company has been much smarter about it. Instead of going about HLS and SLD by itself, it assembled the National Team, today containing Lockheed, Draper, Boeing, Astrobotic, and Honeybee. The National Team’s lander wasn’t nearly as flashy as Starship, but it didn’t have to be. It fit the bill, it needed much less new development to be successful, and it had options where proposed solutions had risk.</p><p>(While we’re here, Dynetics’ lander deserves a shout too — I don’t know as much about it, but it brings its own simpler take to the table as well.)</p><blockquote>Design is based on requirements. There’s no justification for designing something one bit “better” than the requirements dictate.</blockquote><blockquote><a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230307100105/https://spacecraft.ssl.umd.edu/akins_laws.html">— Akin’s Laws of Spacecraft Design, #13.</a></blockquote><p>This is something that I find is difficult to explain to the aerospace community, but is very easy to explain to the industry. To anyone who hasn’t really dealt with these types of programs, a system as flashy and capable on paper as Starship seems incredible, especially at its bid price. But I find many of the industry veterans I’ve talked to take a much more wary view towards such concepts, especially when they far exceed what was asked.</p><p>Sometimes, over-delivering is great. But one should be incredibly wary of confusing “nice to have” with “program requirement.” I feel many have missed this in their coverage of the Starship program, where Starship is often only discussed in context of its incredible <em>claimed </em>capabilities rather than its concerning real status. All of these incredible things that Starship aims to be capable of become liabilities as they are embedded into the design, resulting in a stackup of things that really were never asked for in the original contract now holding up the entire program.</p><p>This truly is why Starship’s “immensely complex” concept of operations is a risk in the first place. Do not get me wrong — it would be incredible to have two dozen super-heavy lift rockets flying every year in support of the Artemis program. You know how much I loved the actual in-person experience of the first flight. But pragmatically, it’s time to acknowledge that things can in fact be ahead of their time today and not just in hindsight, and that’s what we’re seeing with Starship. While I still have hope for the rocket as a LEO mass mover, and I have hope for SpaceX as a whole, it’s time to genuinely reconsider whether we can count on it to carry our first crew back to the Moon in fifty years.</p><p>It is truly rare that there is this much momentum in the spaceflight industry, and we must not take it for granted. The money is on the table to return to the Moon now. It’s time to make the responsible choice, pick someone new for Sustaining Lunar Development, and start reviewing the timelines for Artemis III and IV.</p><p>Quite honestly, this is already in progress. NASA is critically aware of these risks, and it’s why the SLD contract exists even after HLS was significantly underfunded. Rumor has it that Starship’s situation within the Artemis program is already in hot water, but we will have to wait and see. No matter what, if we are to be competent in our return to the Moon, tough decisions must be made.</p><p>I leave you with a few lines from Gene Kranz.</p><blockquote>Mission Control was behind in virtually every area, and the flight and test procedures changed daily. Nothing we did had any shelf life. Not one of us stood up and said, “Dammit, stop!”</blockquote><blockquote>I don’t know what Thompson’s committee will find as the cause, but I know what I find. We are the cause! We were not ready! We did not do our job. We were rolling the dice, hoping that things would come together by launch day, when in our hearts we knew it would take a miracle. We were pushing the schedule and betting that the Cape would slip before we did.</blockquote><blockquote>From this day forward, Flight Control will be known by two words: “Tough” and “Competent”. Tough means we are forever accountable for what we do or what we fail to do. We will never again compromise our responsibilities. Every time we walk into Mission Control we will know what we stand for. Competent means we will never take anything for granted. We will never be found short in our knowledge and in our skills.</blockquote><p>P.S. — This came after I wrote a majority of this post, but<a href="https://twitter.com/lavie154/status/1653082854262292492"> the FAA is now being sued by a bunch of environmental groups</a> over it allowing SpaceX to proceed with operations at Starbase without an environnmental impact statement. The case has a strong claim in that the FAA failed to accurately assess alternatives for development at Starbase, including entirely neglecting to assess use of the (now) existing pad at 39A or a notional 49 instead of Starbase, in turn violating NEPA. I am not an environmental law expert, but that doesn’t look good.</p><p>P.P.S — Covering Falcon Heavy was a blast, and honestly left me with some hope for what SpaceX can still do, even though the vehicle itself was quite the “frankenrocket” as Max Evans called it. A shoutout to Derek, D. Wise, Kyle, Madison, Sean, Max, and everyone else who made the detour to ViaSat-3 Americas an incredible journey. I hope to see you all again soon.</p><p><strong>About Me:</strong><br>I’m a spaceflight reporter, photojournalist, and managing editor of Space Scout. I’ve attended over 20 orbital launches so far. If you’d like to keep up with me, you can follow me here: <a href="https://twitter.com/lavie154">https://twitter.com/lavie154</a></p><p><strong>Edits as of April 10, 2024:<br></strong>Changed some friends’ names to reflect what they currently go by. Also an updated bio for myself — today, I do business development at an up-and-coming space company, in no small part because of the article you’ve just read. However, the article represents my opinions as of that day and do not reflect those of my employer whatsoever.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=df3585d9e39d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Starship OFT thoughts]]></title>
            <link>https://lavieohana.medium.com/starship-oft-thoughts-15573f6b9cea?source=rss-2f4504b51ce5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/15573f6b9cea</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[starship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[rockets]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[space]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lavie Ohana]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 21 Apr 2023 17:23:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-11-20T20:44:43.629Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Starship I: Orbital Flight Test</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xIx0vFsGBy9W-dEjkbuB6Q.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>I watched Starship’s first orbital flight test on April 20, 2023 from 5 miles away at the SpaceX media site on South Padre Island, TX. Here are my thoughts, written same day:</em></p><p>Where the hell do I even start?</p><p>Personal bits first. That launch was possibly the coolest thing I’ve ever seen with my own two eyes. I first saw Starship just 18 hours ago last night, standing just 300 feet from the launch mount staring up at the rocket in awe. There aren’t words to describe the feeling of being out on the pad with a super heavy launch vehicle under 12 hours from liftoff, at night no less, but I’ll try:</p><p>The Orbital Launch Mount is essentially on the beach. It’s sandy, you can hear the waves crashing, and to get to the closest spot, it’s about a 10 minute trek through dunes and brush. As you get closer, the tank farm is breathing and venting the whole time — loud enough to completely disrupt conversation. Starship’s tiled side faces you, which at night is dark, nearly unresolvable, except for when the tower’s lights blink (which light up the whole sky for a moment).</p><p>There isn’t a fence or anything else that really “stops” you from approaching the pad. The only real boundary is a set of posts along the trail that mark the line between public and SpaceX property. If you stick to them, you end up just 300 feet from the rocket — closer to it than the rocket and launch mount are tall. At the end, you’re faced with the largest heavier-than-air flying machine ever built, its gargantuan infrastructure, and nothing else but the pitch black of the night and the constant sound of the waves crashing and the tanks venting. The rocket feels alive and breathing, and yet, you’re certainly close enough that it would kill you in an instant if you were to stay there for just a few more hours, assuming nobody caught you.</p><p>It is one of the most unsettling feelings you can ever have. I’ve been close to ready-to-launch rockets before, a thousand feet from Falcon or SLS, and just five hundred from Delta IV Heavy, which I thought was a beast in its own right that day.</p><p>But I’ve never just walked up to the largest rocket ever built with no fanfare, no process, no safety, just myself and a machine far too big to truly put into scale.</p><p>I felt tiny. And despite having friends by my side, I had this sinking feeling deep down that I shouldn’t be here, that I wasn’t invited — that if something were to happen or I overstayed my welcome, the Titan in front of me would extinguish me as if I were an ant.</p><p>But that didn’t happen. We went back, got some sleep, and headed back out for the launch attempt, which we all were somewhat hoping would push a day as confidence was low. We made it to our viewing site and watched as conditions cleared up and suddenly, this feeling that “maybe we’re actually going to go today” settled in. The same feeling I had back when Artemis I launched. A slight hold there, resolved problem here, and suddenly it was T- 40 seconds and the clock was ticking down for the last time. I felt my heart as if it were on fire while time crawled to a standstill and then:</p><p>Fire. Smoke. The engines had lit, and then immediately shrouded the entire vehicle in a smokescreen far thicker than any launch I had ever seen. There was no flame trench to keep the view clear. We didn’t even know if it kept burning, or if it was burning, if it’d blow up on the pad.</p><p>A few seconds later, Starship rose from the ashes.</p><p>There’s a video somewhere of me, Derek, David, and some other friends screaming at the top of our lungs. I’ll see if I can find it. I don’t think I can put into words the sheer excitement from just seeing the vehicle intact, rising, climbing. The sound hit us right after — one of the loudest launches I’ve ever been at, with shockwaves that just felt like getting punched over and over and over. Even through all the excitement, we still figured something was going wrong… quick.</p><p>Methane plumes are not the brightest out there. They’re purple, transparent, and at the scale of Super Heavy, formed a single large set of mach diamonds. Yet that plume was rapidly interrupted by streaks of bright yellow a quarter mile long that completely outshined everything else. For a moment, I thought that that was it, hand in my pocket ready to grab my earplugs, waiting for the inevitable explosion.</p><p>Yet Starship kept going.</p><p>Engine after engine flamed out, and yet the rocket kept going. Just, really, really slowly.</p><p>I think in almost all of my shots, there’s something visibly wrong with Starship. Whether it’s the tanks venting fuel overboard constantly, or more engines flaming out, or power units failing, the rocket was on the verge of failure for the entire flight. Honestly, I’m extremely impressed it made it as far as it did. There was definitely a beauty to the whole launch, but it came to an end when finally, Starship slowly entered a tumble, flipping end over end over four times (an insane sight on the ground) and in a final act, detonated 30 kilometers over our heads. The sound from the launch would keep going for another few minutes until it ended with a light, anticlimactic, set of thumps. We were left with nothing more but an empty launchpad and a smoke cloud that rose miles high.</p><p>So what do I think of the launch? In terms of the experience of simply witnessing it first hand, it was possibly the single coolest thing I’ve ever seen. I am so incredibly glad I flew out here to see it, and I will be back for Flight 2. I reccommend to anyone reading — if you can make it, come to the next launch. You will not be disappointed.</p><p>From a technical perspective, it gets dicey. With this mission it’s easier to start with what didn’t go wrong rather than what did. The rocket held together insanely well structurally, much better than I expected. The tower worked, at least, the quick disconnects did. That’s… kind of about it.</p><p>The launch itself hurled debris thousands of feet in some cases. I watched with David and Derek as they tried to find out if their remote cameras still even existed, and as we saw the picture of the Orbital Launch Mount with a 40-foot hole excavated from under it by the rocket, foundation exposed and all.</p><p>To put it kindly… I have concerns about the future of the program. It will likely take until at least 2024 to get another orbital flight test, an OFT-2 per se, off the ground. The pad is in completely inoperable condition, the tank farm is severely damaged, and significant redesigns to much of the infrastructure and likely the vehicle are on the board now. Make no mistake, this is no situation similar to Falcon 9’s landings, where a failure had little implications for operational missions, but instead a hard delay to the entire program.</p><p>Starship was contracted to land humans on the moon next year. Yes, perhaps that was an incredibly unrealistic goal, but now it’s likely to have never even made it to space by the beginning of that year. An OFT-2 is required, but so is a new launchpad, revised permits, fixed tank farms, new designs, and inevitably reviews of the whole system. There were a lot of lessons learned on this flight. Implementing them will not be easy.</p><p>As it stands right now, Starship HLS must duplicate this feat at least sixteen times — a number several sources have verified repeatedly — in (relatively) rapid succession in order to achieve its mission. While today was an incredible first step, it is step one of a hundred, and it certainly didn’t get a passing grade from a programmatic standpoint. If at minimum a delay to early 2024 is assumed, Starship is now two years late to step one. A propellant transfer test, long-duration flight test, and landing demo still remain. Each of which requires far more than the former.</p><p>Do not take this to mean that these things are impossible. Today was a remarkable and commendable proof of concept. But personally, I worry that SpaceX will only be able to stomach so much reconstruction and failure before push comes to shove, and the program goes the way of its Soviet sibling. Developing a launch vehicle like this costs billions — estimates and leaks suggest SpaceX has spent well over $10b so far. That is an extreme amount of capital expenditure normally relegated to nation-states. Can they keep it up? How long will they have access to that money?</p><p>I don’t know. Very few people genuinely do know SpaceX’s true financial situation.</p><p>From a customer perspective, it doesn’t look good. The U.S. taxpayer paid north of $3 billion for Starship to land crew on the Moon — now with Artemis III, but also on Artemis IV, and perhaps future missions too.</p><p>Artemis III’s SLS will be ready to go, late 2025. Artemis IV, even with its own delays for ML-2 (a pad that, while expensive, will ideally still exist after one launch) and the Exploration Upper Stage, should be ready by 2028. Will Starship be ready in time for either mission?</p><p>NASA’s Inspector General had already noted a recommendation that Artemis III’s landing be canceled as early as late 2021. With the SLS production rate only ramping up, this seems all but certain now. Not only that, but NASA’s planning to have to stockpile core stages, making room in Michoud and the VAB’s spare high bays for SLS storage.</p><p>If you had told anyone just two years ago that SLS would beat Starship, fly perfectly, and become the component of the Artemis program that contributed to delays the <em>least, </em>you’d have been laughed out of the room. And yet, here we are — of America’s two new and flown super-heavy launch vehicles, one has sent a deep-space crew-capable spacecraft to the Moon and back, while the other totaled its launchpad, struggled and failed the whole way up, and finally exploded not even a third of the way to space — nevermind orbit — carrying nothing more than the hopes and dreams of the Artemis generation.</p><p>To achieve our dreams we must be bold. We must face adversity, we must face hardship, and inevitably, sometimes we must wait. I would love to see a future where we have two super-heavy launch vehicles online, flying crews and cargo to Earth orbit, the Moon, and then on to Mars. Our future lies in the stars, but perhaps, our time has not come quite yet.</p><p>But most important of all, I will be there next time we try — and I reccomend you do as well. For there’s nothing more inspiring and awesome than to see that Titan lumber into the skies, breaking free of the chains of gravity, hoping someday we all can do the same.</p><p>See you at Starship flight two.</p><p><em>(P.S. Thank you to Derek, David, Will, Tyler, and everyone else I’ve bumped into out here at Starbase. It’s been great.)</em></p><p>There’s a part 2 to this story now, written about a week after. If you’d like to read that too, you can find it here: <a href="https://medium.com/@lavieohana/starship-ii-a-reprise-df3585d9e39d">Starship II: A Reprise. Et tu, Starship? | by Lavie Ohana | May, 2023 | Medium</a></p><p><strong>About Me:</strong><br>I’m a spaceflight reporter, photojournalist, and managing editor of Space Scout. I’ve attended over 20 orbital launches so far. If you’d like to keep up with me, you can follow me here: <a href="https://twitter.com/lavie154">https://twitter.com/lavie154</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=15573f6b9cea" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Indifference In a World of Difference]]></title>
            <link>https://lavieohana.medium.com/indifference-in-a-world-of-difference-fddf7cfc97c7?source=rss-2f4504b51ce5------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fddf7cfc97c7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[personal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[world]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[community]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lavie Ohana]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Feb 2023 07:00:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-02-13T07:09:29.517Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/664/1*tLSIDdRoUhsXTQXIJIEApA.png" /><figcaption>An image of the Chinese high-altitude balloon that set off the conversation that led to me writing this. The balloon (and the other objects that followed it) intruded on American airspace, were shot down, and are still a major discussion topic in the American news cycle as of writing.</figcaption></figure><p><em>Preface: I normally write about space stuff. However, given a few conversations I’ve had lately, I thought it’d be meaningful to share some of my world view and how I keep myself sane day to day in an insane world. If you want to see more of what I normally talk about, I talk far too much on </em><a href="https://twitter.com/lavie154"><em>Twitter, located here</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>How does one cope with the state of the world today?</p><p>No, I mean, seriously. How?</p><p>The world is more interconnected than ever, that goes without saying. In the modern day, we’re expected to process the triumphs and tragedies of every corner of the world as if they were our own. Every issue is connected to every other issue, every opinion easily meets a polar opposite, and we’re all exposed to a constant stream of it, 24/7, in the incomprehensible mess we love and call the Internet.</p><p>Hell, if you’re someone like me, born after the year 2000, you grew up with the Internet. Maybe you remember a couple years without those hell bricks we call <em>phones</em>, but beyond some early childhood memories, they were always there. A great novelty at first, but one that quickly gave way to an unfiltered and often unmonitored view of everything the world had to offer. Good or evil, awesome or horrifying, you-name-it, we-got-it. To pull a line from Bo Burnham, <em>could I interest you in everything, all of the time?</em></p><p>Let’s narrow it down and talk about the current day. It’s Sunday, February 12, 2023 as I write this. The Superbowl has just finished (and the Chiefs won). The death toll of the earthquake in Turkiye has topped 33,000, the United States has shot down now the fourth unidentified object intruding on NORAD (US/Canadian) airspace, a derailment of a train carrying toxic materials in Ohio has supposedly poisoned a vast area, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine rages on, careening towards its second year with no sign of stopping.</p><p>This is but a tiny view of the world today as it appears to an observer in southern California. A specific observer, as well. I’m young, I have a specific interest in aerospace, I’m trans, born to two immigrants, Jewish, relatively well connected, and had somewhat of a rough and relatively poor upbringing, though things are somewhat better now. There are more factors, but for brevity I’ll leave it there.</p><p>My neighbor certainly has a different view of the world. So do my parents, who had moved from Israel to avoid having their kids drafted, yet remain staunchly Zionist — an issue we don’t see eye to eye on. And so do their parents, who moved from Spain, Morocco, and Egypt to escape discrimination and in some cases, outright fascism. As for theirs? You try tracing a Jewish family into the 1930s.</p><p>Our world views are born from the limited time we have to interpret our surroundings. As the age of the Internet proceeds, those surroundings grow vast and wide. Today, we are at the very least truly national citizens, if not to some extent global. Is that a bad thing? Not necessarily. But maybe we should get an idea of the senses of scale involved.</p><p>You are a single human. You have some kind of family by blood, whether you care for them or not. You have friends, lost them, and will gain new ones. Maybe you have a partner, or a job. You’ve influenced something, you’ve got stories to tell, memories that are truly yours. If you could possibly tell someone everything unique to you that has happened in your life… well, it’d literally take a lifetime.</p><p>Maybe you live in a city. Take a walk to the nearest transit stop, and go somewhere, anywhere. Even just during that walk, look at everyone around you. They all have their own stories to tell. They have lives. That person you just brushed past may have done the coolest thing you could’ve possibly imagined yesterday, but you can’t know that, and so you move on.</p><p>As you hop on say, a bus, take a note of everyone around you. They all have stories too. If you’re lucky, one may strike up a conversation with you, and share them. They’ve got opinions, and a world view. As you’re en-route to wherever you’re going, look outside. Every home and every building is somewhere someone has spent vast sums of time of their life in. Memories, good and bad, more than you could possibly imagine, flying past you, impossible to access.</p><p>This gets intimidating quick.</p><p>Douglas Adams wrote about this in the second installation of the <em>Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy</em> when he created the Total Perspective Vortex. For the uninitiated, the Vortex is a machine that forces one to witness and process a model of the entire Universe, with an impossibly tiny dot simply saying “you are here.” In effect, this would cause the victim’s mind to collapse, more or less killing them.</p><p>We can, to some extent, experience this in our reality as well. Astronauts commonly speak of the “overview effect” — a mental state incurred by viewing Earth from space, that leaves one in a state of awe and generally overwhelming emotions towards the irrelevance of our day-to-day problems as one sees Earth as whole. While this certainly makes presenting the scales easier, our exercise from earlier can get close enough.</p><p>Even our little bus ride, if you sit and process it for long enough, was far too vast to truly conceptualize. Depending on where, you likely went past a few thousand people and their lives, and you could spend the rest of your life trying to document every person’s experiences and differences and run out of time far before you finished.</p><p>But, relatively easily, we can up the scale by a couple orders of magnitude. For under $100, you can grab a flight from Los Angeles to San Francisco, seeing about a combined 30 million people on your hour-long trip. Try to extend our exercise to even a percent of that, and you will fail.</p><p>What can we take away from this? That we’re meaningless, that the world is so much vaster than us that life is pointless, that nothing has any purpose and we’re too weak to possibly make a difference?</p><p>Not quite.</p><p>A more level conclusion to be drawn from this is that perhaps as individuals, we can’t process being exposed to everything. Sometimes, we can’t even focus on the issues that seemingly directly impact us.</p><p>Using myself as an example here, I’m a trans person. The state of transgender rights in the US is falling apart quickly. Logically it follows that I should be worried about this, and to some extent, I am. But I am also critically aware of the apathy of those around me.</p><p>It sucks to say it, but your average person is not going to significantly inconvenience themselves for a group they have never truly interacted with. You might be a Democrat, but are you going to show up and put yourself at risk when your district’s Republican attempts to legislate away the rights of someone you’ve never talked to? If you did, would it even matter? What about those around you? You might’ve boosted a tweet here and there, started a conversation online, but what have you genuinely done in the real world?</p><p>The answer, for a vast majority of people, is going to be not much. Maybe you participated in the nationwide protests and riots over George Floyd’s killing at the hands of police in 2020. But what about Tyre Nichols? What about Keenan Anderson, a Black high-school teacher and father, who was tased to death by the LAPD on January 3 of this year during a traffic stop? The average person around me doesn’t know of him, and he lived in my city. Do you? <em>What about the innumerable others who faced similar fates?</em></p><p>Let’s say you’re reading this today, and the current topic, at least on national American news, are the airspace incursions by so-far unidentified objects, which most have accepted are some form of balloons. Less discussed, a train has derailed near East Palestine, a village in Ohio, carrying vast amounts of dangerous chemicals, principally vinyl chloride, a toxic chemical that is a precursor to PVC and boils at room temperature. A controlled burn has released vast amounts of it and other chemicals into the air, and many eyewitnesses have claimed mass media has vastly understated the true impact of the incident, with reports of widespread livestock deaths and accusations of a cover-up everywhere.</p><p>It follows that a common question from one to another would now be:</p><blockquote>“Why are you talking about balloons and not the disaster in Ohio?”</blockquote><p>Some will go one step further than this, too. Maybe the balloons <em>are</em> a cover up? What if Norfolk Southern, the company responsible, tied some radar reflectors to some weather balloon? What if it’s the government?</p><p>None of these are impossible. But the most likely answer to why attention seems to be on the balloons, and not Ohio, is far more fundamental than this. I propose a counter-question:</p><p><em>What if there weren’t any balloons? Do you genuinely think people would care more?</em></p><p>We return to an individual’s capacity to process global, or even national events. We all have been very recently subject to far more tragedy than our minds can comprehend. To attempt to even confront one piece of it: <strong>In the last 3 years alone, 1,120,691 Americans have died of COVID. 11 of which died today.</strong></p><p>How do you begin to process that? If we can’t even process our neighborhoods, how can we add several orders of magnitude to that? If you’re mentally strong enough, think of one person dying. What family do they leave behind? Who is impacted by their death? What memories disappear with them, what relationships sever permanently, how much disappears all at once?</p><p>Can you even process one? Today’s eleven? A hundred, knowing that if you ever were to finish with just that, to get to all of the other hundreds would take 11,205 times more? You can do the math in your head, but I promise you it won’t compute in any way that’s meaningful to you.</p><p>To some extent, we are all still processing the trauma. Maybe we’ve started looking for someone to blame for the state of our world as it is today. Wouldn’t it be so simple to say it’s all one person, one ideology, one group’s fault? Isn’t it so enticing to be able to believe in an answer for it all? What if someone thinks <em>you’re</em> the one at fault? Did you come out the other side better off, or worse off? Are you living your best life, carefree and happy, or do you sit there, in fear of the world around you, wondering if you’ll ever be able to step outside safely ever again?</p><p>These questions linger as we try to move on, perhaps remaining unresolved forever. As we do so, the world keeps going, and our global stream of information has no issue upping the ante to keep us hooked on tragedy. How do you feel about tens of thousands killed overnight in an earthquake in Turkiye? What about your tax dollars going to fight the war in Ukraine — and do you care to watch a sizzle reel of a consumer drone (that some of the people around you donated money for) drop a grenade on a Russian conscript’s head? Did you even stop to think about the living conditions in a poor African country, or the genocide in Xinjiang, or North Korea testing a record amount of ballistic missiles that hold the world at gunpoint? Or did I miss something awful you do care about, and you’re getting ready to call me out for it?</p><p><em>These situations suck.</em> Literally. They are incomprehensibly awful in their own ways, but they will also suck the life out of you if you spend too much of your time trying to conceptualize them.</p><p>I hope that if one thing is clear by this point, it’s perhaps that humans were not really ever meant to try to process things on a global scale. Does that mean we need to tune the world out? Perhaps not even just our world, but our nation too? What if, like me, you’re someone whose very life might be held at stake by the state of the world, <em>isn’t that awfully defeatist?</em></p><p>Well, what we can try to do is even out the balance between individual and world. Let’s start with a question that might be a bit easier and more uplifting to answer. <em>What can we do?</em></p><p>What have we established so far? We’re able to conceptualize and impact complex situations, but largely only on scales that we can comprehend our role in. Well, this gives us a starting point.</p><p>Step one, perhaps, is to talk to somebody. No, not on the internet, where you can self select for people who will fit your self-built echo chamber and nothing more, but genuinely go talk to someone in real life. Maybe they’re a stranger. Maybe they’re family. But they’re someone, and if you’re talking to them, they’re willing to hear you out.</p><p>So, maybe there’s a big issue you’re worried about. Maybe, in my case, your rights are at stake, but you’re of a barely visible group whose existence to an everyday person is a nebulous figure, vaguely populated by hearsay. There’s a chance to go ahead and make yourself seen. Being vulnerable, face-to-face, is a difficult task, especially after we’ve all come from months or perhaps years of isolation and socializing online. But now, you’re that person on the bus, sharing their story to the individual trying to process the world. Of all the stories that flew past them, yours will stick, regardless of what they thought of it.</p><p>Perhaps beyond that, there’s some more you can do. The people immediately around you, your friends, your family, whoever they may be — how can you make sure they’re cared for? Can you make a difference in their lives? That’s a much easier thing to think about than the last few examples, isn’t it?</p><p>Or maybe, if you want to move up in scale a tiny bit, look at what’s local to you. What issues face your community? If you need the flow of information, can you maybe switch your source of news to a more local one — keeping an eye on what might actually have a chance to matter to you? If you’re looking to make an impact, is there a mutual aid group nearby that lets you help people around you? Can you genuinely make a difference here, and maybe on the way, meet some people who share that desire, even if you have little in common?</p><p>This is called building community. Organizing doesn’t have to be a grand effort to unite the masses, which is what being online inevitably leads your mind towards. Build small groups, and larger ones will follow suit.</p><p>To put it another way, the internet is a very recent invention. We have had global news for a while now, but it wasn’t the instant torrential flood that it is today, nor was it the infinite network connecting peer to peer across the planet.</p><p>Yet, before its advent, the world was hardly static. Ideologies with millions of followers rose to power and fell to ashes. Somehow, from the American colonies to the Soviet Bolsheviks, from the many French republics to the Carribean slave uprisings, and from the fascist Axis to decolonization in Africa, revolutions were organized, fought, and sometimes even won, changing the course of our world forever. Wars were waged, causes were rallied for, rights were lost and gained, and yet all this achieved with so much less awareness of the world itself, and so much more of the immediate.</p><p>Does that mean we need to completely tune the world out? That is up to you. But perhaps, as an individual, it doesn’t hurt to sometimes be indifferent in a world full of difference. Remember what they tell you to do in an airplane if it loses oxygen? <em>You put on your mask before helping those around you</em>. If you try to care about everything, you’ll burn yourself out and accomplish nothing at all.</p><p>Put what is immediate to you first — the people you love the most, the issues that impact you the most, and a focus for building a community to care and love for those around you. If you can accomplish that, perhaps you stand a chance at evening out the balance between you and the world, and ultimately truly make an impact where it’ll matter to you most.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fddf7cfc97c7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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