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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Liam Flood on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Liam Flood on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@lflood1110?source=rss-bcdb411d36d8------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Liam Flood on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lflood1110?source=rss-bcdb411d36d8------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 16:53:20 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Thaw — a new Novel:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lflood1110/the-thaw-a-new-novel-f9daf1805889?source=rss-bcdb411d36d8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f9daf1805889</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[futility-of-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bravery]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lovestory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-novel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[courage]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Liam Flood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 13:25:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-20T13:25:01.945Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Thaw — a new Novel:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c2lynqjgUUvb7k-Cw4pw1Q.jpeg" /><figcaption>Cover of my new novel</figcaption></figure><p>Set against the backdrop of present-day St Petersburg, <em>The Thaw</em> is a compelling portrait of contemporary Russia and the people caught up in its changing political and social landscape.</p><p>Through the intertwined lives of a diverse group of characters, the novel explores corruption, power, betrayal and the personal cost of living under an increasingly authoritarian regime. But it is equally a story about friendship, loyalty, love, courage and the enduring strength of ordinary people.</p><p>As the consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine reach into everyday lives, individuals from very different backgrounds find themselves confronting difficult choices about where their loyalties lie and what they are prepared to stand up for.</p><p>At its heart, <em>The Thaw</em> is a story about Russia itself — a country of extraordinary contradictions, and a people whose humanity, warmth and resilience endure even through the longest winters.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f9daf1805889" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[America’s Schools: Why Do We Need Armed Guards to Protect Our Children?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lflood1110/americas-schools-why-do-we-need-armed-guards-to-protect-our-children-f9274dbcd915?source=rss-bcdb411d36d8------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Liam Flood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 17:10:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-14T10:29:03.957Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This morning I walked my granddaughter to school in a semi-rural part of the United States, as I have done every morning this week. The walk was uneventful. We admired the scenery, looked at the flora and fauna and enjoyed the sort of peaceful morning that you would expect in the American countryside.</p><p>Then we arrived at the school.</p><p>The school doors were not due to open until 8.25am. Outside, a large group of children had gathered, while some teachers were already entering the building using their passes. But the children had to wait. Rules are rules, and nobody was going to make an exception.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q1nK77SD8efn829o56SeLA.jpeg" /></figure><p>At 8.25, a phalanx of teachers emerged from the school. No child was permitted to enter until a teacher had identified them. Most parents delivered their children by car. There was an efficient one-way traffic system, allowing parents to drop off their children without creating chaos. A teacher identified each child, and in they went.</p><p>My granddaughter was identified by name and disappeared into the school to begin her day.</p><p>When all the children were inside, the doors were locked. Completely locked, and I’m talking heavy duty doors with electronic release locks. Anyone wishing to enter afterwards had to use an intercom and identify themselves.</p><p>This afternoon, when I collect my granddaughter, I will have to first use the intercom to gain access to an outer office, then produce my passport and register my identity. My daughter has already had to confirm that I am indeed the child’s grandfather and an authorised person to collect her.</p><p><strong><em>I have absolutely no objection to any of this.</em></strong> Children must be protected, and a school has a responsibility to know precisely who is entering its premises and who is taking its pupils home. This school appears to be well run and highly professional.</p><p>But it was what I noticed in the school office that really brought the situation home to me.</p><p>There was a man on security duty. I couldn’t establish whether he was a police officer or a dedicated security guard, but he was certainly equipped for serious trouble. He was friendly, approachable and not remotely intimidating. Yet he was armed and equipped with the assortment of weapons, radios, cameras and other equipment that one associates with American law enforcement.</p><p>It was an impressive security operation. It was also, I thought, a rather extraordinary sight in a primary school. I had a few brief words with one of the teachers as I was leaving and she described the process of the children entering and leaving the school as akin to a military operation. She was very good humoured about it to be fair.</p><p>I acknowledge that all children should have a safe place to be educated and should be protected at all times. But why on earth should this over-arching security be necessary?</p><p>A friendly society with a disturbing problem?</p><p>I have been in America for the past week, and I have encountered nothing but friendliness. People in restaurants, shops, bars and on the roads smile at you, strike up conversations and wish you a nice day. Most seem genuinely to mean it.</p><p>There is a natural warmth about these everyday encounters that makes a visitor feel welcome. To an outsider, American society, at least at this ordinary human level, appears to be doing rather well.</p><p>Of course, there are other aspects of American life that raise difficult questions. The political divisions, the arguments surrounding the midterm elections and the behaviour of some people at the highest levels of public life are matters for another article on another day.</p><p>What interests me today is something much closer to home: the security surrounding American schools, and what that security tells us about the society in which these children are growing up.</p><p>If you take a child to school in Ireland, as I did when my own children were young, the process is generally much simpler. You drop the child off, perhaps exchange a few words with another parent or occasionally a teacher, and go about your day. At collection time, you pick them up.</p><p>Arrangements vary between schools, of course, and Irish schools also have security procedures. But the prospect of routinely encountering an armed security officer while registering to collect a grandchild is not part of the normal school experience for most Irish families.</p><p>The same is broadly true in many other countries.</p><p>So why has this become such a feature of American education?</p><p>The grim statistics:</p><p>The obvious answer is the threat of gun violence, particularly the repeated shootings at American schools. I did a little research on this and while it is not definitive, it makes disturbing reading.</p><p>The scale of the problem depends on how you count it. Education Week, which tracks shootings on kindergarten-to-12th-grade school property that cause a firearm-related injury or death, recorded 27 such incidents in 2026 by 19 October. Seventeen people had been killed and 29 injured in those incidents. These figures exclude incidents in which nobody other than the perpetrator was shot and wounded, as well as incidents outside the publication’s definition.</p><p>The broader picture is even more troubling. Everytown for Gun Safety recorded at least 107 incidents of gunfire on school grounds by 26 October 2026, including incidents in which nobody was injured. The two figures measure different things, but both illustrate the scale of the challenge. It is difficult to get accurate statistics for a longer period but I did fine that between 2018 and 2025, 106 children were killed and a further 420 injured. The last thing I would want to do is to create alarm but surely this is truly shocking?</p><p>The figures can be checked in “Education Week’s 2026 school shooting tracker” (<a href="https://www.edweek.org/leadership/school-shootings-this-year-how-many-and-where/2026/01">https://www.edweek.org/leadership/school-shootings-this-year-how-many-and-where/2026/01</a>) and “Everytown’s school-grounds gunfire database” (<a href="https://everytownresearch.org/maps/gunfire-on-school-grounds/">https://everytownresearch.org/maps/gunfire-on-school-grounds/</a>).</p><p>These are not simply numbers in a statistical report. Behind each incident are frightened children, distressed parents, traumatised teachers and communities forced to confront the possibility that a place of learning became a place of violence.</p><p>Nor is the problem confined to the occasional terrible event that dominates television news for several days. Gunfire on school grounds takes many forms, including arguments, accidental shootings and violence outside school buildings. The most notorious massacres attract national attention; many other incidents receive far less coverage.</p><p>America is not the only country in which a school shooting has occurred. Such attacks have happened elsewhere, including in Europe and the UK. But the frequency of school-related gun violence in the United States is exceptional among wealthy industrialised nations. A study published in the journal Pediatrics in 2024, examining school years from 1997–98 through 2021–22, reported that the United States had experienced 57 times as many school shootings as all other major industrialised nations combined, using the databases and definitions employed in that research.</p><p>That is a staggering comparison.</p><p>And it brings us back to the security guard in the school office. He is not there because American parents are unfriendly, or because teachers don’t care, or because US communities are necessarily dangerous. He is there because a country with an extraordinary level of gun violence has had to devise extraordinary measures to protect its children.</p><p>But security is a response — it is not a solution to the underlying problem.</p><p>Why target a school?</p><p>This is the question I find most difficult to understand. I just cannot get my head around it.</p><p>Why would anyone want to shoot little children? What possible grievance could justify such an act? And why does the school, rather than some other institution, become the target?</p><p>There is no single explanation, and it would be misleading to suggest that every perpetrator has the same motive. Research into school shootings has identified a variety of circumstances, including personal grievances, disputes, revenge, social isolation and a desire to make a statement through violence.</p><p>In some cases, the perpetrator was a current or former student. A school may be a familiar place associated with humiliation, resentment, rejection or a sense of having been wronged. Researchers at the US Government Accountability Office found that roughly half of the school shootings in their 2009–2019 dataset involved a current or former student, although the nature of the incidents varied considerably. But surely former students in other countries also have grievances? Do they take weapons and attack schools? Very rarely, and why not? Possibly because in other countries, automatic firearms are not readily available — to me, this is the nub of the problem.</p><p>For some attackers, the school is not an arbitrary target. It represents the people, experiences or institutions against which they feel aggrieved.</p><p>But there is another disturbing possibility: notoriety.</p><p>The 1999 massacre at Columbine High School in Colorado became a defining moment in the modern history of American school shootings. The killing of many students and a teacher shocked the nation, and the extensive coverage of the perpetrators created a template that subsequent attackers could study and, in some cases, imitate.</p><p>Research has found evidence consistent with a copycat effect. Some perpetrators have been influenced by earlier attacks, while others have sought fame, recognition or a lasting place in the public consciousness. For a person who feels insignificant or powerless, infamy may become a grotesque substitute for achievement.</p><p>This does not mean that everyone who commits a school shooting is seeking celebrity. Nor does it mean that mental illness alone explains the violence. The circumstances are complex, and it should be said that the overwhelming majority of people experiencing mental health difficulties never commit violent acts.</p><p>But the combination of grievance, access to firearms, a desire for recognition and the example set by earlier attackers deserves serious attention.</p><p>There is also a vicious circle at work. A shooting occurs, the news media broadcast the details, the country is horrified, and politicians promise action. Then, in time, public attention moves elsewhere. The next attack arrives, and the cycle begins again.</p><p>Meanwhile, children return to classrooms in buildings that may now have locked entrances, security drills, surveillance cameras and armed personnel.</p><p>So, is America still living in the Wild West?</p><p>In my view, part of the explanation lies in America’s long and complicated relationship with guns.</p><p>The country was shaped by frontier expansion, hunting, warfare and a tradition of individual self-reliance. The image of the armed pioneer, the cowboy and the lone hero has become deeply embedded in American popular culture.</p><p>Hollywood has played its part. For generations, American films and television programmes have portrayed guns as instruments of justice, courage and personal power. The hero reaches for a weapon, confronts the villain and restores order.</p><p>Real life, of course, is not a Western movie. A gun does not distinguish between a hero and a villain. It does not settle a dispute fairly, restore a damaged relationship or resolve the problems of a troubled young person. It makes it possible for a moment of anger or desperation to become irreversible.</p><p>I am not suggesting that Americans are inherently more violent than other people, or that everyone who owns a gun is irresponsible. Nor am I overlooking the constitutional and historical arguments surrounding the right to bear arms.</p><p><strong><em>But a country must be prepared to examine its traditions when the consequences become so damaging.</em></strong></p><p>The United States has more firearms in civilian hands than any other country in absolute terms. The widespread availability of guns means that a person who decides to commit an act of violence can obtain the means to do so quite easily, with devastating consequences.</p><p>The question is not whether every gun owner is dangerous. Clearly, most are not. The question is whether society should make it so easy for a person in crisis, or someone intent on mass violence, to acquire a weapon capable of killing large numbers of people in a short time.</p><p>What can be done?</p><p>I have strong views on this subject. I have never liked guns, and I believe their legitimate uses should be strictly limited.</p><p>I would favour a prohibition on civilian ownership of military-style assault weapons, alongside much tighter controls on other firearms. Hunting, where lawful and properly regulated, is a different matter, although it too should be subject to licensing, training and safeguards.</p><p>More broadly, the United States could take several practical steps.</p><p>First, it should strengthen background checks, licensing requirements and safe-storage laws, and ensure that people who present a demonstrable risk of serious violence cannot easily obtain firearms.</p><p>Second, I totally agree that, for now, schools need effective safeguarding procedures, trained staff and clear emergency plans. Secure entrances, visitor registration and reliable communication systems can all help. An armed guard may be appropriate in some circumstances, but security arrangements should be proportionate and should not turn every school into a fortress.</p><p>Third, more attention should be paid to warning signs. Research indicates that many perpetrators communicate their intentions or exhibit troubling behaviour before an attack. Students, parents and teachers need safe ways to report threats, alongside properly resourced systems that can assess them. School counselling and accessible mental-health support are important, too, not because mental illness explains every shooting, but because children in crisis need help before their problems become tragedies. Many US schools are already providing this level of support but not all of them can, due to lack of funding.</p><p>Finally, the media should consider how they report these crimes. Victims and their communities deserve attention, but repeatedly turning perpetrators into household names can feed the desire for notoriety. Reporting the facts without glorifying the attacker is a sensible place to start. I would even go so far as to prohibit naming the shooter at all. That would eliminate the notoriety and infamy at a stroke.</p><p>None of these measures will eliminate every risk. There is no single policy that can guarantee a school will never experience violence. But the absence of a perfect solution is no excuse for failing to make progress. I cannot understand why a society which claims to stand for truth and freedom and justice cannot put a few simple measures in place that will clearly demonstrate that it means this.</p><p>I return to the image of my granddaughter walking into school. She was happy, surrounded by her classmates, ready to begin another ordinary day. Outside, parents were going about their business. Teachers were welcoming children into their classrooms.</p><p>Everything about the scene suggested a society functioning as it should. And yet, beyond that ordinary morning routine, there was a security system designed to guard against the possibility of extraordinary violence.</p><p>I am grateful that the school takes its responsibilities seriously. I would rather see sensible precautions than careless indifference. The security officer was friendly, professional and doing a job that he should not be criticised for doing.</p><p>But I cannot help thinking that something has gone badly wrong when such measures become a normal feature of childhood.</p><p>Children, if they should have any worries at all, should be worrying about homework, friendships, games and what they will do at the weekend. Their grandparents should be thinking about the scenery on the walk to school, not about the armed man waiting in the office.</p><p>The answer cannot simply be to add another lock, another camera or another armed guard. Those measures may reduce certain risks, but they cannot resolve the conditions that make such extraordinary protection necessary.</p><p>America is a country of enormous generosity, friendliness and potential. The people I have met this week have reinforced that impression. Yet the security surrounding its schools reveals a problem that good manners and individual kindness cannot overcome.</p><p>The United States needs an honest national conversation about guns, violence, personal responsibility and the protection of children. It needs to move beyond the familiar arguments and ask whether its laws and traditions are serving the people they are supposed to protect.</p><p>I would like to think that, one day, I could walk my granddaughter to school in America and find the same friendly teachers, the same welcoming children and the same beautiful morning scenery, without the extraordinary security operation.</p><p>That would not mean abandoning the duty to protect children. It would mean creating a society in which protecting them no longer requires quite so much extraordinary protective measures.</p><p>Surely that is a reasonable ambition for any country?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f9274dbcd915" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Are Coffee Shops Pricing Themselves Out of Business — killing the goose that laid the golden egg?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lflood1110/are-coffee-shops-pricing-themselves-out-of-business-killing-the-goose-that-laid-the-golden-egg-464385ffaead?source=rss-bcdb411d36d8------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[coffee-drinking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pricing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coffee-shop]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Liam Flood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 14:54:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-12T14:54:51.268Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Are Coffee Shops Pricing Themselves Out of Business — killing the goose that laid the golden egg?</strong></p><p>This morning, my partner and I went to a local coffee shop and purchased an Americano and a Latte. The cost: €8.25. They were not remarkable coffees — in fact, not even good ones. My partner rates coffee from 1 to 10, and she gave these a 5. Although we’ve had a few coffees from this outlet in the past because it was convenient, we resolved not to go there again.</p><p>The price stuck in my mind for a simple reason. Coffee shops have spent years turning a small pleasure into a daily habit, but they may now be making that habit too expensive to keep.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*1iYE2fU7qXC73IvxYCI_qQ.png" /><figcaption>When a simple coffee stop becomes expensive, people start to question</figcaption></figure><p>There is a coffee craze almost everywhere — town centres, retail parks, petrol stations and train stations all have their cafés. Grabbing a cappuccino or a flat white has become part of the people’s daily commute, their Saturday walk, the chat with a friend and even the school run.</p><p>But habits have limits. When two coffees start to cost what a light lunch once did, people notice. They don’t protest or write reviews. They simply go less often. Coffee shops are not only competing with each other; they are competing with the kettle at home, the office machine, the supermarket pod, and the growing feeling that a small treat has become poor value.</p><p><strong>The coffee boom was built on habit as much as taste</strong></p><p>Coffee shops did not grow because people suddenly became passionate about beans. Of course we always liked a cup but the bigger forces were routine and fashion. Coffee became a reason to meet, a reason to get out of the house, a comfort on a wet morning or a small reward for getting through the day. It filled a gap between the pub and eating out for people who wanted somewhere casual and easy. It also became a go-to on a road trip — new cars have come with cup-holders for years.</p><p>For a long time, the price felt fair for half an hour of warmth, talk or people-watching. That was the golden egg. The money is not in selling one coffee to one person once; it is in persuading thousands of people to make coffee part of their weekly pattern and to keep coming back to the same shop or chain. About fifteen years ago, when I was changing jobs, I noticed the huge growth in coffee consumption — helped, perhaps, by the advent of the durable take-away cup — and toyed with the idea of opening a coffee shop and eventually a chain. People tell me I should have; others did, and made quite a lot of money.</p><p>The risk now is that shops are damaging the very pattern that made them successful. Coffee is an impulse buy, which makes it powerful but also fragile. Once people start asking, “How much did that cost?” the impulse starts to feel foolish — and it disappears quickly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*-b1feWp_4u--Dvnv9DVTCw.png" /><figcaption>Competition can come from unlikely places — like the kitchen</figcaption></figure><p><strong>€8.25 for two coffees changes the conversation</strong></p><p>Two coffees at €8.25 is not ruinous. The issue is value. At that price, customers expect something better than average: warmth, flavour, cleanliness, friendliness and some sense that the place cares about what it is serving. If the coffee is merely fine, the price feels cheeky. A customer might forgive €4.10 for an excellent coffee in a pleasant place; they will resent it for a bean of poor quality or something lukewarm, weak, burnt or rushed.</p><p>The irony is that the place where we bought those coffees used to serve delicious coffee and great breakfasts. It was a ‘go-to’ place for many, to the point where it was difficult to get a table most days. In those days, it was independent. Since then, it has been bought by one of the big chains — and the prices have gone up while the quality has gone down. The breakfast menu has disappeared, replaced by pre-packaged, suspect-looking pastries and cakes.</p><p><strong>Coffee shops cannot blame every increase on costs</strong></p><p>Nobody expects prices to stand still — the days of the two-euro coffee are long gone. Coffee, milk, wages, energy and rent have all gone up, and insurance, card fees, equipment and waste add more. So, while the raw material may be cheap, a café owner is not pocketing the full price of every cup.</p><p>So yes, prices had to rise. But there is still such a thing as overpricing. Some cafés seem to have copied the prices of better competitors without copying the quality. If the cup is small, the coffee average, the service indifferent and the seating cramped, the price becomes the main memory.</p><p>Add-ons make it worse. Choose almond, oat or coconut milk and there is usually a premium of up to an extra euro. Why? Is this milk so much more expensive than cow’s milk? No, it isn’t. Add a pastry and a quick stop costs as much as a small meal; a parent buying for themselves and their children can face a surprisingly steep bill. At that point, the café visit stops being spontaneous and becomes occasional.</p><p><strong>The United States shows why the baseline matters</strong></p><p>I have travelled widely and I notice that the coffee culture is almost universal. Surprisingly, so is overpricing. I recently visited a country where I could stay in a five star hotel for thirty euro, yet I was charged three euro for a very poor quality coffee. Perhaps the one exception to this is the US. Now, fashionable or trendy city cafés in the US can be as dear as anywhere. But America still has a strong culture of basic brewed coffee, never-ending refills and large servings, and diners, convenience stores and chains keep a lower-cost option within reach of an ordinary daily purchase.</p><p>In much of Europe, including Ireland, that basic option has largely given way to the espresso menu — cappuccinos, lattes, flat whites and Americanos at prices that feel increasingly detached from the product. Coffee is everywhere, but affordable coffee is very hard to find.</p><p>That gap is where behaviour changes. People will not stop drinking coffee; they will buy a better machine for home, bring a flask, wait until they get to work, or choose one coffee out instead of three.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*7HTLkdFbH8CefC0CfX38hg.png" /><figcaption>Too expensive? The customer is the ultimate judge.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The customer’s calculation is changing</strong></p><p>Coffee shops were long the affordable indulgence — you might skip a restaurant meal but still meet someone for a latte. That position is now under pressure. Food prices, energy bills and mortgage or rent costs have made households more watchful of small spending. A coffee at around €4 may not shock, but five in a working week is €20 — and for two adults it quickly becomes a real line in the household budget.</p><p>People don’t stop; they ration. They start asking:</p><ul><li>Is the coffee actually good?</li><li>Do I enjoy the place enough to sit in?</li><li>Am I buying this out of habit?</li><li>Could I make something just as nice at home?</li><li>Would I rather spend the money on lunch, groceries or a pint later?</li></ul><p>Once customers ask those questions, the purchase has moved from automatic to considered — and considered purchases face more competition.</p><p><strong>Coffee shops may be mistaking popularity for loyalty</strong></p><p>A packed café on a Saturday can suggest the market will take any price, but crowds do not always mean loyalty. Sometimes they mean fashion, convenience or a lack of alternatives. And because frequency is the hidden engine of the business, a café may not notice regulars quietly trimming their visits until the damage is done.</p><p>It might seem an odd comparison, but snooker clubs are a useful warning. Snooker once had glamour, television attention and a wave of public interest, and a huge number of clubs opened to meet demand. Then interest cooled. The committed players stayed, but the casual players left — and the business model had been built on a craze, not a permanent mass habit. Golf clubs tell a similar story in some places: once able to rely on waiting lists and joining fees, many now work much harder to attract and keep members as tastes change, people have more choice and costs rise.</p><p>Coffee is cheaper than golf and more frequent than snooker, and people will always drink it. But they will not always buy it in the same place, at the same frequency, at any price. A craze creates expansion, expansion creates competition, margins get squeezed, prices rise, customers become selective — and the weaker operators suffer first.</p><p><strong>Chains and independents face different risks</strong></p><p>Large chains can buy at scale and rely on brand recognition, but they can feel impersonal, and customers are less forgiving of high prices somewhere that doesn’t feel local.</p><p>Independents often offer more character and better service but have less room to absorb rising costs. Their great advantage is real loyalty: a friendly owner who remembers customers and serves excellent coffee can charge a fair price without alienating anyone. The danger comes when prices rise but the personal touch disappears.</p><p>People will accept higher prices if they are buying a place to be, not just a coffee. A warm, clean, relaxed room is worth paying for; sticky tables, poor toilets, loud music, impersonal service or uncomfortable seating make the price feel worse.</p><p>The market may split in two: cafés offering genuine hospitality, which can charge more because customers feel the value, and outlets that simply sell caffeine in a cup, which will struggle if they charge like the first. Coffee shops need to be honest about which group they belong to. Premium prices need premium care — not marble counters, but good coffee, consistent standards and staff who make customers feel their custom matters.</p><p><strong>What coffee shops should do before customers walk away</strong></p><p>Coffee shops do not need to race to the bottom, but they do need to protect the habit. My own list starts with good coffee as the essential first step. Then a welcoming room — warm in inclement weather, cool in hot weather — and friendly, helpful staff. If food is served, there should be a decent selection and it should be fresh. Beyond that, a smart café could:</p><ul><li>Select their bean supplier carefully and serve consistently better coffee, not just more expensive coffee.</li><li>Offer a simple lower-priced option, such as a good filter coffee.</li><li>Make loyalty schemes genuinely worthwhile.</li><li>Keep takeaway prices sensible where service costs are lower — in other words, charge at least a euro less if the client is not staying on the premises. The Italians have been doing this for generations.</li><li>Be careful with pastry and food pricing, where bills can jump fast.</li><li>Offer a genuine discount where customers bring their own go-cups.</li></ul><p>Some customers just want a decent cup without feeling fleeced; others will pay more for something noticeably better. Either way, customers do not mind paying when they understand what they are paying for.</p><p><strong>Listen to the quiet customer</strong></p><p>Businesses sometimes treat price complaints flippantly. But judging value is the customer’s role in the exchange. If someone feels €8.25 for two average coffees is too much, it does not matter whether a spreadsheet can justify the price. That feeling decides whether they come back tomorrow.</p><p>The loud customer complains. The quiet customer changes habits — buying fewer coffees, skipping the pastry, meeting at home or walking past. That is how demand softens: not with a dramatic boycott, but with thousands of small private decisions.</p><p><strong>Coffee will survive, but not every coffee shop will</strong></p><p>The coffee craze is not over; people like the ritual too much for it to vanish. But the easy growth phase may be ending, and customers are separating the good from the ordinary. That may even be healthy, forcing standards up and exposing cafés that relied on the boom rather than value.</p><p>The question is not whether people still want coffee. It is whether they want to pay premium prices for average coffee as often as they once did. As people begin to distinguish between a good coffee and an average one, for many, the answer is starting to be no.</p><p>Coffee shops that keep pushing prices while serving forgettable cups may find that the golden egg was never the coffee itself. It was the customer’s habit — and once that habit is broken, it is very hard to get it back.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=464385ffaead" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
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            <title><![CDATA[Imperialism often leaves more citizens outside a country than in it:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lflood1110/imperialism-often-leaves-more-citizens-outside-a-country-than-in-it-adf9d2b56727?source=rss-bcdb411d36d8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/adf9d2b56727</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ethnic-groups]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[kurdish-people]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[irish-american]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Liam Flood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 10:15:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-30T10:45:51.629Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Imperialism often leaves more citizens outside a country than in it:</strong></p><p>Apparently there are 43 million people in the United States who claim Irish ancestry. So if we believe that, Irish Americans outnumber Irish people by over eight to one. The latest Irish census puts the population at 5.5 million. We are all familiar with the Irish Famine in the 19th Century. Now apparently the Irish population before that disaster was 8.5 million and following the deaths of over one million from starvation and the emigration of at least another million if not two, the population was reduced to around three million. Irish emigrants to the USA prospered and spread to the four corners of that land. Imagine though, outnumbering the original population by eight times? I’m sure that has to be a record even though there are vast ethnic German and Italian populations in the US also. It’s a fascinating story and I’ve written a book about it which I hope to publish later this year.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_kgeqCrr6Lj--3Ls3_u7zA.jpeg" /><figcaption>A dry river bed delineates the border between Iran and Azerbaijan — imperialism and history has left far more Azerbaijanis on the Iranian side.</figcaption></figure><p>But enough about Ireland and the US — we are not the only country where our expatriate population outnumbers those at home. If we take it to extreme measures, the Kurdish people are the largest stateless ethnic group in the world. There are approximately 45 million Kurds: Most of them can be found in Turkey (20m) Iran (12m), Iraq (10m) and Syria, and of course in many other countries. I know many Kurdish people who live in Turkey and while they would love a homeland, they are not too bothered about it and are content to live as Turkish citizens where they say their ethnicity is respected and they are treated fairly. I have no knowledge of the situation in Iran and Iraq but it has been said that Kurds are not treated well there.</p><p>But this article stems from a conversation I had with an Azerbaijani person last week in which he told me that there are more Azerbaijanis in Iran than in their homeland. Azerbaijan has a population of 10 million people and he claims that there are another 30 million living in Iran. I did some research and his contention is based on a genuine historical reality, although the figure of 30 million is disputed.<br> <br> There is no reliable modern Iranian census of ethnic groups, so nobody can give an exact number. Estimates vary considerably. Minority Rights Group currently puts the Azerbaijani population of Iran at around 16 percent of the country’s population and says the group may number around 15 million. Other estimates go considerably higher, into the 20–25 million range and figures of 30 million are certainly widely quoted in Azerbaijan and elsewhere.<br> <br> The history behind this is fascinating. The key point is that Azerbaijanis did not originally cross an international border into Iran. The modern border was imposed across a population that already lived in the region. For centuries, much of what is now northern Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan formed part of the same broad political and cultural world.<br> <br> The region was ruled at different times by Persian empires, Turkic dynasties and local khanates. The population included Persian-speaking and Turkic-speaking communities and the Turkic language that eventually became modern Azerbaijani became particularly important in the region.<br> <br> Then, in the early nineteenth century, Russia began expanding southwards into the Caucasus. We are back to imperialism again. Of course it wasn’t just the British and the Russians — all major nations were at it. We can recall the Ottoman Empire (Turkish), the Austro-Hungarian, or the French, Spanish, Portugese, Dutch and even Belgian empires? To the south of Azerbaijan, the Iranians or Persians were at it also.<br> <br> Russia fought two major wars against Qajar Persia, in 1804–1813 and 1826–1828. The first war ended with the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813, which transferred a large number of territories in the South Caucasus from Persian control to Russia. <br> The second ended with the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828. That treaty was decisive. Russia acquired the Erivan and Nakhchivan khanates and established a border that ran broadly along the Aras River — in other words — modern day Azerbaijan. The important point is that the people living on both sides of the new border did not suddenly become different peoples.</p><p>The border was political. The population was not. Turkic-speaking Muslim communities found themselves divided between the Russian Empire to the north and Persia to the south. Over time, the northern part developed into what eventually became the Republic of Azerbaijan. The southern part remained in Iran.</p><p>So when an Azerbaijani today talks about ’30 million Azerbaijanis in Iran,’ they are essentially saying, ‘We are one people who were divided by an imperial border.” That is a very powerful idea in Azerbaijani national consciousness.<br> <br> But there is an important qualification. The people living in northern Iran today are Iranian citizens, and many of them have a strong Iranian national identity as well as an Azerbaijani ethnic and linguistic identity. They are not simply Azerbaijanis who happen to live in another country.<br> <br> Azerbaijani Turks have played an enormous role in Iranian history. They were particularly important in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906, and Azerbaijanis have also played major roles in Iranian politics, commerce, culture and the 1979 revolution. Minority Rights Group notes that most Iranian Azerbaijanis have historically identified with the Iranian state rather than seeking separation.<br> <br> They are also predominantly Shia Muslims, like most of the population of the Republic of Azerbaijan. That religious connection is another reason the boundary between the two populations has never been as simple as the modern international border suggests. The geographical concentration is particularly striking. Iran’s Azerbaijani population is concentrated mainly in the northwest and there are also very large Azerbaijani communities in Tehran and elsewhere in Iran.<br> <br> There is also one other fascinating historical wrinkle. The word “Azerbaijan” itself has a complicated history. The territory south of the Aras River was historically associated with the name Azerbaijan as well. The modern Republic of Azerbaijan adopted that name when it became independent in 1918. So when we talk about ‘Azerbaijanis in Iran,’ we’re talking about a population whose language and cultural identity developed across a region that was subsequently divided between two states.<br> <br> This is why you will sometimes hear the terms North Azerbaijan and South Azerbaijan. “North Azerbaijan” generally refers to the territory of today’s Republic of Azerbaijan. “South Azerbaijan” refers to the Azerbaijani-populated regions of northwestern Iran. The terminology is politically sensitive, however, because Iranian authorities obviously do not regard their Azerbaijani-populated provinces as some kind of unfinished part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.<br> <br> And there is an important difference between ethnic identity and political allegiance. Most Iranian Azerbaijanis are not campaigning to join Azerbaijan. Many are perfectly comfortable being Iranian while speaking Azerbaijani at home and maintaining their own cultural traditions.</p><p>There may be thirty million of them or it might be fifteen, depending on what they choose to identify as. Trying to estimate how many there are is fraught with difficulty. The border between Iran and Azerbaijan was drawn by the Russian and Persian empires in the nineteenth century, and it divided an existing Turkic-speaking population.<br> <br> In other words, just as Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrates how Soviet borders could put one ethnic population inside another republic, the Azerbaijan–Iran border demonstrates something even older: An imperial border can divide a people without actually dividing their language, culture or sense of identity. We only have to look at what the big European imperial powers did in Africa to appreciate this fact.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=adf9d2b56727" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Nagorno-Karabakh — an abiding tragedy:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lflood1110/nagorno-karabakh-an-abiding-tragedy-3e62e1282ead?source=rss-bcdb411d36d8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3e62e1282ead</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nagorno-karabakh]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[armenia]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Liam Flood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 11:47:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-29T11:57:39.166Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Nagorno-Karabakh — an abiding tragedy:</strong></p><p>As an Irish person, I can well appreciate different peoples or ethnicities disputing the same territory. I only have to look to the north of my own country to see that Republicans and Unionists have been fighting over the same small piece of land for hundreds of years. Nowadays, thankfully, peace has broken out and it seems that future arguments about territory and sovereignty will take place in parliament or at the ballot box, where they belong.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/740/0*MMnpo_PhqugeaLr0.jpg" /><figcaption>The mountainous region of Nagorno-Karabakh has been long disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan.</figcaption></figure><p>Sadly, we cannot say the same about the Israel-Palestine conflict or several others on the African continent. In the former Soviet Union, I have been aware of the conflict regarding the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh for over thirty years and I have followed developments there keenly. Unfortunately, while the Northern Ireland conflict claimed over 3,000 lives over thirty years, the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute has claimed ten times that in the same period.</p><p>I visited Azerbaijan recently and as I visited Armenia last year and have spoken with many of the people of both countries, I think I’ve acquired a reasonable understanding of their long running feud.</p><p>While I don’t wish to apply blame to any Government or group of people, present or past, I think it is safe to say that this dispute, like the one in Ireland, and like the ones in the Middle East and Africa, all have their roots in colonialism and empire building.</p><p>Unfortunately Nagorno-Karabakh is a very bitter dispute and nothing I am going to say will resolve it. I can only try to describe it in the fairest terms I can apply. While I can eventually see people living in Northern Ireland in peace and harmony with each other, I fear this will not happen in Nagorno-Karabakh. It is actually a fascinating example of how Soviet borders, ethnic identity and the collapse of the Soviet Union combined to create a conflict that has lasted for more than three decades.<br> <br> The simplest way to understand it is this:<br> <br> Nagorno-Karabakh was internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, but for most of the modern period its population was overwhelmingly Armenian.<br> <br> That contradiction is at the heart of the whole dispute.<br> <br> Nagorno-Karabakh is a mountainous region in the southwestern part of Azerbaijan, close to the Armenian border. The word “Nagorno” means mountainous or highland. Armenians traditionally call the area “Artsakh”.<br> <br> The region has a very long Armenian historical and cultural connection. However, the modern political dispute really took shape during the Russian and Soviet periods.<br> <br> After the Russian Empire expanded into the Caucasus in the 19th Century, the area became part of the Russian imperial system. When the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917, Armenia and Azerbaijan both claimed parts of the region, and fighting took place.<br> <br> Then after the Russian revolution, the Bolsheviks took control of the Caucasus.<br> <br> This is where the Soviet Union effectively created the political problem that would eventually explode.<br> <br> In 1921, the Soviet authorities decided that Nagorno-Karabakh would remain within Soviet Azerbaijan, while providing for autonomy. In 1923, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was formally created inside the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.<br> <br> The important point is that the population of the autonomous region was predominantly Armenian. By the late Soviet period, roughly three-quarters of the population were ethnic Armenians.<br> <br> So you had an Armenian-majority territory sitting inside Azerbaijan.<br> <br> During the Soviet period this did not produce a full-scale war because Moscow ultimately controlled everything. National borders between the Soviet republics were, in practical terms, internal administrative boundaries.<br> <br> But the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh continued to have a strong sense of separate identity and, at various times, sought to have the territory transferred to Soviet Armenia.<br> <br> The situation changed dramatically in 1988.<br> <br> As Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms weakened Soviet central control, the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh began demanding that the territory be transferred from Azerbaijan to Armenia.<br> <br> That quickly became violent. There were serious ethnic clashes, including violence against Armenians in Azerbaijan and against Azerbaijanis in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.<br> <br> Then came the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. And that transformed what had been an internal Soviet dispute into an international territorial conflict.<br> <br> Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent states. Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence from Azerbaijan and proclaimed the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, which later became known as Artsakh.<br> <br> Azerbaijan, naturally, rejected this. From the Azerbaijani perspective, this was Azerbaijani territory being taken away by an Armenian separatist movement with the backing of Armenia.<br> <br> From the Armenian perspective, it was an Armenian-majority population trying to escape Azerbaijani rule and protect itself from what it regarded as discrimination and persecution. Both sides therefore had a powerful narrative.<br> <br> The first Nagorno-Karabakh War lasted from roughly 1988 until a ceasefire in 1994. The Armenians and Armenian forces won the war. Now they did not merely control Nagorno-Karabakh itself. Armenian forces also took control of substantial surrounding Azerbaijani territory, creating a land connection between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.<br> <br> Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced during the conflict. Azerbaijanis were expelled from areas controlled by Armenian forces, while large numbers of Armenians also fled or were expelled from other parts of the region. The war left enormous bitterness on both sides.<br> <br> For the next 26 years, therefore, there was a strange situation. Internationally, Nagorno-Karabakh was recognised as part of Azerbaijan. In reality, it was controlled by ethnic Armenians and had its own unrecognised government, supported by Armenia.<br> <br> No country, including Armenia itself, formally recognised Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state. There were negotiations for years, but no permanent settlement was reached.<br> <br> Then came 2020 — Azerbaijan had become considerably wealthier because of its oil and gas revenues and had spent heavily on its armed forces. Turkey also became an important military and political supporter of Azerbaijan.<br> <br> In September 2020, Azerbaijan launched a major military offensive. This time Azerbaijan won substantial territory back from the Armenian side.<br> <br> The war lasted about six weeks and ended with a Russian-brokered ceasefire in November 2020. Azerbaijan regained all of the surrounding territories that had been occupied by Armenian forces and also captured significant parts of Nagorno-Karabakh itself, including the strategically important city of Shusha.<br> <br> Russian peacekeepers were deployed to the remaining Armenian-controlled part of Nagorno-Karabakh. But the underlying dispute still wasn’t resolved.<br> <br> Then came September 2023 — Azerbaijan launched another military operation against the remaining Armenian-controlled part of Nagorno-Karabakh. This was not another six-week war like 2020. It was a very short offensive. Azerbaijani forces quickly overwhelmed the Armenian forces in the enclave, and the Armenian authorities there agreed to cease fighting.<br> <br> That effectively ended the existence of the separatist Armenian administration. Almost the entire Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh — more than 100,000 people — subsequently fled to Armenia. Now, they fled because they felt they had no choice — people I met in Armenia told me people feared for their lives if they stayed in what was now Azerbaijani territory. My Azerbaijani friends tell me a different story — they say that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of their country and always will be. But, they claim that if Armenians still want to live there, they are welcome and that their culture and religion will be respected. Armenians say it will never happen — the roots are too deep and too bitter. <br> <br> By the end of 2023, Azerbaijan had therefore established full control over the territory. The self-declared Republic of Artsakh subsequently ceased to exist. <br> For Azerbaijanis, the events of 2020 and especially 2023 were enormously significant. For almost thirty years, Azerbaijan had been living with what it regarded as the occupation of part of its internationally recognised territory. Generations of Azerbaijanis had grown up as refugees or descendants of refugees from the areas that had been lost. So when Azerbaijan’s army recovered the territories, it was regarded by many Azerbaijanis as the restoration of territorial integrity and the correction of a historic injustice. President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, who organised the 2020 and 2023 offensives which regained control of Nagorno-Karabakh is a hero in Azerbaijan and will rule indefinitely as a result.<br> <br> The capture of Shusha in 2020 was particularly symbolic because of its enormous cultural importance to Azerbaijan. And the final Azerbaijani victory in 2023 was presented by Aliyev as the culmination of a decades-long struggle. The 2020 victory undoubtedly strengthened his position domestically and the 2023 victory consolidated it.<br> <br> It is important, however, to understand that there is another side to the story. For Armenians, the outcome was catastrophic. They lost control of a territory in which Armenians had constituted the overwhelming majority for generations, and virtually the entire Armenian population left the region after Azerbaijan established control.<br> <br> So when you hear an Azerbaijani describe what happened as “liberation”, you are hearing the Azerbaijani interpretation. When you hear an Armenian describe it as the loss of Artsakh, you are hearing the Armenian interpretation. Both terms reflect deeply entrenched national memories.<br> <br> The legal and political situation, however, is clearer than the competing historical narratives sometimes suggest: Nagorno-Karabakh was internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan. The unresolved question was how the Armenian population of the territory could have security and political rights within that state. That question ultimately ceased to be relevant in the same way after 2023 because the Armenian population largely left.<br> <br> So, in one sentence, the whole story is: The Soviet Union put an overwhelmingly Armenian-populated territory inside Soviet Azerbaijan; the collapse of the Soviet Union turned that administrative anomaly into a war; Armenian forces won the first war and controlled the territory for nearly three decades; Azerbaijan won the 2020 war and then the September 2023 offensive brought the remaining territory under Azerbaijani control.<br> <br> And that explains why the subject is so emotionally charged in Azerbaijan today. For many Azerbaijanis, particularly those who remember the displacement of the 1990s, Aliyev is the leader who finally achieved something that Azerbaijani governments had failed to accomplish for almost thirty years.</p><p><strong>Historical Development:</strong></p><p>Forgive me if this article is becoming long and complicated. All I have explained so far is what the current situation is. There is an important part of the story that I didn’t explain properly: how did a territory that eventually became part of Azerbaijan come to have an overwhelmingly Armenian population? In other words, how did the people who lived or still live in Nagorno-Karabakh get there. In Northern Ireland, it is relatively easy to trace how Scots were ‘planted’ in Ulster in the 17th Century. Nagorno-Karabakh is a little more complicated. <br> <br> The short answer is that Nagorno-Karabakh had a long established Armenian population centuries before the modern Republic of Azerbaijan existed. For many Armenians, that’s the problem in a nutshell — the ‘we were here first’ view.<br> <br> Modern political borders are relatively recent. You can’t really look at the map of today’s Azerbaijan and assume that everyone living inside those borders had historically been Azerbaijani.<br> <br> Armenians have lived in the mountainous parts of Karabakh for many centuries, and the region has a long Armenian Christian cultural and historical connection. There were also substantial Muslim populations in the broader Karabakh region, particularly in the lowlands. For centuries, therefore, Karabakh was a mixed region rather than a neat Armenian-or-Azerbaijani territory.<br> <br> Things become much clearer in the 18th century. In the 1740s, the Karabakh Khanate was established. It was a Muslim-ruled political entity, and its population included both Muslims and Armenians. The khanate was centred on the lowlands and mountains of Karabakh. The important point is that political control and ethnic population was not the same thing. An area could be ruled by a Muslim khan while containing a large Armenian Christian population.<br> <br> Then Russia conquered the region — we are back to imperialism again. The Russian Empire incorporated the Karabakh Khanate in the early 19th century, following the Russo-Persian wars. This gives us the first reasonably reliable population figures.<br> <br> A Russian survey of 1823 showed that the broader Karabakh region was predominantly Muslim. However, the mountainous districts were very different: Armenian communities were heavily concentrated in the mountains. This distinction between mountainous Karabakh and the broader Karabakh region is extremely important. If you look at the whole historical Karabakh area, the population figures can make it appear predominantly Muslim.<br> <br> If you look specifically at the mountainous area that eventually became the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the Armenian presence was much stronger. And the population changed during the 19th century. There was considerable movement of people after the Russian conquest, including Armenians moving into the Russian-controlled Caucasus from territories that had previously been under Persian and Ottoman rule.<br> <br> By the late 19th century, Armenians had become a very substantial part of the population of the mountainous Karabakh area. But there is an important complication here. The demographic statistics for this period are disputed. <br> Azerbaijani and Armenian historians have often used different geographical definitions of “Karabakh” and different population sources, producing very different figures.<br> <br> For example, the Russian Imperial census of 1897 showed that the population of the much larger Karabakh administrative districts was mixed, with Muslims forming the majority overall. But Armenians were heavily concentrated in the mountainous areas. So it would be misleading to say that “all of Karabakh was Armenian.” It wasn’t. It is more accurate to say that the mountainous part of Karabakh had a very substantial and eventually dominant Armenian population, while the wider Karabakh region contained a large Muslim/Azerbaijani population as well.<br> <br> Then the Russian Tsarist Empire collapsed in 1917. This is when the modern territorial dispute really began. There was no independent Azerbaijan or Armenia with today’s borders before 1918. When the Russian Empire collapsed, both the newly emerging Armenian and Azerbaijani states claimed territories in the Caucasus, and there were mixed populations in many of those areas.<br> <br> Karabakh became one of the most fiercely disputed. There were Armenians living in the mountains and Azerbaijanis living in other parts of Karabakh. Neither side could simply say, “Everyone here is one nationality, therefore the territory obviously belongs to us.”<br> <br> Then the Bolsheviks took control. This is where the modern map was effectively created. In 1921, the Soviet authorities decided that Nagorno-Karabakh would remain within Soviet Azerbaijan, while providing it with autonomy. In 1923, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was established inside the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.<br> <br> And here we arrive at something rather extraordinary. The new autonomous region was overwhelmingly Armenian. The early Soviet figures put the Armenian population at roughly 89–95 percent of the population of the autonomous region, depending on the particular year and boundary used.<br> <br> By the final Soviet census in 1989, Armenians still represented about 77 percent of the population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, while Azerbaijanis represented only about 22 percent. There certainly were Azerbaijanis living there and their numbers actually increased considerably during the Soviet period. But the mountainous autonomous region was already overwhelmingly Armenian when it was established.<br> <br> It is also important not to imagine that Armenians suddenly arrived and displaced Azerbaijanis in the 20th century — they didn’t — they had ‘always’ been there. The Armenian population was already deeply rooted in the mountainous region.<br> <br> At the same time, Azerbaijanis had deep historical roots in the broader Karabakh region. This is why both sides have such powerful historical arguments.<br> <br> The Armenian argument is essentially:<br> <br> “We have lived here for centuries, we are the overwhelming indigenous population of the mountains, and we should have the right to determine our own future.”<br> <br> The Azerbaijani argument is:<br> <br> “This territory was legally placed inside Azerbaijan, the wider region has a long Muslim/Azerbaijani history, and international law recognised Nagorno-Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory.”<br> <br> And both arguments contain genuine historical facts. There is one other fascinating point.<br> <br> The word “Azerbaijani” itself is relatively modern in this context. Before the Soviet period, Russian sources commonly referred to the Muslim population of the region as “Tatars” or “Caucasian Tatars”, while the term Azerbaijani became standard later.<br> <br> So when we look back at an 18th- or 19th-century population and call somebody “Azerbaijani”, we’re partly applying a modern national identity retrospectively. <br> The same applies, to some extent, to the idea of a single Armenian national territory.<br> <br> People in the Caucasus historically identified themselves through a mixture of religion, language, local community, dynasty and ethnicity. The modern idea that every piece of territory must belong exclusively to one nation only became powerful in the 19th and especially 20th centuries. Back to imperialism again and marking of territory.<br> <br> That is really the tragedy of Nagorno-Karabakh. The population didn’t neatly correspond to the political borders. And when the Soviet Union collapsed, there was no solution that could satisfy everybody.<br> <br> If you gave the territory to Azerbaijan because it was legally inside the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic, the Armenians could say:<br> <br> “But we are the overwhelming majority living here.”<br> <br> If you gave it to Armenia because Armenians were the overwhelming majority, Azerbaijan could say:<br> <br> “But you’re taking internationally recognised Azerbaijani territory away from us.”<br> <br> That is essentially the conflict in a nutshell. One final point is particularly important: Nagorno-Karabakh was never simply “Armenia inside Azerbaijan.” It was an autonomous Armenian-majority region inside Soviet Azerbaijan, surrounded by areas that contained substantial Azerbaijani populations.<br> <br> That distinction is what makes the history considerably more complicated — and much more interesting — than either side’s simplified version of the story.</p><p>My preferred solution to the problem would be what we now have in Northern Ireland. I would leave Nagorno-Karabakh inside Azerbaijan but share power between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the region. As practically all ethnic Armenians have now left the region and have been integrated into Armenia, it is unlikely to happen. Some parts of Karabakh have been re-settled by formerly displaced Azerbaijanis but apparently large areas remain unpopulated — deserted towns and villages abound. It is a sad end to what, with a little more diplomacy and less military action, could have been a solution that all sides might have agreed to.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3e62e1282ead" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Azerbaijan and my long running battle with Dill:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lflood1110/azerbaijan-and-my-long-running-battle-with-dill-a1273af989da?source=rss-bcdb411d36d8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a1273af989da</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[food-taste]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[soviet-food]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan-cooking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Liam Flood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 13:02:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-28T13:02:27.569Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Azerbaijan and my long running battle with Dill:</strong></p><p>Friends and former colleagues who knew me and worked with me in Russia and Ukraine will immediately recognise this article, perhaps with some humour. I can remember that amongst the first words of Russian I learnt was how to say ‘no dill please.’ This was (and still is) because dill is the one herb that I abhor and it is also the herb that is used in almost every dish in countries that were formerly in the Soviet Union. If you are going to a restaurant in Russia or any former Soviet countries and you don’t like dill — beware.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/740/0*dx9qXyZesjN8ngCK.png" /><figcaption>How to ruin a delicious dish of potatoes — add dill.</figcaption></figure><p>I think dill is one of those things that you either love or hate and I am firmly in the latter category. It’s not just that I dislike it — the flavour it carries is so strong that someone described it to me as like someone had sprayed perfume on your food. I remember one former colleague who agreed with me about this — he could not even enter the section of the supermarket where dill was sold. The smell was so strong that if he was exposed to it, it would stay in his olfactory senses for hours, thereby ruining his day and any meals he ate.</p><p>I had completely forgotten about this until I recently travelled to Azerbaijan. While there, I was quickly reintroduced to the two things that used to put me off their restaurants — the almost universal insistence on serving salad with meals and the remarkable amount of dill that seems to find its way into practically everything.<br> <br> Apparently the salad tradition has quite a lot to do with the Soviet period. In pre-Soviet Russia and other parts of the region, vegetables were certainly eaten, but fresh vegetables were hard to get, particularly in winter so they were often pickled, salted, fermented or otherwise preserved rather than served as the fresh salads we would recognise today.<br> <br> During the Soviet period, a more standardised style of eating developed, particularly in restaurants, hotels, canteens and institutional cooking. A typical meal was structured around a first course, usually soup and followed by a main course, with salads or vegetable dishes served alongside or between the courses.</p><p>Salads were also inexpensive and practical. Cabbage, carrots, beetroot, cucumbers, potatoes and other vegetables were readily available and could provide variety when meat and other ingredients were relatively scarce.<br> <br> This helps explain something I noticed very clearly in Azerbaijan: salad is not necessarily regarded as a separate course in the Western European sense. It is considered something that belongs on the table with the meal.</p><p>That is why refusing it can produce a slightly puzzled reaction and boy, did I get that. In one place, the waiter actually insisted that I take the salad because he informed me that: (a) it was healthy, (b) it was part of the meal, and © it was included in the price. From his point of view, he wasn’t necessarily offering me an optional extra; he was providing what they regard as a normal part of the meal.<br> <br> Azerbaijan also has an older and very strong tradition of serving fresh vegetables and herbs alongside food, so the modern Azerbaijani habit is a combination of its own Caucasian culinary traditions and the influence of the Soviet food system.<br> <br> Then there is dill.<br> <br> Dill became one of the dominant everyday herbs throughout much of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Eastern Europe. There is a very practical reason for this: it grows easily, is inexpensive and was readily available to ordinary households. You could grow it in any garden, in any climate; you could grow it in a window box in an apartment if you didn’t have a garden. It was strong, resilient and always full of flavour — and it was cheap. Other herbs and spices had to be imported and they were either too expensive or were not available.</p><p>Over generations, it became an everyday rather than a special ingredient. Eventually it became so deeply embedded in the cuisine that cooks often used it almost instinctively.<br> <br> Dill goes into soups, potatoes, salads, stews, pickles, fish, sour cream, dumplings and many other dishes. In some parts of the former Soviet Union, it has almost become the default finishing herb for savoury food.<br> <br> There is also an element of familiarity. A cook who has grown up eating dill may regard it in much the same way that an Italian cook instinctively reaches for basil or a French cook for parsley. They are not necessarily thinking that they are adding a strong or unusual flavour. To them, the dish simply seems incomplete without it.<br> <br> Azerbaijan is particularly interesting because its cuisine has a much wider herb tradition than Russian cuisine. Coriander, mint, basil, parsley, tarragon and other herbs are also important, reflecting Azerbaijan’s Caucasian, Persian, Turkish and Middle Eastern influences.<br> <br> So the enormous presence of dill in Azerbaijan is partly a Soviet legacy, but it sits alongside a much older and broader Azerbaijani tradition of using fresh herbs and vegetables.<br> <br> The interesting thing is that food preferences can be remarkably cultural. What one person regards as a delicious, essential flavour can be completely overpowering to someone else.<br> <br> And that certainly explains my experience here.<br> <br> I can understand why they like their dill. I just wish they would occasionally acknowledge that there are people like me who don’t and either give me a choice or prepare the food without it.</p><p>I must say that when I did get back into the habit of saying ‘no dill please,’ in Azerbaijan, the food I got was delicious. So it can be done.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a1273af989da" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Azerbaijan: Where the (Speed) Cameras Are Always Watching:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lflood1110/azerbaijan-where-the-speed-cameras-are-always-watching-2e6ecfd38fca?source=rss-bcdb411d36d8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2e6ecfd38fca</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Liam Flood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 12:49:55 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-28T12:49:55.156Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Azerbaijan: Where the (Speed) Cameras Are Always Watching:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*d62MuMb1G1LZ7tya0lfhUQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Even on super-wide, straight roads, the speed limit can drop from 110 to 60 in an instant.</figcaption></figure><p>I mentioned this in my travel blog, but it is such an unusual phenomenon that I felt it deserved an article of its own. I drove around Azerbaijan for eight days and discovered something rather strange about the country’s roads: there are speed cameras everywhere. Now, I DO mean everywhere.</p><p><strong>Watched on every road:</strong></p><p>Not occasionally, and not just on dangerous stretches — everywhere. They are on main roads, side roads, country roads and really remote roads; at traffic lights, on corners, in bus lanes. You pass one, instinctively check that you are within the (ever-changing) speed limit, and a kilometre later you meet another camera, radar or piece of electronic traffic equipment. After a while you begin to wonder whether there is any stretch of road in Azerbaijan where you aren’t being watched.</p><p><strong>…and yet the driving is chaotic</strong></p><p>Despite this extraordinary level of surveillance, the driving itself can be surprisingly chaotic. Lane discipline is often poor and indicators seem to be regarded as optional. Cars pull across lanes, tailgate, overtake unexpectedly and make sudden manoeuvres that leave you wondering what the driver has seen that you haven’t.</p><p>Above all, cars speed up and then slow down dramatically as the next camera hoves into view: they brake sharply, pass it at the required speed; accelerate again. For someone trying to drive cautiously at a constant speed, it is incredibly frustrating. And where there are no cameras, all bets are off. I saw plenty of cautious driving interspersed with what I can only call ‘lunatic driving’ — overtaking at high speed on narrow mountain roads where continuous bends left almost no visibility. But then, there were no cameras on that stretch of road, you see.</p><p>You sometimes get the impression that the objective isn’t “I must drive safely” but “I mustn’t get caught.”</p><p><strong>What cameras can — and can’t — do</strong></p><p>There is some logic behind all this. Azerbaijan has a poor record of road accidents and deaths and has worked to improve it, with some success over the past decade. Speed cameras are almost certainly part of the reason. Speed is one of the easiest things to measure and control, and controlling it matters enormously: a bad driver at 50 or 60 km/h may cause an accident; the same driver at 100 km/h is far more likely to cause a fatal one.</p><p>But cameras can’t measure everything. They can’t measure judgement, courtesy or consideration for the driver beside you. They can’t tell whether an overtaking manoeuvre is sensible or suicidal, or teach anyone to anticipate what another driver might do. Drivers know they will be punished for speeding, but that doesn’t make them better drivers.</p><p>The authorities recognised the brake-and-accelerate problem years ago and introduced average-speed systems that measure a vehicle’s speed between two points rather than at a single spot. However, these are still rare — almost all the cameras I encountered simply measured the speed of passing traffic.</p><p>So, in very simple terms: poor driving + heavy speed enforcement = plenty of frightening driving, but fewer fatal consequences than there might otherwise have been. That is an oversimplification, of course — Azerbaijan has also improved its roads, junctions and traffic management, so it would be wrong to credit the cameras alone. But my conclusion is that the camera network has probably contributed significantly to making the roads safer in terms of fatalities, without making driving feel any safer or more pleasant. You can use technology to control behaviour, but it can’t necessarily change the culture that produces that behaviour in the first place.</p><p><strong>Road safety or revenue?</strong></p><p>I wouldn’t say I was a nervous wreck after eight days, but I have never been so conscious of my speed or watched my speedometer so closely. The annoying thing is that the system seems designed to catch drivers out, with speed limits changing constantly for no apparent reason, often on wide motorways. Which raises the question: is this about road safety or about revenue?</p><p>An Azerbaijani driver I spoke to had no doubt it was the latter. He told me that in the last fiscal year the government collected over $2 billion in fines — from a population of ten million.</p><p>And my own experience — despite driving ultra-cautiously, at speeds well below what I would normally do, in a careful and mannerly fashion that endangered no one, I still incurred three fines. That, apparently, is well below average. But for a tourist on his first exposure to such severe over-policing, it seems excessive. Not good for tourism, Mr. Aliyev.</p><p><strong>The traffic police are still there:</strong></p><p>One final point: The traffic police who were ubiquitous in the old Soviet Union have seemingly survived intact here, although with so much technology on the roads they mount fewer checkpoints and traffic stops than they once did.</p><p>Other former Soviet states have dealt with theirs differently. When Yushchenko was President of Ukraine, he sacked the entire traffic police force of 200,000 people, on the basis that they were of no use to the government: they operated like an independent organisation, harassing drivers for fines that invariably ended up in their own pockets or those of their superiors. Ukraine later re-formed its traffic police, but with extensive retraining and a clear line of accountability to senior police chiefs. Russia’s traffic police, by contrast, have never been reformed and remain a powerful force, although their wings have been clipped to some extent.</p><p>I’m not saying the traffic police in Azerbaijan are corrupt — I saw no evidence of that. I am simply reminding people that they are still there, so if you fancy trying to evade them, beware: back in the day they drove Ladas; nowadays it is 5 Series BMWs.</p><p>I intended to finish this article by saying:</p><p><em>Here, the cameras are watching — but it’s really the drivers you have to watch.</em></p><p>I’ve changed my mind. In Azerbaijan, the drivers do their best — it’s the traffic police and the government you need to watch.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2e6ecfd38fca" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Azerbaijan — where the Lada’s outnumber the Toyotas:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lflood1110/azerbaijan-where-the-ladas-outnumber-the-toyotas-25556994aedb?source=rss-bcdb411d36d8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/25556994aedb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[old-cars]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[old-zhigulis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan-culture]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Liam Flood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 11:38:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-24T11:38:24.434Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Azerbaijan — where the Lada’s outnumber the Toyotas:</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*twufaunBOfR3o9qSAs0dig.jpeg" /><figcaption>Good as new — it’s 45 years old.</figcaption></figure><p>Last week, I was struck by the enormous number of old Ladas — or Zhigulis, as they were known in Soviet times — on the roads in Azerbaijan.<br> <br> What is particularly remarkable is the condition of many of them. Some look as though they are almost new, despite the fact that they must be 40 or even 50 years old. There seem to be many thousands of them everywhere. It made me wonder why so many have survived in Azerbaijan when, in Russia today, it is becoming increasingly difficult to see anyone driving an old Zhiguli.<br> <br> There are several reasons.<br> <br> During the Soviet period, the Zhiguli was essentially the people’s car. The various VAZ models were produced in enormous numbers — around 17.6 million of the different Zhiguli models were eventually built. Azerbaijan received large numbers of them, and after independence they remained important family and working vehicles.<br> <br> In one of the guesthouses I stayed in, the owner had a Zhiguli that looked like new. He even invited me to sit into it and it really was in mint condition — this despite the fact that it had recorded over 400,000 kilometres. The man told me that Azerbaijanis love these cars and that the great advantage of the Zhiguli is its simplicity. There are very few electronics and relatively little that can go seriously wrong. A competent mechanic can repair one without sophisticated diagnostic equipment, and parts are relatively cheap. Generations of Azerbaijani mechanics have grown up knowing these cars inside out.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IIBbUj8tgkiI_EjwSg1dcQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>400,000 kms but drives like new.</figcaption></figure><p>Consequently, instead of the normal progression of an old car — becoming uneconomic to repair and eventually being scrapped — the Zhiguli can simply be repaired and kept going. A 40-year-old car is not necessarily a problem if the owner can replace a part cheaply and find somebody who knows how to fix it.<br> <br> They are also still useful working vehicles, particularly outside Baku. They are used for carrying people, agricultural produce, tools and all sorts of other things. If you have an inexpensive car that is mechanically simple, reliable enough and cheap to repair, there is not much economic incentive to replace it with a modern vehicle.<br> <br> I did a little research and the statistics are quite extraordinary.<br> <br> Azerbaijan’s 2026 vehicle statistics recorded approximately almost 400,000 Zhigulis — a VAZ is a type of Zhiguli (or Lada as we knew them).<br> <br> • 199,000 VAZ 2101/03–06 models<br> • 126,500 VAZ 2105/07 models<br> • 14,900 VAZ 2102/2104 models<br> • 24,500 VAZ 2108/09 models<br> • 35,300 Nivas<br> <br> That means there are more than 400,000 VAZ vehicles in those categories alone, without even counting all the other old Soviet marques.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MV0u7CeRrkLrbC5rn0sjvg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Another well-kept model</figcaption></figure><p>And what is particularly interesting is that the numbers have not collapsed in recent years. The number of VAZ 2101/03–06 cars, for example, was almost exactly the same in 2023 as it had been several years earlier.<br> <br> Some of the cars I have seen look almost new because there are really two different phenomena. Some are simply old working cars, while others have been maintained, repaired, repainted and refurbished over many years. The basic construction of the Zhiguli makes this relatively straightforward.<br> <br> There is also an interesting difference between Azerbaijan and Russia.<br> Russia eventually developed a much larger market for imported Japanese, European and Korean cars. As a result, the Russian car fleet, particularly in the cities, became much more modern. Today, an old Zhiguli in Russia is increasingly associated with poverty, provincial life or nostalgia.<br> <br> In Azerbaijan, by contrast, the Zhiguli remained much more of an ordinary working car. Modern Mercedes, Toyotas, Hyundai’s and Kia’s are very common, but the old Soviet cars survive alongside them.<br> <br> There is also a cultural element. Azerbaijan was part of the Soviet Union for 71 years, and the Zhiguli became deeply embedded in everyday life. It was the car that generations of people learned to drive, maintain and repair.<br> <br> So when you drive around Azerbaijan and see one after another Zhiguli, you are actually looking at a remarkable surviving piece of Soviet social history.<br> <br> The irony is that the Soviet Union disappeared in 1991, and production of the classic Zhiguli range eventually ended, yet Azerbaijan still has hundreds of thousands of them on its roads.<br> <br> It really is quite extraordinary — and certainly something I have noticed much more there than I would in Russia.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=25556994aedb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Azerbaijan — Repressed Authoritarianism or Benign Dictatorship — closer to Putin’s Russia or…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lflood1110/azerbaijan-repressed-authoritarianism-or-benign-dictatorship-closer-to-putins-russia-or-f29aab4df5fb?source=rss-bcdb411d36d8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f29aab4df5fb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan-leader]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan-politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Liam Flood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 10:35:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-24T10:35:31.677Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Azerbaijan — Repressed Authoritarianism or Benign Dictatorship — closer to Putin’s Russia or Zelensky’s Ukraine?</strong></p><p>I recently visited Azerbaijan and I wrote a very complimentary travel blog recommending it as a tourist destination. I didn’t mention the political situation there at all as I didn’t feel it was relevant to tourism. However, I feel it does merit a separate article as the issues of history, geography and politics interest me greatly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*9mONysC3mU2fdUQPzLlNhQ.png" /><figcaption><strong>President Ilham Aliyev, ruler of Azerbaijan.</strong></figcaption></figure><p>On my first night in Baku, I got chatting with a local man — we weren’t talking about politics or any related subject. He just suddenly remarked: ‘My country is safer than yours.’ I asked him what he meant and he told me I could walk down any street in the country and never be attacked or mugged or have any of my property stolen.</p><p>He had a point. Azerbaijan has relatively low levels of serious street crime and violent crime. You can walk around Baku and many other parts of the country without the feeling of personal danger that you might get in some larger European cities. There is also a very visible police presence and a fairly controlled society.</p><p>Ireland, to be fair, is also an extremely safe country by international standards. So I said to him that I wouldn’t describe Azerbaijan as <em>dramatically</em> safer than Ireland. He acknowledged this and then smiled and said that there is another important distinction: “Azerbaijan is safer in some everyday-crime respects, but it isn’t necessarily ‘safer’ in the broader sense of living in a free society.” I knew what he meant but I asked anyway and he told me:</p><p>“Azerbaijanis can be completely safe as long as they stay out of the political arena. We have a very poor record on political freedom, independent journalism and treatment of political opponents.” I checked this out and I found Reuters has documented arrests of journalists and activists and described the 2024 presidential election, in which Ilham Aliyev received more than 92% of the vote, as having been neither free nor fair.</p><p>My friend would not wish to be quoted so he will remain anonymous. It got me thinking though about Azerbaijan and, particularly, the way the political system operates there. Having travelled extensively, I’m obviously familiar with the fact that countries have very different systems of government, so I’m not approaching this from the perspective of someone who expects Azerbaijan to operate like Ireland or another Western European democracy.<br> <br> What strikes me about Azerbaijan is the extent to which political power is concentrated around President Ilham Aliyev and his family. Azerbaijan formally has the institutions of a republic — a president, parliament, courts and elections — but in practice the presidency dominates the political system.<br> <br>The Aliyev family has been at the centre of political power for decades. Heydar Aliyev, the former head of the KGB in Azerbaijan, ruled the country first as a Soviet leader and later as president of independent Azerbaijan. His son, Ilham Aliyev, succeeded him in 2003 and has remained president ever since.<br> <br>Elections take place, but Azerbaijan is not generally regarded as a genuinely competitive political democracy. Opposition parties have limited room to operate, independent media face considerable restrictions, and critics of the government can encounter serious political and legal pressure.<br> <br>There is also a strong connection between political power and economic power. The state has enormous influence over important parts of the economy, and networks connected to the political establishment have traditionally benefited from that system. This makes it difficult to separate political influence from economic influence.<br> <br>At the same time, I think it would be too simplistic to describe Azerbaijan merely as a dictatorship and leave it at that. The government has delivered considerable infrastructure development, particularly in Baku, and oil and gas revenues have enabled the state to invest heavily in roads, public buildings and other infrastructure. The road infrastructure is as good as you will find anywhere with the exception of very remote areas. Their traffic management and control systems are as sophisticated as I have ever encountered. So the money isn’t wasted on pointless wars — it is ploughed back into the economy. <br> <br>There is also an important historical factor. Azerbaijan emerged from the Soviet Union in a difficult position, surrounded by major geopolitical pressures and involved in the conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. The country borders Russia to the north and Iran to the south, two empires that have kicked Azerbaijan around between them for a thousand years, In fact there are more Azerbaijanis in Iran than in Azerbaijan. Hence, the government has used the idea of national security, territorial integrity and the recovery of Azerbaijani territory as powerful sources of legitimacy.<br> <br>That helps explain why the political system has been able to maintain relatively strong public support in some sections of society despite its lack of political competition. The full recovery of all of Nakorno-Karabakh by President Aliyev’s forces in 2023 added greatly to this public support and it is likely he will draw from it indefinitely. <br> <br>Another interesting feature is the contrast between what you see on the surface and what lies underneath. Baku is a modern, wealthy-looking capital with impressive architecture, excellent roads and considerable investment. Yet the political system behind that modern façade remains highly centralised — you could argue of course that it’s the same in China — perhaps even more so.<br> <br>So, in simple terms, I would describe Azerbaijan as an authoritarian presidential system with elections and formal democratic institutions, but with very limited genuine political competition.<br> <br>The important point, however, is that this is not simply about whether Azerbaijan is “democratic” or “undemocratic”. The more interesting question is how power actually works.<br> <br>And in Azerbaijan, power is concentrated very heavily at the top, with the presidency, the political establishment and influential economic networks closely interconnected.</p><p>I think the more interesting comparison of Azerbaijan is not with Ireland or Western European democracies — it is with Putin’s Russia.<br> <br>Having travelled extensively in Russia, I don’t think it is unreasonable to see considerable similarities between the two systems. But I would also make an important distinction: Azerbaijan is authoritarian and presumably corrupt, but present-day Russia is considerably more repressive and has developed into a much more comprehensive security state.</p><p>Both systems are built around one dominant political family or individual, rather than around genuinely competitive political institutions. In Azerbaijan, power has been concentrated around the Aliyev family. Heydar Aliyev took power in 1993 and was succeeded by his son Ilham Aliyev in 2003. But it wasn’t seamless as my research showed:</p><p>In 1991, when the Soviet Union broke up, all fifteen member states immediately declared independence. Heydar Aliyev was at that time based in Moscow and was a very senior Soviet official. He had been head of the KGB in Azerbaijan previously. He returned immediately when Azerbaijan became independent.</p><p>So Aliyev wasn’t some obscure former KGB officer suddenly appearing on the scene. He was an extremely experienced and powerful Soviet political operator. And here’s the extraordinary part — Azerbaijan <strong><em>actually did</em></strong> have a democratic revolution after independence. In 1992, Abulfaz Elchibey, an anti-communist opposition leader, won the country’s first genuinely competitive post-Soviet presidential election. It was a very different Azerbaijan.</p><p>Unfortunately everything then fell apart. There was war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, military defeats, political chaos, economic problems and an armed uprising. In 1993, Elchibey was driven from power and Heydar Aliyev returned to the centre of politics. This was the crucial moment. Aliyev presented himself as the man who could restore order. And he did, at least to a considerable extent. So we are back to the old Soviet (Russian?) tradition of the people liking a strong man who can restore order. Aliyev consolidated power, stabilised the state and, crucially, gained control over the political machinery. Once he controlled the state, opposition became increasingly difficult. He was elected president in October 1993 and re-elected in 1998 although the latter election was marred by serious irregularities.</p><p>Heydar Aliyev died in 2003 and his son, Ilham Aliyev, seamlessly succeeded him as president. Ilham has now been president for 23 years. Every main street in every city and town in Azerbaijan is named Heydar Aliyev. The airport in Baku bears his name. Practically anything or any building of note is also named after him. Is there a word called ubiquity? Apparently there is — well the Aliyev family has perfected it.</p><p>Freedom House’s 2026 assessment describes Azerbaijan explicitly as an authoritarian regime in which power remains heavily concentrated in Ilham Aliyev and his extended family. It also describes corruption as rampant and says the formal political opposition has been weakened by years of persecution.<br> <br>Russia under Putin has followed a somewhat different route. Putin did not inherit the presidency from his father, of course, and there is no equivalent Putin family dynasty. Instead, he gradually built a highly centralised system around himself, the security services, loyal oligarchs, the ruling United Russia establishment and the presidential administration.<br> <br>Freedom House describes Russia in very similar terms: power is concentrated in Putin’s hands, with loyal security forces, subservient courts, controlled media and a legislature dominated by the ruling establishment.<br> <br>So the underlying political model is similar: One powerful leader — weak institutions — controlled elections — weakened or banned opposition — controlled and subservient media — hence political and economic power concentrated around the ruling establishment.<br> <br>But there is an important difference. I would say that Azerbaijan is less oppressive than Russia today. That may sound surprising when you look at the political system, but the difference becomes obvious when you look at what happens to people who challenge the state.<br> <br>In Azerbaijan, opposition politicians, journalists and activists can certainly be arrested and prosecuted. There has been a significant recent crackdown. Only last month, for example, nine journalists and activists associated with an independent TV channel received lengthy prison sentences in a case widely condemned by international media organisations as politically motivated.<br> <br>But Russia has gone much further. Since the invasion of Ukraine, criticism of the government and especially criticism of the war can lead to extremely serious criminal charges. Independent media have been virtually eliminated or forced abroad, opposition organisations have been banned, and the security apparatus has become much more intrusive.<br> <br>The Russian parliamentary election taking place at the moment illustrates the difference. Reuters reports that genuine political competition is extremely limited and that United Russia is expected to retain its dominance.<br> <br>In other words, Azerbaijan’s authoritarianism is severe, but Putin’s Russia has become a far more comprehensive system of repression.<br> <br>The corruption question is interesting. Both countries have serious corruption problems, but I wouldn’t simply say that Azerbaijan is ‘as corrupt as Russia.’ Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index gives Azerbaijan a score of 30/100 and ranks it 130th out of 182 countries. Russia’s score remains extremely poor and has returned to its worst-ever level according to Transparency International’s Russian organisation.</p><p>But let’s leave the political analysis for now and concentrate on a related practice that is alive and well and operating in both countries. It is something that has always fascinated me because it seems to me so obvious as to what is going on — the cult of the great leader being pushed to an absurd extent. Let me explain: I had an interesting experience driving from Ismayilli towards Baku. I had planned to visit Pirqulu, but the whole area was closed because President Aliyev was travelling somewhere in the region. Now, nobody knew precisely where in the region he was but the entire area was on high alert. <br> <br> What amazed me was the scale of the security operation. I must have seen at least 100 police cars, and there were policemen at every junction and crossroads, just standing on the side of the road or on a bank overlooking it. Armed military personnel were everywhere. This continued for perhaps 30 kilometres into the countryside, in every direction, even on roads that the President would not be using.<br> <br>Apparently the roads could be closed for two or three hours before the president actually arrived. The local policemen I asked didn’t even know exactly when they would reopen.<br> <br>Azerbaijan has a substantial police and internal-security apparatus, although there doesn’t appear to be a reliable current public figure for the total number of police officers. For a presidential journey, personnel can be drawn from local police, traffic police, specialist units and the Interior Ministry’s Internal Troops.<br> <br>The reason for the extraordinary operation is essentially that the authorities want to secure the entire route well before the presidential convoy reaches it. Every side road, junction and possible access point is controlled, which explains the policemen standing apparently in the middle of nowhere.<br> <br>It reminded me strongly of what I saw in Ukraine in the 1990s and, particularly, in Russia during the Putin era. It isn’t necessarily evidence by itself of a personality cult, but it does reflect Azerbaijan’s highly centralised presidential system.</p><p>In a normal democratic system, protecting a president is primarily a security and traffic-management exercise. Here, the approach seems to be much more absolute: Nothing whatsoever must be allowed to interfere with the president’s movement. The result is that an enormous amount of police and security manpower can be deployed simply to make sure the route is completely controlled.<br> <br>And because Azerbaijan is relatively small, the effect is extraordinary. For a few hours, it really can feel as though an entire part of the country has been closed down for one man. To my mind, the entire exercise is for effect — to show the ordinary population how important and how great this individual is.</p><p>Needless to say, Azerbaijan also follows the Russian practice of every business displaying a photograph of the President in every office. (Actually, I noticed in the US last time I visited that all the Government offices are now displaying photos of Trump but more of that in another article). In Azerbaijan, they go further — there are huge billboards displaying photos of a smiling President Aliyev in every town and village. The only other place I have seen this practice was in the Middle East.</p><p>It reminds me of what the former Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach), Bertie Ahern, said to me when he discovered this practice in Russia during a visit in 2003. He was amazed that everywhere he went; there was a photo of Putin. He shrugged, in typical Irish fashion, and remarked: “Jaysus lads, if a fella in Ireland put a photo of me on his desk or his mantelpiece, people would think there was something wrong with him. It sums up my own view perfectly.</p><p>So to conclude, what type of system of Government does Azerbaijan have? I will let you judge for yourselves but some of the people told me, quietly, after a glass or two — it’s a dictatorship — pure and simple. To me it’s a shame. You can say, what do I know and you’d be correct. China is not a democracy and it’s doing fine, apparently.</p><p>With the limited knowledge I gained from my visit and my subsequent research, I will concede that Azerbaijan, while not free and fair, is still a lot closer to Zelensky’s Ukraine than to Putin’s Russia. Let’s hope both survive and progress.</p><p>I don’t like to end on a negative note but as a long-time advocate of democratic systems, I find it sad that thirty five years after the break-up of the Soviet Union, only the three Baltic States and Ukraine are democracies. The other eleven countries are all dictatorships — not all with the same level of repression but nonetheless they are countries where the people have no real say in who leads or rules them.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f29aab4df5fb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Azerbaijan — a sort of Travel Blog:]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lflood1110/azerbaijan-a-sort-of-travel-blog-7a011e9d2104?source=rss-bcdb411d36d8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7a011e9d2104</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan-travel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[azerbaijan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[travel-blog]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Liam Flood]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 09:50:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-23T12:50:53.470Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Azerbaijan — a sort of Travel Blog:</strong></p><p>I’m glad I visited Azerbaijan in late summer; well it was September but it was still up to 30C most days and the skies were pristine blue. I think summer there probably runs well into October. The country’s best features for me are its mountain scenery and I reckon a lot of the high mountain passes would not be navigable in winter.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Hq6kTs2if8Emv5tWtrZonA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Road to Khinaliq</figcaption></figure><p>The country is not a mainstream tourist destination and is unlikely to become one for some time. It is a land of contrasts. In the capital, Baku, you could be in any modern city — in fact, the business and retail district would remind you of central London or even New York. But when you go out to the country areas and visit the small towns and the villages, you could still be in the Soviet Union, which of course Azerbaijan was part of until 1991.</p><p>I’m not sure whether this is a plus or a minus? It has its attractions but also its limitations. One thing I must say from the start though — Azerbaijani people are extraordinarily friendly and welcoming. In the eight days I was there, everyone I met was helpful and pleasant. I have a friend from Azerbaijan whom I worked with in Russia who told me that I could call to any home in Azerbaijan and ask for a cup of tea. He assured me that not only would I be given tea but I would be fed and they would ask me if I wanted to stay the night. I didn’t test his theory but I <strong><em>will</em></strong> say that in the two guesthouses I stayed in, I was greeted warmly and offered tea or coffee and cake as a welcome. It evoked for me the days when you would check into a B&amp;B in the west of Ireland and immediately be offered tea.</p><p>But let’s go back to the travel blog thing and start at the beginning. You will need a visa to enter Azerbaijan but it is easy to apply for one on line and it is delivered within two days. No problem there but when you arrive, be prepared to wait at Immigration control. The evening I got there, the queue was massive and it took over an hour to get through. It reminded me somewhat of the old Soviet Union. The next thing that caused an issue was a minor administrative error but in a rigid system, there is probably no such thing as a small error. The problem was this: The expiry date on my passport says the sixth of February 2033, but whoever issued the Azerbaijani visa typed the sixth of March 2033. Obviously I didn’t notice that there was any difference, but the Immigration officer did, and initially said I couldn’t enter because there was a minor discrepancy between my passport and the visa. I explained that the fault was not mine but that of whoever issued the visa. She eventually agreed to go to somebody more senior, who had to go to somebody more senior still, and eventually they did let me enter. So be sure to check your visa before you travel and ensure it precisely matches your passport.</p><p>My next issue was that my car hire representative was not where he was supposed to be. When I eventually located him, he charged me an additional E50 because I was over 65. Strange — you usually get a discount as a senior. This was the first of many issues I had with the car hire firm who were determined to take as much as they could from me but more of that later. All I will say at this point is that should you wish to visit Azerbaijan, don’t hire a car. I hire everywhere and my experience here was the worst I have had. Go on a tour or get a bus or a train — don’t drive yourself.</p><p>I eventually got my car but the experience was not a great first impression. My second impression was even worse. When I arrived at my hotel, my reservation had been canceled, despite the fact that I had confirmed it both by email and by what’s app. The manager said he had cancelled it because he gets loads of fake reservations or reservations where people don’t turn up, and he has to cancel them. The guy is obviously paranoid because he had contacted me on the 29th of July and asked me was I genuine, and I said yes I was, and he gave me a WhatsApp number and phone number to contact them, and we had a long conversation on that, during which I actually made a second reservation for the following week. Unfortunately he’d forgotten all about this, and he’d canceled my reservation for no particular reason. The hotel was full so there was no room.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bDarzmcGVYdY6hqu1c2DgQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Incredible Vistas at 2,000 metres</figcaption></figure><p>I was quickly forming the impression that this is a country full of bandits. It isn’t. I drove only a short distance to another hotel and while it was also full, the manager called round other hotels and got me a room. He even insisted on carrying my bags to the hotel which was close by. I think both he and the check-in agent in the other hotel were embarrassed at the way I had been treated and went out of their way to help me. The hotel was great and was a taste of things to come as I found the standard of hotels throughout Azerbaijan to be superb and extraordinary good value. I paid an average of around E25 per night for four star properties. I could have paid even less had I chosen two or three stars. The price included a very good breakfast and here’s the clincher — even though I was alone, the price was for two people. I joked with some of my hosts that I should eat two breakfasts. :)</p><p>Let’s deal with cost at this point. Almost everything in Azerbaijan is cheap by European standards. Apart from hotels, meals are very reasonable — a three course dinner with wine or beer costs on average E15. The only thing I noticed which was in any way out of sync was the price of a cup of coffee. Like the rest of the world, Azerbaijanis are hooked on the bean and coffee shops proliferate. Unfortunately, the cost was about three euro. This is completely at odds with the price of everything else. If it were good coffee there would be some justification but in many instances, it was instant. Now, I hasten to add, it is only a small complaint. The coffee shops featured an array of pastries and savouries which could be had for half the price of the coffee.</p><p>Naturally, there are many cultural differences in Azerbaijan. This of course is fine and is actually the reason why many of us travel to distant and different places. We want to experience life in different societies with different systems, values and culture. For instance, although Azerbaijan is a secular society, most of its people are Muslims so you won’t find any bacon for breakfast or ham sandwiches for lunch. That said, the food is very tasty — it has strong links to Turkish and other Caucasian nation foods. I‘d recommend the pies and stews and dishes cooked in earthenware, not to speak of the infinite variety of kebabs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F52bBi8VqUpsL4NHrh-bcQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>But the roads to get there can be narrow.</figcaption></figure><p>I mentioned at the outset that for me, the best parts of the country are its high mountains. I drove from Baku to Quba in the Caucasus Mountains. From there I went up the dramatic gorge road to Khinaliq where the scenery is breathtaking even if the mountain roads are narrow and of poor quality. The drive to the village located at 2,500 metres is only about fifty kilometres but takes at least two hours without stops. It took me six hours there and back — such was the magnificence of the scenery, I just had to keep stopping the car to view it and to take photos.</p><p>On the way back I called to Shahdag mountain resort. Next morning I drove to Sheki and then on to Gabala. These also feature mountains but of a more gentle nature. From Gabala, I journeyed back into the Caucasus to Tufandag, where I took a cable car to 4,000 metres. In Khinaliq, you can drive to over 2,000 metres but not here. It’s worth it though — the views from the cable car and at the top of the mountain are spectacular. Back on the ground, the nearby Nohur Lake and the seven waterfalls are worth visiting although there wasn’t a lot of water due to the dry weather.</p><p>Next day I drove to Ismailli and followed the Quirdimancay gorge up to Lahij, It’s not for the faint hearted as there are numerous cliffs, huge drops into the gorge and narrow roads clinging to the mountainside. But the journey up to the village at the top is worth it and it was here I purchased a few mementoes as the Lahij gift shops offered excellent value. All these adventures were over the course of several days and I am only giving a brief flavour of them here.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6SWcCX59U66raIwhixVWSg.jpeg" /><figcaption>View from Tufandag</figcaption></figure><p>Back in Baku, I’d recommend Fountains square, a walk through the old city and the main boulevard and if you want to go a bit further, Highland Park offers the best view in the city, overlooking over the Caspian Sea. For a little bit more adventure, it’s not far to Yanardag (the burning mountain) or to really enjoy the Caspian beaches, go to Seabreeze.</p><p>One interesting difference I noticed in all the cities including Baku was the absence of the old high rise Soviet style apartments. Of course there were some but not as many as in other former Soviet States. I have travelled through many parts of Russia and everywhere I have gone, even in the smallest town or the smallest village, high-rise apartments proliferate. They didn’t seem to know anything else — they just built high rises and put people into them. In Azerbaijan, by contrast, there are a lot of one-storey, two-storey, and three-storey buildings. Even in Baku, there is a massive amount of what you’d call low-rise accommodation and it obviously isn’t new so not everybody lived in apartments in the Soviet Union, as we were led to believe.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YO3RTs10e16XB8-MGTH04A.jpeg" /><figcaption>Baku.</figcaption></figure><p>I did mention that I wouldn’t recommend driving in Azerbaijan so let me explain. Back in the old Soviet Union, the philosophy was to keep foreigners out and natives in and to make moving around as difficult as possible. Hence it was difficult for a local to get an exit visa and it was difficult for a foreigner to get a visitor visa. Ah, but the clincher was the traffic police. My ex-colleagues will tell you that these people were everywhere, lying in wait to catch you (and fine you) for all sorts of offences — both real and imaginary. It made driving round quite difficult and apart from the roving traffic police, there were numerous checkpoints.</p><p>Nowadays, the checkpoints are gone but the traffic police are as numerous as ever, if not more so. Whereas in the past they used mobile speed detectors, Azerbaijan now has the most comprehensive and sophisticated traffic policing system I have seen anywhere. Cameras are literally everywhere; on every road, major or minor; in every town and village, even in the remotest places. There are so many of them that it is advisable to pick the lowest speed imaginable and just stick to it because the limits can change with bewildering rapidity and for no apparent reason. For instance, you can be on a major highway where the limit is 90 kph and for some reason, the limit may decrease suddenly to 60 kph, even though there is no village or no visible presence. And rest assured all these ‘traps’ will have sophisticated cameras which will detect you from numerous angles. The police are still there too except that in the old days they drove Ladas but now all have BMW’s.</p><p>The official word is that all these systems have been installed to improve driver behaviour and reduce road accidents and road deaths, where Azerbaijan has a poor record. However, for me, it threw up an interesting paradox. Even though they have a very sophisticated system for catching drivers who break the rules, particularly the ubiquitous speed cameras and radar systems, the underlying driving behaviour can still feel remarkably chaotic.<br> <br> It may seem like I’m criticizing drivers here but I’m not really. After a week of driving, I’ve found the combination of the two quite striking. There seems to be a lot of abrupt lane changing and little use of indicators; tailgating; overtaking in situations where you wouldn’t normally expect it; cars cutting across several lanes to make an exit; sudden acceleration followed by equally sudden braking and poor lane discipline. Drivers pay far more attention to where the cameras are rather than simply maintaining a sensible speed. It leads to very erratic driving and a general assumption that other road users will somehow accommodate whatever manoeuvre is being attempted.<br> <br> So Azerbaijan has a highly effective system for controlling speed while still having what feels like fairly poor driving behaviour. The cameras can control something that is easy to measure objectively — speed. But they can’t easily control judgement, courtesy, anticipation or sensible decision-making. And that may help explain something in the road-safety statistics. I may even write a separate article about this as I’ve always found that over-policing a situation is inevitably counter-productive.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*twufaunBOfR3o9qSAs0dig.jpeg" /><figcaption>Looks new? It’s 45 years old.</figcaption></figure><p>But enough of criticism; I’ll make one final observation on the traffic. I was amazed by the number of old Ladas, or Zhigulis, as they were known locally, that are still on the roads. Even more so, the amazing fact is that while most have to be at least forty years old, they seem to be kept in pristine condition. Apparently there are still 400,000 Zhigulis registered to drive in Azerbaijan and about 200,000 other Soviet era vehicles. I spoke to some of the owners and they told me the cars are simple, unsophisticated, with practically no electronics but are simple to repair and maintain and apparently are very reliable. They seem to be proud of the cars and maintain them really well.</p><p>But I’m digressing and should get back to my travel recommendations. Would I recommend Azerbaijan as a tourist destination? Yes, absolutely — if you want guaranteed good weather, sunshine and sea, endless beaches, beautiful scenery, really friendly people and very reasonable prices, this is the place for you. But go on a tour or a package — <strong><em>don’t drive</em></strong>.</p><p>How to get there: Most major European airlines have flights to Baku. There is no direct service from Dublin so I flew through Istanbul. You will find that flights are also good value.</p><p>I didn’t mention the political situation at all in this travel blog, purely because of just that — it’s a travel guide. The political situation is very stable and the country is very safe for a tourist. I’ll talk about the politics in a separate article. In fact, this trip will likely spawn many different articles on different aspects of life in Azerbaijan. Watch this space.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7a011e9d2104" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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