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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Lokesh Sharma on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Lokesh Sharma on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@lokeshh?source=rss-e21a5a1ca7bd------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Lokesh Sharma on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@lokeshh?source=rss-e21a5a1ca7bd------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is the Purpose of Mokṣa?]]></title>
            <link>https://lokeshh.medium.com/what-is-the-purpose-of-mok%E1%B9%A3a-a5723cf91800?source=rss-e21a5a1ca7bd------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[advaita]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[advaitavedanta]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lokesh Sharma]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Mar 2025 05:00:18 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-20T05:00:18.548Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If the Ātman is inherently free from suffering, what is the need for mukti?</p><p>If mokṣa has practical significance in worldly life, then as long as one inhabits a body and engages in daily affairs, the total eradication of suffering remains impossible. Even among revered Gurus, believed to be jīvanmuktas who have realized the ultimate truth, we still observe traces of discontent or irritation.</p><p>Vedāntins often respond to this objection by arguing that even though a jīvanmukta experiences suffering in daily life, they remain inwardly detached, knowing they are immune to it in reality. As a result, they are supposedly less affected by suffering than an ordinary person.</p><p>This brings me to my hypothesis: mokṣa is merely a psychological construct — a mental trick designed to shield us from life’s harsh realities, such as the inevitability of death, the loss of loved ones, and our vulnerability to illness. Vedānta alleviates this mental burden by instilling the belief that we are immune to suffering, that we are neither born nor do we die, and that everything is an illusion — so that we stop worrying beyond a certain point.</p><p>This psychological trick of “believing oneself to be Brahman” works, making Vedānta popular even in the face of its absurd conclusions, such as: everything is an illusion, I am neither body nor mind, I have no worries, the body is not mine, etc.</p><p>These absurd Vedāntic conclusions certainly have a utility, but that does not change the fact that they do not represent the truth. When I confront Vedāntins with these contradictions, I face harsh criticism and am often labeled a śuṣkatārkika — one who engages in “dry logic.”</p><p>Vedāntins go to great lengths to defend their claims, even if it means distorting the meaning of well-accepted words. For example:</p><ul><li>“Real” and “unreal” are redefined as “permanent” and “impermanent,” even though their commonly accepted meaning is based on functional efficacy.</li><li>“Illusion” is defined in such a way that the world must still be taken seriously since it affects the body and mind.</li><li>The term “I,” which ordinarily refers to a person as a mind-body complex, is reinterpreted as “infinite consciousness.” People are then led to believe that they have nothing to do with the mind or body and that everything happens automatically, like light illuminating a room. Yet, in practice, they still employ intent in their actions while telling themselves they are not the doer.</li><li>The term “doer,” which refers to an individual performing actions, is manipulated to fit different contexts. Sometimes, it is claimed that Ātman is the doer of everything; at other times, it is said that Ātman does nothing.</li></ul><p>Ultimately, all sorts of word jugglery are employed to make it seem as if the Vedāntic worldview is true. But is it? I don’t think so. The world is not an illusion. Suffering is a fundamental reality of life, and there is no way to completely eliminate it as long as we live. We are born, we die, our loved ones are ours, and we certainly have something to do with them. We care about them, which makes us susceptible to both happiness and sorrow.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a5723cf91800" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Advaita Vedanta vs Cārvāka / Lokāyatika (The materialists)]]></title>
            <link>https://lokeshh.medium.com/advaita-vedanta-vs-c%C4%81rv%C4%81ka-lok%C4%81yatika-the-materialists-2bd837a99dd0?source=rss-e21a5a1ca7bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2bd837a99dd0</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lokesh Sharma]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 26 Oct 2024 08:00:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-10-26T08:00:28.543Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Cārvāka philosophy holds that there is no separate consciousness apart from the body; rather, consciousness is dependent on the body. Just as bearing fruit is a property of a mango tree, consciousness is a property of the body. Without the mango tree, the mango fruit cannot exist; similarly, without the body, consciousness cannot be found.</p><p>Adi Shankara gives their viewpoint in BrS 3.3.53 — लोकायतिकाः देहव्यतिरिक्तस्य आत्मनोऽभावं मन्यमानाः, समस्तव्यस्तेषु बाह्येषु पृथिव्यादिष्वदृष्टमपि चैतन्यं शरीराकार-परिणतेषु भूतेषु स्यादिति — सम्भावयन्तस्तेभ्यश्चैतन्यम्, मदशक्तिवत् विज्ञानम् चैतन्यविशिष्टः कायः पुरुषः — इति च आहुः। न स्वर्ग-गमनाय अपवर्ग-गमनाय वा समर्थो देहव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा अस्ति,</p><p>the <em>Lokāyatikas</em> (Materialists), who consider <em>Jīva</em>-Self as such as apart from the body does not exist, And who also hold, that sentiency (<em>Caitanya</em>) which is not perceived to exist in matter etc., taken both singly or collectively (<em>Samasta-vyasteṣu</em>), May yet possibly exist when the elements transform themselves into the form of a body, And say, that sentiency like some intoxicating power, results from those elements, And that a <em>Puruṣa</em> is merely a body possessed of such sentiency, And that there is no <em>Jīva</em>-Self as such as apart from the body, capable of proceeding to the heavenly world or capable of obtaining Final Release.</p><p>It is important to clarify that materialists define a conscious person (<em>puruṣa</em> or <em>ātman</em>) as a body (<em>kāya</em>) qualified by sentience (<em>chaitanya-viśiṣṭa</em>). They do not simplistically assert that the unqualified body alone constitutes the conscious person.</p><p>Adi Shankara refutes the Carvaka philosophy in the next sutra, ie BrS 3.3.53, with mainly the following arguments —</p><p>यदि देहभावे भावात् देहधर्मत्वम् आत्मधर्माणां मन्येत — ततो देहभावेऽपि अभावात् अतद्धर्मत्वमेव एषां किं न मन्येत?</p><p>1. If you accept consciousness as a property of the body because it is seen only when a body is there, why don’t you accept that consciousness is not a property of the body because it is not seen even when body is there.</p><p>अपि च सति हि तावत् देहे जीवदवस्थायाम् एषां भावः शक्येत निश्चेतुम्, न तु असत्यभावः पतितेऽपि कदाचिदस्मिन्देहे देहान्तरसञ्चारेण आत्मधर्मा अनुवर्तेरन्।</p><p>2. Besides as long as the body exists, It is possible to ascertain the existence of these attributes (of the <em>Ātmā</em>) conclusively, as long as life exists, But it is not possible to ascertain their non-existence conclusively, After the body has ceased to exist, because may be (for aught we know) the attributes may well continue to exist in the <em>Ātmā</em>, even when perchance the body has fallen, the <em>Ātmā</em> having transmigrated into another body.</p><p>न हि भूतभौतिकधर्मेण सता चैतन्येन भूतभौतिकानि विषयीक्रियेरन्।</p><p>3. If sentiency be the attribute of elements and their products, They cannot be made the objects of such sentiency,</p><p>उपलब्धि-स्वरूप एव च न आत्मेति आत्मनो देहव्यतिरिक्तत्वम्।</p><p>4. Now the <em>Ātmā</em> as we understand it (for us), is of the nature of perception, and hence of course, this <em>Ātmā</em> is an entity apart from the body.</p><p>नित्यत्वं च उपलब्धेः, ऐकरूप्यात्, ‘अहम् इदम् अद्राक्षम्’ इति च अवस्थान्तरयोगेऽप्युपलब्धृत्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्, स्मृत्याद्युपपत्तेश्च।</p><p>5. Now this perception being of a uniform nature, the <em>Ātmā</em> is eternal, Because even under circumstances of a different condition (such as a dream-condition) it recognizes itself as the perceiver, thus — ‘It is I that saw this’, And besides it is only thus that <em>Smṛtis</em> etc. become reasonably sustainable.</p><p>अपि च सत्सु प्रदीपादिषु उपकरणेषु उपलब्धिर्भवति असत्सु न भवतीति — न च एतावता प्रदीपादिधर्म एव उपलब्धिर्भवति; एवं सति देहे उपलब्धिर्भवति, असति च न भवतीति — न देहधर्मो भवितुमर्हति; उपकरणत्वमात्रेणापि प्रदीपादिवत् देहोपयोगोपपत्तेः। न च अत्यन्तं देहस्य उपलब्धावुपयोगोऽपि दृश्यते, निश्चेष्टेऽप्यस्मिन्देहे स्वप्ने नानाविधोपलब्धिदर्शनात्। तस्मादनवद्यं देहव्यतिरिक्तस्य आत्मनोऽस्तित्वम्॥५४॥</p><p>6. Besides, because, perception (of objects) takes place only when auxiliary implements such as a lamp etc. are available, And as it does not take place in the absence of such auxiliary implements, It cannot, merely on that ground, become the property of a lamp etc. In the same manner, because, perception takes place when a body exists and does not take place when a body does not exist, It does not thereby deserve to be the property of the body. Because, it is reasonably sustainable that like the lamp etc., a body is merely useful as an auxiliary implement. Nor is it that a body is invariably necessary in the matter of perception, Because when during dream-condition the body has absolutely no movement, A variety of perceptions is observable. Therefore, (the view) that the Self as apart from a body, does exist, is clearly flawless.</p><p>I am not convinced by the arguments of Adi Shankara for the following reasons:</p><ol><li><strong>Existence of Atman Independent of Body</strong>: Adi Shankara argues that Atman exists apart from the body because, when a person dies, the body remains but consciousness (Atman) is no longer present. However, as Carvaka philosophers have argued, consciousness only manifests in a “qualified” body, i.e., one that is functioning properly. A similar example would be if someone claimed that a mango fruit is a property of a mango tree, but the tree doesn’t always produce fruit. This doesn’t deny the dependency of the fruit on the tree; it simply requires certain conditions. In the same way, materialists assert that consciousness depends on a functional body and does not appear independently.</li><li><strong>Transmigration of Atman</strong>: Adi Shankara suggests that Atman moves from one body to another. While this may have seemed plausible historically, modern scientific research provides no evidence to support the existence of an Atman that transfers between bodies after death. Without empirical support, this claim seems implausible to me.</li><li><strong>Consciousness Interacting with Itself</strong>: Adi Shankara argues that consciousness cannot be a property of the body if it can interact with itself. However, I find this reasoning flawed. For instance, forest fires, which originate within a forest, consume the very forest that sustains them. Here, fire emerges from friction within the forest, spreading and ultimately turning the forest to ash. Similarly, there is no contradiction in consciousness arising from specific bodily configurations and being able to reflect upon itself.</li><li><strong>Consciousness as a Property of the Body</strong>: Materialists do distinguish consciousness from the body itself; they do not equate the two. Instead, they claim that consciousness is a property of the body and does not exist independently. For instance, when two stones collide, sound is produced. Sound is not identical to the stones, yet it is a property arising from their interaction and cannot exist separately from it. Similarly, consciousness is always observed in connection with the body and therefore is argued to be dependent on it.</li><li><strong>Uniformity and Independence of Consciousness</strong>: Shankara claims that the uniformity of self-awareness across varying perceptions implies an independent Atman. However, this uniformity does not indicate independence. Fire remains consistent whether it is fueled by one container of petrol or another, yet fire is still dependent on fuel. Consciousness also varies depending on the body: it has certain limitations in animals, more so in insects, and so forth. Observing this, it becomes clear that consciousness is highly dependent on the bodily structure.</li><li><strong>Dream Argument</strong>: Shankara argues that because perception occurs in dreams without bodily movement, it suggests an independent Atman. Yet, brain activity during dreaming is observable with modern technology, like CT scans, which can even identify when a person is dreaming versus in deep sleep. Dream consciousness is thus invariably linked with the physical body and does not support an independently existing Atman.</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2bd837a99dd0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Madhyamaka Buddhism in Contrast with Vedānta (Part 1 — On Jīvanmukta)]]></title>
            <link>https://lokeshh.medium.com/madhyamaka-buddhism-in-contrast-with-ved%C4%81nta-part-1-on-j%C4%ABvanmukta-bb133a782f3d?source=rss-e21a5a1ca7bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bb133a782f3d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vedanta]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[madhyamaka]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lokesh Sharma]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 18 Aug 2024 08:23:32 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-08-18T08:23:32.074Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Madhyamaka Buddhism in Contrast with Vedānta (Part 1 — On Jīvanmukta)</h3><p>In this series, I plan to contrast Madhyamaka Buddhism with Vedānta. I have long been a student of Vedānta and certainly appreciate many aspects of it. However, there are certain areas where I believe Madhyamaka Buddhism provides a more coherent perspective than Vedānta. I wish to present these aspects to followers of Advaita Vedānta so they too can appreciate these insights. Even if someone is not interested in appreciating these aspects, this series will still be helpful for learning about Buddhism as an alternative philosophy. This way, Advaita followers can better understand the arguments presented by Buddhists and respond appropriately.</p><p>In this post, I will give a broad outline of how Madhyamaka Buddhists view the universe, their concept of liberation, and how it contrasts with Advaita Vedānta. Since this post aims to provide an overview, I will avoid delving into specific details of certain ideas, which will be fully explained in later parts. Additionally, I will focus on the problem of Jīvanmukta in Advaita Vedānta and demonstrate how Buddhist thought resolves it.</p><p>The views in this post pertain specifically to Madhyamaka Buddhism, a school of thought expounded by Ārya Nāgārjuna in the 2nd century CE. Madhyamaka Buddhism is also known as Śūnyavāda.</p><p>The philosophy of Madhyamaka Buddhism is simple and can be summed up in a single equation:</p><p>**प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद = शून्यता** <br>**Dependent arising = Emptiness**</p><p>Before I explain this key philosophy, let me show why it’s essential to understand this equation. According to Madhyamaka Buddhists, the reason for expounding the knowledge of Śūnyatā (emptiness) is to eliminate suffering. Buddhists assert that the direct cause of suffering is not physical but mental. This direct cause is called **क्लेश** (*klesha*), which means mental affliction. There are three types of *klesha* that ultimately cause suffering: **राग** (*rāga*), **द्वेष** (*dveṣa*), and **मोह** (*moha*). The third one, *moha* (delusion), is the primary cause among the three that gives rise to suffering. This is also known as **अविद्या** (*avidyā*), which is similar to the concept of ignorance in Vedānta in many respects. This *avidyā* is the primary cause of suffering. To remove suffering, one needs to eradicate *avidyā*, and this ignorance can be removed by understanding the equation stated above.</p><p>This is the overall worldview of Madhyamaka Buddhism. There is suffering; the suffering has a primary cause, which is ignorance. To get rid of suffering, one needs to eliminate ignorance, and to do so, one must understand emptiness.</p><p>What is this emptiness? I will explore it in more detail later. For now, let’s briefly discuss ignorance. What kind of ignorance must we remove to eliminate suffering?</p><p>To explain this ignorance, Buddhists divide reality into two realms:</p><p>**संवृत्तिः** (*saṃvṛtti*) — The realm of experience. Everything we experience, from physical objects to the subtlest thoughts, falls under this realm. In short, all our experiences perceived by the mind fall into this category.</p><p>**परमार्थ** (*paramārtha*) — The ultimate reality. This realm posits the complete absence of any phenomenon whatsoever. It asserts that anything that can be experienced by the mind and expressed in words cannot have substantial existence.</p><p>The primary cause of our suffering, or ignorance, is taking what we experience at face value and thinking it to be real. This is the single most important point, so let me restate it in other words: The ignorance we are trying to remove is the belief that what we experience is substantially real.</p><p>Madhyamaka Buddhists do not deny our experiences; they only deny that these experiences are based on something substantially real. In other words, they do not oppose any of the experiences of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, etc., that we undergo. They only deny the substantial existence of these phenomena.</p><p>The idea that experiences have substantial reality in the backdrop is the main ignorance that we aim to eliminate here. Proving that experiences do not have any substantial reality is the intended goal of Madhyamaka Buddhism. Once this is realized, suffering dissipates. How exactly understanding the non-substantiality of experiences results in the dissipation of suffering is a topic in itself and will be discussed in future parts. For now, please take this point for granted.</p><p>**Dependent arising = Emptiness**</p><p>The above equation serves to prove that the experiences we have are not substantial in themselves. That’s it.</p><p>Mādhyamikas do not deny the effectiveness of experiences we observe, such as food and water relieving hunger, warm clothes warding off cold, or a pot being used to carry water. These experiences and their effectiveness are not denied. What is denied is the substantial existence of all phenomena, including food, water, hunger, warm clothes, pots, water, etc. The obvious question is: how can experience and effectiveness occur if there is no object, if there is no substance at all? This is now explained.</p><p>All our experiences can be effectively reduced to a single term: **प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद** (*pratītyasamutpāda*), which means “dependent arising.” This means that any phenomenon or object arises in dependence on other objects or phenomena. This is the left-hand side of the equation. The right-hand side of the equation is Śūnyatā, which means emptiness, specifically the absence of substantiality in all phenomena or objects.</p><p>Once we prove that *pratītyasamutpāda* implies Śūnyatā, it achieves the intended goal of proving that experiences occur without being real, without being backed by any real object. Now, understand that this is counterintuitive. Whenever we experience something, we are quick to assign a substance behind it. This is why understanding this statement is challenging and requires concentration.</p><p>I will briefly justify this statement with an example without delving into a rigorous proof, as this post is just an overview.</p><p>The intuition is as follows: We all experience a mirage when certain conditions are met, such as when there’s a hot surface, clear sun, and when we are looking far away. The appearance of a mirage is a phenomenon that depends on specific causes and conditions. Similarly, all phenomena in the world can be said to resemble a mirage because everything in the world is nothing but a product of causes and conditions. As long as these causes and conditions are met, the phenomenon will appear, and when they are not met, the phenomenon will cease to exist. Just as a mirage is false, having no substantial existence of its own and relying on causes and conditions for its appearance and effectiveness, similarly, all phenomena in the world are false, relying on their causes and conditions for their appearance and effectiveness. Without these causes and conditions, the phenomena cannot arise and are, therefore, false just like a mirage. All the phenomena in the world are like this. They arise when certain causes and conditions are met and not otherwise. If we attempt to grasp them, they are found to be insubstantial. As soon as their causes and conditions vanish, they too vanish, like an illusion.</p><p>Having justified the equation above, we are finally in a position to discuss what this ultimately amounts to. It simply means that all phenomena, because they are products of causes and conditions, are essentially unreal in their essence. Every object and phenomenon that can be seen in the world, perceived by the mind, grasped by the senses, or described by words is essentially an illusion. Just like an illusion is experienced and yet effective, all phenomena are experienced and effective even though they are substantially unreal.</p><p>**What does this imply for a Jīvanmukta? How does it solve the problem of Jīvanmukta faced in Vedānta?**</p><p>I will address this now.</p><p>In Vedānta, one paradox or absurdity faced is that if everything is unreal, what’s the need for practicing anything? What’s the need for realizing Brahman? What’s the need to do any of this? And once Brahman is realized, what is it like? Does one still undergo experiences or not? If one undergoes experiences, does one still have *avidyā* or not? If one doesn’t have *avidyā*, how does the world appear? If *avidyā* exists, then how is one liberated? Does the world disappear for a Jīvanmukta?</p><p>All these questions are answered in the worldview of Mādhyamikas. Let me show how. Even when the non-substantiality of phenomena is understood by a *jñānī* according to Buddhism, the mind continues to perceive phenomena because of dependent arising. Although the mind is substantially absent and is like an illusion, it continues to function just like an illusion. For example, a mirage does not disappear once you realize its insubstantiality; the movie on the screen doesn’t disappear even though you realize its insubstantiality. In the same way, the world doesn’t disappear for a *jñānī* who realizes the insubstantiality of the world. The *jñānī* itself is unreal like an illusion and is just an appearance, like a mirage. Similarly, all phenomena concerning realization, bondage, liberation, Buddha, the path to reality, etc., are all substantially unreal and yet effective by virtue of the equation between emptiness and dependent arising.</p><p>Just as an illusory woman in a movie gives knowledge to an illusory man</p><p>in a movie, similarly, in the real world, illusory people are getting liberated. In reality, there is no substantiality in either a *jñānī* or realization. Just the correct understanding of phenomena is realization and liberation, nothing else. There is nothing substantive in this entire world. Everything is governed by causes and conditions and is, hence, an illusion.</p><p>This completes the first part of the series. Feel free to post any questions, comments, or critiques regarding the above topic.</p><p>In the next part, I plan to discuss the nature of ignorance — whether it is *sat*, *asat*, or *anirvacanīya* — which is a point of dispute in Vedānta. I wish to discuss how Madhyamaka Buddhism easily resolves all questions related to ignorance.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bb133a782f3d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Studying Sureśvaracarya’s Reply to Buddhists in Naiśkarmyasiddhi — Part 3(Atman is not light but…]]></title>
            <link>https://lokeshh.medium.com/studying-sure%C5%9Bvaracaryas-reply-to-buddhists-in-nai%C5%9Bkarmyasiddhi-part-3-atman-is-not-light-but-848a39c264f3?source=rss-e21a5a1ca7bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/848a39c264f3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[advaita]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[buddhism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lokesh Sharma]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Aug 2024 15:55:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-08-17T15:55:29.796Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><a href="https://lokeshh.medium.com/studying-sure%C5%9Bvaracaryas-reply-to-buddhists-in-nai%C5%9Bkarmyasiddhi-part-1-the-objection-df530ff4aa84">Studying Sureśvaracarya’s Reply to Buddhists in Naiśkarmyasiddhi — Part 3(Atman is not light but clear sky)</a></h3><p>(My comments will be in brackets)</p><p>अयमत्रांशो विवक्षित इति ज्ञापनायाह ।</p><p>यदवस्था व्यनक्तीति<br>तदवस्थैव सा पुनः ।<br>भण्यते न व्यनक्तीति<br>घटादीनाम् असन्निधौ ।।</p><p>Here (through the previous examples) what we wish to tell, we explain —</p><p>The property by which it illuminates (nearly pot, etc)<br>by the same property again,<br>it is said to be not illuminating<br>when not near pot, etc.</p><p>तत्र च —</p><p>सर्वधीव्यञ्जकस् तद्वत्<br>परमात्मा प्रदीपः ।<br>सनिध्यसन्निधानेषु <br>धीवृत्तिनाम् अविक्रियः ।।</p><p>न प्रकाशक्रिया काचिद्<br>अस्य स्वात्मनि विद्यते ।<br>उपचारात्क्रिया सास्य <br>यः प्रकाश्यस्य सन्निधिः ।।</p><p>Here again, —</p><p>Just as a lamp illuminates all modifications (vṛttis) of the mind,<br>so too does the Paramātman serve as a lamp,<br>illuminating the vṛttis placed near it,<br>while itself remaining unchanged.</p><p>[In reality] there belongs no activity of <br>illumination in Atman.<br>Only, the proximity of the illuminated<br>is determined as activity of illumination.</p><p>(Sureśvaracarya appears to resolve the problem of attributing illumination to the Ātman. However, one issue persists: the assumption of existance of Atman and other objects resulting in a duality. When objects are near, the Ātman supposedly illuminates them. Does this sound familiar? Yes, this is quite similar to the Sāṅkhya theory.)</p><p>मैवं शङ्किष्ठाः साङ्ख्यराद्धन्तोयमिति । यतः —</p><p>यथा विशुद्ध आकाशे<br>सहसैवाभ्रमण्डलम् ।<br>भूत्वा विलीयते तद्वद्<br>आत्मनीहाखिलं जगत् ।।</p><p>By this, don’t think that we have accepted the philosophy of Sankhya. Because —</p><p>Just as in the clear sky,<br>clouds suddenly appear,<br>exist for a while, and then vanish,<br>so too does the entire universe appear, exist, and dissolve in the Ātman.</p><p>(With this, Sureśvaracarya clarifies his perspective on the arising, existence, and destruction of objects within the Ātman. According to him, these objects have no real existence; they merely appear to arise, exist, and vanish, much like clouds in the clear sky.</p><p>This concludes my analysis of Sureśvaracarya’s response to the Buddhist objection regarding the existence of Ātman, with Buddhists not accepting existence of all phenomena including Atman.</p><p>Feel free to share your thoughts on whether you believe Sureśvaracarya has satisfactorily addressed the Buddhist objection. In my view, Sureśvaracarya falls short of providing a decisive response and often evades the core issue. Ultimately, his explanation seems to mirror the theory of Nāiratmya (non-self) or Śūnyavāda (emptiness) but with different terminology.</p><p><strong>Why I Consider Sureśvaracarya’s Ātman Similar to Śūnyatā:</strong></p><ul><li>Ācārya accepts that Ātman is like a clear sky, devoid of attributes. This is analogous to Śūnyatā.</li><li>Ācārya also denies agency and perception in Ātman, which parallels the concept of Śūnyatā.</li></ul><p>What I find problematic in Ācārya’s argument is his frequent shifts in position whenever the discussion starts to challenge Vedānta. There is no consistent theory. For instance, Ācārya begins by hypothesizing an Ātman that is both perceiver and agent. He then contends that this Ātman, being unchanging, lacks agency and perception. Later, he equates Ātman to the clear sky, a complete reversal from his initial position. And the original objection that is “why postulate the existence of Atman which is indistinguishable from non-existence” still remains unanswered.</p><p>When I evaluate Sureśvaracarya’s response as a whole, I find it epistemologically inferior. This becomes more apparent when compared to the Buddhist epistemology, which maintains a consistent, core theory that does not waver.</p><p>I plan to create a series of posts to clearly explain Śūnyatā and the theory of ignorance as per Buddhist philosophy. Through these posts, I aim to highlight the superiority of this way of thinking compared to the often confusing Vedāntic grasp of ignorance, which, to this day, remains unresolved regarding whether ignorance is <em>sat</em> (existent), <em>asat</em> (non-existent), or <em>anirvacanīya</em> (indescribable). The clarity and precision in Buddhist texts on ignorance leave no room for doubt, in stark contrast to the ambiguities in Vedānta. I hope admins of the group wouldn’t object to this.)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=848a39c264f3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Studying Sureśvaracarya’s Reply to Buddhists in Naiśkarmyasiddhi — Part 2(The Atman is not the…]]></title>
            <link>https://lokeshh.medium.com/studying-sure%C5%9Bvaracaryas-reply-to-buddhists-in-nai%C5%9Bkarmyasiddhi-part-2-the-atman-is-not-the-94b6ea1898f9?source=rss-e21a5a1ca7bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/94b6ea1898f9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[vedanta]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[advaitavedanta]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[buddhism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lokesh Sharma]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 16 Aug 2024 15:21:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-08-16T15:21:53.157Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><a href="https://lokeshh.medium.com/studying-sure%C5%9Bvaracaryas-reply-to-buddhists-in-nai%C5%9Bkarmyasiddhi-part-1-the-objection-df530ff4aa84?source=user_profile---------0----------------------------">Studying Sureśvaracarya’s Reply to Buddhists in Naiśkarmyasiddhi — Part 2(The Atman is not the doer)</a></h3><p>(My comments will be in brackets)</p><p>अस्य परिहारः</p><p>ऊर्ध्वं गच्छन्ति धूमे खं <br>भिद्यते स्विन्न भिद्यते ।<br>न भिद्यते चेत्स्थास्नुत्वं <br>भिद्यते भिदास्य का ।।</p><p>Resolution of the objection —</p><p>The smoke going up,<br>does it tear apart the space or not?<br>If it doesn’t, the smoke becomes stationary<br>if it does, how can space be torn apart?</p><p>(In ancient Indian philosophy space is thought to be part-less.)</p><p>इत्येतत्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थमाह ।</p><p>अविक्रियस्य भोक्तृत्वं <br>स्यादहंबुद्धिविभ्रमात् ।<br>नौयानविभ्रमाद्यद्वन्<br>नगेषु गतिकल्पनम् ।।</p><p>The intended meaning is explained —</p><p>The perceptivity of the un-moving (Atman) might appear<br>because of delusion corresponding to “I” thought.<br>Just like to a person sitting in moving boat,<br>the trees (on the shore) seems to be moving.</p><p>(Sureśvaracarya openly admits that Atman that is un-moving is not a perceiver, it’s perceptivity is only an illusion. In the same lines, it can be said that Atman is neither knowner nor an actor either directly or indirectly.</p><p>This is also stated by Śaṇkarācārya in Gītā Bhāṣya —</p><p>न अस्ति आत्मनः स्वतः कर्तृत्वं कारयितृत्वं च। उक्तं हि ‘अविकार्योऽयम्…उच्यते’ (<a href="https://upasanayoga.org/AKAruna/docs/BhG.htm#BhG.02.25"><strong>BhG.2.25</strong></a>) ‘शरीर-स्थोऽपि न करोति न लिप्यते’ (<a href="https://upasanayoga.org/AKAruna/docs/BhG.htm#BhG.13.31"><strong>BhG.13.31</strong></a>) इति। ‘ध्यायति इव लेलायति इव’ (<a href="https://upasanayoga.org/AKAruna/docs/BrhUEng.htm#BrhUEng.4.03.07"><strong>BrhUEng.4.3.7</strong></a>) इति श्रुतेः॥<br>The Self by Its nature has neither direct nor indirect agentship. For it was stated, ‘It is said that…This (Self) is unchangeable’ (<a href="https://upasanayoga.org/AKAruna/docs/BhG.htm#BhG.02.25"><strong>BhG.2.25</strong></a>). ‘O son of <em>Kuntī</em>, although existing in the body, It does not act, nor is It affected’ (<a href="https://upasanayoga.org/AKAruna/docs/BhG.htm#BhG.13.31"><strong>BhG.13.31</strong></a>). And it is also stated in the <em>Upaniṣad</em>, ‘It seems to meditate, as it were; It seems to move, as it were’ (<a href="https://upasanayoga.org/AKAruna/docs/BrhUEng.htm#BrhUEng.4.03.07"><strong>BrhUEng.4.3.7</strong></a>).</p><p>Although, Sureśvaracarya has clearly avoided the first part of the objection by simply discarding the knowership of Atman. The first part of the objection being —</p><p><em>If Atman is like skin, then it is subject to change,</em></p><p>The second part of the objection still entails that is —</p><p><em>Conversely, if It is like the sky, it is indistinguishable from non-existent.</em></p><p>This part intends to say that if Atman does nothing, knows nothing and is completely unmoving and attributeless, then what’s the point of positing it. How is any different from a complete void?</p><p>As we will see Sureśvaracarya will have hard time answering this. Anyhow, here’s how Sureśvaracarya tries to counter it.)</p><p>यथोक्तार्थाविष्करणाय दृष्टान्तरोपपादनम् ।</p><p>यथा जात्यमणेः शुभ्रा<br>ज्वलन्ती निश्चला शिखा ।<br>सन्निध्यसन्निधानेषु<br>घटादीनामसन्निधौ ।।</p><p>To clarify the meaning said before, another example is given —</p><p>Just like shining light of<br>supreme crystal remains unmoved<br>in presence as well as absence of<br>objects like pot, etc.</p><p>(So, does Atman remains unmoved whether in presence of other objects or not. Although, this example does a better job at answering the second part of the objection, by claiming that since Atman shines whether or not it is in contact with other objects or not. When it is in contact, it appears as the knower, agent, etc, and when it is not in contact it still shines as before. Therefore, both the definitions of Atman (one as unmoving and another as subject) are correct.</p><p>The problem with this example is that it results in a duality, as the author is dividing the objects into Atman and other objects, where Atman is the illuminator and other are objects to be illuminated. The other problem with this example is that the property shining is assigned to the Atman. Sureśvaracarya is well aware of these problems, and hence try to overcome in the upcoming part.)</p><p>(This ends the second part.)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=94b6ea1898f9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Studying Sureśvaracarya’s Reply to Buddhists in Naiśkarmyasiddhi — Part 1 (The objection)]]></title>
            <link>https://lokeshh.medium.com/studying-sure%C5%9Bvaracaryas-reply-to-buddhists-in-nai%C5%9Bkarmyasiddhi-part-1-the-objection-df530ff4aa84?source=rss-e21a5a1ca7bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/df530ff4aa84</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[advaitavedanta]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[buddhism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lokesh Sharma]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 08 Aug 2024 05:25:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-08-08T05:25:22.984Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Studying Sureśvaracarya’s Reply to Buddhists in Naiśkarmyasiddhi — Part 1 (The objection)</strong></h3><p>(My comments will be in brackets)</p><p>अत्रापि चोदयन्ति । अनुभवत्मनोपि विक्रियाभ्युपगमे अनभ्युपगमेपि दोष एव ।</p><p>Here too some people object — That which is self-evident (ie Atman) whether it be non-changing or changing, there will be fault.</p><p>यस्मादाह ।</p><p>वर्षातपाभ्यां किं व्योम्नः चर्मण्यस्ति तयोः फलम् । <br>चर्मोपमश्चेत् सो ऽनित्यः खतुल्यश्चेद् असत्समः ।।</p><p>Because they (Buddhists) say —</p><p>How does rain and heat impact the sky, <br>their impact is on the skin, <br>If Atman is like skin, then it is subject to change, <br>Conversely, if It is like the sky, it is indistinguishable from non-existent.</p><p>(Buddhists contend that a <strong>non-changing Subject i.e. Atman</strong> is untenable; the interplay of body, mind, senses, and other impermanent phenomena adequately explains experience.</p><p>Their argument unfolds thus: If the Atman is the perceiver, it must be akin to the skin, undergoing modifications like dryness, oiliness, aging, etc to perceive sensations like heat and cold. This implies a changing Atman, contradicting the initial premise.</p><p>Alternatively, if the Atman is a non-perceiver, unchanging like the sky unaffected by weather, it becomes functionally equivalent to nonexistence. In this case, its postulation seems unnecessary.)</p><p>(The same objection is explained in other words.)</p><p>बुद्धिजन्मनि पुंसश्च विकृतिर् यद्यनित्यता । <br>अथाविकृतिरेवायं प्रमातेति न युज्यते ।।</p><p>With the birth and death of thoughts, if the Atman <br>undergoes change, it would be impermanent. <br>On the other hand, if it remains unaffected, <br>It cannot be the knower or subject.</p><p>(This concludes the Buddhist objection. In the upcoming parts, I will examine Sureśvarācārya’s response to this argument and assess its integrity. Feel free to share your thoughts on the validity of this Buddhist objection.)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=df530ff4aa84" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Buddha stories]]></title>
            <link>https://lokeshh.medium.com/buddha-stories-7f1ad1d9d492?source=rss-e21a5a1ca7bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7f1ad1d9d492</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lokesh Sharma]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 02:33:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-03T02:33:35.256Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>And it is stated in the Noble Vajramaṇḍadhāraṇī,</h3><p>Those five hundred monks, not understanding the Exalted One’s teaching of the Doctrine (dharmadeśanā), not fathoming [it], not being convinced [by it], rose from [their] seats and went forth. Then the Exalted One created two [magical] monks on the path on which these monks were going. Those five hundred monks came near where those two monks were. Having come near, they said to the two [magical monks], “Where are the Venerable Ones about to go?” The [magical monk] creations said, “We are about to go to places in the forest. There we shall abide in states of comfort consisting in the happiness of meditation (dhyānasukhasparśavihāra). For we do not understand, do not fathom, are not convinced of the Doctrine the Exalted One teaches; we are afraid, are terrified [of it], we fall into [a state of] dread.” Then those five hundred monks said this: “We too, O Venerable Ones, do not understand the Exalted One’s teaching of the Doctrine, do not fathom [it], are not convinced [by it], are afraid, are terrified [of it], fall into dread. Therefore we shall, at places in the forest, abide in states of comfort consisting in the happiness of meditation.” The [magically] created [monks] said, “Then, Venerable Ones, we shall confer together, we shall not dispute; for the duty of the ascetic (śramaṇadharma) consists principally in [being] without strife (avivādaparama). For the sake of abandoning what have the Venerable Ones engaged in practice?” They said, “We have engaged in practice for the abandoning of desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa) and disorientation (moha).” The created [monks] said, “But do desire, hatred and disorientation [actually] exist for the Venerable Ones so that you might destroy them?” They replied, “Neither internally, nor externally, nor [somewhere] in between the two are they perceived; nor do they, unless one imagines them (aparikalpita), arise.” The [two] created [monks] said, “Therefore, O Venerable Ones, do not construct, do not conceptualize. And when you, O Venerable Ones, do not construct, do not conceptualize, you will not feel desirous, you will not become free from desire. And it is said that he who is not desirous, is not desireless, is at peace (śānta). Morality (śīla), O Venerable Ones, does not wander [in saṃsāra] (na saṃsarati), does not enter full nirvāṇa (na parinirvāti); concentration (samādhi), insight (prajñā), liberation (vimukti), and the knowledge and the vision of liberation (vimuktijñānadarśana), O Venerable Ones, do not wander in saṃsāra, do not enter full nirvāṇa. And nirvāṇa, O Venerable Ones, is indicated by these dharmas, but these dharmas are empty (śūnya), isolated by nature (prakṛtivivikta). Give up, O Venerable Ones, this notion (sañjñā), namely, ‘full nirvāṇa.’ Neither form a notion in regard to a notion nor see through a notion by way of a notion; because for the one who sees through a notion by way of a notion this becomes nothing but bondage to notions. O Venerable Ones, accomplish the absorption of the cessation of [all] notions and feelings (sañjñāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti). We assert that there is nothing left to be done by the monk who has accomplished the absorption of the cessation of [all] notions and feelings.” Then the minds (citta) of those five hundred monks, not clinging (anupādāya), became liberated from the influxes/impurities (āśrava). Those [monks] of liberated mind went near to where the Exalted One was, [and] come near, [and] having paid homage with their heads to his feet, sat to one side. Then the Venerable Subhūti said this to those monks: “Where did the Venerable Ones go? Or from where did you come?” They replied, “Not for going somewhere, not for coming from somewhere, O Reverend Subhūti, did the Exalted One teach the Doctrine.” [Subhūti] said, “Who, then, is the teacher of the Venerable Ones?” They said, “The one who has not arisen, [who] will not enter full nirvāṇa.” [Subhūti] said, “How (i.e., expecting what) have you listened to the Doctrine?” They said, “Not for bondage, not for liberation.” [Subhūti] said, “By whom have you been trained?” They said, “[By the one] who has no body, no mind.” [Subhūti] said, “How have you practised?” They said, “Not for abandoning ignorance, not for generating knowledge (vidyā).” [Subhūti] said, “Whose auditors (śrāvaka) are you?” They said, “[We are the auditors of the one] who has not attained [anything], who has not awakened to [anything].” [Subhūti] said, “Who are your fellow disciples (sabrahmacārin)?” They said, “[Those] who do not range in the triple world (tridhātu).” [Subhūti] said, “After how long a time will the Venerable Ones enter into full nirvāṇa?” They said, “When the [magical monks] created by the Tathāgata will enter into full nirvāṇa.” [Subhūti] said, “Have you done what is to be done?” They said, “Owing to seeing through the notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’ (ahaṅkāramamakāra).” [Subhūti] said, “Are your defilements (kleśa) exhausted?” They said, “Owing to the complete exhaustion of all phenomena (dharma).” [Subhūti] said, “Has Māra been overpowered by you?” They said, “Owing to the non-perception of Māra [represented by] the [five] constituent elements (skandha).” [Subhūti] said, “Has the teacher been honoured by you?” They said, “Not with the body, not with speech, not with the mind.” [Subhūti] said, “Has the ground (bhūmi) of those worthy of gifts (dakṣiṇīya) been purified by you?” They said, “From not taking, from not receiving.” [Subhūti] said, “Have you crossed over saṃsāra?” They said, “On account of non-annihilation (anuccheda), on account of noneternity (aśāśvata).” [Subhūti] said, “Have you attained the ground of those worthy of gifts?” They said, “From the release of all grasping (grāha).” [Subhūti] said, “Where do the Venerable Ones intend to go?” They said, “Where the [monks] created by the Tathāgata intend to go.” Right then as the Venerable Subhūti was questioning [them] and as those monks were responding, the minds of eight hundred monks in that assembly, not clinging, were liberated from the influxes/impurities, and of thirty-two thousand beings the Dharma-eye (dharmacakṣu) in regard to the teachings was purified (viśuddha), [to the point of being] dustless (virajas), delivered of [all] dross (vigatamala). In this way, a cause of purification was effected for the five hundred monks by way of the [two] monks created by the Tathāgata, [both of whom] had a false own-being.</p><h3>And it is stated in the Noble Vajramaṇḍadhāraṇī,</h3><p>“Just as, O Mañjuśrī, in dependence on a stick (kāṇḍa), in dependence on a churning stick (mathanī), and in dependence on a man’s manual exertion (hastavyāyama), smoke appears, [and] fire comes forth¾but that burning heat (santāpa) of the fire is not located in the stick, not located in the churning stick, not located in the man’s manual exertion¾exactly so, O Mañjuśrī, does the burn (paridāha) of desire (rāga), the burn of hatred (dveṣa), the burn of disorientation (moha) arise for a person (puruṣapudgala) who is disoriented by [subjective] error in regard to what is unreal. And that burn is not inside, not outside, not [somewhere] in between the two. But, Mañjuśrī, why is ‘disorientation’ (moha) called ‘disorientation’? Because disorientation is completely deprived (atyantamukta) of [the true nature of] all phenomena (dharma), O Mañjuśrī; therefore it is called ‘disorientation.’ Similarly, all phenomena have [a source like] the source of the hells (narakamukha), O Mañjuśrī; this is a formulaic phrase (dhāraṇīpada).” [Mañjuśrī] said, “How, O Exalted One, is this a formulaic phrase?” [The Exalted One] said, “The hells, O Mañjuśrī, fabricated by [subjective] error in regard to what is unreal by [spiritually] immature ordinary persons, have come about through [these persons’] own conceptuality (vikalpa).” [Mañjuśrī] said, “Where, O Exalted One, are the hells gathered together?” The Exalted One said, “The hells are gathered together in space, O Mañjuśrī. Then what do you think, O Mañjuśrī, have the hells come about by virtue of [these persons’] own conceptuality or have they come about by [their] own nature?” [Mañjuśrī] said, “Only by virtue of [their] own conceptuality, O Exalted One, do all [spiritually] immature ordinary persons know the hells and the animal [realm] and the world of Yama. And they, on account of [their] superimposition of the unreal, feel painful feeling, and experience [imagined] pain in all three bad destinies (apāya).” “And just as, O Exalted One, I see the hells [as unreal], so [do I see] hellish pain (duḥkha) [as unreal]. For example, O Exalted One, a certain man, asleep, in a dream, experiences himself as gone to hell. There, he would experience himself as cast into a boiling, glowing iron pot of many fathoms. Inside it, he would feel harsh, sharp, acute, agonizing pain; in it, he would experience mental anguish, he would be afraid, would be terrified, would fall into [a state of] dread. Then, upon awakening, he would cry out, would lament, would wail, ‘Oh, the pain! Oh, the pain!’ His friends, acquaintances and relatives would then inquire, ‘What is this pain of yours from?’ He would speak to those friends, acquaintances and relatives thus, ‘I have experienced the pain of the hells!’ He would [then] scold, would rebuke them [saying], ‘Really! I experience the pain of the hells, and you [go on to] ask me, ‘What is this pain of yours from?!’ Then those friends, acquaintances and relatives would speak to that man in the [following] way, ‘Ah, [good] fellow, don’t be afraid, don’t be afraid, for you were sleeping; you did not depart from this house for somewhere [else].’ Once again his memory would surface [and he would realize:] ‘I was asleep! This which I assumed [to be happening] is false (vitatha), unreal (abhūta).’ [And] once again he recovers [his] contentedness (saumanasya).” “Just as, O Exalted One, that man, through the superimposition of the unreal (asat), asleep, in a dream, would experience himself as gone to hell, in exactly the same way, O Exalted One, do all [spiritually] immature ordinary persons, ensnared by unreal desire, construct the appearance (nimitta) of a woman. Having constructed the appearance of a woman, they experience themselves playing amorously with those [women]. The [spiritually] immature ordinary person comes to think thus, ‘I am a man, this is a woman, this woman is mine.’ His mind, inasmuch as that mind is possessed by yearning and desire (chandarāga), goes in search of enjoyment (bhoga). For that reason he provokes arguments, quarrels and disputes. Because his [mental] faculty is corrupted, enmity (vaira) arises in him. He, on account of that ideational error (sañjñāviparyāsa), upon dying imagines himself as feeling agonizing pain in the hells for many thousands of aeons (kalpa).” “Just as, O Exalted One, the friends, acquaintances and relatives of that man [who dreamed he went to hell] speak thus, ‘Ah, [good] fellow, do not be afraid, do not be afraid, for you were sleeping; you did not depart from this house for somewhere [else],’ in just the same way, O Exalted One, do the Buddhas, the Exalted Ones, teach the Doctrine to beings who are mistaken due to an error of the mind (cittaviparyāsaviparyasta) thus: ‘There is no woman (strī) here, there is no man (puruṣa), no being (sattva), no living being (jīva), no individual (puruṣa), no person (pudgala). All these phenomena (dharma) are untrue (vitatha), all these phenomena are inexistent (asat). All these phenomena are fabricated (viṭhapita); like a magical illusion are all these phenomena, like a dream are all these phenomena, like magically created [things] are all these phenomena, like the moon [reflected] in water are all these phenomena,’ and so on in detail. They, having heard this the Tathāgata’s teaching of the Doctrine, see all phenomena as [things] for which desire (rāga) has faded, they see all phenomena as [things] in regard to which hatred (doṣa) has faded, they see all phenomena as [things] with regard to which disorientation (moha) has faded, as without own-being, without obstruction (anāvaraṇa). They die with the mind situated men are in space. After death they enter the sphere of nirvāṇa without remainder. [It is] in this way, [i.e., arisen from conceptuality and thus like a dream, etc.,] that I, O Exalted One, see the hells.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7f1ad1d9d492" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[There’s no person “I” to be found]]></title>
            <link>https://lokeshh.medium.com/theres-no-person-i-to-be-found-e33ee6716885?source=rss-e21a5a1ca7bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e33ee6716885</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[buddhism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[madhyamaka]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nagarjuna]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lokesh Sharma]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 02 Jan 2024 09:03:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-02T09:03:59.064Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>King Milinda then approached Venerable Nāgasena, exchanged pleasant greetings with him and sat on one side. Venerable Nāgasena greeted the king in return and gladdened his heart. King Milinda asked Venerable Nāgasena: “How is the revered one known? What is your name, revered sir?” “Sire, I am known as Nāgasena. My companions in the holy life address me as Nāgasena. Though parents give such names as Nāgasena or Sūrasena or Vīrasena or Sīhasena, this ‘Nāgasena’ is only a designation, a label, a concept, an expression, a mere name because there is no person as such that is found.”</p><p>Then King Milinda spoke thus: “Good sirs, let the Bactrian Greeks and the party of monks hear me. This Nāgasena says that ‘no person as such is found.’” He then spoke thus to Venerable Nāgasena: “If, revered Nāgasena, there is ‘no person as such,’ who gives you robes, alms food, lodgings, and medicinal requisites, and who makes use of them? Who guards morality, who meditates, who realizes the paths and fruits and attains Nirvāna? Who kills living beings, who takes what is not given, who indulges in sexual misconduct, who utters lies and who imbibes intoxicating drinks? Who commits the five evil acts that bear fruit without delay? Therefore, there is nothing wholesome or unwholesome, there is no one that does or makes another do wholesome or unwholesome acts, and there is neither fruit nor result of good or bad deeds. Also, revered Nāgasena, if someone were to kill you there would be no murder. You have no teacher, no preceptor, no ordination. If you say, ‘Co-farers in the holy life address me as “Nāgasena,”’ what is this Nāgasena? Is it, revered sir, the hairs of the head that are Nāgasena?” “No, sire.” “Are the hairs of the body Nāgasena?” “No, sire.” “Are the nails … The teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, bone marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, membranes, spleen, lungs, intestines, mesentery, stomach, faeces, brain, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, lymph, saliva, mucus, joint fluid or urine … are any of them Nāgasena?” “No, sire” “Is material form, revered sir, Nāgasena?” “No, sire.” “Or feeling, perception, mental formations or consciousness … are any of them Nāgasena?” “No, sire.” “Then, revered sir, are material form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness all together Nāgasena?” “No, sire.” “Well then, revered sir, is Nāgasena apart from material form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness?” “No, sire.” “Revered sir, though I have been asking you repeatedly, I do not see this Nāgasena. Nāgasena is only a sound. For who here is Nāgasena? You, revered sir, have spoken a falsehood, an untruth. There is no Nāgasena.”</p><p>Venerable Nāgasena then spoke thus: “You, sire, have been delicately nurtured as fits your noble birth. If, sire, you walk at noon-time on the hot scorching ground, trampling on sharp grit, pebbles and sand, your feet will hurt you, your body will be tired, your mind will be disturbed and you will suffer bodily pain. Now, did you come on foot or in a vehicle?” “I, revered sir, did not come on foot. I came in a chariot.” “If, sire, you came in a chariot, show me the chariot. Is the pole the chariot, sire?” “No, revered sir.” “Is the axle the chariot?” “No, revered sir.” “Are the wheels the chariot?” “No, revered sir.” “Is the body of the chariot … the flag-staff, the yoke, the reins, the goad … are any of them the chariot?” “No, revered sir.” “Then, sire, are the pole, the axle, the wheels, the body, the flag-staff, the yoke, the reins, the goad all together the chariot?” “No, revered sir.” “Well then, sire, is the chariot apart from the pole, the axle, the wheels, the body, the flag-staff, the yoke, the reins and the goad?” “No, sire.” “Sire, though I have been asking you repeatedly, I do not see this chariot. Chariot is only a sound. What then is the chariot you say you came in? You, sire, have spoken a falsehood, an untruth. There is no chariot. You are king over all India, a mighty monarch. Of whom are you afraid that you speak a lie? Let the Bactrian Greeks and all the monks listen to me. This King Milinda says, ‘I have come by chariot,’ but on being asked to show the chariot, he does not show it. Is it proper to approve of that?” When Venerable Nāgasena had spoken thus, all the Bactrian Greeks applauded him and told King Milinda: “Now, sire, speak if you can.” King Milinda then addressed Venerable Nāgasena: “I am not, revered sir, speaking a lie. It is because of the pole, because of the axle, the wheels, the body, the flag-staff, the yoke, the reins and because of the goad that ‘chariot’ exists as a mere designation.” “It is good, sire, that you understand a chariot. Even so is it for me, sire, because of the hairs of the head … because of the urine, because of material form … because of consciousness, that ‘Nāgasena’ exists as a mere designation. However, in the ultimate sense there is no person as such that is found. This, sire, was spoken by the nun Vajirā in the presence of the Blessed One (S I 135):</p><p><strong>Just as when the parts are rightly set <br>The word ‘chariot’ is spoken, <br>So when there are the aggregates <br>It is the convention to say ‘a being’.”</strong><br> <br>“It is wonderful, revered Nāgasena, it is marvellous. Your explanations are brilliant. If the Buddha were still here he would applaud. It is good, it is good, Nāgasena.”</p><p>Source — <em>The Questions of King Milinda: An Abridgement of the Milindapañha</em> by N.K.G. Mendis, <a href="https://www.bps.lk/library-search-select.php?id=bp217s">https://www.bps.lk/library-search-select.php?id=bp217s</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e33ee6716885" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Critique of Advaita Vedanta based on Madhyamaka school of Buddhism -]]></title>
            <link>https://lokeshh.medium.com/critique-of-advaita-vedanta-based-on-madhyamaka-school-of-buddhism-397e82225b15?source=rss-e21a5a1ca7bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/397e82225b15</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lokesh Sharma]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Oct 2023 17:02:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-11T17:03:39.955Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this critique, I wish to present the philosophical differences that exist between Advaita Vedanta and the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism. Founded by Acharya Nagarjuna, the Madhyamaka school offers a different perspective on the nature of reality and ignorance which I find more pleasing to comprehend, and which challenges key aspects of Advaita Vedanta.</p><h3><strong>Key Points about Madhyamaka:</strong></h3><ul><li><strong>Founder and Interpretation</strong>: Acharya Nagarjuna is credited as the founder of the Madhyamaka school. This school represents an interpretation of Gautam Buddha’s teachings and earns its name, “Madhyamaka” (which means “central”), because it skillfully rejects both the extremes of existence (भाव) and non-existence (अभाव) of objects.[1]</li><li><strong>School of Emptiness</strong>: The Madhyamaka is also commonly referred to as “śunyavāda,” signifying the “school of emptiness.” It firmly asserts that reality is devoid of intrinsic nature and lacks inherent existence.[2]</li><li><strong>Emptiness ≠ Non-Existence</strong>: It is of utmost importance to clarify that emptiness should not be misconstrued as non-existence. Nagarjuna emphasizes that when something is described as empty of intrinsic nature, it does not imply non-existence. Rather, it challenges our conventional understanding of the existence of any object which we take for granted. Declaring something as non-existent would be contradictory, as it presupposes the existence of the thing in the first place.[3]</li><li><strong>Non-Acceptance of Ultimate Reality (Nirvana)</strong>: Acharya Nagarjuna goes to the extent of not even accepting the true existence of the highest reality, Nirvana.[4] His teachings purely follow the principle of “नेति नेति” (not this, not this), and he refrains from making any positive assertions about reality. Instead, his focus remains on deconstructing false concepts.[5]</li></ul><h3><strong>Critique of Adi Shankara</strong></h3><p>Acharya Nagarjuna did not directly criticize the teachings of the Upanishads, to the best of my knowledge. However, the critique becomes apparent when one delves into a comparative study of both philosophies.</p><p>It is interesting to note that Ācārya Śāntirakṣita, the last proponent of Madhyamaka before Buddhism mysteriously disappeared in India, voiced a subtle concern regarding the teachings of the Upanishads. The crux of his concern lies in the Upanishadic assertion that ultimate reality is “nitya” (eternally existing), “constant” (immutable), and “चिन्मात्र” (pure knowledge). He subsequently proceeded to dismantle the Upanishadic school of thought.</p><p>In contrast, this critique pales in comparison to the rigorous critique that Ācārya Śāntirakṣita directed towards the Mimamsakas, Nyayayikas, Samkhyas, and others, rendering them without any ground. (Refer to “तत्त्वसङ्ग्रह”).</p><p>I aim to provide a concise summary of why Madhyamikas find Adi Shankara’s Vedantic understanding of reality unacceptable:</p><p>Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati (1880–1975) has elucidated that Avidya (devoid of intrinsic nature) is the cause of samsara (the cycle of birth and death), a viewpoint shared by Madhyamakas. Madhyamakas concur that the erroneous perception — assuming objects with intrinsic nature — is indeed the root cause of samsara. Correcting this perception leads to nirvana. [6]</p><p>Adi Shankara posits that Avidya is Adhyasa (superimposition) of attributes observed elsewhere onto something else. While Madhyamakas acknowledge the existence of superimposition, they do not claim it to be upon something real. Instead, they assert that superimposition occurs on emptiness, where entities with intrinsic nature are imagined within emptiness. In contrast, Adi Shankara contends that these entities are conceived within an existing entity called Atman.</p><p>Acharya Shankara faces this question in Adhyasa Bhashya when the opponent asks:</p><blockquote>कथं पुनः प्रत्यगात्मन्यविषयेऽध्यासो विषयतद्धर्माणाम्?</blockquote><blockquote>(The opponent says) — How can there be a superimposition of a sense-object and its attributes on the Universal Self (Pratyag-ātmā) when the Universal Self is not an object?</blockquote><p>The opponent rightly points out that Atman cannot be a definite object, thus challenging the claim that there is superimposition on a definite object named Atman.</p><p>This objection is quite valid, in my opinion, and echoes the same concern that Madhyamakas would likely have raised had they debated Acharya Shankara. A multitude of problems arises when asserting that Atman is a real object rather than something beyond both existence and non-existence, i.e., sunyata (emptiness).</p><p>One immediate issue is the descent into duality when Atman is regarded positively as a real object. Language operates in such a way that attributing one quality (reality in this case) to Atman inevitably invites recognition of opposite qualities (because reality has no meaning unless you recognize its opposite non-reality). The affirmation of permanence and constancy within Atman necessitates the recognition of impermanence and change, otherwise, the statement that Atman is real, permanent, and unchanging has no meaning.</p><p>Acharya Shankara responds:</p><blockquote>उच्यते — न तावदयमेकान्तेनाविषयः, अस्मत्प्रत्यय-विषयत्वात्, अपरोक्षत्वाच्च प्रत्यगात्मप्रसिद्धेः;</blockquote><blockquote>Our reply — The Universal Self is not entirely devoid of objectivity, as it is an object denoted by the term ‘Asmat,’ and it is widely acknowledged that the Universal Self can be directly and intuitively perceived.</blockquote><p>Acharya Shankara contends that Atman is not entirely devoid of objectivity since it can be directly and intuitively perceived.</p><p>Madhyamakas might counter this by pointing out that the perception of Asmat (“I”ness) is inseparable from Yusmat / Idanta (“you”ness / “that”ness), illustrating that subject and object are not independent. Acharya Nagarjuna presents various compelling arguments in “मध्यमकशास्त्र,” the foundational text of the Madhyamaka school, to support this view.</p><p>Another objection that arises is, if you accept the existence of Atman based on perception, why do you concurrently deny the existence of objects other than Atman which are also established as per one’s intuitive perception?</p><p>The third objection to positing Atman as an existing entity is that it necessitates the acknowledgment of non-Atman. This, in turn, grants ontological existence to Adhyasa, which deviates from the intended purpose.</p><p>All these issues find resolution when one refrains from asserting the existence of an entity named Atman that is permanent and unchanging. Acknowledging such an entity places the burden of explaining the appearance of diversity, which becomes challenging unless an ontological status is granted to Avidya, equating it with Atman.</p><p>Scholars of Madhyamaka schools recognize this issue, hence advocating the concept of sunyata (emptiness) over a definite ultimate reality called Atman possessing an intrinsic nature.</p><p>With this, I conclude this post. I also wish to discuss how Madhyamakas only rely on logic to reach the highest truth while using the teachings of Gautam Buddha just as a guiding principle rather than as an infallible truth. This can be discussed in another post.</p><p><strong>References</strong> -</p><p><strong>[1]</strong> भावाभावव्यतिक्रान्ता मतिर्येषामनाश्रिता ।</p><p>तैर्गम्भीरो निरलम्बः प्रत्ययार्थः प्रतीयते ॥ युक्ति_१</p><p>Those (men) whose minds, having gone beyond existence and non-existence, do not cling (to anything), (those men) understand the profound and imperceptible meaning of “condition”. ( युक्तिषष्टिका)</p><p><strong>[2]</strong> यश्च प्रतीत्यभावो भावानां शून्यतेति सा प्रोक्ता ।</p><p>यश्च प्रतीत्यभावो भवति हि तस्यास्वभावत्वम् ॥ २२ ॥</p><p>The conditional existence of objects is called sunyata. That which exists conditionally lacks intrinsic nature.</p><p>(विग्रहव्यावर्तनी)</p><p><strong>[3]</strong> अविद्यमाने भावे च कस्याभावो भविष्यति ।</p><p>भावाभावविधर्मा च भावाभावमवैति कः ॥ ५.६ ॥</p><p>तस्मान्न भावो नाभावो न लक्ष्यं नापि लक्षणम् ।</p><p>आकाशमाकाशसमा धातवः पञ्च ये परे ॥ ५.७ ॥</p><p>अस्तित्वं ये तु पश्यन्ति नास्तित्वं चाल्पबुद्धयः ।</p><p>भावानां ते न पश्यन्ति द्रष्टव्योपशमं शिवम् ॥ ५.८ ॥</p><p>[Objection — If you say that an object has no being it naturally implies that the object is non-existent]</p><p>[Answer — When we have proven that] an object doesn’t exist, whose non-being can you talk about?</p><p>Therefore, neither being, nor non-being, nor referred, nor reference, exist. The 5 elements are empty like the sky.</p><p>The non-intelligent beings who see the existence or non-existent of entities don’t see the auspicious emptiness.</p><p>(मध्यमकशास्त्रम्)</p><p><strong>[4]</strong> यतो ऽजातम् अनुत्पन्नं सम्यक् सत्त्वार्थदर्शिनः ।</p><p>ततः शून्यं जगद् दृष्ट्वा आदिमध्यान्तवर्जितम् ॥ १४ ॥</p><p>तेन पश्यन्ति संसारं निर्वाणं च न चात्मनः ।</p><p>निर्लेपं निर्विकारं च आदिमध्यान्तभास्वरम् ॥ १५ ॥</p><p>स्वप्नानुभूतविषयं प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति ।</p><p>मोहनिद्राविबुद्धश्च संसारं नैव पश्यति ॥ १६ ॥</p><p>He who realizes the transcendental truth knowing the pratityasamutpada (or the manifestation of entities depending on their causes and conditions), knows the world to be sunya and devoid of beginning, middle, or end.</p><p>The samsara and nirvana are mere appearances; the truth is stainless, changeless, and quiescent from the beginning and illumined.</p><p>The object of knowledge in a dream is not seen when one awakes. Similarly, the world disappears to him who is awakened from the darkness of ignorance.</p><p>The creation of illusion is nothing but illusion. When everything is compound there is nothing that can be regarded as a real thing. Such is the nature of all things.</p><p><strong>[5]</strong> यदि काचन प्रतिज्ञा स्यान्मे तत एष मे भवेद्दोषः ।</p><p>नास्ति च मम प्रतिज्ञा तस्मान्नैवास्ति मे दोषः ॥२६॥</p><p>If I had a view of reality, then this objection applies to me. I don’t have any such view, hence this objection doesn’t apply to me.</p><p>(विग्रहव्यावर्तनी)</p><p><strong>[6]</strong> सर्वभावाः स्वभावेन प्रतिबिम्बसमा मताः ।</p><p>शुद्धाः शिवस्वभावाश्च अद्वयास्तथतासमाः ॥ ४ ॥</p><p>असत्यात्मनि चात्मत्वं कल्पयित्वा पृथग्जनाः ।</p><p>सुखदुःखम् अभिज्ञाश्च सर्वम् एषां च तत्त्वतः ॥ ५ ॥</p><p>षड्गतिर्यश्च संसारः स्वर्गश्च परमं सुखम् ।</p><p>नरके च महद्दुःखं जराव्याधिरपी यताम् ॥ ६ ॥</p><p>अभूतां कल्पनां कृत्वा पच्यन्ते नरकादिषु ।</p><p>स्वदोषेनैव दह्यन्ते वेणवो वह्निना यथा ॥ ७ ॥</p><p>यथा माया तथा सत्त्वा विषयान् परिभुञ्जते ॥</p><p>मायामयीं गतिं यान्ति प्रतीत्योत्पादरूपिणीम् ॥ ८ ॥</p><p>यथा चित्रकरो रूपं यक्षस्यातिभयङ्करं ।</p><p>बिभेति स्वयम् आलिख्य संसारे ऽप्य् अबुधस्तथा ॥ ९ ॥</p><p>यथा पङ्कं स्वयं कृत्वा कश्चित् पतति बालिशः ।</p><p>तथासत्कल्पनापङ्के मग्नाः सत्त्वा दुरुत्तरे ॥ १० ॥</p><p>अभावं भवतो दृष्ट्वा दुःखां विन्दति वेदनाम् ।</p><p>शङ्काविषेण बाधन्ते विषया वितथास्तथा ॥ ११ ॥</p><p>All things by nature are regarded as reflections. They are pure and naturally quiescent, devoid of any duality, equal, and remain always and in all circumstances in the same way (tathata). 4.</p><p>In fact, worldlings attribute atman to what is not atman, and in the same way, they imagine happiness, misery, indifference, passion, and liberation. 5.</p><p>Birth in the six realms of existence in the world, highest happiness in heaven, great pain in hell,- these do not come within the purview of truth (i.e. cannot be accepted as true); nor do the notions that unmeritorious actions lead to extreme misery, old age, disease, and death, and meritorious actions surely bring about good results. 6–7.</p><p>It is owing to false notions that beings are consumed by fires of hell, even as a forest is burnt by forest conflagration. 8.</p><p>As a painter is frightened by the terrible figure of a Yakṣa which he himself has drawn, so is a fool frightened in the world (by his own false notions). 9.</p><p>Even as a fool going himself to a quagmire is drowned therein, so are beings drowned in the quagmire of false notions and are unable to come out thereof. 10.</p><p>The feeling of misery is experienced by imagining a thing where in fact it has no existence. Beings are tortured by the poison of false notions regarding the object and its knowledge. 11.</p><p>(महायान विंशिका)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/686/0*ppHjUcs1aZSJbafB.jpg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=397e82225b15" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[संसारस्य भावाभावविवेकः]]></title>
            <link>https://lokeshh.medium.com/%E0%A4%B8%E0%A4%82%E0%A4%B8%E0%A4%BE%E0%A4%B0%E0%A4%B8%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%AF-%E0%A4%AD%E0%A4%BE%E0%A4%B5%E0%A4%BE%E0%A4%AD%E0%A4%BE%E0%A4%B5%E0%A4%B5%E0%A4%BF%E0%A4%B5%E0%A5%87%E0%A4%95%E0%A4%83-3629ff4462c2?source=rss-e21a5a1ca7bd------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3629ff4462c2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[नागार्जुन]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[चन्द्रकीर्ति]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[संस्कृत]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lokesh Sharma]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 11 Oct 2023 16:39:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-11T16:39:50.099Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>आचार्यनागार्जुनस्य रत्नावल्याः केचन विशिष्टश्लोकाः —</p><p><strong>मरीचिः तोयमित्येतदिति मत्वागतोत्र सन् ।<br>यदि नास्तीति तत्तोयं गृह्णीयान् मूढ एव सः ।।</strong></p><p><strong>मरीचिप्रतिमं लोकमेवमस्तीति गृह्णतः ।<br>नास्तीति चापि मोहोयं सति मोहे न मुच्यते ।।</strong></p><p><strong>अज्ञानकल्पितं पूर्वं पश्चात्तत्वार्थनिर्णये ।<br>यदा न लभते भावमेवाभावस्तदा कुह ।।</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3629ff4462c2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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