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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Drake Long on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Drake Long on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Drake Long on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Reminder: China Has No Rule of Law]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mobrule/reminder-china-has-no-rule-of-law-5b711ff88030?source=rss-44025861c5d0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[government]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Drake Long]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Mar 2018 22:06:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-15T16:26:29.775Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yeaLol7NBIMJ10m3ryuvYA.jpeg" /><figcaption>China’s National People’s Congress, circa 2015.</figcaption></figure><p>With a <em>thwack </em>of its rubber stamp, the National People’s Congress (NPC) of China has signed off on a constitutional change allowing Xi Jinping, and any other future President of China (if there even is one), to rule indefinitely. This came with zero surprise, given the NPC (and its counterpart meeting at the same time, the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) has never refused legislation handed to it. It is not a parliament with any real control. The final vote tally was predetermined and reflected the NPC’s typical place under Xi Jinping’s thumb, even on a matter as controversial as extending the constitution’s term limits. The ‘Two Sessions,’ as this annual meeting is called, is a pageant. <a href="https://www.whatsonweibo.com/the-lianghui-question-asking-bitch-incident-eye-rolling-journalist-goes-viral-on-weibo/">But don’t roll your eyes at it.</a></p><p>The deeper story here concerns the shock over the constitutional amendment in the first place. Shortly after its announcement, the NPC came together to approve it. The Two Sessions were replete with applause for such an amendment, referencing Xi by name so often it would make Chairman Mao jealous. This is despite the fact Chinese society is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/us/xi-student-protest-china.html?mtrref=www.google.com&amp;gwh=7E3AEC253EC0AA005C9A9E077F576133&amp;gwt=pay">more divided</a> over the prospect of a President-for-Life than the glowing CCTV coverage lets on.</p><p>Foreign analysts are similarly deep in consternation over what this amendment really means. Truthfully, it’s not a secret Xi planned on ruling past his term limit; we’ve known that at least since the 19th Party Congress, when no potential successor fitting the normal criteria was elevated to Xi’s Standing Committee. But even before the Congress , most analysts figured Xi’s cultivation of his image and aggressive crackdown on political opponents were signs he wasn’t going away anytime soon. Yet amidst the panic over the prospect of a new dictatorship under Xi Jinping, it seems to be forgotten that the presidency of China is <em>not </em>the most powerful position, historically. And the constitutional term limit had little impact in the first place.</p><p>One of the more confusing aspects of China’s government is its informal method of leadership. Previous leaders like Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin were all given the honorific ‘paramount leader’ in the press to reflect the fact that they did not derive their power from being President, they instead had a form of de facto power based on their positions as the General-Secretary of the Communist Party and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The President runs China in theory. But the General-Secretary runs the Communist Party. Xi’s project this past term has been to merge these two entities until they’re indistinguishable, hence his reliance on Party working groups over private businessmen and solely-governmental employees. And this also explains his current designs on the presidency — he wants to centralize power under the President, yet not give it up. And so, the term limit is abolished.</p><p>The mere fact that he was able to achieve this as General-Secretary gets to the heart of China’s contradiction, then. Deng Xiaoping, the shrewd architect of China’s revival, never held the position of President. Towards the end of his rule and his ‘<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deng_Xiaoping#Resignation_and_1992_southern_tour">southern tour</a>’, he never held any important title whatsoever beyond Chairman. Yet he was still understood to be paramount leader. Reaching back further, Mao Zedong was never President, either. Few would argue against him being in charge of China, though.</p><p>Compounding this is the unpleasant truth that there may be a term limit for a President, but there is nothing of the sort for a ‘paramount leader,’ who can jump from official title to official title if necessary (yet Xi doesn’t seem to think even that fig leaf is required of him). All of the expectations Xi Jinping has shattered — with the 19th Party Congress, his targeted anti-corruption campaign/purge on rivals, and the NPC — were only set up by Deng Xiaoping in 1989. The arbitrary age of 68 as the age of retirement for government officials, the courtesy of elevating one’s successor to the Standing Committee in their second term, and the understanding to empower a different regional ‘faction’ afterward, are all relatively new expectations for how the Communist Party governs China. And all of them were understood as informal rules. There is no legalistic underpinning to them.</p><p>In such a case, is it really shocking Xi Jinping is side-stepping what were in effect soft guidelines on his rule? If not him, then likely at some point another Chinese paramount leader would accrue enough power in the background to do the same. The core of China’s Communist Party is now Xi Jinping because the core of China’s governance itself always stood on shaky ground, with elite mandarins watching each other’s machinations but reluctant to put into force any legal guideline that might curb their own.</p><p>In so many words, China <em>has no rule of law.</em></p><h4><strong>Corrupting Anti-Corruption</strong></h4><p>The amending of the constitution has to happen to give Xi Jinping a veneer of legal hegemony. But it doesn’t change the fundamental problem simmering in the modern Chinese republic for years. The government of China suffers from very little accountability, and everything is rolled out in a top-down manner. There are no hard constraints on the power of a paramount leader except factional politicking, and Xi Jinping has dealt with that informal restraint by launching a massive anti-corruption campaign — a campaign which just so happens to have snagged his <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2123802/criminal-case-opened-against-sun-zhengcai-graft-charges">biggest political rivals</a> and scared the rest of the Communist Party (of which there are no clean hands) into silence. Wang Qishan, Xi’s partner in this purge, is also breaking precedent by informally staying on the Standing Committee past retirement, likely in a <a href="http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2132567/will-wang-qishan-become-xi-jinpings-go-man-chinese-vice">capacity as Vice President</a>.</p><p>Those observing the anti-corruption campaign could liken it to whack-a-mole: there is little changing of bureaucratic rules, instead it is a targeted campaign against high-profile politicians. This illustrates the absurdity of it all. China’s corruption is systemic, owing to the lack of legal constraints and judicial independence in its government. Yet the anti-corruption drive does nothing to fix these problems. It is instead a tool to take down rivals, punishing them for taking advantage of a system that those with enough loyalty take advantage of as well and suffer less for it. Little real accountability will come from these anti-corruption efforts.</p><h4><strong>Foreign Governments Beware</strong></h4><p>Perhaps Xi’s enshrinement of himself is thus surprising to outsiders not because they counted him a reformer, but instead because it shows the real nature of the Chinese state — a Chinese state in which foreign governments are eager to trade and <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/asia-to-become-no-1-stock-market-and-heres-an-all-american-way-to-play-that-says-morgan-stanley-2018-03-12">entangle themselves</a>. Maybe in hindsight they ought to have applied more scrutiny to China’s <a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/09/why_drivers_in_china_intentionally_kill_the_pedestrians_they_hit_china_s.html">inefficient traffic court</a> than its markets. If <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/391637d2-215a-11e8-a895-1ba1f72c2c11">Germany</a>, for example, paid more attention to the ongoing failure of China’s law system to have anything resembling <a href="https://supremepeoplescourtmonitor.com/2014/07/10/the-supreme-peoples-court-issues-its-newest-five-year-reform-plan-for-the-courts/?utm_source=The+Sinocism+China+Newsletter&amp;utm_campaign=9f1ad82bd5-Sinocism07_10_14&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_171f2">independence and predictability</a>, then the punctuation of this constitutional amendment may not have looked so shocking. Instead, it’s something perfectly expected, as China’s legal system has stressed rule <em>by </em>law far more often than a traditional rule <em>of </em>law<em>, </em>the latter wherein elites might be accountable to something other than their own personal whims.</p><p>The warning signs were long in place, then, for China to emerge as an autocratic country, more unstable than Western nations first realized. The myth of Chinese stability was comforting to those trying to find an alternative to the tumultuous current state of the U.S., but it’s a myth nonetheless. Truthfully, at no point in modern history have advanced, democratic countries had to interact with a trading giant like China, which has propelled itself on economic growth despite not having anything similar to the government accountability and rule of law that various Western countries do. Now we are beginning to see the fruits of that relationship, which is an increasingly worrisome one. With little rule of law, foreign companies will see more of their partners <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-anbang-regulation/china-seizes-control-of-anbang-insurance-as-chairman-prosecuted-idUSKCN1G7076">unexpectedly gobbled up</a> by Xi’s Communist Party. Foreign governments will have to contend with Chinese diplomats and bureaucrats unconcerned with the idea that they simply cannot <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/23/sweden-summons-chinese-ambassador-over-kidnapping-of-gui-minhai">yank a dissident into jail in broad daylight</a>. And all of this is summarized by the sheer unpredictability characterized by China’s fraying of both its formal and informal boundaries.</p><p>This unpredictability is a problem given China’s explosive growth on the world stage. Comprising <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/24/infographic-heres-how-the-global-gdp-is-divvied-up/">15% of the world’s GDP</a>, with its hooks in countries from <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/asia/sri-lanka-china-port.html?mtrref=www.google.com&amp;gwh=DF45D2B7A9360D26D002BE3E31B6BE8C&amp;gwt=pay">Sri Lanka</a> to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/world/europe/greece-china-piraeus-alexis-tsipras.html?mtrref=www.google.com&amp;gwh=3FC9A2E9841C8203FA5D47EB53145478&amp;gwt=pay">Greece</a>, China is a massive influencer. No small feat for a country with a line of succession that is largely ad-hoc. With all of this wealth, China is increasingly attractive as a place for investment and cooperation, yet the lack of legalism in its government is also equivalent to a ticking time bomb. Virtually everything from <a href="https://qz.com/1000541/norway-wants-china-to-forget-about-the-human-rights-thing-and-eat-salmon-instead/">petty trade wars</a>, to seizure of assets, <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33490446">to imprisoning foreigners</a> are on the table when dealing with China, and as it continues to grow and become more obstinate the barriers preventing such combative behavior will erode.</p><p>So in debating the impact of this constitutional amendment, we should look at the rubber stamp Congress and not ask ‘<em>why did the NPC do this?’, </em>but instead ask ‘<em>what is the point of the NPC?’. </em>The answer goes a long way in warning about the prospect of a China interconnected with as many countries as it is in the world. While many of its trading partners proscribe to a legal tradition of accountability, China’s new leadership doesn’t seem to find those compatible with their direction for the country. In a way, doesn’t it explain China’s attitude towards <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south-china-sea-case-against-china">certain international laws</a>, as well?</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5b711ff88030" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mobrule/reminder-china-has-no-rule-of-law-5b711ff88030">Reminder: China Has No Rule of Law</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mobrule">Mob-Rule</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[A View to Kargil]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mobrule/a-view-to-kargil-a5047fec8015?source=rss-44025861c5d0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[syria]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Drake Long]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Mar 2018 22:45:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-03-12T22:45:08.971Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y7mmzvZEuZHiC5PlR5LyyA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Deir Ezzor, Syria</figcaption></figure><p>Here’s an unusual news blip: a <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-13/u-s-strikes-said-to-kill-scores-of-russian-fighters-in-syria">US airstrike killed over 200 Russian mercenaries</a> in February, 2018, and it might deserve a deeper look.</p><p>Despite its likely destiny as a piece of trivia in Syria’s continuously <a href="https://syria.liveuamap.com/">confusing, multi-faceted civil war</a>, intense scrutiny should be applied to <em>any </em>situation where two nuclear powers clash. Of course, the two powers in this case would be the United States and Russia, with the caveat that the latter has <a href="https://en.radiofarda.com/a/mattis-russia-mercenaries-syria-killed-us-strikes/29039802.html">plausible deniability</a> when it comes to its role.</p><p>In retrospect, it’s remarkable that a US bombing run against Russian soldiers didn’t lead to any escalation, yet it occurred indeed with very little furor. To first establish that this is an instance where U.S. and Russian forces actually fought, some clarification is required on the function of the Russian mercenary industry. While there are plenty of private military companies (PMCs) that <a href="https://warisboring.com/erik-princes-mercenaries-are-bombing-libya/">work for hire</a> for anyone interested, in reality most are closely intertwined with their host country and expected to reflect those countries’ interests. This was the case with one of the most famous mercenaries in modern history, <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/56jbfy/what_involvement_did_france_have_in_1960s_congo/">Roger Faulques</a>, a former French Legionnaire who was released to the Katanga secession movement in 1960 to further France’s interests in Africa. And this is the case with the majority of Russian PMCs. After all, it isn’t a coincidence that Russian PMCs seem to follow where the Russian army ventures, in both Ukraine and Syria. The <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-vladimir-putin-yevgeny-prigozhin-wagner-group-attack-us-allies-syria/">Wagner Group</a>, the target of the USA’s recent bombing, is a PMC closely tied to Vladimir Putin himself. If that’s not convincing enough, consider how <a href="https://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/uploads-001/2015/08/Russia-s-2014-Military-Doctrine.pdf">Russia’s Military Doctrine for 2014</a> explicitly stated the usefulness of PMCs for “gray” zone warfare and encouraged their integration with Russian military operations abroad.</p><p>Because that’s what Russia <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7-KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf&#39;">prefers to operate under</a> - a gray zone. A gray zone is a tactical use of the fog of war, where the official designation of the soldiers fighting is unclear and whether they’re even involved in an invasion is vigorously denied. A gray zone carries certain risks, namely the inability to commit full force and the necessity of dodging international scrutiny. But it also has benefits, like the ability to deny personal involvement in a war, or reject ownership of troops destroyed in a single bombing run by a nuclear-armed adversary. Under any other circumstance, such destruction of Russian troops would demand serious escalation or at the very least a diplomatic crisis between the two countries. But there is virtually no risk of that here, because Russia maintains the soldiers weren’t affiliated with its military.</p><p>This, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/13/russian-mercenaries-killed-us-airstrikes-syria">as with the Deir Ezzor bombing</a>, is thus wholly unprecedented, in that U.S. and Russian militaries have never fought so openly and bloodily before. Yet it is also precedent-setting, as a harbinger of gray zone conflicts to come as great powers push against each other but try to avoid a world-ending nuclear apocalypse.</p><h4><strong>How to Worry About the Bomb</strong></h4><p>Nuclear weapons are a powerful deterrent, for obvious reasons. Any warfare conducted against a nuclear state or near its borders might induce a nuclear exchange, which would be unimaginably catastrophic. The creation of ‘tactical nukes’, which are low-yield and designed for war-fighting in a misguided attempt to avoid using the most destructive weapons in the nuclear arsenal, scares away conflict even more because of the possibility of escalation.</p><p>Thus, meeting force with force is a delicate matter when either side is nuclear, and especially when both are. Much of the fear over arming Ukraine during Russia’s invasion was out of the possibility of incurring a nuclear exchange with Russia, and Russian politicians <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-threatens-to-use-nuclear-force-over-crimea-and-the-baltic-states-10150565.html">certainly played to this.</a></p><p>The ongoing debate over North Korea involves this same calculus, as talk of a <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/01/politics/north-korea-trump-bloody-nose-dispute/index.html">‘bloody nose’</a> comes with the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/the-cataclysm-that-would-follow-a-bloody-nose-strike-in-north-korea/551924/">dire warning</a> of how war between nuclear powers must be avoided at all costs.</p><p>But there is precedent for war occurring between nuclear states, <em>without </em>it escalating to a doomsday scenario. This conflict concerned two other nuclear powers: Pakistan and India.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GhuO7FrXLWsVMb0VBgQGig.jpeg" /><figcaption>Kargil</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>The Kargil War</strong></h4><p>In May of 1999, shepherds roaming the disputed state of Kashmir reported Pakistani guerrillas in the small, mountain town of Kargil. This was significant considering Kargil was on the Indian side of the line-of-control (LOC), a division set up by the <a href="https://www.stimson.org/simla-agreement">Simla Agreement</a> after the brutal 1971 war between India and Pakistan. The Indian Army sent patrols to investigate, and soon clashed with what were clearly Pakistan Army soldiers. The Indian Air Force (IAF) were even involved in the effort to chase Pakistan back over the LOC, which came to be known as the Kargil War.</p><p>The Kargil War is possibly the most relevant conflict to study for those looking at President Trump’s recently-published <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-china-russia/u-s-military-puts-great-power-competition-at-heart-of-strategy-mattis-idUSKBN1F81TR">National Defense Strategy</a>, which stressed a focus on the ‘great power competition’ among the USA, China, and Russia over the previous decade’s counter-terrorism focus. Implicit in this review of U.S. grand strategy is the agonizing dilemma over how to compete with two nuclear-armed states without incurring a doomsday escalation. And to that question, Kargil provides an answer.</p><p>India tested its first nuclear bomb in 1974. Pakistan developed its own weapons program and subsequently tested its first nuclear bomb in 1998. Thus, by the time of the Kargil War, these neighboring countries were armed with nuclear weapons and had a history of animosity. Escalation to nuclear war was made somewhat more likely given the asymmetry of Pakistan’s armed forces: Pakistan was explicit in promoting its nuclear weapons as a <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/books/the-story-of-pakistan-s-improbable-pursuit-of-nuclear-weapons-1.581758">first-strike capability</a>, to deter India and make up for its comparative lack of numbers.</p><p>But when it came time for an armed confrontation between these two countries… no nuclear weapons were used. Why was that?</p><p>In an unsettling sort of way, the Kargil War should be the standard for how a war plays out between two nuclear powers. Both sides understood the capabilities of the other’s nuclear arsenals, and also the other’s intentions with them (India knew Pakistan would use its arsenal in a first-strike if it anticipated any escalation whatsoever). Despite their hostility to one another, both countries had lines of communication, at the civil and military level, once the fighting actually started. And most importantly of all, both countries kept the conflict <em>limited.</em> Neither threatened a major city or capital of the other. To attribute the lack of a nuclear exchange to a miracle is to deprive both India and Pakistan credit for retaining cool (though butting) heads. Anticipating a larger Indian mobilization if they tried to, say, occupy all of Kashmir, Pakistan instead opted for a single mere strategic military outpost (Kargil) and initiated the conflict in a gray zone manner by obscuring the army’s involvement. India, knowing about Pakistan’s doctrine towards first-strike capabilities, decided to end the conflict at the frozen LOC, and <em>not </em>pursue Pakistani militants over it. Once Kargil was cleared, the war was over.</p><p>The combination of factors that made the Kargil War a smaller conflict than it could have been ought to be present in any tense situation between the U.S. and China or the U.S. and Russia - especially if the U.S. is planning to butt heads with these other countries anytime soon, but is not willing to launch an ICBM. For the most part, communication is already present and available between these three countries. The understanding of intentions would depend on the conflict. But to those stressing the unimaginable consequences a conflict between the U.S. and either of the other two nuclear powers would have, it might be worth imagining a Kargil-like scenario somewhere else. Perhaps over the skies of the <a href="https://www.rand.org/paf/projects/us-china-scorecard.html">Taiwan Strait</a>, where Chinese J-20s can be shot down back to Fujian without risking the appearance of a mainland invasion. Or, in the hills of <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/27-days-hell-when-china-vietnam-went-war-19596">northern Vietnam</a>, a part of Southeast Asia that <a href="http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=976">might see conflict</a> sooner than others might think.</p><h4><strong>Back to Deir Ezzor</strong></h4><p>Regardless of hypotheticals, the main point is that conflict and even warfare between China, Russia, and the U.S. is not unthinkable or unknowable. But there is a real possibility that some of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/13/ukraine-us-war-russia-john-pilger">hysterics</a> over the mere thought of war with Russia could paralyze U.S. decision-making when real crises and potentially risky responses are required. In a new era of “great power competition,” if that is truly what we want, less paralysis and more Kargil-style thinking is going to be necessary.</p><p>But maybe, for those uneasy at the thought of Chinese soldiers shooting at U.S. Marines, there is another way for conflict to be resolved with little to no risk for escalation. The recent bombing of the Wagner Group has provided just that.</p><p>The use of PMCs, or mercenaries, seem to be <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Modern-Mercenary-Private-Armies-World/dp/0199360103">growing</a> among all countries cursed with the excess capital and expertise to outfit small armies. In Deir Ezzor, the U.S. encountered the Wagner Group as a not-quite-proxy fighting for Russian aims, with Russian arms and only a Syrian fig-leaf. Had the Wagner Group succeeded in its siege, it would have been an unimaginably cost-effective win for the Syrian regime. There’s the possibility the Putin-connected oligarch behind the Group was banking on the Russian connotation deterring any U.S. counterattack. It apparently did not work, and instead a new precedent has opened up for great power conflict.</p><p>As previously mentioned, the Russian PMC business is thriving on “patriotic” contracts awarded for service in Ukraine and Syria. The seed of modern PMCs was arguably an American company, Blackwater. Blackwater may have <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-dark-truth-about-blackwater/">sunk into disgrace</a>, but not before rebranding as Academi. Academi is run by the infamous Erik Prince, who is not only unapologetic over his <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/prince-of-mercenaries-who-wreaked-havoc-in-iraq-turns-up-in-somalia-2191270.html">military adventurism</a> but also busy building a Russian-style <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-companies/blackwater-founders-fsg-buys-stake-in-chinese-security-school-idUSKBN18Q0WR">PMC apparatus</a> for the <a href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/frontier-services-group-strategy-update-607417306.html">People’s Republic of China</a>. Given the nature of China’s footprint abroad, it is not unlikely we will see Chinese private security companies <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/2a1ce1c8-fa7c-11e6-9516-2d969e0d3b65">surrounding oil fields in South Sudan</a> and getting involved in local conflicts.</p><p>The key difference is the refreshingly low chance of escalation the use of these mercenaries entails, and the ability for the U.S., China, or Russia to chase these gray zone soldiers over the proverbial line-of-control, a feat that simply was not possible in the Kargil War.</p><p>When it initially happened, perhaps because of the confusion over responsibility and facts of the battle, little was written about the Kargil War, and it took a few years for non-proliferation and security studies experts to pick up the subject in a scholarly way. Perhaps, soon, the February Deir Ezzor Bombing will get the same treatment. In a world where the U.S. is looking at ways to deter or posture against two nuclear-armed adversaries, it can’t come soon enough.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a5047fec8015" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mobrule/a-view-to-kargil-a5047fec8015">A View to Kargil</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mobrule">Mob-Rule</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Letters From the Pearl Delta: The Macau Affair]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mobrule/letters-from-the-pearl-delta-the-macau-affair-1827f5a6595c?source=rss-44025861c5d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1827f5a6595c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[humor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[macau]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Drake Long]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 07 Jan 2018 08:04:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-07T08:04:37.584Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dhrjEQGRgFutgzNkUHYsaA.jpeg" /><figcaption>St. Paul’s Cathedral, Macau</figcaption></figure><blockquote>Note: This is the ninth in a multi-part series about my year spent working and living in Guangdong, China. It’s not the series for a definitive and authoritative account of Sino-US relations and cultural differences. It’s mostly a lot of rambling and inaccessible humor.</blockquote><p>All the signs are in Portuguese, but nobody in the city speaks Portuguese. That’s the strange contradiction of Macau.</p><p>Macau is the other port city of China that enjoys a special status, next to Hong Kong. Unlike Hong Kong, though, Macau is tiny. Really, really tiny. It’s difficult to convey how confusing it is to walk through Macau and realize it’s not nearly as big as its reputation might convey — it’s only around 30 square kilometers. Hong Kong’s area, for comparison, is about 1000 square kilometers. Macau is thus a cramped city, and every bit of space seems to be in use. Massive apartment blocks are put so close together that the people living in them can probably reach out and touch the window of the tower right next door. It’s got to be some kind of lesson in city planning.</p><p>Macau, being a former colonial possession, has an awkward sort of identity to it. An identity that leads to every sign and official document accommodating Portuguese, yet out of everyone I spoke with nobody actually knew the language. It might be an expression of independence from the rest of China, similar to how Hong Kong vigorously defends its use of the Cantonese language. But with Macau’s situation, it feels somewhat futile. Much of the border crossing was packed with expats passing back and forth between Macau and the rest of the People’s Republic, stocking up on cheap things only Macau could provide. Chinese citizens, in contrast, face a byzantine visa procedure that limits their ability to stay in Macau and move so fluidly in and out of it. It’s not hard to see why the People’s Republic might want to make sure no legalized smuggling occurs, but on the flip side it’s turned tiny Macau into more of an oddity than a separate system equal to its mainland counterparts, like how I’d describe Hong Kong.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lezH65qq4g0xZxN9W5Y9sg.jpeg" /><figcaption>The entirety of Macau.</figcaption></figure><p>To those who don’t know, Macau was a Portuguese colony until 1999. The Portuguese did not imbue the city with the robustness that Hong Kong received from the British, namely because Macau does not have a deep water port and, as I previously mentioned, it is <em>tiny. </em>However, the Portuguese did leave behind something to its benefit. Along with its fascinating feitoria and the ruins of St. Paul’s cathedral, Macau is the gambling mecca of China.</p><p>Its status as a place for legalized gambling goes back to the late 1800s, encouraged by its Portuguese governors who (smartly) realized it would take off amid the Qing Dynasty’s confused crackdown on gaming, and later exploded as the People’s Republic of China was founded and banned gambling outright. In 1999, the PRC kept its status as a haven for chance games, keeping it the only place on mainland China where someone can gamble (legally). It’s somewhat over-compared to Las Vegas, but after visiting the city this label feels somewhat analogous to the St. Paul Cathedral in the city square: it’s just a façade.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Gx-HdVkYXJ1jbtxpvythVQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>I’m not a big gambler. I don’t really understand gambling. But the Vegas experience, conveyed to me through friends, media, and vigorous research, at least involves more than video poker and slots. Macau appears to cram as much gambling as it can into a small area, and has figured out video games and slot machines are the most size-efficient for this. It creates a bizarre experience where I can wander around a casino floor and find no actual games I’d want to play, surrounded by throngs of Chinese silently watching slots and collecting (virtually no) payouts. There’s no roulette wheels, or card tables. I didn’t even spot a mahjong table (not that I could play it!)</p><p>It was somewhat disappointing, but I wasn’t posh enough to go to any of the upscale floors on the casinos. And that’s the side of Macau not many people think about.</p><p>Right next to the grand Lis Boa, a beautiful casino, are yet more slums packed together. Macau is not just the designated gambling den for the PRC, it illustrates the inequality that a lot of China suffers from and seems to have it out in the open, making it a haven for the ultra-rich, too. There’s some cynical benefit to be gathered from turning Macau into an Amsterdam for decadent and overtly illegal activity, though. The PRC can carefully monitor it, and make sure any crime stays contained. This lends Macau a unique character, just not the one it seems to want with its Portuguese signs.</p><p>In front of the seedier side, Macau is still stunning in its beauty, especially at night. There’s just a lot of expectation it seems to fail to meet. Much like Portugal’s imperial days, its light was bright, pioneering, and then vanishes in the enormity of another being’s shadow. It’s a familiar feeling to be awed by each city I’ve seen in the Pearl Delta, but Macau was the first one that took my preconceived notions and turned them around. It is, and I cannot stress this enough, a <em>very tiny city</em>. The push for a separate identity from the rest of China feels different, if not non-existent. Yet with this resigned enclave status, the people of Macau still face odd issues in getting across the border, and are set to be swamped in tourists monthly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vfSI-7WfRlgijEm-wLjRzg.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1827f5a6595c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mobrule/letters-from-the-pearl-delta-the-macau-affair-1827f5a6595c">Letters From the Pearl Delta: The Macau Affair</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mobrule">Mob-Rule</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The DisConnect: The ‘New Aristocracy’ and US-China Relations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mobrule/the-disconnect-the-new-aristocracy-and-us-china-relations-3819fbba243e?source=rss-44025861c5d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3819fbba243e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[inequality]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Drake Long]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Dec 2017 14:08:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-12-11T14:08:23.353Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WYnH5aU2QHJa98AbJAvYJA.jpeg" /></figure><h4>OR, Ramblings For the Sublime Port (Of D.C.)</h4><p>There’s a little-discussed problem with the rhetoric of the Trump administration.</p><p>Or maybe it’s better to say ‘often-overlooked problem,’ since plenty of people have realized the Twitter antics of the President set a <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/12/09/trump-unleashes-fresh-attacks-on-the-media-saying-cnn-made-a-vicious-and-purposeful-mistake/?utm_term=.219cd720367a">new precedent for embarrassment</a>, and are watching the <a href="https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/egypt/1.825299">consequences</a> <a href="https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/08/trump-fake-news-despots-287129">unfold</a> in horrifying real-time. There is plenty of discussion about that, as there should be. However, missing from the cheese-and-cocktail party of the average American suburbanite is a discussion on how Trump’s polarizing behavior poisons the well of otherwise important topics.</p><p>Trump’s Asia trip <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-14/trump-declares-trade-rules-have-changed-as-asia-trip-concludes">wrapped up about a month ago</a> and accomplished relatively little. Despite his bluster, he was apparently charmed enough by Xi Jinping to relax the rhetoric on Chinese trade and brought forth a plan for a ‘Quad’ alliance of Indo-Pacific states with <em>zero </em>substance. He did, however, save some insults for <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/195f9678-c29a-11e7-a1d2-6786f39ef675">US allies</a>, in a cringe-inducing example of economic nationalism.</p><p>Among many things, the economic nationalism mantra of the Trump administration should worry people. Negotiations with NAFTA are apparently floundering over non-starters like a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta/u-s-hikes-tensions-in-nafta-talks-with-call-for-sunset-clause-idUSKBN1CH2EO">sunset clause</a> allowing the US to exit if the trade deficit between it and its members doesn’t disappear in five years’ time. Advocates for free trade, globalization, and neoliberal policies feel <a href="http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0316-perry-trade-benefits-20160316-story.html">under siege</a>. The deeply polarizing nature of Trump is <a href="https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/11/17/16585982/psychology-memory-polls-trump">driving more people in the Republican party to accept mindless economic nationalism</a>, and in turn neoliberals, or otherwise anybody not so keen to shut down borders, are <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-free-trades-reluctant-champion-china-trump-protectionism-international-trade/">becoming defensive</a>.</p><p>The odious economic nationalism of the Trump administration is thus muddying the topic of free trade by drawing a line in the sand between people who are either ‘with him’ or ‘against him.’ The ‘against him’ party is somewhat justified by just how <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelpremack/2017/11/02/what-is-korus-and-why-is-trump-so-mad-about-it/#35f2fa054375">nonsensical economic nationalism</a> is, especially since Trump employs it for shameless political posturing instead of how it would affect the actual US economy. However, polarization is also leading to some strange reactions and <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2079797/xi-merkel-vow-support-free-trade-ahead-german-leaders">unusual bedfellows.</a> This is a problem because free trade and neoliberalism, contrary to what its staunchest advocates might say, <em>does </em>have issues. Tremendous ones that aren’t being taken seriously, because the loudest advocate for them is someone who similarly doesn’t treat them seriously.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sYKlQYIAHWrleBulap_5Ew.jpeg" /><figcaption>Guangzhou, China. Photo by Drake Long.</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>The Chinese Trade Shock</strong></h3><p>Neoliberalism is an invention of the ’90s, when the Washington Consensus crafted a global order for free trade and open markets to better accommodate a post-Cold War world. The advocates for free trade and globalization were unambiguously hopeful for the positive benefits of their policies. But one thing they didn’t anticipate was the rise of one country: China.</p><p>At the time, China’s market reforms were somewhat in flux. The man singularly responsible for changing China’s economy, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/23/books/review/deng-xiaoping-and-the-transformation-of-china-by-ezra-f-vogel-book-review.html">Deng Xiaoping</a>, was on his way out after presiding over the decidedly anti-reform minded Tiananmen Square incident. In his absence, the free trade ports and special economic zones of China weren’t expected to last very long. Indeed, it took Deng’s unofficial ‘Southern Tour’ to protect these areas from his successor’s scrutiny. The Western world didn’t anticipate China’s rapid industrialization, nor was it likely they could have given the lack of precedence with regards to China’s development.</p><p>In the entire history of the world, no country as big as China has become as rich as it has in so short a time. There have been export-oriented countries prior, such as Japan and South Korea, but neither had the population or natural resources China does. China managed to quickly move through the prioritization of raw resources to an economy based on manufactured goods, and now boasts an incredible tech sector that could make it privy to a <a href="https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/">Fourth industrial Revolution.</a> Japan is still somewhat stuck on frugal spending habits, but China is supercharging its economy through domestic consumption. Inequality aside, the Chinese economy is a different beast from the industrializing countries that came before it.</p><p>China’s progress is the perfect storm for a ‘trade shock,’ as Dave Autor detailed so closely <a href="https://www.ddorn.net/papers/Autor-Dorn-Hanson-ChinaShock.pdf">in his paper on the subject.</a></p><p>The basics of neoliberalism are simple: countries have comparative advantages in certain sectors. Why bother producing something inefficiently when it can be bought more cheaply from another country with no trade barriers? This, when applied in reality, is why an automobile ostensibly made in the USA is actually composed of parts from <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta-autos/mexican-auto-lobby-rejects-u-s-nafta-proposal-on-rules-of-origin-idUSKBN1CO34K">all over North America.</a> This ‘specialization’ of products and industries works best when goods flow freely, reducing spending costs for any country’s consumers.</p><p>However, Autor, along with <a href="http://www.omaha.com/money/new-book-says-economists-helped-spark-backlash-against-free-trade/article_86883562-0733-5842-b9a9-fdd8e0efc348.html">multiple other economists</a>, focused on one aspect of neoliberal policy in particular. Labor adjustment is how free trade advocates justify the dismantling of inefficient industries. Even though the semiconductor industry in the USA is nonexistent, workers pushed out as its factories shuttered over time are supposed to ‘adjust’ by moving to newly-created industries where the USA has a comparative advantage.</p><p>When it comes to China, Autor found, that labor adjustment doesn’t necessarily happen. There is a significant lag when it comes to finding a new job, no matter what, but in the industries that China dominates — manufactured goods — the average US worker isn’t facing a simple priority shift. Their entire skillset is wiped out, turned meaningless. Autor points out that <em>related industries </em>are shuttered, one after another, simultaneously as workers with skills for them try to find work. The job skills for a manufacturing job prepare a worker to apply for a related industry…that will inevitably lose out from lack of comparative advantage as well.</p><p>The long-term effects are being felt as job mobility (the ability to move to find work) and upward mobility (the ability to change one’s social class) have declined, severely, in the USA. The consumers supposed to benefit from free trade don’t have the pocket money to actually fuel the economy. Retraining, while perhaps ideal, is not a perfect solution given many workers can’t gain new skills so quickly and easily. This is the crux of the labor adjustment lag that Autor’s paper is so concerned with.</p><p>This is not a situation with an easy precedent.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UAKBARtdHOUWPCPlaN6qRQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Salem, Ohio. Photo by Drake Long.</figcaption></figure><p>It’s very clear the US-China relationship, and China’s placement in a world of free trade and global supply chains, has entered a new phase. The democratic society of the USA is beginning to wear more and more on its foreign policy, a uniquely American challenge that authoritarian regimes such as China don’t contend with. The very workers Autor notes as vulnerable to the Chinese Trade Shock are the same ones holding voting power in those states that won Trump the election. The reality of the US-China relationship is not a simple one, but in terms of trade, there is definitely a conflict that affects these two governments differently precisely because of <em>how they govern. </em>The people most impacted by trade with China have voting power in the USA. The same is not said for China’s citizens.</p><p>Free trade is a positive development from its time, but with regard to China it’s clear the USA should weight the costs more closely. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trade-wto/u-s-formally-opposes-china-market-economy-status-at-wto-idUSKBN1DU2VH">Certain steps </a>are in the right direction, but their messenger is so <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/us/politics/trump-access-hollywood-tape.html">vile</a> that American society and its political literati may <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/22/taming-tiger/">embrace China</a> more than ever before just out of the pressing need to oppose what Trump does.</p><p>As stated previously, the US-China relationship is entering a new phase. The findings of economists like Autor perhaps should usher in the recognition of a new <em>world order, </em>as well, with different challenges requiring different theories on international relations. What will this phase, or order, look like? That’s not an easy answer to give, but the aforementioned cautioning on free trade can give us one <em>challenge </em>for American society in this new world.</p><p>Let’s see if there are other challenges to consider.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PWPPF8oUp8UVkVsC_6KUnA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pazhou, Guangzhou, where the 2017 Fortune Global Forum was held. Photo: Drake Long</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>The New Aristocracy</strong></h3><p>An uncomfortable truth about the USA’s near-future is that it will be one with relatively little social mobility. As previously mentioned, the workers most vulnerable to trade shocks work in manufacturing or related sectors — they are not usually educated beyond high school, or beyond a Bachelor’s degree. Those who work in highly lucrative service sector jobs (such as that of a Congressman!) or certain STEM fields, however, are virtually unaffected by trade shocks. There thus exists a kind of obliviousness <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/03/news/economy/wealth-gap-america/index.html">about wealth inequality</a> in the USA, as the people who could most likely fix it only benefit from it. <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/01/heres-how-trump-stands-to-benefit-from-the-republican-tax-bill.html">This includes President Trump, of course</a>. Much of the ire over the Republican tax bill is how it favors the elite class of society more than any other, while simultaneously slashing the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/01/heres-how-the-senate-tax-bill-affects-recent-college-grads.html">means by which some Americans try to get up the socio-economic ladder</a> and, well, adjust to dying job prospects. Those believing in ‘trickle-down’ policy should perhaps heed the words of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BSvcZtj9c1U&amp;list=PLS8YLn_6PU1ko9KpX6DKVlLSwAIF9zfPX&amp;index=3">Bill Ford, Jr</a>., who at the 2017 Global Forum in Guangzhou, China admitted the US tax bill would ultimately help him retain earnings…not necessarily invest back into the USA.</p><p>Griping over increasingly stratified wealth is nothing new. But one could say the level of inequality is becoming <a href="https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/05/economist-explains">direr</a>, and this article makes the point it’ll eventually become a serious threat to the USA’s stability.</p><p>Most people ridiculed the odd New York Times <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/opinion/how-we-are-ruining-america.html?mtrref=www.nytimes.com&amp;gwh=2BBFE641E23A89E0F2EB53621FE538DD&amp;gwt=pay&amp;assetType=opinion">op-ed about David Brooks and the sandwich shop.</a> However, the underlying point of that article, clumsy though it may have been, was that there <em>are </em>social cues and norms established at the class level, and they’re becoming more thick and insular with each passing year. The alienation between the highest classes of American society and the lowest is <a href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/08/louise-linton-instagram">extremely stark</a>. Oftentimes, it’s like the two parts of America aren’t speaking the same language, and this is the crux of the rural-urban divide so many op-ed writers flail about in trying to explain. This is not an issue that will disappear anytime soon, if the middle-class is going to increasingly get crushed by the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/12/slow-economic-mobility/510521/">impossible challenge of making/holding generational wealth.</a></p><p>Generational wealth, or more succinctly put ‘the family fortune,’ is the ultimate crafter of class in America these days. Not a hard work ethic. To escape the industries destroyed by trade shocks (and automation, which this article isn’t arguing around) a higher education is necessary. But costs of college are increasing at the same time students are getting poorer. Worse yet, to get into a truly great college one needs to attend a <a href="http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/lifestyles/ct-ptb-bradshaw-educated-advice-st-0515-20150514-story.html">commensurate secondary school.</a></p><p>This simply isn’t possible unless you have a high class backing, usually from your parents. The more unsettling aspect to this is how the governing class of America and the elite class (as in, even higher than just ‘upper’ class) are virtually overlapping. People who run for Congress or become Secretaries require the funds or education that only <a href="http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/a13027068/trump-bannon-mercers/">elite donors</a> or <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/06/harvards-incoming-class-is-one-third-legacy.html">ancestry</a> can grant them.</p><p>What we’re seeing is uncomfortably similar to the aristocracy of the Old World, in European countries where political power remained in cities, among well-educated royals or barons, and absolutely nobody else. However, this is not some historical turn of the wheel, come ‘round again to the Gilded Age. The development of an aristocratic class in the USA is not happening in a vacuum. We’re looking at a New Aristocracy, transplanted into a strange and unfamiliar time.</p><h3><strong>‘Compradors’</strong></h3><p>For people studying international relations or merely curious about US foreign policy, there is perhaps one important rule that deserves to be endlessly repeated until it sticks in the American subconscious: <em>foreign policy is not always profitable.</em></p><p>The Trump presidency engages in foreign policy for two reasons: political expediency and with a promise of profit. This is not a good approach. Fundamentally, there are things more important than always reaping massive financial awards, and such awards are going to be scarce as the USA continues to <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2017/12/deterrence-retreat-cold-wars-core-principle-fell-fashion/">abandon deterrence</a> and <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/09/u-s-diplomat-resigns-warning-of-state-departments-diminished-role-diplomacy-national-security-tillerson-africa-somalia-south-sudan/">embrace (expensive) military options</a>. Attempting to forge a ‘capitalist foreign doctrine’ has never worked in the USA’s short existence. Prior to World War I, the USA’s isolationist predilection for trading with both sides in an international conflict predictably lead to crisis. Imperial Germany’s submarines made sure there was no ‘capitalist’ solution. More recently, the privatized wars of Iraq and Afghanistan have been <a href="https://www.sigar.mil/interactive-reports/reconstructing-the-andsf/index.html">uninterrupted disasters</a>, incompetently managed and with <a href="https://www.thedailybeast.com/al-qaeda-is-stronger-now-than-when-bin-laden-was-killed">very little to show</a> for the USA’s endeavors. The Bush administration attempt to involve so many contractors and private companies was for the sake of saving money, and did the exact opposite. They illustrate nicely what should become a new cardinal rule about foreign policy: don’t try to make a profit. It’s difficult to imagine a feat of diplomacy like the Marshall Plan occurring in the American Congress of today, as it fights over nickel and dimes with respect to such initiatives as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which would have had the diplomatic purpose of diversifying US trade <em>away </em>from China and into more cooperative countries. But now the US will be cut out of it.</p><p>What is worrying is that this trend of pursuing profit for the US economy (in however vague a way you quantify that) is coinciding with the creation of the New Aristocracy. The old, European aristocratic classes were insulated from the degradation suffered by the average peasant, but at least pursued policy with the understanding they had to support a country. The New Aristocracy, in contrast, came about in a world where nationalities are increasingly meaningless the richer you are. There is little patriotism (distinct from nationalism…) in the pages of the <a href="https://panamapapers.icij.org/">Panama Papers</a>, where billionaires connive to hide their wealth. Instead, New Aristocrats are concerned with their profits, and that might just be it.</p><p>In China, an old Communist term for someone of the merchant class who worked with foreign threats was a ‘comprador.’ This derogatory, unfair term was often applied to people from the more liberalized south. On the other hand, in modern-day America, there should be a real concern about American businessmen and women who pursue camaraderie with China a little too much. Insulated from trade shocks, many people such as Bill Ford, Jr., and Tim Cook aren’t going to feel any repercussions from kowtowing to the Chinese government’s demands. At the 2017 Fortune Global Forum, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_ng8xQ-SNGc&amp;index=2&amp;list=PLS8YLn_6PU1ko9KpX6DKVlLSwAIF9zfPX">Tim Cook struggled to justify Apple’s adherence to Chinese censorship</a>. Ultimately, it’s clear Apple’s reasons for complying with gross violations on free speech and ingenuity were simply to access the massive, mouth-watering Chinese market. This is the rationale behind many companies working in China.</p><p>Also at the same forum, the US Ambassador to China, Terry Branstad, confirmed many China-watchers worst fears when he admitted US policy toward China involved a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkSpEq8nCB4&amp;list=PLS8YLn_6PU1ko9KpX6DKVlLSwAIF9zfPX&amp;index=7">fusion of economic and diplomatic concerns</a> — tying diplomatic actions to economic concessions, and vice versa. This has been the Chinese approach for a while — notice the heavy economic warfare on South Korea after the deployment of THAAD. But the USA has resisted playing along with such a game, knowing it grants China an unfair advantage in negotiations. Then again, the USA also enjoyed a good separation between its diplomatic corps and the private business sector.</p><p>That separation is disappearing, and it’s because the New Aristocracy is so heavily intertwined with government. In a way, Trump’s election represents the total eclipse: the <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Private-Empire-ExxonMobil-American-Power/dp/0143123548">business class</a>, the <a href="https://gizmodo.com/report-a-chemical-industry-lobbyist-is-writing-toxic-c-1819750667">elite class</a>, has completely overtaken the government. The interests of the United States of America are now the interests of the businessmen based in it. This is going to prove disastrous for international relations in the new era of China and the USA.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cEo7vbKxYD7liWtFCiHZKg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Guangzhou, China. Photo: Drake Long</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>The Etairia States of America</strong></h3><p>Businesses should be wary <a href="https://www.rcrwireless.com/20170627/carriers/att-joint-venture-with-china-telecom-tag6">of getting into bed</a> with Chinese companies just for access to China’s market. Inevitably, these businesses face competition from Chinese counterparts after spending so long in the country, and the Chinese government does <a href="https://harpers.org/archive/2015/11/the-new-china-syndrome/">not play as fair with US companies as the average CEO hopes.</a> Consider Huawei and Xiaomi, two competitors overtaking Tim Cook’s Apple in the country that owe a lot of their success to being involved in Apple’s supply chain. Now they dominate the Chinese market. Furthermore, with a perspective that ignores the monetary fortunes of US companies, Chinese businesses are so intertwined with the state that their progress is coupled with ominous advances for one of the most <a href="https://www.buzzfeed.com/meghara/the-police-state-of-the-future-is-already-here">complex police regimes</a> in the world. Pony Ma, CEO of Tencent and one of the richest men in China, was somewhat unconvincing when discussing the benefits of facial recognition at his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gGnby27ypRo">recent talk.</a> It’s doubtful facial recognition will be used mostly for finding missing persons. However, it does have great utility in identifying anybody, at any time, for a government obsessed with patriarchal control.</p><p>The partnerships, investment, and innovation done with Chinese companies is thus advancing something directly counter to long-standing US policy: the suppression of human rights. At a certain point, the unwillingness to initiate conflict has to give away to the reality that the USA and China are diametrically opposed on what they stand for. The USA offers a normative vision for how <em>society </em>ought to be, and that includes certain rights the government can’t trample on. China has writhed against this vision its entire modern life, and prefers a world where monarchical states can interfere with their populace to their heart’s content (and individual’s detriment).</p><p>Unfortunately, the New Aristocrats running US policy probably won’t acknowledge this basic difference. Because the New Aristocracy and the business class are one in the same, and if they dominate the US government, then the prioritization of ‘profit-driven foreign policy’ will always come first. Something so incorporeal and ‘flaky’ as ideals of human rights and rule of law (not rule <em>by </em>law) doesn’t appeal to profit margins.</p><p>There’s an argument to be made that in advocating for US business interests, conflict with China will come due to unfair protectionist practices, and thus the skewed priorities of a new aristocratic governing class won’t matter. After all, US businesses have to compete with Chinese ones. A major show-down or confrontation isn’t necessarily forthcoming, though, due to how the US economy functions in comparison with China’s.</p><p>Despite the many things Wilbur Ross <a href="https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/11/us-secretary-commerce-wilbur-ross-announces-hundreds-billions-deals">touted</a> after his trade trip to China, one question for him goes unasked. He says a Chinese company has agreed to develop an Alaska oil field. Why isn’t an American company doing that?</p><p>This isn’t mindless economic nationalism, it’s a question with a point. US companies are not suited to develop those fields because US companies have long-since ceased investing in <a href="https://academic.oup.com/cje/article-abstract/39/3/907/1712337?redirectedFrom=fulltext">capacity.</a> The ability to develop a gas field is not as important as boosting stock prices in the short-term, which can be achieved more easily through announcing a partnership…with a Chinese company. This is the essence of ‘finance-dominated capitalism,’ pointed out by Hein as a serious issue with modern American management (<em>NOTE: a catchy shorthand for this would be fin-dom capitalism, but that apparently has an unfortunate double meaning.</em>)</p><p>Mergers and acquisitions are the go-to method of making more money in the world of US finance, and as Hein also warns this does not transfer greater wealth down to workers lower on the corporate ladder. Factories are not growing, and opportunities for advancement and promotion are unavailable to workers not already privy to an advanced education. Perhaps if unions had greater strength, things would be different, but that’s unlikely to come back in roaring fashion. The contrast in strategy between the biggest American corporations and their Chinese counterparts is going to be a serious point of conflict in the future, and not many congressmen accepting the lobbyist’s outstretched hand are considering this.</p><p>So, in a world where the New Aristocracy runs the US government like <a href="http://time.com/donald-trumps-suite-of-power/">a private export-import bank</a>, skewing grand strategy for its own business interests, where do we actually see US foreign policy going? Since the label ‘for profit’ does not seem descriptive enough.</p><p>Consider an historical analogue.</p><p>It’s a gross betrayal of historians to draw a comparison between the modern United States and the Ottoman Empire, but a salient point can still be illustrated this way. The Ottoman Empire once stretched from Persia into the Balkans, and collapsed in a spectacular fashion. Its feudal system of management is a far cry from the America of today, but the one similarity between the two states is the sheer diversity of people within either one’s borders. The United States, as an immigrant nation, is a unique superpower. The Ottoman Empire had subjects ranging from Arabs to Croatians. Middle Easterners and Europeans comingled. Among the many groups of the Ottoman Empire, no ethnic group held as unique a position as the Greeks, though.</p><p>Despite its power in Constantinople (now Istanbul) and its colonies in the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire was an outsider to European politics, and remained so after the failure to overtake Vienna, the Austrian capital. It may have come straight to the borders of well-established European states, dealt with them, connived with them as the Sublime Porte, but it was too different on the basis of religion and custom to truly fit in. The Ottoman nobles were not of the same connected royal families running Europe at the time.</p><p>With significant holdings beyond Thrace, administering its territory became a periodic issue for the Ottomans. There were the various provincial governors, measures of autonomy granted to European provinces, but these developments took time. And the Ottomans inherited the Adriatic Sea from Venice faster than it could build the appropriate navy for such a vital trade route.</p><p><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Establishment-National-1804-1920-History-Central/dp/0295964138">Enter the Greeks</a>, who in Ottoman society enjoyed a privileged position. Greeks (or at least those who identified as such) were often dragomans (admirals) in the Ottoman Navy, sailors on Ottoman ships, and most importantly, they occupied the merchant class. Certain Greeks called Phanariots became provincial despots in their own right, running territories in what is modern-day Romania. Living on the edge of Anatolia and one of the most diverse points of Europe gave the Greeks a vital role as translators, interpreters, and merchant messengers for Constantinople. Adriatic trade was handled by the Greek class, and many worked as both administrators and diplomats for the Empire. One such man like this was Alexander Ypsilantis, one founding father of Greece who once served as a leader in the Danubian Principalities (Wallachia and Moldova).</p><p>But Ypsilantis, like many other Greeks, had a distinct identity from the other Ottoman subjects. The Hellenistic culture of ancient Greece was kept alive through the intelligentsia and literati of the educated Greeks. As a merchant class, the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire had extensive contact with foreign countries, such as Imperial Russia and Great Britain. With this interaction, financial transactions gave way to study exchanges, which gave way to conspiracy. There were many Philhellenes in the British Empire and Russian Empire who were strongly supportive of a weaker Ottoman Empire and an independent Greece.</p><p>They quickly found common cause with the <strong>Filiki Etairia</strong>, an organization of Greeks headed by Alexander Ypsilantis, among others, who conspired against the Ottoman Empire. The Etairia (literally, ‘Company’) was an association of Greek naval officers, military officers, and members of the merchant class, united by their privileged status in the Ottoman Empire and motivated by the possibility of an independent Greece. This same organization instigated the Greek Revolution against the Ottoman Empire, and set into motion its permanent destruction. Those who consider this a narrative of national self-determination should bear in mind the original goal of the Etairia was not to just create a new Greece, but to create a new Greek Empire. One that would include significant non-Greek subjects as part of a pan-Orthodox Megali Idea (literally, ‘Great Idea’.) The actual revolution didn’t accomplish this, as it was ultimately decided by the machinations of the British, Austrians, and Russians. Greece then had a rump state, and had to accept a German prince as its ruler. The privileged class of the Etairia somewhat got what they wanted, but for many regular Greeks the new Kingdom was not up to par (the monarch was driven out shortly after).</p><p>The purpose of this history lesson is not to draw a comparison between the New Aristocrats focused on business interests and the Filiki Etairia. The goals of the Etairia were independence, and it’s silly to believe the New Aristocracy of the USA wants the same. Rather, this story illustrates how extensive contact with foreign countries, coupled with a deep alienation from other classes of the home country, encourages foreign policy opinions among the privileged class that would actually harm a country’s national goals. This is normally acceptable, but in a democracy like the USA, the same people holding such opinions making the decisions that matter are beginning to wear down the positives of the democratic system. It’s as simple as focusing the entirety of American grand strategy on <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/trump-foreign-policy-follow-money-171118145504969.html">profit</a>, while simultaneously <a href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/12/2/16720952/senate-tax-bill-inequality">denying</a> any of that profit to the vast majority of the population.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yK9wybUMeVsrVV-HNaDMJA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Salem, Ohio. Photo: Drake Long.</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Conclusion</strong></h3><p>Who decides what is in America’s interests?</p><p>In a democratic system, ideally it would be the representatives of the people voting. However, thoughts on this matter have shifted far away since the end of the Cold War, as foreign analysts encounter a world where the USA is increasingly aimless. There was no great ideological battle to be waged after the fall of the Soviet Union, and foreign policy instead became one of being frugal. Save money, and maybe get dragged into a pointless conflict here or there. These circumstances, along with the incredible wealth gained through trade with China, has crafted a New Aristocracy that increasingly dominates the national conversation.</p><p>Well-educated, well-acquainted with the outside world, it’s difficult to argue against the idea some of these new aristocrats know what’s best. Similar to how the words of Greek merchants weighed more heavily than that of a Serb in the Ottoman Empire. However, the New Aristocracy is mostly built on the fortunes of the business class in the USA, a group increasingly insulated from the poverty and <a href="https://www.cincinnati.com/pages/interactives/seven-days-of-heroin-epidemic-cincinnati/">issues affecting other sectors</a> of American society.</p><p>The absence of ideology contributes to the bluster and meaningless, incompetent gestures of Donald Trump, and in-turn provokes a reaction that glosses over serious issues in the post-Cold War arrangement that should get a second look. But there <em>is</em> an ideological battle being waged, between those <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/15/saudi-arabia-prosecution-forming-human-rights-group">who would destroy civil society</a> and those who understand sovereignty is not an excuse for an aristocratic class to abuse the lower rungs. This is best understood as the ongoing struggle for human rights to be taken seriously. Unfortunately, on this front, the New Aristocracy and the counterparts it works with in a country <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-13/china-s-jailed-nobel-peace-prize-winner-liu-dies-from-cancer">like China</a> tend to agree more than someone less profit-driven would. <a href="https://deadspin.com/this-slave-built-qatari-world-cup-stadium-sure-is-prett-1795349171">Human rights simply get in the way of business.</a> There is thus an internal ideological struggle between stratified classes in the USA, to see who gets to hold the wheel in a whole new way.</p><p>Democracy is supposed to keep such a class of elite socialites grounded. Yet, with the election of Trump, no one can say that with a straight face.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3819fbba243e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mobrule/the-disconnect-the-new-aristocracy-and-us-china-relations-3819fbba243e">The DisConnect: The ‘New Aristocracy’ and US-China Relations</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mobrule">Mob-Rule</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Letters from the Pearl Delta: Two Weddings]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mobrule/letters-from-the-pearl-delta-two-weddings-cd3d7037084d?source=rss-44025861c5d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/cd3d7037084d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[weddings]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[humor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Drake Long]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Nov 2017 06:10:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-28T06:10:45.726Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lIpIPdz9VXnRSpLosDUuNw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Outside the family home</figcaption></figure><blockquote>Note: This is the eighth in a multi-part series about my year spent working and living in Guangdong, China. It’s not the series for a definitive and authoritative account of Sino-US relations and cultural differences. It’s mostly a lot of rambling and inaccessible humor.</blockquote><p>Prior to his ceremony, the groom separates from the wife and avoids seeing her while she decorates his hotel room with red balloons and peanuts. When he comes back to his room, the wife is gone once more with her bridesmaids and has retired to her family home. In order to marry his wife, the groom has to go to her parents’ house and bribe the extended family with 红包 (red paper packets full of money). Then, he has to find which room she is locked in and undergo a series of trials to prove his worth to her. Only then will the bride’s best friend allow the wife and groom to see one another.</p><p>This was the wedding I witnessed this past weekend, while most people back in the US of A were busy celebrating or recovering from Thanksgiving. I was a guest of the groom, one of a handful of foreigners, and didn’t have to do much more than watch while my friend professed his love through a somewhat cheesy spectacle of singing, dancing, and a set of fifty push-ups. I did sing back-up vocals at one point, while a much older relative of the wife fed me and the rest of the entourage grapes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PcxV5qKwgrtpJqnrWywnsQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Eating snacks while the groom pays homage to the wife’s (large, extended) family</figcaption></figure><p>I told all this to a Chinese student of mine when I got back to Guangzhou. His response was to crinkle his nose and simply say, “That’s weird.”</p><p>I’ve had a conflicting array of opinions from my students and friends about what exactly a ‘traditional Chinese wedding’ should be like, with some agreeing that the ceremony I witnessed was perfectly normal while others didn’t know what I was talking about. It was a subtle reminder of how much Cantonese culture remains in Guangdong province.</p><p>At the post-ceremony dinner, I was treated to limitless cognac and wine, which was probably a bad combination. I reflected a lot on weddings and the notion of ‘ceremony’ (although not in the typical way that Eros’ dustbin of regret-filled lonely losers such as myself normally would). Prior to Guangzhou, I studied in Tianjin, at China’s northeastern coast. Tianjin is an <em>interesting</em> city. It’s filled with districts of mock-colonial architecture, turning the aesthetic of its historical <a href="http://www.visitourchina.com/tianjin/attraction/tianjin-old-concession.html">European concessions</a> into something for tourists to gawk at. There’s a curious caricature of an Italian street, for example. I watched wedding ceremonies in Tianjin, although I wasn’t invited. They happened on the lawns of certain architecturally-bizarre buildings, and on the streets prettied up with a European vibe. They were public weddings, absolutely effervescent but a little voyeuristic at the same time. They couldn’t have been more different from the wedding I witnessed in Guangdong, especially since they were meant to mimic a typical ‘Western’ ceremony.</p><p>There were some similarities, though, stark as the two weddings were in execution. There’s a strong sense of ceremony and outward appearance in Chinese society, to the point where the ‘western’-style weddings I watched in Tianjin would invite good-looking strangers and foreigners (I said “No thanks.”) just to sit on some lawn-chairs. The wedding I just got back from was packed with relatives of the wife, who were tripping over themselves in expressing well-wishes and liquored-up congratulatory speeches. At one point the emcee for the reception asked for me or one of the other foreigners to give a speech for our friend. When we declined, there was a stark feeling of having done something <em>wrong. </em>Clearly we’d committed a faux-pas, and some more relatives of the wife stepped in to compensate by stating how happy they were for the couple. We’d disturbed our friend’s ‘face,’ or perhaps disrupted the ‘harmony.’ It’s unclear which part of Chinese social culture had actually been ruined. Maybe both.</p><p>The irony is, such speeches and ceremony were constant, and unending, but at the end of the day my friend told us he’d received so little in gifts/红包 from his wife’s family. He wasn’t shocked — after all, he’s still a foreigner. Acceptance goes so far.</p><p>The superficiality of the ‘western’-style weddings I watched listlessly in the northeast similarly had me thinking about what exactly these couples were trying to copy.</p><p>I’ve got one more wedding coming up: my older sister’s, next August. Where I am now, there’s not much to do except listen on the sidelines while the preparations unfold. Understandably, my sister — a recent college graduate with a solid job, considering a Master’s — is overwhelmed. That is the hallmark of a <em>true </em>Western wedding. Weddings aren’t cheap, and my sister can be forgiven for admitting to my parents that she’d been considering just eloping. A lot of work is being done to make sure absolutely none of that anxiety shows in the actual wedding ceremony. There’s an expectation that I have to improvise a plus-one, as otherwise some ‘harmony’ will be disturbed. I’m sure there’d be less enthusiasm for western-style weddings if a Chinese couple just sat nearby a discussion between my sister and my parents.</p><p>It’s not insensitive to point out China’s society has a problem with being <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/id/26153578/ns/beijing_olympics-beijing_olympics_news/t/young-olympics-singing-star-didnt-really-sing/">superficial</a>, but now I’m not so certain it’s a China-specific trait. Being immersed in such artificiality, I’m getting acutely aware of how much I <em>don’t </em>want the USA to feel the same way when I get back to it. But it’s already felt like that for a while. American society has placed an emphasis on appearances that seems to get more and more <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt6706188/">meaningless</a> and <a href="http://www.breitbart.com/big-hollywood/2017/11/27/shes-like-an-angel-melania-trump-stuns-in-dior-for-unveiling-of-christmas-at-the-white-house/">inane</a> with each round of Tindr the average American fails to get a hook-up in. Everyone picks their best pictures to show, and everyone else rates them for it. Social media has become a competition to watch how happy other people can look and vigorously imitate them. There’s little reality being peddled — and especially nothing that would otherwise humanize any of the social media/dating personalities everyone is carefully cultivating. China, for me, has always been something of a cautionary tale in this regard, but now I’m beginning to think it’s the inevitable end-state of where American life is going.</p><p>This was the cognac-soaked worry of a guy watching a Cantonese wedding unfold. Probably the most authentic thing I watched this weekend was my friend’s profession of love to his wife, behind the locked door of her bedroom. Occasionally, I think all the other bullshit saps away at the chance to appreciate something truly meaningful.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Tv8rKz84rSsnOkrjAaEmmg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Congratulations!</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=cd3d7037084d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mobrule/letters-from-the-pearl-delta-two-weddings-cd3d7037084d">Letters from the Pearl Delta: Two Weddings</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mobrule">Mob-Rule</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Letters from the Pearl Delta: A Sense of Shenzhen]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mobrule/letters-from-the-pearl-delta-a-sense-of-shenzhen-6c4f3b6785b?source=rss-44025861c5d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6c4f3b6785b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[humor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[shenzhen]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Drake Long]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Nov 2017 05:27:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-21T05:27:08.790Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QrRHuhRoTXX9MHYA0BgQ1w.jpeg" /></figure><blockquote>Note: This is the seventh in a multi-part series about my year spent working and living in Guangdong, China. It’s not the series for a definitive and authoritative account of Sino-US relations and cultural differences. It’s mostly a lot of rambling and inaccessible humor.</blockquote><p>I traveled to the city of Shenzhen this past week to get a suit before my friend’s wedding.</p><p>Style is something I’m sorely lacking in, not least because I plan on going to the Guangzhou Opera House for the hell of it one day and I can’t show up in the typical Ohio Finery (described as a flannel and jeans of varying color combination). The upcoming wedding gave me the extra push necessary to get a suit while I’m in China, which I heard was worth the money and would <em>not </em>evoke my worst fears about class-symbol shopping scenarios. I never had the option to get a tailor-made suit before. But even if I did, I wouldn’t have done it. Because I believe that if I ever did some 18th century French aristocrat with ticker tape thrown over his shoulders would drag me out by the ear and call the police to give me a good drubbin’, as I dare to enter an abode above my low society self. Maybe the shopkeep would laugh at me and give me some boat oars to hold, or something like that.</p><p>That’s not completely rational, but I figured something along those lines would happen.</p><p>As I found out in Shenzhen, no such antics were to occur. I took the train into the city and was pleasantly surprised by the process. I can never stress my love for China’s high speed rails enough — it took me about thirty minutes to get to Shenzhen station, and during that time I had a nice cushioned seat and plenty of quiet. There are three classes of tickets, and the third-class is just a standing ticket for anyone who doesn’t want to pay for a whole seat or doesn’t care that the train is full. But sometimes, I buy a third-class ticket and am lucky enough to get an empty seat anyway. Minor joys, sure, but on my many adventures through the Guangzhou subway I’ve never been able to sit.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gdQvOP5oAKKDGu_f9p8N_Q.jpeg" /></figure><p>Shenzhen itself is an <em>interesting </em>city. I can call any city beautiful, but the <em>interesting </em>label is reserved for places with those small distinctions and subtleties make me think about them well after I’ve left. Shenzhen is interesting in that way. Plenty of foreigners go to Shenzhen for suits and dresses, as I heard a chorus of British, Hongkonger, and some South Asian accents in the mall where I got fitted. The tailors of Shenzhen reminded me of what an old 18th century craftsman might actually be like — just experts, at what they did, and able to use limited communication to get any Brit whatever they needed. Any sort of dress or suit, in any fabric or style, could be made. The particular shop I went to with my friends had a whole library of fabric books to reference, filled with references to companies all over the world.</p><p>“If you show them a picture, they can make any style you want.” My friend offered me some advice before I talked to the tailor. I didn’t really have a set style in mind (something nice? In a…dark color?) but I decided if I had the opportunity I might as well try and make use of it. So I showed the tailor a picture of a <a href="https://www.hugoboss.com/us/pinstriped-super-130-wool-suit-slim-fit-huge%2Fgenius/hbna50375777_061.html">Hugo Boss suit</a> I’ve always wanted on my phone and he casually nodded and said “Okay.”</p><p>And he just…did it. He found matching fabric, fitted me, and that was it. No top-hat wearing baron came in to throw me out onto the street. It was a very mixed feeling. I told my friends beforehand, “Very excited to get my first tailor-made suit,’ but I don’t think they quite understood how serious I was about that. The particular suit I picked out would normally cost about $1,000. The tailor made it for me for the low, low cost of $140. It’s bafflingly cheap. I might go back and get something crazier just for the hell of it. For years, I always held up suits and other stuff like it as status symbols, some sort of materialistic <em>goal </em>for me to grab onto when I could say, years later, that I finally <em>made it. </em>As in, actually became somebody important. Maybe with a Bluetooth, and annoying East Coast accent, and a wife I barely talk to. To get a tailor-made suit now felt awful early.</p><p>But in the end, a suit’s just a suit. Shenzhen (possibly China as a whole) has that kind of effect on what I once knew, where things considered far-off and impossible get equalized into normalcy. Everything I’d consider expensive in the USA is absurdly cheap here. The <a href="http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/2069899/chinas-luxury-goods-market-begins-recovery-middle-class">sheer appetite for luxury items</a> that I see displayed on Chinese streets has so thoroughly turned me off the idea of ‘status’ that I don’t think about how to work in ‘high society’ much anymore. It’s a good change of pace from the usual neuroticism.</p><p>Shenzhen’s cheap suits and skilled tailors are probably a lifesaver for many people busting into the business world from nearby Hong Kong, which is not so affordable. But Shenzhen is not just a good place for shopping — <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shenzhen-sez-china.asp">it’s the business mecca of Southern China</a>. It was the original Special Economic Zone (SEZ) chosen by Deng Xiaoping for his market experiments in the 1980s, and it’s simultaneously a financial and industrial hub that foreign companies often make first contact with. <a href="http://www.huawei.com/en/">Huawei</a> owns a massive complex here, and Huawei itself benefits enormously from the special status an SEZ gets. It’s somewhat ironic that this part of China supplies Apple, another technology company, with so many parts, yet that aspect also let it <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/bdef1838-a690-11e7-93c5-648314d2c72c">severely undercut Apple later on when Huawei</a> started selling its own smartphones and electronic tablets. Many of the tailors and fabric companies I noticed were busy supplying cheap materials and suits to foreign companies — <a href="http://annualreport-2015.hugoboss.com/group-profile/sourcing-and-production/suppliers.html">like Hugo Boss.</a> At home, though, they could make the same suits or dresses for drastically cheaper prices. Such is the way of business in China, and such is the reason China’s domestic market is increasingly dominated by domestic companies.</p><p>The exception, however, is luxury goods. How many Chinese Fu’erdai (富二代) did I see in Beijing rocking a mishmash of Dolce and Gabbana and Armani? Stuff that has to be bought in luxury outlets or abroad? Despite the fact they could buy the same stuff for far cheaper domestically? But, that’s a matter of <em>status.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Tzd6W_DSGWjJVKlLSXgIQg.jpeg" /></figure><p>On that same note, the status of an SEZ isn’t quite what it used to be, either. As much as I loved Shenzhen and its endless buildings and clean subway, it’s somewhat odd I never felt jostled or crowded in any store or metro stop. I was in Shenzhen on <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singles%27_Day">Singles’ Day.</a> Singles’ Day is probably the most capitalist holiday I’ve ever seen — it is entirely based around buying things. What things? Anything. My students apparently went broke pursuing deals on everything from phone accessories to clothing. Virtually every year, Singles’ Day sales break records.</p><p>However, there wasn’t much of a crowd in Shenzhen’s markets. That’s because Singles’ Day is usually spent online. Big online retailers like Alibaba, JD.com, and Lazada make big bucks for the holiday, often to the breaking point for their servers. But young Chinese, I’m increasingly finding out, don’t often leave the house to go shop in-person. It’s a hassle, they tell me. Thus Shenzhen’s markets were unusually quiet aside from the usual haggling. It used to be the place for Chinese people to flock to on Singles’ Day.</p><p>Now, Shenzhen is still a rich part of China. But the ‘special’ status of an economic zone is a bit cheapened now that most of the Pearl Delta is included and <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/04/21/chinas-new-special-economic-zone-evokes-memories-of-shenzhen/">China as a whole has opened up markets all along the East Coast. </a>Shenzhen used to be the only way to do business in China, as an access point for established Hong Kong businesses and other entrepreneurs abroad. The megalopolis of the Pearl Delta will soon be joined by the megalopolis of the Beijing-Xiongan-Tianjin corridor, though, and this could be a shrewd way by Xi Jinping to make sure economic wealth and foreign trade starts funneling more northward, instead of staying in the south (which includes Shanghai, a city famously derided by Deng Xiaoping for its <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comprador">‘comprador’</a> mentality due to its merchant class).</p><p>It’s somewhat of a shame, I feel, for Shenzhen to slowly lose its special status as the SEZ where foreigners and Chinese businessmen came to meet. As each mega city in China gets richer, they all become mundane. At least Shenzhen has the stock exchange to make it unique, but I’m not sure how long that will stay true. And it’s also a shame Singles’ Day drew few Chinese crowds to the city when I was there, and likely will draw fewer and fewer in the future as internet stores continue to dominate. Maybe some single, Chinese fellow will miss out on the chance of getting a fitted suit.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Oxx5mXRKeqxsXPmxfmzqXA.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6c4f3b6785b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mobrule/letters-from-the-pearl-delta-a-sense-of-shenzhen-6c4f3b6785b">Letters from the Pearl Delta: A Sense of Shenzhen</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mobrule">Mob-Rule</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The ‘Group of Two’ That Isn’t To Be]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mobrule/the-group-of-two-that-isn-t-to-be-ce1a43b48ff4?source=rss-44025861c5d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ce1a43b48ff4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[group-of-two]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-relations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[us-china-relations]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Drake Long]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Nov 2017 04:23:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-13T04:23:58.846Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZOoHPNlB5ec8nkj4m2xcdQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by Jim Watson</figcaption></figure><h4>Other countries have figured Trump out.</h4><p>For Saudi Arabia, Trump’s love of pageantry was easy to tap into. A sword dance later, and now they have an administration willing to sign off on everything from an<a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-arrests-trump/trump-praises-saudi-purge-voices-confidence-in-king-crown-prince-idUSKBN1D62XM"> internal coup</a> to a counterproductive <a href="http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-11-12/lebanon-says-saudi-should-clarify-why-hariri-hasnt-returned/9141738">shakedown of Lebanon</a>. Now, China has apparently impressed Trump enough to have him renege the tough talk on trade and <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trump-asia-china-bromance/trump-heaps-praise-on-very-special-xi-in-china-visit-idUSKBN1D91C8?il=0">openly praise</a> President Xi Jinping. To get to the President’s heart, a healthy dose of flattery and ceremony is all that’s necessary.</p><h4><strong>Ceremony</strong></h4><p>It’s important to keep this word in mind — <em>ceremony. </em>Despite Trump’s touting and fawning over his trip to China, he and others are falling into an irritatingly naïve game. A game that China is proving more adept at toying with, as the fanfare with which the summit was given has a certain implication to it. For many, <a href="https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/928769154345324544">Trump’s new treatment of China</a> and Xi Jinping’s ambition has paved the way for a G-2. That is, <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/the-long-read-henry-kissinger-was-right-it-is-time-for-us-to-build-bridges-with-china-1.36793">a special bilateral relationship where two countries acknowledge each other as equal superpowers</a>. This sort of arrangement is not dissimilar to the one needed during the Cold War, with the Soviet Union, and indeed its biggest proponent today is the same one back then: Henry Kissinger.</p><p>A G-2 summit, which many could argue just occurred, sounds like a necessity given the overwhelming economic rise of China and the USA’s tenacious influence in its neighborhood. However, there was a lot going on in this past summit, and quite a bit would actually contradict any evidence for a G-2 being necessary, or an appropriate enough label for the new order coming into the world.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/489/1*PBsM4R1dBMMU7NnHixnx6g.png" /></figure><h4><strong>The US: Whose Indo-Pacific?</strong></h4><p>China <em>loves </em>the art of ceremony. This compliments Trump’s personal style well, and similar to how Saudi Arabia preyed on this aspect of him, China saw fit to flatter the visiting President in order to get what it wanted. Chiefly, the trade deals boasted by Trump have all the hallmarks of a typical Chinese policy. While it’s nice to think the billions of dollars in trade deals Trump talks of will actually happen, the reality is less clear. Many of these trade deals are actually in the form of memorandum of understanding (MOUs), which are non-binding, vague, and often dropped quietly long after they’re declared. This was the case with the highly-praised <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-22/guide-to-400-billion-in-saudi-u-s-deals-black-hawks-to-oil">Saudi Arabian arms deal</a>. In short, they’re declarative for declaration’s sake. But this is important to a China seeking greater stature on the world stage and a favorable, benign attitude from Washington, as only with a better reputation, or ‘face,’ can China pursue some of its subtler objectives…<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/07/ahead-of-trumps-china-visit-real-teeth-in-new-north-korea-sanctions-bill/">such as getting past US animosity over North Korean sanctions while still not budging on how to actually solve the North Korean problem</a>. This works nicely with Trump’s MO, which has always been to stress appearance over substance.</p><p>Take, for example, the new phrase entering the Trump administration’s lexicon: ‘Indo-Pacific.’ This is a well-selected phrase, worthy of a marketing dissertation, as it evokes a broad stretch of territory (the Indian and Pacific Oceans) in unity while also echoing back to one of the greatest <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/the-geopolitical-vision-of-alfred-thayer-mahan/">pioneers of naval studies and foreign policy</a>. The Indo-Pacific, as per the USA’s definition, is a vast part of the world needing free navigation, free trade, and a benevolent US role.</p><p>But, in the end, what exactly <em>is </em>the USA’s role in the Indo-Pacific? Most would say ‘facilitator,’ as the USA prods its allies such as Japan and India to work better together toward a common anti-China policy. However, the USA has not exactly acted like such a great facilitator before, and its allies are taking steps to detach themselves…most notably through the formation of a <a href="https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/11/11/business/economy-business/eleven-trade-ministers-reach-deal-tpp-without-u-s/">new Trans-Pacific Partnership</a>, which the USA almost joined, but then squandered. The goal of the TPP was going to be much the same as what Trump currently wants the Indo-Pacific to do: decrease reliance on Chinese companies and goods by diversifying among other Indo-Pacific nations. Simultaneously<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/trump-wants-to-end-horrible-south-korea-us-trade-deal-koreans-disagree/2017/09/13/fb528b3e-9627-11e7-a527-3573bd073e02_story.html?utm_term=.95fc0b34e2b0">, Trump has bullied South Korea over its trade deal with the US</a>, mostly for domestic political optics. This is not the attitude of a country that a web of Indo-Pacific nations should trust.</p><p>Alternatively, perhaps the USA’s Indo-Pacific policy will be that of a security guarantor. Ignoring the fact that China’s preeminence comes from an overbearing <em>economic</em> atmosphere, the USA already has security pacts with Japan and South Korea, and simply won’t be extending such a strong policy outside East Asia. The biggest dispute involving military elements in the Pacific, the South China Sea, lacks a strong US response. Freedom of navigation exercises are helpful, but in the absence of a coherent, overarching policy, they just appear routine. They’ve ceased being provocative, and the basic security situation altered by the new Chinese maritime bases isn’t affected. Maybe the USA is meant to guarantee security another way, by promoting military cooperation among its allies. This is a hopeless policy though, as the national security objectives of India are never going to align with Japan’s. An ‘anti-China front’ is probably necessary, but in the maritime realm India has to fend off a vastly superior Chinese fleet alongside a continental force with both Chinese and Pakistani troops. Japan does not have the latter worry, but instead contends with a North Korean nuclear capability — a situation the US hasn’t yet dealt with, and doesn’t fit in to the proposed common policy of an Indo-Pacific alliance as it doesn’t involve resisting China. India and Japan are utterly vital to an Indo-Pacific approach, though. It’s not clear what the USA could do beyond some token military exercises with these two powerhouses of the Indian and Pacific oceans.</p><p>The Indo-Pacific, to put it plainly, is too big, and the USA has not actually gone through with policies that would have tied a non-military role for it to the region (the TPP). The usage of the phrase evokes many feelings of a common front, but a large reason why the <a href="https://gbtimes.com/china-dismisses-speculation-about-indo-pacific-containment-strategy-by-us-japan">Chinese press</a> doesn’t care about it could be the same reason it isn’t likely to mean much in the long term: it’s just a showpiece term, without much meaningful policy change behind it. It’s similar, in that respect, to Barack Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia.’</p><p>Or Xi Jinping’s ‘One Belt One Road.’</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/470/1*MXPtDIBwbv2DwsASmkkpuQ.png" /></figure><h3><strong>China: G-2 Aspirant</strong></h3><p>Probably the greatest indicator of Xi Jinping’s savvy was the complete lack of a press Q&amp;A session after this past summit. This is standard for a Chinese event — questions aren’t tolerated, and the press has no freedom. It’s usually customary for the US to argue otherwise and force China’s politicians to a higher standard.</p><p>Trump didn’t do that, most of all because he hates the press himself. In so doing, he has now expressed solidarity with an authoritarian leader. But, more importantly, he’s given Xi Jinping everything he wanted in terms of showmanship. China looked much like the powerful host at this past summit, and a number <a href="http://time.com/5014822/donald-trump-xi-jinping-china-beijing/">of foreign outlets couldn’t resist saying so</a>.</p><p>There is a serious problem with the recent praise of Xi Jinping. Not <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/09/world/asia/trump-xi-jinping-north-korea.html">just from Trump</a>, but those who detest Trump are <a href="http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-rothkopf-trump-goes-to-china-20171103-story.html">projecting their ideals of a competent, rational leader</a> onto a veritable dictator, presiding over a country that may espouse free trade rhetoric but is <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-did-china-kidnap-its-provocateurs">brutally illiberal</a> at its core.</p><p>Undoubtedly, China has come a long way from the Beijing Olympics of 2008, which could be considered its ‘debut’ to the world stage. But the usage of the Beijing Olympics as a show to impress underlies one of the most predictable Chinese foreign policies — a desire to be taken seriously, a desire for stature, coupled with an unrelenting resistance to embarrassment. It’s not surprising that China wants a G-2 status, then, and feels emboldened to request it during this past summit.</p><p>Analysts, thinkers, and China-watchers should take stock, then, of whether a G-2 is even necessary for China, or if it would be handing China’s ruling party a monumental win for little gain on the international security scene. Returning to the rhetoric many writers treat Xi Jinping with, there’s a certain myth that despite his <a href="https://www.vox.com/world/2017/10/24/16533526/china-xi-jinping-constitution-chinese-congress-mao">self-promotion to head of the Communist Party</a> and ascension to its constitution, Xi’s personal style of governance is far removed from that of petty dictators and the unstable Mao Zedong, therefore there is less to worry about. In so many words, Xi looks like a technocrat. Consider, however, the major contributions of Xi Jinping to China’s governance. The economic rise was not his doing, nor were the free market reforms. Those were the works of his predecessors. Xi Jinping is instead best known for his anti-corruption drive and the articulation of a Chinese foreign policy (and a <a href="http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-evolving-military-strategy-the-reorganization-the-17508">restructuring of institutions</a> like the military to meet that end).</p><p>The anti-corruption drive is turning out <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/a-closer-look-at-the-downfall-of-sun-zhengcai/">far more selective</a> than observers first realized. China’s foreign policy is best understood as the One Belt, One Road project…something appropriately grand for China’s propaganda purposes but <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/magazine/what-the-worlds-emptiest-international-airport-says-about-chinas-influence.html">lacking in actual execution</a>. A lot of China’s foreign policy as understood by outsiders — free trade, and protection for neoliberal institutions where the US drops them — is<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/world/europe/china-norway-nobel-liu-xiaobo.html"> farcical</a>. Instead, one of the most important foreign policy moves as an indicator of the future should be Xi’s approach to the Korean Peninsula. On North Korea, China is still stuck in a confused stance, begrudgingly agreeing to United Nations sanctions while hoping the USA solves the problem (and the USA hopes the opposite). With South Korea’s deployment of THAAD, itself a product of the inattention North Korea’s received for so long, the world saw a <a href="http://www.38north.org/2017/11/abrahamianson110917/">disproportionately hysterical Chinese response</a>. This is not unusual — as previously mentioned, China is more obsessed with reputation than people realize, and the US-ROK alliance is an ongoing embarrassment given its proximity to the Chinese border. The response outlines an approach China is likely to use more often as it desires a status commensurate with a G-2 power. Economic warfare like this is not the conduct of a benevolent, neoliberal technocrat — it is instead the sign of a mercurial party-state.</p><p>The circumstances over this outburst are also not exactly flattering to a G-2 position. China’s position on North Korea is still characterized by indecision. Despite the fact that North Korea is ostensibly an ally, <a href="http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2114232/beyond-thaad-real-reason-why-china-angry-south-korea">business ties are much closer with the South</a>. The approach to North Korea has been polite neglect, marked by North Korean intransigence. Faced with the coming endgame of the North Korean problem, China is rooted in inaction. This illustrates one of the core weaknesses of China: although it appears to be flexing its foreign policy, it’s a very muddy one. China is resistant to military intervention, which is good, but is also geriatric in its approach to countries other than Pakistan. Economic aid for One Belt, One Road projects is losing its luster, and will contribute to a series of white elephants. A superpower, as the word implies, should have an ideology to champion abroad, to bring other countries into its sphere of influence and spread the home country’s values. China, instead, is characterized by the utter lack of ideology. It has very little soft power to peddle, and few countries it courts choose to <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/03/zambian-president-workers-chinese-mines">align with it on anything else</a>. Simply having a large economy and big businesses does not a G-2 superpower make.</p><p>In the absence of military intervention, China is sitting on the sidelines while conflict crops up elsewhere in the world. For a G-2 summit to be necessary, the USA and China would need to pursue common objectives that would justify meeting in the middle. However, China is not willing to get mired in any disputes or stability operations, even where it might make sense, such as in Afghanistan. It prefers the status of a superpower with none of the responsibilities. This is a desirable situation for many countries, not just China, but in the absence of common problems, why wouldn’t the USA continue to push for multilateral engagement with China, instead of the bilateral kind?</p><p>China’s attitude toward the US should thus be considered in terms of how badly it wants to get to a G-2. The past territorial disputes, and the badgering of South Korea over THAAD, show China believes it automatically deserves a great seat above the G-20, or the G-8, and is frustrated it isn’t automatically receiving such.</p><p>Concisely, why treat China’s G-2 status as a <em>fait accompli, </em>when that would just confirm the ruling Communist Party’s overconfidence?</p><h3><strong>China and the US: A Confusing Affair</strong></h3><p>Even now, the hallmarks of a G-2 relationship aren’t seeded properly.</p><p>The one problem both China and the US could use a summit to discuss is North Korea, and that discussion is going nowhere. The USA, proportional to its military commitments abroad, is obsessed with security and stability issues all over the world. China, with its haphazard network of financial investments and ‘go-abroad’ initiatives, is instead only willing to talk about economic issues, which would be better suited for multilateral forums anyway.</p><p>A G-2 summit would look much like this past trip undertaken by Trump: a lot of words, but little substance as China confines all talk to the economic sphere.</p><p>There is a rush toward a G-2 by people concerned with China’s rise and the USA’s increasingly unstable administration, but the phrase ‘G-2’ itself attempts to project Cold War institutions and agreements on a decidedly post-Cold War atmosphere. Cooler heads ought to prevail, especially when you think about what a G-2 would discuss. For Trump and Xi, given Trump’s willingness to shelve human rights and inability to get over personal ego to push for a simple Q&amp;A session, and also considering Xi’s use of <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-10/china-to-allow-foreign-firms-to-own-51-of-securities-ventures">economic ‘gifts’</a> to ensure cooperation, what would these two want behind closed doors? What grand bargain could be struck there that a multilateral forum couldn’t better make? In the state things are now, forming a G-2 with all the status involved would be meeting China on its terms, for little reason beyond satisfying Chinese ego.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ce1a43b48ff4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mobrule/the-group-of-two-that-isn-t-to-be-ce1a43b48ff4">The ‘Group of Two’ That Isn’t To Be</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mobrule">Mob-Rule</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Some Thoughts About Neoliberalism]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mobrule/some-thoughts-about-neoliberalism-a9dd8c2fb1fd?source=rss-44025861c5d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a9dd8c2fb1fd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[international-affairs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[neoliberalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Drake Long]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Nov 2017 15:00:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-11-06T15:02:34.719Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*khdm2gwqfU7KWhUPkFHFyQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>berG-20 Summit, 2017. Source; Wikimedia Commons</figcaption></figure><h4><strong><em>Or, The Risks of Treating Neoliberalism as a Dying Ideology</em></strong></h4><p>People are talking about neoliberalism again, and not in the healthiest way.</p><p>The election of 2016, among many things, saw the crystallization of neoliberalism in the public sphere, despite the fact that few people beforehand really knew what the word referred to. For the Trump campaign and its affiliated fan clubs, neoliberalism ceased to be a relatively benign aspect of the international system and instead became the word to describe the entire thought behind ‘the establishment.’ Neoliberalism quickly became the go-to label for an orthodox ideology that could be pinned to all Republican and Democrat administrations since the end of the Cold War. Trump is not alone in this: <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/corbyn-and-sanders-show-that-neoliberalism-has-failed-to-privatize-hope/">his far-left antitheses</a> also started deriding neoliberalism as the doctrine of the ‘before,’ when American workers were losing jobs to globalization and rising inequality got worse from corrupt bargains between transnational billionaires. Neoliberalism has been relegated to the same seat as ‘globalism’ and ‘multiculturalism’: a dirty word simultaneously mocked and feared by Trump’s populist cohorts (and some radically left-wing pundits).</p><p>Neoliberalism has its defenders, but they’re unwittingly playing into its recent, vehement detractors’ ploy. It’s understandable that those who enjoyed ‘establishment’ politics or believe in world trade would feel under siege by the extremes of both right and left, and therefore it was inevitable that the mantle of neoliberalism would be picked up and championed as a rational, centrist alternative. This reaction is provoked and given more energy by the worrying <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta/u-s-hikes-tensions-in-nafta-talks-with-call-for-sunset-clause-idUSKBN1CH2EO">attacks on NAFTA</a> and <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-06/trump-leaves-empty-handed-on-trade-as-close-friend-abe-digs-in">free trade</a> by the current administration. In short, neoliberalism has been revived as an ideology in the face of its potential death. Which is admirable. But its supporters are confining neoliberalism to the same corner its opponents get their fuel from: the economic sphere.</p><p>Neoliberal economics are what most people think of when considering neoliberalism. Free trade, laissez-faire market capitalism, and Chicago School-style structural reforms were the backbone of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Consensus">Washington Consensus</a> that brought neoliberalism to the fore.</p><p>There’s nothing wrong in advocating for free trade, or neoliberal economics. There is something deeply problematic in <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/01/24/communist-china-is-now-the-leader-of-the-free-trade-world/#55c974b421e0">praising China</a> as a new leader of the neoliberal regime, though.</p><p>Now that neoliberalism has come under siege, its supporters are hardening their stance on a number of things, mostly on the benefits of global markets and multilateral trade agreements. This hardening is coming with a sense of orthodoxy too, though, which is the kind of attitude Trump’s surrogates had such an easy time setting up and knocking down during the election. This orthodoxy manifests in an uncompromising view on free trade, or in some cases a fierce factional affinity with so-called establishment/moderate political figures (be they on the right or left). This is unusual because neoliberalism itself is not a rigid political ideology.</p><h4><strong>The Path to Neoliberalism: Cold War</strong></h4><p>I use the term ‘political ideology’ because it’s more apt than the people who think of neoliberalism in the modern, orthodox sense realize. Neoliberalism, as a guiding ideology for policy-making, did not arrive fully formed in the age of the Washington Consensus, ready to be practiced by elites. Indeed, neoliberalism’s creation was the result of a debate within the Chicago School of Economics, <a href="https://academic.oup.com/cje/article-abstract/39/5/1443/1690932">chiefly between economists Frank Knight and Aaron Director.</a></p><p>The economic aspects of neoliberalism were not really in dispute between these two figures. What they did disagree on was the <em>political </em>application of neoliberalism — a reflection of how liberalism itself had a long history as a political theory, and the Chicago School’s reinterpretation of it was in contest with other theories. Namely, the ‘institutionalists’ favoring deep state intervention in the market and those who would be called Keynesians, after John Maynard Keynes’ economic and political thought. Neoliberalism, or <em>laissez-faire </em>capitalism, needed to be partly steeped in political philosophy if it wanted to compete with these other post-war ideas for liberal democracy.</p><p>The debate between Knight and Director over this started over their individual fears. For Director, he was extremely wary of collectivism. After World War II, institutionalists and Democratic Socialists were gaining ground in American society as they offered an alternative to the market system that had so spectacularly failed during the Great Depression. Director feared where collectivism would take the country, since groups like Democratic Socialists made a clear distinction between political freedoms, which needed protection, and economic freedoms, which, in their minds, didn’t. One of Director’s biggest intellectual contributions to neoliberalism, then, was the idea of economic freedoms being just as important to safeguard as that of political ones. This idea has the most currency in libertarian circles, but for neoliberals the right to own private property and make decisions in a marketplace unfettered by needless regulation is taken for granted. Director’s argument was very simple: liberal democracies had to protect economic freedoms (defined simply as the freedom to make choices in the economy) since there was a whole demographic who would value those freedoms just as much as political ones. Namely, everybody in the business sector of society. Director thus argued strongly against the idea that Democratic Socialists could consider political freedoms as vital, but ignore economic ones, and still construct a liberal, democratic government.</p><p>For Knight, the economic crises of the 1930s was the result of liberal democracies’ inability to properly keep inequality and political corruption in control. Knight realized that as wealth grew more concentrated in the top rungs of a liberal society, it would simply translate into patronage and thus inefficiency. There needed to be some rules and norms to constrain the market <em>and </em>political spheres, to keep this inequality in check and stave off another Great Depression. Knight thought of the essence of liberalism as a revolution, one that had forever changed the nature of the ruled versus the ruler. It was the result of a struggle against religious and monarchial authority. Knight took this idea and decided, then, a political form of liberalism would need to constrain society but in a decidedly non-authoritarian way. His suggestion was thus to promote what he called <em>discussion.</em></p><p>Political liberalism, Knight articulated, could only come from a strong civil society with individuals constantly in free association with one another. The discussion that would arise from this would then lead to smart, collective decision-making — a democratic way to properly regulate the market, for example.</p><p>This is a very classical liberal viewpoint, but Knight was talking about something much broader than just free speech, as the word discussion might suggest.</p><p>Knight believed an individual’s actions were the result of extremely malleable wants and desires, and those actions in turn <em>created </em>different/better wants and desires. Society could function in the same way, through continuous social action leading to decision-making. Discussion, then, would help society express what wants, desires, and values it needed to have. The pursuit of this kind of discussion (meaning both speech, debate, and social action) would lead to the appropriate ethics, guiding a new set of norms into place for the market and politics. This is a lot of responsibility to heap on something as vaguely defined as ‘discussion,’ but Knight didn’t give any more detail from his writings.</p><p>To put it pithily, Knight was a strong proponent of collective decision-making, and trusted democratic society to make the right choices. Director believed the exact opposite.</p><p>Because Director feared collectivism, and believed certain classes of people favored different freedoms more than others and would strip certain ones away if they could, Director did not have much confidence in majoritarian decision-making. He believed it was a necessity, in a democratic society, but an <em>evil </em>one as well, that needed to be mitigated by a system guided by the elite class. This is probably the main difference between him and Knight, his counterpart at the time. As one can tell just from reading his perception of things, Director found discussion to be fruitless, and could never contribute to meaningful economic policy as Knight suggested it could. They had divergent views of freedom, then, as Knight thought of it in the more cooperative sense, whereas Director believed freedom arose from <em>competition</em> within a system. This notion of competition was a market ideal applied to the political sphere: a different, more combative idea of discussion, that Director believed would help minority views from being stifled by the majority.</p><p>The debate went much deeper than these issues, but this is just a sampling of the arguments necessary to truly understand what neoliberalism is and why it became so paramount. Director’s vision eventually won out, but his idea of state intervention in the market (never justified) could be contested in the wake of the Great Recession, where someone like Knight (who believed market intervention was necessary if a politically liberal society failed to rein in inequality again) could be brought up to propose a different path for neoliberalism, politically and economically. In other words, there’s nothing wrong with questioning neoliberalism, and doing so shouldn’t be equated to its destruction.</p><h4><strong>The Path to Neoliberalism: Post-Cold War</strong></h4><p>Another aspect of neoliberalism is its root word, ‘liberalism.’ As noted before with Knight’s idea of it as a revolution, liberalism itself was a radically transformative idea that turned Europe’s Old World societies into constitutional monarchies or democracies over a period of intense unrest and warfare. The United States was founded on this idea of liberalism, which struck against religious/monarchial authority by insisting a sovereign’s subjects had certain rights the ruler had to respect, or else the people were justified to lash out. This is the basis of <em>human rights.</em></p><p>For neoliberalism, human rights have taken on a different meaning. For the first time in human history, there’s the idea that human rights actually supersede issues of sovereignty. This is an aspect oft-forgotten by neoliberals, who are still stuck in thinking of neoliberal foreign policy as just a matter of trade. But why was the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/the-tpp-a-win-for-vietnams-workers/">Trans-Pacific Partnership written with labor rights in mind</a>? Why did the USA intervene in such places as Kosovo and Bosnia? Human rights were a paramount factor. This standard, of treating human beings as something more than subjects, is a begrudging acceptance by many of the world’s governments. Far from the naivete that its neo-realist opponents would argue this position has, it’s absolutely true that the extension of human rights achieves something more akin to <em>dignity </em>for a person. Dignity, a feeling that comes from anything from employment to <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-tunisia-act-of-one-fruit-vendor-sparks-wave-of-revolution-through-arab-world/2011/03/16/AFjfsueB_story.html?utm_term=.0eb49281c898">operating a fruit stand unfettered</a>, is the main reason people protest. A sore lack of dignity is what subjects in brittle sultanistic regimes suffer from, and the USA still has not figured out how to balance these regimes’ security value with their inherent instability. It’s the revolution that never seems to end, but it’s a necessary aspect of neoliberalism to take it seriously as an ideology. Otherwise, there’s no positive idea — no prescription — for how the world ought to be.</p><p>And by praising China for a mere promotion of free trade, neoliberalism’s champions are profoundly stripping their political philosophy of any real meaning. China will always support the international system of trade, but only if it can strip neoliberalism of all other meaning. This contemporary political philosophy’s proponents should be keep this in mind, then: neoliberalism is more than an idea for economics. It wouldn’t have had the weight to last this long, otherwise.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a9dd8c2fb1fd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mobrule/some-thoughts-about-neoliberalism-a9dd8c2fb1fd">Some Thoughts About Neoliberalism</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mobrule">Mob-Rule</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[So Much Ado About SOEs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mobrule/so-much-ado-about-soes-8fd0ced8001?source=rss-44025861c5d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8fd0ced8001</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trade]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[usa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade-mission]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Drake Long]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Oct 2017 04:37:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-30T04:37:36.376Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zOFZ782eR66p3C6D7D0H-g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Sinopec HQ</figcaption></figure><p>Trump’s ten-day trip across Asia is highly notable for a number of reasons, not least because of the dilemma North Korea poses and the way the USA’s traditional allies are jolted from it. However, Trump has placed a high priority on trade throughout his campaign and time as President, therefore it’s probably equally important to pay attention to the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-27/trump-china-trip-to-broker-multibillion-dollar-u-s-energy-deals">massive trade mission to China he’ll be leading alongside Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross.</a></p><p>The roughly 40 US companies brought along for the ride are hoping for Chinese investment and cooperation, which is a depressingly hat-in-hand type of tone. Nonetheless, it comes after two separate moves to better scrutinize intellectual property theft by Chinese companies and signal a potential World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute over aluminum foil. With this ground set, the trade mission is an event of much fanfare for the companies included and the trade hawks Trump’s administration is surrounded with.</p><p>Over enthusiasm is never warranted, though.</p><p>Among the many conflicts over trade the USA has with China, China’s usage of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) ought to rank at the top, for a number of reasons. Regardless of the <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/27/white-house-distances-itself-from-whitefish-contract-with-puerto-rico.html">sweetheart deals</a> the Trump administration might dabble in, they have nothing on the level of <a href="http://fortune.com/2015/07/22/china-global-500-government-owned/">subsidy and benevolent prodding the Chinese government</a> employs for its SOEs in their effort to create competitive, transnational corporations.</p><p>But the goals of these SOEs are contradictory, and US companies involving themselves with them are getting into a dangerous dance when they court, for example, <a href="http://fortune.com/global500/sinopec-group/">Sinopec.</a></p><h3><strong>A Verse on the SOE</strong></h3><p>First, it’s important to bear in mind how trade missions can fail.</p><p>The particular issue facing American corporations right now is a criticism voiced back in 1989 by a Japanese nationalist, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Japan-That-Can-Say-No/dp/0671726862">Shintaro Ishihara</a>. In short, the competitive nature of the American market isn’t functioning like it used to — bigger companies prefer to control market share through <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=00wQYmvfhn4">Oligopolies</a>, a process that has changed and arguably gotten worse since the drop-off in (labor-intensive) manufacturing during the 1980s. Aggressive consolidation is itself a response to tough international competition. As companies fail to foreign counterparts, there’s an urge to simply acquire and merge out of the hole. This is a fine way to keep companies going, but at the basic level the situation isn’t changing as to why US companies are struggling to compete — it’s just a matter of production. The failure to compete in certain sectors drove a <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/09/world/bush-in-japan-bush-collapses-at-state-dinner-with-the-japanese.html?pagewanted=all">certain infamous trade mission</a> to Japan in 1992 to be something of a waste of time. The cartel-like organization of Japan’s economy back then is similar to the oligopolies of today, and they were unimpressed by their American counterparts.</p><p>The situation is going to be somewhat similar with modern China. However, rather than the cartels of Japan, called <em>zaibatsu, </em>the US trade mission is dealing with China’s SOEs, massive corporations acting under ‘Groups.’ The USA cannot compete with Sinopec Group, for instance, when it comes to infrastructure building because the USA does not have anything comparable to its production in facilities and other key infrastructure. But this is purposeful. <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-26/china-tells-entrepreneurs-they-must-put-patriotism-over-profit">Business in China is increasingly meant to serve the state’s purposes.</a> The steady pumping of capital into construction and related companies meant to build China’s One Belt, One Road project (OBOR) is based on political goals, with profit a possible parallel goal or maybe even second in its importance.</p><p>The problem with this trade mission is that these SOEs that American companies are dealing with are, by their nature, unfair. A company such as <a href="https://www.recode.net/2017/10/23/16496908/bike-sharing-dockless-limebike-ofo-motivate-citi-bike-spin">Ofo </a>receives incredible investment from other Chinese companies like Alibaba and Didi Chuxing without showing an equal potential for profit. This may seem like a net benefit, but it injects an uneasy air into analyzing the Chinese market, as this same centrally-planned oligopoly crashed hard for Japan before. China appears to be trying to offset this possibility with foreign direct investment and acquisition of foreign companies — some opportunities to do so may present themselves at this trade mission. These acquisitions are the subject of much dispute, and rightfully so — <a href="https://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&amp;id=TRAD2015020">the WTO has already found several cases where foreign acquisitions were meant to hoard technological patents inside China and were also accompanied by heavy export restriction of manufactured product.</a></p><p>Of particular note in that research paper? Magnequench, which was acquired by China’s rare earth material mining SOE in 1997. Holding a number of patents for rare earth mining, China’s SOE then used those patents to exploit rare earth reserves, and the ensuing export restriction kept the raw material (which is used in virtually all modern technology) out of foreign hands. This was done for domestic profit, sure, but these protectionist measures were also meant to help with Deng Xiaoping’s political goal of revitalizing China through modern technology and electronics. American companies don’t receive quite the same level of governmental help.</p><p>By getting into bed with these oligopolies, American corporations are also exposing themselves to the danger of entanglement in a major market failure.</p><p>The aforementioned collapse of the Japanese economic rise doesn’t need much delving into it, especially <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/6ae38350-b8aa-11e7-9bfb-4a9c83ffa852">since its visible effects are still seen even today</a>. For China, most speculators are genuinely unsure whether any SOEs are going to burst or if any market is over-saturated enough it could actually cause harm. Consider Ofo, which was brought up previously. There are <em>many </em>bike-sharing companies competing right now, yet Ofo has start-up capital of over $800 million thanks to deals with massive Chinese companies. It’s valued at over $3 billion. All for a service that merely charges $1 an hour for a ride, and has insane upkeep costs for its non-parked bike rentals.</p><p>That’s just an anecdote, though. Smart money would look at the decidedly <em>not </em>smart money going toward <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-29/the-biggest-stock-collapse-in-world-history-has-no-end-in-sight">infrastructure and construction giants</a>, of which Sinopec Group is one. <a href="http://web.b.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/ehost/detail/detail?vid=2&amp;sid=3f421c33-b1da-4b3c-b3c8-2f37a535c0c6%40sessionmgr102&amp;bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWlwLHVpZCZzaXRlPWVob3N0LWxpdmUmc2NvcGU9c2l0ZQ%3d%3d#AN=109304921&amp;db=bth">The allocation of capital by the Chinese government toward SOEs is still caught between profitability and political purposes.</a> This systemic problem hasn’t shifted. By working with these Groups, American companies are perhaps dealing with likeminded oligopolies, but their Chinese counterparts simply don’t operate with the same rules. Capital injections are fairly easy to get, especially for foreign acquisition, but certain organizational changes (such as <em>downsizing) </em>are virtually impossible for an SOE to do.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/1*EKtjyXfrPtfVxhjKK4yHWg.jpeg" /><figcaption>US Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Versus the SOE</strong></h3><p>Rather than implore for Chinese investment, American companies should take a step back and scrutinize their potential partners more closely. Although Trump may loathe to admit it, private companies should be smart enough to realize their biggest ally is still the <a href="https://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&amp;id=TRAD2015001">WTO</a>. The WTO, and the USA, are both somewhat befuddled by China’s SOEs. International law has difficulty distinguishing between a ‘state organ’ and a ‘non-state organ’ that still might work on behalf of a government. For the WTO, this difference determines the severity of consequences, as state organs are punished under <a href="http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf">Article 4 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts</a>. Non-state organs can still be considered under Articles 5 or 8. These articles were originally written for matters outside the world of trade, though, and the WTO’s reference to them are appropriately confusing.</p><p>Previous US cases against China in the WTO have tried to pin an Article 4 classification on Chinese SOEs, but have failed. Perhaps it’s time to accept they’re only classifiable under Articles 5 and 8, and move onto more stringently fighting them in court. The duties against <a href="http://www.alu.com.cn/enCompany/Free_aluminiumyc.html">Zhejiang Junma</a> are a good start, but only if the USA plays its cards right in the WTO. There may be backlash, as any action against the Chinese economy would prompt, but the status quo of merely accepting SOEs as an acceptable part of the world economy is not sustainable. The increasing interconnectedness of these massive companies with privately-run corporations elsewhere is going to expose the world economy to serious risk.</p><p>Ironically, the best tool to combat the Chinese economy and the true people in need of a trade mission are small and mid-sized businesses in the USA. The USA’s oligopolies aren’t keen on letting them compete, though. This is antithesis to what trade missions should prioritize, which is not the massive American companies consolidating to make profit but the mid-sized businesses that can’t break into foreign markets easily. On that front, China’s aforementioned drive toward ‘patriotic entrepreneurship’ and the dominance of its Groups will deprive it of equivalent small and mid-sized business. Thus, there’s a real chance to engage in markets where the overbearing Chinese giants can’t saturate so easily. And that would mean a trade mission somewhere other than China — perhaps to <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/29/indonesia-will-be-asias-next-biggest-e-commerce-market/">Indonesia</a>? At least in Indonesia, there is less need to kowtow to politically-connected Groups just for access to privileges non-SOEs enjoy virtually everywhere else.</p><p>Increasingly, ‘trade warriors’ and economists need to realize there is going to be a protracted battle between US and rising Chinese transnational corporations, and the <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/chinese-company-wins-contract-for-deep-sea-port-in-myanmar/">Chinese SOEs</a> are already ‘<a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-08/09/content_26408292.htm">winning</a>’ (in whatever sense of that word you interpret). It isn’t protectionist to seek out different markets and foreign business partners to contest ground in — it’s just an innovative strategy.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8fd0ced8001" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mobrule/so-much-ado-about-soes-8fd0ced8001">So Much Ado About SOEs</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mobrule">Mob-Rule</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Wang Huning: Philosopher with Chinese Characteristics?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/mobrule/wang-huning-philosopher-with-chinese-characteristics-897a66cc6cdb?source=rss-44025861c5d0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/897a66cc6cdb</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[usa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Drake Long]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 23 Oct 2017 04:02:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-10-23T04:02:46.300Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/980/1*0D9AilXeIz0L1z5JxGXFrQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Wang Huning. Photo courtesy Cary Huang at <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1192583/think-tank-veteran-wang-huning-retain-influence-despite-lack-portfolio">South China Morning Post</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>As predicted, China’s 19th National Party Congress kicked off with a laboriously long (3.5 hours, to be exact) speech by President Xi Jinping. It was a speech that touched on virtually every aspect of Chinese society, from foreign policy and the environment to culture and the importance of ‘<a href="https://www.economist.com/news/china/21730407-it-sounds-much-old-oneonly-more-so-chinas-leader-xi-jinping-declares-start-new">socialism in the new era</a>.’ Various analysts are already busy parsing the meaning from what was, in all seriousness, an unexciting opening ceremony. This is an aspect of studying China, which has a strange style of political rhetoric that tries to bend administrative doctrine into vaguely Confucian-style phrases that are easy to repeat (The ‘Chinese Dream,’ the ‘Three Represents,’ ‘Find Truth from Facts,’ to name just a few). However, analysts should probably shelve that temptation for now. Much of the most interesting parts of Xi’s speech didn’t come from its content, but <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/18/back-from-the-dead-chinas-internet-goes-wild-over-youthful-jiang-zemin">from the events happening on the sidelines.</a></p><p>A lot of the rhetoric heard at the National Congress is contradictory, and thus wasting time analyzing it just grants its rhetors the appearance of stately intellectualism they want. It might be fun to talk about what Xi means by a new era of socialism, but a little intuition tells me it’s going to be more of the same: talking about a philosophy, but never implementing it. After all, he also talked about <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-20/china-s-19th-party-congress-what-we-learned-on-day-three">new free trade ports and the importance of foreign direct investment</a>. Rather than pin down ‘Xi Jinping Thought,’ as many analysts are, why not spend more time writing and reading about <em>why </em>Xi Jinping Thought is being pushed in such a way? What is its importance?</p><h3>Xi Family Values</h3><p>It’s not a secret that the Chinese Communist Party presents its political philosophy and style of government as an open alternative to ‘Western’ values. Xi Jinping himself worked to implement this idea, that Chinese values are different from the West and in many cases superior, through the party’s propaganda organs. However, a lot of Western China-analysts are treating this as a <em>fait accompli. </em>It’s thought that a Chinese alternative already exists, and Xi Jinping is merely more emboldened in talking about it as he enters his second term. The opposite is true: these ‘Chinese values’ are an ongoing project, and where some students of Chinese government might see Xi Jinping Thought as a great ideological challenge to the West, others should see it as a clunky attempt to retroactively justify how the Party runs China.</p><p>One of the big initiatives started by Xi Jinping was the encouragement of ‘think tanks’ in China, with the same purpose as those of their American inspiration, just with a heavy dose of censorship and state control. These think tanks, it would be hoped, would provide a place for retired political officials to work at and improve Chinese policy even after their own career has ended. This sounds good in practice, but the <em>reason </em>such think tanks need to exist at the state’s behest is because the Chinese Communist Party is constantly worried about legitimacy. Thus, these think tanks are not going to be like those we can find giving oh-so-many seminars in the USA. China’s think tanks are meant to constantly echo the rhetoric of the Communist Party and write in support of it. This is purposeful.</p><p>Enter <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/china_20171013_19thpartycongress_wang_huning.pdf">Wang Huning</a>, who is apparently <a href="http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2116222/dream-come-true-communist-ideologist-behind-three">likely to join China’s elite Standing Committee</a> by the end of the Congress. This is significant considering Huning is not an administrative official or governor, like most members of the Committee. But this defiance of convention makes more sense when one thinks of the ongoing effort the Party has on articulating Chinese values. Wang Huning, above all, is a political theorist and the architect of many Confucian-style phrases used by Xi Jinping — and his two predecessors, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Wang Huning would be a valuable asset for the new state-sponsored think tank culture developing in the country, coming from them in his past and in all likelihood he’ll lead them in the future.</p><p>The actual political philosophy of Wang Huning in the modern era is fairly simple: it’s a new spin on enlightened despotism that puts a great emphasis on Chinese-style bureaucracy as a superior alternative to Western democracies. This is exactly what Xi Jinping wants the impression of China’s governance to be. Wang has been articulating this philosophy since at least the 1980s, though. Why as it taken on new significance now?</p><h3>The Party of Contradiction</h3><p>Despite guiding three of China’s leaders, Wang Huning’s thesis is still struggling to be proven true. Regardless of what the Party may want, Western values are <a href="https://www.merics.org/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/MPOC/MPoC_5_Ideo/Merics_Papers_on_China_No_5_Ideologies_Oct2017.pdf">still held in high regard by much of the Chinese middle-class population</a>. Even if public figures representing the West (see: Donald Trump) are considered odious, there’s no trouble separating their negative image from other things the West offers. It’s the leadership vacuum of people like Trump that has emboldened the Chinese government to press for international respect for Chinese values, but even if it takes advantage of this opportunity it isn’t clear China’s own population really buys the line that the Party has a credible alternative to Western political philosophy.</p><p>Wang Huning’s goal, for his academic life, has been to fix this problem. Xi Jinping’s reorganization of the propaganda organs was also meant to fix this problem. But Wang Huning’s ultimate thesis feels a little flimsy: how can Chinese values substitute the West when those values are held up as what the Party is <em>doing, </em>not what it <em>should do. </em>Perhaps this distinction is confusing. Consider that for much of its life, the Party’s legitimacy rested on communist philosophy — Marx, Lenin, and Mao. These are still the figures quoted in Xi Jinping’s speech about socialism, and their works are still studied in every Chinese university. However, the Party’s actions are not in line with communist values whatsoever. This contradiction, between rhetoric and action, is fine, so long as China has continued economic prosperity. But at its core China’s economy was not built by the Party, it was built by the market reforms of the late 1980s. Wang Huning’s job, and Xi Jinping’s dream, has been to promote Chinese values that somehow claim China’s prosperity comes from the Communist Party. But that’s just not true — it was the gradual release of the Party’s hold on the economy that made China rich.</p><p>The new ideology of the Chinese Communist Party, the ‘new socialism,’ will try to remedy this by justifying state capitalism under Marxist doctrine, but it’s still a very flimsy philosophy. In other words, the work of Wang Huning will be to claim Chinese values are superior to the West because of how rich China is, and retroactively attribute these values to a Communist Party that didn’t even articulate them until 2017. That’s the inherent contradiction. Western political philosophy, and its think tank adherents, are devoted to <em>opposing </em>doctrinal policy and providing alternatives. The gamut of criticism levied at policy and governance from the Western political tradition makes that part of the world’s values much more attractive, since it articulates a vision of how a government should be.</p><p>‘Chinese values,’ in contrast, are somewhat-intellectual justifications for authoritarian regimes that have to grapple with staid rhetoric about communism. Wang Huning will champion China has a model of values, separate from the Western tradition, when the reality of China’s greatness lay in a mere easing up on market controls and is predicated on economic prosperity. China’s own citizens, much less other countries, don’t buy the lofty rhetoric of the Party. How, then, could Chinese values come to be as attractive as that of the West, especially when Wang Huning focuses on what <em>is </em>and not how things <em>should be?</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/266/1*ITDTDONtRM5rAMHAEaE5Hw.jpeg" /><figcaption>President Xi at the UN General Assembly</figcaption></figure><h3>The China Approach</h3><p>Nevertheless, despite the inherent contradictions in its philosophy, the Party will likely have Wang Huning honing its vision from a seat on the Standing Committee. China will continue to promote and champion authoritarianism, even if its other talk will prove a paper-thin justification, <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/18/china-is-getting-better-at-undermining-global-human-rights/">just because it has a strategy.</a> By inheriting leadership posts at international organizations that would normally spread the universal values the Party leadership hates, China can make them more accommodating to authoritarian systems. <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/how-china-is-changing-the-un/">This has been the plan for quite some time</a>, and there isn’t much hope the current US administration will reverse it.</p><p>Still, this approach illustrates what every student of world governments should do when looking at China: watch what they <em>do, </em>not what they <em>say.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=897a66cc6cdb" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/mobrule/wang-huning-philosopher-with-chinese-characteristics-897a66cc6cdb">Wang Huning: Philosopher with Chinese Characteristics?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/mobrule">Mob-Rule</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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