<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Lukas Vogt on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Lukas Vogt on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@lukasvogt?source=rss-fb03d3d9d245------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 03:55:51 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@lukasvogt/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[8 facts about founding team composition]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/capnamic-ventures/8-facts-about-founding-team-composition-fad737a53331?source=rss-fb03d3d9d245------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fad737a53331</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[founders]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[insights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lukas Vogt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Sep 2019 11:46:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-09-03T11:46:16.151Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dSl1lSbDWAL7i3VCzOFeLA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Key takeaways from our empirical study</p><p><em>At Capnamic, we always apply the 3 T’s when making an investment decision — team, timing and technology (</em><a href="https://www.siliconluxembourg.lu/olaf-jacobi-on-the-3-ts-of-startup-success/"><em>read more here</em></a><em>). While the best timing as well as the best technology can be quantified, the data-driven determination of the “best team” remains difficult. To define more quantitative measures as well as to test our hypotheses derived from experience, we conducted an empirical study* to answer which measurable characteristics of the founding team ultimately have a positive impact on the exit valuation and exit type (failure, trade-sale, IPO) of a startup. Find below our 8 key findings.</em></p><p><strong>1 — Experience in leadership roles as well as analytical skills are key to success — long work and same-industry experience are not</strong></p><p>Founders’ prior total work experience in general (which also can be seen as a proxy for age) and work experience in the same industry as the new startup do not systematically affect the exit value or type of a startup. However, founders’ prior work experience in a management position (C-level, VP, Head of, Director, …) and founders’ backgrounds as consultants significantly increase the likelihood of achieving a successful exit (likelihood of failure decreases, likelihood of IPO increases).</p><blockquote><strong>So what: Yes, we are seeking strong leaders to build a great product first and an even greater company afterwards. The ability to lead, manage and inspire your team is crucial. Additionally, advanced skills of communication and structuring work can often be found among former consultants.</strong></blockquote><p><strong>2 — “Serial entrepreneurs” are not doomed to systematically achieve successful exits</strong></p><p>Surprisingly, founders’ prior entrepreneurial experience (measured by the number of previously founded companies) is not found to significantly impact the exit value or type (but: a distinction between successful and failed previously founded companies could enable to disentangle the outstanding serial entrepreneurs from the underperforming ones and may lead to other results).</p><blockquote><strong>So what: Interesting. We believe in founders with the ability to build multiple companies. On the other side, we conclude that “first-time-founders” do not need to be more afraid to fail than <em>Serial Entrepreneurs</em>.</strong></blockquote><p><strong>3 — Higher education and 4 — one business person makes the founding team stronger</strong></p><p>Higher graduation levels of founders’ formal education (measured on a four-point ordinal scale from no university degree (worst) to PhD/MD (best)) — independent of the respective course of studies — significantly increase the exit value of a startup. Considering the particular courses of studies, the founders graduated in, founding teams with at least one person with a business-managerial degree (business administration, management, economics, …) — independent of the respective graduation level — achieve higher exit values and more successful exit types.</p><blockquote><strong>So what: We agree to 3 while being absolute fans of unconventional CVs. 4 really sounds like only having a numbers cruncher — BUT all managers should be driven by commercial traction and financials in the end.</strong></blockquote><p><strong>5 — Complementary teams combining natural sciences and business outperform the rest</strong></p><p>Furthermore, heterogeneous teams consisting of founders combining business-managerial, natural science (engineering, physics, mathematics, biology, …), and IT-related educational backgrounds perform better in terms of both exit value and type. Additionally, the higher the degree of general heterogeneity in the founding team (so basically combining any background) the higher the exit value and the better the exit type.</p><blockquote><strong>So what: Nothing to add — diversity rules. Fully agree and happy to have a lot of portfolio examples at Capnamic.</strong></blockquote><p><strong>6 — “Hubs” have a beneficial influence on exit success</strong></p><p>Startups headquartered in a hub (here: city with a minimum population of 1m) realize higher exit values and more successful exit types compared to those located in more rural areas.</p><blockquote><strong>So what: Partially disagree — we are proud of our provincially located teams but also see them moving to larger cities when international expansion kicks in. However, hubs can definitely help building powerful networks fast — especially in the beginning.</strong></blockquote><p><strong>7 — Larger teams are better and 8 — Gender does not have any impact</strong></p><p>Larger founding teams on average achieve higher exit values. In addition to that, the empirical analysis proves that founders’ gender does not have a significant impact on the exit value or type.</p><blockquote><strong>So what: Our remark regarding large founding teams is that there has to be a CEO or one person pushing decisions within the management. Like a higher heterogeneity in educational backgrounds, gender diversification is beneficial for startups.</strong></blockquote><p><strong>Concluding our findings, we think that a lot of the key findings can be seen as “boxes to be ticked” and interpreted as dummies supporting the decision process. However, a blind application of them would be dangerous and is not recommended by us.</strong></p><p><em>*Study: Our former intern </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/jan-jeske-3815a4125/"><em>Jan</em></a><em> graduated from University of Cologne writing his thesis together with us. The regression analysis is based on data from 245 European startups collected from the </em><a href="https://www.crunchbase.com/"><em>crunchbase.com</em></a><em> database and 534 founders, on which the information was mainly obtained from their individual LinkedIn profiles. Only companies founded after January 1st, 2002, which have experienced at least one funding round by VC investors and successfully exited or failed, were considered. </em><strong><em>Feel free to reach out for the raw .csv file.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4fpjI5l5c6XbsziVhg3uOw.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fad737a53331" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/capnamic-ventures/8-facts-about-founding-team-composition-fad737a53331">8 facts about founding team composition</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/capnamic-ventures">Capnamic Ventures</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Dimensions of Scalability]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/dimensions-of-scalability-74a7a7c4dcd1?source=rss-fb03d3d9d245------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/74a7a7c4dcd1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tmvc-insights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[scalability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lukas Vogt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Nov 2018 16:20:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-11-26T05:08:45.748Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Venture capital investment cases are supposed to scale — heavily. Heavily growing companies have great products and strong inbound demand — so customers want to get that product (!!). But is that all the magic? Yes and no — because I think that these companies outperform their peers regarding the ability to scale their business. From my view, this ability can be broken down into broadly applicable “dimensions of scalability” — this article briefly and non-exhaustively summarizes a few of the dimensions. Have fun!</em></p><p><em>*PRE-WARNING (!) MY VIEW IS BASED ON LEARNINGS I HAVE MADE MOSTLY WITH “TECH-STARTUPS” IN MY ROLE AT </em><a href="https://capnamic.com/"><em>CAPNAMIC VENTURES</em></a><em>*</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*77YfE94WrdLtGSlzD5w0QQ.png" /><figcaption>Dimensions of Scalability — the overview chart.</figcaption></figure><p>To start with the obvious drivers for scalability, there are direct levers for each business unit in a company. <em>Tech</em> itself can achieve <strong>better performance — </strong>e.g. by using state-of-the-art libraries, languages or frameworks. <em>Product</em> is directly scalable through <strong>more products (</strong>and of course more product features) enabling the company to sell more at higher prices. <em>Marketing</em> can virtually <strong>boost demand</strong> entering new markets steered through the headquarter whereas <em>sales</em> can crack a <strong>new market</strong> by hiring a dedicated country manager. Eventually, <em>service</em> <strong>creates synergies</strong> by centrally handling the needs of customers.</p><p><strong>Team — adding more people.</strong></p><p>Every unit in the company grows by its headcount — <strong>more people</strong> enable more actions and eventually more business. In the same regard, the <strong>organization</strong> of teams is highly relevant and boils down to the ability to manage and execute — this is why <strong>leadership</strong> skills and <strong>transfer</strong> of responsibility are key to scale. For example, a founder team which installs a strong 2nd line leadership team scales by each new person added in the 3rd line and so on.</p><p><em>So highly scalable companies attract more people and are able to hire and develop more people (onboarding, compensation, career tracks, …).</em></p><p><strong>Budget — spending more money.</strong></p><p>Cash is king — especially when thinking about your internal budget. Budgets apply for every business unit and are very straightforward: licenses of software in use (which could mean more efficient operations), the SEA spend (which could result in more sales) or a booth at the most popular conference in the industry (which could lead to higher visibility in the market). But caution, a high budget does not necessarily mean more positive outcome.</p><p><em>So highly scalable companies can increase budgets for relevant areas because they have enough resources and/ or prioritize cash flows more strongly.</em></p><p><strong>Processes — gearing up the machine.</strong></p><p>We often talk about internal operations driving scalability when being geared-up like machines. Be it the efficiency of <strong>internal communication</strong>, the integration of internal <strong>tools</strong>, the way of <strong>implementing new processes</strong> across teams or the kitchen cleaning plan. Processes are defined, followed-upon, authorized and measured — and offer room for efficiency and <strong>automation</strong>. Especially, the processes across teams are key — e.g. the continuous rebound of customer feedback to the product team through sales and service OR the exchange of product material between product, marketing and sales.</p><p><em>So highly scalable companies follow the approach of “building machines” and focus on communication, i.e. installing processes which allow for a high degree of automation and unleash resources for strong communication.</em></p><p><strong>Transition — creating value.</strong></p><p>In the end, a company exists to create value. This value — from my view — fundamentally connects all business units. This is why the “connections” between business units foster scalability.</p><p>Let’s go through the graph from left to right: <em>Tech</em> decides on <strong>architecture</strong>, <strong>maintainability</strong> and <strong>compatibility</strong> of the technology the offered products are based on. E.g. the decision of where to host the services by <em>tech</em> enables <em>product</em> to create a certain product feature and vice versa. Additionally, <em>product</em> and <em>marketing</em> touch base on <strong>content</strong> about products, <strong>advertising</strong> them and gaining <strong>insights</strong> from the market. Very similar logic holds between <em>marketing</em> and <em>sales</em>: <strong>content</strong> for working on new opportunities or key accounts, the creation of leads (be it <strong>inbound</strong> or <strong>outbound</strong>) and the ability to <strong>qualify</strong> them enhances value. Finally, <em>sales</em> and <em>service</em> scale in the ability to <strong>deliver</strong> the product to the customer, working on <strong>upselling</strong> and refine <strong>pricing</strong> continuously.</p><p>*Caution* again — the transition of value is evident for all tuples of business units. <em>Service</em> and <em>product</em> should have a very close and scalable relationship too — they connect development and application of their very own product.</p><p><em>So highly scalable companies focus on the transition of value and the steady flow of information (which itself can be automated) between all business units.</em></p><p><strong>So what? First, a company’s generated demand causes scalability. Second, scalability follows a logic applied to every area in the organization. Third, the dimensions of scalability for each unit build upon each other (tech&lt;-&gt;product&lt;-&gt;marketing&lt;-&gt;sales&lt;-&gt;service). When thinking about it, the transition of value between units is the real lever and holds for all combinations within a company. Keep on scaling!</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=74a7a7c4dcd1" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/dimensions-of-scalability-74a7a7c4dcd1">Dimensions of Scalability</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital">Teenage Mutant Venture Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Dojo of Commerce]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/the-dojo-of-commerce-9e70487365dd?source=rss-fb03d3d9d245------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/9e70487365dd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[due-diligence]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lukas Vogt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 25 Feb 2018 17:46:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-26T06:16:25.301Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tZAvG4nLXj6nC39Ul7a6mw.png" /></figure><p><em>“In the Western world, the term dōjō primarily refers to a training place specifically for Japanese martial arts such as aikido, judo, karate, or samurai.”</em></p><p><em>Welcome! This article is supposed to be a questionnaire for VC/startup people to master the relevant aspects of a commercial due diligence (DD). This list of questions should be answered precisely and any startup should be prepared for them. Find the main article </em><a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/the-4-martial-arts-of-a-startup-due-diligence-d878453b23e2"><em>here</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>There are a lot of questions to be asked when it comes to the commercial dimension of a startup. Actually this part of the DD commences in the very first moment a VC talks to the founder or in the first scroll through the pitch-deck. As you can see in the chart of martial arts in VC DD you can define at least four different clusters of a startup’s commercial side: product, market, metrics and exit. Every question is fairly simple, but answering it sufficiently requires some training! As dojos are for many different fighting styles, they are phrased to be broadly applicable and limited in count. As always — non-exhaustive — <strong>but any exercise is better than no exercise.</strong></p><p><strong>Product/service</strong></p><ol><li>What does it exactly do?</li><li>Who is your customer?</li><li>How is the problem solved currently?</li><li>What exactly is the underlying problem?</li><li>Is the product something they don’t need yet but would love to use?</li><li>Who exactly takes the decision to buy? Is it one or multiple people involved in the buying process (decision makers vs. influencers)?</li><li>How is it delivered?</li><li>How is it being deployed on the customer’s side?</li><li>How long does a customer use it?</li><li>What kind of lock-in do you have?</li><li>What are the minimum prerequisites that must be fulfilled to use the product?</li></ol><p><strong>Market</strong></p><ol><li>How can you measure market size in your case?</li><li>How many potential customers of the product are there currently?</li><li>In which direction does demand develop (anticipated growth rate)?</li><li>How can the competition and your positioning be described?</li><li>What exactly do you know about the competition’s traction and technology (do feature set comparisons, etc.)? Differentiate between direct (same/close product/service offering and indirect competitors (affiliated product/service offering up/down-stream the value chain).</li><li>Who are 3rd parties your product/service is relying on? How powerful are these? Do they might put your business under pressure by pricing or replicating and integrating a comparable solution?</li><li>Are or will there be certain regulations you (have to) rely on?</li><li>Which future changes are key to your success (e.g. changes in regulation or major technological shifts)?</li><li>Which regions can be described as „the market“? Differentiate between Total Addressable Market (TAM), Served Addressable Market (SAM), and Target Market.</li></ol><p><strong>Metrics</strong></p><ol><li>What are your top KPIs to be communicated to investors?</li><li>How do you price your product/service — fix vs. variable?</li><li>Which factor increases the price of your product/service per customer?</li><li>Which factor determines how many units are required by a customer (initially, but also over time)?</li><li>Which direct costs do you have per customer — fix vs. variable?</li><li>How do costs correlate and potentially create scaling effects?</li><li>How much of costs would be claimed as <a href="https://www.myaccountingcourse.com/financial-ratios/cost-of-goods-sold">COGS</a> and <a href="https://www.entrepreneur.com/encyclopedia/overhead">overhead</a>?</li><li>What numbers yield positive earnings per unit (and at company level)?</li><li>When will be the first time revenues surpass costs? (Hint: it will be always later than you claim ;-))</li><li>How can you further tweak the billed revenue per customer (upselling)?</li></ol><p><strong>Exit</strong></p><ol><li>Which exit channels exist?</li><li>What is the core asset or value you build with your company (technology, user-base, data, etc.)?</li><li>How long will it take to create this asset or value?</li><li>Which institution would be interested in buying it?</li><li>Why would someone buy your company?</li><li>Are there comparable transactions by these acquirers as of today?</li><li>Who would be a better strategic partner than acquirer?</li><li>What is the current shareholder structure?</li><li>Which metrics do current investors apply — <a href="https://medium.com/@gerstenzang/open-source-venture-model-osvm-v1-55bebf3eda9">when will they be happy</a>?</li><li>How many new investors/ capital is necessary to sleep well at night?</li></ol><p><strong>When thinking about these 40 questions in the context of a VC investment, of course, the “Exit” exercise is a tough one and doesn’t need to be included in the very first run. However, a VC always has to find an exit plus an overall view on the case does help everyone. No dojo is visited once and exercises do change — so congrats for your first session and do not hesitate to get some more reps!</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=9e70487365dd" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/the-dojo-of-commerce-9e70487365dd">The Dojo of Commerce</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital">Teenage Mutant Venture Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The 4 Martial Arts of a Startup Due Diligence]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/the-4-martial-arts-of-a-startup-due-diligence-d878453b23e2?source=rss-fb03d3d9d245------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d878453b23e2</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tmvc-insights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lukas Vogt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 04 Feb 2018 16:29:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-05T05:41:33.622Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*myrI6rfXe-pF1oVK-Pbcpg.png" /></figure><p><em>As a part of the investment team, the major challenge is to support a detailed, timely and comprehensive due diligence (DD). The DD is not only essential for the investor but should also be understood by every startup. So, this article is a — non-exhaustive — summary of practical aspects regarding Commercial, Technical, Financial and Legal parts of a DD (see also the graph below)!</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*5Lm26bhdcL7n8k_xVVrOPA.jpeg" /><figcaption>The four martial arts of a startup DD — the summary graph.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Commercial</strong></p><p>The master exercise in a DD is to properly capture a highly innovative product with its potential to capture a huge market, which yields profitable economics and attractive exit scenarios. To kick-off, understanding the product is key, i.e. that the actual use-cases are crystal clear. Following this, market research should validate that (1) the market is not too small (e.g. &gt;Xbn annual revenue), (2) there is little, but not an overly superior competition and (3) that a growing number of customers actually demands the product as of today. In addition, the business economics have to be understood: revenue and cost metrics for the company as a whole and for individual units (<a href="https://medium.com/@Equidam/unit-economics-the-key-to-a-sustainable-business-is-recurring-revenues-f5c80a78c46f">Unit Economics</a>) should yield long-term profitability (e.g. upselling potential). Finally, after combining product, market, and economics you should be able to (4) define multiple exit scenarios which result in appropriate returns based on your/your firm’s potential share on the cap table.</p><p><strong>Technology</strong></p><p>The assessment of a company’s technology should reflect (1) the value of the underlying innovation — thus the technical asset (or intellectual property (IP) which ties tech to legal) the company has developed. As we talk about high-growth cases, (2) the degree of automation should also be measured as well as the robustness of the „engine“ powering the company through massive growth. Moreover, (3) the IP should even deter mighty competitors from copying the competitive edge. Finally, (4) the overall quality of the technology regarding infrastructure, architecture, code-base, testing as well as the technical roadmap &amp; processes should be evaluated as competitive and doable. Note: Many technology cases require an external review.</p><p><strong>Finance</strong></p><p>The financial evaluation of an investment case could be described as the quantitative conversion of the shiny commercial part into the dusty accounting part. So, the financial DD requires (1) a detailed analysis of a company’s book-keeping (accounts, invoicing, deposits, balance sheet, cash flow, P&amp;L, etc.) and (2) should validate that official business assessments (positively) correlate with the presented business plan plus the accuracy of past figures. For example, what is the amount of gross revenues recognized by tax authorities vs. the gross revenue in the business plan? Moreover, the DD should show the company’s ability to qualitatively and quantitatively assess financial and operative KPIs. As an investor invests cash, he wants to see what cash is actually generated. This is why (3) the analysis of liquidity, hence cash in- and outflows (cash collection, payment policy, etc.) is crucial. Finally, (4) previous audit and tax reports complement this DD part and tie up accounting, controlling and cash status.</p><p><strong>Legal</strong></p><p>Starting-off, you (1) analyze the legal base, meaning the legal body, articles of association and entity structure (e.g. existence of subsidiaries or parent companies). This again can be seen as the conversion of the shiny commercial part into the dusty legal one. Additionally, (2) the evaluation of previous or current legal cases and reports should reflect challenges the company faces because these could indeed influence commercial success (e.g. incorrect terms and conditions triggering customer churn). Directly related to this, (3) a detailed look at the company’s legal relationships is undertaken: employees, customers, partners, suppliers, banks, shareholders and so on. Ultimately, (4) negotiated investment terms have to be implemented (into new and) existing agreements with respect to acquiring and future selling of shares. These legal statements and updates require the support of specialized lawyers.</p><p><strong>As stated in a previous post, to do well as VC requires a lot of craftsmanship which is quite a challenge and comes with loads of information, references, research and external help. However, each and every finding will sharpen or dilute the investment decision. Therefore, in terms of speed and effectiveness both, VC and startup, should team up to be ready for a good DD!</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d878453b23e2" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/the-4-martial-arts-of-a-startup-due-diligence-d878453b23e2">The 4 Martial Arts of a Startup Due Diligence</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital">Teenage Mutant Venture Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Venture Things E05: The Top Down]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/venture-things-e05-the-top-down-83deb4dcefd8?source=rss-fb03d3d9d245------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/83deb4dcefd8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-things]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investors]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lukas Vogt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 26 Jan 2018 16:55:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-26T18:13:20.901Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ohK3N_7h7O_ZFMM_ZIbTdg.png" /></figure><p><em>On the VC side you get confronted with many numbers, assumptions and business cases. Most of them apply a bottom up approach assuming a variety of things. To verify a bottom up you can model a top down approach using own assumptions — this should yield similar results, if not this could be a good reason for a call with the company!</em></p><p><strong>What is the Bottom?</strong></p><p>You could say the bottom is the supply of something — e.g. the product and services of a company. Let’s distinguish two perspectives for that: B2C vs B2B. In the B2C case many cases I get on the table are based on different marketing channels — following a logic of “do marketing -&gt; generate demand -&gt; sell product”. Many B2B cases I see are based on the number of leads which are created by ctivity in marketing and sales. There, the logic is focused on “do marketing -&gt; qualify leads -&gt; sell product”. Therefore, the driver of this approach is to create demand through marketing or the activity of sales reps.</p><p><strong>Top Down approach</strong></p><p>Imagine you worked through the case and have a good overview of how the business will scale over time (based on the very case on your computer screen). Let’s say the Year 5 revenue is 100m. To verify that, I build a top down case which assumes three things 1) a totality of target customers, 2) a conversion rate and 3) a mapping of products to these target customers.</p><ol><li>Where to get all the target customers? For B2C this is quite hard and requires an estimation of different consumer groups — google, calculate, google, calculate — like the company would do. For B2B this is a little bit simpler — products are often tailored to certain industries or company sizes — try to get the latest statistics on these markets and write down.</li><li>Conversion rates make the case — this is actually the key metric, which connects a bottom up and top down approach. Here, I also try not to be scientific, but mostly pessimistic. E.g. I assume 1% average conversion in many cases. This puts more emphasis on the assumption 1) and the matter of market size for a VC.</li><li>Map the products — this is not that trivial at all: Different products of a B2C or B2B company have different prices and lifetimes — I try to be very pessimistic with that, too. E.g. premium products are only for the top 5% of all target customers etc.</li></ol><p>Like the company which handed in a sophisticated case the top down version can also become a tricky thing. To keep things simple, I would stop after the 3 assumptions and calculate the resulting size of the case — will it fit to the 100m?</p><p><strong>It’s all about assumptions — but you can drill down to very few of them and have a good discussion on that. Additionally, your case can help the company itself very much to get another perspective which is more “market size” driven.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=83deb4dcefd8" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/venture-things-e05-the-top-down-83deb4dcefd8">Venture Things E05: The Top Down</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital">Teenage Mutant Venture Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Venture Things E04: The Growth Hypothesis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/episode-4-the-growth-hypothesis-903b7276b1ed?source=rss-fb03d3d9d245------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/903b7276b1ed</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-things]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sales]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lukas Vogt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jan 2018 11:00:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-20T14:13:41.022Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tP_V6CWJ2rVLrYiVd7a8Zw.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>“We are going to reach X EUR of revenues within the next 12 month.” This is a statement I have to validate very often when diving deeper into startup cases. For me, the Growth Hypothesis represents the likelihood of reaching the business plan goals — simply spoken current status vs. forecasted top-line growth. See below my most important questions regarding this matter!</em></p><p><strong>Team</strong></p><ul><li>Do you have a the sales machine within the founder’s team?</li><li>Have you already hired a sales representative? If yes, how many?</li><li>How much of your processes are already automated?</li></ul><p><strong>Marketing</strong></p><ul><li>What are your efforts to create inbound leads?</li><li>Through which channels do you reach your target audience?</li><li>Did you build a brand already?</li></ul><p><strong>Demand</strong></p><ul><li>What is your current pipeline?</li><li>How many customers are necessary to reach X EUR of revenues in 12 months?</li><li>Which current references/milestones boost your speed when talking to new customers?</li></ul><p><strong>Sales</strong></p><ul><li>What is your sales team structure currently?</li><li>Which assumption is behind the forecasted conversion rates?</li><li>Are you dependent on partner sales or do you reach the targets by yourself?</li></ul><p><strong>By answering the questions the Growth Hypothesis should really be sharpened. From my view, this statement would be the result when getting it right: “We are going to leverage our kick-ass team, smart marketing, the huge demand and of course our sales squad to reach X EUR of revenues within the next 12 months.”</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=903b7276b1ed" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/episode-4-the-growth-hypothesis-903b7276b1ed">Venture Things E04: The Growth Hypothesis</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital">Teenage Mutant Venture Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Venture Things E03: The Fund Metrics]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/venture-things-e03-the-fund-metrics-540050f1e078?source=rss-fb03d3d9d245------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/540050f1e078</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[metrics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-things]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lukas Vogt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Jan 2018 18:28:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-20T14:13:00.453Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*6_IghFsYy5reCrSMGgqsDw.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>A VC fund operates as a financial investor and has to report KPIs to its Limited Partners. There are three dimensions of KPIs a VC has to examine on a frequent basis: fund financials, the portfolio company KPIs and the deal flow. The summary below is made for beginners in the industry.</em></p><p><strong>Fund financials</strong></p><p>From my view, there are three groups of KPIs associated with fund financials: the fund’s capital status (a), the portfolio valuation (b) and return metrics ©. Therefore, (a) includes the total committed and remaining capital to let LPs know how much money is left. Additionally, the capital allocation split shows how much of cash went into management fee and how much into the portfolio. The capital distribution yields the current amount of money flowing back into the fund because of exits and ultimately LPs. (b) is short and brute: the valuation of the entire investment portfolio based on the recent funding rounds the startup companies have undertaken. © is displaying two bold metrics: the IRR (which we questioned in E01 of Venture Things) and the multiple on the money.</p><p><strong>Portfolio company KPIs</strong></p><p>Imagine the case that there are no recent valuation rounds of your startup companies: so your portfolio valuation (see (b) above) equals the aggregate costs of investment. Then you are lucky to have the financial (1) and operational (2) KPIs of your portfolio companies at place. Whereas (1) compiles the current cash balance of each startup, the revenues, costs and resulting profits, (2) includes the most important metrics surrounding product/service usage and customer retention. Both sets of KPIs are benchmarked against the business plan — therefore growth and the progress of these KPIs can have explanatory power — even if the portfolio valuation remains somewhat static.</p><p><strong>Deal flow</strong></p><p>Like every company is defining itself by the demand for its product, the VC does so by evaluating its deal flow. I think there are three main sub-metrics to the deal flow: the total volume and quality (i), the source of deals (ii) and ultimately support &amp; feedback (iii). Starting off with (i), the VC wants to know how many startups knock on the door and how well these startups fit to the fund with regards to: business case, industry, team, phase, funding requirement et cetera. Second question (ii) is “where the startup came from?” Because investing is people business, a VC wants to have a large amount of deals sourced through its own network and events. (iii) is something I understand as the VC’s duty to give feedback and knowledge back to startups reaching out — even if they won’t get money. This service-oriented dimension could be a net promoter score or a qualitative analysis based on feedback from startups.</p><p><strong>The metrics a VC faces are pretty straight forward, but a little tricky to get mastered as a whole. Therefore a VC has to combine the capabilities of a well organized and professional financial investor, a corporate finance expert as well as a service-oriented approach to the market.</strong></p><p>Further reading on the topic:</p><p><a href="http://christophjanz.blogspot.com/2013/06/kpis-for-vcs.html">http://christophjanz.blogspot.com/2013/06/kpis-for-vcs.html</a> by <a href="https://medium.com/u/4b7646df6df4">Christoph Janz</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@olafjacobi/investing-in-startups-is-people-business-f2575dcf9196">https://medium.com/@olafjacobi/investing-in-startups-is-people-business-f2575dcf9196</a> by <a href="https://medium.com/u/567d014b7a94">Olaf Jacobi</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/@JasonShuman/dear-founders-here-are-my-kpis-dd93d8cda8a0">https://medium.com/@JasonShuman/dear-founders-here-are-my-kpis-dd93d8cda8a0</a> by <a href="https://medium.com/u/e9a79833d899">Jason Shuman</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=540050f1e078" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/venture-things-e03-the-fund-metrics-540050f1e078">Venture Things E03: The Fund Metrics</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital">Teenage Mutant Venture Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Venture Things E02: The Target Ownership]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/venture-things-e02-the-target-ownership-de409b21d175?source=rss-fb03d3d9d245------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/de409b21d175</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-things]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[valuation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lukas Vogt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 Dec 2017 16:42:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-20T14:12:40.951Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_gF67jDffl1ild4fbx8qDA.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>One of the most talked-about topics in Venture Capital is the valuation of startup companies. There are more than enough articles on different valuation models: First Chicago, DCF, comparables et cetera. And they all try to be scientific. This article is for startups seeking capital and looking for a less scientific approach to get on the investor’s seat: the </em><strong><em>target-ownership-based valuation</em></strong><em>.</em></p><p>The target-ownership-based valuation method works with the following input variables: the investment ticket range and the targeted ownership range of the investment round lead — e.g. an early-stage VC. Where to get these inputs?</p><p>The investment ticket range can be determined by researching the VC’s website or by directly asking after the first call or meeting — caution, it will be a very unspecific range like “500k up to a 10m”, but you will know from past public investments what their preferred ticket is. The targeted ownership of a VC is more difficult to get but something you can model a few realistic scenarios for. E.g. you could calculate the lower and upper limits of dilution you are willing to accept for the round or seek for publicly known investment rounds to get some figures.</p><p>EXAMPLE: Imagine you found the following inputs for your post-seed investment round:<strong> </strong>Target ticket sizes: Minimum 500k, Average 1.5m, Maximum 3m. Targeted ownerships: Minimum 15%, Average 25%, Maximum 35% (all post-money, including ESOP on the captable). Then you can calculate a small <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1B7ds7nZ8CntX8VEt3YA7ixwM6eeMW-bwwT3Wjim9ED4/edit?usp=sharing">matrix</a> displaying the implied post-money valuations.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MG3ioSabcQBw5oyH_yNh5g.png" /><figcaption>Post-Money Matrix for the Targeted-Ownership Method.</figcaption></figure><p>So what? This is a matrix and can be used alongside the other valuation methods. However, you could use your business plan to find your vertical coordinate. The horizontal coordinate could be determined by answering the following two questions: 1) what is the anticipated dilution throughout the lifetime of your company? and 2) what is the ultimate ownership the VC has to preserve at exit? Here we are, yet another valuation method with a generic name!</p><p><strong>The target-ownership of an investor is the real magic and also the lever when valuing a company. It helps to create scenarios to test where you can go and actually where you do not want to go. During your calls and meetings with potential lead investors you should update your scenarios as input variables get more solid.</strong></p><p><strong>Download the sheet to play around: </strong><a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1B7ds7nZ8CntX8VEt3YA7ixwM6eeMW-bwwT3Wjim9ED4/edit#gid=0">https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1B7ds7nZ8CntX8VEt3YA7ixwM6eeMW-bwwT3Wjim9ED4/edit#gid=0</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=de409b21d175" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/venture-things-e02-the-target-ownership-de409b21d175">Venture Things E02: The Target Ownership</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital">Teenage Mutant Venture Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Venture Things E01: The Internal Rate of Return]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/venture-things-e01-the-internal-rate-of-return-51bf1dd6f3be?source=rss-fb03d3d9d245------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/51bf1dd6f3be</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[interest-rates]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[finance]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-things]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lukas Vogt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 22 Dec 2017 11:01:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-20T14:12:09.524Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/568/1*b3UhRXkbBl7ZapE2LnjRFA@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is a wide-spread measure for the return of investment projects — also in Venture Capital. It has very good properties, but also a very critical assumption. In Venture Things we try to give short explanatory views on terms &amp; KPIs used in the VC life!</em></p><p>The IRR is the interest rate which yields a Net Present Value (<a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/npv.asp">NPV</a>) of Zero for an investment project. So what about the Net Present Value and the Zero? When deciding over investment projects a NPV &gt; Zero is a clear “GO!” and a NPV &lt; Zero is “Nope!”. Therefore, the IRR is the interest rate which represents the break-even between “GO!” and “Nope!”. After calculating the IRR of a project you can benchmark this value — e.g. against other risk-adjusted interest rates which are annualized and derived from other comparable investment projects.</p><h3><em>Do not close this website and continue reading!</em></h3><p>The main assumption of the IRR is that temporal cash-inflows can be re-invested at the very IRR. Decisions based on NPV and IRR can differ because of this assumption. However, finance practitioners still love this measure and especially in VC this is actually okay: The timing and amounts of temporal cash-inflows is limited in Venture Capital — thus, the main assumption does not inflate results too much. Additionally, you can modify the IRR by actually modelling the re-investment process and assume other (more realistic) interest rates for re-investing the temporal cash inflows until the maturity of the project.</p><p><strong>The existence and use of the IRR should be enjoyed — carefully. To measure performance and overall returns of longterm-high-risk investment projects is not that easy and should include different measures and KPIs as a modified IRR or a detailed comparison of Money-Multiples.</strong></p><p><strong>Sources:</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/internal-rate-of-return-a-cautionary-tale">https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/internal-rate-of-return-a-cautionary-tale</a></p><p><a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/npv.asp">https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/npv.asp</a></p><p><a href="http://www.chegg.com/homework-help/definitions/internal-rate-of-return-irr-11">http://www.chegg.com/homework-help/definitions/internal-rate-of-return-irr-11</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=51bf1dd6f3be" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/venture-things-e01-the-internal-rate-of-return-51bf1dd6f3be">Venture Things E01: The Internal Rate of Return</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital">Teenage Mutant Venture Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Don’t fear the dark side]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/dont-fear-the-dark-side-6af101289b18?source=rss-fb03d3d9d245------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6af101289b18</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investors]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tmvc-insights]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dark-side]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Lukas Vogt]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 17 Dec 2017 14:49:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-20T14:17:26.827Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/934/1*2Qc_FzNq4422406fDKu5Zw.png" /></figure><p><em>I used to work in a startup — now I am on the VC side and I like to use the terms “dark side” for investors and “bright side” for startups — of course in a fun way. But if there should be any darkness to the VC side, I take the chance to brighten things up. Therefore, I try to explain how tough the VC business model actually is, how VCs can be differentiated and a brief view on the required skills of VCs. Have fun!</em></p><p><strong>The VC model</strong></p><p>VCs are investment funds which collect money from investors and commit to a certain risk-return profile — i.e. high risk, high return and eventually delivering these returns back to their investors. Moreover, the wellbeing of a VC is determined by the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DSYkZmmqCMI">power law</a> — meaning a few outliers in the portfolio can return the fund, the rest will default. Therefore, to increase the likelihood of creating such outliers, a VC has to build a massive and continuous deal flow requiring marketing, events, people et cetera. This is why every default indeed hurts the VC and increases the dependency on outliers.</p><p><strong>The VC value-adds</strong></p><p>As VC, when you are pitching to a startup, there are mainly two sales arguments: “(1) We provide you with enough capital to rock your business plan and (2) we are special”. Whereas (1) is not a USP (but for the startups more than good enough), VCs do push a lot for the (2). All soft factors aside, I think that there are 3 hard differentiators for (2): a) your fund is the absolute go-to-place when building a business in a certain sector, phase or technology (<em>the expert</em>). b) your fund aggregates corporate “business development” money and you kick-start sales &amp; marketing for your startups (<em>the multi-company fund</em>). c) your fund is one of the top 5 brands and will be the quality certificate when approaching customers and/or raising funds in the next round (<em>the shiny brand</em>). My guess is, whereas (1) gets people inside, (2) makes them really stay even though competition is crashing the party.</p><p><strong>The VC skills</strong></p><p>As stated above, VCs have to build a strong deal flow and an even stronger team. On top of that, they have to close deals with potential outliers. As startups, technologies, business models et cetera change, there are endless obstacles on the way to a successful fund performance. Looking at me, I really do not think that our job can be ever mastered as a whole: being always open to new cases, up-to-date, analytically capturing all pitfalls when executing the DD and of course being super persistent on the way to the exit… Plus you get the 360 degree set of company issues: commercial issues, legal issues, cultural issues, cost issues, cash issues and so on — this is why doing a good job as a VC can be very exhausting and requires many skills, abilities, a lot of external help and the will to constantly adapt.</p><p><strong>Turn on the light — the glamorous and invincible “dark side” is not that dark at all. VCs take risks and face long investment cycles. VCs have to use their scarce resources to build branding and finally do their best not to be the roadblocker on the way to the exit.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6af101289b18" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital/dont-fear-the-dark-side-6af101289b18">Don’t fear the dark side</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/teenage-mutant-venture-capital">Teenage Mutant Venture Capital</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>