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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Madhulika Ra Chauhan on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Madhulika Ra Chauhan on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075?source=rss-dbdb1ae62605------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Madhulika Ra Chauhan on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075?source=rss-dbdb1ae62605------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 01:56:33 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Wēijī : Turning Crisis into Opportunity : Rise of Chinese Brands]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075/w%C4%93ij%C4%AB-turning-crisis-into-opportunity-rise-of-chinese-brands-bf37becd979c?source=rss-dbdb1ae62605------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[brands]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[opportunity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[weiji]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crisis]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Madhulika Ra Chauhan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 02:11:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-11-09T02:11:01.472Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/398/0*dZ4TRtE1rgslBuSi.jpg" /><figcaption>Source : Conscious Manager</figcaption></figure><p>The first time I came across the mandarin word for ‘Crisis’, Wēijī (pronounced as way — ji) was when I was researching to teach senior management professionals about Change Management. The word hit me deeply. It was not just a word, it was a philosophy in itself.</p><p>The first character, Wēi stood for danger and Ji could be loosely translated as opportunity. The interesting part is that the character jī is highly polysemous, meaning it can be interpreted in many different ways. According to sinologists and Chinese scholars the closest meaning of ‘jī’ could be a change point or an inflection point at best. So, in other words to get to the seed of the opportunity which lies hidden in crisis the organization or the person in question has to go through an inflection point and only then can that danger truly be turned into an opportunity.</p><h4><strong>John F Kennedy&#39;s </strong>Wēijī<strong> Connection</strong></h4><p>On April 12, 1959, John F. Kennedy, the soon to be President, used the word in his speech in Indianapolis, “When written in Chinese the word crisis is composed of two characters. One represents danger, and the other represents opportunity.”</p><p>From then on perhaps more popular usage of the meaning ‘opportunity’ took on over the other possible implications.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/704/0*_hXG-CQx7WgtLxuE" /><figcaption>Source : Facebook</figcaption></figure><h4>The Wēijī Principle</h4><p>A crisis delivers the danger whether or not you are ready for it. The opportunity exists only if you build it, and you build it at the pivot, before the window closes.</p><ol><li><strong><em>Move One: Name the Danger Honestly</em></strong></li></ol><p>The first move is the least glamorous, and the one most firms skip. It is to see the danger for what it is.</p><p>Chinese industry has been unusually willing to do this at the level of the whole system. The campaign against 内卷, or involution, is an official acknowledgment that relentless investment, local-government incentives, and destructive price competition keep weak companies alive and strong ones thin. Whatever one thinks of the policy response, the diagnosis is honest: a business that can only grow by undercutting its neighbors at home has a problem that no amount of domestic effort will solve.</p><p>The firms that moved earliest started from the same honesty. They did not describe slowing demand as a temporary dip. They asked what a company would look like if the home market never again grew as it once had. The question is uncomfortable, and it is the entry fee for everything else. A company that tells itself the danger is not real has chosen to experience the pivot as something that happens to it.</p><p>“Our people are ready to take on the challenge, but they get overwhelmed under pressure when they need to decide,” was an honest acknowledgement of the director of a Fortune 500 company I met recently in China.</p><p><strong><em>2. Move Two: Rebuild Under Pressure</em></strong></p><p>The second move is to use the pressure itself as the reason to rebuild. Huawei is the clearest example.</p><p>When restrictions cut Huawei off from key foreign technology, there were two paths. It could shrink to fit what remained, or it could commit to producing what it could no longer buy. It chose the second. In 2025 the company reported revenue of CNY 880.9 billion and net profit of CNY 68 billion, and it put a record CNY 192.3 billion into research and development, about 21.8 percent of revenue. Its automotive solutions business grew rapidly, and overseas sales recovered to roughly 30 percent of the total.</p><p>Huawei is no triumphant parable, and it would be misleading to present it as one. It lost large parts of its Western consumer market, and most of its revenue still comes from China. The pivot did not return Huawei to where it had been. It made Huawei something different, with different strengths and different limits. Resilience, in the sense I mean, is not the ability to bounce back to the old shape. It is the willingness to become a new one.</p><p><strong><em>3. Move Three: Move Trust Closer to the Customer</em></strong></p><p>The third move comes when an exporter discovers that selling abroad and belonging abroad are not the same thing. BYD is the example I keep returning to, because it is moving through this lesson in real time.</p><p>BYD has done what few companies in any country have done: it turned a home market under severe price pressure into a global business. Its overseas sales reached a record 189,466 vehicles in August 2026, about 43 percent of its monthly total, and management has guided toward 1.9 to 2 million overseas shipments this year and more than 2.5 million in 2027. Yet it faces a combined tariff of roughly 27 percent on China-built battery EVs entering the EU, and a 34 percent duty in Brazil. Its answer is not to argue with tariffs but to make them irrelevant by producing locally.</p><p>A plant in Hungary is due to begin assembly, and the company’s European adviser has said BYD will eventually need three assembly plants and a battery factory on the continent.</p><p>This is the three stage pattern: export, localize, embed.</p><p>An exporter controls production at home and carries every trade risk abroad. A localizer adapts its product and marketing to each market. An embedded firm produces, partners, and governs locally, until customers and regulators see it as part of the market. BYD’s European plans amount to an effort to move from the first stage to the third. A BYD executive put the logic plainly in September: once everything is made locally, the company becomes a European company.</p><p>Trust cannot be exported. It has to be built on the ground, in factories, supplier relationships, hiring, and local leadership that has real authority. The firms that understand this treat tariffs as a signal about where the pivot points.</p><p><strong><em>4. Move Four: Fix the Model Before the Rule Changes</em></strong></p><p>The fourth move is the hardest, because it requires giving up something that works. Shein and TikTok show what happens when that move is delayed.</p><p>Shein built a global fast-fashion business on AI-driven trend forecasting, a tight supply chain, and small parcels shipped directly to consumers. The model relied heavily on duty exemptions for low-value goods. When the United States ended its exemption in 2025 and the European Union introduced a €3 duty on small parcels from 1 July 2026, the economics shifted underneath it. Shein reported a loss of about $99 million in the first quarter of 2026, against a profit a year earlier, and warned in its Hong Kong listing documents that Europe, around a third of revenue, could be affected as much as the United States. The company is now working to reshape its model, including toward more local sellers and inventory inside the EU.</p><p>TikTok’s lesson is related. Its recommendation engine outperformed Western rivals for attention, but its position in the United States depended on questions that no algorithm could answer: who controls the data, who audits the code, who answers to whom. The agreed US joint venture, with Oracle, Silver Lake, and MGX as managing investors and ByteDance retaining 19.9 percent, was a negotiated answer to those questions.</p><p>Both stories say the same thing. A model optimized for one regulatory condition has an expiry date, and the pivot arrives when the condition changes. The firms that survive are the ones that start rebuilding the model before they are forced to, while they still have the cash, the talent, and the goodwill. (Check out the first chapter of my <a href="https://www.amazon.in/WeiJi-Finding-opportunity-Crisis-Chinese-ebook/dp/B0HNF449L1">book</a> below : <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qXPsHgic1K8&amp;list=PLeXm_mXc0tlg&amp;index=1">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qXPsHgic1K8&amp;list=PLeXm_mXc0tlg&amp;index=1</a>)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NF_etdpg5YLBkCmXMJQgiw.png" /></figure><p><strong>What the Future Holds</strong></p><p>The Wēijī principle applies wherever a pivot appears, and Chinese expansion is itself a pivot for everyone it touches.</p><p>For Western and Indian companies, the arrival of well-funded, fast-moving Chinese competitors is a danger that is already given. The opportunity is made in the response: competing on something other than price, partnering where capabilities complement, or learning from how these firms scale. The one choice that reliably fails is to wait for the pressure to pass. The pressure does not pass. It becomes the new market.</p><p>The same applies to the countries receiving this investment. In India, ASEAN, and the Gulf, the question is what a host market wants from a Chinese entrant beyond a lower price: local jobs, technology transfer, supplier development, a seat at the table. Markets that ask those questions clearly will shape better partners.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bf37becd979c" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[AI and Civil Code: How Jurisdiction is Keeping Pace with AI in China]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075/ai-and-civil-code-how-jurisdiction-is-keeping-pace-with-ai-in-china-a248aeb11c18?source=rss-dbdb1ae62605------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a248aeb11c18</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[copyright]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[original]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Madhulika Ra Chauhan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 02:34:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-26T02:34:59.755Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*mLEqc0OloSE_ilAF" /><figcaption>Source: Facebook: Van Gogh AI Generated</figcaption></figure><p>On 24 February 2023, Mr Li Yunkai, generated the picture by inputting prompts in Stable Diffusion, an open source software, and then published the picture on Xiaohongshu(the Red Book), a popular Chinese social media platform, under the title “Spring Breeze Brings Tenderness”. No one, not even Mr. Li knew at that time, that this picture was going to be the reason behind a landmark judgement.</p><p>In days to come, 2 March 2023 to be precise, a blogger on Baijiahao platform, Ms Liu, used the picture in an article titled “Love in March, in the Peach Blossoms”, and published it without Mr. Li’s permission.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/201/0*9q7AU-oUxgcsbvsR.png" /><figcaption><em>Source </em>: Picture generated by Li, titled “Spring Breeze Brings Tenderness”</figcaption></figure><p>The matter was bought in front of Beijing Internet Court. They began by setting out the elements that must be satisfied for a work to attract copyright protection, one of which is that the work must be “original”.</p><p>The Beijing Court opined:</p><blockquote>Of course, not all intellectual achievements are works; only those with “originality” are. Generally speaking, “originality” requires that the work be completed independently by the author and reflect the author’s personalized expression.</blockquote><p>The Court further explained that:</p><blockquote>Generally speaking, when people use the Stable Diffusion model to generate pictures, the more different their needs are and the more specific the description of picture elements, layout, and composition is, the more personalized the picture will become. In this case, there are identifiable differences between the picture involved and the prior works. In terms of the generation process of the picture involved, the plaintiff did not draw the lines himself, or instruct the Stable Diffusion model everything on how to draw the lines and do the colors; <strong>the lines and colors that constitute the picture involved are basically done by the Stable Diffusion model</strong>, which is very different from the conventional way of people using brushes or software to draw pictures.</blockquote><p>As per the court as Mr. Li used prompt words to work on the picture elements such as the character and how to present it, and set parameters to work on the picture layout and composition, which <strong>reflects the plaintiff’s </strong>(Mr. Li) <strong>choice and arrangement</strong>. According to the court the plaintiff input prompt words and set parameters and got the first picture; then he added some prompt words, modified the parameters, and finally got the picture involved<strong>. </strong>Such adjustment and modification also<strong> reflect the plaintiff’s aesthetic choice and personal judgment</strong>.</p><p>The Court held that Mr. Li’s AI-generated work was original.</p><p>The two outcomes differ in how much human input each system treats as enough, not in the principle each applies. Both ask whether a person, rather than the software, shaped the result. The case of <em>Zarya of the Dawn</em> in the United States, where Kristina Kashtanova had used Midjourney (an AI platform) to produce images based on text prompts to create illustrations for her graphic novel, “Zarya of the Dawn”. Much like Mr. Li, Ms Kashtanova arrived at the final pictures through a process of trial-and-error, as she provided “hundreds or thousands of descriptive prompts” to Midjourney until the “hundreds of iterations as perfect a rendition of her vision as possible”.</p><p>The USCO (United States Copyright Office) took the view that the copyright registration was limited only to the text and selection and arrangement of the written and visual elements, but not the individual images generated by Midjourney. Per the USCO, it was trite (in US law) that only human authors can claim copyright protection for their works. However, Ms Kashtanova was not considered the author of the Midjourney-generated images.</p><p>The USCO distinguishes between the use of generative AI and the use of other tools in the creative process, on the basis that unlike other kinds of creative tools, users using generative AI have insufficient control over and are unable to predict or guarantee the outcome of generative AI’s output. This contrasts with the view of the Beijing Internet Court, which opined that the prompts given by Li “reflect aesthetic choice and personal judgment” and the Beijing Internet Court, took the view that there is “no question” that the generative AI user is the creator, because generative AI “has no free will and is not a legal subject”.</p><p>Even though Ms. Kashtanova had expended significant time and effort working with Midjourney, the USCO reiterated that effort does not make her the “author” of the images and cannot be the basis for copyright protection in otherwise unprotectable material.</p><p>It is striking that despite near-identical working methods, iterative prompting and parameter adjustment, led to different results. What the Beijing court treated the choices as enough human input, the US Copyright Office did not.</p><p>Chinese courts have not applied this test uniformly. In <em>Feng v. Zhangjiagang Dongshan Cultural Communication Co., Ltd.</em>, decided on 19 March 2025, a designer sued over a butterfly-shaped children’s chair. She had published three Midjourney images on Xiaohongshu, together with the prompts she used. The Zhangjiagang court dismissed her copyright claim. It found the images did not reflect enough original human input, and it treated the prompts she had shared as ideas rather than protectable expression. She also could not recreate the images from almost identical prompts, which weakened any claim to control over the output.</p><p>Unlike the previous AIGC copyrightability cases where the local Chinese courts recognized the original authorship in the AI-generated work, this was the first Chinese case under which AI-generated pictures were denied copyright protection.</p><p><strong>Extending the Civil Code to AI</strong></p><p>On September 7, 2026, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) released the Opinions on the Trial of Cases Involving Artificial Intelligence Disputes. <strong>A list of 24 articles in five parts, framed as guidance for applying existing statutes (Civil Code, Cybersecurity Law, Copyright Law, Consumer Protection Law, Personal Information Protection Law, and others) to AI disputes. </strong>China’s Civil Code (in force since 2021), protects a person’s control over their own name, image, likeness, voice, and reputation.</p><p>Zhou Jiahai, head of the SPC research office in China said,</p><p><em>“We cannot expect every consumer to become an expert at spotting deception. The law must step in promptly to protect consumers’ legitimate rights and interests.”</em></p><p>That framing explains why the document spans personality rights, algorithmic pricing, and provider liability in one release courts needed a single reference as impersonation tools went mainstream.</p><p>While the US and EU continue to solidify their stance on deepfake and voice-cloning rules through a patchwork of state laws and disclosure mandates, China’s judiciary moved with more force. In the absence of a dedicated AI statute yet in China, these opinions are the highest national judicial rules on the topic to date.</p><p><strong><em>What the framework covers</em></strong></p><p>The Opinions regulate what they call “AI face-swapping and voice-mimicking” and “AI resurrecting the deceased” under generative AI.</p><p><strong><em>Likeness: </em></strong>Without consent, using AI to process a natural person’s name or portrait to generate an identifiable virtual digital image, then using or publishing it, supports a personality-rights claim, specifically name and portrait rights.</p><p><strong><em>Voice:</em></strong> Without consent, using a person’s voice as training material to imitate timbre, tone, and pronunciation style, producing a synthetic voice identifiable as that person, supports a voice-rights claim. Note the liability hook: training use, not only publication of a recording.</p><p><strong><em>Reputation:</em> </strong>Manipulating a synthetic likeness or voice to spread false statements or improper conduct that lowers social evaluation constitutes reputation infringement.</p><p><strong><em>Deceased persons:</em></strong> Unauthorized AI creation or use of a deceased person’s virtual image that infringes name, image, or reputation can be sued by close relatives under Civil Code Article 994.</p><p>These 24 articles explicitly classify unauthorized identifiable AI clones of a person’s voice, likeness, or persona as personality-rights violations, alongside rules for training data, provider notice duties, and emergency injunctions.</p><p>However, the SPC’s explanatory article says the Opinions deliberately leave two questions open as opinion was sharply divided:</p><p>a) Whether AI-generated content is copyrightable, and</p><p>b) Whether training on others’ works without permission is infringing.</p><p>Globally, the gap exists, as voice-cloning and likeness-generation products have operated in a synthetic reproduction of someone’s voice, generated by a model rather than recorded directly, legally equivalent to using their actual voice without permission. China’s top court just made their opinion loud and clear.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a248aeb11c18" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Batteries to Global EV Dominance: The Remarkable BYD Story]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075/from-batteries-to-global-ev-dominance-the-remarkable-byd-story-da5a95cb4d18?source=rss-dbdb1ae62605------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/da5a95cb4d18</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[industry-disruptors]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[automobile]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[byd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Madhulika Ra Chauhan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 02:30:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-17T02:30:20.704Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m0Dx-e_TNnwxXSdk6EShDg.png" /><figcaption>Source : BYD</figcaption></figure><p>In the ever-evolving landscape of electric vehicles, one company has defied expectations and rewritten the rules of automotive manufacturing. BYD (Build Your Dreams) has transformed from a modest battery startup in southern China to the world’s largest electric vehicle manufacturer, surpassing even Tesla in global sales. This is the story of vision, persistence, and strategic innovation that built an automotive empire.</p><h3>Humble Beginnings</h3><p>The BYD story begins with Wang Chuanfu, a man born into poverty in Wuwei County, Anhui Province, one of China’s poorest regions. Orphaned as a teenager and raised by his elder siblings, Wang’s early hardships forged the resilience that would later define his business approach. His academic excellence led him to Central South University in Changsha, an elite institution renowned for battery chemistry research, where he earned both bachelor’s and master’s degrees in metallurgical physical chemistry.</p><p>In 1995, at just 29 years old, Wang made a bold move. After briefly managing a state-owned battery company, he secured an approximately 2.5 million Yuan from his cousin Lu Xiangyang and founded Build Your Dreams in Shenzhen, the bustling hub of China’s electronics industry. Starting with just 20 employees, BYD began by reverse-engineering Japanese batteries from Sony and Sanyo, then improving their designs while cutting costs dramatically.</p><p>Wang’s timing proved fortuitous. When Japan pledged in 1994 to stop producing nickel-cadmium batteries for environmental reasons, he saw an opportunity to fill the supply gap for thousands of phone producers at the dawn of China’s mobile era. By the early 2000s, BYD had become China’s largest producer of rechargeable batteries, supplying power packs for cell phones and laptops worldwide.</p><h3>The Automotive Leap</h3><p>In 2003, flush with funds from a Hong Kong IPO that raised HK$1.65 billion, Wang made a controversial decision that rattled investors: BYD acquired 77% of Qinchuan Automobile Company for HKD 254 million. The move seemed puzzling given the fact that, Qinchuan was a struggling state-owned automaker with little brand recognition. BYD’s share price plummeted 30% in the first three days following the announcement, and major funds abandoned the company.</p><p>But Wang saw beyond the immediate skepticism. “With such a platform, BYD’s electric vehicle battery industrialization process was accelerated by 2–3 years,” he explained. The acquisition provided an auto assembly plant, mold-making facilities, and an R&amp;D division — essential infrastructure for his ultimate vision of electric mobility.</p><p>BYD’s first vehicle, the F3 sedan launched in 2005, bore an uncanny resemblance to the Toyota Corolla. At the 2007 Guangzhou auto show, American executives openly mocked the car’s uneven purple paint job and poorly fitted doors. “They were the laughingstock of the industry,” recalled auto analyst Michael Dunne.</p><p>Nobody is laughing now.</p><h3>The Buffett Blessing</h3><p>By 2008, BYD had achieved something remarkable: it launched the F3DM, the world’s first mass-produced plug-in hybrid sedan, beating competitors like Toyota and GM to market. This caught the attention of Charlie Munger, Warren Buffett’s longtime business partner, who was introduced to BYD by early investor Li Lu of Himalaya Capital.</p><blockquote>Munger was captivated by Wang’s abilities, describing him as “a combination of Thomas Edison and Jack Welch — something like Edison in solving technical problems, and something like Welch in getting done what he needs to do. I have never seen anything like it.”</blockquote><p>During a factory tour, Wang famously took a sip of battery fluid to demonstrate the safety of BYD’s batteries — showmanship that sealed the deal. In 2008, Berkshire Hathaway invested $230 million for a 10% stake. Though less than the 25% initially offered (Wang was reluctant to part with such a large share), the investment proved transformative. Today, that stake is worth approximately $2.5 billion, an impressive 11x return.</p><p>At the time, <strong>Buffett predicted that “BYD Auto will one day become the world’s largest automaker in an inevitably electric future.”</strong> BYD currently ranks sixth globally by vehicles sold and is climbing rapidly.</p><h3>The Long Road to Success</h3><p>Despite the high-profile investment and early innovations, BYD’s path was far from smooth. In 2012, as China’s car market matured and buyers became more discerning, BYD’s sales and stock price plummeted. Multinational competitors offered more stylish models, and industry executives questioned whether BYD had a future.</p><p>Wang made two critical strategic bets during this period that would ultimately pay off handsomely.</p><p>First, in 2016, he hired Wolfgang Egger, a prominent Audi designer, who recruited hundreds of car engineers with bold aesthetic sensibilities. They completely redesigned BYD’s vehicle lineup, transforming the brand’s image from cheap knockoff to sophisticated competitor.</p><p>Second, Wang doubled down on battery innovation. While the industry standardized around nickel-cobalt-manganese lithium batteries, BYD pursued lithium iron phosphate (LFP) chemistry — cheaper and safer, but initially plagued by shorter range. For years, this seemed like a questionable choice.</p><p>In 2020, BYD unveiled its breakthrough: <strong><em>the Blade Battery</em></strong>. This revolutionary LFP technology closed most of the range gap with nickel-cobalt batteries while costing a fraction of the price. The same year, Tesla began incorporating LFP batteries in its less expensive models, validating BYD’s decades-long bet.</p><p>Wang also persisted with plug-in hybrid technology when others focused solely on pure electric vehicles. After 19 years of development and multiple setbacks, BYD launched its Super DM (Dual Model) Plug-in Hybrid Technology in 2021. These vehicles achieved fuel consumption equivalent to half that of regular combustion engines, with faster acceleration, less noise, and pricing comparable to traditional cars.</p><p>“Why didn’t users choose our plug-in hybrids?” Wang reflected in a 2024 speech. “I have to admit that our plug-in hybrid technology at that time was not good enough… For 19 years, we have poured countless energy and painstaking efforts, but we still have not been recognized by the market. I was very anxious. But I always had a belief in my heart that a plug-in hybrid car should be the primary option for most Chinese families, and I must stick to it no matter what.”</p><h3>Vertical Integration and Manufacturing Excellence</h3><p>A key factor in BYD’s success has been its vertically integrated approach. Unlike most automakers, BYD manufactures three-quarters of its vehicle components in-house, including critical electronics and batteries. This strategy, similar to Tesla’s approach, gives BYD significant cost advantages.</p><p>A 2023 study by Swiss bank UBS found that a BYD Seal electric hatchback cost 35% less to produce than a comparable Volkswagen ID.3 made in Europe. The savings came not only from cheaper batteries but also from lower labor costs and streamlined manufacturing processes.</p><p>BYD’s Shenzhen headquarters exemplifies this integration. The company operates its own walled town, where an airport-style monorail carries workers from 18-story company apartments to office towers and research labs. Engineer Liu Qiangqiang, who joined from General Motors, noted that his car development team had nearly tripled in just 15 months. “The pace is fast,” he observed simply.</p><h3>Overtaking Tesla</h3><p>In late 2023, BYD achieved what many thought impossible: it surpassed Tesla in global electric vehicle sales. For Tesla, which had reached a trillion-dollar valuation in 2021 and seemed unstoppable, the shift was dramatic.</p><p>The contrast between the two companies is striking. Tesla, crafted with Silicon Valley ethos, focuses on software-defined vehicles, autonomy, and a premium brand ecosystem. It’s often described as “a technology company that happens to make cars.”</p><blockquote>BYD, by contrast, was built by an engineer more focused on manufacturing excellence than flashy marketing. As one observer noted, Wang is more akin to “a Lord of the Rings elven forgelord than Iron Man.” BYD’s foundation is its battery technology and vertically integrated supply chain, built methodically over three decades.</blockquote><p>The irony is palpable: BYD, the great mimicker of Japanese technology in the 1990s, is now being copied by Tesla, which increasingly relies on BYD’s battery designs and vertical integration strategy.</p><p>Even Elon Musk has acknowledged the threat. In a January 2024 earnings call, he warned: “Frankly, I think if there are not trade barriers established, they will pretty much demolish most other companies in the world.”</p><h3>Global Expansion and Future Ambitions</h3><p>BYD’s ambitions extend far beyond China. The company has established manufacturing plants and partnerships in Brazil, Hungary, Thailand, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and Mexico, with rapid expansion into European markets. BYD’s electric buses are now standard in cities worldwide, contributing to cleaner urban environments.</p><p>In 2024, BYD launched the BYD Explorer №1, the first of the world’s largest car carrier ships, capable of transporting 5,000 electric vehicles. The vessel’s maiden voyage from Shenzhen to the Netherlands symbolizes BYD’s determination to become a truly global automotive leader.</p><p>The company has also pivoted aggressively into autonomous driving technology. After initially dismissing the technology, Wang reversed course when Chinese electronics companies Huawei and Xiaomi introduced vehicles with advanced autonomous capabilities. In January 2024, he announced that BYD had deployed 4,000 engineers working on assisted driving technology, with plans to invest $14 billion in the field.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/893/1*OIgJsLCXXFTRONWT1CyoOQ.png" /><figcaption>Source : BYD</figcaption></figure><p>BYD’s product lineup has expanded dramatically, from the subcompact Seagull (starting at less than $11,000) to the premium Han flagship sedan, the Tang SUV, and the innovative Dolphin compact. The company’s Blade Battery technology now charges in just five minutes, setting new industry standards.</p><h3>5 Strategic Lessons</h3><p>BYD’s remarkable journey offers valuable lessons for entrepreneurs and business leaders worldwide.</p><p><strong>1.Long-term vision pays off.</strong> Wang spent three decades mastering battery technology before it became the cornerstone of a global automotive empire. Strategic industries require patience and sustained investment.</p><p><strong>2. Vertical integration provides competitive advantages.</strong> By controlling its supply chain from raw materials to finished vehicles, BYD achieved cost efficiencies that competitors struggle to match.</p><p><strong>3. Diversification and adaptability are essential.</strong> BYD successfully expanded from batteries to vehicles to renewable energy solutions, adjusting its strategy when market conditions demanded.</p><p><strong>4. Persistence through failure builds resilience.</strong> Wang endured years of losses on plug-in hybrids before achieving breakthrough success. His unwavering belief in the technology ultimately proved correct.</p><p><strong>5. Innovation drives market leadership.</strong> BYD’s continuous technological advancement — from LFP batteries to the Blade Battery to super hybrid systems — kept it ahead of competitors.</p><h3>The Road Ahead</h3><p>On June 10, 2021, BYD’s share price surged nearly 7%, pushing its market value past one trillion yuan — making it the first independent Chinese automobile brand to join this exclusive club. The achievement reflected not just financial success but BYD’s transformative impact on the global automotive industry.</p><p>Today, BYD produces not only vehicles but also solar panels, energy storage systems, and integrated solutions for managing renewable energy. The company’s vision extends beyond transportation to encompass smart cities and sustainable urban infrastructure.</p><p>Wang Chuanfu’s personal philosophy — that technology should serve humanity and contribute to a cleaner world — has guided BYD from its inception. His hands-on approach, deep technical knowledge, and relentless pursuit of excellence continue to drive the company forward.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F04fWc1iNASWVYqU7X3t_w.png" /><figcaption>Source : BYD</figcaption></figure><p>“Technology is the main force to solve problems in the world,” Wang has said. “We want to use our technological innovations to help solve the world’s energy problems. Our dream is to build the world’s most efficient and sustainable transport system.”</p><p>From a $300,000 loan and 20 employees in 1995 to a trillion-yuan global powerhouse, BYD’s journey embodies the potential of vision, innovation, and unwavering determination. As the world accelerates toward electrification and sustainable energy, BYD stands ready to lead — building dreams into reality, one vehicle at a time.</p><p>The story of BYD is ultimately the story of believing in the future when others doubt, persisting through failure when success seems distant, and transforming adversity into opportunity. As Wang proved, sometimes the greatest innovations come not from Silicon Valley boardrooms but from humble beginnings and an engineer’s determination to change the world.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=da5a95cb4d18" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The China Story, Part III: The Rise of Disruptors and Innovators (2012–2026)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075/the-china-story-part-iii-the-rise-of-disruptors-and-innovators-2012-2026-b66da15d59fc?source=rss-dbdb1ae62605------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b66da15d59fc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[tencent]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china-startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[shenzen]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Madhulika Ra Chauhan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 15:06:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-10-12T15:06:01.808Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The nation once marred with deprivation had pulled itself into an <a href="https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075/china-story-from-imitation-to-innovation-part-1-b6f52b9e76ad">enviable growth story</a> standing on the engine of increased production capacity, real-estate growth and infrastructure development and an indomitable will to <em>“cross the river while feeling the stones”. </em>The 2008 Olympics showcased the new and rising China, putting its best foot forward enjoying the favorable tailwinds created by policy, stability and opening up of the economy. <a href="https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075/china-story-imitation-to-innovation-part-2-setting-the-stage-1992-2012-352ba69ac4da">After joining the WTO</a>, China’s products ubiquitously penetrated the world markets. The students who made their way to study abroad, brought back ideas which laid the foundation of the new generation of disruptors.</p><h3>The Wave of Disruptors Addressing the Gap</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F8LsaOhovGSRtFsnwwV6yA.png" /><figcaption>Source : China Daily</figcaption></figure><p>The people who built China’s modern technology giants did not own a backyard to experiment. Jack Ma, had travelled to US in his capacity as a translator and was sparked by the idea of how internet could be used. His first internet venture, China Pages, an online directory for Chinese businesses, failed. In 1999 he started again with a simple idea: connect small Chinese manufacturers to buyers across the world.</p><p>Alibaba began as a business-to-business marketplace, not the consumer empire it became.</p><p>The consumer story came in 2003 with Taobao. eBay had already bought the market leader, EachNet, and had the capital and the global brand. Taobao beat it anyway, in large part by understanding Chinese buyers and sellers better than a foreign platform could. In 2004 came Alipay, which solved the trust problem that held back online buying and later became the backbone of mobile payments. By 2014, Alibaba’s New York listing raised $25 billion, the largest public offering in history at that time.</p><p>Xiaomi, founded in April 2010 by Lei Jun, was a different kind of disruption. Lei was already an established software entrepreneur. His innovation was less about a new product than a new business model: sell excellent hardware at close to cost, build a loyal community of users, and earn from software, services and an expanding family of connected devices. Its first phone, the Mi 1, arrived in 2011. By 2014 Xiaomi was China’s leading smartphone brand. In 2021 Lei Jun announced a $10 billion bet on electric vehicles, and the first Xiaomi car reached the market in 2024.</p><h3>The Green Push Fueling the Growth</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Q3VNXoK4YbcQ0oBQem8GQg.png" /><figcaption>Source : HS Insider</figcaption></figure><p>On 3rd September, 2016, China formally joined the Paris Agreement in a ceremony in Hangzhou, China. President Obama and President Xi deposited each country’s official instrument to join the agreement with United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. China became the 25th country to ratify the agreement. It said the move would “safeguard environmental security” and was “conducive to China’s development interests”.</p><p>In the same year 13th Renewable Energy Development Five Year Plan (2016–2020) was adopted by National Energy Administration on 10th of December 2016 establishing targets for renewable energy deployment until 2020. Targets aligned with objectives of the 13th FYP on National Economy and Social Development and respective FYP for each renewable energy technology. One of the core objectives was to increase share of non-fossil energy in total primary <strong>energy consumption to 15% by 2020 and to 20% by 2030.</strong></p><p>In 2024, China accounted for roughly 31 percent of global renewable energy investment, about $625 billion of a $2 trillion total. In the same year it installed more wind and solar capacity than the rest of the world combined. By the end of 2025, its installed renewable capacity had passed 2,300 gigawatts, with solar around 1,200 GW and wind around 640 GW. In 2025, wind and solar capacity together overtook coal capacity for the first time.</p><p>For China pushing the green economy did not only accord direct benefits but also made China key to any nation on the path to a sustainable low-carbon economy, with its formidable hold on upstream resources and refining of rare-earth metals. An analysis published through Carbon Brief found that according to CREA (Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air) clean energy industries <strong>drove more than 90 percent of China’s investment growth in 2025 and contributed over a third of its economic growth.</strong></p><p>China turned climate action into industrial advantage, financial leverage, and geopolitical influence.</p><h4>The Rise of Innovators</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Onw5RBdc8eRJTYeWhQpABw.png" /><figcaption>Source : China Daily</figcaption></figure><p>For decades the question about Chinese technology was whether it could do more than copy. In January 2025 a Hangzhou start-up, DeepSeek, released an open-source reasoning model, <strong>DeepSeek-R1,</strong> that matched leading Western systems at a fraction of the reported training cost, built under chip export restrictions. Many commentators called it <strong>China’s Sputnik moment.</strong></p><p>It was not an overnight accident. China’s share of the world’s top AI researchers rose from about 11 percent in 2019 to about 20 percent in 2023. By early 2025 Chinese applicants had filed more than 1.5 million AI-related patent applications, around 38 percent of the global total, and the core AI industry was approaching 1 trillion yuan in scale. Hangzhou, Alibaba’s home city, has become a second hub for AI and robotics, home to both DeepSeek and the robot maker Unitree. The ecosystem Alibaba seeded two decades ago is now producing its own successors.</p><h4><strong>Forging the New Innovation Map</strong></h4><p>On September 29, <strong>WIPO’s 2026 index kept China in 10th place for a second consecutive year</strong>, ahead of every other emerging economy, with 25 of the world’s top 100 innovation clusters. <strong>Shenzhen</strong>, the fishing town that Deng chose as an experiment in 1980, <strong>now sits at the top of the global cluster list.</strong></p><p>It is a long way from feeling for the stones. The journey ran through the bold reforms of the 1980s, the institution-building of the 1990s and 2000s, the disruptors who found gaps nobody else was filling, and a state that now directs capital at clean energy and AI.</p><p>The harder questions lie ahead. China has to prove that its patents carry influence as well as volume, and that innovation can carry growth as property and cheap labor once did, while the workforce ages and geopolitics tightens. While the earlier chapters were about catching up to someone else’s map, this one is about drawing a new one.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b66da15d59fc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[China Story : Imitation to Innovation : Part 2: Setting the Stage(1992–2012)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075/china-story-imitation-to-innovation-part-2-setting-the-stage-1992-2012-352ba69ac4da?source=rss-dbdb1ae62605------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/352ba69ac4da</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[housing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trade]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[deng-xiaoping]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Madhulika Ra Chauhan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 06:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-28T06:01:01.622Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/502/1*K_1C6jcUvYPzsBSG5ed5Ew.png" /><figcaption>Source : Wikipedia</figcaption></figure><h3>The China Story, Part II:</h3><p><a href="https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075/china-story-from-imitation-to-innovation-part-1-b6f52b9e76ad"><em>Part one</em></a><em> looked at how China’s reforms picked up pace rebuilding the nation. Part two picks up from there — the two decades in which “socialist market economy” stopped being a rhetorical and laid the foundation for progress to follow.</em></p><p>I recently read Edward Tse’s book China Disrupters. It was like taking a trip down memory lane as he described the years that was shaping China, the same time around which I had first set foot in China in 2007. The energy, the growth, the eagerness to progress was visible. The book described the rise of an entrepreneurial ecosystem that moved beyond copying American rivals to accomplishing bona fide innovation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/534/1*7cyZAt11ceL_pKOk6-XlsQ.png" /><figcaption>Source : <a href="https://medium.com/www.penguinrandomhouse.com">P</a>enguinrandomhouse.com</figcaption></figure><p>What I was witnessing was a growth which had been built much earlier. Deng Xiaoping continued his efforts to open up the economy and push the reforms he had started. His famous 1992 southern tour, where Deng promoted the ideological basis for the socialist market economy, stating his view that <strong><em>“Socialism can have market mechanisms as well, and government planning and market are both economic means.”</em></strong> Within this model, privately owned enterprises became a major component of the economic system alongside the central state-owned enterprises and the collective township village enterprises.</p><p>This tour reinvigorated and expanded the SEZ model which had been initiated with Shenzhen a decade ago.</p><blockquote><strong>“I don’t care if the cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice (不管黑猫白猫，捉到老鼠就是好猫)” — Deng Xiaoping ( — 1962)</strong></blockquote><p>A colleague once told me he’d grown up hearing that line, his parents repeated. It became a shorthand for everything that had changed around them.</p><p>The mandate had been set. It was about bringing progress.</p><p>As a direct impact of Deng Xiaoping’s famous southern tour, China began downsizing the role State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) played in the economy, particularly by subjecting SOEs to more market competition. In 1997 at the 15th Party Congress, Beijing’s SOE reform was turbocharged as many smaller and medium size SOEs were forced to close, privatize, or merge.</p><p>According to National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) paper by Drs. Hanming Fang, Ming Li, Zenan Wu, and Yapei Zhang downsizing of SOEs (SOE employment peaked at about 110 million in 1995 but fell to less than 75 million by 2001) “significantly improved the quality of entrepreneurship” in China because “some high-skilled SOE employees were reluctantly unleashed into entrepreneurship.”</p><p>A 2021 paper from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that between 1998 and 2005, the share of SOEs in industrial output fell from around 50 percent to about 30 percent, and that this “transition coincided with rapid aggregate productivity growth, which came in part from the growth of the private sector at the expense of less productive SOEs. This was a welcomed development in China and for the global economy more broadly.</p><p>As a result foreign direct investment arrived as China built an ecosystem through tax incentives, a regulatory environment tuned to attract capital, and a location advantage that diaspora business networks in Hong Kong and across Asia and North America were quick to leverage. That initial wave of FDI brought not only money but technology transfer and managerial know-how, absorbed through joint ventures that were often explicitly structured to force this kind of learning.</p><p>It closed technological gaps faster than a purely organic domestic development process would have allowed. That shift ran alongside one of the largest internal migrations in human history, as rural workers moved to cities in search of factory jobs, feeding both export industries and, increasingly, a domestic consumer market.</p><p>Infrastructure investment ran on a parallel. By the 2000s and 2010s, China had turned this logic inward at staggering scale, and built the world’s largest expressway network and the world’s largest high-speed rail network, along with telecommunications infrastructure.</p><p>By the time I arrived, housing sector was booming, and owning a house was a mark of prosperity which had become so only almost a decade before I came.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*22s5txDrrBbahBv_OXvvKQ.png" /><figcaption>Source : China Daily</figcaption></figure><p>The reforms (in 1998) permitted individuals to own housing structures and, for a fee, acquire transferable residential land-use rights for up to 70 years. The owner-occupier home ownership rate was only around 20% in the early 1990s, but after the reform it jumped to 80% in 2002 and to 90% by 2009. As a result a new mortgage market came into being with the newly created wealth pillar.</p><p>It became the primary engine of urban wealth creation nearly doubling the private wealth of the individuals. The overhaul was designed to trigger domestic private demand and establish real estate as a new push for economic growth following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.</p><p>China’s progress was not only felt by the population internally, but the surplus product China made also needed a bigger market. That market expansion got sealed on December 11, 2001, when China officially became the WTO’s 143rd Member. This was a pivotal event in the history of the multilateral trading system.</p><p>For China, adopting WTO rules and principles served as a blueprint for a far-reaching economic and institutional makeover. The structural transformation triggered by accession-related reforms contributed to China’s dynamic growth and modernization. For the WTO, welcoming China marked a significant step towards becoming a truly “world” organization with over a fifth of the world population gained full entry into the multilateral trading system.</p><p>China’s joining the WTO had been a 15-year journey starting with its request to resume its status as a contracting party to the GATT in 1986.</p><p>WTO membership locked in access to global markets and supply chains, embedding China’s manufacturing base into the world economy in a way that would have been much harder to reverse or renegotiate piecemeal.</p><p>China’s human capital story in this period is genuinely startling in its speed. In 1995, roughly 8% of China’s college-age population was enrolled in post-secondary education. By 2015 that figure had passed 50%. That expansion of higher education and vocational training didn’t just create a more skilled labor pool, it repositioned China’s competitive advantage as the economy began moving up the value chain, from low-cost assembly toward more sophisticated manufacturing and services. Though no standard weight could be attributed to cultural factors which helped build a strong work ethic, Confucian emphasis on education, the state’s own capital allocation decisions during this period created a forward looking workforce.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Tl-GibP26zZr-Yfgx64KUQ.png" /><figcaption>Source : South China Morning Post</figcaption></figure><p>On 20 April 1994, China made its Internet debut through a 64K international special line, becoming the 77th member of the global Internet community. Over the next six years, the foundations of Internet infrastructure were established followed by remarkable growth. By the end of 2000, China’ s online users had reached 22.5 million. China had embarked on the third wave of evolution — the internet.</p><p>During the 1980s and 1990s, one of the most read books in China was <em>The Third Wave</em> by American writer and futurist Alvin Toffler. The biggest takeaway for China was that it could not miss the third wave of transformation of human society.</p><p>The establishment of key backbone networks like CSTNET, CHINANET, CERNET, and CHINAGBN facilitated nationwide connectivity. With the internet still in infancy, the internet entrepreneurs laid the foundation to nationwide connectivity and e-commerce platforms like Alibaba, JD.com and QQ. These companies paved the way for the hypermodern, cashless, app-mediated texture of daily life in Chinese cities. By the time I arrived everyone had a QQ account where people wrote blogs and shared experiences about their life and payments had started to become cashless.</p><p>Tse in his book has described the case studies and the growth of the new wave of internet companies like Baidu, Alibaba and J.D that I had seen unfold on the ground level in those early years in China.</p><p>By 2012, the stage was set. The infrastructure, the human capital base, the private sector, the trade relationships, the digital economy. What China’s leadership did next was to decide what kind of force it wanted to become.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=352ba69ac4da" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[China Story : From Imitation to Innovation : Part 1]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075/china-story-from-imitation-to-innovation-part-1-b6f52b9e76ad?source=rss-dbdb1ae62605------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b6f52b9e76ad</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china-growth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[science-and-technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[deng-xiaoping]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Madhulika Ra Chauhan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 14:26:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-14T14:26:01.606Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1020/0*woDnaYlc97oIPVfG" /><figcaption>Source : South China Morning Post</figcaption></figure><p>The 19th edition of WIPO’s (World Intellectual Property Organization) <strong>Global Innovation Index</strong> (GII) will be released on Tuesday, September 29, 2026.</p><p>Last year, China ranked 10th globally in the 2025 GII (score 56.6), up from 11th in 2024, its first time ever in the top 10.</p><p>China has 24 clusters in world’s top innovation clusters of the GII.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*asghSchj7ncoY3rimfNpbg.png" /><figcaption>Source : WIPO 2025 Report</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Path Ahead</strong></p><p>‘China story’ seems like an unlikely phenomenon, where the world seem to be asking one single question ? How did it happen? More importantly how did it happen seemingly overnight. It’s a hard conundrum to answer. China’s phenomenal rise and shift certainly cannot be attributed to a single factor like: government policy and reform.</p><p>It is a far complex phenomenon which cannot be unfurled in a single sentence. Most people see it through a singularity of imitation to innovation, but the inimitable growth story cannot be seen clearly while brushing aside the years which built the nation. Through this series we will try to look at China’s path of self-discovery for the last forty years and how the country has been able to built itself up despite facing unsurmountable problems.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*RYcWoQIPtvfbVilr" /><figcaption>Source : World Bank Group Report</figcaption></figure><p><strong>A Nation Born</strong></p><p>The enigmatic China growth story, called so, mostly because of the western economist who have tried to look at the phenomenon of China’s growth through the lens of numbers, graphs and GDP percentage over the years have tried to create a unifying picture using the same lens to chart the phenomenon. The growth story through that lens does look phenomenal and exceptional, except it undermines the role of intangibles, the conditions the nation faced and overcame. The shifts, turns and pivots. In the absence of those actors, the story gets limited to a few pictures over the years. What one clearly misses is the slow yet deliberate unfolding and a rise marked by some wrong turns, right intentions and resilience.</p><p>Post Mao’s Great Leap, and great famine China was left struggling with a dearth of food resources to feed a nation, ideological alienation from Russia and a population which was primarily governed by the central government. That’s when there the need of shift was felt by Deng Xiaoping.</p><p><strong>Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones</strong></p><p>It was on December 18, 1978 at the third plenary session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, that Deng Xiaoping initiated the economic reforms that would eventually reshape China into a socialist market economy. Deng Xiaoping realized the need to adopt a more pragmatic approach to rebuild the nation.</p><p>The famous quote “<strong><em>crossing the river by feeling the stones</em></strong>” which later became associated with Deng. The reforms de-collectivized agriculture, abolished the people’s communes, relaxed price controls, allowed foreign direct investment into China, and led to the creation of special economic zones. Private enterprises were allowed to grow, while many state-owned enterprises were scaled down or privatized. There was a parallel push towards scientific rebuilding which happened during the same period.</p><p>From 1978 to 1992, Deng’s reform and opening up can be described as a large scale experiment requiring thorough experimentation in practice instead of textbook knowledge.</p><p><strong>The ‘Bottom Up’ Experimental Approach</strong></p><p>Reforms in this period started with local experiments that were adopted and expanded elsewhere once their success had been demonstrated. Officials generally faced few penalties for experimenting and failing and those who developed successful programs received nation-wide praise and recognition. The bottom-up approach of the reforms promoted by Deng, is considered an important factor contributing to the success of China’s economic transition.</p><p>One of the first reforms began in agriculture. By the late 1970s, food supplies and production had become extremely deficient, Deng responded by decollectivizing agriculture and emphasizing the household-responsibility system, which divided the land of the people’s communes into private plots. Under the new policy, peasants were able to exercise formal control of their land as long as they sold a contracted portion of their crops to the government. Agricultural output growth accelerated from about 3.2% per year pre-reform to roughly 7.9% per year in 1979–83, grain yield per unit area rose about 40% from 1978–85 and total agricultural productivity rose around 40% over the same years.</p><p>Reforms were also implemented in urban industry to increase productivity. A <strong><em>dual-price system</em></strong> was introduced, in which state-owned industries were allowed to sell any production above the plan quota, and commodities were sold at both plan and market prices. Moreover, the adoption of Industrial Responsibility System 1980s further promoted the development of state-owned enterprise by allowing individuals or groups to manage the enterprise by contract. Private businesses were allowed to operate for the first time since the CCP takeover, and they gradually began to make up a greater percentage of industrial output. Price flexibility was also increased, expanding the service sector.</p><p>At the same time, in December 1978, Deng announced a new policy, the <strong><em>Open Door Policy</em></strong>, to open the door to foreign businesses that wanted to set up shop in China. Deng created a series of Special Economic Zones, including Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Xiamen, for foreign investment that were relatively free of the bureaucratic regulations and interventions that hampered economic growth. These regions became engines of growth for the national economy. On January 31, 1979, the Shekou Industrial Zone of Shenzhen was founded, becoming the first experimental area in China to officially “open up”.</p><p>In July 1979, China adopted its first Law on Joint Venture Using Chinese and Foreign Investment. This law was effective in helping to attract and absorb foreign technology and capital from advanced countries like the United States, facilitated China’s exports to such countries, and thereby contributed to China’s subsequent rapid economic growth.</p><h3>Science and technology is a productive force</h3><p>Along with an opening up of the economy and initiation of reforms, Deng initiated a push towards education and understood that it was through science and technology, China would be able to bridge the gap. One of the first step was the reinstatement of the <strong>gaokao (national college entrance exam)</strong> in December 1977. Approximately, <strong>5.7–5.8 million people sat the exam out of which </strong>an estimated <strong>273,000 were admitted</strong> drawn from an unusually wide pool of factory workers, farmers, and demobilized soldiers alongside secondary graduates.</p><h4>March 1978 — The National Science Conference</h4><p>In March 1978, Beijing held the National Science Conference, Deng opened it with the line that became a founding slogan of the era: <strong>“science and technology is a productive force”</strong>. This active push towards science repositioned scientists as part of the working class. The conference adopted the National Plan for the Development of Science and Technology, 1978–1985, targeting fields like computing, high-energy physics, and semiconductors, and it’s remembered as the “Spring of Science” (科学的春天).</p><h4>1978 — Sending students abroad</h4><p>In June 1978, Deng made a case for Chinese students to be sent overseas “by the thousands or tens of thousands, not just a handful,” explicitly framing it as the fastest way to close the science-and-technology gap. By the end of 1978, the first cohort of <strong>52 Chinese scholars</strong> flew to the United States under this push. What is remarkable is that all this fast pace action which led the foundation of scientific push was laid in a 10-day window.</p><h4>1985 — The S&amp;T system reform decision</h4><p>On <strong>March 13, 1985</strong>, the CCP Central Committee issued its formal “Decision on the Reform of the Science and Technology System”. It began dismantling the old model of funding to create a structural shift similar to the dual-track pricing and industrial contract-responsibility reforms where research institutes were pushed toward contract-based funding, closer ties with enterprises, and market-relevant results.</p><h4>1986 — The 863 Program</h4><p>Named “863” for its March 1986 origin, the program was initaited by Four senior scientists (Wang Daheng, Wang Ganchang, Yang Jiachi, Chen Fangyun) who wrote directly to Deng in March 1986 urging a dedicated high-tech push. The program is said to have been approved by Deng within two days and<strong> </strong>received an initial government allocation of <strong>10 billion RMB — about 5% of that year’s total government spending</strong>, aimed at fields including biotechnology, space, information technology, lasers, automation, energy, and new materials.</p><p>The program later produced the lineage behind China’s Loongson processors, Tianhe supercomputers, and Shenzhou spacecraft program, and an early AI research track — “863–306” — that seeded several of today’s Chinese AI companies.</p><h4>Other Programs</h4><p>Other programs like the Spark Program in 1986 was aimed at the countryside applying research results to rural production, demonstrating techniques in poorer regions, and tackling basic food-and-clothing shortages and the torch program in 1988 which was focused on commercializing high-tech research pairing it with the establishment of <strong>state-level high-tech development zones.</strong></p><p>Science policy in this period wasn’t only about frontier tech, it was also about diffusing existing knowledge into the vast rural economy moving the benefits of science and technology to the ground level.</p><p>While, we will know China’s latest global innovation rating in a few days, we will continue to track the policy changes which happened over the years which made that innovation possible.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b6f52b9e76ad" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Niu Lai : Deciphering China’s New Viral Obsession]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075/niu-lai-deciphering-chinas-new-viral-obsession-50e6728824c0?source=rss-dbdb1ae62605------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/50e6728824c0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pop-culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockbusters]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stock-market]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[niu-lai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Madhulika Ra Chauhan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 03:24:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-25T03:24:04.537Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/516/1*u5qizoTw8anjyf1lJRlzJQ.png" /><figcaption>Source : Niu Lai theatrical release poster</figcaption></figure><p>“I want to watch Niu Lai,” declared my teenage son.</p><p>“Niu Lai? what is that?”</p><p>“It’s the worst movie, its really badly made and I want to watch it,” he reasoned in a classic teenage fashion.</p><p>“Why would anyone want to watch a badly made movie?” I asked, thinking I was asking a reasonably rational question.</p><p>Turns out, not only was my assumption flawed, but the phenomenal success of the movie defied logic.</p><p>Niu Lai (roughly translated as ‘the bull is coming’) was made frame to frame by a mother and son duo over five years, on a budget of about US$4,000.</p><p>It opened to rather lukewarm response. <br>Opening day: 342 yuan. First 10 days: 7,711 yuan.<br>Roughly US$1,000 in total.</p><p>Then something phenomenal happened. The mockery became the ‘marketing tool’. The bad reviews became viral and handmade posters urging audience not to watch the movie became its driver for success. The curiosity of watching the ‘worst’ movie was also driven by genuine adoration of the ‘mother-son’ duo who had cared and believed enough for the movie to make it over five years.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*E1Er3T1jIkoa1FWd7H1oDA.png" /><figcaption>Source : Complex Pop Culture</figcaption></figure><p>Niu Lai, 86-minute animated feature, released nationwide on 5 August 2026. The story follows Niulai, a newborn calf unable to stand: inside a dream brought by a desert skylark, he lives through an entire coming-of-age journey.</p><p>It was like looking at your two year old’s drawing and loving it despite knowing how bad it is. ‘Niu Lai’ hit the emotional core of the audience. It has since crossed 41 million yuan, and is still climbing. Not because the content was good. For all the trade pundits, who claim to know the audience and have built for the audience, using AI and tracking the measured movements of the audience, this was audience reclaiming their likes and dislikes, and a greater behavioral curiosity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Ex4CKAhc3LEYfL2W62kyCg.png" /><figcaption>Source : Handmade Niu Lai Posters</figcaption></figure><p>Despite the crude animation, stiff characters, typos left in the final cut, the audience filled the halls. On Douban (a movie review site) it scored 5.9. However, the average hides the diametrically opposite swing. 35.8% gave it five stars, 37.8% gave it one. And yet, while audience’s world was filled by AI slop, this hand-drawn badly made animation ruled the theaters and movie watching became a community laugh fest.</p><p>The success is followed by memes, merchandise and knock-offs. One “ugly-cute” cow plush moved over 8,000 units in a single day on a Douyin livestream. The whole machine spun up within days, and licensing deals lined up, seeping into the stock market. The name itself, ‘bull is coming’, read like an omen to the distressed investor. Driven by meme-fueled frenzy, it prompted the retail investors to buy tickets for luck and to chase bull-named stock. Shares of several companies with the Chinese character for “cow” or “bull” in their names rose as the film went viral, though there was no evidence that the movie had affected their businesses.</p><p>The speculation became prominent enough for a journal operated by the People’s Bank of China to warn investors against treating the film as a market signal.</p><p>The rising phenomenon of Niu Lai will run its season, with everyone queued in to encash the success of the amateurish creation. I have booked the tickets to watch it with my son, to convince him that mother-son duo can make a great team.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=50e6728824c0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Ghalib, Kifayat and AI : The Road to Token Optimization]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075/ghalib-kifayat-and-ai-the-road-to-token-optimization-1dca685e4fec?source=rss-dbdb1ae62605------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1dca685e4fec</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sustainability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[optimization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ai]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[token]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[poetry]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Madhulika Ra Chauhan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 16 Aug 2026 20:36:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-16T20:36:01.533Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/400/0*W6Xyq84lvPLR65x_" /><figcaption>Source : Tribune India</figcaption></figure><p>“Ghalib was <em>kifayati</em>.”</p><p>“Ghalib used to edit his own poems and often rejected the works he did not like,” Gulzar, a celebrated Indian poet and lyricist, said while talking about the 19th century poet Mirza Ghalib, known for his eclectic poetry.</p><p>The word he used to describe Ghalib was ‘<em>kifayati’ (ki-faa-ya-ti)</em>, a person who practices <em>kifayat</em>, loosely translated as “frugal,” or for the sake of simplicity, “optimal.” Ghalib was the master of word frugality. He had developed the discipline of conveying a lot more with fewer words. The same discipline, in today’s AI world, translates to <strong>token optimization.</strong></p><p><strong>In the AI World, Each Word Counts</strong></p><p>Token optimization is the new determinant of efficient use, as the way you query is directly linked to cost. Before we understand token consumption, or optimization let’s first understand what a token is and how it works.</p><p>A <strong>token </strong>is <em>not</em> a word, or a character. It’s a chunk of text that a model (LLM) has learned to treat as a single unit. It sits somewhere between a syllable and a word in length. The model never sees letters or words. It sees a stream of integer IDs, each representing one of these chunks.</p><p>Let’s take a simple example :</p><p>If you query :</p><p>The customer’s mortgage interest rate was declined.</p><p>In tokens it will look something like this:</p><p>The ·cust om er’s ·mort ga ge ·inte res t ·rate ·was ·decl ·ined ·</p><p>Notice a few things:</p><ul><li>Common short words like “the” or “was” are usually one token.</li><li>Longer or rarer words get split — “mortgage” might become mort + ga + ge.</li><li>Spaces are often attached to the following word, not left floating on their own. Numbers and punctuation are usually their own tokens.</li></ul><p>Tokens are built through a training process called <strong>Byte-Pair Encoding (BPE)</strong>. It starts with individual characters, then repeatedly merges the most common adjacent pairs into a single token until it has a vocabulary of about 100,000 entries. The result is a vocabulary where common English words are single tokens, common word-parts are tokens, and rare or technical strings get fragmented into smaller pieces. Code, numbers, and non-Latin languages require more tokens per character of information than common English prose.</p><p>Every token that enters the model’s context costs compute, in and out. This is why systems handling millions of queries a day are not just chasing accuracy, they are chasing <em>kifayat</em>. Call it, if you like, ROTI: return on token investment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vkKA84hGkX8mLHXzEEoihw.png" /><figcaption>Source : Implicator.ai</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Packing the Bag</strong></p><p>Your context window is a carry-on bag with a fixed size limit. Before every flight (<strong>every query</strong>), you pack your non-negotiable travel documents (<strong>the system prompt</strong>) which take up a fixed corner of the bag. Then you pack for the trip itself: a weekend trip (<strong>customer chat</strong>) needs a smaller bag than a month-long road trip (<strong>compliance review</strong>). Your saved receipts from previous trips (<strong>conversation history</strong>) help you plan better, but as you add more trips, you start discarding the old ones. And if you like some last-minute duty-free shopping, you’d need the empty space (<strong>output reservation )</strong> you have to leave room for, or you won’t get anything back.</p><p>The <strong>context engine</strong> is the expert packer, the one who knows exactly what to fold, what to leave behind, and how to make everything fit without forgetting the thing you’ll actually need. It is the machine equivalent of reading a long letter in installments, because you cannot hold the whole thing in your hand at once.</p><p>Ghalib’s frugality was a discipline he chose and learnt as a mark of craft. Ours need to become a discipline we cannot and should not avoid. Every word he never wasted was a pleasure delivered to the reader. Every token a data center burns though is a causing a burden on the planet’s resources.</p><p><strong>Why Being Kifayati Is the Need of the AI Hour</strong></p><p>The push for token efficiency isn’t <em>only</em> about corporate budgets, it’s about the hidden cost of natural resources. Every time you ask an AI chatbot for a recipe, summarize an article, or draft a report, a cluster of GPUs in a data center draws power from the grid, generates heat that must be cooled with water, and produces emissions tied to whatever fuel mix supplies that grid. A single query seems trivial, but the cumulative weight of billions of daily AI interactions worldwide is anything but.</p><p>When Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo defeated Lee Sedol, the human Go champion, 4–1, it was an impressive feat of technology and a quietly damning one. During the match, AlphaGo consumed a staggering 200,000 watts of electricity. Lee Sedol’s brain used 13.</p><p>Globally, ChatGPT is estimated to use around 39.16 million gallons of water a day, roughly the equivalent of everyone in Taiwan flushing a toilet at once. Over a year, that’s enough to fill the Central Park Reservoir seven times over.</p><p>Ghalib never measured his word-economy in watts or gallons. But the instinct Gulzar referred to as <em>kifayat</em> meant that each chosen word was precious, that every added word displaced another. It is the same instinct now being forced on machines that don’t yet know how to want it.</p><p>A normal letter might say:</p><blockquote>“I would like to inform you that the meeting which was scheduled for tomorrow morning has unfortunately been cancelled due to unforeseen circumstances.”</blockquote><p>The same information, optimised for cost:</p><blockquote>“Meeting tomorrow cancelled.”</blockquote><p>Same meaning. 22 words vs. 3. Token efficiency is exactly this discipline. <strong>Getting the maximum meaning into the minimum number of tokens.</strong> Ghalib cared about elegance and formality, AI doesn&#39;t. It cares about tokens used.</p><p><strong>When Less Is More</strong></p><p>Ghalib never had to think about ceilings like these. But he understood something engineers are only now rediscovering, that the discipline of leaving things out is not a limitation on expression, it <em>is</em> the expression. As Ghalib said:</p><p>haiñ aur bhī duniyā meñ suḳhan-var bahut achchhe<br>kahte haiñ ki ‘ġhālib’ kā hai andāz-e-bayāñ aur</p><p>there are in the world even/also more very good poets/wordsmiths<br>they say that Ghalib’s is a style of expression [that is] other/more</p><p>Gulzar called it <em>kifayat</em>. We call it token optimization. The instinct is the same, just dressed differently.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1dca685e4fec" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Robotics in China: The Story of Bionic Companions(Part-2)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075/robotics-in-china-the-story-of-bionic-companions-part-2-94a95d4e440a?source=rss-dbdb1ae62605------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/94a95d4e440a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[mental-health]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[loneliness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[robotics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bionic]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Madhulika Ra Chauhan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 02 Aug 2026 22:16:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-02T22:16:01.334Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fc05DYaH-QDKQf6qoARFHg.png" /><figcaption>Image Source : CNA News</figcaption></figure><p>What happens when companionship is sold as a product? A product which offers to listen to you with empathy, remembers the last conversation, and gets accustomed to you over time and it’s not virtual, it seems real. Well almost !</p><p>In the month of June, UBTECH Robotics, had opened presales for the U1, a full-size humanoid from its UWORLD consumer brand. The interesting part : it is sold as an emotional companion rather than a household worker.</p><ul><li>June 2: presale opens on JD.com, 3,000 yuan deposit</li><li>June 9 (day 8): passes 3,000 reservations</li><li>~June 12 (day 10): near 4,000 reservations, 10M+ yuan in deposits</li><li>June 21: passes 5,000</li><li>June 30 (launch day, Shenzhen event): 13,361 total orders</li></ul><p>That does not prove a consumer robotics revolution is here but that first home humanoids are being sold for companionship over utility.</p><h4>An Adult first loneliness companion, not a housekeeper</h4><p>UBTECH began the U1 presale on JD.com on June 2, with a formal product debut scheduled for June 30. The reservation requires a 3,000 yuan deposit, about US$440, and the first deliveries are expected no later than Sept. 15.</p><p>While UBTECH’s material describes an emotional AI model, local encrypted memory storage, and appearance customization, translating into a machine which is meant to talk, remember, move its head, blink, and create the feeling that it knows the person in front of it. Is that useful, strange, or both? For many buyers, that may be exactly the point.</p><p><strong>Rise of the Friction-free Relationships</strong></p><p>The humanoid robot on sale has one stated purpose: to keep you company. The voice is soft, its designed to detect tiredness or stress. If it detects a change in tone, it softens further. It reminds you to take your keys and remembers what you tell it. It is built for presence, more customized overtime as it learns about you. More data, more sophistication.</p><p>By launch day, 13,361 U1s had been pre-ordered. The entry model runs at about US$16,600 and the top tier model closer to US$140,000, and UBTECH is selling it to adults for a single purpose: emotional companionship to fulfill a real need — loneliness.</p><p>A human relationship also learns about you over time and is bound to have some friction which ultimately leads to a developed depth, and growth in a relationship, here the bionic companion is specifically built to avoid conflict and stroke your ego in the process. It can certainly seem like it understands you better through a friction-free interaction. Even though this might seem like a stretch, human beings are more likely to opt for a friction-free relationship.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VHk3YM5K-GBjt36meiE_Pw.png" /><figcaption>Source : Cartoon Stock by Tom Williams</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The Loneliness Economy</strong></p><p>A 2025 report from the WHO Commission on Social Connection found that roughly one in six people worldwide experience persistent loneliness, a condition the commission linked to an estimated 871,000 deaths every year — about 100 an hour.</p><p>The commission’s co-chairs, including former U.S. Surgeon General Vivek Murthy, equated loneliness to other major public health risks like tobacco use, with costs that ripple outward into healthcare systems, workplaces, and schools. Cigna’s research on workplace loneliness puts the economic cost at $154 billion a year in stress-related absenteeism and turnover in US, a figure which is cited as high as $406 billion when broader productivity losses are folded in.</p><p>According to a Business Research Insights report, the global AI Companion market is valued at US$501.01 billion in 2026 and steadily progressing to US$972.16 billion by 2035 with a CAGR of 36.6% from 2026 to 2035.</p><p><strong>The China Market</strong></p><p>UBTECH’s mission is to bring intelligent robots into every family, and making everyday life more convenient and intelligent. Established in 2012 and listed on the HKSE (Hong Kong stock exchange) the company is trying to deliver on its promise. The stock markets responded to the booking number with enthusiasm, the UBTECH’s stock reportedly closed up over 7% the day before the June 30 launch, with a cumulative two-day gain near 15%.</p><p>The first time buyers of U1 are people aged 35 to 55, urban, high income, and living alone. This is the first generation raised on the internet and the mobile phone. The very devices that quietly thinned out their social life, are queuing up for the technology to patch it.</p><p>According to Reuters report, China’s emotional-companionship market is on track to grow from about US$530 million in 2025 to US$8.2 billion by 2028. That is roughly fifteen times bigger in three years.</p><p>A growing loneliness crisis in China has fueled the rapid rise of a new industry: paid companionship. From hiring someone to chat over coffee to virtual emotional support services, more people are turning to companionship platforms to combat isolation in fast-paced urban life.</p><p>Changing social habits, delayed marriage trends, and the pressures of modern living, the phenomenon is reshaping how many people seek connection in the digital age.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8IOE3-nmwpGc5cvLNeSPMw.png" /><figcaption>Source : Cartoon Stock by Randy McIlwaine</figcaption></figure><p>What was even more interesting was as that as part of the June 30 launch, UBTECH announced a “Human-Robot Companionship Initiative” — a plan to donate 100 customized U1 units in 2026 to support mental well-being programs. The said units incorporate 3D facial reconstruction and voiceprint-based identity replication, meaning the robot can be built to recreate the likeness and voice of a specific, designated person.</p><p>UBTECH frames this as pairing “emotion-driven interaction models” with dedicated long-term memory systems and multimodal situational awareness, positioning the donated units as structured psychological support tools rather than generic companions.</p><p>As of now, emotional value can be put in a shopping cart, with a price and a delivered on a date in September. Loneliness is now a market, and China has just built the most literal version of it.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=94a95d4e440a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Low Flight : The Gig Worker’s Words take a Literary Flight]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@madhulikarachauhan_37075/low-flight-the-gig-workers-words-take-a-literary-flight-721a8f1fd24e?source=rss-dbdb1ae62605------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/721a8f1fd24e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[wang-jibing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[low-flight]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[literary-awards]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gig-economy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Madhulika Ra Chauhan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 06:11:40 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-07-30T06:11:40.324Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BklQtKfEgghzRIi0q0JTVQ.png" /><figcaption>Wang Jibing Source : China Minutes</figcaption></figure><p>The literary world is abuzz with the <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c5ydr3xd0kvo">news</a> of Wang Jibing, a blue collared delivery rider, from China who bagged the Lu Xun Literary Prize, named after a writer who has been referred to as the father of modern Chinese literature.</p><p>Wang’s win feels like the win of the shining human spirit covered in ashes, much like a diamond hidden in the coal mine. His win shouts out loud like an anomaly in a world driven by eloquent erudition, pageantry and must I say heaviness of class. The entry of the blue-collared rider seems like a page out of proverbial fiction, largely unfathomable and that’s precisely the reason why it stands out.</p><p>Wang is not alone in his quest to be a part of this new wave of New workers’ literature is a new type of proletarian literature that has emerged in China since 2000, taking the working class as its creative object.</p><p>He is part of a growing group of blue-collar workers who are being celebrated for their literary works, which offer a glimpse into the pressures that they face in China’s massive gig economy.</p><h3>The Fact of the Win</h3><p>Wang Jibing is 56, from Kunshan, in China’s Jiangsu province. He began writing as a young man in 1988. It took decades and a detour through farm work and then, at nearly 50, food delivery before literature found him an audience. On July 15, 2026, he won the poetry category of the 9th Lu Xun Literary Prize for his collection <em>Low Flight</em>, an award historically reserved for career writers, critics, and academics. He has written more than 6,000 poems while riding, drawing on conversations with more than 140 fellow riders and dozens of questionnaire responses gathered along his routes.</p><p>His breakout moment came in 2022, when a poem titled “Man in a Hurry” went viral. A work, he confessed, was inspired by a real, maddening 2019 delivery. Hours lost chasing a wrong address a customer had entered. In those moments of maddening frustration he turned to words for succor, and those very words became his armor.</p><p>In 2023 he published his first collection under the same title, <em>Man in a Hurry: Poems of a Food Delivery Rider</em>. <em>Low Flight</em> followed as his most recent and most decorated work.</p><p><strong>Low Flight</strong></p><p>Translated from Mandarin by <a href="https://thebaffler.com/authors/chen-du">Chen Du</a> &amp; <a href="https://thebaffler.com/authors/xisheng-chen">Xisheng Chen</a></p><p><strong><em>Who prescribes that with wings spread one must fly high</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>Low flight is also a flight</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>With wind rustling like birds’ chirps</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>And wheels speeding like shooting stars</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>The meal delivery note attached to a takeout</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>In clear black and white symbolizes urgency</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>Like a legal document and a magic incantation</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>From the three hundred and sixty industries</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>Rushes out a new career</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>And from the twenty-four solar terms</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>One for deliverymen</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>A time cruncher catches sixty-one minutes from an hour</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>And delivers tenderness racing against time</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>They pave the second and minute hands on the road</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>Like a well-arranged black-and-white keyboard</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>Who can say highbrow songs must find few singers</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>The sound low on the ground</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>Is the symphony for all things striving upward</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>If there’s a fifth season in the human world</em></strong></p><p><strong><em>It must be spring for deliverymen</em></strong></p><p>Wang takes the ordinary props of gig work: the meal note, the fleeting time and transforms them into imagery without irony, into something worth singing. His central question needs no answer: who says that to fly with wings spread, one must fly high?</p><h3><strong>The Rise of the Proletarian literature</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ECGTx4iSYMnBFTcRcR5D6A.png" /><figcaption>Wang Jibing : Source : The Print.in</figcaption></figure><p>Wang is not writing alone. He belongs to a growing wave of blue-collar authors, many of them migrant workers who left the countryside for the cities, now being read and awarded for capturing the pressures of China’s massive gig economy from the inside. Critics call this body of work <em>new workers’ literature</em>, a strand of proletarian writing that has emerged in China since 2000, taking the working class itself as its subject.</p><p>Compared to earlier proletarian literature, this new wave has two distinctive features.</p><ul><li>First, the writing is experiential rather than an outside observation</li><li>Second, it has largely set aside the old theme of working-class liberation, splitting instead into two different consciousnesses: one that dwells in the cruelty and despair of life at the bottom, and one that insists, against the evidence, on defending the dignity of that life.</li></ul><p>Wang belongs to the second camp. His work defends and at times gently romanticizes the everyday deluge of the delivery rider’s day. There is sadness in it, but it is sadness carried with a touch of traditional Chinese Buddhist thought that offers a utopian vision of class relations.</p><h3>The Poems Riding Outside the Border</h3><p>The reach of Wang’s work hasn’t stopped at China’s borders. His poem ‘At Three in the Afternoon’, which captures a rare pocket of stillness in a rider’s demanding day, was translated into Italian by Martina Benigni, a doctoral student in Asian and African civilizations at Sapienza University of Rome, and published in the magazine <em>Internazionale</em>.</p><p>In March 2026, the Italian Federation of Writers hosted a public dialogue in Rome built around the poem’s journey. His poems have now been translated into several languages and published in five countries. A rider’s-lived words read in rooms far from the lanes they emerged in.</p><p>There’s a temptation to make Wang into a symbol, a proof that talent finds a way, that class is porous, that literature is a great leveler. Having spent almost two decades in China, I have encountered many an artists, philosophers and musicians who practice art as a way to find harmony, and not to make a statement. Wang is part of that community and by his own account he seems uninterested in wearing that costume.</p><p>The prize hasn’t changed who he is. The deliveries still need to go out on time. What he has done instead is taken the vocabulary of his own raw fragility and made it sing in a note the literary establishment couldn’t ignore. If there’s a fifth season in the human world, he’s already claimed it for deliverymen.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=721a8f1fd24e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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