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    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mahmoud Soheem on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Mahmoud Soheem on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@mahmoudsoheem?source=rss-28d33d6f4fd2------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Mahmoud Soheem on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mahmoudsoheem?source=rss-28d33d6f4fd2------2</link>
        </image>
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 21:50:41 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Getting Started with The DFiR Galaxy Workstation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mahmoudsoheem/getting-started-with-the-dfir-galaxy-workstation-7f4b56bfbe1e?source=rss-28d33d6f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7f4b56bfbe1e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mahmoud Soheem]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2025 15:12:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-11-10T13:50:12.479Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Download Link v1.2: <a href="https://1024terabox.com/s/1a0J5uOpxptTSb175sqCxnw">https://1024terabox.com/s/1a0J5uOpxptTSb175sqCxnw</a></p><p>Github Repo for Config files: <a href="https://github.com/msoheem/DFiR-Galaxy-Workstation/tree/main">https://github.com/msoheem/DFiR-Galaxy-Workstation/tree/main</a></p><blockquote><strong><em>Important Note: </em></strong><em>I have found some unexpected behavior with the below</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>1. Windows Explorer limits submenus in the context menu to around 13 visible items. To make all tools accessible, ForensicsTools_v2.reg introduces a reorganized structure. I have updated the VM and uploaded the new one. If you have the old version of the context menu that do not show all tools, can download it from github repo.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>2. Errors with some Python tools</em></blockquote><blockquote>I am sorry for that but if anyone have found one of the above errors please download the latest version<strong> “Folder Name: DfirGalaxyWorkstation_v1.2”</strong></blockquote><h3>1. Boot and Login</h3><ul><li>Once you have booted the VM use the below credentials to login</li><li>Username: Administrator</li><li>Password: dfir4ever</li></ul><h3>2. Desktop Overview</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WKM5OyJm8zeU0PArr0Ar-g.png" /></figure><p>The <strong>DFIR Galaxy desktop</strong> is designed for quick and convenient access to your tools, resources, and cheat sheets:</p><ul><li><strong>Tools Bar</strong> — Provides immediate access to your primary toolkit, useful investigative websites, and a collection of DFIR regular expressions for rapid analysis.</li><li><strong>Tools Folder</strong> — Contains shortcuts to additional tools not included in the Tools Bar, along with a <strong>Cheat Sheets</strong> folder. All cheat sheets are also accessible from the Favorites in the Edge browser for easy reference.</li></ul><p>This layout ensures that essential tools, references, and connectivity utilities are always readily accessible, improving workflow efficiency for DFIR practitioners.</p><h3>3. Add Evidence</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/756/1*_JiidnUjcvbyKLZFzi8qOA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WnI2K4D2OggOqzbABNJB9Q.png" /></figure><p>The “Cases” tab allows you to create a new evidence name, which performs two key functions:</p><ul><li>It automatically creates a subfolder structure in C:\\Cases\\Analysis, with subfolders for each evidence category.</li><li>It sets the EvidenceName environment variable, ensuring all tools launched from the context menu redirect their output to this new folder.</li></ul><blockquote><em>Note: For your convenience, the “Dissect” plugin is available in the forensics tools context menu to quickly retrieve the evidence name.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>Right-click on the evidence folder → select </em><strong><em>Forensics Tools for Folders</em></strong><em> → Choose </em><strong><em>Parse with Dissect</em></strong><em> → Run </em><strong><em>osinfo Plugin</em></strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KfUsk5Wglth6IUUDWoLKUQ.png" /></figure><h3>4. Start investigation</h3><p>You can start your investigation by creating a super timeline. A helper script for this is available using <strong>Plaso</strong>.</p><p>First, create a filesystem timeline with <strong>MFTECmd</strong>:</p><ol><li>Navigate to the $MFT file.</li><li>Right-click the file and select <strong>Parse with MFTECmd</strong>.</li></ol><ul><li>This will run MFTECmd against the $MFT file, creating CSV and body files. The output will be redirected to C:\\Cases\\Analysis\\%EvidenceName%\\Filesystem.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TJw5gnhyr76PBPtCmK9UuQ.png" /></figure><p>Next, create the super timeline:</p><ol><li>From the <strong>WindowsForensicsTools</strong> tab, select <strong>Plaso Helper</strong>.</li><li>Enter the required parameters when prompted to create the super timeline.</li></ol><ul><li>Once complete, the Plaso super timeline database will be in C:\\Cases\\Analysis\\%EvidenceName%\\Filesystem.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Fs26H9m8HYv_lnFjeVl71A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*spMh0XIrQo9cQPrb0eZa7w.png" /></figure><p>You can easily add the filesystem body file to the database with a single right-click on the body file. Additionally, you can filter the Plaso database by a specific time range by right-clicking the .plaso database.</p><ul><li>Add body file to plaso database</li><li>Run psort against a plaso database</li><li>Run cdqr.exe against a plaso database</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/935/1*zwQ30ffCX0nFyPLKdwFLbA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/923/1*TZj3GFfgy2c67JC98RWrsQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zo-BAdSrMoLNOZi19gh4VA.png" /></figure><p>Then you can copy Plaso directory from using the toolbar</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/728/1*js_gMswJx84Jl8mxCtiBYw.png" /></figure><h3>5. Parse specific artifact</h3><p>To parse a specific artifact, simply use the context menu. For example, you can right-click a Prefetch file and select the option to parse it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_MmobBYCmwpda6HGaDpnnw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A38FYrXREYOijj1tsKbQSg.png" /></figure><h3>Notes about the VM</h3><p><strong>Python and Virtual Environment</strong></p><p>Please note that each Python tool has its own virtual environment to prevent dependency conflicts. To run a tool, you have two options:</p><ol><li><strong>Activate the virtual environment</strong> by running:C:\\ForensicPrograms\\DriveFS-Sleuth-1.2.1&gt;.\\venv\\Scripts\\activate.bat (venv) C:\\ForensicPrograms\\DriveFS-Sleuth-1.2.1&gt;python drivefs_sleuth.py</li><li><strong>Call the Python executable directly</strong> from within the virtual environment:C:\\ForensicPrograms\\DriveFS-Sleuth-1.2.1&gt;.\\venv\\Scripts\\python.exe drivefs_sleuth.py</li></ol><p><strong>Plaso is a special case.</strong> Each of its tools is compiled into a standalone .exe. To use a Plaso tool, simply run its executable directly from the virtual environment folder:</p><pre>C:\\ForensicPrograms\\plaso-main&gt;.\\venv\\Scripts\\log2timeline.exe --version</pre><p><strong>DFIR_Toolbar Cleanup Notice</strong></p><p>The <strong>DFIR_Toolbar</strong>, an open-source Python tool packaged as an executable via PyInstaller, creates a persistent issue with temporary files.</p><p>When the dfir_tool.exe runs, it unpacks its contents into a temporary folder (%AppData%\\Temp\\_MEIxxxxx). Because the toolbar does not shut down normally, Windows fails to delete this temporary folder upon exit. Every subsequent execution creates a <strong>new, temp folder</strong>, leading to a large accumulation of obsolete data in your %Temp% directory.</p><p><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Manually delete the older _MEIxxxxx folders from %AppData%\\Temp periodically to manage disk space.</p><blockquote><em>Note that the VM does not have a Windows license. You will need to add your own license.</em></blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7f4b56bfbe1e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[DFiR Galaxy Workstation: A Swiss army knife for DFIR Investigations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mahmoudsoheem/dfir-galaxy-workstation-a-swiss-army-knife-for-dfir-investigations-979d888d024b?source=rss-28d33d6f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/979d888d024b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mahmoud Soheem]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2025 15:12:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-13T15:12:14.262Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Overview</h3><p>A <strong>Windows VM pre-configured with</strong> a comprehensive set of tools required for digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) investigations. It comes with built-in automation to simplify repetitive tasks — allowing you to parse artifacts with a single click, without needing to recall complex tool arguments.</p><h3>Capabilities</h3><p>The DFIR Windows VM supports a wide range of forensic and incident response activities, including:</p><ul><li>Windows artifact parsing and analysis</li><li>Data recovery</li><li>Database examination</li><li>Memory forensics</li><li>Timeline generation and analysis</li><li>Browser forensics</li><li>Email parsing and analysis</li></ul><h3>Windows Explorer Context Menu Integration</h3><p>The VM provides a Windows Explorer <strong>right-click context menu</strong> with preconfigured tools for artifacts, folders, and disk images, allowing you to run powerful parsing and analysis commands without remembering tool parameters. Available actions include:</p><ul><li><strong>Dissect plugins</strong> — Collect initial image information</li><li><strong>Chainsaw</strong> — Hunt for threats in Windows Event Logs</li><li><strong>KAPE</strong> — Rapid artifact parsing</li><li><strong>Evilize Evtx</strong> — Event log analysis</li><li><strong>Hayabusa</strong> — Fast Windows Event Log threat hunting</li><li><strong>RBCmd</strong> — Parse Recycle Bin artifacts</li><li><strong>SBECmd</strong> — Parse ShellBags</li><li><strong>SrumECmd</strong> — Parse SRUM database</li><li><strong>LECmd</strong> — Parse LNK files</li><li><strong>PECmd</strong> — Parse Prefetch files</li><li><strong>Jumplist Parser</strong> — Extract and analyze Jump Lists</li><li><strong>AmcacheParser / AppCompatCacheParser</strong> — Parse Amcache and Shimcache artifacts</li><li><strong>Loki</strong> — Indicator-based malware scanning</li><li><strong>HxD</strong> — Open files or images in a hex editor</li><li><strong>Exiftool</strong> — Extract metadata from files</li><li><strong>MemProcFS</strong> — Mount memory images as a filesystem</li><li><strong>MFTECmd</strong> — Parse $MFT and $J (USN Journal)</li><li><strong>mactime</strong> — Generate timelines from body files</li><li><strong>bmc-tools</strong> — Parse RDP bitmap cache</li><li><strong>amcache_evilhunter</strong> — Parse amcache database and provide some insights.</li><li><strong>cdqr</strong> — Parse Plaso database</li></ul><h3>Timeline Automation</h3><p>The VM includes <strong>helper scripts</strong> to streamline the creation and management of supertimeline using Plaso (log2timeline). Context menu integration allows you to perform common timeline operations directly from Windows Explorer:</p><ul><li><strong>Add MFT body files</strong>: Right-click on .body files to import them into a Plaso database.</li><li><strong>Filter and query Plaso databases</strong>: Right-click on .plaso files to run psort and extract specific timeline data.</li></ul><p>These automation features simplify timeline generation and analysis, reducing manual command-line tasks and accelerating forensic investigations.</p><h3>System Requirements</h3><p><strong>Host Operating System:</strong> Windows, Linux, or macOS (with virtualization support)</p><p><strong>Virtualization Platform:</strong> VMware Workstation / Fusion, VirtualBox, or Hyper-V</p><p><strong>Minimum Specifications:</strong></p><ul><li>CPU: 4 cores</li><li>RAM: 8 GB</li><li>Storage: 100 GB free disk space</li></ul><p><strong>Recommended Specifications:</strong></p><ul><li>CPU: 8 cores</li><li>RAM: 16 GB or more</li><li>Storage: 200 GB free disk space SSD</li></ul><h3>Included Tools</h3><p>The VM comes preloaded with commonly used open-source forensic and incident response utilities, covering areas such as:</p><ul><li><strong>Artifact parsing</strong> (registry, event logs, prefetch, SRUM, AmCache, etc.)</li><li><strong>Memory analysis frameworks</strong> (e.g., volatility-based tools)</li><li><strong>File system and data recovery</strong> utilities</li><li><strong>Database viewers and query utilities</strong></li><li><strong>Timeline creation and correlation</strong> tools</li><li><strong>Browser history and cache analysis</strong> utilities</li><li><strong>Email examination and parsing</strong> tools</li></ul><blockquote><em>Note: A full list of included tools is available in the Available Tools Page.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>This VM inspired by the awesome work of SANS SIFT Workstation</em></blockquote><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=979d888d024b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Available Tools in DFiR Galaxy Workstation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mahmoudsoheem/available-tools-in-dfir-galaxy-workstation-b92112a05577?source=rss-28d33d6f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b92112a05577</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mahmoud Soheem]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Oct 2025 15:12:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-10-13T15:12:13.945Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>All DFIR Tools installed in folder C:\\ForensicPrograms</p><h3>Forensics Tools</h3><ul><li>4n6 Outlook Forensics Wizard</li><li>AccessData</li><li>FTK Imager</li><li>Registry Viewer</li><li>Agent Ransack</li><li>ANJP</li><li>Arsenal-Image-Mounter-v3.11.307</li><li>Autopsy-4.22.1</li><li>bitsparser (background intelligence transfer parser by Fireeye)</li><li>bmc-tools-master</li><li>bulk_extractor-2.0.0-windows</li><li>Chainsaw</li><li>CoolUtils Mail Viewer</li><li>CoolUtils MBox Viewer</li><li>CoolUtils PCL Viewer</li><li>CyberChef_v10.19.4</li><li>CyLR_win-x64</li><li>DB Browser for SQLite</li><li>DCode v5</li><li>DFIR_Toolbar</li><li>DidierstevensSuite</li><li>DriveFS-Sleuth-1.2.1</li><li>eedh (Elcomsoft Encrypted Disk Hunter)</li><li>Event Log Explorer</li><li>Evilize-Local-LogParser</li><li>exiftool-13.33_64</li><li>EZTools</li><li>hayabusa-3.5.0-win-x64</li><li>HxD</li><li>jschicht</li><li>ExtractAllAttributes-master</li><li>ExtractFromDataRun-master</li><li>ExtractUsnJrnl-master</li><li>GetProcAddressGUI-master</li><li>HexDump-master</li><li>Indx2Csv-master</li><li>IndxCarver-master</li><li>LogFileParser_v2.0.0.53</li><li>Mft2Csv_v2.0.0.51</li><li>MftCarver-master</li><li>PowerMft-master</li><li>RawCopy_v1.0.0.19_.Win2000</li><li>SetRegTime-master</li><li>UsnJrnl2Csv_v1.0.0.24</li><li>UsnJrnlCarver-master</li><li>Kernel OST Viewer</li><li>keydet89</li><li>bodyfile.exe</li><li>destlist.exe</li><li>evtparse.exe</li><li>evtxparse.exe</li><li>ftkparse.exe</li><li>idx.exe</li><li>jl.exe</li><li>lfle.exe</li><li>lnk.exe</li><li>LogParser.exe</li><li>mft2.exe</li><li>parse.exe</li><li>parseie.exe</li><li>pcaparse.exe</li><li>pie.exe</li><li>pref.exe</li><li>rawie.exe</li><li>recbin.exe</li><li>regslack.exe</li><li>regtime.exe</li><li>tln.exe</li><li>usnj.exe</li><li>wevtx.bat</li><li>loki</li><li>LPSV2.D1 (Log Parser Studio)</li><li>MagnetResponse</li><li>Mandiant FindEvil_v0_1</li><li>Mandiant IOCe</li><li>MemProcFS</li><li>MiTeC</li><li>EHB</li><li>EXE</li><li>HEXEdit</li><li>IHB</li><li>IMHB</li><li>JSONView</li><li>MailView</li><li>OLExp</li><li>PDE</li><li>SQLiteQ</li><li>SSView</li><li>WFA</li><li>WRR</li><li>XMLView</li><li>NirSoft</li><li>ODE (OneDriveExplorer)</li><li>PdbXtract</li><li>pestudio</li><li>PhotoRec-testdisk-7.3-WIP</li><li>plaso-main (Compiled for Windows)</li><li>Printer Spool File</li><li>Quickhash-GUI-Windows-v3.3.4</li><li>RdpCacheStitcher_Windows_x64</li><li>Redline</li><li>RegRipper3.0-master</li><li>saminside</li><li>ShadowExplorer</li><li>sleuthkit-4.14.0-win32</li><li>sqlite-dissect</li><li>Stellar Data Recovery</li><li>Stellar Photo Recovery</li><li>SysinternalsSuite</li><li>tapir</li><li>Teams-artifacts-parser-main</li><li>thumbcache_viewer_64</li><li>thumbs_viewer_64</li><li>TZWorks</li><li>USB-Detective</li><li>UsbTreeView_x64</li><li>volatility3-develop</li><li>WinHex</li><li>WiresharkPortable64</li><li>Woanware</li><li>autorunner.v0.0.16</li><li>csv2xlsx.v1.0.0</li><li>LogViewer2.v1.0.0</li><li>SessionViewer.v1.1.0</li><li>usbdeviceforensics.v0.0.3.windows</li><li>WMI_Forensics-master</li><li>zircolite_win</li><li>XstReader</li><li>yara-master-v4.5.4-win64</li><li>amcache_evilhunter.exe</li><li>cdqr.exe</li><li>Converter.exe</li><li>diskcat64.exe</li><li>eml_process.exe</li><li>FIV.exe</li><li>ForensicCopy.exe</li><li>hindsight_gui.exe</li><li>MFTView.1.1.0.exe</li><li>srum_dump.exe</li><li>velociraptor.exe</li><li>WinSearchDBAnalyzer.exe</li><li>Dissect by Fox-IT</li></ul><h3>Compilers</h3><ul><li>Python 3.12</li><li>Perl</li></ul><h3>Editors</h3><ul><li>VSCode</li><li>Sublime</li><li>Notepad++</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b92112a05577" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Adobe Trust Manager Forensic Artifact]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mahmoudsoheem/adobe-trust-manager-forensic-artifact-11f6b7933ff0?source=rss-28d33d6f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/11f6b7933ff0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[open-source]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensic-tools]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mahmoud Soheem]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2025 14:08:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-09-25T14:08:06.265Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you click a link on a PDF file opened with Adobe Reader, Adobe will prompt you to allow or block access to the website. This prompt appears if the user has configured Adobe to ask for permission every time. By default, there is a checkbox checked to save your choice.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CVUnuz8MiPpnjtXGuM0RCg.png" /></figure><p>Adobe trust manager in the background saves the website and your choice to allow or block in following registry key:</p><pre>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Adobe\\{*}\\DC\\TrustManager\\cDefaultLaunchURLPerms\\tHostPerms</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Th4_glU9FnJ2vr3UuoDFQA.png" /></figure><p>Thanks to Eric Zimmerman Registry Explorer tool, which supports plugin integration, I have developed the <strong>Adobe User Accessed websites</strong> plugin. This plugin parses a specific key and generates a table that displays the Website and User Choice. Additionally, with the Eric Zimmerman Adobe program information plugin, which offers insights into documents opened with the application, you will obtain comprehensive information regarding user activity on Adobe programs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y9RxHYOY2vYDBOsMhxWHdw.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=11f6b7933ff0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[New Digital Forensics Artifact from Windows Notepad]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mahmoudsoheem/new-digital-forensics-artifact-from-windows-notepad-527645906b7b?source=rss-28d33d6f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/527645906b7b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[windows]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[notepad]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[windows-11]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mahmoud Soheem]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Dec 2023 09:56:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-19T09:56:13.271Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Microsoft Windows Notepad has always been one of the key applications any Windows user uses for note taking even if you use another note taking application you will find yourself at some point clicking on the Windows logo key and searching for Notepad to take a single note. Recently I have noticed that Microsoft invested in developing Windows Notepad adding new features and improving the design. One of the features that caught my attention is saving the state of the session you open as Windows Notepad saves all the tabs when you close the program. Imagine that an attacker used RDP to connect to his target system and during the session, he opened Notepad to check the command he will use before typing it into the command prompt and then closed the program without noticing that it saved his notes. Therefore, I thought this could be a good new artifact for the digital forensics community that will provide evidence of user files and I started an analysis of Notepad behavior to find out where it saves those files.</p><p>I performed my test on Windows 11 with Windows Notepad updated to the latest version 11.2310.13.0. Opened Notepad and typed some text on multiple tabs.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/984/1*O8Nk9kGg_AbN-RKmIuYUGg.png" /></figure><p>Then I closed the program and opened Sysinternals Process Explorer after that I opened Notepad again and observed the open handles of the program searching for file handles.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/979/1*z_Nr2sN3EdmkX_mKtiTZ9w.png" /></figure><p>I observed a folder named <strong>TabState</strong> which contains GUID-named binary files</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/531/1*nLBchkcABlCAEqUijHrq2A.png" /></figure><p>You also will notice that the folder “TabState” presents under user’s directory “C:\Users\<strong>ma7mo</strong>\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.WindowsNotepad_8wekyb3d8bbwe\LocalState”so you can tie these evidences to specific user.</p><p>Then I used strings.exe from Sysinternals and found that one of the GUID named binary files contains my Notepad tabs content.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/979/1*pQYLzm1NZGFsC0lhmqH8ug.png" /></figure><p>After some tests and observations, I found that each tab will have three files {GUID}.bin, {GUID}.0.bin, {GUID}.1.bin where {GUID}.bin is the actual tab content.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/979/1*8yOaQ8numuOBANi89dxPkg.png" /></figure><p>This feature can be disabled from Notepad Settings ⚙️ à change “When Notepad starts” option to “Open new window”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/829/1*qAQtH9IZGl82Wwc6kCNniA.png" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=527645906b7b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Forensic evidence of Opening Files without extraction with WinRAR]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mahmoudsoheem/forensic-evidence-of-opening-files-without-extraction-with-winrar-555d3c21f758?source=rss-28d33d6f4fd2------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/555d3c21f758</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[office]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[windows]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[winrar]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mahmoud Soheem]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Nov 2021 14:17:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-17T14:17:02.859Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From SANS great course FOR500 poster Windows Forensic Analysis | SANS Poster we know that as evidence of Folder/File opening can be found on multiple location such as:<br>• Open/Save MRU<br>• Recent Files<br>• Jump Lists<br>• Shell Bags<br>• Shortcut (LNK) Files<br>• Prefetch<br>• Last-Visited MRU<br>• IE/Edge file://<br>• Office Recent Files<br>So, we learnt that any office file opened with explorer will leave tracks behind it. However, I was working on analysis for opening files from WinRAR without extracting it and I found interesting facts that worth sharing.<br>Testing environment: <br>• OS Name: Microsoft Windows 10 Pro<br>• Version: 10.0.19043 Build 19043<br>Test:<br>I opened the archive “Browls.zip” which contains two office files excel and word “Tara.xlsx”, “Colt.docx”. Then I opened the two files without extracting the archive as depicted in the screenshots below. WinRAR created temporary folders with name “Rar$Dla” appended with random number for each file opened under “C:\%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\temp”. And under these folders WinRAR extracts the files. These folders are removed once WinRAR closed.</p><ul><li>After opening the word document</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/591/1*n7jpRI5oLvLH-EUxHLPVwg.png" /></figure><ul><li>After opening the excel spreadsheet</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/1*nN21Z19a9pnwwl0qwpK98Q.png" /></figure><ul><li>Before closing WinRAR</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/629/1*v1gyj2WtUz4UHPWl2TKaEA.png" /></figure><ul><li>After closing WinRAR</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/629/1*ledi437laVfYlaTivGx5Dw.png" /></figure><p>Analysis</p><p>I used SANS FOR500 poster evidence of type Folder/File opening.</p><ul><li>Open/Save MRU</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DUavS-kpyONfVkxg1d30Ag.png" /><figcaption>OpenSavePidMRU\docx key</figcaption></figure><ul><li>Recent Files</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WmeaC186t_4OsoYpyjGqBw.png" /></figure><ul><li>Shortcut (LNK) Files</li></ul><p>Used EricZemmerman Tool LECmd.exe</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1018/1*er5IkUu3fLUQWxRhWzMHIg.png" /><figcaption>C:\%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OTuAHISzhk5t88BloDEaYg.png" /><figcaption>C:\%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent</figcaption></figure><ul><li>Office Recent Files</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1018/1*YR-YwrDMjb2mLfjEHlVrLQ.png" /><figcaption>SOFTWARE\Mircrosoft\Office\16.0\excel\File MRU</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1022/1*iYDqqwO3teynl_c56Z9V6g.png" /><figcaption>SOFTWARE\Mircrosoft\Office\16.0\word\File MRU</figcaption></figure><ul><li>Jump Lists</li></ul><p>Used EricZemmerman Tool JLECmd.exe</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fG_-XQf_dd2ezvPVtcfiJA.png" /></figure><p>I also checked the behavior of WinRAR with ProcMon and ProcDOT</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*obWilzyqyUQxA9fNqOnfgA.png" /><figcaption>ProcDOT Graph of Process WinRAR while opening the two office files</figcaption></figure><p>The interesting part is that I didn’t find any evidences of file opening. And the only evidence of opening the files is under the temp folder mentioned above and it gets removed once WinRAR closed. So we Couldn’t proof that the files opened except if we recovered deleted files from temp folder but with modern system and the increasing use of SSDs with TRIM technology the chance is very low to retrieve deleted files.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=555d3c21f758" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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