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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Maíra Martini on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Maíra Martini on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@mairarmartini?source=rss-ac9e3d2cb672------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Maíra Martini on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[COVID-19: Perfect storm for the corrupt?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mairarmartini/covid-19-perfect-storm-for-the-corrupt-c42eb9dfc234?source=rss-ac9e3d2cb672------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money-laundering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pandemic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maíra Martini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2020 09:30:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-23T05:28:47.994Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>COVID-19: A perfect storm for the corrupt?</h3><h4><strong>New and old money laundering risks during the coronavirus pandemic</strong></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/634/1*Sgr33NYrxBYp60N3O5xfBw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by Lee Junda on <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/___Lnn9HGko">Unplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Around the world, governments are intensifying their efforts to combat the global spread of the coronavirus by enacting various measures to support public health systems, safeguard the economy and to ensure the safety of citizens.</p><p>At the same time, criminals have been quick to seize opportunities to exploit the crisis.</p><p>The European Banking Authority has <a href="https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/document_library/News%20and%20Press/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2020/EBA%20provides%20additional%20clarity%20on%20measures%20to%20mitigate%20the%20impact%20of%20COVID-19%20on%20the%20EU%20banking%20sector/Statement%20on%20actions%20to%20mitigate%20financial%20crime%20risks%20in%20the%20COVID-19%20pandemic.pdf">advised</a> that while most economies are facing a downturn and financial flows are likely to diminish, “experience from past crises suggests that in many cases, illicit finance will continue to flow.”</p><p>In the <strong>European Union</strong>, supervisory authorities in several countries have already alerted financial institutions to increased money laundering risks linked to the pandemic. They have warned of the ‘new’ modus operandi of opportunistic criminals who may take advantage of the crisis to make short-term gains. Europol’s <a href="https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/pandemic-profiteering-how-criminals-exploit-covid-19-crisis">initial analysis</a> of current developments shows an increase in cybercrime, fraud and trading of counterfeit goods.</p><p>In the <strong>United States</strong>, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/coronavirus">monitoring</a> new tendencies in financial crime during the COVID-19 crisis. Investment scams, product scams and insider trading have been identified as key emerging trends.</p><h4>No rest for the wicked</h4><p>But it is not only fraudsters and organised crime groups who could take advantage of the pandemic. Corrupt officials and businesses have the perfect combination in place:</p><p>· more opportunities for rent-seeking, as more domestic and foreign resources are made available to fight the pandemic;</p><p>· more discretion in decision-making and allocation of resources;</p><p>· less transparency and accountability mechanisms;</p><p>· limited supervision and enforcement.</p><p>Given the gaps and weaknesses in anti-money laundering systems of various countries, it is likely that corrupt individuals will continue to rely on existing mechanisms and networks to make bribe payments, as well as hide and launder the proceeds of corruption — particularly while they assume resources and attention are focused elsewhere.</p><h4><strong>Adjusting anti-money laundering practices in times of crisis</strong></h4><p>Due to the pandemic and lock-down, financial institutions are facing major operational challenges that could impact their ability to conduct checks and report suspicious transactions. Regulators from <a href="https://www.moneylaundering.com/legs_and_regs/austrac-plans-to-work-with-regulated-entities-on-aml-ctf-during-coronavirus-pandemic/"><strong>Australia</strong></a> to <strong>Canada </strong>have underscored their expectations that banks continue to meet their anti-money laundering obligations, in particular the <a href="https://www.moneylaundering.com/legs_and_regs/austrac-urges-banks-to-continue-submitting-high-quality-smrs-during-covid-19-pandemic/">monitoring </a>and reporting of suspicious transactions related to COVID-19. Meanwhile, supervision, r<a href="https://www.moneylaundering.com/legs_and_regs/austrac-extends-compliance-report-2019-deadline-due-to-covid-19-pandemic/">eporting deadlines</a> and due diligence <a href="https://www.moneylaundering.com/legs_and_regs/austrac-extends-compliance-report-2019-deadline-due-to-covid-19-pandemic/">requirements</a> have been relaxed.</p><p>In the <strong>Bahamas</strong>, for instance, the duties of <a href="https://www.moneylaundering.com/legs_and_regs/the-bahamas-suspends-certain-beneficial-ownership-act-duties/">financial institutions</a> under the Register of Beneficial Ownership Act 2018 have been temporarily suspended as a result of commerce-related restrictions triggered by COVID-19.</p><p>At the same time, national supervisors are <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/statement-covid-19.html">encouraged</a> to adjust supervisory practices in a pragmatic and risk-sensitive way. Some suggestions include, for example, postponing on-site examinations where not deemed essential, by making greater use of virtual meetings and inspections, and delaying reporting obligations. The Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) response to COVID-19 emphasises the importance of risk-based supervision at this moment to ensure authorities use their resources wisely.</p><p>The FATF also encouraged financial institutions and others to make use of technology, including Fintech (delivery of financial services), Regtech (complying with regulatory requirements) and Suptech (supervision of financial institutions) to the fullest extent possible. While this is understandable given the current circumstances, the risks in these sectors are still largely unknown to both financial institutions and supervisors. Additionally, mitigation strategies might not be in place in most countries. Therefore, a sudden shift in approach could entail additional risks and end up facilitating money laundering.</p><p>If these adjustments are not made with an astute appreciation of broader risks brought by the pandemic, it will be much more difficult to follow the money and hold the corrupt to account once the crisis is over.</p><h4><strong>Less information, less ability to detect crimes</strong></h4><p>In addition to reduced access to information from financial institutions and supervisory reviews, changes to reporting requirements by companies could have an impact on the ability of competent authorities, as well as activists and the media, to detect and uncover criminal activities during this time.</p><p>In the <strong>United Kingdom</strong>, for example, the deadline to <a href="https://www.devonshires.com/publications/companies-house-response-to-covid-19-extension-for-filing-accounts-and-same-day-service-suspended/">submit company annual accounts</a> to the company register has been extended.</p><h4><strong>Keeping resources where they belong</strong></h4><p>A <a href="http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/493201582052636710/pdf/Elite-Capture-of-Foreign-Aid-Evidence-from-Offshore-Bank-Accounts.pdf">recent paper</a> published by the World Bank suggests that previous aid disbursements have triggered significant money flows to offshore bank accounts. To prevent this from happening with funds that should be going towards fighting the pandemic, Transparency International has been<a href="https://voices.transparency.org/covid-19-receipts-57a3e643f3df"> calling on</a> multilateral bodies, such as the IMF and the World Bank, the G20 and other countries negotiating emergency rescue packages to ensure that funds are disbursed and managed in a transparent manner. This is essential for ensuring accountability can happen when the turmoil passes.</p><p>Countries should ensure that the measures they take now related to financial crime and money laundering are supportive of these efforts and do not ignore the risks related to corruption.</p><p>It is essential that financial institutions and supervisory authorities stop opportunistic criminals and protect citizens from cybercrime and fraud. However, this should not come at the expense of regular due diligence and enforcement actions that would help detecting and stopping corrupt money flows.</p><p>Financial institutions and other professional enablers should keep their eyes wide open to more ‘traditional’ approaches to money laundering, particularly involving shell companies and high-risk customers and jurisdictions.</p><p><strong>Now more than ever, global financial centres should strengthen their systems to ensure that secrecy in company ownership, banking and other sectors are not enabling the misuse of much needed resources.</strong></p><p><a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/panama_papers_four_years_anonymous_companies_corporate_secrecy">Panama Papers four years on: Anonymous companies and global wealth</a></p><p>Moreover, more support, from advanced economies as well as intergovernmental bodies, should be given to financial intelligence units (FIUs) and other relevant competent authorities in countries with less capacity. This will help ensure that poorer countries are able to identify patterns and red flags and prevent dirty money from entering or leaving their countries. Increased communication and information-sharing between FIUs and other competent authorities — both formally and informally — will be crucial to ensure that the limited resources available during this time are used effectively and efficiently.</p><p><strong>Exceptional times require exceptional measures, but these should never be used as excuse to relax obligations and cut costs in key areas. The failure to stop the flow of dirty money now will have both short-term and long-term consequences. It will affect the ability of countries to save lives and the economy. Ultimately, illicit financial flows during this crisis, and at any time, will lead to further decline in institutional capacity, trust in government and the rule of law.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c42eb9dfc234" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Building a fuller picture: The Financial Secrecy Index & CPI]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mairarmartini/what-the-financial-secrecy-index-tells-us-that-the-corruption-perceptions-index-doesnt-6c8d4bf5c06d?source=rss-ac9e3d2cb672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6c8d4bf5c06d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[illicit-financial-flows]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cpi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money-laundering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[secrecy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maíra Martini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Feb 2020 14:20:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-02-20T15:08:33.039Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>By Maíra Martini and Roberto M. Kukutschka</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*adzSzbno801LHT2teqT5vw.png" /></figure><p>Last month, Transparency International launched the 2019 <a href="https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019"><strong>Corruption Perceptions Index</strong></a>(CPI), which captures perceptions of a variety of forms of corruption in a country’s public sector. The CPI sheds light on countries where bribes or political connections are often necessary to win government contracts or obtain a business license, for example. But it does not capture the full range of corrupt behaviours. The CPI does not consider transnational forms of corruption, money laundering or the role of the private sector in allowing the corrupt to safely hide and enjoy the proceeds of corruption.</p><p>The recent <a href="https://www.icij.org/investigations/luanda-leaks/"><strong>Luanda Leaks</strong></a> investigation shows that a myriad of shell companies incorporated in different jurisdictions — from <strong>Malta</strong> to <strong>Mauritius </strong>— were used to disguise ownership and gain contracts or subcontracts with the Angolan government and state-owned oil company. Anonymous bank accounts in different jurisdictions — from <strong>Portugal</strong> to <strong>UAE </strong>— were allegedly used to pay bribes and to launder stolen funds. Similar mechanisms were used by <a href="https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/g20_leaders_or_laggards"><strong>Odebrecht</strong></a>: the company relied on at least 42 offshore accounts to pay bribes to public officials across Latin America and two African countries.</p><p><strong>While the types of legal structures and financial channels used by the corrupt vary, they all have one thing in common: secrecy.</strong></p><p>Secrecy attracts illicit and illegitimate or abusive financial flows. The <a href="https://www.taxjustice.net/2020/02/18/financial-secrecy-index-2020-reports-progress-on-global-transparency-but-backsliding-from-us-cayman-and-uk-prompts-call-for-sanctions/"><strong>Financial Secrecy Index</strong></a> (FSI) released yesterday by the Tax Justice Network shows that, overall, countries remain extremely secretive. The FSI’s underlying <a href="https://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/en/introduction/method-and-concepts"><strong>Secrecy Score</strong></a><strong> </strong>assesses the degree to which a country’s legal and regulatory systems enable illicit financial flows on a scale from 0 (full transparency) to 100 (full secrecy). The Secrecy Score results show that most countries still have a long way to go towards improving transparency in their financial sectors, by taking action on areas such as beneficial ownership information transparency (who owns and controls companies), data on who owns real estate, anti-money laundering laws and international cooperation.</p><p>The average secrecy score for the 133 jurisdictions evaluated by the FSI is 63.9. <strong>No country can be considered highly transparent</strong>. <strong>Slovenia</strong>, the country assessed as the least secretive received a score of 37.55 out of 100.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fe.infogram.com%2Fd16e8510-3b9c-4f3c-a083-400467dd9ba7%3Fsrc%3Dembed&amp;display_name=Infogram&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Finfogram.com%2Fsecrecy-score-vs-cpi-1hxj48en87wq4vg&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Finfogram-thumbs-1024.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com%2F69fa4ed7-dc47-408d-9b41-31cd0b36c5be.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=infogram" width="700" height="600" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/8d380436a97096cb80297625813b429e/href">https://medium.com/media/8d380436a97096cb80297625813b429e/href</a></iframe><p>This overall high level of secrecy gives the corrupt countless loopholes to choose from according to what they are trying to hide and who they are hiding it from. For example, if the goal is to hide company ownership to avoid paying taxes, <strong>Mauritius</strong> offers secret company ownership and limited tax and international cooperation treaties — perfect for avoiding detection by national tax authorities. If the goal is to use the company to hide wealth and conduct business behind the facade of what appears to be a legitimate company, the <strong>US </strong>would be a good option.</p><p><strong>The level of corruption in a country may be a factor in the decision of which secrecy loopholes to abuse and where. </strong>At the same time, high levels of secrecy in jurisdictions with strong rule of law and low levels of corruption provide the perfect destination to stash the proceeds of crime and corruption. The owners of illicit wealth can be certain that the system will protect their rights while keeping their identity secret.</p><h3><strong>Financial Secrecy vs. Corruption Perceptions</strong></h3><p>While the CPI and the FSI do not measure the same thing, a comparison between the two still provides food for thought.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fe.infogram.com%2F32ea6a0a-7e25-4d5e-b860-ef5b75a0e728%3Fsrc%3Dembed&amp;display_name=Infogram&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Finfogram.com%2Ffsi-2020-vs-cpi-2019-1h984wdn83xd2p3&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Finfogram-thumbs-1024.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com%2Fb765fa26-026b-42d3-b88b-b10a06956def.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=infogram" width="700" height="600" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/671ec86a2d0af719286dbdbddf373b76/href">https://medium.com/media/671ec86a2d0af719286dbdbddf373b76/href</a></iframe><p>Countries can be grouped in two broad categories:</p><h4>1. High secrecy, high corruption</h4><p>In these countries, which include <strong>Angola</strong>, <strong>The Gambia</strong>, the <strong>Maldives</strong>, and <strong>Venezuela</strong>, corruption is systemic and the rules of the game are made, implemented and enforced for the benefit of a small group very close to those in power.</p><p>Secrecy is high and used by these groups to extract even more rents from the State. However, conflict, political instability and weak rule of law make these places unattractive to those wishing to park or launder their funds there. This helps to explain the low secrecy impact of these countries in their overall Financial Secrecy Index.</p><p>The combination high corruption and high secrecy can also be seen in more “traditional” tax havens. Those are places known for offering corporate secrecy combined with preferential tax rates for non-residents. The usual suspects include the <strong>Bahamas</strong>, <strong>Panama</strong>, <strong>Seychelles</strong> and <strong>Mauritius</strong>, for example. Recent corruption and money laundering scandals have also featured <strong>Cyprus</strong>, <strong>Latvia</strong> and <strong>Malta</strong>. In these countries, <strong>secrecy is a business model</strong> and the company formation industry represents an important part of the economy. As such, there is little incentive to promote transparency and crack down on abuses. Corruption and weak rule of law make it less likely that wrongdoing will be pursued and sanctioned, benefiting corrupt companies and politicians and allowing shady deals to take place across the globe.</p><h4>2. High secrecy, low corruption</h4><p>Another group of countries include those where secrecy is high and perceptions of public sector corruption are low, such as <strong>Hong Kong</strong>, <strong>Luxembourg</strong>, <strong>Singapore</strong>, <strong>Switzerland</strong>, the <strong>UAE</strong>, the <strong>US</strong>, and the <strong>UK</strong>, for example. These countries do not only have high levels of secrecy in corporate and financial sectors, they are usually also attractive places to park dirty money — either through the purchase of assets, like real estate and other luxury goods, investments in alternative investment funds, like hedge funds, or bank accounts.</p><p><a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/three_ways_to_stop_money_laundering_through_real_estate">Three ways to stop money laundering through real estate</a></p><p>While public sector corruption in the form of bribes and direct embezzlement of public funds is less likely to take place in these countries, other forms of corruption including undue influence and regulatory capture ensures that a financial services industry that thrives on secrecy continues to operate and service corrupt actors from different countries, often with impunity.</p><p>Some of these countries, like the <strong>US</strong>, the <strong>UK</strong>, <strong>Luxembourg</strong> and <strong>Switzerland </strong>have recently taken steps to reduce secrecy. Nevertheless, sufficient loopholes remain, making it still worthwhile for criminals to take higher risks to launder or bring dirty money to these places. In the<strong> US</strong>, for example, law enforcement authorities have <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm902">repeatedly</a> underscored the challenges they face to investigate crimes due to the lack of information on the real owners of companies. In <strong>Switzerland</strong>, banks still have limited incentives to prevent and detect dirty money, according to the most recent Financial Action Task Force (FATF) <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/mer-switzerland-2016.pdf">mutual evaluation report</a> that emphasises that sanctions against financial institutions are not proportional nor dissuasive.</p><p><a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/next_week_governments_can_take_a_step_to_close_down_secrecy_jurisdictions">Next week governments can take a step to close down secrecy jurisdictions. Will they?</a></p><p><strong>This edition of the Financial Secrecy Index is a reminder that</strong> <strong>the corrupt and other criminals still have plenty of options to hide and launder money extracted from around the world</strong>. Closing the loopholes that allow corruption schemes to take place and stolen money to be hidden and laundered should become an integral part of any anti-corruption strategy. If global financial centres are serious about maintaining their reputation and stopping dirty money from entering their borders, they need to shine a light on the real owners of companies, supervise and punish professional enablers who facilitate corrupt deals and identify and return stolen assets. Without that, any other effort to curb corruption in low- and medium-income countries are unlikely to succeed.</p><p><em>Maíra Martini is an anti-money laundering research and policy expert at Transparency International</em></p><p><em>Roberto M. Kukutschka is an expert on corruption measurement tools at Transaprency International</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6c8d4bf5c06d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The case for an EU anti-money laundering agency is clear: will the EU take action?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mairarmartini/the-case-for-an-eu-anti-money-laundering-agency-is-clear-will-the-eu-take-action-a12133d59896?source=rss-ac9e3d2cb672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a12133d59896</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[anti-money-laundering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[malta]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money-laudering]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maíra Martini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Dec 2019 12:37:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-12-04T15:36:11.697Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>by Laure Brillaud and Maíra Martini</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hG-U4tkWmkr5vVCGvxo-sw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@paulfiedler?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Paul Fiedler</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Recent money laundering scandals have shown how indispensable European banks and other intermediaries have been in helping — either knowingly or negligently — design and run dodgy schemes. This casts serious doubts on Europe’s willingness to meaningfully fight grand corruption and organised crime, which have devastating impacts for people living in other parts of the world.</p><p>The EU has come a long way in terms of fighting money laundering and currently has possibly the most advanced anti-money laundering rules in the world. But when it comes to anti-money laundering supervision, the current EU framework leaves a vacuum.</p><p>Transparency International has previously called on the EU to get its house in order and tackle money laundering through European banks. With several EU countries <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-moneylaundering-reform/eu-heavyweight-states-push-for-joint-supervisor-against-money-laundering-idUSKBN1XJ04D">endorsing the proposal</a> for a dedicated EU supervisory body, it is clear that any future action will fall short unless the EU is equipped with powers to supervise both financial institutions and national supervisory bodies, and the powers to sanction them.</p><p><a href="https://voices.transparency.org/european-banks-in-money-laundering-scandals-what-lessons-for-the-eu-d743f3d7ac9b">European banks in money laundering scandals: what lessons for the EU?</a></p><p>The EU’s finance and economics ministers will <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/ecofin/2019/12/05/#">meet on December 5</a> to discuss the anti-money laundering priority agenda for the future. It is a perfect opportunity for the EU to ensure that the past scandals do not repeat themselves through equipping the EU with anti-money laundering supervisory powers.</p><h4><strong>Money laundering hotspot</strong></h4><p>While the EU has achieved financial integration, it has not achieved the same level of integration in terms of anti-money laundering supervision over its financial system. This creates weaknesses that can become hotspots for money laundering, easily exploited by criminal and corrupt individuals.</p><p>Take the recent example of the <strong>Anglo Austrian Bank</strong>, previously known as Meinl. Back in 2010, the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht needed a bank willing to move dirty money to pay off politicians in 12 countries spanning Latin America and Africa. It found a solution in an overseas branch of the Meinl bank. Company executives bought 51 per cent of the shares of the branch and for seven years used it to pay bribes and buy influence, without competent authorities ever raising concerns. Only about two weeks ago, the European Central Bank (ECB) revoked the bank’s license over repeated anti-money laundering control failings. It remains to be seen whether or not there will be real consequences, as the bank’s appeal has resulted in a <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/11163-anglo-austrian-bank-freezes-revocation-of-its-banking-licence">temporary suspension of ECB’s decision</a>, pending a court ruling.</p><p>That same week, a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malta-bank-of-valletta-ecb-exclusive/exclusive-ecb-flags-failings-in-dirty-money-screening-at-maltas-top-bank-idUSKBN1XU28A">leaked ECB report</a> about Malta’s <strong>Bank of Valletta </strong>revealed that the bank failed for years to detect or address risks involving thousands of transactions by high-risk foreign customers, potentially allowing dirty money to be laundered through the bank.</p><h4><strong>Ill-equipped to deal with transnational issues</strong></h4><p>Hearing about these cases in the same week, one may think that <strong>ECB </strong>— and by extension the EU — effectively deals with Europe’s money laundering problem. But this is far from the truth.</p><p>The ECB is the only EU body with the power to sanction banks but it cannot do so on anti-money laundering grounds. It <a href="https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/newsletter/2018/html/ssm.nl180516_2.en.html">does not have the mandate</a> to deal with money laundering, and does so sporadically only in cases where money laundering failings reported by other authorities provide grounds for license withdrawal.</p><p>Moreover, the withdrawal of a license is the only sanction available to the ECB and can be applied only in extreme cases. To effectively fight money laundering, such sanctions should be complemented with a wider range of measures to avoid waiting until it is — in a way — already too late to detect and stop the transactions.</p><p>The governance structure of the <strong>European Banking Authority (EBA)</strong> has also proven inadequate to effectively cover EU-level anti-money laundering supervisory needs. The EBA’s main decision-making body is its board of supervisors, composed of the banking authorities of the 28 EU Member States. To see the conflict this can create, we can look at the recent decision by the board to bury an <a href="https://eba.europa.eu/eba-closes-investigation-into-possible-breach-of-union-law-by-the-danish-and-estonian-supervisory-authorities">EBA report</a> pointing to a possible breach of law by Member States in the Danske Bank case.</p><p>Currently, no EU body appears appropriate or fit to take on future anti-money laundering supervisory responsibilities.There is already a recognition among EU leaders that the current model is inadequate. The European Commission published<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication_from_the_commission_to_the_european_parliament_towards_better_implementation_of_the_eus_anti-money_laundering_and_countering_the_financing_of_terrorism_framework.pdf"> a proposal</a> this summer complemented more recently by a joint statement by 6 EU countries — France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands and Spain — stressing the need for an EU body with anti-money laundering supervisory powers.</p><h4><strong>Powers needed to supervise</strong></h4><p>It is vital that the supervisory powers of a new body are not limited to coordination and exchange of information. This body must be given direct powers to independently and proactively investigate and sanction individual institutions that fail to comply with anti-money laundering obligations.</p><p>It should also be granted powers to supervise and sanction Member States for failing to comply with their anti-money laundering supervisory duties. This would not clear Member States of their responsibilities, and the EU body should not be a substitute for supervisory national authorities but complement Member States’ supervisory actions in high-risk cross-border cases and in cases where national authorities are weak.</p><p>In the future, the EU should consider expanding the scope to non-financial intermediaries. This would ensure that no grey zone is left for criminals or the corrupt to carry out their dirty business in the EU.</p><p>A strong EU anti-money laundering framework will require better integration and analysis of intelligence data collected by Financial Intelligence Units. Considering the cross-border nature of most high-risk financial transactions, having a body that can access and map intelligence data from different countries could help in the detection of suspicious activities.</p><p>A first step towards an effective EU-level supervision would be to harmonise frameworks and standards across the EU, providing a common baseline against which to evaluate enforcement and effectiveness.Transparency International calls on the EU to use this opportunity to close remaining loopholes in legislation. This includes increasing beneficial ownership transparency on trusts and expanding the scope of anti-money laundering legislation to golden visa schemes.</p><p><a href="https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/golden_visas">TI Publication - Golden Visas</a></p><p>With scandals piling up, from the Panama Papers to recent cases involving banks such as the ABLV, Danske Bank, Swedbank, Pilatus and Deutsche Bank, anti-money laundering should remain a priority for both the EU and European Commission in their next mandate. Recent political events in Malta have also demonstrated how systemic corruption and money laundering can undermine the rule of law and democracy exposing the EU as a whole. The EU cannot remain silent.</p><p>Member States have now a chance to show leadership and determination to tackle the issue at the EU level when they meet on December 5 in Brussels to discuss and agree on the future anti-money laundering strategic priorities for the EU.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a12133d59896" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Brazil’s Supreme Court halts anti- money laundering investigations]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mairarmartini/the-role-of-financial-intelligence-units-and-the-fight-against-corruption-in-brazil-e745f1c8e749?source=rss-ac9e3d2cb672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e745f1c8e749</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[money-laundering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lava-jato]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brazil]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[banking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maíra Martini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jul 2019 08:20:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-08-26T12:50:06.856Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Brazil’s Supreme Court halts anti-money laundering investigations</h3><p>Last week, a decision by <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/brazil/2019/07/brazils-supreme-court-president-suspends-investigations-into-bolsonaros-son-flavio.shtml">Brazil’s Supreme Court on a case concerning the president’s son</a> has halted most of the country’s money laundering investigations. The decision threatens one of the most important investigative tools against corruption and leaves Brazil at odds with the international anti-money laundering regime.</p><p><strong><em>In Portuguese</em></strong><a href="https://medium.com/@transparenciainternacionalbr/brasil-em-desacordo-com-o-regime-internacional-de-combate-%C3%A0-lavagem-de-dinheiro-8d38df6f0394"><strong><em> here</em></strong></a><strong><em>.</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9cDdCevHUJcA-B6SV4qU8w.jpeg" /><figcaption>Brazilian Supreme Court Photo by Maira Martini</figcaption></figure><h3><strong>Suspicious funds</strong></h3><p>The son of President Jair Bolsonaro, Flávio Bolsonaro, has been the subject of financial intelligence <a href="https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2019/01/19/politica/1547855965_283326.html">reports</a> produced by the Brazilian financial intelligence unit — the Council of Control of Financial Activities (COAF).</p><p>These <a href="https://g1.globo.com/rj/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2019/01/19/relatorio-do-coaf-sobre-flavio-bolsonaro-mostra-pagamento-de-titulo-de-r-1-milhao-sem-indicar-o-favorecido.ghtml">reports</a>, leaked to the media earlier this year, reveal that Flávio Bolsonaro received 48 cash deposits made on five days in a one-month period. The total worth of these deposits was close to 100,000 reais (US$27,000).</p><p>Flávio was a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of Rio de Janeiro during the time. Prior to that, in December 2018, federal financial investigators had reportedly already <a href="https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/corrupcao/relatorio-do-coaf-aponta-48-depositos-suspeitos-na-conta-de-flavio-bolsonaro/">discovered</a> that in 2017 about 1.2 million reais (about US$327,000) had been moved to and out of a bank account belonging to Fabrício Queiroz, Flávio Bolsonaro’s former assistant.</p><p>These reports were made based on suspicious transactions reports (STRs) submitted by banks to the COAF. According to Brazil’s <a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L9613.htm">anti-money laundering rules</a>, financial institutions are required to report to the COAF any transactions where there is serious evidence of money laundering or predicate crimes.</p><p>In this case, the fact that money was deposited in smaller amounts — a practice known as structuring — may have created grounds for the bank to submit a report. Structuring cash deposits is considered a red flag for money laundering.</p><p>Flávio Bolsonaro <a href="https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2019/01/19/politica/1547855965_283326.html">denies</a> any wrongdoing. According to him, the money relates to real estate transactions.</p><h3>Unexpected step backwards in Brazil</h3><p>The COAF shared these reports with the Brazilian Public Prosecutor’s Office investigating the now Senator and his assistant. However, this week, one of the Brazilian Supreme Court justices, Dias Toffoli, <a href="https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/brazil/2019/07/brazils-supreme-court-president-suspends-investigations-into-bolsonaros-son-flavio.shtml">granted Flávio Bolsonaro’s defence’s petition</a> and temporarily suspended all investigations in progress in Brazil that are based on confidential data shared by the COAF and the Federal Treasury without prior authorisation from a court. The Supreme Court will pick up the matter again in late November.</p><p>According to Judge Toffoli, the COAF could only share generic data, such as the name of the account holder and total amounts received, but not details of the transactions without a court order due to bank secrecy rules.</p><h3>Frozen anti-money laundering investigations</h3><p>If there are irregularities regarding the type of information shared by the COAF or other authorities, that should be investigated on a case-by-case basis.</p><p><strong>Paralysing most money laundering investigations in Brazil under the premise that sharing detailed reports about suspicious transactions from financial institutions is illegal without a court order, is disproportionate and goes against international anti-money laundering standards.</strong></p><h3>What are financial intelligence units and what do they do?</h3><p>A financial intelligence unit (FIU) is a country’s <a href="https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/helpdesk/financial-intelligence-units-fius-effective-institutional-design-mandate-and-powers">central national body</a> tasked with three core functions to: i) collect (receive and request); ii) analyse; and iii) disseminate financial information relating to potential financial crimes, such as general money laundering, associated offences, such as corruption, and terrorism finance.</p><p>The FIUs, therefore, function as intermediaries between the private entities that are subject to anti-money laundering obligations and law enforcement agencies.</p><p>In Brazil, the COAF is tasked with these functions.</p><p>Unlike other investigative bodies, FIUs produce intelligence analysis based on suspicious transaction reports submitted to them by financial institutions and other entities or professionals that have money laundering obligations.</p><p>This means that the FIU does not have access to the whole banking information of an individual, but only to information related to transactions deemed by financial institutions as suspicious.</p><p>FIU intelligence reports that are shared with law enforcement describe anomalies that could be connected to money laundering and related crimes and, therefore, require further investigation. These reports are subject to strict confidentiality rules.</p><p>Based on FIU reports, competent authorities deliberate whether to start investigations and whether lifting bank secrecy or gaining access to other types of the information through a court order is necessary.</p><h3>International standards and practice for FIUs</h3><p>To ensure FIUs can perform their duties and support the fight against money laundering, the <a href="http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf">Financial Action Task Force</a> (FATF), the inter-governmental body responsible for setting and monitoring the implementation of standards against money laundering and terrorist financing, has specific recommendations on the role, functions and powers they should have.</p><p>Many of these recommendations are relevant to the upcoming discussion that the Brazilian Supreme Court will hold in November.</p><h3>Dissemination of information from FIUs</h3><p>To fulfil its mandate, it is critical that the FIU be able to share information and the results of its analysis with the relevant authorities, including law enforcement promptly and whenever there are grounds to suspect money laundering, associated offences or terrorist financing.</p><p>Similarly, the FIU should be able to respond to information requests from competent authorities. When the FIU receives such a request from a competent authority, the decision to conduct analysis and/or share information with the requesting authority should remain with the FIU.</p><p>The FATF also stresses that the FIU should be independent and autonomous. This includes autonomy over deciding to analyse, request and/or disseminate specific information. In all cases, this means that the FIU has an independent right to forward or disseminate information to competent authorities.</p><p>Given how fast the corrupt and other criminals are able to move assets, the ability of FIUs to share relevant information with law enforcement authorities quickly is critical.</p><h3><strong>Access to information</strong></h3><p>According to the FATF recommendations, the FIU should also be able to “actively request new or additional information from reporting entities.”</p><p>If a financial institution submits an STR, the FIU should be able to ask further questions regarding that specific (set of) transaction(s) — and not of any other — without the need for an authorisation from the court or any other body.</p><p>In fact, a <a href="https://medium.com/Financial%20Intelligence%20Units%20Working%20With%20Law%20Enforcement%20and%20Prosecutors.">2018 study by the World Bank Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative</a> (StAR) shows that in the great majority of countries surveyed for the report, FIUs produce intelligence reports that go beyond the initial information provided in STRs. They include, for example, additional information collected from reporting entities such as banks, open and public sources, and administrative and law enforcement datasets, among others.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/624/1*X7bKMsDlKl99BZXTyn81Yg.png" /><figcaption>Source: Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative — The World Bank and UNODC (2018). <a href="https://star.worldbank.org/publication/financial-intelligence-units-working-law-enforcement-authorities-and-prosecutors"><em>Financial Intelligence Units Working With Law Enforcement and Prosecutors</em></a>.</figcaption></figure><h3>Back to Brazil</h3><p>While international standards are clear regarding the role of FIUs in combatting money laundering, recent events in Brazil put their effectiveness at risk.</p><p>In June 2019, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) issued a <a href="http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/a-c/brazil/documents/brazil-statement-june-2019.html">statement</a> conveying its concerns about Brazil’s delays in implementing the recommendations put forward in the country’s <a href="http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/a-c/brazil/documents/mutualevaluationreportofbrazil.html">latest mutual evaluation report</a>, particularly related to terrorism financing.</p><p>Despite recent legislative changes in the country, the FATF announced that it continues to see the delay as a membership issue that it will consider during the October 2019 plenary meeting.</p><p>A decision that weakens the country’s anti-money laundering framework could send a negative message regarding Brazil’s commitment to implement the FATF standards.</p><p>In 2018, Brazil’s COAF produced more than 10,000 financial intelligence reports and shared information with national authorities more than 7,000 times. COAF financial intelligence reports have been critical in investigations conducted as part of the Lava Jato investigation and other corruption cases, but also in investigations related to drug trafficking and organised crime.</p><p>Limiting the ability of COAF to analyse, produce and share quality reports in a timely manner will certainly hamper the ability of Brazilian authorities to investigate and punish corruption and other crimes in the country. Such a limitation also goes against anti-money laundering international standards and could have severe consequences for the country.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e745f1c8e749" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Two principles Open Government Partnership needs to embrace to end corporate secrecy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mairarmartini/two-principles-open-government-partnership-needs-to-embrace-to-end-corporate-secrecy-e01ccf13bc83?source=rss-ac9e3d2cb672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e01ccf13bc83</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[money-laundering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[beneficial-ownership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ogp]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maíra Martini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 May 2019 13:20:09 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-07T10:36:34.505Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QwzjOfNAqCEhnBeCbF7_fQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image by <a href="https://pixabay.com/users/photosforyou-124319/?utm_source=link-attribution&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=image&amp;utm_content=1165407">photosforyou</a> from <a href="https://pixabay.com/?utm_source=link-attribution&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_campaign=image&amp;utm_content=1165407">Pixabay</a></figcaption></figure><p>Scratch the surface of any of the big cross-border corruption scandals of the last decade — the <a href="https://voices.transparency.org/why-danske-bank-estonia-appears-in-so-many-money-laundering-scandals-424047fe987c">Russian, Azerbaijani</a> and <a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/troika_laundromat_a_different_kind_of_financial_crisis">Troika</a> laundromats, <a href="https://voices.transparency.org/lava-jato-whatever-happened-to-complicit-swiss-banks-6481e4d66ae1">Lava Jato</a> — and it won’t take too long to discover the critical role of shell companies, and the anonymous individuals behind them, in facilitating corruption on a vast scale.</p><p>Making the anonymous individuals behind companies identifiable is critical to preventing the criminal and corrupt from laundering their dirty money and hiding it overseas. This is achievable through mandatory disclosure of company ownership data, which is then verified and made available in public beneficial ownership registers.</p><p>This week, when governments, businesses and civil society meet in Ottawa for the <a href="https://www.opengovpartnership.org/events/ogp-global-summit-2019-ottawa-canada/">Open Government Partnership (OGP) Global Summit 2019</a>, they will have the opportunity to take a stand against corruption by improving beneficial ownership transparency.</p><p>At this year’s Summit, with technical support from the OGP, Open Ownership and Transparency International, the UK government will be leading the launch of a new coalition to advance beneficial ownership transparency. Countries will have the opportunity to sign a declaration and commit to the beneficial ownership transparency disclosure principles. Among other things, these aim to <strong>promote open registers</strong> and <strong>improve verification of ownership data</strong>.</p><p>This is a much needed development. For years, Transparency International and other civil society organisations have been highlighting the importance of mandatory disclosure of company ownership data and the benefits of public beneficial ownership registers.</p><p><a href="https://voices.transparency.org/taking-a-step-back-why-do-we-care-so-much-about-public-registers-of-beneficial-ownership-263f212f8362">Taking a step back: Why do we care so much about public registers of beneficial ownership?</a></p><h3><strong>What do country evaluation reports tell us?</strong></h3><p>Unfortunately, the reality today is that, in most countries, authorities still rely on beneficial ownership information recorded by banks, lawyers, accounts and real estate agents.</p><p>Our <a href="https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/g20_leaders_or_laggards">2018 study</a> into beneficial ownership transparency in G20 member and guest countries found that in 15 out of 23 countries assessed, investigators rely almost solely on the information collected by banks.</p><p>This is a flawed approach and does not guarantee that authorities will have access to accurate, reliable and timely beneficial ownership information.</p><p>These challenges are also obvious when looking at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) mutual evaluation reports. Implementation of the beneficial ownership standard has been weak across the global network of countries assessed by FATF. The vast majority of countries receive low ratings.</p><p>Individual country evaluations highlight the challenges authorities face when the only information they can access is held by legal entities — financial institutions, lawyers or corporate services providers — or basic information in company registers.</p><p>In the case of the <strong>United States</strong>, for example, the <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-States-2016.pdf">2016 FATF assessment shows</a> how difficult it is for law enforcement to collect information on who owns companies:</p><blockquote>“LEAs [law enforcement agencies] advised the assessors that they must often resort to gathering this information through time-consuming, resource-intensive, and lengthy investigations, which may involve: detailed analysis of bank accounts and transaction records; physical around-the-clock surveillance; collection of emails; conducting searches; interviewing potential witnesses, etc. As a result, the competent authorities are not always able to access such information in a timely manner, and thus it cannot be said that there are no impediments to their collection of such information.”</blockquote><p>Challenges were also found in <a href="https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-Canada-2016.pdf"><strong>Canada</strong></a>:</p><blockquote>“While the legal powers available to LEAs are comprehensive and sufficient, the instances in which LEAs were able to identify the beneficial owners of Canadian legal entities and legal arrangements appear to have been very limited and investigations do not sufficiently focus on international and complex ML [money laundering] cases involving corporate elements. Some LEAs are therefore less familiar with ML typologies involving corporate structures. Also, in a number of cases that have been investigated and where Canadian companies were owned by foreign entities or foreign trusts, it was not possible for LEAs to identify the beneficial owners.”</blockquote><p>Or in <a href="http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-Austria-2016.pdf"><strong>Austria</strong></a>, which is currently reeling from a <a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/austrias_strache_affair_at_the_undue_influence_toolkit">major political corruption scandal</a> featuring an attempt of money laundering:</p><blockquote>“[T]he powers of law enforcement authorities to get timely access to this information are limited, as this can be done only in the context of a criminal investigation. Moreover, financial institutions and professional intermediaries may use the right of appeal against such requests for information, and, in fact, routinely do so. In practice that means that competent authorities do not have timely access to the BO information.”</blockquote><p>In fact, according to FATF, no country has high levels of effectiveness when it comes to beneficial ownership transparency. However, countries with better ratings all have beneficial ownership information recorded in at least one register, in addition to information available upon request from financial institutions and other professionals with anti-money laundering obligations as well as companies themselves.</p><p>The <a href="http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer4/MER-United-Kingdom-2018.pdf"><strong>United Kingdom</strong></a> offers a good example of how this can work,</p><blockquote>“UK authorities are able to access basic and BO information on legal persons and arrangements via one of three sources: from financial institutions and DNFBPs [designated non-financial businesses and professions], from registers, or from the legal entity itself. The variety of sources increases transparency and access to information,<strong> </strong>and helps mitigate accuracy problems with particular sources.”</blockquote><p>But, this doesn’t mean that authorities are always successful in identifying the beneficial owner of companies. Two main issues remain: (1) accuracy and reliability of the data authorities are able to access; and (2) inability to access company information that is held outside of the country.</p><blockquote>“[M]ore often than not, foreign trusts are deliberately established in jurisdictions that do not collaborate, thus making the identification of the ultimate beneficial owner particularly arduous.” (Italy, FATF Mutual Evaluation Report 2016)</blockquote><blockquote>“Information on beneficial owners may not be as timely or even available when owned by foreign legal persons or legal arrangements.” (Macao-China, FATF Mutual Evaluation Report 2017)</blockquote><p>We see the same patterns emerging when we analyse recent cross-border corruption cases. For example, in the Brazilian Car Wash (Lava Jato) investigations, Brazilian prosecutors faced challenges in getting information to prove that certain business executives and public officials were behind offshore companies used in the scheme. In one instance, a mutual legal assistance request to access account records took a very long time to process. Worse than this though, the request was leaked, threatening the whole investigation.</p><h3>Let the sunshine in</h3><p>We believe that a public beneficial ownership register has an enormous potential to solve these problems.</p><p>A public register can guarantee timely access to information and help improve the accuracy of the data provided in several ways:</p><p>· <strong>Authorities</strong> no longer have to request information from the entity, corporate service provider or bank — although if they want to cross-check information, they can still do so.</p><p>· <strong>Foreign authorities</strong> do not need to go through lengthy and complex mutual legal assistance requests.</p><p>· <strong>Banks, corporate service providers, lawyers and real estate agents</strong>, wherever they are located, can easily check information when conducting due diligence.</p><p>· The <strong>private sector</strong> can access information on business partners.</p><p>· <strong>Civil society and journalists</strong> can uncover illicit activity as well as monitor the accuracy of the information registered.</p><p>The power of public registers can be seen in the Czechia, TI Česká republika, where TI’s national chapter was able to <a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/andrej_babish_is_our_controlling_person_czech_republic">uncover a conflict of interest of Prime Minister Andrej Babiš</a> thanks primarily to the public beneficial ownership register of a neighbouring country, Slovakia.</p><p>Czechia does not have a public beneficial ownership register, but Slovakia requires all companies that have a contract with the public administration to disclose their beneficial owners and this information is publicly available.</p><p>TI Česká republika was able to expose that Prime Minister Babiš was the main beneficiary of a company that received significant EU subsidies. The discovery led the European Commission to suspend the payment of any EU subsidies until the Prime Minister’s conflicts of interest have been resolved.</p><p>If that was a reason enough, we also expect that public registers would serve as a deterrent to criminals and the corrupt seeking to hide behind anonymous companies.</p><p><strong>The time for OGP countries to send a strong message that dirty money is not welcome within their borders by shining a light on corporate ownership is long overdue.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e01ccf13bc83" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lava Jato: Whatever happened to complicit Swiss banks?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mairarmartini/lava-jato-whatever-happened-to-complicit-swiss-banks-6481e4d66ae1?source=rss-ac9e3d2cb672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6481e4d66ae1</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[banks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[brazil]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[lava-jato]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money-laundering]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maíra Martini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:46:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-03-04T15:31:02.774Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>A case study of failed banking supervision</em></strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dkszswWaVaEhbST-KcV1NQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/N2xScr6Gsgg?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">eberhard grossgasteiger</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/search/photos/switzerland?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>This is an abridged version of the presentation delivered at ‘Dark Havens: Confronting Hidden Money &amp; Power’, a conference held in Berlin on 5–6 April 2019</em></p><p>The corrupt need a safe place to hide their illicit gains. No one wants to simply keep money under their mattress at home.</p><p>That’s when tax havens become an important part of the dirty money puzzle. The great majority of grand corruption schemes feature offshore, anonymous shell companies to hide the identity of those who benefit from dirty money. These are remarkably easy to set up. So easy that a <a href="https://www.gfintegrity.org/report/the-library-card-project/">recent study</a> by Global Financial Integrity shows that in all 50 US states it is easier to set up a company than get a library card.</p><p>Even with an anonymous company through which to operate, without a bank account even the corrupt will struggle to transform their illicit money into beach-side property or luxurious yachts. Banks are the vital link in the flow of illicit money around the world.</p><p>Transparency International is currently analysing 50 cross-border corruption cases — from Brazil, to Ukraine, to Malaysia — to understand how the corrupt have used banks and if and why financial institutions have failed to identify wrongdoing and stop transactions. One case from the forthcoming study illustrates many of the issues our analysis has identified so far.</p><h3><strong>Operação Lava Jato</strong></h3><p>The case is a very small part of the largest corruption scandal in the history of Brazil — known as Operation Carwash, or Lava Jato, in Portuguese. The scheme was first uncovered by Brazilian prosecutors in 2014 and continues to be the subject of investigations.</p><p>As part of the scheme, Brazilian politicians appointed executives for high-level positions at Petrobras, the Brazilian state-owned oil company, who then negotiated public contracts with construction companies in exchange for bribes. These bribes were subsequently shared with the politicians and their political parties.</p><p>One particular case involved the purchase of an oil block in Benin.</p><p>Two Swiss banks played a key role in facilitating this scheme: BSI and Julius Baer (formerly Merrill Lynch).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/313/1*06u_iKeDGvb6vjKLw7Kp8g.png" /><figcaption>Source: Brazilian Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office vs. Pedro Augusto Cortes Xavier Bastos. Available <a href="http://www.mpf.mp.br/para-o-cidadao/caso-lava-jato/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/parana/denuncias-do-mpf/documentos/1DENUNCIABENIN.pdf">here</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>It all started back in 2009, when a manager at Petrobras named<strong> Pedro Bastos</strong> was approached by <strong>CBH</strong>, a company registered in Benin that had a concession rights to explore for oil in the country. CBH wanted to sell 50 per cent of its exploration rights. After internal discussions, Petrobras recommended <a href="http://www.mpf.mp.br/para-o-cidadao/caso-lava-jato/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/parana/denuncias-do-mpf/documentos/pedroxavier-sentenca.pdf">not to proceed with the deal</a>, but Bastos ignored the recommendation and two years later the deal was approved.</p><h3><strong>Follow the money</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/603/1*WTLjpOSwh8RfNA40ZXH1iw.png" /></figure><p>As part of the agreement, on 3 May 2011, Petrobras transferred US$34.5 million to CBH.</p><p>The same day, CBH transferred the money to an account held by its parent company, <strong>Lusitania Petroleum,</strong> at the Swiss bank <strong>BSI</strong>. <a href="http://www.mpf.mp.br/para-o-cidadao/caso-lava-jato/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/parana/denuncias-do-mpf/documentos/pedroxavier-sentenca.pdf">Lusitania Petroleum</a> is an offshore company registered in the British Virgin Islands, owned by a <a href="https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/nodes/12102652">Portuguese businessman</a>, and with no previous experience in the oil sector. That fact alone would make one question how the Benin government awarded the concession to this company in the first place, but that’s a question for another time.</p><p>Two days later, Lusitania<strong> </strong>transferred part of the money — US$10,000 — to another offshore company, <strong>Acona</strong>. Acona is a shell company created by Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca and registered in the Seychelles upon the request of <a href="http://www.mpf.mp.br/para-o-cidadao/caso-lava-jato/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/parana/denuncias-do-mpf/documentos/Denuncia-David-Muino.pdf">David Muino Suarez</a>, Vice President for Latin America at BSI. Acona later received other transfers from Lusitania Petroleum, <a href="http://www.mpf.mp.br/para-o-cidadao/caso-lava-jato/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/parana/denuncias-do-mpf/documentos/Denuncia-David-Muino.pdf">totalling US$22 million</a> — more than half the total amount paid by Petrobras to CBH.</p><p>Acona then made others transfers to yet more offshore companies. One of them was <strong>Sandfield</strong>.</p><p>Sandfield was also established by Mossack Fonseca, this time in Panama, <a href="http://www.mpf.mp.br/para-o-cidadao/caso-lava-jato/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/parana/denuncias-do-mpf/documentos/Denuncia-David-Muino.pdf">upon the request</a> of Muino Suarez, just one month before Petrobras made the payment to CBH. Muino Suarez then opened Sandfield’s bank account with BSI.</p><p>Documents show that the <a href="http://www.mpf.mp.br/para-o-cidadao/caso-lava-jato/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/parana/denuncias-do-mpf/documentos/pedroxavier-sentenca.pdf">only person</a> with authorisation to manage the Sandfield account was Pedro Bastos — the same Pedro Bastos involved in the negotiations of the oil field in Benin.</p><h3><strong>To cut a long story short…</strong></h3><p>The money left Petrobras, passed through two offshore companies with the help of a Swiss bank and returned to a manager at Petrobras.</p><p>Payments were also made from the Sandfield account to <a href="https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2017/10/18/extratos-mostram-gastos-de-r-28-milhoes-em-joalherias-por-ex-gerente-da-petrobras.htm">purchase luxury goods</a> in different parts of the world. There is even evidence of a payment (possibly a bribe) to a Brazilian customs official, possibly to ensure that Bastos could return to Brazil with his purchases without any problems. Bastos presented the bank with documents that showed he worked for Petrobras (there is even a copy of his business card in the bank files). Yet, no measures were taken to investigate the origin of the money entering the account.</p><p>Acona also made transfers to accounts in another Swiss Bank, <strong>Julius Baer</strong> (formerly Merrill Lynch). In spite of strong evidence of money laundering, this bank also chose to turn a blind eye.</p><h3><strong>The political connection</strong></h3><p>In 2011, US$1.5 million was transferred from Acona to <a href="http://www.mpf.mp.br/para-o-cidadao/caso-lava-jato/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/parana/denuncias-do-mpf/documentos/denuncia-eduardo-cunha-pr-contas">Orion</a>, a trust formed in Scotland in 2007. Eduardo Cunha, a Brazilian politician who at the time was the Speaker of the Lower House, created the trust and was its beneficiary. The bank held several files that stated Cunha was the beneficiary of this and other accounts used in the scheme, including a copy of his passport.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/594/1*f7neCcKP8zOtxaMzyXvcLg.png" /><figcaption>Merrill Lynch’s risk categorisation of Eduardo Cunha. Source: Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office vs Claudia Cordeiro Cruz. Available <a href="http://www.mpf.mp.br/para-o-cidadao/caso-lava-jato/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/parana/denuncias-do-mpf/documentos/denuncia-claudia-cruz-e-outros">here</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>Cunha was also the politician who suggested Bastos’s name for the position with Petrobras.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F1gFbMHzgF5U%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D1gFbMHzgF5U&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F1gFbMHzgF5U%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/3f05ea18830e19f9363de965e059626a/href">https://medium.com/media/3f05ea18830e19f9363de965e059626a/href</a></iframe><h3><strong>Close, but no cigar</strong></h3><p>After noticing that a significant percentage of the money was transferred to someone with no specific credentials and who was not directly involved in the deal, the compliance department of BSI requested further information. Muino Suarez, as the account manager, described Acona’s role as follows: “External consultant for Petrobras for international services/questions. Intermediary between Petrobras and Lusitania Petroleum.” The question came up at least one more time a year later, when the compliance system of the bank flagged another suspicious transaction. Muino Suarez made a reference to his prior explanation. Surprisingly, Muino Suarez’s explanations were deemed sufficient. This and other transfers were allowed to continue and no suspicious transaction reports were submitted.</p><p>David Muino Suarez is now under arrest in Brazil. According to the <a href="http://www.mpf.mp.br/para-o-cidadao/caso-lava-jato/atuacao-na-1a-instancia/parana/denuncias-do-mpf/documentos/Denuncia-David-Muino.pdf">investigations</a>, he played a key role in setting up the structure that allowed illicit funds to be laundered. But this is rare; it is more common for senior managers not to be held responsible for their role in money laundering schemes.</p><p>There is no publicly available information indicating that these two Swiss Banks were punished by Swiss authorities for their role in these schemes.</p><p>BSI was punished for their role in the <a href="https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2016/05/20160524-mm-bsi/">1MDB scandal</a> in Malaysia, which took place at the same time and involved more than 100 accounts with the bank. Yet, there are questions about whether the sanctions applied were proportionate. Swiss authorities ordered the disgorgement of profits made by the BSI for passing these transactions, but no actual fine was issued. Authorities also approved BSI’s integration by EFG International on the condition that BSI would thereafter be dissolved — which does not seem like a real punishment either.</p><p><strong>We won’t win the battle against corruption and money laundering unless authorities and those regulated and supervised by them take enforcement seriously. In this case, we saw that banks did part of their job and identified the real people behind the offshore companies involved in the transactions. They even flagged some transactions as suspicious, yet very simple (and frankly unconvincing) explanations by management were sufficient to allow corruption to flourish.</strong></p><p>As important as the Panama Papers and other leaks are for understanding the inner workings of offshore corruption schemes, we can’t always rely on whistleblowers, journalists and civil society to uncover all cases. It is time for the authorities to start doing their jobs.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6481e4d66ae1" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Verifying the beneficial owner of companies. Why and how.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mairarmartini/verifying-the-beneficial-owner-of-companies-why-and-how-d6e24bd9f99f?source=rss-ac9e3d2cb672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d6e24bd9f99f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[money-laundering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[troikalaundromat]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[laundromat]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[beneficial-ownership]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maíra Martini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2019 19:08:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-20T08:26:53.313Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/639/1*aaq-E_buiIa9Kfcp4bmLYA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Image: FreeImages / <a href="https://www.freeimages.com/photographer/just4you-44728">Justine FG</a></figcaption></figure><p>Armen Ustyan is a 34-year-old Armenian. He lives in a simple house in Vanadzor, Armenia, and works seasonally in the construction sector in Russia. He is also the beneficial owner of a Panamanian company involved in million-dollar transactions, according to records the company held with Ūkio bankas in Lithuania. Ustyan found out about the company and the account through journalists investigating a massive anti-money laundering scheme, the <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/troikalaundromat/vast-offshore-network-moved-billions-with-help-from-major-russian-bank">Troika Laundromat</a>. He had never heard of the company before and never benefitted one cent from all this money.</p><p>Ustyan is just one of many individuals who have allegedly been used as proxies by companies involved in the Troika Laundromat. The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) had already uncovered a similar approach by companies in the <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/azerbaijanilaundromat/the-core-companies-of-the-azerbaijani-laundromat">Azerbaijani Laundromat</a>. Maharram Ahmadov, a working class driver living in a simple house in the outskirts of Baku, was also the beneficial owner of two accounts held by two British shell companies with Danske Bank Estonia. The accounts were used to transfer more than US$1.7 billion, some of it reportedly used to pay bribes and launder Azerbaijan’s reputation.</p><p>These examples highlight the critical importance of beneficial ownership registers — databases holding information on who controls and benefits from companies — and the dangers of relying only on data collected by corporate service providers or financial institutions themselves.</p><p><a href="https://voices.transparency.org/taking-a-step-back-why-do-we-care-so-much-about-public-registers-of-beneficial-ownership-263f212f8362">Taking a step back: Why do we care so much about public registers of beneficial ownership?</a></p><p>In recent years, the debate around transparency of companies has progressed significantly. In particular, the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32018L0843">Fifth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive</a> is an important step, requiring all EU Member States to establish public beneficial ownership registers by 2020. However, one should not forget that a beneficial ownership register is only as useful as the data it collects.</p><p>While existing rules emphasise the need for accurate, reliable and up-to-date beneficial ownership information, verification of information provided by companies is often minimal, when it happens at all. A 2018 <a href="https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/g20_leaders_or_laggards">study</a> published by Transparency International assesses how well G20 and guest countries are implementing the G20 High Level Principles on Beneficial Ownership. It shows that no governments that collect beneficial ownership information verify it.</p><p>Some countries, such as Spain, have relied on notaries to collect and verify the information that is then submitted to the register; others have given registering authorities anti-money laundering obligations, such as Brazil, meaning they have to conduct due diligence, including reviewing beneficial ownership information. However, there is no indication that in these cases notaries and authorities independently verify the information provided by companies.</p><p>In the United Kingdom, for example, the registering authority does not have the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/companies-house/about">mandate</a> to investigate the accuracy of the information submitted by companies. At the same time, an <a href="https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/corruption-and-money-laundering/anonymous-company-owners/companies-we-keep/">analysis</a> of the UK Company Register undertaken by Global Witness in 2018 revealed that thousands of companies are filing suspicious entries or not complying with the rules. Global Witness found that more than 9,000 companies are controlled by beneficial owners who control over 100 companies, an indication that the beneficial ownership information of these registered companies could be false. Additionally, more than 10,000 companies declare a foreign company as their beneficial owner, which is unlikely to meet government requirements. Of these, 73 per cent are linked to secrecy jurisdictions.</p><p>Verification of beneficial ownership remains one of the biggest challenges to dealing with corruption, money laundering and tax evasion.</p><h3>Is technology the solution?</h3><p>In a <a href="https://www.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Beneficial-ownership-verification_Tax-Justice-Network_Jan-2019.pdf">recent paper</a>, the Tax Justice Network (TJN) proposed a way of checking the validity of data provided: an information technology system combined with advanced analytics to identify red flags.</p><p>The verification process involves ensuring that people in the official register are who they say they are (authentication), that those persons have agreed to be involved in a legal entity (authorisation), and that all the registered data is valid (for example, the address exists and the purpose of the company is accurate). It also involves checks after the legal entity is set up to ensure information is up-to-date and to identify potential red flags.</p><p>The proposed verification process should be a fully automated information technology system with human supervision. The system will have access to relevant data, held by national and foreign authorities for cross-checking and advanced analysis.</p><p>The process could be managed by the beneficial ownership or company register, or another public body that has experience with data analytics, such as financial intelligence units or tax authorities. The responsible body needs to be adequately resourced and empowered to conduct such checks.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/627/1*835FVY9aJ294UHCJ7KlsIQ.png" /><figcaption>Adapted from “ Beneficial ownership verification: ensuring the truthfulness and accuracy of registered ownership information”, Tax Justice Network</figcaption></figure><h3>Not without challenges</h3><p>Technology can be an ally in the fight against corruption, optimising time and resources and even enabling analysis that wouldn’t be possible otherwise. However, appropriate safeguards need to be in place to ensure the system is not open to abuse, including a robust legislative and regulatory framework to establish transparent and accountable management of data by relevant authorities.</p><p>These should include parameters related to the type of information that is accessible for cross-checking and advanced analytics — based on the information state agencies already collect or hold. Clear security and confidentiality provisions about each type of information and the possibility to exchange information within state agencies should be established. There should be an oversight mechanism to detect and sanction any abuses.</p><p>In a world where the criminal and corrupt are already exploiting the power of technology, we must harness it ourselves to make it much more difficult for them to hide behind nominees and proxies.</p><p>___________________________________________________________________</p><p>As knowledge partners at this year’s <a href="https://www.oecd.org/corruption/integrity-forum/"><strong>OECD Global Anti-Corruption and Integrity Forum</strong></a>, Transparency International invites government officials, the private sector, media and other civil society organisations to discuss what needs to be done to ensure available beneficial ownership information is accurate and reliable.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d6e24bd9f99f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lithuania’s money laundering problem]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mairarmartini/lithuanias-money-laundering-problem-c3b3ebba1618?source=rss-ac9e3d2cb672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c3b3ebba1618</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[ukioleaks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[troikalaundromat]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money-laundering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maíra Martini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 05 Mar 2019 14:56:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-06T12:02:44.264Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*CG6nD5yDjkmkbVzbP57-RA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Vilnius at dusk (Image: <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vilnius_at_dusk.jpg">Wikimedia Commons</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>Baltic banking scandals have hit the headlines repeatedly over the past few years. First, Latvia’s <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/laundromat/latvian-bank-was-laundering-tool/">Trasta Komercbanka</a> was at the centre of the <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/laundromat/">Russian Laundromat</a> investigations in 2014. ABLV, another Latvian bank, was exposed by the US authorities for their involvement in a <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-names-ablv-bank-latvia-institution-primary-money-laundering-concern-and">wide array of illicit conduct</a> last year, causing it to <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2018/02/28/why-the-u-s-treasury-killed-a-latvian-bank/#4c8d0c4d7adc">shut down</a>. And of course there is the infamous case of Danske Bank in <a href="https://voices.transparency.org/why-danske-bank-estonia-appears-in-so-many-money-laundering-scandals-424047fe987c">Estonia</a>, the many threads of which have made it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/sep/20/danske-bank-money-laundering-is-biggest-scandal-in-europe-european-commission">the largest money laundering scandal in Europe</a>. Ever.</p><p>In contrast, things have been quiet in Lithuania. With a relatively small banking sector, Lithuania’s financial system was not known as a target for criminals and the corrupt seeking an entry point to the European Union (EU) single market.</p><p>But now, in the aftershock of a <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/troikalaundromat/vast-offshore-network-moved-billions-with-help-from-major-russian-bank">new investigation</a> published this week by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), Lithuania must brace for a reputational crisis.</p><p>Just two weeks ago, in February 2019, an extensive investigation by the Swedish broadcaster SVT revealed that at least US$5.8 billion of the dirty money that passed through Danske Bank came from another Nordic bank, <strong>Swedbank</strong>.<strong> </strong>This Swedish bank <a href="https://www.svt.se/special/swedbank/english/">allegedly allowed transactions</a> from 50 of its suspicious accounts for nearly a decade. Money was funneled through all three Baltic branches, including <a href="https://www.svt.se/special/swedbank/english/yanukovych/">Lithuania</a> — where an alleged bribe of US$4.2 million was transferred for the ultimate benefit of Ukraine’s corrupt ex-president Viktor Yanukovych.</p><p>In <a href="https://www.lb.lt/en/news/bank-of-lithuania-to-assist-in-investigation-of-alleged-money-laundering-cases">response</a> to the findings, the Bank of Lithuania — the country’s central bank — stated that it has “a zero-tolerance approach to money laundering” and will help Estonian and Swedish authorities uncover the truth. The Bank of Lithuania also insisted that the country’s share of non-resident clients that may potentially pose a money laundering risk is one of the lowest in the EU; and that “factual data shows that the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing in Lithuania is not high”.</p><p>The <a href="http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/j-m/lithuania/documents/mutualevaluationoflithuania.html">latest mutual evaluation of Lithuania</a> conducted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) — an international body responsible for setting anti-money laundering standards — partially confirms this statement. The evaluation shows that after <strong>ŪKIO bankas</strong> went bankrupt in 2013, the number of bank accounts held by non-residents, considered as high-risk for money laundering, dropped dramatically. Before 2013, ŪKIO bankas accounted for a significant share of Lithuania’s non-resident customers.</p><p>According to this week’s investigation by OCCRP, some of these non-resident customers were linked to a massive money laundering scheme, the <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/troikalaundromat/vast-offshore-network-moved-billions-with-help-from-major-russian-bank">Troika Laundromat</a>. The scheme operated from inside the Russian investment bank Troika Dialog and involved more than 70 offshore companies registered in places such as the British Virgin Islands and Panama. At least 35 of these companies had accounts with ŪKIO bankas in Lithuania and were used to move more than US$4.6 billion between 2006 and early 2013.</p><p>The findings of the OCCRP investigation raises questions as to whether anti-money laundering supervision in Lithuania is fit for purpose. If the share of non-resident high-risk customers is so small, as the Bank of Lithuania insists, should it not have been easier for the authorities to detect and stop the scheme?</p><h4><strong>Red flags everywhere</strong></h4><p>If the value of transactions and number of accounts — at least 35 accounts belonging to companies registered in tax havens — were not enough to raise suspicions, there were other elements that should have. Documents reviewed by OCCRP show that the registered beneficial owners for many of the accounts were seasonal workers from Armenia. If the bank followed a proper due diligence process, they surely would have found that these individuals did not match the profile of a company owner involved in million-dollar transactions in another jurisdiction.</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FY6z0G8liiKQ%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DY6z0G8liiKQ&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FY6z0G8liiKQ%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/15ed2bc670d048e3c58413761f72aa87/href">https://medium.com/media/15ed2bc670d048e3c58413761f72aa87/href</a></iframe><p>The purpose of these transactions was not always very convincing either, as documented in the written <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/troikalaundromat/vast-offshore-network-moved-billions-with-help-from-major-russian-bank">exchange</a> between ŪKIO employees. Inexplicably, the transactions weren’t stopped and no suspicious activities seem to have been reported by the bank.</p><p>Considering that the bank in question held most of the high-risk non-resident accounts in the country, the low number of submitted suspicious transaction reports should have served as a warning sign to the authorities.</p><p>In addition, at the time when the Troika Laundromat was fully operational, the Bank of Lithuania investigated whether ŪKIO had been one of the banks involved in the Russian Laundromat. The investigation seemed to have been quite narrow in focus, as the authorities didn’t find any pointers to a larger money laundering scheme.</p><p>Lithuanian authorities looked closer at ŪKIO at least one more time. When the bank went bankrupt in 2013, the circumstances around its insolvency led the authorities to investigate whether it had been defrauded. The Bank of Lithuania <a href="https://rm.coe.int/committee-of-experts-on-the-evaluation-of-anti-money-laundering-measur/16809247ed">found</a> that the main owner of ŪKIO had embezzled the bank’s money using three fake loans and shell companies. The embezzled funds were sent out of the country and the <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/28-ccwatch/cc-watch-indepth/9036-the-wayward-millions-of-lithuania-s-runaway-banker">owner fled to Russia</a>. The investigation led to the sanctioning of ŪKIO’s external auditor <a href="http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/WGB(2017)70/FINAL&amp;docLanguage=En">Deloitte</a> and the loss of license for one of its auditors. But even then, the authorities do not seem to have extended their investigations to look at bank’s other business.</p><h4><strong>Insufficient supervision</strong></h4><p>The Bank of Lithuania is responsible for prudential and anti-money laundering supervision of financial institutions. The Bank of Lithuania supervises 470 financial market participants — including banks — using risk-based supervision. This type of supervisory approach conforms with best practice but is only effective if (a) there is a good understanding of risks and (b) actions are taken to mitigate these and detect potential wrongdoing.</p><p>While there is a recognition that the Bank of Lithuania has made noteworthy improvements in the last two years, recent anti-money laundering reviews conducted by <a href="https://rm.coe.int/committee-of-experts-on-the-evaluation-of-anti-money-laundering-measur/16809247ed">FATF</a> and <a href="http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/WGB(2017)70/FINAL&amp;docLanguage=En">OECD</a> show that significant shortcomings remain, particularly related to risk-based supervision and level of resources available to supervisory bodies.</p><p>In 2014–2015, key government bodies such as the Financial Crime Investigation Service and the Bank of Lithuania, carried out <a href="http://www.fntt.lt/en/money-laundering-prevention/lithuanian-national-risk-assessment-of-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing/228">Lithuania’s anti-money laundering risk assessment</a>. The report, however, does not address the risks around cross-border illicit payments, particularly those from and to higher risk countries. According to the 2018 FATF evaluation, this gap still impacts authorities’ current understanding of money laundering vulnerabilities in the country. Further, the Bank of Lithuania seems to primarily rely on off-site inspections that draw on annual reports submitted by the financial institutions.</p><p>In higher risk cases, this approach might not be sufficient. Preventive random on-site inspections should be the norm to review whether financial institutions are complying with their anti-money laundering obligations and detecting any suspicious activity. In a <a href="http://www1.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/Lithuania-Phase-2-Report-ENG.pdf">2017 evaluation</a>, the OECD concluded that inspections of financial institutions in Lithuania appear insufficient. The report recommends that the Bank of Lithuania allocate sufficient resources to ensure more rigorous supervision of reporting entities.</p><p>The issue of resources is also raised in the <a href="http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/j-m/lithuania/documents/mer-lithuania-2018.html">FATF assessment</a>, although the report recognises that the Bank of Lithuania has demonstrated a strong commitment during the last two years, in particular to increasing its resource capacity, so as to continue to move towards comprehensive risk-based supervision. As of December 2017, the Bank of Lithuania had <a href="http://www1.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/Lithuania-Phase-2-Report-ENG.pdf">seven staff members</a> allocated to the supervision of anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing systems, information technology and operational risk in all financial market participants. This number is hardly sufficient to effectively supervise the 470 entities under its responsibility, particularly considering that their use of automated processes in investigations is limited.</p><p>The FATF report stresses that Lithuania’s financial intelligence unit, Financial Crime Investigation Service, which is responsible for collecting and analysing suspicious transactions reports submitted by financial institutions and other professionals, also appears to be “slightly ill-equipped in terms of staffing and analytical tools”.</p><p>If these shortcomings are not addressed, there is a risk that supervisory authorities would fail to detect a similar scheme if there were to happen now.</p><h4><strong>What next?</strong></h4><p>Recent revelations show that no country is immune to corruption and money laundering. Serious steps need to be taken to ensure Lithuania’s financial system cannot be misused by criminals as an entry point to the EU financial market. The authorities should thoroughly investigate the freshly unearthed schemes, identify suspicions accounts and transactions and take the necessary measures to sanction those involved. Next, Lithuanian financial supervisors must share their findings with other countries so that further investigations can be conducted into the origin and final destination of the money that passed through ŪKIO and Swedbank.</p><p>In order to prevent another Laundromat in the future, supervisory bodies need to gain a better understanding of cross-border money laundering schemes so they can deal with the problem effectively. Access to technology as well as adequate human and financial resources are key. On-site inspections should be carried out more frequently, particularly in higher-risk sectors.</p><p>Moreover, supervisory authorities should provide guidance and training on customer due diligence and on identifying and reporting suspicious transaction reports to financial institutions and other professionals. As reported by FATF, the current number and quality of <a href="https://rm.coe.int/committee-of-experts-on-the-evaluation-of-anti-money-laundering-measur/16809247ed">suspicious transaction reports</a> submitted by anti-money laundering obliged entities in Lithuania is not satisfactory. This has had an impact on the detection of wrongdoing but also on the authorities’ understanding of money laundering risks in the longer term.</p><p>Lithuania’s reputation has been tainted because of the Swedbank and ŪKIO revelations, and now Lithuania’s financial sector needs to work hard to regain trust from citizens, customers and partners, sending a strong signal that dirty money is not welcome.</p><p>…</p><p><em>Transparency International is a member of the </em><a href="https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/activity/global_anti_corruption_consortium"><em>Global Anti-Corruption Consortium</em></a><em>, a groundbreaking partnership to accelerate the global fight against corruption by bringing together advocacy and investigative journalism, spearheaded by The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c3b3ebba1618" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[European banks in money laundering scandals: what lessons for the EU?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mairarmartini/european-banks-in-money-laundering-scandals-what-lessons-for-the-eu-d743f3d7ac9b?source=rss-ac9e3d2cb672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d743f3d7ac9b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[money-laundering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[danske-bank]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eu-supervision]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[laundromat]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maíra Martini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Feb 2019 22:43:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-27T12:15:31.730Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>by Maíra Martini and Laure Brillaud</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CvmZrPYKTf642H3Uy4QLJw.jpeg" /><figcaption>© European Union 2018 — European Central Bank</figcaption></figure><p>What do all recent major grand corruption scandals have in common? Individuals and companies involved in the schemes like the <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/laundromat/the-russian-laundromat-exposed/">Russian</a> and <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/azerbaijanilaundromat/">Azerbaijani</a> Laundromats and <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-43825294">Operation Car Wash</a> in Brazil relied on European banks to pay bribes, transfer illicit funds and hide the proceeds of corruption. In less prominent schemes, we have also seen that kleptocrats and their family members also used European banks to launder reputation and the proceeds of crime: the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/world/europe/angola-portugal-money-laundering.html">Dos Santos</a> family from Angola, the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/french-court-finds-african-playboy-teodorin-obiang-guilty-of-embezzlement/a-41146626">Obiangs</a> from Equatorial Guinea, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/25/viktor-yanukovych-gone-where-ukraine-missing-millions">Viktor Yanukovych</a> from Ukraine and <a href="https://www.moneylaundering.com/news/dutch-prosecutors-assess-record-money-laundering-penalty-against-ing/">Gulnara Karimova</a> from Uzbekistan, among a long list of others.</p><p>If we take the Russian Laundromat as an example, more than US$13 billion of illicit funds were transferred to the Trasta Komercbanka in Latvia and, from there, around the world. From 2010 to 2014, 21 shell companies made almost 27 thousand payments via 732 foreign banks. Many of these banks were located in Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK — all EU countries.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*o-2cx0miI3mwkZAp7soOPg.png" /><figcaption>Banks that received the Russian Laundromat money, according to OCCRP. <a href="https://www.occrp.org/assets/laundromat/BarChartBank-big.png">View full infographic</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>The largest part of this money passed through the Estonian branch of <a href="https://voices.transparency.org/why-danske-bank-estonia-appears-in-so-many-money-laundering-scandals-424047fe987c">Danske Bank</a>, Denmark’s biggest bank, which is in <a href="https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/danske_bank_scandal_needs_full_accountability_not_scapegoating">the spotlight</a> for having allowed around 9.5 million payments from high-risk customers, including as part of other money laundering schemes such as the Azerbaijani Laundromat. The total amount of these payments was around US$ 230 billion (EUR 200 billion), making it <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/sep/20/danske-bank-money-laundering-is-biggest-scandal-in-europe-european-commission">the largest money laundering scandal in Europe</a>.</p><p><a href="https://voices.transparency.org/why-danske-bank-estonia-appears-in-so-many-money-laundering-scandals-424047fe987c">Why Danske Bank Estonia appears in so many money-laundering scandals</a></p><h3>Bad laws or poor practice?</h3><p>Over the past few years, the European Union (EU) has strengthened its anti-money laundering rules and regulations. Yet, supervision and enforcement by national regulators and law enforcement bodies in Member States has been inconsistent.</p><p>In some cases, supervisory bodies reacted only after the US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) took <a href="https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-and-regulations/311-special-measures">special measures</a> or investigative journalists <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/20/the-global-laundromat-how-did-it-work-and-who-benefited">uncovered wrongdoing</a>. These individual episodes undermine the integrity and reputation of the EU financial system as a whole, suggesting it relies on outsiders to point out failures.</p><p>Even when malpractice is identified, national authorities often don’t take appropriate action. When they are applied, fines are often too low. Information on sanctions is not always publicly available.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> What’s worse, high profile financial institutions and their senior management seem untouchable, with very few being prosecuted for facilitating money laundering.</p><p>A national audit of the Latvian banking system following the Laundromat led to just US$ 850,000 (EUR 640,000) in <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/latvian-member-of-european-central-bank-detained-in-probe/2018/02/18/325c7e28-14b3-11e8-930c-45838ad0d77a_story.html?utm_term=.100deba2e7fd">fines against three banks</a>. Danske Bank was reprimanded but has not faced any financial sanctions in spite of widespread evidence of wrongdoing. Danish and Estonian authorities opened criminal investigations as late as August 2018 — four years after the Estonian regulator first pointed out serious shortcomings. In December, Estonia <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-danske-bank-moneylaundering/estonia-makes-first-arrests-over-danske-money-laundering-idUSKBN1OI0NL">arrested 10 client managers</a> as part of the investigation. Last week, the Estonian Financial Supervision and Resolution Authority ordered Danske Bank to shut down its Tallinn branch. It remains to be seen, however, if the bank and its senior management will face any other sanctions.</p><h3>An EU problem</h3><p>The EU recognises that the corrupt and criminals often operate across different Member States and that their assets, including bank accounts, are often located in others. Given the cross-border dimension of serious crimes, including terrorism, and of related financial activities, competent authorities carrying out investigations often need to access information on bank accounts held in other States.</p><p>The need to improve cooperation between national authorities is clear. This should not happen in an<em> ad hoc</em> fashion on a case-by-case basis; instead, cooperation and information-sharing should happen throughout the various phases of the supervisory processes, including prudential supervision — standards that require firms to control risks and hold adequate capital, with the goal of protecting the markets.</p><p>Nevertheless, in the wake of recent money laundering scandals the question is whether relying only on national authorities for anti-money laundering supervision is sufficient or whether the EU should have more responsibility when it comes to money laundering involving financial institutions in Member States. Given the scale and number of scandals in recent years, the reasonable answer would be a firm “yes” to the latter question.</p><h3>Failure to supervise</h3><p>When it comes to anti-money laundering standards, the EU seeks to ensure that Member States consistently comply by means of its Directives. The same, however, cannot be said about supervision, where rules are not precise enough. Member States have divergent supervisory practices and have allocated different levels of resources to tackle financial crime. In many cases, these practices have proven ineffective in detecting malpractice by banks in a timely manner and resulting in sanctions.</p><p>Currently, the <strong>European Central Bank </strong>(ECB) is tasked with prudential supervision of EU financial institutions, but the <a href="https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/publications/newsletter/2018/html/ssm.nl180516_2.en.html">scope is very limited</a> when it comes to anti-money laundering. This isn’t optimal, many of the issues under the responsibility of the ECB — licensing, qualifying holdings proceedings and “fit and proper” checks — would benefit from information related to anti-money laundering practices of the financial institutions it’s watching. As things stand, those are under the exclusive responsibility of national authorities.</p><p>The <strong>European Banking Authority</strong> (EBA) oversees Member States’ anti-money laundering and prudential supervision of banks. In particular, the EBA may investigate “breaches of Union law” and, in some circumstances, even override individual decisions of national authorities. However, this has not been done in a proactive and timely manner:</p><p>● In July 2018, Malta became the first Member State to <a href="https://eba.europa.eu/-/eba-issues-recommendation-to-the-maltese-financial-intelligence-analysis-unit-in-relation-to-its-supervision-of-pilatus-bank">receive a recommendation from the EBA</a> for breaching Union law in the areas of money laundering. This was only done in reaction to a significant supervisory failure.</p><p>● Last week, the EBA <a href="https://eba.europa.eu/-/eba-opens-formal-investigation-into-possible-breach-of-union-law-by-the-estonian-and-danish-competent-authorities-regarding-money-laundering-activitie">opened a formal investigation</a> into a possible breach of Union law by the Estonian Financial Services Authority and the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority over Danske Bank and its Estonian branch. The decision to open an investigation followed a <a href="https://eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/2608715/Letter+EBA+DK+and+EE.pdf/8fcb4a42-3198-4a8e-861c-c81bee480911">request from the European Commission</a>.</p><p>There seems to be a broad consensus emerging — from <a href="https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-eu-banks-moneylaundering/ecb-calls-for-eu-agency-to-combat-money-laundering-idUKKCN1LN1KZ">ECB representatives</a> to international <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/0b2476e4-b02b-11e8-99ca-68cf89602132">media and experts</a> — that the current system is inadequate, and that more needs to be done to improve anti-money laundering supervision in the EU.</p><h3>What is the EU doing?</h3><p>In response to recent money laundering scandals, in September 2018 European Commission President Juncker <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-supervisory-authorities-regulation-646_en.pdf">announced new potential measures</a> to strengthen the supervision of EU financial institutions to better address money-laundering and terrorist financing threats.</p><h3>Jean-Claude Juncker on Twitter</h3><p>The geopolitical situation makes this Europe&#39;s hour: the time for European sovereignty has come. #SOTEU https://t.co/hfYvgIxFMf</p><p>Specifically, the European Commission proposes to revamp the EBA to reinforce its supervisory role in anti-money laundering. If approved, the EBA will have powers to, among others, request national anti-money laundering supervisors to investigate potential material breaches and to request them to consider targeted actions such as sanctions and address decisions directly to individual financial sector operators if national authorities do not act.</p><p>The European Commission is calling on the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union to endorse the proposed amendments and to adopt the relevant legislative proposals by early 2019 at the latest. There are concerns, however, that these new powers won’t be sufficient to ensure effective supervision.</p><p>The EBA already has some jurisdiction over anti-money laundering but clearly lacks adequate resources and capacity to carry out its functions. It is unclear to what extent these tasks will be matched with resources. As of late 2018, the EBA had an equivalent of <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/ea95c75c-b412-11e8-bbc3-ccd7de085ffe">1.8 staff members</a> working on money-laundering issues.</p><h3>Who should watch Member States?</h3><p>A <a href="http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/PC-19_2018-241018_.pdf">recent paper</a> published by a Brussels think tank, Bruegel, makes a compelling argument for EU-wide anti-money laundering supervision by highlighting gaps in the current framework. According to the authors, the existing framework of an integrated, enforceable single financial market policy and of national anti-money laundering supervisory structures create loopholes and opportunities for abusing the system. <br> <br>Alarmingly, anti-money laundering supervisory weaknesses in one member state make it attractive for money launderers interested in gaining access to the entire single market. The authors also highlight the risk that this could create a constituency against anti-money laundering enforcement in the country — criminals and their representatives, service providers and others — that could even lead to policy and government capture.</p><p>Some experts are advocating for a new European anti-money laundering body, that would be more suitable to address existing problems related to supervision and enforcement of anti-money laundering rules. Bruegel recommends a unitary architecture centred on a new European anti-money laundering authority:</p><blockquote>“The imperative of establishing sound supervisory incentives to fight illicit finance effectively demands a stronger EU-level role in AML supervision. We recommend a unitary architecture centred on a new European AML Authority that would work on the basis of deep relationships with national authorities such as financial intelligence units and law enforcement agencies. The new authority should have high standards of governance and independence, publish all its decisions and be empowered to impose sufficiently large fines to deter malpractice.”</blockquote><p>The Commission seems to be of the view that it is too early to discuss the need for a new body but it will consider this discussion in its longer-term reform plans. According to them, there are other measures that can be taken in the short- to medium-term, such as the implementation of the 5th EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) by Member States and improved financial intelligence unit (FIU) coordination.</p><p>While it is important that Member States duly implement the 5th EU AMLD, the Directive’s primarily aim is to improve legal frameworks to prevent and detect money laundering. It does not provide detailed guidance or any sort of harmonisation related to supervision. In recent cases such as the Danske Bank in Estonia or <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ing-groep-settlement-money-laundering/dutch-bank-ing-fined-900-million-for-failing-to-spot-money-laundering-idUSKCN1LK0PE">ING in the Netherlands</a>, banks had inadequate procedures in breach of international standards as well as EU and domestic rules.</p><p>Would the situation have been different had the provisions of the 5th EU AMLD already been in place? If the supervisory approach was to remain the same, then probably not.</p><p>Money laundering and corruption <a href="https://twitter.com/anticorruption/status/1042699890604822528">go hand in hand</a>. At Transparency International, we believe that effective supervision and enforcement against money laundering are key to stopping corruption. At the EU level in particular, the existence of a unitary financial market calls for better supervisory integration. Decisive action from national authorities to stop dirty money from finding its way into the EU single market is long overdue. While the exact institutional arrangements still need to be worked out, the EU undoubtedly needs to ensure that Member States take this task seriously and consistently.</p><p>— — — — — —</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1"><em>[1]</em></a><em> The Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD) attempts to close this loophole by requiring Member States to issue a public statement in the case of administrative sanctions, identifying the natural or legal persons involved in the wrongdoing. EU Member States should have transposed the 4th EU AMLD by mid-2018. If Member States implement the requirement adequately, transparency around administrative sanctions related to non-compliance with anti-money laundering obligations will improve in the next years. It is important to note, however, that at least a summary of the actions taken by the natural or legal person that caused the breach of AML rules must be included in the public statement.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d743f3d7ac9b" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Need help laundering money? What about buying your own bank?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mairarmartini/need-help-laundering-money-what-about-buying-your-own-bank-5127457f09a8?source=rss-ac9e3d2cb672------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5127457f09a8</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[odebrecht]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[money-laundering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venezuela]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[anti-money-laundering]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corruption]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maíra Martini]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 04 Dec 2018 16:27:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-05T16:05:19.548Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qoCn9t_oRXEXz86pV0zLoA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/uXWPg9uMwt8?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Freddie Collins</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/search/photos/bolivars-banknotes?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Last week, the US Department of Justice <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/venezuelan-billionaire-news-network-owner-former-venezuelan-national-treasurer-and-former">announced charges</a> against a Venezuelan businessman, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1112816/download">Raul Gorrin Belisario</a>, for his suspected role in a billion-dollar corruption scheme. Two other Venezuelans involved, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1112821/download">Gabriel Arturo Jimenez Aray</a> and <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1112826/download">Alejandro Andrade Cedeno</a>, pleaded guilty and provided details of how bribe payments were made and money was laundered.</p><p>Gorrin owns Globovision, a private news network in Venezuela that once was very critical of the Venezuelan government. Gorrin purchased the channel in 2013 and since then, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-46270105">according to reporters</a>, the news network has become much friendlier to Maduro’s administration.</p><p>According to <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1112816/download">the indictment</a>, between 2008 and 2017 Gorrin paid more than US$150 million in bribes to officials in Venezuela’s treasury, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1112826/download">including former national treasurer Alejandro Andrade</a> for access to currency deals. Through allegedly illegal payments, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1112826/download">Gorrin got permission</a> to carry out the US dollar to bolivar exchange process with the Venezuelan National Treasury which allowed him to obtain substantial profits on the exchange transactions.</p><p>The funds used to bribe officials were allegedly <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/venezuelan-billionaire-news-network-owner-former-venezuelan-national-treasurer-and-former">wired to accounts in the US</a> from Swiss accounts held by three Panamanian shell companies that were owned by Gorrin. The businessman also allegedly used his personal account at HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) SA to wire money to the US. None of the banks used have been accused of wrongdoing by US authorities.</p><p>With these funds, Gorrin allegedly <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/venezuelan-billionaire-news-network-owner-former-venezuelan-national-treasurer-and-former">purchased and paid expenses</a> related to private jets, yachts, multiple champion horses, watches, luxury cars and real estate in the US.</p><p><strong>So far the scheme seems “dirty business as usual”, right? Multiple shell companies, multiple offshore bank accounts, purchases of luxury goods in foreign countries using funds from different bank accounts. But there was something new in this scheme.</strong></p><p>According to the US Department of Justice, around 2010, Gorrin, Jimenez and others <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/venezuelan-billionaire-news-network-owner-former-venezuelan-national-treasurer-and-former">bought a bank</a> in the Dominican Republic — Banco Peravia — for the purpose of laundering money and paying bribes to Venezuelan officials. A number of Peravia’s executives have been <a href="https://elnacional.com.do/fiscalia-deposita-25-mil-pruebas-fraude-peravia/">under investigation</a> since 2015 for allegedly defrauding the bank.</p><h4>While buying a bank with the primary aim of using it to launder money seems something extreme, it is not the first time it has happened — and probably won’t be the last if supervision and control remain lax.</h4><p><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-06-08/no-one-has-ever-made-a-corruption-machine-like-this-one">Another bank</a> in a small Caribbean island was purchased by the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht and reportedly used to move dirty money and pay bribes to officials in at least 12 different countries. In the end of 2010, two of the Odebrecht’s executives responsible for running the “unofficial” international operations of the company decided to <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-06-08/no-one-has-ever-made-a-corruption-machine-like-this-one">buy 51 per cent</a> of the Antigua branch of the Austrian Meinl Bank AG that at the time was largely inactive.</p><p>They reportedly paid US$4 million for it and agreed with Odebrecht they would still get a commission of two per cent on the transactions carried out on behalf of the company through the bank. According to <a href="https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/odebrecht-comprou-banco-para-distribuir-propinas-19543844">information provided</a> by the executives in their plea agreements with Brazilian authorities, they were running the bank from São Paulo and most (if not all) of the transactions made by the bank were related to Odebrecht. As highlighted in Odebrecht’s <a href="https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/919916/download">plea agreement</a> with United States, Brazilian and Swiss authorities, “[B]y virtue of this acquisition, other members of the conspiracy, including senior politicians from multiple countries receiving bribe payments, could open bank accounts and receive transfers without the risk of raising attention. By acquiring the bank, members of the conspiracy, including Odebrecht Employee 4 and others, willfully facilitated the illegal payment scheme.”</p><p>Money was transferred from Meinl Bank Antigua to other banks such as the Andorra Private Bank (BPA), allegedly mainly to <a href="https://elpais.com/elpais/2017/07/27/inenglish/1501179676_398397.html">pay bribes</a> to politically exposed persons, according to Odebrecht’s former lawyer. There is no sign that authorities in the country (or in Austria, where Meinl Bank is located) asked questions or investigated the bank at any time during the period Odebrecht used the Meinl Bank Antigua for money laundering. Only in December 2017 did the Antiguan Financial Services Regulatory Commission <a href="https://www.fsrc.gov.ag/images/pdf/banking/Notice%20_of_Licence_Revocation_-_Meinl_Bank_(Antigua)_Ltd.pdf">revoke</a> Meinl Bank Antigua’s license.</p><p>These cases add to the recent examples where poor supervision has reportedly allowed millions to be laundered. (See my blog post on <a href="https://voices.transparency.org/why-danske-bank-estonia-appears-in-so-many-money-laundering-scandals-424047fe987c">Why Danske Bank Estonia appears in so many money laundering scandals</a>). National supervisory bodies have a duty to ensure banks operating within their territory maintain sound anti-money laundering risk management so they are not misused by criminals, but also to protect the integrity of the financial system as a whole.</p><p>Supervisors need to assess financial institutions’ anti-money laundering policies, procedures and controls on a regular basis through off-site and on-site inspections. It is also vital that licensing, registration and other controls implemented by supervisors prevent individuals involved in criminal activities or their associates from holding or controlling a management function in financial institutions.</p><p>Effective supervision should lead to dissuasive and proportionate sanctions to punish misconduct by a specific bank and also deter them and others from wrongdoing. To fulfill this purpose, supervisors should seek to publicise the names of banks that are found to have money laundering failings, spell out what the bank did wrong and how the amount of the fine was determined. More importantly, in addition to administrative fines, banks and senior managers involved in money laundering should also face appropriate criminal investigation and prosecution. Otherwise, be it a small or a big bank, fines may become just another cost of doing business while crime continues to pay.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5127457f09a8" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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