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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Manar Makram on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Manar Makram on Medium]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Catching AD Enumeration with Decoys: A Practical SharpHound Detection Guide]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@manarmakramrizk/catching-ad-enumeration-with-decoys-a-practical-sharphound-detection-guide-ae0f1612cfb2?source=rss-5a2c7e330eb1------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Manar Makram]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2026 17:46:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-22T17:46:53.069Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>What SharpHound does and why it matters</h3><p>SharpHound is the data collector component of BloodHound, the attack path analysis tool developed by SpecterOps. In the context of an Active Directory intrusion, it is almost always the first automated tool an attacker deploys after gaining initial domain access. Its purpose is to enumerate everything about the AD environment in a single automated pass: every user, every computer, every group, every group membership, every session, every local admin relationship, and every access control entry on every object. The output is a ZIP archive that BloodHound imports to produce an attack path graph showing exactly how to reach Domain Admin from any starting point.</p><p>SharpHound achieves this through two primary mechanisms running concurrently. The first is a large volume of LDAP queries directed at the Domain Controller, retrieving object attributes from the AD database. The second is SMB-based session and local admin enumeration, connecting to each domain-joined machine to determine who is currently logged in and which accounts hold local administrator rights. The combination of both mechanisms running simultaneously in a short window is what produces BloodHound’s complete picture of the environment. Understanding this mechanism is the foundation for everything in this report.</p><h3>Why existing behavior-based rules are not sufficient on their own</h3><p>Behavior-based detection has one structural limitation that cannot be designed away: it depends on volume and timing. Every threshold-based rule can be defeated by a patient attacker who throttles their queries below the threshold. One LDAP query every 45 seconds instead of 15 per minute looks identical to a legitimate application in a volume-based rule. The behavior is still happening, but slowly enough to blend into background noise.</p><h3>So Why Add Decoy Objects?</h3><p>Decoy objects solve this specific gap with a completely different mechanism: <strong>they do not care about volume or timing at all.</strong> They care about whether something touched them at all.</p><p>This makes decoy objects a <strong>complementary layer</strong>, not a replacement. Together, the two approaches cover each other’s blind spots</p><p>when decoys can be bypassed? an attacker who already knows exactly which objects to query and deliberately avoids anything that looks like a decoy. This requires prior knowledge of the environment which means the attacker would have had to enumerate it first, triggering our behavior-based rules in the process.</p><p>In practice, these two layers are <strong>mutually reinforcing</strong>: the behavior-based rules catch broad enumeration, and the decoy objects catch anything that slips through by being slow or targeted differently than expected.</p><h3>How AD deception exploits SharpHound’s indiscriminate collection</h3><p>SharpHound collects data by querying Active Directory for all objects matching its LDAP filters, then retrieving properties for each one. It does not distinguish between real accounts and decoy accounts it retrieves all of them, because that is the only way to build a complete picture of the environment. Any user object, computer object, or group object in the domain will be enumerated.</p><p>Windows generates Event 4662 (an operation was performed on an object) whenever an AD object with auditing configured is accessed. By creating AD objects that serve no operational purpose and enabling Read all properties and Read permissions auditing on them for Everyone, any process that reads those objects will generate a 4662 event. Because the objects are fake and have no legitimate use, there is no benign explanation for anything touching them the event is, by construction, evidence of enumeration.</p><p>The critical technical detail established during investigation is that when Windows forwards Event 4662 to a SIEM, it does not forward the human-readable object name. It forwards the Object GUID. This means the detection rule cannot be written to match on Manar.Makram or SRV-BACKUP01 — it must match on the specific GUIDs assigned to those objects, which were collected when the objects were created.</p><h3>Configuration and Creating Decoy Objects on the Domain Controller</h3><h4>Step 1: Enable Directory Service Access Auditing</h4><p>Open an elevated Command Prompt on the DC and run:</p><blockquote><em>auditpol /set /subcategory:”Directory Service Access” /Success:Enable</em></blockquote><p>Verify it is active:</p><blockquote><em>auditpol /get /subcategory:”Directory Service Access”</em></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/826/0*197XvGw2fJtVs1hP" /></figure><blockquote><em>This is the policy that generates Event ID 4662 when any AD object with auditing configured is accessed. It is enabled by default on DCs but worth confirming explicitly.</em></blockquote><h3>Before You Start: Enable Advanced Features in ADUC</h3><ol><li>Open <strong>Active Directory Users and Computers</strong> (ADUC)</li><li>Click <strong>View</strong> in the top menu</li><li>Click <strong>Advanced Features</strong></li></ol><p>This is required — without it you won’t see the Security/Auditing tabs later.</p><h4>Step 2: Create the Three Decoy Objects</h4><h4>1) Create the Decoy User</h4><p><strong>Step 1: Create the account</strong></p><ol><li>Right-click on <strong>Users</strong> container (or any OU you want)</li><li>Click <strong>New → User</strong></li></ol><p>Fill in:</p><ul><li>First name: Manar</li><li>Last name: Makram</li><li>Full name: Manar Makram</li><li>User logon name: Manar.Makram</li></ul><p>Click <strong>Next</strong></p><ol><li>Set a strong password: Dec0y2026!</li><li>Uncheck <strong>User must change password at next logon</strong></li><li>Check <strong>Password never expires</strong></li></ol><p>Click <strong>Next → Finish</strong></p><p><strong>Step 2: Add realistic details</strong></p><ol><li>Right-click Manar Makram → <strong>Properties</strong></li><li>Go to <strong>General</strong> tab:</li></ol><ul><li>Description: Junior SOC Analyst</li><li>Office: HQ - Floor 3</li><li>Telephone: 555-0142</li><li>Email: Manar.Makram@noekirax.com</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/933/0*qZtVpxDefUZKefkt" /></figure><p>3. Go to <strong>Organization</strong> tab:</p><ul><li>Title: SOC Analyst</li><li>Department: SOC Operations</li></ul><p>Click <strong>Apply → OK</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/933/0*OH1UV0k2Ko3qMoJ5" /></figure><p><strong>Step 3: Enable Auditing on the Decoy User</strong></p><p>Right-click Manar Makram → <strong>Properties</strong></p><ol><li>Go to <strong>Security</strong> tab → click <strong>Advanced</strong></li><li>Click <strong>Auditing</strong> tab</li><li>Click <strong>Add</strong></li><li>Click <strong>Select a principal</strong> → type Everyone → click <strong>Check Names</strong> → <strong>OK</strong></li><li>Set <strong>Type</strong> to Success</li><li>Set <strong>Applies to</strong> to This object only</li><li>Scroll down the permissions list:</li></ol><ul><li><strong>Uncheck</strong> everything at the top</li><li><strong>Check only</strong> these two: Read all properties &amp; Read permissions</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*8sZ_1Y_aaIoQVqcB" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/963/0*mucPsCpu1gIxPFL5" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/962/0*q5ZiNgZqliHSqLej" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/961/0*Wen7ZYIMml8O2a1V" /></figure><h4>2) Create the Decoy Computer</h4><p><strong>Step 1: Create the account</strong></p><p>Right-click on <strong>Computers</strong> container</p><ol><li>Click <strong>New → Computer</strong></li><li>Fill in:</li></ol><ul><li>Computer name: SRV-BACKUP01</li><li>Click <strong>Next → Next → Finish</strong></li></ul><p><strong>Step 2: Add realistic details</strong></p><p>Right-click SRV-BACKUP01 → <strong>Properties</strong></p><ol><li>Go to <strong>General</strong> tab: Description: Backup Server - IT Infrastructure</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/961/0*kiAooKKbp2LAvbzW" /></figure><p><strong>Step 3: Enable Auditing on the Decoy Computer</strong></p><p>Right-click SRV-BACKUP01 → <strong>Properties</strong></p><ol><li>Go to <strong>Security</strong> tab → click <strong>Advanced</strong></li><li>Click <strong>Auditing</strong> tab</li><li>Click <strong>Add</strong></li><li>Click <strong>Select a principal</strong> → type Everyone → <strong>Check Names</strong> → <strong>OK</strong></li><li>Set <strong>Type</strong> to Success</li><li>Set <strong>Applies to</strong> to This object only</li><li>Scroll down:</li></ol><ul><li><strong>Uncheck</strong> everything</li><li><strong>Check only:</strong>Read all properties &amp; Read permissions</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/961/0*P6xyMw40NEW70wy4" /></figure><h4>3) Create the Decoy Group</h4><p><strong>Step 1: Create the group</strong></p><p>Right-click on <strong>Users</strong> container (or same OU as the decoy user)</p><ol><li>Click <strong>New → Group</strong></li><li>Fill in:</li></ol><ul><li>Group name: Domain Admins Backup</li><li>Group scope: Global</li><li>Group type: Security</li></ul><p>Click <strong>OK</strong></p><p><strong>Step 2: Add realistic details</strong></p><p>Right-click Domain Admins Backup → <strong>Properties</strong></p><p>Go to <strong>General</strong> tab:</p><ul><li>Description: Secondary Admin Group - Infrastructure Team</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/961/0*zAqTcmy1FDDIJiD3" /></figure><p>Go to <strong>Members</strong> tab:</p><p>Click <strong>Add</strong></p><ul><li>Type Manar.Makram → <strong>Check Names</strong> → <strong>OK</strong></li></ul><p>Click <strong>Apply → OK</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/961/0*eMArG8B_AvcDViKI" /></figure><p><strong>Step 3: Enable Auditing on the Decoy Group</strong></p><p>Right-click Domain Admins Backup → <strong>Properties</strong></p><ol><li>Go to <strong>Security</strong> tab → click <strong>Advanced</strong></li><li>Click <strong>Auditing</strong> tab</li><li>Click <strong>Add</strong></li><li>Click <strong>Select a principal</strong> → type Everyone → <strong>Check Names</strong> → <strong>OK</strong></li><li>Set <strong>Type</strong> to Success</li><li>Set <strong>Applies to</strong> to This object only</li><li>Scroll down:</li></ol><ul><li><strong>Uncheck</strong> everything</li><li><strong>Check only:</strong></li><li>Read all properties &amp; Read permissions</li></ul><p>Click <strong>OK → Apply → OK</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/961/0*ZDKa2EaXDWQjwKb7" /></figure><h4>Step 3: Collect the GUID of Each Decoy Object</h4><pre><br>#Decoy User GUID<br>(Get-ADUser -Identity &quot;Manar.Makram&quot;).ObjectGUID​<br># Decoy Computer GUID<br>(Get-ADComputer -Identity &quot;SRV-BACKUP01&quot;).ObjectGUID​<br># Decoy Group GUID<br>(Get-ADGroup -Identity &quot;Domain Admins Backup&quot;).ObjectGUID<br></pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/961/0*kGgt37LYjPTDh8np" /></figure><p>From <strong>Active Directory Users and Computers</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/961/0*SUuVXjrHADdN95VI" /></figure><p><strong>Save all three GUIDs</strong> — they will be used in the Wazuh detection rule. The rule fires only on these specific GUIDs, which is what keeps it free of false positives.</p><blockquote><em>When Windows forwards Event 4662 to a SIEM, it does not forward the human-readable object name. It forwards the </em><strong><em>Object GUID</em></strong><em> instead. This is why we collect the GUIDs now and build the rule around them rather than around the object name.</em></blockquote><h3>Validating Decoy Detection: Event Viewer Investigation</h3><h4>Step 1: Trigger the Detection</h4><p>Before investigating, you need to generate the events. From WS1, run SharpHound:</p><p><strong>SharpHound:</strong></p><blockquote>.\SharpHound.exe -c All — Domain noekirax.com — OutputDirectory C:\Users\Tools\SharpHond</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*QrkGDlQ8I2JPLPLj" /></figure><p>Note the exact time you ran the tool you will use this as your time filter in Event Viewer.</p><h4>Step 2: Open Event Viewer on the DC</h4><ol><li>Log in to the <strong>Domain Controller</strong></li><li>In the left panel, expand:​</li><li>Windows Logs → Security</li></ol><h4>Step 3: Filter for Event ID 4662</h4><ol><li>In the right panel, click <strong>Filter Current Log</strong></li><li>In the <strong>Event ID</strong> field, type: 4662</li><li>Set the time range to cover the period when you ran the tool</li><li>Click <strong>OK</strong></li></ol><p>You should now see a list of 4662 events generated during the enumeration.</p><p>Step 4: Confirm All Three Decoy Objects Were Touched</p><p>Search through the filtered events and verify that all three of your decoy objects appear:</p><h4>Step 4: Confirm All Three Decoy Objects Were Touched</h4><p>Search through the filtered events and verify that all three of your decoy objects appear:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/963/0*VbLKaI3YsR6vFT1Q" /></figure><ul><li>Decoy Computer (SRV-BACKUP01) — identified by its GUID</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/687/0*MGH7Y8ooDzBuTmUQ" /></figure><ul><li>Decoy User (Manar Makram) — identified by its GUID</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/688/0*_32IDkcTwpEN6cnP" /></figure><ul><li>Decoy Group (Domain Admins Backup) — identified by its GUID</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/690/0*CvNrLwaVHtMgtQGd" /></figure><p>If all three appear, it confirms that the enumeration tool retrieved all AD objects without discrimination, including the ones you planted as traps.</p><h3>Development: Writing the Detection Rules</h3><h4>Decoy Object Detection Rules</h4><p>Three decoy objects were created in the lab domain: a user account (Manar.Makram), a computer account (SRV-BACKUP01), and a security group (Domain Admins Backup). Each object was created with realistic attributes to make it indistinguishable from a legitimate account at a glance — the user has a job title, department, and phone number; the computer has an operating system description; the group contains the fake user as a member and has &quot;Admin&quot; in its name to attract privilege-focused enumeration tools. Each object has auditing enabled on Read all properties and Read permissions for the Everyone principal, scoped to the object itself only.</p><p>The detection logic uses three separate rules, one per object, each matching on its specific GUID. A fourth rule correlates all three into a confirmed full-enumeration alert:</p><h4>3. Final Updated Rule Configuration</h4><p>XML</p><pre>&lt;rule id=&quot;100451&quot; level=&quot;14&quot;&gt;<br>    &lt;if_sid&gt;60103&lt;/if_sid&gt;<br>    &lt;field name=&quot;win.system.eventID&quot;&gt;^4662$&lt;/field&gt;<br>    &lt;field name=&quot;win.eventdata.ObjectName&quot; type=&quot;pcre2&quot;&gt;85ec9a82-ae8d-4dee-bf69-4f830d84819c&lt;/field&gt;<br>    &lt;description&gt;[DECOY] Decoy user (Manar.Makram) enumerated by $(win.eventdata.SubjectUserName)&lt;/description&gt;<br>    &lt;group&gt;decoy_hit,&lt;/group&gt;<br>    &lt;mitre&gt;&lt;id&gt;T1087.002&lt;/id&gt;&lt;id&gt;T1069.002&lt;/id&gt;&lt;/mitre&gt;<br>  &lt;/rule&gt;<br><br>&lt;rule id=&quot;100452&quot; level=&quot;14&quot;&gt;<br>    &lt;if_sid&gt;60103&lt;/if_sid&gt;<br>    &lt;field name=&quot;win.system.eventID&quot;&gt;^4662$&lt;/field&gt;<br>    &lt;field name=&quot;win.eventdata.ObjectName&quot; type=&quot;pcre2&quot;&gt;4ad8040b-08c4-4456-b4c7-ecbd5ebf0b69&lt;/field&gt;<br>    &lt;description&gt;[DECOY] Decoy computer (SRV-BACKUP01) enumerated by $(win.eventdata.SubjectUserName)&lt;/description&gt;<br>    &lt;group&gt;decoy_hit,&lt;/group&gt;<br>    &lt;mitre&gt;&lt;id&gt;T1087.002&lt;/id&gt;&lt;id&gt;T1018&lt;/id&gt;&lt;/mitre&gt;<br>  &lt;/rule&gt;<br><br>  &lt;rule id=&quot;100453&quot; level=&quot;14&quot;&gt;<br>    &lt;if_sid&gt;60103&lt;/if_sid&gt;<br>    &lt;field name=&quot;win.system.eventID&quot;&gt;^4662$&lt;/field&gt;<br>    &lt;field name=&quot;win.eventdata.ObjectName&quot; type=&quot;pcre2&quot;&gt;79f9bf70-080a-46d8-8432-94df5be43c2b&lt;/field&gt;<br>    &lt;description&gt;[DECOY] Decoy group (Domain Admins Backup) enumerated by $(win.eventdata.SubjectUserName)&lt;/description&gt;<br>    &lt;group&gt;decoy_hit,&lt;/group&gt;<br>    &lt;mitre&gt;&lt;id&gt;T1069.002&lt;/id&gt;&lt;id&gt;T1087.002&lt;/id&gt;&lt;/mitre&gt;<br>  &lt;/rule&gt;<br><br>  &lt;rule id=&quot;100454&quot; level=&quot;15&quot; frequency=&quot;3&quot; timeframe=&quot;300&quot;&gt;<br>    &lt;if_matched_group&gt;decoy_hit&lt;/if_matched_group&gt;<br>    &lt;same_field&gt;win.eventdata.SubjectUserName&lt;/same_field&gt;<br>    &lt;different_field&gt;win.eventdata.ObjectName&lt;/different_field&gt;<br>    &lt;description&gt;[DECOY] CONFIRMED FULL AD ENUMERATION: All three decoy objects accessed by $(win.eventdata.SubjectUserName) within 5 minutes&lt;/description&gt;<br>    &lt;mitre&gt;&lt;id&gt;T1087.002&lt;/id&gt;&lt;id&gt;T1069.002&lt;/id&gt;&lt;id&gt;T1018&lt;/id&gt;&lt;/mitre&gt;<br>  &lt;/rule&gt;</pre><p>The correlation rule (100454) uses a rule-level &lt;group&gt;decoy_hit,&lt;/group&gt; tag rather than correlating on specific rule IDs. This is intentional: it means the correlation is scoped to exactly these three rules and nothing else in the ruleset, and it uses the same reliable group-tag correlation pattern that has been validated throughout this lab. The same_field condition on SubjectUserName ensures that the correlation only fires when all three decoy objects were touched by the same account — not three separate accounts each touching one object, which could be coincidental.</p><p>Then restart the manager:​</p><blockquote>systemctl restart wazuh-manager</blockquote><h3>Deployment: Production Rule Engine Integration</h3><p><strong>Deploying Finalized Rules to the Wazuh Manager</strong></p><p>Decoy rules 100050 to 100054) was appended to the manager&#39;s local rule configuration file:​</p><blockquote>sudo nano /var/ossec/etc/rules/local_rules.xml</blockquote><p><strong>XML Syntax Validation &amp; Service Restart</strong></p><p>To prevent breaking the wazuh-analysisd log analysis daemon due to undetected syntax errors or malformed XML tags, the configuration file was validated against schema constraints prior to restarting the service:​</p><p>Validate XML syntax integrity​</p><blockquote>sudo xmllint — noout /var/ossec/etc/rules/local_rules.xml​</blockquote><p>Test configuration loading via Wazuh analysis daemon​</p><blockquote>sudo /var/ossec/bin/wazuh-analysisd -t</blockquote><p>Upon receiving confirmation of zero XML syntax errors and valid rule hierarchy references, the Wazuh Manager service was restarted to activate the new detection engine:​</p><blockquote>sudo systemctl restart wazuh-manager</blockquote><h3>Live Validation: Real-Time Attack Execution &amp; Dashboard Analysis</h3><p><strong>Live Attack Execution Workflow</strong></p><p>With all active agents (DC1, WS1) reporting healthily to the Manager over TCP/1514 and live Event Channel logging active, the full adversary recon workflow was executed from host WS1 using unprivileged domain user credentials:</p><p><strong>SharpHound:</strong>​</p><p>Execute SharpHound with full collection flags​</p><blockquote>.\SharpHound.exe -c All — Domain noekirax.com — OutputDirectory C:\Users\Tools\SharpHond</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*2wV4dm80B-HKe0zI" /></figure><h3>Real-Time Alert Triggering &amp; Correlation Verification</h3><p>During execution, real-time log ingestion generated immediate high-severity alerts on the Wazuh Dashboard:</p><p><strong>Decoy Object Access (Rule 100054 — Level 14):</strong> Triggered immediately upon SharpHound querying the specific Object GUID (Event ID 4662). This verified that high-interaction deception triggers regardless of query volume or execution speed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qykZy8rngqFOr5bXsth2Tw.png" /></figure><h4>Decoy User Account Detection</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hU8x03JlixJlA1qZ0T1VHQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qbaHuNQOc5kUzPFwpRsHLQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QF_r46xx_HDuYRECYZjM3w.png" /></figure><blockquote><em>Validation Evidence: Following the execution of SharpHound enumeration scripts from host </em><em>WS1, the Wazuh SIEM instantly captured Active Directory access event 4662 and successfully triggered Rule 100451 (Level 14). This confirms that any unauthorized querying of the decoy user account (</em><em>Manar.Makram) is accurately detected in real time.</em></blockquote><h4>Decoy Computer Account Detection</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QPyTFunSbmEAeQW8StBxew.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_ZXjttPSTvM5CArGioSVGw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SRwOYBgzYHF3JzHdaZT01Q.png" /></figure><blockquote><em>Validation Evidence: Active Directory monitoring successfully intercepted the adversary’s sweep for domain assets. Hitting the canary computer account (</em><em>SRV-BACKUP01) immediately fired Rule 100452 (Level 14), validating that automated host discovery techniques are successfully identified by our deception layer.</em></blockquote><h4>Decoy Admin Group Detection</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*n_q22-rshPgMBpM7kSbgYQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F4G3dvP_EVQ9796_M2kdaw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c412eDe04UqWllwj0e8P5Q.png" /></figure><blockquote><em>Validation Evidence: When the enumeration tool attempted to resolve security descriptors for privileged groups, it tripped the honeytoken group (</em><em>Domain Admins Backup). Rule 100453 (Level 14) triggered instantly, proving that permission group discovery attempts are fully visible and flagged.</em></blockquote><h4>Confirmed Full AD Enumeration Correlation (Critical Alert)</h4><p>The alert’s firedtimes reached 3, and the correlation logic successfully grouped the incoming events.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bz9HdjVd_ynSU-wErr_bOQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yC_3BGIgMnAuMKgT7gdj2Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*olhPW3UBgmeGWEpirpE3IQ.png" /></figure><blockquote><em>Validation Evidence: The ultimate correlation test. After aggregating the multiple decoy hits from the attacker within the 5-minute timeframe, Rule 100454 (Level 15) fired successfully. This provides definitive proof that our SIEM correlated the multi-vector reconnaissance sequence and confirmed an active, full-scale automated AD enumeration attack in progress.</em></blockquote><p>With that, we have reached the end of this article and covered the full process of designing, deploying, and detecting Active Directory decoy objects against SharpHound.</p><p>I hope this article has been useful and has given you a practical foundation for implementing high-fidelity decoy objects to detect SharpHound and similar AD enumeration tools.</p><p>In the next article, I’ll dive into behavior-based detection techniques for SharpHound — focusing on how to identify its distinctive LDAP and SMB activity patterns even when an attacker tries to stay under the radar.</p><p>Stay tuned((:</p><p>​</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ae0f1612cfb2" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Graduation Project — Cortex-Sec]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@manarmakramrizk/graduation-project-cortex-sec-63dccc0f0322?source=rss-5a2c7e330eb1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/63dccc0f0322</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Manar Makram]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 07 Aug 2026 18:15:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-08-07T18:15:03.546Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Security researchers spend more time managing tools than actually finding vulnerabilities.</p><p>Running recon means juggling five different scanners, copying outputs between terminals, cleaning up duplicates by hand, and filtering through noise before a single real finding surfaces. By the time you’re ready to test, half the day is gone.</p><p>We built Cortex-Sec to fix that. One domain in — and the platform takes it from there. Subdomain enumeration, URL discovery, JavaScript analysis, GitHub secret scanning, CVE detection, and active testing for XSS, SQLi, SSRF, CORS, Open Redirect, S3 exposure, and more — all automated, all connected, all running without a single manual step between them.</p><p>And it wasn’t just a project we built for a grade. We hunted with it. On real bug bounty and VDP programs. And the findings came back accepted — critical exposures, leaked secrets, access control bypasses. Real impact from a real tool.</p><p>This is how we built it, what it does, and what it found.</p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*qDAoTmjBj-c2X-F3.jpeg" /></figure><p>Here’s what it covers:</p><h3>1. Subdomain Enumeration</h3><p>Pulls subdomains from Subfinder, CRT, SecurityTrails, and GitHub at the same time, merges everything into one clean deduplicated list, and classifies each subdomain as Valid, Forbidden, Not Found, or Invalid. Then does a second pass on valid subdomains to find deeper ones and updates the results.</p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*ghlJFzAL47DuKfdb.png" /></figure><h3>2. Subdomain Takeover</h3><p>Checks CNAME records of unresolved subdomains returned from subdomain enumeration module for dangling entries that could be claimed externally.</p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*EmGsNT3cDjU6IeWo.png" /></figure><h3>3. URL Discovery &amp; Processing :</h3><p>Collects URLs from Wayback Machine, GAU, Waymore, and Katana, then runs them through a multi-stage processing pipeline. First splits them by type — JS files, directories, and others. Then pulls out all parameterized URLs, keeps only the most parameter-rich version of each endpoint, and maps each parameter to the vulnerability class most likely to apply to it. Everything else gets classified into 8 severity-based buckets: Admin Panels, Auth Endpoints, API Endpoints, Upload/Download, Debug/Dev, Config &amp; Secrets, Backup &amp; Logs, and Redirect &amp; Callback.</p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*3VT8DnOtHm87lRzP.png" /></figure><p><strong>2 Excel files surfaced through URL classification exposed Confidential data and reported as Critical in a VDP program.</strong></p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*h_z3_LUzkXgvZi0L.jpeg" /></figure><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*Z_6Nhon296vum8ZG.jpeg" /></figure><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*gSFA_8KV_Ihbw50u.jpeg" /></figure><h3>4. JavaScript Analysis</h3><p>Pulls and analyzes every JS file found during recon, looking for exposed API keys, credentials, hidden endpoints, GraphQL schemas, and XSS sinks. Results are grouped by type with direct links to the source file.</p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*qEWUGL9PCIDpij-q.png" /></figure><h3>5. GitHub Dorks</h3><p>Runs 389 search dorks across 8–10 GitHub accounts in parallel to find leaked secrets, API keys, and sensitive config data in public repositories. Multi-account threading cut the scan time from 90+ minutes down to 8–20 minutes.</p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*WYrNlohquaG9Pi0A.png" /></figure><p><strong>+8 findings from GitHub Dorks accepted in a single VDP program.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/379/0*L2kyIrtFZrMVtceB.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/350/0*HZT9_qwVeh5iNDtc.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/350/0*Lk7ZFl6gq57-8CD3.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/374/0*LLeWEHumWETd5xS3.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/351/0*dy2mqUmON0N__85B.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/328/0*l33bdDMPqejRrLhj.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/379/0*CzS392Y5E46ZR1B0.jpeg" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/412/0*2aGRF6v9ev7KbFvo.jpeg" /></figure><h3>6. XSS Detection</h3><p>Three-stage pipeline — Kxss finds reflected parameters, Dalfox runs pattern-based detection with WAF bypass, and XSStrike takes over for advanced fuzzing when the earlier stages flag something worth digging into.</p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*Bs7jwNSzfqQcnJlN.jpeg" /></figure><h3>7. SQL Injection</h3><p>Sends baseline and injected requests side by side across all parameterized endpoints, including time-based blind payloads, and flags anything where the response diverges beyond the threshold. Runs up to 20 threads at once.</p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*fhFFWy3Km09yaqvF.jpeg" /></figure><h3>8. SSRF Detection</h3><p>Tests every parameter with a full payload set — localhost variants, obfuscated IPs, alternative protocols like gopher and file, URL encoding variations, and metadata endpoints for AWS, GCP, and Azure.</p><h3>9. CORS Misconfiguration</h3><p>Identifies endpoints with permissive cross-origin policies that could expose sensitive resources to unauthorized origins.</p><p><strong>1 CORS misconfiguration accepted with a bounty.</strong></p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*M33ZucC-cubzSJEc.jpeg" /></figure><h3>10. Open Redirect</h3><p>Finds endpoints where the redirect destination can be controlled by an attacker.</p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*V8P2_1fOMgFmgzrk.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>1 Open Redirect accepted with a bounty (a second one came back as a duplicate).</strong></p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*k9Tjg0UmfY2ttWHO.jpeg" /></figure><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*VXfD04GEZZwRRoYQ.jpeg" /></figure><h3>11. API Endpoint Scanning</h3><p>Tests discovered API routes for access control issues and common misconfigurations.</p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*r1MJJGpUOUYB-2i3.png" /></figure><h3>12. Virtual Host Enumeration</h3><p>Discovers web applications sharing the same infrastructure that subdomain enumeration alone wouldn’t find.</p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*k2pXD3nHhAfmYAQq.png" /></figure><h3>13. Port Scanning</h3><p>Maps open ports and service banners across all discovered hosts using Nmap/Naabu, grouped by service.</p><p>Press enter or click to view image in full size</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/875/0*gENcBq5Kdt6q6mS_.jpeg" /></figure><h3>14. CVE Detection</h3><p>Runs Nuclei templates against detected services to surface known CVEs with their CVSS scores, severity ratings, matched URLs, and references.</p><h3>15. 403 Bypass</h3><p>Tries multiple bypass techniques against forbidden endpoints and shows which one worked alongside the before/after status code.</p><h3>16. S3 Bucket Scanning</h3><p>Checks associated buckets for public access and lists every readable file inside the exposed ones.</p><h3>How it works</h3><p>Pick a domain, choose your modules, and run. The platform figures out what each module needs and runs dependencies automatically in the right order. Results come back merged, deduplicated, and filtered — displayed across an 11-tab interface with detail panels per finding, severity breakdowns, and a shared scan history the whole team can access.</p><h3>What it actually found</h3><p>We ran it on real bug bounty and VDP targets while building it, and it delivered:</p><p><strong>12 findings from GitHub Dorks accepted in a single VDP program.</strong></p><p><strong>2 Excel files surfaced through URL classification, and reported as Critical in a VDP program.</strong></p><p><strong>1 CORS misconfiguration accepted with a bounty.</strong></p><p><strong>1 Open Redirect accepted with a bounty (a second one came back as a duplicate).</strong></p><p>One domain. Real findings. That’s the point.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=63dccc0f0322" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[SOC342 Writeup: CVE-2025–53770 ToolShell — How I Investigated a SharePoint Zero-Day Exploitation]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@manarmakramrizk/soc342-writeup-cve-2025-53770-toolshell-how-i-investigated-a-sharepoint-zero-day-exploitation-39f6cc5683c4?source=rss-5a2c7e330eb1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/39f6cc5683c4</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Manar Makram]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2026 17:16:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-27T17:16:31.941Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Introduction</h3><p>During this investigation, I analyzed a critical security alert involving the exploitation of the SharePoint ToolShell zero-day vulnerability chain affecting on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Server deployments.</p><p>The alert was triggered on <strong>July 22, 2025</strong>, against the server <strong>SharePoint01</strong>, and simulated a real-world attack pattern associated with active ToolShell exploitation campaigns observed in the wild.</p><p>This was a <strong>Security Analyst-level</strong> investigation where the objective was to determine whether the alert represented a legitimate compromise (<strong>True Positive</strong>) or suspicious but benign activity (<strong>False Positive</strong>).</p><p>After reviewing network traffic, proxy evidence, process execution, PowerShell payloads, payload compilation, and web shell deployment activity, the conclusion was clear:</p><p>This was a confirmed successful exploitation.</p><h3>Researching the CVE After the Initial Alert</h3><p>As soon as I saw the alert, my first step was to research the vulnerability itself before making any assumptions.</p><p>Since the detection rule referenced <strong>CVE-2025–53770</strong>, I immediately searched for official reports and threat intelligence to understand the attack pattern, affected systems, and known Indicators of Compromise (IoCs).</p><p>I relied mainly on two high-confidence sources:</p><ul><li>Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) guidance for CVE-2025–53770 →<a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2025/07/customer-guidance-for-sharepoint-vulnerability-cve-2025-53770?msockid=35e91155fd0863391aa7079cfc38628a"><strong>Customer guidance for SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2025–53770</strong></a></li><li>Recorded Future’s report on the ToolShell exploit chain →<a href="https://www.recordedfuture.com/blog/toolshell-exploit-chain-thousands-sharepoint-servers-risk"><strong>ToolShell Exploit: Critical SharePoint Zero-Day Threatens Global Enterprises</strong></a></li></ul><p>These reports helped me understand that the attack chain involved:</p><ul><li>authentication bypass using a spoofed Referer header</li><li>exploitation of ToolPane.aspx</li><li>Remote Code Execution through PowerShell spawned by w3wp.exe</li><li>theft of ASP.NET Machine Keys</li><li>deployment of persistent ASPX web shells inside the SharePoint LAYOUTS directory</li></ul><p>This gave me a clear baseline for what I should hunt for during the investigation and helped me quickly recognize that the alert behavior strongly matched known ToolShell exploitation patterns.</p><h3>What is ToolShell?</h3><p>ToolShell is the name used to describe an exploit chain that combines two critical Microsoft SharePoint vulnerabilities:</p><ul><li><strong>CVE-2025–53771</strong> — Authentication bypass using path traversal combined with a spoofed Referer header</li><li><strong>CVE-2025–53770</strong> — Remote Code Execution (RCE) through insecure deserialization</li></ul><p>These vulnerabilities primarily affect <strong>on-premises SharePoint Server deployments</strong>, especially hybrid environments integrated with ADFS.</p><p>The attack allows threat actors to:</p><ul><li>Bypass authentication</li><li>Execute arbitrary code remotely</li><li>Steal cryptographic secrets</li><li>Deploy persistent web shells</li><li>Maintain access even after patching</li></ul><p>This makes ToolShell one of the most dangerous SharePoint exploit chains observed in 2025.</p><h3>Initial Alert Details</h3><p>The investigation started with the following alert:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nCz88PQsmRxdZlgnQXEOoA.png" /></figure><h3>First Red Flag: Suspicious POST Request</h3><p>The attacker sent an unauthenticated POST request to:</p><pre>/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit&amp;a=/ToolPane.aspx</pre><p>This endpoint is a known target in ToolShell exploitation.</p><p>The large payload size (<strong>7699 bytes</strong>) combined with the spoofed referer:</p><pre>/_layouts/SignOut.aspx</pre><p>strongly matched known exploitation behavior for CVE-2025–53771 authentication bypass.</p><h3>Second Red Flag: Known Malicious Infrastructure</h3><p>The source IP:</p><pre>107.191.58.76</pre><p>Cross-referencing threat intelligence and public reporting showed that this IP had already been associated with active ToolShell exploitation campaigns observed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VWYZLlyKLsYAaS_zNf-2Wg.png" /></figure><p>This was not random internet noise.</p><p>This was active malicious infrastructure.</p><h3>Additional Evidence from Proxy Logs</h3><p>To further validate the alert, I pivoted on the attacker source IP:</p><pre>107.191.58.76</pre><p>and searched across all available proxy logs.</p><p>The result showed a matching HTTP request occurring at the exact same time of the alert.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*GIxd8etDN9zxz6vWhfhJHA.png" /></figure><h3>Why This Matters</h3><p>This proxy evidence independently confirmed the exploitation attempt and matched the original alert perfectly.</p><p>Several indicators strongly aligned with known ToolShell attack behavior:</p><ul><li>Direct targeting of the SharePoint endpoint</li><li>Spoofed referer header</li><li>Large POST body</li><li>External malicious source communicating directly with the SharePoint server over HTTPS</li></ul><p>This eliminated the possibility of a false detection or parsing issue.The attacker was actively interacting with the vulnerable endpoint.This was a real exploitation attempt.</p><h3>Process Tree Analysis</h3><p>Immediately after the malicious HTTP request, the following process chain was observed:</p><pre>services.exe<br>└── w3wp.exe<br>    └── powershell.exe -EncodedCommand<br>        └── cmd.exe<br>            └── powershell.exe</pre><h3>Why This Is Critical</h3><p>w3wp.exe is the IIS worker process responsible for handling SharePoint web requests.</p><p>Under normal circumstances, it should never spawn PowerShell.</p><p>The observed command was:</p><pre>powershell.exe -EncodedCommand [Base64 Payload]</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XuKbHytN_AoNGvwkP3Y6IQ.png" /></figure><p>This is a classic indicator of Remote Code Execution.</p><p>Attackers commonly use:</p><ul><li>Base64-encoded PowerShell</li><li>hidden execution</li><li>no-profile mode</li><li>IIS-spawned PowerShell</li></ul><p>to execute malicious payloads while avoiding detection.</p><p>This strongly confirmed successful exploitation.</p><h3>Decoding the Malicious PowerShell Payload</h3><p>The Base64-encoded PowerShell command revealed the attacker’s real objective.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7WDILHnqE8ZThRFLCeGw3g.png" /></figure><p>After decoding, the payload generated an ASPX payload using .NET Reflection to access internal SharePoint configuration and steal cryptographic secrets.</p><p>When I observed the following command:</p><pre>System.Web.Configuration.MachineKeySection.GetApplicationConfig()</pre><p>The script extracted:</p><p>it immediately raised suspicion.</p><p>My first thought was that the attacker was trying to access sensitive cryptographic configuration related to authentication and application security.</p><p>The function name itself strongly suggested interaction with ASP.NET Machine Keys, which are responsible for protecting authentication tokens, encrypted ViewState data, and other protected application secrets.</p><p>To validate this, I searched the function name directly in Google and reviewed Microsoft documentation and security reports.</p><p>This confirmed that:</p><pre>MachineKeySection.GetApplicationConfig()</pre><p>is used to retrieve the application’s MachineKey configuration, including:</p><ul><li>ValidationKey</li><li>DecryptionKey</li><li>Validation algorithm</li><li>Decryption algorithm</li></ul><p>and returned them directly through the HTTP response.</p><h3>Why Machine Keys Matter</h3><p>This is extremely dangerous.</p><p>With these keys, an attacker can:</p><ul><li>Forge valid authentication cookies</li><li>Decrypt protected application secrets</li><li>Maintain persistence after patching</li><li>Re-enter the environment without exploiting the original vulnerability again</li></ul><p>Machine key theft often creates a much bigger long-term risk than the initial RCE itself.</p><p>This changed the incident from exploitation into full persistence establishment.</p><h3>Secondary PowerShell Execution</h3><p>A second PowerShell process was later observed:</p><pre>powershell.exe -Command &quot;[System.Web.Configuration.MachineKeySection]::GetApplicationConfig()&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/995/1*iNBiEnsCeJguCkxT38OdPw.png" /></figure><p>This confirmed repeated machine key extraction activity.</p><p>The attacker was deliberately ensuring successful credential material theft rather than performing random execution.</p><p>This showed intentional post-exploitation behavior.</p><h3>Payload Compilation Using csc.exe</h3><p>Another major indicator appeared when the attacker used:</p><pre>csc.exe /out:C:\Windows\Temp\payload.exe C:\Windows\Temp\payload.cs</pre><h3>Why This Matters</h3><p>csc.exe is the Microsoft C# compiler.</p><p>Threat actors often abuse it to compile malicious payloads directly on the victim machine to avoid dropping obvious binaries from the internet.</p><p>This means the attacker likely created malicious source code first (payload.cs) and then compiled it locally into:</p><pre>payload.exe</pre><p>This is a strong sign of advanced post-exploitation activity.</p><h3>Web Shell Deployment</h3><p>The next stage involved persistence through a dropped ASPX web shell.</p><p>The command observed was:</p><pre>cmd.exe /c echo &lt;WebShell&gt; &gt; C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Web Server Extensions\16\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\spinstall0.aspx</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/974/1*occxwk5PSVB23wYq-RK-LQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/747/1*XYvhqSC5YmIV7akF9AiEKw.png" /></figure><p>The dropped file was:</p><pre>spinstall0.aspx</pre><p>with SHA256:</p><pre>92bb4ddb98eeaf11fc15bb32e71d0a63256a0ed826a03ba293ce3a8bf057a514</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NJ7wMtWJKaqCc8ZdRqYVwg.png" /></figure><p>which was confirmed as a Trojan .</p><h3>Why the LAYOUTS Folder?</h3><p>This folder is highly valuable for attackers.</p><p>Anything placed inside:</p><pre>TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\</pre><p>becomes accessible through:</p><pre>/_layouts/16/spinstall0.aspx</pre><p>This creates a persistent HTTP-accessible backdoor directly inside SharePoint.</p><p>Even after rebooting or patching, the attacker can return through the web shell if it is not removed.</p><p>This is one of the most common persistence methods in SharePoint compromises.</p><h3>Strong Correlation Between Network and Host Activity</h3><p>The timeline correlation was extremely important.</p><pre>13:07:11 → Malicious POST request received<br>13:07:11 → w3wp.exe spawned PowerShell</pre><p>This direct sequence between:</p><p><strong>Network Event → Process Execution</strong></p><p>provided high-confidence confirmation of successful Remote Code Execution.</p><p>This is one of the strongest forms of validation in incident response because it proves the attack was not only attempted, but successfully executed.</p><h3>Full Attack Timeline</h3><p>Reconstructing the full sequence made the compromise obvious.</p><pre>13:07:11 → POST request hits ToolPane.aspx<br>13:07:11 → w3wp.exe spawns PowerShell (RCE confirmed)<br>13:07:24 → Encoded PowerShell extracts Machine Keys<br>13:07:27 → csc.exe compiles payload.cs into payload.exe<br>13:07:29 → cmd.exe drops spinstall0.aspx web shell<br>13:07:34 → Second PowerShell extracts Machine Keys again</pre><p>This showed a complete attacker workflow:</p><p>Initial access → RCE → secret theft → payload compilation → persistence → continued access</p><p>There was no ambiguity left.</p><h3>Final Verdict: TRUE POSITIVE</h3><p>This alert was a confirmed <strong>True Positive</strong>.</p><p>The attacker successfully achieved:</p><ul><li>Authentication bypass via CVE-2025–53771</li><li>Remote Code Execution via CVE-2025–53770</li><li>ASP.NET Machine Key theft</li><li>Local payload compilation using csc.exe</li><li>Persistent web shell deployment</li><li>Long-term re-entry capability</li></ul><p>This was a full SharePoint server compromise.</p><p>Immediate incident response would be required in a real production environment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nfEHeUdkgrYIiQydUflk_A.png" /></figure><h3>Opening the Case and Following the Incident Response Playbook</h3><p>After confirming that the alert was highly suspicious and strongly matched known ToolShell exploitation behavior, I proceeded to open an official investigation case for the incident.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/771/1*eruTvgtjsvg579r5jmYgUQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jLuQWNJVeDxcdczXmQAVpw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/922/1*SYaVrAtzyLyqcE3G3D-6Lg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/937/1*MarHFsHksTqX-PYNkg_vjg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/843/1*y4GY2zqwOSdEU68mxSCvEA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/916/1*-IsvZLySEMoqAuKthqPgqw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/902/1*MhpdPh2jOReGy_0MV3gHKA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/941/1*XGIgwI2XIMvbSbdEE1uUIQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/917/1*AU6B0335Rr4pyblAhK8K7Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*pzO8i7elcOSZgU9gIY5VAg.png" /></figure><p>This challenge was a great learning experience and helped me better understand how real-world SharePoint exploitation works, especially the importance of correlating network activity with host-based evidence. It also reinforced how critical threat intelligence and a structured investigation workflow are when handling high-severity incidents.</p><p>If you would approach this investigation differently, I’d love to hear your thoughts and learn from your perspective.</p><p>Full Investigation Details: LetsDefend →<strong>SOC342 — CVE‑2025‑53770 SharePoint ToolShell Auth Bypass and RCE</strong></p><p>See you in another investigation.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=39f6cc5683c4" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hunter Lab — CyberDefenders]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@manarmakramrizk/hunter-lab-cyberdefenders-38f7a115116a?source=rss-5a2c7e330eb1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/38f7a115116a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hunter-lab]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Manar Makram]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2026 15:32:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-09T18:51:30.452Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*jcX64PS01kLZH2ycQmUpEg.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Introduction</h3><p>This is my writeup for the <strong>Hunter</strong> lab on CyberDefenders — a blue team endpoint forensics challenge where you are handed a forensic image of a suspect’s machine and tasked with uncovering evidence of malicious activity.</p><p>What started as a routine investigation quickly revealed a story of insider threat, data exfiltration, and deliberate anti-forensic behavior. In this writeup, I’ll walk through all 30 questions while explaining the reasoning and methodology behind each finding — the same way you’d approach it on a real case.</p><h3><strong>Tools Used:</strong></h3><p>FTK Imager · Registry Explorer · RegRipper · CyberChef · DB Browser for SQLite · Outlook Viewer · ShellBag Explorer · Jump List Explorer · Notepad++</p><h3>Acquiring the Evidence</h3><p>After downloading the lab, extraction revealed two files: a forensic image (.ad1) and a verification text file generated during acquisition.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/899/1*hsrjBRbvm8--zREsamZltQ.png" /></figure><p>The text file confirmed the image was acquired using <strong>AccessData FTK Imager</strong>, and included MD5/SHA1 hash values for integrity verification. Always verify these hashes before touching an image — chain of custody matters.</p><p>I loaded the .ad1 image into <strong>FTK Imager</strong> and began my investigatio</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/716/1*NanxJjKTwIsmvzyC0B42HA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*cVF70pCo4xyVVAzblBLgjQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MrqakW49kGTefIXUhLlzjA.png" /></figure><h3>The Investigation</h3><h3>Q1 — What is the computer name of the suspect machine?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Windows Registry → SYSTEM Hive <strong>Path:</strong> HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters</p><p>The computer name is the first thing I anchor to — it ties together network logs, event logs, and user activity into one identity.</p><p>I extracted the SYSTEM hive from C:\Windows\System32\config\ using FTK Imager</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*R9eTFPwidjeKYO5NWgmQ8Q.png" /></figure><p>then loaded it into Registry Explorer and Navigate to HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters .</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*QOZeqHJAJrfZxqpmGxbgSw.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>4ORENSICS<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q2 —What is the computer IP?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Windows Registry → SYSTEM Hive <strong>Path:</strong> SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces</p><p>With the computer name established, I moved to identify the machine on the network. DHCP lease data is stored as a DWORD value inside the interface&#39;s registry key.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zPNqmMIvdCSATXs_5_FANQ.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>10.0.2.15<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q3 —What was the DHCP LeaseObtainedTime?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Registry → LeaseObtainedTime (Unix Epoch DWORD)</p><p>Timestamps in forensics are everything. The DHCP lease time was stored in Unix Epoch format inside the same interface key from Q2.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hc_2miX97oJcIxP2lmQVpg.png" /></figure><p>I used CyberChef to decode it into a human-readable timestamp.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*HpWJJBcoE5p1tuihm7T2gg.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>21/06/2016 02:24:12 UTC<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q4 — What is the computer SID?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Windows Registry → SOFTWARE Hive <strong>Path:</strong> Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\UserData</p><p>The Computer SID is the unique machine identifier that Windows uses for the local system. It forms the base for all local user SIDs on this machine (the last part like -500 or -1001 is the RID for each user).</p><p>I extracted the <strong>SOFTWARE</strong> hive using FTK Imager, then loaded it into <strong>Registry Explorer</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*-gATbdMjI9vJDWmNixMNJw.png" /></figure><p>While navigating through the SOFTWARE hive in Registry Explorer, I came across two keys under the path: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\UserData</p><p>One of the keys ended with <strong>-1001</strong>. I suspected this might be related to the Computer SID, so I decided to verify it further.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*G5WowwRdef40Jmn3ApxShQ.png" /></figure><p>I loaded the SAM hive into RegRipper after extracted it .</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*eS5nsbss_2CHhev2h1koeg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/694/1*pMPq8PhsZF-94yEGP_Ecow.png" /></figure><p>After running the tool, the output clearly showed that the user associated with RID 1001 is Hunter.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1002/1*3FvjxOrMReZIX7V4Ax6awQ.png" /></figure><p>as you can see every user end with his RID</p><p>This confirms the same Computer SID that appears across other registry locations.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em> S-1–5–21–2489440558–2754304563–710705792<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q5 — What is the Operating System(OS) version?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> SOFTWARE Hive <strong>Path:</strong> SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion</p><p>Knowing the OS version is critical — it tells you what forensic artifacts to expect, what default paths apply, and which tools are compatible.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K-6AMV0nlFXikSgNepPjCw.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>8.1<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q6 — What was the computer timezone?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> SYSTEM Hive <strong>Path:</strong> SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\TimeZoneInformation</p><p>I found <strong>TimeZoneKeyName = Pacific Standard Time (PST)</strong>.</p><p>Then I checked:</p><ul><li><strong>ActiveTimeBias</strong> = 420 minutes → <strong>7 hours</strong></li><li><strong>DaylightBias</strong> = -60 minutes</li></ul><p>This tells me the system has already adjusted for Daylight Saving Time. So the current time zone is <strong>Pacific Daylight Time (PDT)</strong>, which is <strong>UTC-07:00</strong> (7 hours behind UTC).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TwchUad6iJs8oSpLCdji0A.png" /></figure><p>I double-checked this using Google time converter and it confirmed the same result (PDT is 7 hours behind UTC).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qG3PxbGD_BOgMb8rmNET-w.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>UTC-07:00<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q7 —How many times did this user log on to the computer?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> SAM Hive → User account entry for Hunter</p><p>The SAM hive doesn’t just store passwords — it tracks login counts per account. This metric helps establish how active an account was on a system.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*SZxJphLoDca4K-4n9_7LjQ.png" /></figure><p>I double-checked this using RegRipper, I got the same thing again</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/935/1*F1wVxEKm5Xxg1-FSiN9r2A.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[3]</em></blockquote><h3>Q8 — When was the last login time for the discovered account? Format: one-space between date and time</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> SAM Hive → Same user entry</p><p>Right alongside the login count sat the last login timestamp.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8pPsggzmOexUFT29L-AdwA.png" /></figure><p>I verified this using RegRipper’s SAM plugin output.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/932/1*BC3_N0riDD1pnQ4XgkJo4A.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>2016–06–21 01:42<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q9 — There was a “Network Scanner” running on this computer, what was it? And when was the last time the suspect used it? Format: program.exe,YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS UTC</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Windows Prefetch Files <strong>Path:</strong> C:\Windows\Prefetch\</p><p>Prefetch files are a goldmine. Every time an application executes on Windows, a .pf file is created or updated — recording execution time, run count, and referenced files. I extracted the Prefetch folder and parsed the files.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*A8hcjS7hrsHeN0HDBNhVmQ.png" /></figure><p>I identified the network scanning tool and its last execution time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lgNgOiG-rPrY-ZfGogorFQ.png" /></figure><p>One important note: the timestamp in the prefetch file is in <strong>UTC</strong>, so I applied the timezone offset established in Q6 to convert it correctly.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>zenmap.exe,2016–06–21 12:08:13 UTC<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q10 — When did the port scan end? (Example: Sat Jan 23 hh:mm:ss 2016)</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Nmap scan output file <strong>Path:</strong> C:\Users\Hunter\Desktop\nmapscan.xml</p><p>The suspect didn’t just run a scan — they saved the output. This file contains detailed information about when the scan started and when it ended.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*nEdwsqVb8jlLyVPFt-VmDA.png" /></figure><p>By searching for the keyword “finished” or “time”, I found the exact timestamp that shows when the port scan was completed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yTjzQDgLcBmfOUf0O16Zfw.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>Tue Jun 21 05:12:09 2016<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q11 — How Many Ports Were Scanned?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Same nmapscan.xml file</p><p>I opened the nmapscan.xml file using Notepad++ as the Q10 and I searched for the keyword “ports” to locate the total number of ports that were scanned during the Nmap operation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*sVOTgXQCKHMKGH8hEcbnaA.png" /></figure><p>This result matches Nmap’s default behavior, as the tool automatically scans the top 1000 most commonly used ports</p><p>To verify this was the default Nmap behavior, I checked the Nmap command that was used.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KX9WaOGc6lcddV3w2ajUXw.png" /></figure><p>The scan did not include the -p option (which is used to specify a custom port range). This confirms that Nmap ran with its default setting.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[1000]</em></blockquote><h3>Q12 — What ports were found “open”?(comma-separated, ascending)</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Same nmapscan.xml file</p><p>Filtering for state=&quot;open&quot; entries within the XML revealed all open ports on the target.I then extracted the port numbers and arranged them in ascending order.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uA2ceefJ8gVBsvnwXCz31A.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>22,80,9929,31337<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q13 —What was the version of the network scanner running on this computer?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Same nmapscan.xml file</p><p>The scanner version was embedded in the XML header, identifiable with a simple keyword search.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MVrqqFWyqIQjTiV5w9hkew.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[7.12]</em></blockquote><h3>Q14 — The employee engaged in a Skype conversation with someone. What is the skype username of the other party?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Skype main.db (SQLite database) <strong>Path:</strong> C:\Users\Hunter\AppData\Roaming\Skype\[username]\main.db</p><p>The investigation took an interesting turn here. Inside the Skype application data, I found the legacy main.db SQLite database — used by Skype 7 before cloud-based storage replaced it in 2017.</p><p>I extracted the main.db SQLite database from the Skype application data folder.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*MNYQhukn0d--9BF0fgTQzA.png" /></figure><p>Then, I opened the database using DB Browser for SQLite.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*r1t6TMFG_TRvIf5Xuyykug.png" /></figure><p>I queried the ChatNembers table to identify the participants in the chat. The query results clearly showed both Skype usernames .</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*y6lcGQigHA3Lo5rtPW1Apw.png" /></figure><p>The chat history between the two parties told a clear story: this was not a casual conversation.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>linux-rul3z<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q15 — What is the name of the application both parties agreed to use to exfiltrate data and provide remote access for the external attacker in their Skype conversation?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Skype main.db → messages table</p><p>Reading through the conversation between the suspect and the external party, one application was explicitly named as their tool of choice for both remote access and data exfiltration.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tn3J7akrL_i1ZL9PWI9oRQ.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>Teamviewer<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q16 — What is the Gmail email address of the suspect employee?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> outlook pst filebackup.pst → inbox <strong>Path</strong>: C:\Users\Hunter\Documents\backup.pst</p><p>I exported the backup.pst file from the Users\Hunter\Documents\ using FTK Imager.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*welytGnM9ri_HMQQQxcp0Q.png" /></figure><p>Then, I downloaded <strong>Outlook Viewer</strong> and opened the PST file with it.</p><p>I navigated to the <strong>Inbox</strong> folder, and there I found the suspect’s Gmail address clearly visible in the email headers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TQnckLmWXroflsO8HpHcpw.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em><a href="/service/mailto:ehptmsgs@gmail.com">ehptmsgs@gmail.com</a><em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q17 —It looks like the suspect user deleted an important diagram after his conversation with the external attacker. What is the file name of the deleted diagram?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Outlook .pst file <strong>Path:</strong> C:\Users\Hunter\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Outlook\</p><p>Using the same <strong>Outlook Viewer</strong>, I went to the <strong>Trash</strong> (Deleted Items) folder.</p><p>I found several deleted emails. When I checked the attachments in one of the emails, I discovered a picture named <strong>“home-network-design-networking-for-a-single-family-home-case-house-arkko-1433-x-792.jpg”</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*R4dlrzOSXDET3DWLZzVVPA.png" /></figure><p>I exported the attachment and opened it. It turned out to be a complete and detailed diagram of the home network.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7rdqi-H68KYp2UXOotjuZw.png" /></figure><p>This matches the description of the important diagram that the suspect deleted after communicating with the external attacker.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em><strong>home-network-design-networking-for-a-single-family-home-case-house-arkko-1433-x-792.jpg</strong><em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q18 — The user Documents’ directory contained a PDF file discussing data exfiltration techniques. What is the name of the file?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> User Documents folder <strong>Path:</strong> C:\Users\Hunter\Documents\</p><p>A PDF file found in the suspect’s Documents folder discussed data exfiltration techniques — suggesting deliberate research into how to move data covertly.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*21JDCkqb6M4kWq_6vWWkjA.png" /></figure><p>While examining the suspect’s Documents folder, I opened several PDF files to check their contents.</p><p>I found one PDF file whose header clearly mentioned <strong>“Exfiltration Techniques”</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Zzb21SN6qX21gIdjBZ2oOQ.png" /></figure><p>After opening the file, it was confirmed that the document discusses different methods and techniques for data exfiltration (moving data out of the network covertly).</p><p>This shows the suspect was actively researching exfiltration methods.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>Ryan_VanAntwerp_thesis.pdf<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q19 — What was the name of the Disk Encryption application Installed on the victim system? (two words space separated)</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Program Files (x86) → UnInstall.log</p><blockquote>I’ll be transparent here — this one got me. I ended up using <strong>Hints 2 and 3</strong> to point me in the right direction.</blockquote><p>My first instinct was to check the installed applications list and the Downloads folder, which seemed like the logical starting point. However, I couldn’t pinpoint the encryption tool from there alone.</p><p>Hint 2:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/804/1*xdqTcNhSmufkkWrWoQ6mqw.png" /></figure><p>pointed me toward the Program Files (x86) directory, so I navigated there in FTK Imager and started looking for anything encryption-related. That&#39;s when Hint 3:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/787/1*mJq2w3BMs-JvXfQF48Me4Q.png" /></figure><p>revealed the key: inside one of the application folders, there was an unusual file named <strong>UnInstall.log</strong>.</p><p>Opening that log gave away exactly what was installed — a disk encryption application</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/943/1*fQoEEKeO0bnVMIHV3mJcbA.png" /></figure><p>Opening that log revealed the application name — but I wanted to be sure before locking in my answer. I Googled both the folder name and the parent company, and confirmed that <strong>Jetico</strong> is indeed a data protection and encryption company, specializing in tools for strong encryption and secure data wiping. That was enough to validate the finding with confidence.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/597/1*2l0jVaVl2Kpx9IQDusnc_g.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>Crypto Swap<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q20 —What are the serial numbers of the two identified USB storage?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> SYSTEM Hive <strong>Path:</strong> SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR</p><p>USB artifacts are critical in exfiltration cases. I navigated to the USBSTOR key and identified two storage devices by their serial numbers. Note: Windows appends &amp;0 to hardware IDs — the actual serial number is everything before that suffix.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1iA22ZkXLHaYO4_jpPaeEA.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>07B20C03C80830A9,AAI6UXDKZDV8E9OU<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q21 —One of the installed applications is a file shredder. What is the name of the application? (two words space separated)</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Program Files (x86) → UnInstall.log</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*FyD1FK0hFJpQ3OXOsQbNow.png" /></figure><p>This question connected directly to what we uncovered in Q19. While investigating the disk encryption application, we came across the company <strong>Jetico</strong> through a tool called <strong>Crypto Swap</strong>. I wasn’t familiar with Jetico at first, so I did a quick Google search — and that turned out to be a pivotal moment in the investigation.</p><p>Jetico is a Finnish company that specializes in data protection solutions, covering two main areas: <strong>strong encryption</strong> and <strong>secure data wiping</strong>. That immediately raised a flag — if the suspect had one Jetico product installed, there was a good chance another was present too.</p><p>Going back to the Program Files (x86) directory in FTK Imager, I looked for other Jetico-related folders. Sure enough, another application was sitting there. Examining its UnInstall.log confirmed the name: <strong>BCWipe Total</strong> — a tool specifically designed to securely delete files and wipe data in a way that makes forensic recovery nearly impossible.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7N41vmoRIku3phd51TNixA.png" /></figure><p>The combination of a disk encryption tool <em>and</em> a file shredder from the same vendor tells a clear story: this wasn’t accidental. The suspect was deliberately building an anti-forensic toolkit.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>Jetico BCWipe<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q22 — How many prefetch files were discovered on the system?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> C:\Windows\Prefetch\</p><p>I exported the full Prefetch folder from FTK Imager and parsed all the files. My initial count came back as <strong>190</strong> — but submitting that returned an incorrect answer, which pushed me to take a closer look.</p><p>Going back through the exported files, I noticed that some of them were <strong>empty</strong> — no valid prefetch data inside, just shell files taking up a slot in the count. I filtered those out, and the final count of valid .pf files landed at <strong>174</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Mf8P2bT3klePrEMT8ujfOQ.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[174]</em></blockquote><h3>Q23 —How many times was the file shredder application executed?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Prefetch file for shredder executable</p><p>Using the prefetch file specific to the shredder application, I extracted the run count — revealing exactly how many times it was deliberately executed.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DbHq3a5mnTG6UDLPfH58Lw.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[5]</em></blockquote><h3>Q24 — Using prefetch, determine when was the last time ZENMAP.EXE-56B17C4C.pf was executed?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> ZENMAP.EXE-56B17C4C.pf</p><p>The prefetch file for Zenmap stored its last execution timestamp. I parsed the specific .pf file to extract this value.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m9ycOZXCxN4mty-hqNZ8LA.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>06/21/2016 12:08:13 PM<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q25 — A JAR file for an offensive traffic manipulation tool was executed. What is the absolute path of the file?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Downloads folder / execution traces</p><p>A .jar file associated with a well-known offensive traffic manipulation tool was found on the system. The full absolute path was recovered from the file system.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WJEqwHlb9JcMO4lfVi-z2g.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>C:\Users\Hunter\Downloads\Burpsuite_free_v1.7.03.jar<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q26 — The suspect employee tried to exfiltrate data by sending it as an email attachment. What is the name of the suspected attachment?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Outlook .pst — Sent mail</p><p>We already uncovered this during the email investigation in Q17. The suspect attempted to exfiltrate data as an email attachment.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YSEYlSGUcbRI8ln28VbxYg.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>Pictures.7z<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q27 — Shellbags shows that the employee created a folder to include all the data he will exfiltrate. What is the full path of that folder?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> USRCLASS.DAT → ShellBags <strong>Path:</strong> C:\Users\Hunter\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\USRCLASS.DAT</p><p>first what shellbages are</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IThMcA_8wpYjtE3GXWnJmw.png" /></figure><p>Shellbags record every folder a user browsed in Windows Explorer — even after deletion.</p><p>based on the hint 2</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/798/1*aDlXtWLmKgMV18xHjgszMA.png" /></figure><p>I extracted USRCLASS.DAT .</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2J4B9GkEolW4_UePR8BdBQ.png" /></figure><p>analyzed it using ShellBags Eplorer</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nzMS4DQNDUMDqytHB9BRug.png" /></figure><p>A folder path clearly linked to the exfiltration activity emerged.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>C:\Users\Hunter\Pictures\Exfil<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q28 — The user deleted two JPG files from the system and moved them to $Recycle-Bin. What is the file name that has the resolution of 1920x1200?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> $Recycle.Bin</p><p>Two JPG files were deleted and moved to the Recycle Bin. I recovered the metadata and identified the file with the target resolution.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0Gvkb7Ts8rumRV_gB08Z3w.png" /></figure><p>This one required a two-step approach. I started by navigating to the $Recycle.Bin in FTK Imager, where I found the deleted JPG files. Checking the image metadata, I was able to identify which file had the <strong>1920×1200</strong> resolution — but the original filename wasn&#39;t recoverable from there, since the $I metadata file was missing.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/996/1*C8LPiUSZ3vCfT1iS5PRk0A.png" /></figure><p>So I needed another way to get the name. Thinking about where else on the system a reference to this file might exist, I turned to the <strong>Pravite</strong> folde inside Pictures folde that folder contained a copy to the same image, which gave me the original filename I was looking for.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*lyWwxJh1hipYc-Fu29zovg.png" /></figure><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>ws_Small_cute_kitty_1920x1200.jpg<em>]</em></blockquote><h3>Q29 — Provide the name of the directory where information about jump lists items (created automatically by the system) is stored?</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> Windows file system structure</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nhfbEXIi1zp3BaCC085xiA.png" /></figure><p>Jump Lists are automatically maintained by Windows to track recently/frequently accessed files per application. They live in a well-known path under the user’s AppData.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>C:\Users\Hunter\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\AutomaticDestinations</em></blockquote><h3>Q30 — Using JUMP LIST analysis, provide the full path of the application with the AppID of “aa28770954eaeaaa” used to bypass network security monitoring controls.</h3><p><strong>Artifact:</strong> AutomaticDestinations &amp; CustomDestinations Jump List files</p><p>For this final question, I extracted both the <strong>AutomaticDestinations</strong> and <strong>CustomDestinations</strong> folders from C:\Users\Hunter\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\ using FTK Imager. Both types of Jump Lists can hold application execution traces, so I made sure to grab both rather than assume the answer was in one or the other.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JUQvc86aRYjWcOZzNmKTvA.png" /></figure><p>I then opened the extracted files in <strong>Jump List Explorer</strong> and searched for the AppID aa28770954eaeaaa. The match came from the <strong>CustomDestinations</strong> folder — which makes sense, as custom destinations are written by applications themselves and can persist even when automatic entries are cleared.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*32zXdg-wluumewmJWoc56w.png" /></figure><p>The path that came back was telling: a <strong>Tor Browser</strong> executable sitting on the suspect’s Desktop. This confirmed that the suspect was deliberately routing their traffic through Tor to anonymize their activity and bypass network security monitoring — a calculated move that, fortunately, left a trace in the Jump Lists.</p><blockquote><strong><em>Answer:</em></strong><em> </em><em>[</em>C:\Users\Hunter\Desktop\Tor Browser\Browser\firefox.exe<em>]</em></blockquote><p><strong>A fitting end to this investigation.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DQqiOrDG5E56ad4b1poLJw.png" /></figure><h3>Case Summary</h3><p>What began as a routine forensic investigation of a single machine revealed a deliberate insider threat operation:</p><p>StageEvidence Found<strong>Reconnaissance</strong>Zenmap/Nmap port scanning (1000 ports, 6 open)<strong>Communication</strong>Skype chat with external attacker (linux-rul3z)<strong>Planning</strong>PDF on exfiltration techniques found in Documents<strong>Execution</strong>Data staged in Pictures\Exfil, sent via email as .7z<strong>Remote Access</strong>TeamViewer installed per attacker&#39;s instructions<strong>Anti-Forensics</strong>File shredder (Jetico BCWipe) run 5 times; Tor Browser used to bypass monitoring<strong>Encryption</strong>Disk encryption tool installed to protect local data</p><p>The suspect — user Hunter — made several critical mistakes: leaving Skype logs, saving the Nmap XML output, and using a non-wiped Recycle Bin. A careful, methodical forensic investigation was enough to reconstruct the full timeline.</p><h3>Final Thoughts</h3><p>This lab was an excellent exercise in chaining artifacts together — no single artifact told the whole story, but together they painted a clear picture. The key lesson: <strong>always follow the timeline</strong>, and <strong>never ignore anti-forensic indicators</strong> — they often point directly to what the suspect was trying to hide.</p><h3>Link of the Lab</h3><p>“<a href="https://cyberdefenders.org/blueteam-ctf-challenges/hunter/">Blue team CTF Challenges | Hunter — CyberDefenders</a>”</p><h3>See you into the next one)).</h3><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=38f7a115116a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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