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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Beacon Capital on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Beacon Capital on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@maria-dramalioti?source=rss-f80918c6bee0------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Beacon Capital on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maria-dramalioti?source=rss-f80918c6bee0------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Move Guides just raised $48m: what made us invest in their seed round?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maria-dramalioti/move-guides-just-raised-48m-what-made-us-invest-in-their-seed-round-16ff0abbc07d?source=rss-f80918c6bee0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/16ff0abbc07d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[hr]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[move-guides]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[funding]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[relocation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beacon Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Aug 2017 09:30:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-08-10T09:30:09.747Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Move Guides, one of our very first investments as Beacon ( then Angellab), <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/11/blowing-up-the-re-location-industry-move-guides-raises-48m-series-c/">closed $48 million in Series C funding</a> last month. We were the first investors in the company and it is, almost to the day, five years since we participated in its seed round. Move Guides has since raised over $90 million in follow on funding and is now reshaping the $5BN corporate relocation industry, offering a “digital” alternative to the outdated “analogue” offerings of the incumbent relocation companies.</p><p>This is perhaps a good time to reflect on, and revisit, our rationale for investing in the business. Was it the size and structure of the market, the quality of the product or the talent of the team that weighed more in our decision? Was our decision stochastic, or the result of a rational analysis and a methodology which we should aim to replicate?<br> We invested in Move Guides when the business was only just starting to engage with their first pilot customers and the product was in “alpha” at best. That was early even for us who, back then, were a syndicate of angel investors accustomed to high levels of risk. So why did we do it?</p><p>First and foremost, the CEO and founder, Brynne Kennedy, is an individual of rare talents: a strong character, she comes from an entrepreneurial family, was an elite gymnast and athlete competing at the highest level, has an MBA from a top school and had worked in rigorous investment banking and VC environments beforehand. She also had some domain expertise having experienced multiple relocations. She had an excellent partner in Steve Black, ex-associate partner at Oliver Wyman, whose somewhat quieter demeanour (though no less driven) made him an ideal partner. It would be easy to say, in retrospect, that we knew all along that Brynne and Steve would succeed. But at that point in time the only thing we knew was that they had a combination of skills that could create a “high octane” culture to drive performance. We also fundamentally believed that they would attract the necessary talent and assemble a team that would execute on the plan.</p><p>Secondly, I happen to have an understanding of the “ Global Talent Mobility” market from my relevant work in Andersen and Ernst &amp; Young overseeing their corporate relocation business process outsourcing (BPO) services. This helped us form the view that corporate relocation is one of the few markets that had remained “analogue” due to its complex supply chain. Incumbent BPO providers treat employee mobility management as a series of disconnected process that overlap with mainstream HR processes like payroll and compliance and run low tech, low Gross Margin models and outmoded user experience based on phone and email. Internal corporate units could not justify the CapEx to automate the entire business process of employee movement and the BPOs were ridden with mostly legacy technology with archaic 3rd party connectivity and only basic data analytics capabilities. This was an opportunity for a SaaS solution.</p><p>Finally, we had a “gut feel” that the market was sufficiently big — a billion plus — though at that time was difficult to definitively say how big. In a VERY simplistic way, we knew there were 700 thousand corporate sponsored moves a year and each move was worth $4,000 which made the corporate relocation — assuming a reasonable growth rate — a $ 11bn market in 2021. Questions around “teleworking” and the effects on mobility were eroding somewhat our conviction but we firmly — even irrationally one might argue given how little we knew back then of how employee mobility might evolve — believed that businesses will continue to send people around the globe to build their local presence: the “corridors” of movement might change but the overall volume will not only not contract but will continue to expand and the “millennials” will strenuously object to the old school relocation practices.<br> There is still a long way for MoveGuides to go but they, from day one, were positioning themselves to become a market leader with an offering that provides unbeatable customer service while operating a high gross margin, scalable business model. If they carry on at their current velocity of displacing the incumbents and gaining market share, they may give Europe one more unicorn success story.</p><p>Looking back it is always easy to rationalise one’s decisions, especially if they seem to have been the “right decisions”. The team was exceptional, we had an insight into the market pains and we thought the market was sufficiently big to merit the risk (high) vs rewards (even higher, we believed) trade off at that particular point in time. The business is now at an amazingly exciting juncture, though there is still much work to be done.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/2017/08/move-guides-just-raised-48m-what-made-us-invest-in-their-seed-round/"><em>Beacon Capital</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=16ff0abbc07d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Why enterprise SaaS marketing is an investment opportunity]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maria-dramalioti/why-enterprise-saas-marketing-is-an-investment-opportunity-213a04304e47?source=rss-f80918c6bee0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/213a04304e47</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[saas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[opinion]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[enterprise-software]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ppc]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beacon Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 May 2017 13:24:27 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-05-04T15:59:51.628Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The way enterprises buy software has reached a fascinating juncture where the <a href="https://medium.com/@iamtikue/the-consumerization-of-enterprise-software-3e6eca1b5bbe#.kkrv49jho">consumerization of the enterprise</a> has created fertile ground for the next generation of SaaS tools. The digitisation of the SaaS sales process has meant that SaaS adoption grows strongly and with that grows the willingness of businesses to source, assess and buy SaaS online.</p><p>A marketing tool that has been round the block to facilitate this is the traditional “yellow pages esque” directory for online software, a business model based on pay-per-click (PPC) and other paid advertising models. The SaaS sector has been able to come up with a set of standardized metrics that work for almost any SaaS business so these marketing directories leverage the paid acquisition budgets and are able to continue marking a good living by servicing these vendors with leads.</p><p>At Beacon we believe there may be a significant opportunity in this market and this is something we have explored recently by way of an investment in <a href="https://crozdesk.com/">Crozdesk</a>. We believe there is pent up demand for qualified sales leads and the intensifying competition amongst SaaS vendors drives demand for qualified sales leads acquired either organically or via PPC. We estimate there is close to $1bn in unchannelled demand for PPC by SaaS vendors and existing SaaS directories satisfy less than a 1/20 of this, especially seeing as the current top 3 players have a combined turnover of less than $50m.</p><p><strong>So how much do SaaS companies really spend?</strong></p><p>Global SaaS revenues have surpassed $30bn and are growing at 20% year-on-year. B2B businesses spend a minimum of 10% of this on marketing budgets ($3bn) and of this, an estimated 30% is typically carved out for paid acquisition methods leaving us with a total spend on paid acquisition of circa $900m. In fact these may be modest estimates; for example the graph below takes into account data available from public companies, where marketing spend comfortably remains more than 30% of the revenues over the life of the company.</p><figure><img alt="SaaS sales and marketing spend" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*uzDZ-JIupgnqHcKr.png" /></figure><p>The graph above was produced <a href="http://tomtunguz.com/saas-marketing-spend/">here</a> by Tomasz Tunguz at Redpoint, however please note this takes into account public SaaS companies only.</p><p>PPC remains a significant part of many B2B SaaS marketing strategies today. We have seen several businesses over the years (link to our old blogs) and the anecdotal evidence suggests that in the case of smaller B2B SaaS companies the overall PPC budget in relation to marketing budget may be fairly high — sometimes roughly around 60% of their marketing budget.</p><p><strong>Natural ceiling: a plausible theory?</strong></p><p>One theory for the unchannelled demand is that the rate of growth in demand for traffic from SaaS vendors may be growing quicker than the directories’ ability to grow their traffic. In this case we could argue that the market has a “natural ceiling”. The precise reasons and weighting of these reasons are difficult to prove but the increase of pricing in particular through the use of the auction pricing model appears to demonstrate excess demand from software vendors. The likely main reasons for incumbent platforms increasing prices are a) they can: since demand is outstripping supply and b) they must: since the cost of their acquiring traffic is itself increasing (for example, we believe that some incumbents are spending up to £1m per month on acquiring a portion of their traffic).</p><p>Another view is that this “natural ceiling” is partly a product of the actions of Google, from whom most of the major traffic is bought. Some have seen Google actively limit traffic flows from their site to companies which grow too strongly in a particular category and thus pose a threat to their own search dominance. The quantum of this effect is hard to measure but for whatever the reasons the market is making it more expensive for vendors to acquire leads on their CPC / auction models.</p><p><strong>So where does this leave us?</strong></p><p>In addition to easing the supposed “natural ceiling”, by injecting more traffic at lower prices in the market, a potential stumbling block is the presentational hierarchy at play in in such digital platforms. A vendor’s willingness to pay determines the ranking of their product on screen and indeed whether it can make it to the all-important first page of any listing. Some have seen this as generating a long tail of “second page” of SaaS vendors which cannot compete for paid acquisition with the industry incumbents. This leaves a long tail of SaaS businesses which are typically niche vertical SaaS solutions, micro SaaS horizontal solutions, <a href="https://medium.com/point-nine-news/the-unbundling-of-traditional-saas-products-d7f4eee2c9e7#.xo3udzw5w">“unbundled” SaaS applications (API based)</a> and, of course simply new entrants, who cannot outbid the large SaaS vendors on PPC.</p><figure><img alt="SaaS long tail" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/598/0*6FSYTto8Ixc_17Si.png" /></figure><p>As it stands there are high barriers to entry for new SaaS directories: new entrants have to acquire traffic bidding on CPC (cost per click) on Google, Facebook etc. which is capital intensive especially as they have to outbid the incumbent directories. Original content creation and SEO is an alternative to paid-for traffic acquisition but this takes time and is a slow burn to result in significant volumes of traffic.</p><p>However, the market opportunity is likely to persist for two reasons: i) the top directories are all owned by a single player in Gartner thus controlling the supply of qualified sales leads and the PPC for the SaaS Vendors; and ii) demand for paid traffic from SaaS vendors is likely to grow faster than the rate at which the SaaS directories seem able to scale their own traffic economically.</p><p>Most of what has been discussed in this post applies to businesses with lower AOVs (annual order value), where the sales engine is typically more digitised and where most of the sales process can be optimised. Our next challenge is to look into the extent to which (if at all) these platforms may benefit enterprise sales at higher AOVs, where longer and less digitised sales cycles persist.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/2017/05/why-enterprise-saas-marketing-is-an-investment-opportunity/"><em>Beacon Capital</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=213a04304e47" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Enterprise Tech Ventures — UK Landscape]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maria-dramalioti/enterprise-tech-ventures-uk-landscape-8464dd4c0ead?source=rss-f80918c6bee0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8464dd4c0ead</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[landscape]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[enterprise]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beacon Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 15 Mar 2017 17:04:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-15T17:22:37.047Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Background</strong></p><p>At Beacon Capital, our investment thesis focuses on early stage enterprise tech ventures. We have created a (first draft) representation of the landscape as we see it, and hope that this will serve as an interesting starting point for discussion. In our experience, many startups in enterprise tech find it difficult to reach the key players in the space and it can be difficult to know the relative strengths of the players and how they fit in. We hope that, in the long term, this resource becomes a comprehensive view of the enterprise tech ecosystem.</p><p><strong>Methodology</strong></p><p>There are of course many ways of representing the enterprise landscape. The players don’t perfectly fit into compartments, some have multiple roles, and they can change direction or focus over time. We tried to fit players into our classification of enablers and investors to reflect the practicalities of starting an enterprise tech venture.</p><figure><img alt="enterprise landscape" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/0*otqB7RO23-5SKS1b.png" /></figure><p><strong>Enablers</strong></p><p><em>Vertical specific accelerators</em> are building up knowledge in a defined area, theme or sector. They serve as a good platform for idea validation, sometimes with the help of industry specific partners. As an example, <a href="https://cylonlab.com/">CyLon</a> has emerged as the go to place for entrepreneurs determined to solve cybersecurity challenges.</p><p><em>Corporate accelerators</em>, as the name suggests, are commissioned by the institutional players in particular sector and give early access to product trials and POCs for product validation. <a href="http://www.barclaysaccelerator.com/#/">Barclays</a> is one such corporate to have followed the model in the financial technology space.</p><p><em>Industry institutions</em> such as universities, research institutions, etc support the UK as a <a href="https://www.stem.org.uk/">STEM</a> player and provide greatest value to teams through the tech expertise and quality of industry mentorship.</p><p><em>Service providers</em> are at integral place in our ecosystem closing the bridge in terms of technological, marketing and PR challenges that most businesses face during their lifetime.</p><p><em>Public and government associations</em> are of strategic importance working as door openers for the UK ecosystem by giving access to and dialogue with foreign markets and to global organisations.</p><p><strong>Investors</strong></p><p><em>Early stage enterprise dominant investors</em> play in the black hole typically spanning seed and pre-series A. This is a disorganised space, made even more chaotic as B2C angel investors increasingly turn to B2B. In reality there are very few investors with enterprise tech expertise who have practised the dark art of closing a pre-A funding round.</p><p><em>Later stage enterprise dominant investors</em> contain both equity as well as debt investors but only for those startups with greater than £500k ARR. By this point the investee companies would typically have proven their product fit with the buyers and the capital is primarily to scale up the sales &amp; marketing engines.</p><p><em>Generalist investors</em> dip their toes but do not have deep understanding of the sector. They are happy to participate in deals to build up their knowledge on the sector but have no immediate plans to invest heavily in enterprise tech ventures as part of their current focus.</p><p><strong>How can you help?</strong></p><p>We had to leave out several players to make the landscape intelligible, and there will definitely be some discrepancies here. This is a draft, and we hope it will help uncover more detail on, and draw attention to the UK enterprise software players.</p><p>Let us know if you have any thoughts or further suggestions to this landscape. Feel free to reach me by email on <a href="/service/mailto:sanchit.dhote@beaconcapital.co.uk">sanchit.dhote@beaconcapital.co.uk</a> and I can then share with you a link to the google doc where we can together try and keep up to date the key players in the enterprise tech ecosystem.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/2017/03/enterprise-tech-ventures-uk-landscape/"><em>Beacon Capital</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8464dd4c0ead" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Grand Visionaries Or Piecemeal Tacticians?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maria-dramalioti/grand-visionaries-or-piecemeal-tacticians-c739d8e3b252?source=rss-f80918c6bee0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c739d8e3b252</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[success]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[tech]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneur]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vc]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[validation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beacon Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 02 Feb 2017 12:10:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-02T15:19:40.377Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Grand Visionaries or Piecemeal Tacticians?</h3><p>I was asked recently to speak at an Imperial College Enterprise Lab event on whether, as an early stage VC, I thought successful entrepreneurs are grand visionaries or piecemeal tacticians.</p><p><strong>VISION</strong></p><p>The ability to summon a big, paradigm shifting vision is often touted as the edge that successful tech entrepreneurs have over mere mortals.</p><p>In a start-up, vision has many important roles to play. It can be the road map that enables the setting of goals which, in turn, enables the selection of strategies and tactics. Importantly, vision can be the glue that binds together a team. When you have half a dozen under-paid, under-fed folks crammed in a small room working 24/7 to simultaneously build a beta product and sign up customers for the yet to be finished beta product, it is vital to have a world dominating common purpose to cheer and defend.</p><p><strong>PITFALLS OF A GRAND VISION</strong></p><figure><img alt="vision1" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/279/0*WGw0Kr1YllICU8JS.jpg" /></figure><p>However, an entrepreneur’s journey is not linear. Far from it. At the early stages (particularly pre-Series A) there will be few dull days, rather most days will involve multiple and simultaneous existential crises. The entrepreneurs who succeed in this phase have an uncanny ability to duck and dive, wheel and deal. It may closing the first sale of a product that is not fully baked, taking big risks, making sacrifices to extend the runway, moving quickly to restructure the team when needed. These things can be uncomfortable, sometimes brutally uncomfortable.</p><figure><img alt="vision2" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*pxask4yRKGnpkdJ2.jpg" /></figure><p>At Beacon, we have met over 3,000 start-ups since we started in 2013. Clearly not all founders have the aptitude for leading start-ups. It can be a difficult thing to admit. Sometimes, a grand vision can stop us from recognising this. I thought I would share some of the hazards of a grand vision.</p><p><strong>(1) A grand top down vision is only half way</strong></p><p>Most founders start their pitch by framing a vision based on a pain point — the bigger, the better. For example: businesses all over the world rely on a piece of technology nearly 40 years old … called e-mail. Yet email is slow, unproductive, hampers collaboration, seems light years behind mobile chat messaging and other social media. Instead imagine a new product that will instantly organise all your emails, intelligently sift out important issues, generate action lists, automatically populate calendars, and more. Such a top down vision is compelling. The pain is clear. The addressable market could not be bigger.</p><p>In 2015, we saw quite a few start-ups with big visions for addressing this pain point. (Coincidentally, 2015 was also the year when VC activity peaked with record valuations and dry powder in private capital funds.) Whilst we were excited by the top down vision, none of the email start-ups had convincing answers to some basic bottom up questions:</p><ul><li><strong>Who are the buyers?</strong></li></ul><p>The typical response was enterprises with X number of employees or X number of email accounts. And, assuming some reasonable conversion rates, we have line of sight to a X million business. An entirely logical approach.</p><p>But what about the other end of the telescope: the buyer must be (a) a real person (b) is motivated to buy the product, and © has a budget to spend. It is not obvious who this person is for a product that replaces or sits on top of email. Is it the CTO? Will the CTO care enough about a product whose ROI is hard to ascertain?</p><ul><li><strong>Having identified the buyers, how will you get to the buyer?</strong></li></ul><p>The typical response was some optimised permutation of PPC, content, social, referral, partnerships.</p><p>But, basically, what is needed is (a) a list of buyers (the easier it is to obtain such a list, the better) and (b) the right people to make the approach. With the email product, even assuming leads are identified, have we identified a salesforce and how do they sell a product whose ROI is hard to measure and requires the breaking of a 30 year old habit?</p><p>So, a grand top down vision is important but it is equally important to think about things from the bottom up. Strip it down to the basics and imagine if and how the basics can be executed.</p><p><strong>(2) Market validation</strong></p><p>It can be so easy to be drawn in by big visions and start executing straightaway. Sadly, many founders burn time, cash and emotional capital with nowhere near enough validation.</p><figure><img alt="market validation" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/292/0*dQ9Xt3VQkO8ToC0C.jpg" /></figure><p>With the tools available today, there is no excuse for just doing some desktop research or “I visited some cafes and asked some random people”. Some of the market research platforms (eg <a href="http://www.onepulse.com/">OnePulse</a>) used by the likes of Unilever and PwC are available to start-ups to reach thousands of real people, of any demographic, to get opinions on any question in minutes.</p><p>There is also no excuse for not doing an exhaustive appraisal of the competitive landscape for your product. Founders must be clear where, why and how their start-up fits in. Find out as much as you can about the competitors and potential partners — how long have they been in business, how are they funded, market share, user reviews etc. These are not just the incumbents (whose product might be general and not as targeted) but also start-ups near and far.</p><p><strong>(3) Runway</strong></p><p>Executing a grand vision requires a long runway. Most founders under-estimate the runway required. The immortal Airbnb took nearly three years to raise its Series A. They had 143 reservations in their first 12 months averaging £36 in fees, sold homemade breakfast cereal to make ends meet and had parted with 26% equity by the time they graduated from YC.</p><figure><img alt="runway" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*EwzqXRcuDX0dloko.jpg" /></figure><p>At the early stage, a start-up lives and dies by its ability to secure that next round of funding. To some extent, the grand vision must take a backseat and give way to interim milestones that will deliver the next round funding. To be a CEO at this stage is to be the Chief Cash Extraction Officer. This means staying in constant touch with providers of next stage funding and understanding the milestones they want to see. There is a caveat here: not all start-ups are suited to VC funding. Sometimes it can make perfect sense for a founder to not take VC funding and adopt a low growth strategy. It doesn’t mean that the vision is somehow inferior. It is just another way of getting to a viable business.</p><p>There is also a personal runway to consider. Founders must ask themselves how many months (more likely years) of poverty salary and zero holidays they can tolerate. Then double this number and see if the answer remains the same.</p><p>In the end, successful entrepreneurs are nimble operators who know that a grand vision is an enabler yet recognise it can be a hazardous masking agent!</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/2017/02/grand-visionaries-or-piecemeal-tacticians/"><em>Beacon Capital</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c739d8e3b252" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Venture Capital 2020: UK vs US]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maria-dramalioti/venture-capital-2020-uk-vs-us-758e38b85271?source=rss-f80918c6bee0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/758e38b85271</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beacon Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 May 2016 10:51:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-05-13T10:51:10.752Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is based on data analysis we did at Beacon Capital (see acknowledgements at the end of this post) and it was first presented by Chris Mairs, CBE, FREng, and Beacon Capital Venture Partner, in his keynote speech at our </em><a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/2015/12/looking-back-to-the-beacon-capital-and-london-partners-event/"><em>event</em></a><em> “London Tech Venture Capital: An Asset Class for Global Investors”</em>, on November 18th 2015.</p><p>There has been no shortage in recent months of inspirational (and aspirational) articles about the London venture capital and startup ecosystem (Local Globe’s <a href="https://medium.com/localglobe-notes/12-reasons-to-be-excited-about-london-62060110eb84#.a7u2gmp2a">post</a> serving as a good example) pointing to the robust economic growth, world leading universities and favourable investor tax regimes to paint a picture of a thriving venture capital ecosystem and a land of opportunities for startups, VCs, and more importantly Limited Partners (LPs) — those who ultimately invest in VC funds which in turn invest in startups.</p><p>And yet, arguing that the London startup ecosystem is booming does not seem to have attracted significantly more LP investment. London venture capital (let alone the rest of the UK or Europe) as an asset class has no, or only tiny, LP allocations.</p><p>The issue is that LPs (understandably) look at historical mean performance of Venture Capital investments in different geographies and conclude that this is better in the US than elsewhere. But perhaps that is a simplistic view and it may make more sense to consider the spread of performance within a portfolio as well as the mean.</p><p>The more pertinent question therefore is whether the relative performance of the two ecosystems, the US and European/UK, are likely to “converge” and, if yes, how soon might this happen.</p><p><strong>Relative Historic Performance of US and Europe</strong></p><p>To try and shed some light on this question, we analysed two datasets of startups in the US and Europe that received one or more investments between 2003 and 2010.</p><p>The US dataset of nearly 6700 deals is much larger than the European dataset, which contains a little over a 1000 deals, but both sets are large enough to tell us something. The data is far from perfect and we’ve had to make various assumptions where data was missing. We only considered companies that have actually had a liquidity event — i.e. got acquired, had an IPO or went bust. For each investment we calculated the multiple return on the investment and then considered the dataset as a whole. The model is quite basic and we plan to refine this over the coming weeks but allows for some interesting observations.</p><figure><img alt="USvEU multiples" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/545/0*KPS7kYqKKZSCVJuK.png" /></figure><p>NB: The X axis refers to the year the first investment was made. We did not include investments after 2010 because only very few have exited (due to the short time period) and hence this makes the analysis unreliable.</p><p>Looking at the chart on top, we can see that the US multiples (blue line) are indeed on average better than the EU (red line). However, it is very striking that the US standard deviations on the bottom chart, i.e. a measure of the spread of the returns within the dataset, are consistently higher.</p><p><strong>What about the future?</strong></p><p>We then applied a polynomial regression to the data to predict how the averages and standard deviations might look in the future. This is a notoriously unreliable business and of course does not take account of black swans or other unexpected global events. But so long as the relationship between macro conditions in Europe and the US follows the trends that existed over the past few years then this may tell us something about the relative performance of the two markets looking forward.</p><figure><img alt="USvEU regression" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/645/0*Cr0uUKrRM_y5-QM8.png" /></figure><p>Although the US mean is still ahead, the EU is converging on the US and the EU standard deviation remains much tighter than the US. In other words, we are approaching the same level of returns but with much more predictability if we have a sensible sized portfolio.</p><p><strong>Predicted Portfolio Performances in the US vs Europe</strong></p><p>We then used the Central Limit Theorem to predict the performance of a portfolio containing 10 randomly selected investments per year based on these mean and spread predictions.</p><figure><img alt="USvEU CLT" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/801/0*6ltS6Nzup99BmuES.png" /></figure><p>The red shaded area shows the performance of an EU portfolio within 99% confidence limits, and the larger blue shaded area shows the same for a US portfolio. The dark blue and dark red lines are the mean performance.</p><p>What we see is that although the EU mean performance is a bit lower, the red area falls entirely within the blue area. In other words, it is always more likely that the EU portfolio will be closer to its mean than a US portfolio, making the downside risk lower in the EU.</p><p><strong>So one might ask is this anything more than lies, damn lies and statistics?</strong></p><p>Well, the sanity check comes in the form of the increasing number of posts and articles arguing that the London ecosystem is becoming stronger and able to compete on a global scale but also from our very own experience having been actively involved in the local ecosystem for some time now.</p><p><strong>A Golden Age for UK Tech Investment</strong></p><p>Thinking about the US data for a moment, there is a very small number of mega unicorns like Uber and Whatsapp that significantly skew the data. Only the privileged few get to invest in these super outliers and it would be nonsense to build a strategy around finding the next Uber.</p><p>Coming back to the UK, a combination of the strengthening economy, presence of world class universities, the attractive investment tax regime and belief in the London ecosystem amongst investors has led to a significant increase in the private capital available to startups. This comes at a time when hands-on investors have spent many years working with entrepreneurs to build businesses efficiently in a capital constrained market. Their experience in the efficient use of capital and the fact that we have not yet suffered the early stage valuation inflation which has happened in the US is very significant. <strong>The return on an investment is the difference between the exit valuation and the entry valuation, diluted by the additional capital that the business sucks up in its journey. So buying into a capital-efficient business at an attractive early valuation is a great step towards good returns.</strong></p><p><strong>What does that mean for LPs?</strong></p><p>The reality is that there is a small number of tier 1 VCs in the US who consistently get access to the best deals with consequent portfolio performance consistently towards the upper end of the blue shaded area. In a future post we will segregate the US data and we expect to see that after only excluding a very few top performing investments the mean drops significantly. If you are an LP with access to one of the top performing funds, then good luck and fill your boots! Unfortunately, these funds are almost always oversubscribed and access is tough. So, if you are not in that privileged elite then you should certainly consider the UK, where standard deviations are lower, there is more space for new LPs in well managed funds and the mean performance may well exceed all but the very best US funds.</p><p>All prudent LPs do of course take account of more than the headline numbers and should not get seduced by Unicorn valuations. Interestingly recent adjustments in publicly traded stocks including Twitter and LinkedIn <a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> have shaken some investors’ general appetite for the Venture Capital class. However, we believe that these adjustments simply reinforce our view that markets with a smaller standard deviation, and hence less volatility, make more sense, so perhaps now more than ever before is the time for progressive LPs to refocus their investments towards the UK market.</p><p><em>A big thank you to the two INSEAD MBA students, </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/gautamnangia"><em>Gautam Nangia</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/gilles-aime-harerimana-9003114"><em>Gilles-Aime Harerimana</em></a> <em>who worked painstakingly for two weeks to get the data from various sources (Preqin, Thomson Reuters, etc) and </em><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/vassossanoudos"><em>Vasos Dramaliotis</em></a><em>, now a graduate engineer, who performed the analysis.</em></p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <a href="http://www.marketwatch.com/story/linkedin-loses-nearly-a-twitter-in-market-cap-2016-02-05">http://www.marketwatch.com/story/linkedin-loses-nearly-a-twitter-in-market-cap-2016-02-05</a></p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/2016/05/venture-capital-2020-uk-vs-us/"><em>Beacon Capital</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=758e38b85271" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Sliding Down the Deal Funnel]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maria-dramalioti/sliding-down-the-deal-funnel-550c36641aa7?source=rss-f80918c6bee0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/550c36641aa7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fundraising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beacon Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Mar 2016 00:27:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-03-09T00:30:00.347Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>and catching a glimpse of the chequered flag.</h4><p>Most, if not all, VCs optimize their deal funnel for (their own) efficiency. The objective is to quickly identify the “NOs”, track the progress of the “MAYBEs”, and focus on the “LIKELYs” to decide whether to issue a term sheet or not.</p><p>How do our numbers break down? As we touched on in the <a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/2016/03/jumping-into-the-top-of-the-deal-funnel/">previous post</a>, about a third of the <strong>1600</strong> opportunities we received — <strong>548 in total</strong> — got to engage with the Beacon team through a meeting or a call. Subsequently, a fifth of those moved into Deep Dive, during which we spend time to get to know the team and understand the opportunity in more detail. We issue term sheets for about 1% of the opportunities that we interact with, and we intend to close all of these.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/0*a_vhebXYAr6bEj8Z.jpg" /></figure><p>If <strong>1%</strong> seems tiny (all this work for 1%!), bear in mind that we also have an existing portfolio of <strong>29</strong> (soon to be <strong>30</strong>) investments and in 2015 our existing investments raised <strong>8 follow on rounds</strong>. Our deal making capacity — based on the last 3 years — is on average <strong>one deal a month</strong> but as our existing portfolio companies grow and raise follow on rounds (they have raised over <strong>$100 million in total in 3 years</strong>) it can somewhat affect our capacity for new deals. The silver lining — if you are a portfolio company — is that we help you!</p><h4>What ensues as we move down the funnel</h4><h4><strong>DEEP DIVE</strong></h4><p>Our objective remains the same- to discover which MAYBEs have to (regrettably) be NOs and which could receive funding- but at this point we like you and the opportunity enough to start devoting resources to it. The odds are still stacked against doing the deal; and this stage has the highest rejection rate (<strong>less than 1 in 10</strong> will make it to the next stage).</p><p>We perform a desktop review of the market, your product, and the business model. This covers the usual elements that one expects (i.e. market size, competitive landscape, what enterprise budget do you target, how significant is the “pain point” being addressed, the team’s synthesis, traction over time, etc.). Typically, we would have seen at least half a dozen similar opportunities previously and will be familiar with where the challenges lie. We call on our resources — the <a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/about-us/">Venture Partners</a>, other entrepreneurs and industry contacts — until we feel we have an informed view on the opportunity.</p><p>We will also consider further the balance of the founding team, their current skills and ambitions, and their past achievements both in and out of business.</p><p>We will take a first look at the numbers to ensure that these fit with the market opportunity and business model presented and that adequate funds are being raised at this stage of business development.</p><p>If we are not convinced after a bit of digging, we always make it a point to give the entrepreneur speedy and honest feedback. If we do believe in the opportunity but it is a little early for us, we suggest that we re-engage further down the line. We only convey that if we like the opportunity, not as a “get out of jail” card for us.</p><p>This stage normally involves at least another face-to-face meeting, including (if we plan to proceed) potentially talking to one of your customers (we always do this as discreetly as possible so that we do not unsettle any relationships!)</p><p><strong>What do we look for? </strong>For well prepared entrepreneurs this is the easiest of phases and they usually whizz through. Be responsive to our requests, share openly, and try to figure out whether you would like working with us.</p><p>If the Deep Dive has not turned our MAYBE into a NO, we issue a term sheet. We now consider (subject to due diligence) that you are building a substantial business; and that we would like to work with you. Yes we did say “subject to due diligence”; Deep Dive is the key commercial diligence on you and the opportunity, however, we still need to confirm what we discussed. Here we will principally check facts, corroborate key statements and beliefs and fulfill any legal or regulatory requirements. It may be that we have agreed to take references from customers and business only after the term sheet is signed in which case this will be done then. In any case we will specify exactly in the term sheet what we will do prior to completion of funding.</p><h4><strong>TERMSHEET</strong></h4><p>We always discuss the terms verbally with you before we send the term sheet across. As lead investors, we define further confirmatory due diligence and we try to coordinate this with the other investors too. This sounds onerous but most entrepreneurs sail through and they see it as a good training exercise for their next financing rounds (which may get more complicated if things go well!). We also discuss whether or not we would take a board seat post-investment; usually we do, and we are particularly active in helping the business over the funding period (typically 18 months).</p><p>This could potentially be a messy phase if there are multiple parties offering a term sheet or participating in the round. Having a lead investor in place should help ease the multi-party negotiations.</p><p>NB: We will write a separate blog on term sheets and how to deconstruct and compare term sheets clause by clause. If you have any specific questions do let us know.</p><p><strong>What do we look for?</strong> The savviest entrepreneurs (and VCs). <em>Stay cool, communicate a lot and avoid playing games</em>. This can be a test of our early relationship and how easily issues will be resolved post investment.</p><p>At this stage, it seems that we have (almost) made it. What remains is just the <em>final stretch</em> to the chequered flag!</p><h4><strong>CLOSING</strong></h4><p>This stage deserves a post by itself but suffice to say with two (or more!) set of lawyers now involved in the process and often two or more other investors in the round, things can get complicated (obtaining signatures, warrant letters, KYC processes, finalising investor consent matters etc..). The important thing is that both we, usually as the lead investor in the round, and your team are now keen to conclude matters. Both parties have invested time, emotion, and often money in coming this far and want the investment to take place.</p><p><strong>Warning:</strong> We never issue term sheets “speculatively”. When we issue a term sheet we want to close the deal. Last year we did not close three deals we intended to. The reasons were varied: negotiations breaking down with the team possibly due to the lead investor (not Beacon) issuing a term sheet too early in the process; a company not passing product DD (lack of sufficient data to back up a particularly important statement about the product performance); and, one of the founders facing a particularly strenuous personal situation that changed the risk profile of the opportunity. Sometimes life gets in the way but if everything goes to plan, we close all the term sheets we issue.</p><p><strong>What do we look for in founders during the investment process?</strong> Entrepreneurs (and also VCs for that matter) that don’t flinch under fire; stay cool and work towards the closing stages. If an unforeseen event arises, deal with it immediately and openly. Investors at this stage are as keen as you are to close and will do everything to help (NB: when the particular circumstances allow us, we will share a remarkable story of a young company which we <em>almost </em>funded and why we did not).</p><p>Finally, after the papers are inked (more likely DocuSigned these days), we enjoy a customary “closing drink” and try not to forget that this is the beginning (not the end!) of the hard work.</p><h4>Making it in the 1%</h4><p>Just 1% of the opportunities that broadly fit our investment strategy (of the 548 opportunities out of a universe of 1600) in 2015 made it to our portfolio. 1% is pretty striking, “needle in a haystack” might you say. Maybe, but if this needle grows to become the next Azimo, MoveGuides or Ometria, it is well worth the effort.</p><p>The opportunities knocking our door are overwhelming with great talent, ambitions and dreams. Yet, we are standing on the edge to take decisions whether these startups will make it or break it in the future. What’s the best thing you can do when you approach us?</p><ol><li><strong>Make a strong case, give us both vision and facts. </strong>Prepare a solid deck that shows the tech (share a demo), the team, traction (data, not words) and the timing (why is now the right time to go after this, what “shifted” in the market that created an opportunity). Even when they do not realise it, entrepreneurs identify an “arbitrage” opportunity in the market and go for it. Tell us what you think that is.</li><li><strong>Think about the type of investor you would like to work with. </strong>There is plenty of “easy” money available; but spending a little more time with the right investor could benefit the business long term.</li><li><strong>Be transparent in your dealings with us. </strong>Keep the lines of communication open — especially when the communication is getting tricky.</li><li><strong>Keep in mind that securing investment is only the beginning. </strong>The hard work for both parties begins post-close. It is always harder when you have money in the bank to spend.</li></ol><p>For both parties, it can sometimes feel like an eternity to get to the finish line (usually spanning 4 to 8 weeks), but the point here is to make the process as quick and frictionless as possible. Having worked with entrepreneurs at both ends of the spectrum, we are aware there is no magic formula, but being thoroughly prepared during the deep dive, to clear communication during the closing process, can make a huge difference.</p><p>Please let us know if you have any questions or any comments you would like to share. Next up, we plan to break down some more interesting numbers that we see in our deal flow at both ends of the funnel.</p><p>See you soon with the next post!</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/2016/03/sliding-down-the-deal-funnel/"><em>Beacon Capital</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=550c36641aa7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Jumping into the Top of the Deal Funnel]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maria-dramalioti/jumping-into-the-top-of-the-deal-funnel-59ce10176f27?source=rss-f80918c6bee0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/59ce10176f27</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fundraising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beacon Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Mar 2016 10:30:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-03-03T10:30:11.975Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>And how to work your way around the guillotine</h4><p>Last week we kicked off with a blog post on the cyclicality of the 1600 investment opportunities that we received in 2015 and, amongst other things, we challenged the myth that August is a ‘dormant month’ for VCs and entrepreneurs.</p><p>Your feedback was a mixture of “your analysis is not statistically correct!” (which we agree with of course, as it is just a data set from one year) to “we want to know how you breakdown the funnel!”.</p><p>Therefore, in the next couple of posts, we will talk about how those 1600 opportunities translate into the 548 interactions and subsequently the 13 investments that closed last year; and what are the steps that could take you to the bottom of the funnel. We plan to address this in two parts: a) how do we filter the deal flow at the top of the funnel and b) what happens at each stagelower down the funnel after we are interested.</p><p>There are not many VCs who would publish such numbers but we are different: we like to test the boundaries of what can (not) be shared. Experimentation makes us better (and perhaps helps others too). We are constantly fine-tuning the process and battling to keep everything on track despite the unpredictably ‘spiky’ nature of our workload.</p><h4>Is there any method to the madness?</h4><p><strong>INTRO STAGE</strong></p><p>This is where you appear as a line on our WIP (work-in-progress) and one of our team knows a little about you. The opportunity will be discussed in our weekly meeting and will fall into one of the following two categories: NO, MAYBE.</p><p>This is the very first connection between you (the startup) and one of the Beacon team (i.e. the Analyst Team, the Managing Partners or, more often, our Venture Partners; <a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/about-us/">meet the team</a>). This could be through a cold email, a warm introduction or a conversation at demo days, pitch events or accelerator programmes. A good starting point is usually a high level summary or the infamous ‘deck’, which should give us an overview of the business and your fundraising requirements.</p><p><strong>What do we look for? </strong>Principally whether the opportunity fits our investment strategy.<strong> </strong>Keep in mind that at Beacon we are not generalists; we do have certain predilections, for instance:</p><ul><li>B2B businesses with typically SaaS/recurring revenue models</li><li>Solutions tackling enterprise problems (e.g. operations/productivity, supply chain, sales and marketing, HR)</li><li>An addressable market of £500m+</li><li>Founding <em>teams</em> rather than “star” <em>sole </em>founders</li><li>Tech must have been developed in-house (CTO must have equity)</li><li>Some commercial validation; we predominantly invest post-revenue ( &gt;£5k MRR)</li><li>We participate in round sizes between £500k and £1.5m and have a strong preference to lead transactions, typically contributing over half of the round.</li></ul><p><strong>A note on valuations:</strong> Do not feel compelled to include the valuation in the deck if you don’t want to, but you should add it to your cover email (how much do you intend to raise, at what valuation, and if you have any commitments or leads). Many warn against mentioning valuations as early as that, but we find that it helps. You (the entrepreneur) have nothing to hide. If the valuation is not set, just say this is your ‘asking price’.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/882/1*wp2xEX5GmFp3k0XK5FIoaA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>INTERACTION</strong> <strong>STAGE</strong></p><p>If a startup falls into our sweet spot, it is typically a MAYBE and we engage through either a call or a face-to-face meeting with the founding team. We start spending time with you, which is encouraging, but bear in mind that the culling rate is even higher than the previous stage. Our objective is to decide whether the MAYBE is a NO or NOT NOW; your objective is to stay a MAYBE.</p><p>At this point we aim to begin a relationship: both parties try to show their best self. The challenge for us is to try and ask the difficult questions without appearing to be unfriendly or negative. A product demo is also important at this stage.</p><p><strong>Warning</strong>: if VCs do not ask you challenging questions at this stage, it is because they either did not understand your business or are not interested. The savviest entrepreneurs welcome, even invite, tough questions. We suggest that you stay away from the “easy VCs”, as it will probably load your cap table with indifferent investors (while your competitors will end up getting the ones who really care!)</p><p><strong>What do we look for? </strong>We like entrepreneurs with a big vision but that alone does not pass muster with our team. The surest way to get past this part of the funnel is with facts-based answers, data-backed statements and a compelling product demo.</p><p>If the MAYBE stays a MAYBE after this interaction, we start investing even more time in you.… Next week we plan to break down the latter stages in the deal funnel and what to keep in mind– i.e. during deep dive, how we issue term sheets, and how to manage the closing process.</p><p>In the meantime, here are <strong>4 pieces of advice</strong> for when you start to engage at the top of the funnel:</p><ol><li><strong>Get to know us</strong>. Before approaching us, <a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/faq/">Read about Beacon Capital</a> and check if your business fits our strategy.</li><li><strong>If we do not discover you first (we are <em>very</em> active in sourcing opportunities) then reach us through a warm introduction</strong>. Warm intros “skip the queue”. Do you know any of our <a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/about-us/">Venture Partners</a>? Have you got in touch with <a href="http://lcif.co/">LCIF</a>?</li><li><strong>A “no” does not always mean “never”.</strong> Our favoured entrepreneurs are the ones who listen, filter the feedback and try again. We too — as investors- can receive no for an answer, but we rarely give up. At the end of the day the ones who succeed are the persevering ones.</li><li><strong>Forgive us if we are late in getting back to you! Give us a second chance. We always try to give you one as well.</strong></li></ol><p>Thank you to those who got in touch last week and shared some thoughts. We’d love to hear from more of you. Feel free to send us any further ideas on what you would like us to discuss and we will try our best to do so.</p><h4>See you next week to dig a little deeper down the deal funnel!</h4><p>Original Source: <a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/2016/03/jumping-into-the-top-of-the-deal-funnel/">http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/2016/03/jumping-into-the-top-of-the-deal-funnel/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=59ce10176f27" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Getting on Your Fundraising Bike]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maria-dramalioti/getting-on-your-fundraising-bike-83988cc547cc?source=rss-f80918c6bee0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/83988cc547cc</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[fundraising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beacon Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 22 Feb 2016 13:03:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-02-22T13:03:02.658Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>And keeping your balance.</h4><p>This is a “<em>Hello World!” </em>blog post from the analyst team here at <a href="http://beaconcapital.co.uk/">Beacon Capital</a>. One of the things we do is look at some of the new opportunities that come in, and make sure we get these in front of the Partners at Beacon to be discussed at our weekly progress meetings. We noticed how busy it can get in certain months and have been thinking about how we could help entrepreneurs shape their approach when they reach out to us, so that both parties have a better first experience. We asked around, we listened, and now we are starting with a series of short weekly blog posts to give you some insight into how we work.</p><h4>How cyclical is fundraising?</h4><p><strong>One of the observations over the years is that fundraising appears to be cyclical; entrepreneurs seem to prefer certain months to start their fundraising. Take 2015 for example: we were approached by 1600 teams, and we interacted with 548 of them </strong>(the breakdown of our funnel will be posted in the next blog). By ‘interacted’ we mean that at the very least we had a call or a meeting to try and understand their business in greater detail. <strong>This means, on average we had conversations with just over 10 startups per week. </strong>Havingplotted the 548 first interactions over the twelve months, the outcome suggests that entrepreneurs <strong>chose January, February and October to start their fundraising</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/630/1*31K4T885bmwAuCksuUqpzQ.png" /></figure><p>Are these months the best time to approach us? Maybe not: those periods are the busiest and consequently it leads to us being (just a little) less sensitive when an entrepreneur has an “off day”. With the burst of entrepreneurs approaching us during these periods, it’s not inconceivable that good opportunities may be missed because they were not presented as well as they could have been. In other words, by choosing these months to start your fundraising you may be entering the market when the competition is most intensive. Are you making your life more difficult than it should be?</p><p>And just to give you a full picture of the activity in a VC like Beacon Capital, we also plotted the deals that have closed over the same period; we average a deal per month with the most eventful months being <strong>May and August (!), well clear of </strong>the busiest months for seeing new opportunities (January &amp; February). Interestingly, <strong>October</strong> also seems to be a relatively busy month, both for closing as well as seeing new opportunities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/612/1*oX8FvSjtIP2YVrGbjEXcAw.png" /></figure><p>Keep in mind that <strong>a transaction can take anywhere between two to three months from the first meeting to close</strong> (taking the new transaction that closed in November as an example, we started engaging with the founding team in September).</p><p>It may seem counterintuitive as most people believe VCs do very little in the summer, but approaching us in the relatively quiet months of <strong>June, July and Septembe</strong>r will give you this extra bit of space to develop a relationship, by getting to know us and putting your ideas across.</p><p><strong>Fundraising should be driven by the capital needs of the business and not how busy or not the VCs are, but *if* you have the option then maybe you should start engaging with VCs during their “lower activity months”.</strong> However, if you still find yourself approaching us during the busiest months, then be prepared for relatively slower responses and for a little bit more persistence from your end.</p><p>In the coming weeks, we’ll share a breakdown on our deal funnel and how this relates to our investment focus.</p><h4>Take away message</h4><p><strong>Fundraising should be driven by the capital needs of the business and not how busy or not the VCs are, but *if* you have the option then maybe you should start engaging with the VCs during their “low activity months”.</strong> However, if you still find yourself approaching us during the busiest months, then be prepared for relatively slower responses and for a little bit more persistence from your end.</p><p>In the coming weeks, we’ll share a breakdown on our deal funnel and our investment focus.</p><h4>See you next week!</h4><p>Original Source: <a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/2016/02/blog1-getting-on-your-fundraising-bike/">http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/2016/02/blog1-getting-on-your-fundraising-bike/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=83988cc547cc" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lessons on pivoting from the $11m-backed Shopa]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maria-dramalioti/lessons-on-pivoting-from-the-11m-backed-shopa-6a7ec9b7e170?source=rss-f80918c6bee0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6a7ec9b7e170</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[opinion-article]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pivot]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[angellab]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[shopa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[funding]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Beacon Capital]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2015 15:14:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-02-18T14:07:50.518Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There seems to be a series of news lately of well-funded startup failures: <a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/23/what-really-killed-homejoy-it-couldnt-hold-onto-its-customers/">Homejoy</a> ($38m in total funding), <a href="http://techcrunch.com/2015/08/10/zirtual-pause/#.m18mwb:shH5">Zirtual</a> ( $5.5m funding) and now <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/11824981/Shopa-shuts-down-just-months-after-raising-7m-in-growth-capital.html">Shopa</a> ( $11m funding), only this one is much closer to home. Shopa failing reminded us of how easy it is to underestimate the B2C pivot and, for us, the very early investors, how deceptively easy it is to drift into disengaging with our investments when these get “marquee” follow on investors on board.</p><p>In the early days of <a href="http://www.angellab.co.uk/">AngelLab</a> we made an investment in Shopa. The size of the investment is inconsequential in the context of our portfolio today but this does not take the bite out of our disappointment. Shopa had a bold vision of changing the way we discover and make buying decisions. It was one of many startups who ventured in the social commerce area but it was the one that raised the most substantial amount from institutional investors. We loved the team and the founder’s entrepreneurial spirit and commitment to make this venture a success was a reassuring sign. What we liked more however was that Shopa had a B2B offering in a sea of “me too” B2C social commerce offerings. As investors, we generally like B2B, we get it. You target a piece of an enterprise budget which is owned by someone who has the explicit intent of spending it.</p><p>Shopa, at the beginning, was offering retailers a platform to turn their existing customers to their most effective customer acquisition machine by incentivising them to share what they buy and get rewarded for it too. With all its risks, this was a believable if bold proposition that relied on, amongst other things, building a piece of tech the retailers did not have and could not easily build.</p><p>When and how exactly Shopa pivoted from B2B to a highly ambitious B2C proposition is for another day. But pivot it did and this — alongside other things- was the beginning of the end.</p><p>Almost invariably failure comes down to key strategic or operational decisions. Our learnings from Shopa are about how easy it is to underestimate the pivot from B2B to B2C:</p><ol><li><strong>Pivoting to B2C requires a business model overhaul not merely a facelift</strong>: Don’t underestimate the depth of the change. It requires more than a new deck and a few million dollars in funding. Ultimately, businesses try to get a piece of someone’s budget. But when this someone becomes the <em>consumer</em> rather than an <em>enterprise</em> the business model needs a fundamental readjustment, not merely an expensive facelift.</li><li><strong>When pivot, make sure there is Opportunity AND Aptitude;</strong> successful pivots happen when the company unexpectedly discovers a particular <em>aptitude</em> for converting an <em>opportunity</em> in the market. “Aptitude” as well as “opportunity”, though not sufficient, are <em>both</em> <em>necessary</em> ingredients of a successful pivot.</li><li><strong>Beware of the “revenue does not matter, traction does” mantra</strong>; this *may* hold true when the company’s funding can cover its burn for a long enough period (24 plus months and then some!) to get the company to a substantial value accretion point. Revenue however <em>does</em> matter in most cases. When SV startups and their investors say “we do not focus on generating revenue right now, we want to build an awesome product” what they mean is they focus on the metrics (eyeballs, engagement, repeat, CAC, whatever they have decided that proves <em>significant latent demand for their product</em>) until they reach a substantial part of their Total Addressable Audience.</li><li><strong>Fundraising can become a bottomless pit for the CEO’s time: </strong>B2C startups, especially when they believe “revenue does not matter”, usually survive only if the CEO spends disproportionate amount of time on explaining the vision, model and metrics in the service of raising cash. When this happens, no matter how good the C-team behind him/her is, there is something wrong. In the UK, where risk capital is in short supply relatively to the US, this can send the company to a dangerous spiral.</li></ol><p>There are many other reasons why Shopa failed but most of these will sound familiar to all of us who have been investing in young businesses for more than a few years. There may be variations on the specifics– different stage of business, different stage in the economic cycle, different investors, different excuses — but the themes are the same.</p><p>What makes Shopa’s failing a little more interesting by UK norms is its <em>spectacular speed </em>given the size of its last raise: it was only recently that Shopa had closed a significant round of investment on the back of an aggressive B2C pivot and expansion plan. It was even more recently that the company was on the road raising for an even larger round at a valuation that would make our multiple on this investment — though not our IRR as our investment was small — probably record breaking. It is not every day that we see that. At least in the UK.</p><p>Shopa’s failure that came so soon after the last funding round, served a stark reminder to all of us at AngelLab as early investors: we must remember to keep a close eye to those companies in our portfolio who have “spread their wings” and grew to attract “marquee” investors on board. Being an early investor is not an excuse for becoming a disengaged investor later on. This is what the shareholders information rights are there for. The early investors probably still know the founder — and to some extent the business too- better as they have met him/her during the crucial, formative period of the early days.</p><p>Back to the Shopa vision and the social-discovery-led shopping: we still believe the way we discover and make shopping decisions will change; “googling it” is the frictionless way to discover generic, commoditised products but it will not work for more aspirational purchases. Consumers yearn for inspiration from trusted influential sources. So, watch this space especially now that Shopa is out of the way and does not discourage new talent from “attacking the opportunity”!</p><p>Onwards and upwards to discovering the next one hoping that we know a little more about what <em>not</em> to do when we find it.</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.beaconcapital.co.uk/2015/08/lessons-pivoting-11m-backed-shopa/"><em>Beacon Capital</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6a7ec9b7e170" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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