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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mariana Carmona on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Mariana Carmona on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Mariana Carmona on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[From Hayek’s denationalization of money to algorithmic stablecoins]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/coinmonks/from-hayeks-denationalization-of-money-to-algorithmic-stablecoins-7b72735272a5?source=rss-16ed9209e469------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7b72735272a5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[terra]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cardano]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ampleforth]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stablecoin-cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mariana Carmona]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Mar 2022 04:56:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-03-21T05:04:31.167Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>A review of Ampleforth, Terra, and Djed</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*l84Lu-ic8BdEni-gPlWxnQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: Bit2Me Academy</figcaption></figure><p>Have you ever thought of competing private currencies where individuals are able to choose the currency of their preference? In 1976, the Nobel Laureate <a href="https://medium.com/@charlietuk73/cryptopolitics-the-geopolitics-of-cryptocurrencies-and-their-impact-on-the-global-geopolitical-36e255076240">Friedrich A. Hayek published <strong>Denationalisation of Money</strong>. In his book, Hayek envisioned a world where private token money could get into circulation taking away the state’s monopoly to produce money.</a> In the chapter “Putting Private Token Money into Circulation”, he wrote about competing currencies that <em>would certainly prove a more effective constraint, forcing the issuing institutions to keep the value of their currency constant […]. </em>Moreover, he stated:<em> The managers of the bank would learn that its business depended on the unshaken confidence that it would continue to regulate the issuance of private currencies so that their purchasing power remained approximately constant […] To achieve this aim, </em><strong><em>the amount would have to be promptly adapted to any change of demand, whether increase or decrease</em></strong>.</p><p>Almost 50 years later, Hayek’s private money in circulation has its closest configuration in the advent of blockchain-based algorithmic stablecoins, where the adjustment of the money supply to changes in demand is apolitical, decentralized, and fully automated by smart contracts.</p><h4>Digging into algo-stablecoins</h4><p>Cryptocurrencies are extremely volatile. Broadly speaking, cryptocurrencies do not accomplish the three characteristics to function as ‘money’, i.e., to be a good <strong>store of value </strong>— something that will retain its value in a reasonably predictable way; a <strong>unit of account</strong> — an easy way to price goods and services, and a <strong>medium of exchange</strong> — something that people hold because they can swap it for other things or currencies. Due to the high variability in value, cryptocurrencies cannot be used as units of account, therefore complicating their utilization as a medium of exchange. Imagine customers would need to know the exchange rates every time they want to buy something priced in BTC or ETH.</p><p>The volatility of cryptocurrencies is addressed by <strong>stablecoins </strong>that try to maintain the characteristics of the native cryptocurrencies in a blockchain such as decentralization, censorship resistance, trustlessness, while seeking to function as money. Stablecoins represent — in my view - the closest to Hayek’s private token money in circulation with <a href="https://www.blockchainresearchinstitute.org/project/digital-asset-revolution/?utm_campaign=Newsletter%202021&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;_hsmi=195407350&amp;_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_uxjqJV3tCWz0VydXxvhv3M98Q-ong0cWZ4udt7VfZYy-NSIm-bxnlIU7a06xF--Wx0e0E-ADEwP4FAQY-fNz_Myln0lq-1rNbddYn5WYOOcu5Z3c&amp;utm_content=195407350&amp;utm_source=hs_email">the potential to transform legacy payments infrastructure such as SWIFT, interbank network handling global payments and others by ushering in a new era of frictionless global real-time value settlement</a>.</p><p>Stablecoins are cryptocurrencies that keep its price pegged to a fiat currency that is widely accepted as ‘sufficiently stable’ such as the USdollar, Euro or gold. There are different types of stablecoins. One class is <strong>fiat-collateralized </strong>where<strong> </strong>the price is kept stable backed by the correpondent amount of fiat reserves, in this case we find examples such as Tether. Fiat collateralization has a few shortcomings, for instance, the need to use the traditional financial system to invest the reserves in money markets or bond markets which could transfer new risks to the stablecoin. Perhaps a major drawback is that these stablecoins are centralized demeriting the case of using a distributed ledger (i.e. the blockchain), first by trusting third parties in the management of reserves and secondly because the supply adjustment to changes in demand relies upon the operators of the stablecoin. A second type of stablecoins is <strong>crypto-collateralized </strong>which are<strong> </strong>backed with cryptocurrencies — for example DAI — posing a few other challenges, for instance the need to address the volatility of the cryptocurrency, higher risk of autoliquidation, or over-collateralization requirements. A third type is <strong>algorithmic stablecoins, </strong>where the adjustment of the money supply to changes in demand is encoded in the protocol, providing more capital efficiency and decentralization. Algo-stablecoins entail a few challenges as well, for instance, to keep stability and liquidity, and algo-stablecoins require continuous growth. Algorithmic stablecoins are the ‘youngest’ in the scene however there are some sound cases out there which will provably unseat centralized stablecoins and fiat currencies.</p><h4>Three different stabilization mechanisms in algorithmic stablecoins</h4><p>The mechanism by which an algorithmic stablecoin keeps its peg to the fiat currency is not unique. The following cases: Ampleforth, Djed and Terra utilize different mechanisms:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*NRS3rwoKl7OCoH7IwsLIJQ.jpeg" /></figure><h4>Ampleforth</h4><p><a href="https://messari.io/asset/ampleforth">Ampleforth is an uncollateralized algorithmic coin for stable purchasing power</a>. The coin, AMPL, is an ERC-20 token designed around <a href="https://www.ampleforth.org/economics/">the concept of <em>denationalized money</em></a>, functioning as base money.</p><p>Ampleforth has a maximum supply of 395,345,189 coins. As of writing, the circulating supply was 93.03m AMPL with a market cap of US 87.75 million. AMPL has a modest size and presence, for instance, it is ranked out of the top 100 cryptocurrencies. Nonetheless, AMPL is designed as a new primitive building block in DeFi just like BTC or ETH and its insertion to DeFi is growing for instance, AMPL is a lend or borrow asset in Aave alongside integrations to Avalanche, Binance Smart Chain, Uniswap, and Balancer which will foster adoption and growth.</p><p>Among the use cases, AMPL is considered to be a unit of account — i.e., can be used as a means of payment — . As a store of value, it is designed to keep purchasing power, and in DeFi, <a href="https://www.ampleforth.org/">AMPL is suitable to denominate long-term on-chain stable contracts and crypto-backed derivatives. Moreover, it is functional money free from centralized collaterals, lenders of last resort and beyond the reach of politics</a>.</p><p><strong><em>AMPL token design</em></strong></p><p>Ampleforth has an elastic supply that absorbs the volatility of demand by setting a <em>target price</em> (Pt) and a <em>price threshold (</em>δ) creating a price-band around the target. Within that interval, the price of AMPL is considered “stable” or in equilibrium. Whenever demand changes and the unit price gets out of that range, the supply expands or contracts proportionally until the price gets back to the equilibrium band (see the figure below). Expansion or contraction of supply modifies the quantity of AMPLs in holder’s wallet such that their net balance remains constant, calling this a rebase of balances. <a href="https://www.ampleforth.org/papers/">The user’s percent ownership remains fixed unless the user chooses to sell or buy AMPLs</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/610/1*B7IlHjwElLTN_jaiSpQIiw.png" /></figure><p>Suppose that Alice has 1 AMPL worth US$1.00. If demand increases such that 1 AMPL = US$2.00, the nominal exchange rate in AMPLs is higher than the target, thus a supply expansion occurs. In the next equilibrium, Alice will have 2 AMPLs worth US$1.00. The supply change is computed and executed no more than once every 24 hours based on the latest price difference and it is distributed uniformly over the course of <em>k</em> days. Changes in supply are timestamped automatically therefore it is possible to know when it will occur and in what measure.</p><p>Ampleforth is not strictly a stablecoin because it is subject to price fluctuations. Notwithstanding the foregoing, AMPL is capable of bootstrapping volatility by keeping the price fluctuation within an interval.</p><h4>Ampleforth’s volatility fingerprint</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*26MWFnF5hLCbhd_Bh-srLg.png" /><figcaption>Source: Ampleforth whitepaper.</figcaption></figure><p>In the figure of the left, an expansion of supply is represented by the semicircle in dotted lines above the price band whereas a contraction of supply is represented by the semicircles below the price band. During these dynamic periods where supply of AMPL is moving towards a new equilibrium, there is a time lapse where arbitrageurs can sell or buy AMPL, right after the supply increases or reduces but before the price correction takes place, producing patterns (step-like functions) in supply and market cap (middle and right figures), outlining its own volatility fingerprint. After the adjustment period, new equilibria in supply and market cap are reached, represented by the straight horizontal lines in the figures above.</p><p>The volatility fingerprint of supply and market cap is showing, foremostly, that there is no fixed trend in the long-run. The trend can alternate up and down depending on changes in demand, whereas the price fluctuates around band. In the figure below, one year series of price and stock shows that the trends match with the theoretical design.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*WMoWedybq5K0QvhQR1lV9w.png" /><figcaption>Taken from Ampleforth.org</figcaption></figure><p>Moreover, AMPL is decentralized, meaning there is no control in the supply adjustment, the protocol sets the incentives by propagating the latest price information and the fast-actors (arbitrageurs benefiting for near term trades) propagate supply information back into price by selling or buying AMPL during the lapse of time they can make profits from an overpriced or underpriced AMPL. For AMPL holders, the dynamics between one equilibrium and the other goes unnoticed since their net balances are rebased.</p><h4>Terra-Luna</h4><p>The first thing you read in the website says: “<a href="https://www.terra.money/">Terra is a public blockchain protocol deploying a suite of algorithmic decentralized stablecoins which underpin a thriving ecosystem that brings DeFi to the masses</a>”. In Terra’s philosophy, fulfilling the monetary needs of the average customer is the key <a href="https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/terra-luna/">to power price-stable global payments systems</a>. In Hayek’s view, Terra is competing to attract billions of customers to use their stablecoins in the new Web 3.0 monetary order that is configured.</p><p>To do so, Terra uses a dual-coin mechanism where Luna (native token) absorbs the volatility of the various Terra stablecoins. In this case, an elastic monetary supply adjusts to keep the peg, contracting or expanding, according to changes in demand for money. Luna is also used as a <a href="https://coinmarketcap.com/alexandria/glossary/governance-token">governance token</a>.</p><p>The dual mechanism works as follows: if the price of UST stablecoin (pegged to the US dollar) falls below the peg, Luna is auctioned in exchange for UST, that is, the system mints Luna and burns (destroys) UST. This process will contract the supply of UST, increasing its price until reaching the peg again. In this operation, there is a risk-free profit by arbitraging the difference in price since the system always exchanges at price of $1.00. Example: if UST falls to 0.90, by trading UST for 1 USD worth of Luna from the system, an arbitrageur makes a 0.10 risk-free profit compared to the 0.9 USD worth she could get in the open market. Conversely, when the price of UST is above the peg, the supply increases by minting UST and burning (destroying) Luna, reducing UST price until reaching the peg. Arbitrageurs also make risk-free profits for example, if UST increases to 1.10, arbitrageurs can trade 1 USD worth of Luna to the system to get 1.1 USD worth of UST. Originally, Luna burns were tokens deposited into Terra’s Treasury, using the funds to support new developments in the ecosystem and keep a growing demand for Terra stablecoins. In the recent upgrade, the protocol was modified to effectivley burn Luna tokens.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/173/1*hql_q0bNs7OHns7sCTutDw.png" /></figure><p>In lieu of the Treasury, earlier this year, Terra Money announced the commencement of <a href="https://lfg.org/fundingandgrants/">Luna Foundation Guard</a>, an organization that will support projects whenever they are open-source applications, algorithmic stablecoins, research and education and the building of community-driven ecosystems.</p><p>Terra stablecoin (UST) has gained traction becoming fourth among its type with 14.9 billion market cap as of writing. Likewise, Luna has climbed up — in less than one year — becoming part of the large market cap tokens with 32.25 billion.</p><p>Nowadays, Terra Ecosystem has approximately ninety projects, sixty are live platforms where Terra stablecoins are used in the ample functions of money, for instance, Anchor is a savings platform where UST can be stored with a not negligible 20% APY. Nexus Protocol is a yield farming optimizer, or Apollo Dao where capital investments take place. Chai is a payments platform where KRT (Terra stablecoin tracking the South Korean Won’s price) is used as a means of exchange, likewise Memepay does in Mongolia. There are also platforms using stablecoins in e-commerce, money markets, and automated market makers.</p><h4>Djed</h4><p>Djed is a newborn stablecoin in the Cardano ecosystem. <a href="https://iohk.io/en/research/library/papers/djeda-formally-verified-crypto-backed-pegged-algorithmic-stablecoin/">The whitepaper was released in August 17, 2021</a>. Djed is a hybrid stablecoin because it is crypto-backed and algorithmic. In Djed, an autonomous bank — powered by smart contracts — buys and sells the stablecoin for a price that is pegged to a target, keeping the volatile currency as a reserve. <a href="https://iohk.io/en/research/library/papers/djeda-formally-verified-crypto-backed-pegged-algorithmic-stablecoin/">While doing so, it charges fees and accumulates them as part of the reserves, benefiting reserve holders who ultimately contribute to the reserve funding and take the risks of price fluctuations.</a></p><p>Djed has gone through a long verification process including a robust mathematical research checked on paper and through Isabelle, an automated tool for theorem proof after which Djed was tested.</p><p><strong><em>Djed’s token design</em></strong></p><p>Djed has a more complex design than the previous two cases. The protocol starts with a simplified version called <strong>minimal Djed </strong>that encodes the<strong> </strong>stability properties under which the automated bank operates.</p><p>In minimal Djed users buy stablecoins from the contract and deposit the equivalent value of the pegged fiat currency in a base coin (e.g., ADA, ERG, etc) and the contract mints Djed. Likewise the user can sell stablecoin and get back the equivalent dollars in base coins. The protocol establishes a lower and upper bound where the smart contract is always willing to buy stablecoins starting 0.99 cents and sell at 1.01. If reserves were too low due to fluctuations in the price of base coins, holders of stablecoins will not receive 1 dollar for each Djed, instead they will be receiving the proportional amount of reserves in relation to the total number of Djed in circulation (R / Nsc). The protocol is gauged to resist a market crash up to 67% where Equity never goes zero, relieving the protocol from an insolvency problem and bankruptcy. However, to improve the situation in which holders of stablecoin receive less than 1 dollar for each Djed, the protocol buys and sells reserve coins (RC) to provide more equity to the contract to have enough reserves.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*U-ZpaHKd-ygCdRHfWJszsA.png" /><figcaption>Source: <a href="https://iohk.io/en/blog/posts/2021/08/18/djed-implementing-algorithmic-stablecoins-for-proven-price-stability/">Input / Output</a></figcaption></figure><p>The protocol sets limits to the buy / sell operations of reserve coins by establishing the reserve ratio (r ) equal to Reserves divided by Liabilities (i.e., the equivalent in US dollar circulating in Djed) and the parameters that do not allow the operations. If too many RC were sold the ratio can be too low and the contract will not be able to face liabilities. Likewise if the demand for Djed increases. In the opposite case, one might think that a verey big (r) is desirable, however there is also a maximum to avoid diluting the fees per reserve coin that is the incentive for holders of reserve coins.</p><p>During the testing period, it was detected that minimal Djed required a few adjustments, to mention a few, reserve draining was possible if a malicious actor could estimate the future exchange rate; the fees in the minimal version were rigid and could not serve as a lever to encourage or discourage operations (to buy / sell reserve coin) whenever it was required, more importantly, if the peg was lost, stablecoin holders could suffer financial losses and as the reserve ratio approached to zero, holders of reserve coins the possibility of a bank run was there.</p><p>An <strong>extended Djed protocol </strong>overcomes the issues detected in the minimal Djed, moreover, it considers dynamic fees that are increased for operations that shift the reserve ratio away from an optimum reserve parameter and decreased fees for operations that bring it closer to the optimum. By doing so, holders of Djed have robust stability conditions while reserve coin holders have attractive rewards.</p><p>Future developments can be expected in Djed, for instance, the possibility to stake the Reserves and provide better incentives to reserve coin holders, introducing governance to the protocol — for instance allow the governance community to adjust key parameters in the protocol — , KYC and AML functionalities, debt financing for the autonomous bank, pegging the stablecoin to a basket of assets, and so forth.</p><p>Djed has quite relevant use cases besides being the stablecoin for the DeFi ecosystem in Cardano and Ergo blockchains:</p><p>One of the most outstanding use case is that Djed is meant to be a decentralized stablecoin <strong>used for payments</strong>. Issued by Cardano’s partner COTI, the stablecoin will be instantaneously available in AdaPay — a payments gateway already supporting over 30 fiat currencies. Secondly, Djed is <a href="https://iohk.io/en/blog/posts/2021/06/10/stablefees-and-the-decentralized-reserve-system/">the stablecoin to denominate all the Cardano’s network transaction fees, introducing the novel concept of <strong>stable fees</strong></a><strong>, </strong>which will be a major advantage and game changer for users and operators of DeFi platforms that are currently bearing the headaches of highly volatile gas fees. Last but not least, Djed is a powerful diversified stablecoin as the autonomous bank can hold reserves in multiple cryptocurrencies including stablecoins (e.g., ADA, BTC, ETH, USDC, etc.) and the target price can be referenced to fiat currencies or other assets (e.g. dollar, euro or gold).</p><h4>Takeaways</h4><p>If Hayek could see what algorithmic stablecoins are capable of doing, I think he certainly had written a few of them as vivid examples of private token money in circulation. Perhaps algorithmic stablecoins are the killer app for massive adoption in payments, savings, trading, long-term contracts, etc., as they are proving the possibility to create monetary systems free of political controls and a variety of ther such that customers can choose the most competitive stablecoin that fulfills their needs. Finally, for their capital efficiency — seen in decentralized monetary adjustments — algorithmic stablecoins might be unseating the collateralized ones and perhaps fiat currencies too.</p><blockquote>Join Coinmonks<a href="https://t.me/coincodecap"> Telegram Channel</a> and<a href="https://www.youtube.com/c/coinmonks/videos"> Youtube Channel</a> learn about crypto trading and investing</blockquote><h3>Also, Read</h3><ul><li><a href="https://coincodecap.com/best-online-casinos">Best Online Casinos</a> |<a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/binance-review-ee10d3bf3b6e"> Binance Review</a> |<a href="https://coincodecap.com/bitmex-review"> BitMEX Review</a></li><li><a href="https://coincodecap.com/sparrow-exchange-review">Sparrow Exchange Review</a> |<a href="https://coincodecap.com/nash-exchange-review"> Nash Exchange Review</a></li><li><a href="https://coincodecap.com/crypto-trading-bots-in-the-us">Best Crypto Trading Bots in the US</a> |<a href="https://coincodecap.com/changelly-review"> Changelly Review</a></li><li><a href="https://coincodecap.com/crypto-arbitrage-in-india">Earn Passive Income Using Crypto Arbitrage In India</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/godex-io-review-7366086519fb">Godex.io Review</a> |<a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/invity-review-70f3030c0502"> Invity Review</a> |<a href="https://coincodecap.com/bitforex-review"> BitForex Review</a></li><li><a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/bitcoin-margin-trading-exchange-bcbfcbf7b8e3">Best Bitcoin Margin Trading</a> |<a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/lolli-review-e6ddc7895ad8"> Lolli Review</a> |<a href="https://coincodecap.com/bityard-margin-trading"> Bityard Margin Trading</a></li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7b72735272a5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks/from-hayeks-denationalization-of-money-to-algorithmic-stablecoins-7b72735272a5">From Hayek’s denationalization of money to algorithmic stablecoins</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/coinmonks">Coinmonks</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Get ready for the dazzling Metaverse]]></title>
            <link>https://mariana-nft.medium.com/get-ready-for-the-dazzling-metaverse-5eb9b4dc6d8f?source=rss-16ed9209e469------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5eb9b4dc6d8f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terra]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[defi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[polygon]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metaverse]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mariana Carmona]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Feb 2022 01:38:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-02-10T14:35:47.361Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/950/1*v3nO4JNNBUYaj-hUUs3Ikg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Source: Adobe Stock</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Demystifying the Open Metaverse</strong></h4><p>The Metaverse is the blockchain-based, cryptocurrency, 3D internet. The <strong>Open Metaverse</strong> adds the subtle but powerful word of democratic ownership between builders and users, trustless, peer-to-peer, interoperable, and token-incentivized networks with digital communities and Distributed Autonomous Organizations as governance institutions.</p><p><a href="https://grayscale.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Grayscale_Metaverse_Report_Nov2021.pdf">The Open Metaverse is preeminently a crypto-economic system. Other studies call it <em>a meta-economy</em> meaning by that an interconnected crypto-cloud economy with decentralized protocols interoperating and providing infrastructure to build new experiences in e-commerce, art, entertainment, gaming, businesses, labor markets and more. The open virtual economy in the Metaverse generates physical-world value for users.</a></p><p>Metaverse is a digital universe encompassing our physical social interactions with a simultaneous virtual self, transforming our dealings and behavior at large.</p><p><strong>Hey Tech Giants, the Metaverse is not yours !</strong></p><p>The Metaverse is unlikely to be ‘owned’ by a small set of tech firms with a shareholder logic, although “Verses” can exist in permissioned and closed environments, they will coexist and will be challenged by <strong>Open Verses</strong> gaining more traction among creators, users, and tech-savvies.</p><p><strong>If there is a virtual economy, there must be a virtual financial system too.</strong></p><h4>Welcome to MetaFi</h4><p><a href="https://coinyuppie.com/metafi-the-rise-of-metaverse-finance/">DeFi´s “currency legos” are enabled by their unstoppable composability and programmability features.</a> These characteristics allow the aggregation of financial services as never seen before, forming an innovative parallel financial system.</p><p><a href="https://outlierventures.io/research/metafi-defi-for-the-metaverse/">MetaFi is the layer that unlocks value in the Metaverse, permissionless participation, and extreme competition</a>.</p><blockquote><strong>MetaFi allows going beyond the play-to-earn to the stake-as-you-use, mine-as-you-own.</strong></blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/583/1*7tTkpPZhvnpM7yJORHG-JA.png" /><figcaption>Adapted from Outlier Ventures</figcaption></figure><p>The figure above is not the outcome of lucubrations of an idle mind, here are two projects of the sort:</p><h4><a href="https://nextearth.io/">Next Earth</a></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*dtrgjlHWf66dFjmFzOxjwA.jpeg" /></figure><p>Next Earth is the latest Metaverse project in Polygon. This is a virtual land ownership platform where users can generate income through DeFi whether in the play-to-earn activities or by farming and staking the native token <strong>NXTT</strong>. This year, Next Earth will incorporate <strong>fiat payments</strong> and <strong>business module integrations</strong>.</p><h4><a href="https://terraoffice.world/#/">Terra World</a></h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/318/1*luLVw0JlfGXejY4lar22mA.png" /><figcaption>Source: terraworld.me</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Terra World</strong> is the first NFT Metaverse work service platform built in Terra blockchain. The working environment for businesses and employees is Terra Office introducing the concept <a href="https://terraoffice.world/Terra%20World.pdf"><strong>Metaverse for Work</strong> (MFW), a mining system that provides rewards in the native TWD token just by running an office or working in one</a>. Mining rewards can be used to support business expenditures including transaction fees or salaries for employees. TWD token will be exchangeable for other Terra coins.</p><p>Terra World includes other functionalities for instance a decentralized freelance site for job seekers that can be hired using smart contracts, an NFT Real Estate market and a sophisticated NFT gallery for selected digital artists named Terra World Art Hall.</p><h4><strong>What the Open Metaverse is going to be</strong></h4><p>The frontiers in the Open Metaverse are unknown, and only the evolution of the technology will show the functionalities to come. Nonetheless, today it is possible to identify trends under which the Metaverse might evolve.</p><p>In the Verses, <a href="https://grayscale.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Grayscale_Metaverse_Report_Nov2021.pdf">users’ data and identities can create social reputation coins used for credit scoring. </a>The possibility to financialize anything susceptible of being captured in a digital token allows non-fungible tokens (e.g., metadata) to be financially fungible, for example, as collaterals of loans. The provision of sophisticated governance services where members can join and exit based on algorithmically programmed rules. The mutualization of risks where digital communities bring cooperative-based insurance tools to users, a decentralized cloud infrastructure for data storage.</p><p>In a nutshell: an unfathomable virtual economy that generates and aggregates value susceptible to transfer wealth to and from the physical world.</p><p><strong>Limitations today</strong></p><p>The limits in the Open Metaverse are nowadays inherited from the limitations in blockchain, the infancy in DeFI and NFTs. To mention a few: the lack of valuation models where price discovery in cryptocurrency occurs in real-time and perhaps this is what has to be assumed; the need to improve the immature decentralized governance schemes signaled for the lack of democratic praxis, apathy, and plutocracy, or the interoperability constraints between decentralized networks for which standards have not yet emerged.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5eb9b4dc6d8f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Unraveling DEXs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/immutable-oasis-labs/unraveling-dexs-76ec8454a3e5?source=rss-16ed9209e469------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/76ec8454a3e5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[bonding-curves]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dex]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency-exchange]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[trading-crypto-currency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blockchain-technology]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mariana Carmona]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 18 Dec 2021 06:26:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-08-25T16:00:59.109Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>For a first encounter with UNISWAP’s Automated Market Maker</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/512/1*UcAvbCJDNMcw0UGGd6T4vA.png" /></figure><p>Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs)allow the exchange of cryptocurrencies in a permissionless, censorship-resistant, and automated manner [1] with a very interesting design such that it merits a deep dive. In this attempt, I try to make this encounter as smooth as possible. The case I take is <a href="https://www.tokenterminal.com/terminal/markets/exchange/metrics">UNISWAP V2 (and some changes in Uniswap V3), the biggest DEX so far in terms of its Market Cap</a>.</p><p>DEXs are decentralized applications (dApps) that use smart contracts to enable token swaps. At a high level, the type of DEX described here is integrated by <strong>liquidity pools</strong> holding digital assets that act as reserves. UNISWAP’s liquidity pools hold two tokens while other DEXs, such as Balancer, hold more than two assets within a liquidity pool. In DEXs <strong>liquidity providers</strong> deposit digital assets into a pool, whose share is proportionate to their liquidity contribution, expressed as a fraction of the entire pool. <strong>Traders</strong> coming to a DEX exchange one asset for another. The <strong>exchange rate</strong> at which the tokens are traded is determined by an <strong>Automated Market Maker </strong>(AMM).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4VNqd9rub4vermZ2FFl8TA.png" /></figure><h4>Automated Market Makers (AMMs)</h4><p>AMMs substitute the need for order books. In fact, an order book in a DEX is not practical and expensive to run in a smart contract environment because of the large sets of outstanding orders paying for space and computing power. Some other DEXs tried to combine order books with on-chain and off-chain execution. This scheme has different drawbacks such as front-running, latency arbitrage and staled orders [4]. Conversely, AMMs allow high-frequency trading through algorithms that determine how the liquidity becomes available for trades, based on a deterministic function called <strong>Bonding Curve </strong>or<strong> Conservation Function </strong>[2].</p><p><strong>Let’s start digging !</strong></p><p>A bonding curve allows swapping tokens while keeping invariant their total value in the liquidity pool, that is, each trade has to be made in a way that the value removed in one digital asset equals the value added in the other<em> </em>[2]. The geniality of bonding curves used in DEXs is that they encode a desired invariant property while keeping two mechanisms in operation: the swapping of digital assets and the liquidity provision or withdrawal. Nonetheless, choosing a mathematical function as a bonding curve is not trivial. Bonding curves have certain properties, for instance, the function must be concave, nonnegative and nondecreasing [2]. Not all DEXs are designed upon the invariant properties of a bonding curve, for instance, dYdX or Binance DEX utilize order books.</p><p>The function used by UNISWAP is the Constant Product Market Maker (CPMM) :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/278/1*DWsWNQHo2BL6PwhxAabxyg.png" /></figure><p>The CPMM (1) means that the product of the reserves of two tokens in a liquidity pool has to be equal to a constant value ‘k’ regardless the token swap activity. k changes when liquidity is added or withdrawn from the pool. Following with a pool composed by ETH and DAI, the the token swaps in a CPMM look like:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/463/1*nn8kOy_cmtoBpDi-3WyuGA.png" /></figure><p><em>How’s the exchange price determined?</em></p><p>When a trading occurs, the exchange rate is determined by the relative price of the traded asset pair, that is, the price of ETH is expressed in units of DAI, which means ETH is valued in its capacity to buy DAI. The price is the best exchange rate a trader can obtain by swapping arbitrarily small quantities. In mathematical terms, this is the limit when both traded assets tend to zero thus the negative first derivative of the function in that state. In the CPMM function, this is the ratio of the two reserves:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/288/1*iUcb3eqsxXnimol90Ln20g.png" /></figure><p>The first liquidity provider sets the initial exchange rate of tokens. Note that the initial provision must be equal in value. Perhaps you would like to see a practical example. Suppose the pool is composed by 20 ETH with a market value of US 1,000 each (ha ! old times for ETH). To equalize the value in the pool, the stable coin DAI provision must be 20,000.</p><p>The constant k is 20 x 20,000 = 400,000 and the price of ETH in units of DAI is: 20,000/20= 1000</p><p>Suppose a trade of 3 ETH from the pool. For now we are assuming that the transaction fee is zero (γ=(1+fee)). The rate at which the exchange occurs is determined by extracting 3 ETH from the pool and adding the equivalent value in DAI keeping the constant value k=400,000:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/268/1*H1jQARZssIE4zLDS8YGvxQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/313/1*xX8u-tfOoXS08Lx0N36S_w.png" /></figure><p>In this example, the trader has to pay on average 1,176.47 DAI for each ETH. The pool ends with 17 ETH and 23,529.41 DAI. Arbitrageurs will profit from the price difference adding ETH to the pool and that action will reduce the price again. Note that this is a simplified static example, now scale this operations in an unstoppable high-frequency trading 24/7 !</p><p>The CPMM function has some nice properties, for example, it is easy to recover the protocol’s price by dividing the quantity of reserves of the two tokens in the pool; the price is strictly positive whatever the reserves available in the pool might be, and one cannot exhaust the stock of one asset as the relative price increases sufficiently fast [3] as you could see with the first trade in the example.</p><h3>The devil’s in the details: impermanent loss and price slippage</h3><p>DEXs are not free from risks and costs. Herein, I address the main risk for liquidity providers (impermanent loss) and for traders (price slippage).</p><h4>Slippage</h4><p>Trading in DEXs includes costs that the trader has to bear in mind. The first one is the gas fee for using the blockchain (in Uniswap, it is the gas fee to the Ethereum network), the second cost is the fee paid in every transaction (0.3% in Uniswap) and the slippage cost. The <strong>price slippage </strong>is<strong> </strong>defined as the difference between the <strong>effective exchange rate</strong> obtained by the trader and the market price. In absence of slippage, a trader would pay the market price (p) regardless of the volume traded:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/188/1*oZXTSsOylZ9I3MZBg1q48Q.png" /></figure><p>The slippage cost that a Uniswap V2 user experiences when swapping token ‘x’ for token ‘y’ can be calculated as the ratio of the effective exchange rate (token swap) and the pre swap spot exchange rate (the ratio of the reserve quantities) [2] :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/192/1*_ovliuv5GkVfH28vxlaJww.png" /></figure><p>Notice in the slippage calculation that tokens with higher liquidity (reserves) have less slippage cost and also that small swaps have lower slippage. If you want to make a big trade of tokens with low liquidity, you would be increasing the slippage to yourself !. Uniswap sets a default slippage tolerance (0.5%), however in the transaction settings it is possible to change it. A slippage above the tolerance level makes the swap’s execution to fail.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/627/1*yrXfNmWJdFK3VWAb1eGKIA.png" /><figcaption>Screenshot from uniswap.org</figcaption></figure><p>In Uniswap V3, the liquidity is limited to a range in price [P low, P high]. It is the same bonding curve moved left and down. With this change to the CPMM, as long as there is liquidity for both assets, the range in exchange rates restrains the slippage — specially important for small market cap tokens twith less liquidity.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/394/1*bxADPsZYqXJTP9O0BtFNIA.png" /></figure><h4>Impermanent Loss</h4><p>Liquidity providers<strong> </strong>generate revenues via the transaction fees paid by traders in every exchange performed — often called <em>liquidity mining</em>. In Uniswap, the 0.3% fee charged in every trade is distributed to liquidity providers in the proportion of their contribution to the pool. Nonetheless, liquidity providers have to lock the funds (moreover some DEXs contemplate a withdrawal penalty). One of the risks associated to locking funds is called <strong>impermanent loss (IL) </strong>which occurs<strong> </strong>when a price movement results in less value of providing tokens to a liquidity pool than just holding. The loss is ‘<em>impermanent’ </em>because the price of the digital asset can recuperate thus neutralizing it. It becomes a permanent loss if the funds are effectively withdrawn. The higher the volatility of the asset, the bigger the exposure to impermanent loss.</p><p>Impermanent loss can be obtained by comparing the value of the portfolio vis-à-vis the value of holding the assets out of the pool (stake vs hodl).</p><p>From the previous example, suppose that ETH now trades at US 1,300 and a liquidity provider staked 10% of the pool (2 ETH, 2000 DAI). After the trade in the example, the pool ended with 17 ETH and 23,529.41 DAI. Had the liquidity provider simply held his assets, at the new price, his portfolio would be worthing US 4,600 whereas staking in the pool gives a portfolio value of: US 4,562.94</p><p>Holding:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/497/1*u9GnB3h1rgmqUV_vtbUAug.png" /></figure><p>Staking:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/587/1*2qdI6jolNiru5cTfkbB6hA.png" /></figure><p>The Impermanent Loss is the ratio of the value of staking vs holding in US:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/455/1*ZX0HTPhrVYX3Ge8nyXu1YQ.png" /></figure><p><a href="https://defi-lab.xyz/uniswapv3simulator">You can use Defi Lab or similar calculators to simulate Uniswap</a> asset value of holding vs staking, helping in your strategy as a liquidity provider. In the figure below, using an initial investment of 1000 DAI in a pool with WETH (wrapped ETH) the orange line represents holding the two assets and not staking whereas the green one is the value of staked assets in the unbounded Uniswap V2 and the dark blue uses the price range (Uniswap V3). The gaps between hodling and staking represent the impermanent loss. There is a price interval where holding vs. staking has no IL. However, note that the simulation is excluding the fees, therefore, for small impermanent losses, the attractiveness of providing liquidity is precisely the revenue from fees.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/862/1*9rNqaQFfFbc7dVF72GtFVQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: Impermanent Loss simulation for a DAI / WETH pool using Defi Lab</figcaption></figure><p>AMMs and liquidity pools are essential for the operation of DEXs, moreover, they enable functionalities for other DeFi products such as yield farming, lending and borrowing, synthetic assets. Moreover, AMMs <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.08806">can be used to replicate payoffs of financial derivatives</a> pushing their scope even further in the DeFi space.</p><p>Stay tuned for more about <strong>Unraveling DEXs</strong> !</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>[1] Aigner A. A. and Dhaliwal G. (2021). <a href="https://arxiv.org/pdf/2106.14404.pdf">UNISWAP: Impermanent Loss and Risk Profile of a Liquidity Provider</a>. TradeFlags, Vienna, Austria, +Fuel Ventures, London, United Kingdom</p><p>[2] Xu J., Paruch K., Cousaert S. and Fent Y. (2021). <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.12732">SoK: Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) Protocols.</a></p><p>[3] Direr Alexis. (2020). <a href="https://gdre.leo-univ-orleans.fr/direr/paper/Uniswap_v2.pdf">A primer on constant product matching markets</a></p><p>[4] Angeris G., Kao H.T., Chiang R., Noyes C. and Chitra T. (2019). <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.03380">An Analysis of UNISWAP markets.</a></p><p>[5] <a href="https://chainbulletin.com/impermanent-loss-explained-with-examples-math/">https://chainbulletin.com/impermanent-loss-explained-with-examples-math/</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=76ec8454a3e5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/immutable-oasis-labs/unraveling-dexs-76ec8454a3e5">Unraveling DEXs</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/immutable-oasis-labs">Immutable Oasis Labs</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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