<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Marija Carter on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Marija Carter on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@marijacarter?source=rss-201c52db69e8------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 06:52:20 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@marijacarter/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Henry Kissinger Dead at 100, and 3 Million Dead Because of Him]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@marijacarter/henry-kissinger-dead-at-100-and-3-million-dead-because-of-him-b109e07128e9?source=rss-201c52db69e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b109e07128e9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[genocide]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[israel]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[foreign-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[palestine]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Marija Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 02 Dec 2023 23:58:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-13T11:44:51.501Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>The first casualty of war is the truth – in Gaza, the second was the myth of Western integrity.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/627/1*NunlQL3qqTCiL2z7SUFFrg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Kissinger’s family fled Germany in 1938, as the Leviathan of Nazism began to swallow the nation whole. He became a US citizen in 1943, served in the Counter Intelligence Corps during WWII, and later earned a PhD in political science at Harvard, before joining it as an instructor of international relations in 1954. He soon gained widespread recognition for his expertise in geopolitics, and in 1955, he inaugurated 14 years of employment at the Council of Foreign Relations.</p><p>In 1957, he published Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. One of many dozens of books he would come to author, it explored, inter alia, the integration of military and political strategy. Advising the government on international relations and security matters, he had also undertaken a role as a contributor to the Eisenhower administration’s Operations Coordinating Board. He later served as a consultant to the National Security Council during Kennedy’s presidency, all the while directing the Harvard Center for International Affairs.</p><p>But it was the rise of Nixon that finally allowed him to fully realise his potential. He had been appointed as National Security Advisor in 1969 and soon became the Secretary of State.</p><p>He always maintained a charming tint of a Bavarian accent. He is said to have been a voracious reader, as one might well expect – and a lifelong rock music and football fan, as one might well not. Those close to him enjoyed his wry sense of humour, as well as his appreciation for gourmet cooking. And as a Secretary of State, he became one of the most despicable war criminals modern history has seen.</p><p>His ‘secret bombing’ campaign in Cambodia, aiming to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail supply line employed by the North Vietnamese, led to a civil war and the rise of the Khmer Rouge regime. South Korea was on the verge of collapse, and the pre-emptive strike on the NVA and Viet Cong distribution lines, bypassing the approval of the US Congress, was designated to prevent that, and therefore halt the spread of communism – the ideology of Washington’s geopolitical arch-nemesis. Over 300,000 civilians paid with their lives for Kissinger’s vision of himself as the architect of American geopolitical supremacy. The 8-year civil war that tore Cambodia apart was merely a strategic pawn sacrifice.</p><p>During the Bangladeshi Liberation War in 1971, Kissinger backed the West Pakistani government’s brutal suppression of the independence movement of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). He supplied military hardware to assist the crackdown, which soon escalated into genocide. Despite the staggering and well-documented human cost, with the death toll at 3 million and the incalculable suffering tearing the very fabric of the region, Kissinger prioritised his Cold War considerations — Pakistan was a key ally against the USSR. He proudly called his approach the Realpolitik — purely pragmatical, unwaveringly focused on national interests, but the term ‘psychopathic’ has already existed.</p><p>East Timor, its history scarred by Portuguese and Indonesian exploitation, declared independence in 1975, only to immediately face an Indonesian invasion. Kissinger, this time with Ford, endorsed the Suharto regime, emboldening a brutal occupation. Again in the name of Cold War alliances above all, Kissinger supported a trail of atrocities leading to 200,000 deaths, only coming to an end with the UN-sponsored 1999 referendum, the establishment of the UNTAET, and the finalisation of independence in 2002.</p><p>In Argentina, from 1976 to 1983, he provided support to the military junta of General Videla, to overthrow Perón, diplomatically elected in 1946, 1951 and 1973. Kissinger had secured $50 million in funding for subsequent Argentine dictatorship. The following so-called Dirty War led to the euphemistically termed ‘disappearances’ of nearly 30,000 people. In 2010, Videla was sentenced to life in prison for his part in the terror. Kissinger just scored another multi-million copy book deal that year.</p><p>In Chile, Kissinger led destabilisation efforts against Allende’s government since 1970, aiming to protect US business interests in the region. Upon Allende’s overthrow in a coup in 1973, the Pinochet regime replaced the democratically elected leader and threw the nation into darkness. Before the return of power back to civilian hands on 11 March 1990 due to severe domestic and international pressure, his apparatus had murdered over 40,000 people and tortured countless others. Infamous for its ‘dead flights,’ the administration revelled in intimidating any opposition — in particular, anyone leftist.</p><p>Pinochet did not face legal accountability for his human rights abuses during his lifetime. As a senator-for-life in Chile, he benefited from legal immunity. Various legal actions were initiated to hold members of his regime accountable for human rights violations, and some individuals associated with Pinochet’s regime have been convicted. But there will never be real justice. Pinochet died in 2006. And Kissinger died yesterday.</p><p>Yet a rare point of convergence can be found between the play-pretend opposing Republican and Democratic political establishments — their mutual admiration for Henry Kissinger. The great all-American war criminals lined up to pay tribute. Clinton stated that he <em>‘read all Dr Kissinger’s books’ </em>and <em>‘was immensely enlightened by them.’ </em>He then joked about how delightful he found Kissinger’s accent. Bush viewed him as <em>‘the most accomplished and respected public servant’ </em>and<em> </em>Obama had presented him with the Distinguished Public Service Award. Trump stated him to be a <em>‘friend of mine. I’ve liked him. I’ve respected him.’ </em>Biden was grateful for the ‘<em>opportunities to learn from</em>’ Kissinger. He is currently proving to be a good student indeed. Yesterday, his administration had announced it will provide Israel with bunker buster bombs. Meanwhile, the UN is clear that the regime is engaging in ethnic cleansing.</p><p>In the UK, Tony Blair had called him an <em>‘artist of diplomacy’ </em>and Boris Johnson considered him to be <em>‘a giant’</em> of it. One has to wonder what definition are they operating upon. ‘Diplomacy’ refers to the conduct of international relations and negotiations between states — the use of dialogue, negotiation, and formal agreements to manage and resolve disputes and foster cooperation. It adheres to established principles of international law, including respect for the sovereignty of states, subjection to treaty obligations, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. It involves sending over diplomatic envoys, not carpet bombers.</p><p>Perhaps the best summation of Kissinger’s legacy comes from Antony Bourdain: <em>‘Once you’ve been to Cambodia, you’ll never stop wanting to beat Henry Kissinger to death with your bare hands. You will never again be able to open a newspaper and read about that treacherous, prevaricating, murderous scumbag sitting down for a nice chat with Charlie Rose or attending some black-tie affair for a new glossy magazine without choking. Witness what Henry did in Cambodia — the fruits of his genius for statesmanship — and you will never understand why he’s not sitting in the dock at The Hague next to Milošević.’</em></p><p>As Kissinger himself proclaimed: <em>‘America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.’</em> He can be well understood by his own words.</p><p>But mainly, and forever, he shall be defined by his actions. By the millions of lives he sacrificed to promote a vision of US supremacy.</p><p>A nation which cannot provide universal health care to its citizens. That had witnessed 632 mass shootings this year alone and 100,000 opioid overdoses. Overseeing the highest percentage of incarceration in the world, supplied by a system openly targeting the people whose melanin level rings as a reminder of the foundational cruelty of slavery. One of only 2 nations in the world failing to provide paid maternity leave – meanwhile also scrapping federal protection of the right to abortion. One with the largest military budget on earth, 5,428 nuclear weapons, and 750 foreign bases. And one in which many 17-year-olds sell their souls to the army death cult anyway, to grasp their only chance at free education.</p><p>Kissinger’s shadow has haunted many nations and generations. In the eerie symphony of tributes echoing for the proud war criminal, the disturbing revelation emerges: nobody should have ever believed that the West has changed.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b109e07128e9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Words of Mass Destruction — The Israeli Gaza Nuclear Threat Fall Out]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/illuminations-mirror/words-of-mass-destruction-the-israeli-gaza-nuclear-threat-fall-out-65208a14a03e?source=rss-201c52db69e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/65208a14a03e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[palestine]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[israel-palestine-conflict]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Marija Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Nov 2023 01:44:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-11-12T13:51:46.073Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Words of Mass Destruction — The Israeli Gaza Nuclear Threat Fallout</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OnUvVg66wXgtvaeZ0dMUBw.jpeg" /><figcaption>A school wall clock in Hiroshima, frozen at the time of nuclear detonation. Eiichi Matsumoto, 6 August 1945</figcaption></figure><p><em>‘There are no non-combatants in Gaza.’</em></p><p><em>‘Providing humanitarian aid to the Strip would constitute a failure.’</em></p><p><em>‘The monsters in Gaza should find a solution by themselves […] They can go into the deserts.’</em></p><p><em>‘The Gaza Strip has no right to exist.’</em></p><p><em>‘Anyone waving a Palestinian flag shouldn’t continue living on the face of the earth.’</em></p><p>Netanyahu took 5 hours before taking disciplinary action against his Heritage Minister Eliyahu, suspending him from cabinet meetings ‘until further notice.’</p><p>The PM communique barely disavowed Eliyahu’s subtextus:</p><p><em>‘Minister Amihai Eliyahu’s statements are not based in reality. Israel and the IDF are operating in accordance with the highest standards of international law to avoid harming innocents. We will continue to do so until our victory.’</em></p><p>One runs out of sophisticated ways to say that something is bullshit. One runs out of ways to say something is deliberately evil. One runs out of ways to say that something is fascist without using that word, because one runs out of patience for this deliberately evil bullshit.</p><p>In the 29 days since the Hamas attack on 7 October, 9500 people have been killed in the Gaza Strip alone. 3900 children. 35 journalists — targeted for daring to show the world the hell-scape that the antediluvian lands have become under 18,000 tons of IDF explosives. 90 of UNRWA humanitarian staff, many serving the most vulnerable in the clearly marked UN and Red Cross hospitals and schools, struck in heinous breaches of international law. Unequivocally categorised as war crimes.</p><p>Article I of the 1864 First Geneva Convention declares that ‘<em>[a]n individual carrying out medical duties, no matter whether he belongs to the armed forces or not, is considered inviolable by the enemy.’ </em>In 1968, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2444, reaffirming the protection afforded to all non-combatants. UN GA Resolution 2675 of 1970 emphasised the obligation to take all feasible measures to protect civilians trapped in conflict zones. Further, Resolution 3318 condemns any reprisals against the civilian population. Article 18 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention unambiguously mandates the protection and respect for all medical facilities. Article 19 thereof extends such protection to all medical and humanitarian personnel. Complementing the Geneva framework, the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II further reinforce the safeguarding of civilians in the context of armed conflict, underscoring the imperative to shield civilian populations from harm, and mandating all warring parties to employ all possible precautions. In 1999, the UN Security Council Resolution 1265 expanded upon the organisation’s commitment to civilian protection in international armed conflict. A year later, Resolution 1296 specifically emphasised the imperative of ensuring humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas. The 2002 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court designates the deliberate targeting of civilian objects as a war crime in its Article 8(2)(a)(iv). Article 8(2)(b)(ix) explicitly posits that, inter alia, ‘<em>medical units, transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions</em>’ are not only excluded from designation as legitimate military objectives under <em>jus in bello</em> but to be shielded by the belligerents. The 2009 UN SC Resolution 1894 condemns the targeting of humanitarian personnel and facilities.</p><p>It is an odd thing for a lawyer in the field of use of intra&amp;international armed force to say, but none of this matters. You just intrinsically <em>know</em> that this is fucked up — as a human.</p><p>The MoD of Jordan condemned the ‘<em>blatant and unacceptable violation of international law and humanitarian law,’</em> and urged ‘<em>immediate action against it.</em>’ Qatar’s Foreign Ministry observed it to be ‘<em>a serious incitement to a war crime,</em>’ while the Saudi counterpart considered that ‘<em>the failure to immediately dismiss the minister from the government and merely suspending his membership reflects the utmost disregard for all human, ethical, religious, and legal standards by the Israeli government.</em>’</p><p>Evidently, you do not even need humanity to be sickened by Israel’s modus operandi. Even the Saudi government can do it.</p><p>But the international community has reacted. The expeditious denunciations from the Arab world were promptly followed by the widespread rejection of the proposed iter: the US and EU leaders, generally well willing to let Israel have its long-awaited genocide, were not prepared to risk their universally unstable domestic situations.</p><p>Sunak, seeing hundreds of thousands participate in pro-Palestine marches from his window every Saturday since the start of the war, facing an utterly existential threat to his party in the next general election.</p><p>Macron, fresh out of violent street crashes following the increase of the age of retirement, and, in a Kafkaesque and almost comical fit of unfortunate timing, the Islamophobia-driven ban on abayas in schools — effectively mandating that Muslim children dress more revealingly to access education.</p><p>Biden, juxtaposed as always and fair-weather as ever, just oversaw a historic ousting of the Speaker of the House by the most far-right supporters of his predecessor and likely successor.</p><p>Not that any of them care about chain reactions within the IDF’s Teller-Ulam model nuclear weapons, detonating TNT equivalent 520 times greater than the bomb that doomed Hiroshima to be the symbol of hell on earth forever. Not that they would ever spare a thought for the Middle East, the foreign and untameable lands their lineage exploited for centuries. But they care about their home fronts. About their trust funds.</p><p>And they will now do everything in their power to support Netanyahu’s claim that this rogue, insignificant, and anyway, now dismissed minister does not speak for Israel. He only did for about 5 hours, after all. Only until the international condemnation reached a critical mass.</p><p>Grasp the gravity as this is of the utmost urgency: on 5 November 2023, Israel broke a 7-decade-long tradition of strategic ambiguity concerning its nuclear programme.</p><p>Since the 1950s, international observers accepted that Tel Aviv had a nuclear weapon stockpile. 70 years, 8 significant wars, 15 Prime Ministers, 20 defence ministers, 28 governments, no one broke ranks and stated, on record, that Israel is a nuclear proprietor. Until 5 November 2023.</p><p>One of many, the untranslatable Arabic term يقبرني [<em>ya’aburne</em>] refers to one’s wish to die before one’s beloved do. Another similar concept, فناء [<em>fanas</em>] acknowledges the inherently transient nature of existence and the inevitability of crossing over, and, at its core in the context of Islam, the shadow of death is often met with a degree of tranquillity, for it carries the promise of جنّة [<em>Jannah</em>].</p><p>May our Muslim brothers and sisters in Gaza and around the world find solace in whatever the fuck can provide it. As for the rest of us, wishing to see justice during our lifetime, the court halls of Hague will keep standing long past the last cancer hospital in Palestine. Long after its last high school was levelled by the very same Mk80-type bombs that the US deployed against Vietnamese civilians in 1973 — the same year the Godfather was released, the VCR was introduced, and the SNL aired its first show.</p><p>Those who refuse to learn from history intend to repeat it. As we bear 24/7 live witness to the Israeli genocide in Gaza, its increasingly desperate and isolated government, firmly rejected by over 80% of its own people, tests how far can it step to execute its final solution to the Palestinian question.</p><p>To be clear: I am not implying that under its current leadership, Israel is a fascist state. I am saying that explicitly.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=65208a14a03e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/illuminations-mirror/words-of-mass-destruction-the-israeli-gaza-nuclear-threat-fall-out-65208a14a03e">Words of Mass Destruction — The Israeli Gaza Nuclear Threat Fall Out</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/illuminations-mirror">ILLUMINATION’S MIRROR</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Family of Al Jazeera Journalist Wael al-Dahdouh Killed in an Israeli Strike on the Truth]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@marijacarter/the-family-of-al-jazeera-journalist-wael-al-dahdouh-killed-in-israeli-strike-on-the-truth-a71913e0f132?source=rss-201c52db69e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a71913e0f132</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[israel-palestine-conflict]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[journalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[war-crimes]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gaza]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Marija Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Oct 2023 22:20:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-01-27T22:28:03.390Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Marija Carter: The Family of Al Jazeera Journalist Wael al-Dahdouh Killed in an Israeli Strike on the Truth</h3><h4>Today, the wife, son, and daughter of the Gaza correspondent join a long procession of people murdered for standing between Israel and the false narrative it seeks to promote at any cost.</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aMj8vtqSUjBdvBkYAuVTHw.jpeg" /></figure><p>On 24 June 2022, the human rights office of the UN confirmed that the bullet which ended the life of a prolific journalist Shireen Abu Aqla had been fired by Israel. The UN conducted an independent review of the 11 May outrage-sparking tragedy. The Al Jazeera correspondent had acquired a legendary status during her lifetime, inspiring a generation – especially in the Arab world.</p><p>She had been wearing a ‘PRESS’ jacket when she had been killed.</p><p>Despite the OHCHR’s analysis, the IDF, predictably, refused to accept the conclusion, calling it ‘<em>a blatant lie</em>.’ Israel continues to blame Palestinian militants for the incident to this day.</p><p>In the 18 days since the Hamas attack on Israel, at least 24 journalists have been among the 7,000 deaths the subsequent conflict has caused so far:</p><p>Mohammed Imad Labad</p><p>Roshdi Sarraj</p><p>Mohammed Ali</p><p>Khalil Abu Aathra</p><p>Sameeh Al-Nady</p><p>Mohammad Balousha</p><p>Issam Bhar</p><p>Abdulhadi Habib</p><p>Yousef Maher Dawas</p><p>Salam Mema</p><p>Husam Mubarak</p><p>Issam Abdallah</p><p>Ahmed Shehab</p><p>Mohamed Fayez Abu Matar</p><p>Saeed al-Taweel</p><p>Mohammed Sobh</p><p>Hisham Alnwajha</p><p>Assaad Shamlakh</p><p>Shai Regev</p><p>Ayelet Arnin</p><p>Yaniv Zohar</p><p>Mohammad Al-Salhi</p><p>Mohammad Jarghoun</p><p>Ibrahim Mohammad Lafi</p><p>Four hours ago, it was confirmed that the home of Wael al-Dahdouh had been targeted. The IDF had killed his wife and two children. He was live on air reporting for Al Jazeera at the time.</p><p>International law demands a strict distinction between agents of warfare and civilians. This doctrine constitutes one of the most solidly established premises of <em>jus in bello </em>– the law of war. Cited as a concrete fact as early as 1758 by de Vattel and considered by the International Court of Justice to be one of the ‘<em>intransgressible principles’</em> of humanity<em>, </em>it was first codified in the Preamble of the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration, since then recognized by the 1909 Hague Regulations, and reiterated by both 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.</p><p>The Fourth Geneva Convention and AP I require parties to any armed conflict to maintain respect for the protection of civilians, including journalists. International law unequivocally prohibits the targeting of civilians, as well as the designation of the morale of a nation as an objective of military action. The law of war permits only one legitimate objective of using armed force: the weakening of enemy combat forces.</p><p>The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the principal judicial organ prosecuting, inter alia, war crimes, considers direct targeting of civilians to belong under such category in Article 8.</p><p>The United Nations Security Council issued several resolutions regarding protecting journalists in conflict zones. Resolution 1738 of 2006 demands an end to impunity for such crimes.</p><p>The actions of Israel against journalists covering its actions in Gaza are not only a blatant affront to the law of nations. They are a stain on mankind and an offence to basic human decency.</p><p>And only a few hours ago, Israel threatened to block the UN from entering the country to ‘<em>teach</em>’ the organisation entrusted with securing global peace ‘<em>a lesson</em>,’ following Guterres’s statement that the 7 October attack does not justify collective punishment on the 2.2 million civilians in Gaza.</p><p>There is a crucial piece of context to this cruelty: hours before IDF targeted al-Dahdouh’s home, Anthony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, had reportedly told the Qatari PM to ‘<em>turn down the volume on anti-Israel incitement on Al Jazeera.</em>’</p><p>Al Jazeera consistently scores as one of the most objective and most trusted news outlets on the planet. The US government was noted to solicit it to silence its reporting in Gaza, and hours later, the network’s journalists were targeted by the IDF.</p><p>The West has decided that the Israeli ‘right to self-defense’ includes a right to defend oneself against cameras and pens. That is fascism.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a71913e0f132" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[QR-ious? ISIS’s Online Recruitment Code in British Marginalised Groups]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@marijacarter/qr-oious-isiss-online-recruitment-code-in-british-marginalised-groups-20e74487e310?source=rss-201c52db69e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/20e74487e310</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[radicalisation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marginalization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybercrime]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[isis-recruitment]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Marija Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 07 Oct 2023 12:31:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-05-11T13:44:15.273Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OC6kdaDGVOhmwvutfzTHmQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>At 10:31 PM on 22 May 2017, a 30-kilogram TATP-based bomb exploded in the City Room of the Manchester Arena, as a pop concert drew to a close. It killed its von Frankenstein, Salman Abedi, and 22 innocent civilians. Over 1000 people were injured, owing to the nails and screws added to the explosive device, with the explicit intent to mutilate and traumatise as many bystanders as possible. 14,200 people were present at the event. The majority of them were children, mostly girls, coming to see their idol perform in their city. The atmosphere in the arena was reportedly wonderful, as witnessing the performance of the star of the show, Ariana Grande, was a dream come true for many in the young, and in large proportions female and LGBT audience. Many attendants were on the phone with their parents as they were leaving the concert hall through one of the four exits, not knowing they would never make it out. The youngest victim was only eight years old. A then-17-year-old bravely outspoken survivor Lucy Jarvis required surgery on 30 shrapnel wounds, and, like several others, had to learn how to stand and walk again. She notes that while the physical wounds were treated and healed, the trauma of the night remains. Indeed, that was precisely the point of the attack — to scare Britain. To make a clear, nail-filled declaration that ISIS’s network is omnipresent and omnipotent, and that in its long shadow stretching from Syrian Raqqa to your English town, sending your children to a concert comes with a risk of a coffin coming back. The then-PM Theresa May rightfully condemned the ‘<em>sickening cowardice</em>’ of the assault.</p><p>It was an unjustifiable attack.</p><p>As such, it is tempting to also discard any justification the perpetrators present. There is nothing that can ‘justify’ killing children. But ironically, that was the dead terrorist’s very argument, too.</p><p>It is hard to resist conceptualising the terrorists who perpetrated horrors such as the Manchester arena bombing as fundamentally damaged, and unrecognisable beyond redemption. And undeniably, by deciding to pull the trigger, the perpetrators die as less than humans. However, alleging that that is all they have ever been based purely on their own inner faulty wiring is a comforting and convenient lie: it enables the West to ignore the causes of radicalisation. If jihadists were always monsters in the making, determined to cause suffering to non-combatant population just for the hell of it, then there is no need to wrestle with the motives they cite for their cruel and deluded ‘revenge’ acts: centuries of European colonisation, its lasting consequences today, the deep institutional racism and xenophobia within white societies in the West, and the gruelling terrorist-to-civilian ratio in the death toll of the Iraqi invasion, as well as other NATO interventions. Abedi’s sister conveyed that her brother’s stated motivation for the Manchester Arena attack was the ‘<em>injustice of Muslim children dying in bombing</em>’ stemming from the US-led intervention in the Syrian Civil War. Two years later, Shamima Begum lost her British citizenship and was rendered stateless for noting that while ‘<em>obviously it is wrong that innocent people have died</em>,’ she was, at the time of the attack, satisfied with the same ‘<em>justification</em>.’</p><p>As the Western population, we retain the full right to remain appalled by these statements and to abstain from engaging with them in any way that matters. But we do so at our own peril.</p><p>While the so-called Caliphate collapsed with ISIS’s defeat in the battle of Al-Baghouz on 23 March 2019, many were stuck in the ruins. Among them were then-19-year-old Shamima and her soon-to-be-born son. By all confirmed accounts she had never played an active role in ISIS, was a victim of human trafficking and statutory rape, and she has since, at great personal risk, repeatedly publicly denounced ISIS’s philosophy, expressed immense regret over joining the group, and reiterated her willingness and indeed wish to return to the UK to stand trial. However, her arc is not the norm. Large sections of the population of the Al-Hawl camp in Northern Syria remain loyal to the ideals of ISIS, and threaten, torture and kill those like Begum, labelled as traitors. According to many in the British intelligence community, most notably Jonathan Hall KC, the UK Government’s terrorism adviser, these camps are a ticking time bomb. As the Kurdish armed forces currently securing the world from what is left of ISIS observe, sooner or later, their prisons and camps will become too porous, or implode. Another version of ISIS will emerge in the place of the old, and will likely learn from its past failings.</p><p>Terrorism cannot be treated symptomatically — it needs to be designed out. And for that, as uncomfortable as it is, the motivations of its perpetrators need to be examined. So what is the c<em>ausa principalis</em> of the chain of events, at the end of which 22 innocent civilians attended a pop star’s concert in Manchester, England, and never came home?</p><p>There is no more fitting paradigm for the 2003 invasion of Iraq than the Abu Ghraib torture case, which only closed in 2014. Its hearings revealed several human rights violations and war crimes committed by the US military during its adventures within the same antediluvian Levant plains that ISIS would emanate to haunt a decade later. Just for the sake of amusement, US soldiers tortured civilians to death. The majority of the victims were entirely innocent of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The gleefully self-recorded evidence, which included hundreds of images and statements, gained media attention when the scandal was exposed by the Associated Press. Admittedly, the AP may be primarily followed by enthusiasts of current events. Or whatever other term for ‘nerds’ you fancy. In April 2004, CBS News reported these findings to a broader US audience. Granted, only approximately 48.81% of the US population tunes in to CBS at least once a month. The Economist made a bold statement with its <em>‘Resign, Rumsfeld’</em> cover on May 6, 2004, which featured one of the ‘milder’ torture images. Nonetheless, The Economist’s weekly circulation reaches only about 1.6 million copies, often landing in the hands of less-favoured acquaintances. This list could go on indefinitely. Ultimately, the extensive and disturbing documentation of these human rights violations is accessible to anyone at any time, as it is freely available on the open internet. You can Google it right now.</p><p>63 people died in Abu Ghraib. 36 of these casualties occurred due to insurgent mortar attacks. The rest were murdered or died indirectly as a result of the torture they were subjected to. While the US initially argued that the mortar deaths should not be noted as a part of the induced death toll, the 1949 Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War requires surrendered captives not to be kept at facilities vulnerable to attack, including artillery.</p><p>There is a disturbing yet deeply human explanation as to why the majority of the populace under the NATO umbrella would not perceive themselves as associated with such terror — in fact, only a negligible number are even aware it exists, despite our information freedom.</p><p><em>E pluribus unum</em>, British-Kuwaiti Mohammed Emwazi, ISIS’s favourite poster boy, wore baklava, spoke flawless Arabic and wielded a knife while maintaining intent eye contact with his Western viewer on the other side of the screen, as he decapitated his victims in their peak-era propaganda videos. Sabrina Harman wore her blonde hair in pigtails, happily smiled to the camera and showed thumbs-ups as she took selfies next to the bodies of Iraqi fathers and sons that she and her colleagues murdered following months of brutal torture.</p><p>‘Jihadi John’ is dead. Sabrina Harman was released after 6 months in prison.</p><p>When sections of the Western citizenry blame individuals like the then-15-year-old Shamima Begum for being blind to the terror they chose to affiliate themselves with, we do not want to hold up a mirror and examine out own geopolitical context. Normative dilution comes with an enormous gravitational pull. Our brains get us used to the smell of our own home using the same chemical processes that it employs to numb us to our government’s openly declared conduct towards those who are not us.</p><p>We are, however fundamentally, passive participants — whether it is by being a comfortable British citizen listening to a politics podcast hosted by a war criminal, or a Saudi waving a flag around Mohammad bin Salman’s motorcade’s path because you went up two tax brackets under his reign. What then converts one to not only active awareness but further, towards the willingness to die and kill for a change of one sort or another, is not any predictable set of facts, as much as we would all desperately wish it to be. There is no predetermined terrorist.</p><p>Violent anti-Muslim sentiments in the West have peaked during ISIS’s operational years. There are 44 million Muslims in Europe: over 3.8 million in Britain, out of which 1.3 million in London. The majority has directly faced islamophobia and xenophobia at some point in their lives, many have been victimised by it actively and on a daily, and all have witnessed it. ISIS had constructed an ideological conversion assault the likes of which the world has never seen. With an eye firmly on the UK and especially on London, ISIS employed the most skilled psychological experts to target and convert British Muslims to jihadists. The terror group financed this large-scale online recruitment campaign from the<em> jizya</em> (protection tax) imposed on non-Sunni Iraqis and Syrians in newly secured regions. Additionally, ISIS was bringing in millions in <em>ghamima</em> (war spoils) from the properties of those it murdered and enslaved — especially the Yazidis, whose systematic extermination has been recognised by the UN as genocide. With these blood-soaked virtually unlimited credit cards, ISIS bought itself radicalisation expertise and virtual space on an unprecedented scale.</p><p>So how many of the 3.8 million it targeted did it persuade?</p><p>850.</p><p>That is a 0.02% conversion rate for a terror group whose operational force has been so advanced that at their peak, ISIS-controlled territory the size of Britain, perpetuated a highly bureaucratically self-documented genocide in all provinces they established control over, succeeded in circumventing the entire global security service, repeatedly trafficked western children like the Bethnal Green Girls to Syria to distribute as wives to adult ISIS fighters, and carried out several mass-casualty terror attacks in Europe, despite the EU swiftly turning into a fortress and a large-scale surveillance entity. Yet, 99.98% of the demographic ISIS has attempted to brainwash rejected the terror group’s message. In contrast to the 0.02% figure, 7% of the British population identify as far-right.</p><p>Nonetheless, it is crucial to see what made the 850 drop in an ocean of over 3.8 million vulnerable to ISIS’s message. And in all cases, the infatuation with jihad began online.</p><p>The echo chambers the online environment can provide are on a scale never seen before. In the corporeal realm, we are faced with a variety of opinions and realities — however, our virtual worlds are crafted by algorithms. They are designed to make us want to stay online, to go deeper into what a while ago were merely light interests and turn these into our obsessions, and to cut off any distractions so that we are comfortable amidst our altered context. We live in a different era of history to the one we lived in thirty years ago, and it is characterised by the fact that there is no longer any objective reality. The past contained geographically bound, ideologically coherent narratives. They might have been various shades of correct and nonsense, but they were generally genuinely embraced by their respective audiences. They ran as a background layer in the lives of those they affected, and they enjoyed a high degree of consensus at least on their existence if not on their merit.</p><p>The dawn of the internet had changed that, likely forever. ‘Online’ is forming an increasingly large part of the lives of the populace of the developed nations, and everything that we see is tailored to us. The previous generations could choose between two or a few different TV channels or newspapers, giving them different angles on the news, but with a clear label and in an escapable form. The introduction of the World Wide Web to this scene is fully comparable to the invention of the printing press, the introduction of electricity, the conception of the car or the discovery of penicillin. The internet ushered in a revolution in information and unlike its predeceasing transformational breakthroughs, it proved itself to be an unfathomably challenging, if not impossible to regulate. It is not that authorities all over the world have not tried to stop the wildfire spread of ISIS propaganda online — it is that they found themselves utterly unable to.</p><p>The internet should be imagined as another dimension to life. It operates across borders and jurisdictions, making it difficult for any government to exert control over content created or shared in its territory. This poses critical challenge to the creation of any regulatory legal framework, let alone enforcement, which in the cases of terror groups like ISIS necessitates coordination among different countries with varying laws, enforcement willingness and capabilities, and indeed, overriding principles. This issue of authority or control point is further complicated by the inherent decentralisation of the internet. It is a network of interconnected devices and systems, with no single pressure point that can be readily identified. Breaking down any internet-based crime syndicate is an extremely complex and costly exercise, and it is often only the human factors that decompose the defences.</p><p>One helpful example is the collapse of the dark web marketplace Silk Road, which operated between 2011 and 2013. Chiefly used for the global distribution of illicit drugs, the network had been a thorn in the eye of several highest-level security services in the world. The takedown project involved high-profile law enforcement agencies posing as buyers and sellers on the platform to infiltrate the Silk Road ecosystem to gain insight into its operations and to identify key individuals. Investigators used various digital forensics techniques to trace transactions on the Bitcoin blockchain used within the marketplace, starting with little more than the ledger of pseudonyms. Through digital tracing, they then had to follow the funds and identify BTC wallets associated with the site. Ross Ulbricht, the founder and chief operator of Silk Road, was eventually identified by a mixture of online and offline investigation, and largely due to his human errors. Using OSINT, the FBI tracked down the first ever mention of the Silk Road appearing on the surface web. Ulbricht used a pseudonym to promote his new website on an unbreachable drug user forum — however, he then used the same pseudonym on a Bitcoin start-up site, which upon inspection revealed the email address associated with it — rossulbricht@gmail.com.</p><p>It is impossible to overstate how draining on an extensive range of resources these kinds of operations are, to say nothing of the danger to individuals involved in the investigation. As noted above, the inherently decentralised nature of the Internet makes the investigation of any criminal enterprises occurring within it extremely challenging, however, Silk Road itself had a few crucial control points. Once one of its physical servers had been discovered and its founder unmasked, the structure began to collapse. There had also been a clear endpoint to the particular mission: posting that iconic ‘<em>[t]his hidden site has been seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’</em> seal to Silk Road’s landing page.</p><p>The same simply cannot be done for ISIS’s propaganda operation. To call it decentralised is an understatement: it is composed not only of the official control centre, most of which held its physical infrastructure in locations hostile to American and European investigation agencies but also of countless individuals, often not even formally associated with ISIS. There is no single entity to hold accountable, and states are willing to take an incredibly varying degree of responsibility for and action on their national’s behaviour online, for reasons ranging from mere enforcement capabilities to a national ideology more permissive on freedom of speech.</p><p>The internet has become a platform of unrestrained expression and a space for diverse voices. Some of the most crucial recent civil unrests have been organised on the internet, as around the world, states still withhold freedom of association and the right to protest more commonly than uphold it. In India, the government oversaw 84 localised internet shutdowns in 2022, to curb the spread of information relating to various farmer protests. In the same year, Iran enforced 22 mostly nationwide internet shutdowns in the wake of the uprising following the murder of Mahsa Amini in the hands of its ‘morality police.’ Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Myanmar and Sudan all exercised control over their citizens’ access to the Internet at various times this year, to suppress the spread of information facilitating the exercise of basic human rights. As with any regulation of free speech, striking the balance is incredibly difficult — the moment any national authority has complete censorship control over the exercise of free speech in its digital space, it can become a tool of oppression – yet conversely, allowing utterly unfiltered speech can lead to the spread of violent ideologies that endanger the state and its citizens.</p><p>Additionally, the internet is continually evolving. New platforms and services emerge regularly, and any regulatory framework will inherently struggle to keep up with the rapid pace of technological advancement in the field. Regulating the Internet literally cannot be made even more-or-less future-proof the way regulating electricity or cars had been.</p><p>While encryption technologies are crucial for user trust, they can also hinder law enforcement efforts. This, however, opens an entirely new point of contention: to which extent should the security apparatus of the state have access to citizen private data? In the 2016<em> Apple vs FBI </em>dispute relating to a phone used by one of the San Bernardino terrorists, the intelligence agency insisted it requires back-door access to smartphones to extract crucial information to protect the public, despite devices capable of cracking the pin code of the iPhone 5C model in question being readily available on Amazon for $19.99. This, of course, came only 3 years after Edward Snowden’s revelations of thousands of classified NSA documents to journalists Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras, Barton Gellman, and Ewen MacAskill, proving that the agency had extensively spied on the US populace without probable causes. While the EU security agencies have a much better track record safeguarding the privacy of their subjects, it is questionable to which extent the populace should wish to trade-off privacy for security. The US operates a largely surveillance-based model and nonetheless, a mass shooting (defined as over 4 victims excluding the perpetrator) occurs on an average nearly two times a day (690 in 2021, 647 in 2022). Ethical concerns aside, the collection of vast amounts of data impedes and sometimes even cripples processing capabilities. And despite the existence of EU/US Privacy Shield, or rather, its 10 July 2023 upgrade EU/US Data Privacy Framework, several US-based platforms require signing off additional EU protections by EU citizens, and lack of education on the topic or just mere convenience renders many positive ticks.</p><p>To summarise, the anonymity and pseudonymity that the internet allows its users make it extremely challenging to identify and track individuals engaged in illegal conduct. The inherently open and decentralized nature of the internet and its fast innovation yield positive contributions to humanity but also hinder the possibility of effectively regulating it. Whenever regulations are put in place, they can be circumvented within days. The cat-and-mouse game between regulators and those evading them cannot be won by the former without an unacceptable compromise on freedom of speech and the right to privacy.</p><p>In effect, it is impossible to ensure that radical content does not end up online.</p><p>There is, however, another way to ensure that it does not translate to citizen radicalization. Despite ISIS’s unprecedented online recruitment skills and the failure of the British and global intelligence community to effectively prepare for its wrath, 99.98% of ISIS’s targeted British demographic was simply immune to its message. As noted, the radicalisation ratio pales in comparison to the 7% that far-right groups were able to subdue. And needs to be stated that groups like Britain First were able to amass such membership despite the clear fact that white Britons do not face any institutional discrimination. The British Muslim community demonstrated incredible resilience when confronted with the rise of violent xenophobia in the run-up to the Brexit referendum and the declaration of the so-called Caliphate. Remarkably, experts now deem strategies such as the Prevent program to have a deeply negative impact on the prognosis — communities are afraid to discuss concerns with one another for fear of governmental intervention. Where before, a teenager might speak to an<em> imam </em>or <em>hafiz</em> about jihadist concepts, they now instead ask the internet.</p><p>And the internet will always hold a variety of answers for them. Some of these might be the same peaceful interpretation of Islam that the <em>ahla hay</em>’s imam would have given them. And some of them will set them on a path to Syria. Some will make them order a book from Amazon. And some will get them to order TATP.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=20e74487e310" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Till Martyrdom Do Us Part: What Created 550 Western ISIS Brides]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/illuminations-mirror/till-martyrdom-do-us-part-what-created-550-western-isis-brides-4e3fef290a5a?source=rss-201c52db69e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4e3fef290a5a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[isis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[radicalisation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[terrorism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[shamima-begum]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[statelessness]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Marija Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 01 Sep 2023 22:54:28 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-13T12:19:32.381Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/494/1*T2djIrsTY0JkdTUmZZ9wRQ@2x.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Al-Hawl camp, Syria, 13 February 2019: ‘I am a sister from London. I’m a Bethnal Green girl.’</h3><p><em>“In this way it began, the opening moments of the encounter that was to catalyze the UK into a paroxysm of rage, kick-starting a toxic tragedy that burned across the nation’s emotional spectrum, pinballing left and right between fear and fury as it roiled around the arena of public opinion, shapeshifting finally into a panting four-way wrestle as mercy and fairness bounced ropes with vengeance and retribution in a fight to decide not so much what justice might look like, but whether we even cared for justice at all in this instance.” <br>— </em>Anthony Loyd, journalist and war correspondent</p><p>On the 17th of February 2015, a group of three girls from Bethnal Green Academy in East London, Amira Abase, Kadiza Sultana, and Shamima Begum, took a Turkish Airlines flight from Gatwick Airport. Following their arrival in Istanbul, the trio spent a day on the capital’s central bus stop, before being picked up by an arranged smuggler and transported over the border to Syria.</p><p>The disappearance gathered significant media attention. The girls were at that stage rather universally seen for who they were: young vulnerable teenagers groomed by an organisation the likes of which the world has not seen before: the Islamic State.</p><p>The propaganda machine that ISIS was able to construct and spread worldwide was seductive to substantial amounts of disillusioned people. Despite the concentration of Western media on the now notorious, visibly brutal elements, ultraviolence composed only between 8 to 10% of ISIS’s messaging. The majority of its propaganda output has been focused on the creation of the vision of a genuine Islamic state, where the values of Muslims are upheld — an international society based on community and shared purpose. Jihad and bloodshed, while integral to ISIS’s true conation, were forming only a rather fringe section of the group’s public agenda in the months after the declaration of the caliphate on 29 June 2014.</p><p>Early sympathizers from the West, such as the Bethnal Green girls, were often members of ostracised communities in their home countries, and therefore both susceptible to the promise of an equal Muslim society, and inherently distrusting of the Western narrative that had excluded them and marginalized them. Media reports of ISIS’s brutality were dismissed when the affected individuals contrasted them with the ‘witness reports’ they were receiving from ISIS’s skilled propagandists, and later, from their peers who had joined the group.</p><p>London’s Bethnal Green is an over 50% Muslim and largely immigrant, vibrant and warm yet also notably disadvantaged neighbourhood sitting in the shadows of the City skyscrapers. In 2015, it was especially impacted by the wave of violent xenophobia and islamophobia that gripped the UK and indeed Europe as a whole. ISIS’s promises of an international Muslim utopia successfully exploited this environment and first led astray a classmate of the Bethnal Green trio: Sharmeena Begum (no relation) left for Syria months ahead of them, maintained contact, and corroborated the terror group’s messaging.<br> <br>Despite the 16-year-old’s disappearance into the hands of ISIS, authorities were slow to react and complacent at every stage — including, most bafflingly, issuing letters warning parents of Abase, Sultana, and Begum, noting the potential radicalization of their children, however letting the teenagers themselves deliver them, which predictably never occurred.</p><p>Following the warranted media frenzy, the British authorities launched an international investigation aiming to locate the Bethnal Green girls. Nonetheless, by late February, the Metropolitan police could only confirm that the trio had reached Syria and disappeared into the ISIS-controlled territory.</p><p>The children, aged between 15 and 16, were placed in a <em>maqar</em> — a house for unwed women, which they could only leave after being married to an ISIS member. Conditions in <em>maqars</em> are gruelling, and deliberately so — they are meant to incentivize the quick ‘distribution’ of women. Only ten days after arriving in Syria, the 15-year-old Begum was married to a 23-year-old Yago Riedijk, a Dutch-born convicted ISIS terrorist. Abase entered matrimony with Abdullah Elmir, an Australian ISIS fighter dubbed the ‘Ginger Jihadi.’ <br>A few months later, Elmir’s death following a drone attack was verified by the British security services, and Abase had to remarry. She maintained communication with her mother through social media channels until she abruptly stopped. Sultana, likewise widowed and then espoused by another fighter, even planned to escape from Syria, yet never proceeded with the plan in fear of ISIS’s brutal retaliation.</p><p>Abase and Sultana lived in ISIS-held territory for the rest of their lives: They both died before the caliphate was finally crushed, making Shamima Begum the only surviving Bethnal Green girl.</p><p>She had lived in Raqqa, the terrorist group’s <em>de facto</em> capital. Despite speculations in the press, there has never been any evidence that Begum had actively participated in ISIS’s operations. In all confirmed accounts, she had lived a housewife and a mother’s life in Raqqa and faced abuse from her husband — an adult ISIS fighter who had been able to marry her after only 10 minutes of a meeting, had children with her while she was underage, and openly boasted about how easy it had been to make her entire existence conform to his wishes, including most recently for the <em>I’m Not a Monster</em> documentary cooperation between BBC and FRONTLINE (PBS). Following the fall of the caliphate, Begum’s husband had been captured and detained. She was stripped of her British citizenship and placed in a notorious refugee camp where she remains to this day, fighting her case against the British government. She had lost all three of her children.</p><p>The story of the trio lays bare several disheartening institutional shortcomings. The incompetence and in numerous instances, indifference of those meant to protect them was painfully obvious in the scores of steps that led to their disappearance. The authorities fell short of adequately assessing the danger to the girls and other populations vulnerable to ISIS’s propaganda. In stark contrast to how ruthless the British Government’s attitude to Begum’s fate is for the crime of being groomed by a terrorist mega-group at 15, its security services utterly failed to prepare themselves for ISIS’s online empire.</p><p>As noted above, the <em>causa principalis</em> of Western citizens joining projects such as ISIS has less to do with religion and more with societal exclusion, frequently stemming from institutionalized and interpersonal islamophobia, xenophobia, and racism. Ostracism from the society of a nation of choosing, or, on many occasions, the society the individual’s parents emigrated to, leaves them in a vacuum — unable to relate to their former or inherited identities, yet rejected by the one surrounding them. <br>As Begum, raised in a disadvantaged, rather close-knit immigrant community in London, noted herself in the fourth episode of the above-mentioned BBC/FRONTLINE investigation’s podcast: ‘<em>I did not feel Bengoli […] and I did not feel British, because I feel like I wasn’t able to be British, even though I wanted to be.</em>’</p><p>Experiencing a sense of isolation from one’s environment is a prevalent feeling among teenagers regardless of their context. The ages of 14 to 17 are a particularly vulnerable developmental period, as individuals start gaining agency over their lives and the ability to avoid detection by their authority figures. As the wish to belong runs alongside the desire to differentiate oneself, children are drawn into seeking cliques, and the exponential rise of the presence of online media in their lives left their parent generation notably more out of step than any previous generation in history. Online subcultures evolve rapidly and are incredibly difficult to keep up with from the outside — even for experts, let alone for ordinary parents, especially ones coming from characteristically socially conservative backgrounds. Teenagers are particularly susceptible to the influence of online echo chambers: these spaces can represent the only environments in which they feel genuinely understood, as well as enjoy a certain degree of rebellion against society, all from the comfort and safety of their bedrooms.</p><p>What then drives an individual from engaging with a group like ISIS online to embarking on a complicated and dangerous journey to Syria or Iraq, is most commonly a previous traveller link. In the case of the Bethnal Green girls, the classmate who allegedly radicalized the trio and devised the plan to join the terror group had already made the journey to Syria.</p><p>Once she informed Abase, Sultana, and Begum of her safe arrival, coupled with tales of the utopian life in the caliphate, their direct planning began. Along with demonstrating to their peers that passage to the ISIS-controlled territory is possible, the effectuated travellers fulfil an utterly crucial function in the terror group’s campaign of international recruitment: <br>They serve as buffers against the acceptance of reporting of the factual operations and objectives of the group.</p><p>In conjunction with pre-existing distrust in a system that disenfranchised them, the individuals considering joining such a group are more likely to believe their friend on the ground in Raqqa that ISIS is not the pure evil it was, over the media. Fundamentally, for the potential foreign recruits, the idea of Islamic State was a conspiracy theory — with some elements of truth and large amounts of fabrication, the rest to be crafted by the viewer.</p><p>There exists a popular misconception that ISIS persuaded foreigners to join its ranks chiefly through its well-known high-definition ultraviolence propaganda, such as its infamous execution series. However, while naturally, such scenes attracted wide media attention, ultraviolence, as noted above, composed only between 8–10% of ISIS’s propaganda output. <br>Whilst many Westerners, largely men, had indeed publicly expressed a desire to participate in this facet of ISIS’s existence, it was the rarer cause for which people enlisted. Whereas the most frequently reported footage had been the execution of a cage burning of the captured Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh, the video that gathered the most views in communities of interest was the Eid al-Fitr celebration.</p><p>Deleted from YouTube, it can still be viewed around the web. It is clear textbook propaganda when perceived through the lens of ISIS’s true purpose and the ultimate fall of the caliphate. Nonetheless, it is immensely worth noting that it convinced thousands of regular people —<em> inter alia</em> teachers, nurses, engineers, social workers, and indeed A-tier teenage students, to leave their lives in the West and head over to Syria. It shows idyllic scenes, a multi-ethnic community all connected by their faith in Islam, without divisions of class, race, or country of origin.</p><p>This is an extremely seductive message to a teenager that had grown up ostracised and feels like they found their purpose in their faith. The film shows new maternity wards, with a Western doctor noting how surprised he was by the highly modern state of the hospital: it could be in London, but it is in Raqqa. It showcases children playing and adults laughing… it has a travel-guide atmosphere. One might well expect it to end with a standard-issue Ministry of Tourism logo or a little ‘get 20% off your hotel now’ banderol. Instead, it ends: ‘<em>wish you were here</em>.’</p><p>People, and especially women, in large part joined ISIS for this vision. While many British people might find it baffling that these individuals claim they never known about ISIS’s ultraviolence aspect, never seen its execution clips, and did not believe in its expansionist nature, it is valuable to inquire within themselves how many British or American citizens would stand by every action of their national militaries. The invasion of Iraq, which began in 2003 and formally ended in 2011, had been universally perceived in the Middle East as a plain attack on a sovereign state and led to a million civilian deaths, as well as a total collapse of the nation’s infrastructure.</p><p>The Abu Ghraib torture case, only closed in 2014, featured several human rights violations and war crimes committed by the US military in Iraq — over the same antediluvian Levant plains that ISIS would emerge to daunt a decade later. The records and images are likewise freely available to the Western public. They made media rounds in 2003 when the scandal was uncovered by the Associated Press and subsequently reported to the wider US audience by CBS News in April 2004, leading to widespread condemnation — including the iconic 6 May 2004 ‘<em>Resign, Rumsfeld</em>’ cover of the Economist, prominently featuring one of the ‘mild’ torture images.</p><p>A total of 63 people died in Abu Ghraib: 36 casualties occurred due to insurgent mortar attacks, and the rest were murdered or died indirectly as a result of the torture they were subjected to. The US initially argued that the mortar deaths should not be noted as a part of the induced death toll, however, the 1949 Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War requires surrendered captives not be kept at facilities vulnerable to attack, including artillery.</p><p>The torture that these Iraqis, most of whom were innocent of any wrongdoing whatsoever, have been subjected to, is what most Westerners would not expect any of their governments to sanction since the times of the Nazis, and the extensive, graphic documentation of these human rights violations can be viewed by anyone at any time. Yet, most of the populace under the NATO umbrella would not perceive themselves as associated with such terror — in fact, for the majority, awareness of it is unlikely, and no one would imply that life in the West is some unending terror of genocide, despite this recorded war crime. It is, in fact, not that hard to relate.</p><p>And parts of the Eid al-Fitr propaganda video are indeed true. ISIS did build education centers, roads, and hospitals. It operated as a <em>de facto</em> state, with tax systems, social services, schooling and health care, and national identity. Nonetheless, its main goal was the expansion of its radical philosophy, and it was universally understood by the state’s agents that this was to be achieved by violent means and at any cost necessary. <br>ISIS funded its mission, from missiles to pre-schools, by systematically targeting non-Sunni Iraqis and Syrians in each new area they succeeded in securing, forcing them out of their homes to exploit their businesses and properties to claim as <em>ghanima</em> (war spoils), and imposing <em>jizya</em> (protection tax) on other religious minorities. In the Eid al-Fitr video, women dressed modestly — in real-life Raqqa, they were subjected to the dehumanizing full compulsory black <em>burqa</em>, paired with an <em>abaya</em> covering the entire body, and a shield on top of the <em>abaya</em>, along with gloves. Non-compliance was met with physical punishments and sometimes lethal torture.</p><p>ISIS committed further war crimes and crimes against humanity in all areas in which they gained control: they forced religious conversions under the threat of death and torture, took thousands hostage, jailed and executed political opposition and any perceived enemies, targeted escapees as exemplary cases and often arbitrarily tortured, mutilated and executed civilians, including journalists and humanitarian staff. The group’s actions against especially the Yazidi population (forced child marriages, enslavement, systematic and widespread murder, the use of rape as a weapon of war) amount to genocide. ISIS did not go only after the flesh, either: it reveled in the destruction of concepts humanity holds the dearest — community, family, heritage, cultural fabric… best exemplified in the terror group’s destruction of the ancient city of Palmyra.</p><p>Being a territorially expansive organization first and foremost, ISIS, in addition to the establishment of <em>wilayat</em> (provinces) in areas of interest, dedicated significant efforts and resources to external operations, organizing terrorist attacks outside Syria and Iraq both before and after the declaration of the establishment of the caliphate itself. ISIS also sought to exert indirect control over Western actors to carry out ‘ISIS-inspired’ acts, instilling further fear into the Western populace, and seeking to mitigate the involvement of the Coalition in its ‘headquarters’ area of Iraq and Syria. ISIS issued statements providing <em>carte blanche</em> ‘permissions’ to carry out attacks in its name without further instructions.</p><p>While it must be noted that the majority of terrorist attacks carried out by the group and its lackeys took place in the Middle East and its targets were Muslims, this approach also led to the November 2015 Paris terror campaign, the December 2015 San Bernardino shootings, the March 2016 Brussels Airport bombing, the June 2016 Orlando gay club shooting and the July 2017 Nice and Berlin truck attacks. The UK was targeted especially in 2017, with the Westminster attack, the Manchester Arena bombing, and the London Bridge stabbings taking place in March, May, and June respectively.</p><p>It is estimated that 1,200 people outside of Iraq and Syria were killed by ISIS or ISIS-inspired attacks. While this death toll is gruesome and unforgivable, we must not forget that this number includes all areas outside of the self-declared Caliphate and that ISIS primarily targeted Muslims, not the West — in June 2014 alone, it slaughtered 1500 Iraqi soldiers. Its wrath did not stop with non-Sunni Muslims, either: hundreds of Sunnis were executed for refusing to swear alliance to ISIS, for harbouring undesirables of the regime, or for simply being in the wrong time in the wrong place.</p><p>This is what Begum was referring to in her infamous and rather unfortunate Manchester Arena bombings comment: ‘<em>It is wrong that innocent people did get killed […] but, women and children in [ISIS territory] being killed right now unjustly with the bombings […] It’s a two-way thing really because women and children are being killed in the Islamic State right now and it’s a kind of retaliation.’</em></p><p>It must be noted that Begum had just spent the last 4 years of her life, from 15 to just a day before this interview, speaking only to ISIS sympathizers, seeing death and destruction daily, and burying two of her children, heavily pregnant with her third. Nonetheless, her core assertion that grave atrocities were perpetrated against people within the ISIS-held territory, and the fact that these events received scant attention in Western media, is not meritless at all.</p><p>It was these attacks, however, that led the Western nations to fully embrace what would become the Global Coalition Against Daesh, which encompassed the efforts of more than 60 partner states. The military component of the operation was led by the US. It took five years of fighting on every front — from 34,000 air and artillery strikes to large-scale intelligence collection in the West against potential ISIS sleeper cells, and it cost the displacement of millions until ISIS was finally expelled from the majority of its Iraqi and Syrian territory and cornered in its last Syrian enclave of Baghuz.</p><p>From there, most surviving men were detained, and many subsequently faced trial for terrorism and war crimes, while women and children were predominantly placed in various forms of internment. Of these, the Al-Hawl camp, safeguarded by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, gained significant attention due to its association with the fall of the ISIS caliphate, including the discovery of Shamima Begum by Anthony Loyd. Originally housing Syrians internally displaced due to the civil war, the camp saw a substantial increase in population following the breakdown of the caliphate.</p><p>If the male heads of ISIS were at its peak the world’s most wanted, then Al-Hawl, housing ISIS’s women and children, is currently a containment camp of the world’s most unwanted.</p><p>The facilities of the camps that ISIS-affiliated foreigners like Begum are held in are unsatisfactory at the best of times — indeed, her third child, a British citizen, had died only a few days after birth. The camp faces significant humanitarian challenges in providing basic sanitation facilities, food and water, shelter, and healthcare, let alone education and deradicalization. On the contrary, there are reports of ongoing radicalization within the camps, as the inadequate schooling system leaves the formal learning and recreational hours of children entirely to the detainees, some of whom are still deeply committed to ISIS.</p><p>In July 2019, there were several incidents of children, some too young to have any memory of the caliphate still operating and formally brainwashing, creating make-shift ISIS flags and raising them in the camp. Often, followed by the chant <em>‘baqiya’</em> — the Arabic word for ‘remaining’ — a reference to the ISIS slogan <em>‘baqiya wa tatamaddad’</em> meaning ‘lasting and expanding.’ There have been physical attacks, tent burnings, and even murders of detainees seen as lapsed, <em>kāfir</em>, by their fanatical peers, especially if they made efforts towards repatriation, spoke to the press, or stopped confirming with ISIS’s strict female dress code. Indeed, Begum herself had to be moved to another location for safety reasons. In the latest videos of her, she is wearing jeans and a baseball cap — utterly unviable in the depths of the camp, where children were known to throw rocks at media trucks and make death threats towards the Kurdish staff.</p><p>As of 15 December 2022, Human Rights Watch reports that over 40,000 people are still held in post-ISIS detention camps. This is a ticking time bomb and the biggest gift to ISIS’s inevitable resurrection in one form or another.</p><p>Therefore, many countries are faced with the dilemmas connected with the repatriation of their citizens. The US has adopted a general pro-active policy of repatriation, most famously Abu Dujanah, Samantha Elhassani, and Abdelhamid Al-Madioum, all of whom have been subsequently prosecuted on American soil and sentenced. This approach is not only much more fitting of a state wishing to make its citizenship worthwhile — it is also much more pragmatic.</p><p>Nonetheless, the UK had been averse to most attempts. The Al-Hawl camp houses several British women and children, and there is no denying that it exemplifies a complex political issue. Begum and her peers have however been radicalised in the UK. As Anthony Loyd notes, following the revocation of her citizenship, she is treated as if she were always a stranger among the British, just a temporary visitor. But she was not — she was born in London, grew up in Bethnal Green, and got radicalized here. She had three children, all of whom were British nationals by <em>jus sanguinis</em>. Abandoning people like her in desert camps, insisting they are not British and that mistakes they made at 15 should doom them forever, only perpetuates the same atmosphere of hostility that pushed these individuals into the arms of ISIS in the first place.</p><p>Marija Carter LLM</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4e3fef290a5a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/illuminations-mirror/till-martyrdom-do-us-part-what-created-550-western-isis-brides-4e3fef290a5a">Till Martyrdom Do Us Part: What Created 550 Western ISIS Brides</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/illuminations-mirror">ILLUMINATION’S MIRROR</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Marija Carter: Held at a Nuke Point]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/marija-carter-held-at-a-nuke-point-dde1716bbfa0?source=rss-201c52db69e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dde1716bbfa0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[denuclearization]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[usa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nato]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Marija Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Aug 2023 13:39:42 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-08-12T13:39:42.935Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>The American 5,428 nuclear weapons and 1,054 detonations hell of a power-trip</strong></p><p>At the peak of the nuclear arms race in 1967, the US held 31,255 nuclear weapons. The largest American field test was conducted with a nuclear weapon with a yield of 15 megatons – for contrast, the bomb that doomed Hiroshima to be a symbol of hell on Earth had a yield of 16 kilotons.</p><p>Despite the enormous reductions in nuclear arsenals since the hottest days of the Cold War, it is crucial to remember that the 5,428 weapons the US possesses are each capable of inflicting barely imaginable suffering. It is incomprehensible how much of an overkill 5,428 is – not only 428, not only 28, but even ‘just’ 8 would constitute an existential threat to humanity and the planet as a whole.</p><p>The US holds one of the most advanced nuclear stockpiles in the world. While large sections of its specifics are classified, the world got an update on its most important particulars in May 2023. The Pentagon released its nuclear warhead data, in a bid to pressure Russia back into participation in the New START following Kremlin’s earlier decision to suspend participation. The US noted that of its 5,428 total warheads, 3,708 are operational strategic and non-strategic, and 1,419 are deployed.</p><p>The birthplace of the atom bomb, with the first successful detonation on 16 July 1945, remains to this day the only nation that has ever employed them in an attack. Today, the country maintains an incredibly expensive nuclear triad – it is estimated that since the start of the Manhattan Project to 2023, over $12.2 trillion in present-day terms was spent on nuclear weapons development, storage and testing. In addition, the US boasts three state-of-the-art delivery systems. The US Air Force operates a fleet of Minuteman III, which are land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying multiple warheads simultaneously. Further, there are submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), notably the Ohio-class submarines Trident II D5, and lastly, ‘old fashioned’ strategic (gravity) bombers such as the B-2 Spirit and the B-52 Stratofortress.</p><p>This armed-to-the-teeth approach provides redundancy, ensuring that the compromise of any of its pillars does not infringe on nuclear capabilities. The US continues modernising its nuclear arsenal, supposedly to ensure safety as well as reliability and effectiveness, especially following the 3 July 2017 Associated Press revelations that the Pentagon knew of critical shortcomings in the safety of storage systems and reacted by ‘pass-fail’ grades being declared off-limits in audits, justifying this clear breach of national safety by a desire to ‘prevent adversaries from learning too much about nuclear weapons vulnerabilities.’</p><p>The US denied participation in the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons but is a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which aims chiefly to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Through this Treaty, the US is technically committed to eventual nuclear disarmament, however, it has never made any attempts to even pretend it fully accepts this premise.</p><p>On the international stage, the US positions itself as a prominent advocate for non-proliferation – after all, it burned Iraq to the ground over dubious allegations of an active nuclear weapon programme, and enthusiastically threatened Libya and Iran should they fail to pledge towards strict 0-nukes deals. One cannot overlook the irony of the situation: 5,428 to 0.</p><p>This approach does not, as is sometimes opined, raise questions about the credibility of the US commitment to non-proliferation. On the contrary: it proudly lays the answer out. The US maintains its nuclear arsenal as a way to project its power and secure its interests on the global stage. The danger that US stakes would be subjected to the nuclear threat, let alone a nuclear attack, is literally non-existent.</p><p>The stockpile is not maintained for defence purposes: it exists purely to shape other nations’ behaviour in ways that benefit the US. The only risk it eliminates is the risk of resistance on the grounds of state sovereignty under international law. This becomes particularly comically obvious when used to extract nuclear disarmament deals from states that seek to arm in response to US imperialism.</p><p>While the only world worth striving towards is the one with no nuclear weapons whatsoever, if one accepts the US argument that nuclear weapons are a deterrent to conflict, it would follow that it makes infinitely more sense for Arab nations to arm themselves than it does for the US or any NATO nation. Any Pentagon-advanced argument to the contrary is only a glaring example of the instability of its rationale, as well as a glaring illustration of never-ending geopolitical inequality.</p><p>The US is not alone in its responsibility for the slow pace of nuclear disarmament under the 1968 NPT. It remains, however, the most arrogant obstacle.</p><p>Composed by Marija Carter for Denuclearise.com on the 27th of July 2023</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dde1716bbfa0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com/marija-carter-held-at-a-nuke-point-dde1716bbfa0">Marija Carter: Held at a Nuke Point</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/denuclearise-com">Denuclearise.com</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Law of War re Nuclear Weapons]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@marijacarter/law-of-war-re-nuclear-weapons-30cd426a1107?source=rss-201c52db69e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/30cd426a1107</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[icj]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[law-of-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military-history]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Marija Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Jun 2023 14:42:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-11T18:21:15.814Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>‘Intransgressible principles’</h3><p><em>Jus ad bellum</em> recognises use of force as legal only if employed in accordance with the exemptions to Art 2(4) of the UN Charter, as codified in Art 42 (UN SC approval) and Art 51 (self-defence) thereof. In contrast, <em>jus in bello</em>, the <em>lex specialis</em> of nuclear weapons use, does not <em>per se</em> concern itself with the legitimacy of the origin of the conflict it operates in — it governs the conduct within it. IHL imposes several limits on the legal means and methods of warfare. It aims to protect, in particular, those who are not, or are no longer, directly or actively participating in hostilities. IHL norms and principles articulate standards of armed conflict that shall be universally accepted.</p><p>While weaponry does not have to be explicitly ‘authorised’ by any instrument to retain potential lawfulness under IHL, States engaging in an armed conflict have their choice of warring methods subjected to several restrictive frameworks. As reiterated by the ICJ in 1996, any use of a weapon will be unlawful if, and to the extent in which, it is employed in a manner that infringes IHL. The ICJ observed in 1996 that WMD tend to be outlawed by a specific conventional instrument, such was the case with chemical and biological WMD, outlawed by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, UN GA 2826 (19 December 1971) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, UN GA 47/39 (30 November 1992). There exists no such universally binding instrument outlawing nuclear weapons. This statement remains <em>de jure</em> true, despite TPNW’s entry to force.</p><p>A particular element of the deterrence strategy adopted by NWS and their allies consists of maintaining vagueness surrounding the circumstances in which nuclear weapons would be used. Nonetheless, the ICJ’s para 105(2)(D), reiterating the applicability of IHL to the issue of nuclear weapons, deems it subject to a multitude of principles, the operation of which in practice renders it virtually guaranteed to be illegal.</p><p>A critical principle of IHL states that a lawful attack can only proceed in so far as the expected civilian harm is not excessive compared to the anticipated direct, concrete military advantage. This concept of proportionality represents a crucial lens through which to assess the legality of a particular type of weapon. IHL renders States obligated to treat civilians under its power, <em>inter alia</em>, humanely, without distinction, in all circumstances, and to protect them from violence and degrading treatment, this protection extends to the medical, humanitarian, and other relief bodies providing essential assistance to civilians, whose access the belligerents are obligated to facilitate. In its context, the ‘civilian harm’ which would inevitably be caused by a nuclear detonation includes direct and indirect loss of civilian lives, damage to or collapse of civilian infrastructure (including the access of relief teams), long-term adverse health consequences, and immense environmental damage.</p><h3>Legitimate military objectives</h3><p>IHL demands a strict distinction between agents of warfare and civilians. This ‘principle of distinction’ constitutes one of the most solidly established premises of international law, cited as a concrete fact as early as 1758 by de Vattel. Considered by the ICJ to be one of the ‘<em>intransgressible principles of international customary law,</em>’ it was first codified in the Preamble of the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration, since then recognised by the 1909 Hague Regulations, and reiterated by both 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention.​</p><p>This principle mandates all decisions to be taken through the lens of the constant operation of a policy of distinction between civilians and combatants, both in terms of persons and civilian versus military property. IHL designates that the only legitimate aim of war is the weakening of enemy military forces. It states that in a situation where this goal can be attained by disabling combatants, it shall not be achieved by killing them. The combination of the doctrines of proportionality and doctrine of military necessity in turn supports one further ‘disqualifier’ of the legality of a weapon under IHL — any weapon rendering the death of adversaries inevitable is prohibited.​</p><p>While attacks directed at the civilian populace are conclusively outlawed due to the principle of distinction, civilians may nonetheless be legitimately killed or injured as a result of an armed conflict, if falling under ‘collateral damage’ in the pursuit of a military objective. What constitutes a legitimate objective of a military assault is determined,<em> inter alia</em>, by the scope of the doctrine of military necessity.</p><p>The St Petersburg Declaration codified the concept of military necessity as follows: ‘t<em>he only legitimate object […] during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.</em>’ Where such a goal can be achieved by temporarily disabling the combatants or by using methods inflicting a lesser degree of suffering, opting instead for methods rendering their death inevitable or causing avoidable suffering would be ‘<em>contrary to the laws of humanity</em>.’ The legitimate objective of war, it follows, is to defeat the enemy force, not to kill as many enemy combatants as possible, or inflict the greatest possible wounds. Under the application of this principle, civilian casualties can be permissible only if a sufficient effort has been made to prevent their occurrence. As will be discussed in more detail further, given the magnitude of damage caused by modern nuclear bombs, most strikingly the unpredictable levels of harm caused to the environment, making the case that nuclear attack might pass through the IHL filter of military necessity would be impossible.</p><h3>Principle of proportionality</h3><p>The IHL principle of proportionality provides a further constraint on the scope of legitimate means and methods of warfare. In its most concise form, this doctrine prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause civilian casualties excessive to the anticipated military advantage.</p><p>Collateral damage constitutes a part of near every military operation. The ‘anticipated military advantage,’ against which the proportionality of harm to civilians is to be weighted, is itself subject to several restraints: it has to be exclusively military in nature, and ‘concrete and direct.’ As such, the advantage will usually be measured <em>vis-à-vis</em> gained ground, or destruction or weakening of enemy armed forces.</p><p>The principle of proportionality cannot be used to justify an attack deliberately targeting civilian objectives, notwithstanding the military advantage such targeting would be pursuing. As it follows, creating conditions that coerce surrender by targeting the civilian population does not constitute a legitimate military objective, and the morale of a nation cannot be designated as one either. The 1945 nuclear attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki (justified by the wish to force a more appealing Japanese surrender for the US, a showcase of the new weaponry for purposes of foreign relations with the USSR, and the prevention of domestic internal investigations into expedited finances), demonstrably fail to pass these core IHL standards.</p><p>Several P5 NWS expressed, and indeed keep expressing, firm reservations about the applicability of AP I to the category of nuclear weapons. ‘<em>It continues to be the understanding of the United Kingdom</em>,’ one such modern declaration holds, that AP I rules ‘<em>apply exclusively to conventional weapons […] In particular, the rules […] do not have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons</em>.’</p><p>Accordingly, Judge Schwebel maintained in his dissent during the 1996 ICJ AO, AP I innovations were understood to not govern nuclear weapons at the time of their preparation and adoption. Judge Weeramantry considered such arguments hinging on a lack of specificity nonsensical: ‘<em>Even though indiscriminate mass slaughter (through the nuclear weapon), irreversible damage to future generations (through the nuclear weapon), environmental devastation (through the nuclear weapon), and irreparable damage to neutral States (through the nuclear weapon) are not expressly prohibited in international treaties… If [nuclear weapons] are deleted from the previous sentence, no one could deny that the acts mentioned therein are prohibited by international law. It seems specious to argue that the principle of prohibition is defeated by the absence of particularization of the weapon.’</em></p><p>Furthermore, despite such reservations, Sassòli argues, customary IHL as set in 1973 does not constitute the full extent of the IHL framework applicable to them, as IHL would have continued to develop even in the absence of the formation of the specific legal instrument of AP I. The rule of proportionality of attack, the operation of which would disqualify the majority of perceivable nuclear weapon deployments, had been firmly established before the operation of AP I began.</p><p>In their two historical deployments, nuclear weapons were employed in the knowledge of their inherent inability to distinguish between military and civilian targets, and indeed, with the view to cause severe civilian casualties and a large-scale breakdown of civilian infrastructure. In line with the conceptualisation of civilian harm outlined above, deployment in any proximity to the civilian population would inevitably render it non-compliant with the principle of distinction.</p><h3>Unnecessary suffering</h3><p>At least in theory, the civilian population cannot be targeted. However, combatants directly engaging in hostilities are, unless placed <em>hors de combat</em> through capture, injury or other forms of incapacitation, subject to only very limited protections under international law. ‘Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict’ constitute primary agents of warfare, and thus legitimate military targets.</p><p>Nonetheless, the ‘unnecessary suffering’ rule, closely linked to the doctrine of military necessity, forms the second restriction on permissible weapons — a prohibition on weapons that uselessly aggravate the suffering of enemy combatants. Similarly to the principle of distinction, this IHL concept was first codified by the St Petersburg Declaration, then reiterated by the Hague Regulations and AP I. The ICRC had confirmed the operation of this principle both within international and non-international armed conflict. The aim of a legitimate attack is to be the removal of agents of warfare from active combat, not the infliction of superfluous injury upon them.</p><p>In scenarios in which the use of a nuclear weapon could be targeted so precisely as to not result in tremendous civilian harm (such as some of the scenarios contemplated by Judge Schwebel, further) it is argued it would nonetheless be close to impossible to establish that such use did not render the death of adverse personal unjustifiably inevitable, or subject them to unnecessary suffering.</p><h3>Inherently indiscriminate</h3><p>IHL encompasses the principles of war-time targeting — as noted, one of its core rules stipulates that parties to a conflict can only verge direct attacks against military personnel or objects of concrete military value. Both in the context of international and non-international armed conflict, this obligation to restrict the scope of attack to only lawful military targets echoes customary norms. AP I Art 52(2) defines ‘military objectives’ by reference to the fulfilment of two criteria: first, the object in consideration must constitute an effective contribution to military action; and second, the attack planned against such object must offer a definitive military advantage. Art 51(5)(b) further codifies the principle of proportionality, solidly established within customary international law. Civilian interests are often argued to be meant to have a higher priority in multifaceted proportionality assessments.</p><p>Based on the doctrines of military necessity and proportionality, IHL strictly prohibits any weapon intrinsically incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets. Even attacks ostensibly directed at a particular, legitimate military objective can still be deemed indiscriminate if the means or method of the attack is inherently incapable of being confined to that target.</p><p>In its two deployments, nuclear weapons were used with the clear knowledge of their indiscriminate nature, with the vision to target the morale of an adverse nation — an explicitly illegitimate military objective. The radioactive fallout following nuclear detonation poses both direct and indirect lethal risk to the civilian population. Additionally, it constitutes ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ environmental damage. It cannot be successfully argued that wartime employment of a nuclear weapon bearing any similarity to the two historical deployments could ever comply with the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks.</p><h3>The Martens Clause</h3><p>Recognised as an applicable international custom by the ICJ and first codified in the Preamble of the 1899 Hague Convention II, the Martens Clause asserts that in scenarios not covered by an instrument adopted by the relevant Parties, the populace under and belligerents of a conflict remain under the protection of principles of international law, as established by the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience. As such, the Clause proves an effective tool for addressing the rapid evolution of military technology. The ICJ referred to the Martens Clause in asserting that the mere lack of specific 1974–7 Conference mechanisms relating to nuclear weapons cannot be translated into any conclusions as to their legality.</p><p>The Court weighed the substance of ‘<em>public conscience</em>’ and ‘<em>elementary considerations of humanity</em>’ in the face of the State’s right to avoid defeat at all costs. However, the premise of IHL does not permit derogations upon such grounds. The earliest concrete IHL developments transpired out of armed conflicts in which the pursuit of the objective became limited by the harm that the opposing forces were willing to inflict or receive. IHL principles that emerged to facilitate such conflicts had to be, by definition, observed by both or all warring parties, irrespective of their motivations and grievances, as the rules restricting their methods of warfare in turn conferred upon them protection from the unrestrained wrath of their opponents. It is the conclusion of this work that asserting that such rules can be unilaterally waived undermines the very basis of IHL.</p><p>Further, there are currently no publicly known weapons capable of threatening ‘<em>the very survival of [a] State</em>’ on their own, other than nuclear weapons. Their global retention in the numbers currently reported sabotages the very premise upon which such retention occurs. The author submits that it is illegitimate to ascribe any merit to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Despite its rationale supposedly forming the core upon which the ICJ opted against pronunciation of outright illegality, nuclear attacks or nuclear retaliation do not protect <em>‘the very survival of a State’ prima facie</em> — instead merely ensuring partial or full destruction of the State against which it is waged, as well as immense collateral damage. Further, contemporary to ICJ’s ruling, let alone modern nuclear weapons carry a destructive potential several-fold higher than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In such a context, the very act of retention of nuclear weapons is a perpetual threat of unleashing unmeasurable suffering. President Bedjaoui insisted that the ICJ went as far as it could have, citing the inherent clash between IHL and the State’s right to survival for its decision not to pursue a declaration of illegality of use in all circumstances. As Nicholas Grief notes, ‘<em>surely the “intransgressible” principles of humanitarian law, “at the heart of which is the overriding consideration of humanity,” are paramount?</em>’</p><p><strong>Schwebel’s scenarios</strong></p><p>Grounding his controversial viewpoint in the established superpower State practice, Judge Schwebel provided the only affirmative answer during the 1996 ICJ ruling. His argument rested on the premise that the NPT permits the P5 to lawfully possess nuclear weapons until disarmament, and that such possession, as it is occurring in the context of nuclear deterrence, implies the threat of the use of such weapons. The NPT therefore, in his opinion, implicitly acknowledges the legitimacy of the potential use of nuclear weapons. He agreed with the ultimate decision of the Court on para 105(2)(D) — that the above-mentioned rules of IHL, all antedating nuclear weapons, apply to their use and threat of their use. While he posited that it would be impossible for a countervalue use of a nuclear weapon to occur in line with these IHL considerations, he stated that tactical nuclear weapons could be, in some scenarios, employed against military targets in a way that satisfies these requirements. In his statement during the ruling, he opted to outline such scenarios.</p><p>​</p><p>a) Nuclear depth charge targeted at a nuclear-equipped submarine ready to discharge</p><p>​In a stand-off between two nuclear weapon-carrying submarines, Judge Schwebel opinionated that the use of a tactical nuclear weapon ‘<em>might well be lawful</em>’ if the targeted submarine appears readying for an imminent first-strike, thus constituting a ‘<em>discrete military [target] so situated that substantial civilian casualties would not ensue</em>.’ He noted that such a nuclear attack would be reconcilable with the proportionality rule, especially as nuclear radiation at sea posing risk to humans would be marginal when contrasted with a nuclear explosion on land.</p><p>​Judge Schwebel’s interpretation of IHL’s application indeed forms a potentially sustainable position on the assumptions on which it has been constructed — however, several of these premises had since been challenged. Crucially, the state of the current interception systems, particularly those of the P5, renders it extremely unlikely that there could be a set of circumstances so drastic as to specifically require the use of a nuclear weapon. More precise targeting producing minimal collateral, as well as advanced radar technologies, disqualify the assumption that the personnel’s most reasonable course of action if faced with a nuclear counterpart would be to deploy their own nuclear weapons.</p><p>​Save for this argument, whichever NWS deployed the nuclear weapon would find itself in breach of a customary obligation to opt for means of defence that avoid or minimise incidental effects on the civilian population. Arguendo assuming that the attack would not transgress the rule against unnecessary suffering, nuclear engagement will always render certain civilian damage inevitable. As noted above, the calculation of harm caused to the civilian population has to factor in the damage caused to the environment. Contrary to the state of information available in 1996 at the disposal of the Court, the environmental damage caused to marine environments by nuclear detonations poses a direct threat to life, albeit more complex to quantify. Further, modern science on environmental protection is notably less anthropocentric and operates under the assumption that damage to ecosystems, even supposing it not immediately and directly endangering humans, stands subject to regulation.</p><p>​It is additionally submitted that from a strategic perspective, nuclear submarines pose extremely unlikely targets for a first-strike. The permanent at-sea nuclear deterrents are more vulnerable to accidental discharge or other severe accidents resulting from the ordinary course of events than they are likely to be deemed worth risking a nuclear war over. A nuclear first-strike on a permanent at-sea deterrent would constitute a suicide mission — and crucially, if history is any teacher, could attainably be an accident.</p><p>As Sagan observes, ‘<em>deterrence optimism is based on mistaken nostalgia and faulty analogy […] there were many close calls.’</em> It is nothing short of a miracle that the few nuclear weapon accidents that had occurred have caused remarkably low casualties and environmental damage. At times, the future of humanity rested in the hands of individuals who have opted to exercise restraints, second-guess their technology or directly disobey orders.</p><p>During the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 27 October 1962, Vasili Alexandrovich Arkhipov protested the decision of his B-59 captain Valentin Savitsky, who urged for nuclear retaliation against what turned out to be a US warning shot, not a lethal nuclear attack in the making. Save for that lone officer decision, the Soviet nuclear attack would have obliterated the USS Randolf. If, as indeed was the protocol for such a situation, the Pentagon’s Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) would be implemented in response, the world would immediately find itself gripped by an outright nuclear war.</p><p>In 1983, lieutenant colonel Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov found himself in the same position of Atlas. Following the Soviet shooting down of the KAL007, Petrov’s early warning system, in a storm of awry circumstances, reported 6 nuclear missiles fired from the US, headed toward the USSR. Petrov disobeyed orders of the Soviet military protocol when he opted not to react. He later remarked that he ‘<em>knew perfectly well that nobody would be able to correct my mistake if [he] had made one.</em>’</p><p>His decision not to report what turned out to be a false alarm was shakily based on the belief that a US first-strike nuclear attack would be an ‘all out,’ which did not match the 6 nuclear warheads appearing on his early warning system. He noted that he believed most of his colleagues would have obeyed the protocol, which would translate to an immediate nuclear ‘retaliation.’</p><p>The well-known stories of Arkhipov and Petrov are but two on the lengthy list of nuclear close calls — there have been several instances of faulty early warning systems, incorrect intelligence or confused data reading before and notably, after. We currently live in the third consecutive decade without a reported nuclear attack close call. However, the 1983 Able Archer saga produced several nuclear false alarms, and the 1991 Gulf War and the 1995 Black Brant scare, forming the immediate context to the ICJ decision, make Judge Schwebel’s insistence on a situation of this sort forming a legitimate basis of nuclear weapon hard to fathom.</p><p>b) The use of a nuclear weapon to eliminate an enemy army stationed in a remote desert</p><p>In the second scenario, Judge Schwebel considered, the above analysis of the practical dangers associated with a first-strike nuclear attack applies in connection with the IHL prohibition on unnecessary suffering and the doctrine of military necessity. This scenario holds topical relevance with the recent threats of tactical weapon use in the context of the current Russia-Ukraine war.</p><p>Judge Schwebel asserted that the use of a nuclear weapon against a gathering of enemy forces in a remote enough desert could satisfy the proportionality rule of IHL based on the argument that proportionality of attack is to be assessed in relation to the ‘<em>threat posed to the victim State</em>.’ He asserted that prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons even in such circumstances would translate to a situation where the ‘<em>victim [State] loses the right to take the only measure by which [it] can defend itself and reverse the aggression.’</em></p><p>This interpretation of the issue ignores the above-listed strategic reasons to refrain from engaging in a nuclear weapon strike where conventional warfare can provide the same practical result and have a notably higher chance of passing through the IHL legality criteria. It would further violate the IHL stipulation that where disabling enemy combatants is an option, State shall not pursue indiscriminate killing.</p><p>c) Certain scenarios of belligerent reprisal</p><p>In his dissent, Judge Schwebel specifically referenced the case of Iraq, whose biological and chemical weapon programme dominated the agenda of contemporary global security analysts. Nuclear attack, he declared, might provide legitimate means of actioning belligerent reprisal, should these weapons be employed against coalition forces. Such recourse to nuclear weapons, especially in the context of previous a nuclear strike, is the most commonly threatened one and forms parts of the official policies of the US, Russia and France, and has been endorsed by the UK.</p><p>The concept of belligerent reprisal refers to a State action in a breach of IHL, nonetheless not considered unlawful due to its context as a direct response to a previous breach of international law by the enemy. Belligerent reprisals are intended to terminate the enemy’s IHL violation by utilisation of an extreme degree of pressure, aimed to ensure the enemy’s compliance with international law.</p><p>Schwebel argued that even if one were to treat the use of a nuclear weapon as prohibited, the use could nonetheless satisfy IHL proportionality of attack assessment if contrasted with a previous and potentially recurring use of chemical and biological weapons. He rests his argument on the fact that States are not explicitly debarred from the use of nuclear weapons on a ‘never under any circumstances’ basis, while they are under such terms proscribed from the use of chemical weapons. In reliance on the State practice of the superpowers, Judge Schwebel argued that military manuals of States issued following ‘<em>long affirmed … principle and practice</em>’ of customary IHL contradict the ICJ’s potential implication as to the illegitimacy of the concept of belligerent reprisals.</p><p>​However, the doctrine of belligerent reprisal is immensely narrow in application. Where they are not prohibited outright, several rigorous restrictive frameworks prohibit its application against the civilian population and civilian infrastructure, medical personnel, transports and structures, prisoners of war, wounded, sick and shipwrecked military personnel cultural property, religious personnel and structures, installations containing dangerous forces (such as dams or nuclear reactors), structures used for civilian protection, and natural environment.</p><p>Even in such constricted scope, belligerent reprisal is a rightfully controversial concept. Furthermore, as illustrated above, communicated military intelligence is not inherently infallible (as indeed demonstrated several years later with Iraq itself). While belligerent reprisals once constituted an accepted practice, there is a long pattern of attempts to limit the concept, notably during the 1874 Brussels Conference and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences. While fundamentally unsuccessful in the elimination of the tradition, they contributed to its gradual delegitimization. Currently, as affirmed during the trials under the ICTY, there is a clear global trend towards the complete outlawing of belligerent reprisals under IHL.</p><p>The use of a nuclear weapon, universally perceived as the most radical of warfare options, on the grounds of a dying doctrine, would not pass the criteria of IHL. That is especially the case with modern thermonuclear, ‘H-bomb’ weapons. Arguendo assuming the original target is fully legitimate, hydrogen bombs combine the deadly nuclear fallout of fission products with the exponentially larger blast force provided by the subsequent fusion reaction. Three-stage thermonuclear weapons can propel radioactive particles into the stratosphere, where their subsequent behaviour becomes wholly unpredictable. The same impossibility of quantification of damage lingers over contamination to groundwater supplies, as surface nuclear tests are conducted in areas as devoid of them as possible. Due to the dichotomy between past and present nuclear weapons, the strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot, as devastating as they were, serve as examples — this would be the case even if the subsequent collection of data relating to them was conducted by modern techniques and gathered by conscientiously unbiased scientific bodies.</p><p>Therefore, even if the target of the attack had an incredible concrete military value and no immediate civilian casualties, its aftermath would be nonetheless virtually guaranteed to cause suffering to civilians. It is a core premise of IHL that States may never take civilians as an objective of an attack. If, arguendo, nuclear attack satisfied the ‘proportionality in attack’ assessment, it is extremely unlikely that human rights law would conclude that sufficient effort has been made to avoid or limit the loss of life. This is especially the case given the targeting capabilities of conventional weapons. In light of the above chapter, it is concluded that the IHL framework evidently prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in the vast majority of conceivable scenarios, as indeed ICJ noted in 1996. Developments since the beginning of the century only further testify that the resort to nuclear weapons would inherently violate the IHL principles of distinction and military necessity, as well as the rule against unjust suffering.</p><p>Marija Carter LLM</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=30cd426a1107" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A Second To Midnight]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/illuminations-mirror/a-second-to-midnight-118f643d2567?source=rss-201c52db69e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/118f643d2567</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[military-strategy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[military-history]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cuban-missile-crisis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[denuclearization]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Marija Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Jun 2023 14:24:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-25T23:25:27.569Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>Nuclear Close Calls</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/645/1*G5y3v1ybbAD5XT0RogM0jg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>As Sagan observes, <em>‘deterrence optimism is based on mistaken nostalgia and faulty analogy […] there were many close calls</em>.’ It is nothing short of a miracle that the few nuclear weapon accidents that had occurred have caused remarkably low casualties and environmental damage. At times, the future of humanity rested in the hands of individuals who have opted to exercise restraints, second-guess their technology or directly disobey orders.<br> <br> During the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 27 October 1962, Vasili Alexandrovich Arkhipov protested the decision of his B-29 captain Valentin Savitsky, who urged for nuclear retaliation against what turned out to be a US warning shot, not a lethal nuclear attack in the making. Save for that lone officer decision, the Soviet nuclear attack would have obliterated the USS Randolf. If, as indeed was the protocol for such a situation, the Pentagon’s Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) would be implemented in response, the world would immediately find itself gripped by an outright nuclear war.<br> <br> In 1983, lieutenant colonel Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov found himself in the same position of Atlas. Following the Soviet shooting down of the KAL007, Petrov’s early warning system, in a storm of awry circumstances, reported 6 nuclear missiles fired from the US, headed toward the USSR. Petrov disobeyed orders of the Soviet military protocol when he opted not to react. He later remarked that he ‘<em>knew perfectly well that nobody would be able to correct my mistake if [he] had made one</em>.’ His decision not to report what turned out to be a false alarm was shakily based on the belief that a US first-strike nuclear attack would be an ‘all out,’ which did not match the 6 nuclear warheads appearing on his early warning system. <br> <br> He noted that he believed most of his colleagues would have obeyed the protocol, which would translate to an immediate nuclear ‘retaliation.’ <br> <br> The well-known stories of Arkhipov and Petrov are but two on the lengthy list of nuclear close calls — there have been several instances of faulty early warning systems, incorrect intelligence or confused data reading before and notably, after.</p><p>We currently live in the third consecutive decade without a reported nuclear attack close call. However, the 1983 Able Archer saga produced several nuclear false alarms, and the 1991 Gulf War and the 1995 Black Brant scare make the insistence of nuclear-armed states that nuclear weapons keep humanity ‘safe’ utterly apocryphal.</p><p>Marija Carter LLM</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=118f643d2567" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/illuminations-mirror/a-second-to-midnight-118f643d2567">A Second To Midnight</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/illuminations-mirror">ILLUMINATION’S MIRROR</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Was the globalisation of the Cold War a logical consequence of the Truman Doctrine?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/illumination/was-the-globalisation-of-the-cold-war-a-logical-consequence-of-the-truman-doctrine-466b78e15a10?source=rss-201c52db69e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/466b78e15a10</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[kennan]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[korean-war]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[truman]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[globalisation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cold-war]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Marija Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 12 Jun 2023 01:09:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-10-21T04:21:48.320Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Was the Globalisation of the Cold War a Logical Consequence of the Truman Doctrine?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/0*L0Tc7Sty-415WTcO" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@uxgun?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">UX Gun</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/?utm_source=medium&amp;utm_medium=referral">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>For decades, the Cold War was the main lens through which any movement on the geopolitical stage was viewed — as is no wonder of hostility between two armed-to-the-teeth superpowers with enough nuclear capabilities to end the world several times over. It was evident that World War III would take hours, not years, to kill tens of millions. While it is clear why the Cold War provided for such an omnipresent context, its globalisation was potentially avoidable. The following will argue, focusing on the example of the Korean War, that this has been largely the product of the Truman doctrine, or rather, the desire of its originators to maintain the credibility of its underlying promise, to better suit their needs on the main battlefield of Europe.</p><p>Truman Doctrine</p><p>To do so, one must begin with the Truman Doctrine itself. The origins of the Cold War were fundamentally in the inability to reach a deal with Germany. As the dilemma was too complex to deal with, the moment passed. The eventual ‘decision’ to keep Germany divided was rather a lack thereof. The distrust between the two superpowers continued to break down, and as the tones of 1946 Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ speech became more conventional, Truman needed a reconceptualization. As the British influence over the situation in Greece continued to crumble due to financial constraints, and due to the British and American belief that Stalin, not Tito, was supporting the ploy, Truman intervened, drawing inspiration from Kennan’s belief that the Soviet regime was fundamentally unsustainable unless it is expanding. He decided to draw the line in the sand and defend anything West of it. Geopolitically, the logic was that the Soviet regime would suffocate and collapse if prevented from expanding both ideologically and physically.</p><p>The main priority was to prevent Europe, and particularly West Germany, from falling into the hands of Stalin. The decision to prevent Turkey<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> and Greece from becoming communist was ultimately to signal to the Soviets that Truman’s administration was serious about protecting West Germany. Kennan’s, and by extension, Truman’s reasoning was that the Soviets were more context-sensitive than the Nazis, and would not fight unnecessary, burdensome battles. If further gains in Europe and beyond are not allowed by suppressing the conditions needed for them, no military power will need to be exercised to the prevention of Soviet expansion. In March 1947, Truman came up with the ‘codification’ of the doctrine that would come to define him:<em> ‘one of the primary objectives […] is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. […] We are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes […] Totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States […] I believe that it must be the policy […] to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation….’</em></p><p>Defects of the formulation</p><p>There are several caveats. The main essence of it is containment. However, when Truman talks of totalitarian regimes, it is clear he means specifically communism, as soon, the US will find itself protecting right-wing dictatorships. The US was also implicitly promising not to intervene if communist parties won in fair elections, but that proved to be a problem — communists were popular strong elements of the anti-Nazi resistance in Europe, and their philosophy was more in line with that of many new States freeing themselves of the colonial oppression. The US therefore immediately went on to, if not directly intervene, then at least fund and support opposing parties.</p><p>Kennan was not impressed by this formulation of his ideas, believing it was leading the US toward military conflict. Ironically, the main weakness of the Truman Doctrine lay in that it was, supposedly, a defensive strategy. If the US promises to fund, or even fight for, democracy against communism, the initiative is left to its ideological opponent. That is then in turn made impossible to maintain given that there had been no set ‘border’ — to function as intended, the Truman doctrine needed to be perceived to be a global strategy.</p><p>Truman’s administration had been practically concerned mostly with Western Europe, particularly Germany, and supported the Greek and Turkish anti-communists to prove their dedication to that cause. In his policy formulations, Truman wished to refrain from drawing attention to the failure to obtain agreement concerning Germany, and he could not readily secure domestic support for the backing of Greece, predominantly seen by the Americans as a costly failure of the collapsing British imperialism. Framing the containment effort as a global commitment spared Truman the political difficulties associated with directly targeting these strategic areas. However, it rendered his doctrine an impossible commitment to fulfil and more importantly, cost millions of ‘collateral’ lives and destabilised vast areas of the world for decades to come.</p><p>The fact that the commitment of the president threatened huge investment from the beginning did not escape the attention of many of his allies, and there were immediate attempts to qualify the applicability of the doctrine to only strategic regions. It was however impossible to communicate such caveats without leaving the doors open to communist opportunism elsewhere.</p><p>Global consequences</p><p>Regarding the central objective of the doctrines pronunciation, it can be said to have been a success: by the 1950s, the battlelines in Europe were solid, and Stalin realised that no danger-free gains were available on the continent. The border solidification and geopolitical tension crystalise in the Berlin Blockade and the subsequent Berlin Airlift operation. The latest event mentioned allows the Truman administration the crucial in-between move to convince its European allies, and crucially its own Congress, to allow for serious military reengagement in Europe. Before Stalin gave up, the foundations for NATO were set. And from that moment forward, the Cold War moves to its next stage of far-away proxy wars, becoming global.</p><p>From this synopsis, it is clear that the globalisation of the Cold War was to quite some extent inevitable due to the formulation of the Truman Doctrine. Once North Korea invaded South Korea, the US quickly intervened, calling upon the UN Security Council for joint military action to protect the border between these two quasi-States. Soon, the US found itself involved in trench warfare that would take countless lives and taint Truman’s legacy.</p><p>With the benefit of hindsight, it had been a clear demonstration of the weaknesses of the doctrine that came to define him. There was no strategic objective derived from engagement, and the US had little to no genuine interest in the well-being of the people of the peninsula. For their purposes, had the South fallen to the North, the course of the Cold War was estimated to continue unchanged. But, confronted with this dilemma, the administration decided that the Truman Doctrine needed to be made credible by being enforced nonetheless.</p><p>The political credit associated with the Truman Doctrine was high, because only the belief that the US would decisively retaliate if the Soviets attempted gains in Europe was, in the American eyes, keeping Stalin from attempting it. As it had been opinionated that the Soviet regime could only survive if it continued to expand both geographically and ideologically, preventing such expansion was deemed to be the only way to win the Cold War and preserve American primacy. Therefore, the desire to safeguard the credibility of the central promise (and implicit threat) of the doctrine was so strong, that the US was willing to enter into a lengthy conflict with China, already a UNSC member itself.</p><p>The victory of the communists in the Chinese Civil War was a surprise not only to Chiang Kai Cheng, but also to Truman, Stalin, and perhaps Mao himself. This victory was a slap in the face of the Truman Doctrine — it had failed to help the nationalists prevent a communist takeover. Truman’s next step needed to be context-sensitive to the highest degree. The decision to intervene in Korea, due to fear of another domino falling and destroying his strategy, was a fatal error in hindsight, but a logical step if Truman’s premises were to be accepted as accurate. Additionally, Truman had the blessing of the UNS and had been assured by his main military advisor that the US would not face difficulties protecting its interests on the peninsula.</p><p>Stalin was largely disengaged from the potential battlefields of Europe and the Far East, but Mao needed to make a stance as a believer in the global communist revolution and ultimately pressured Stalin to endorse his position in relation to Korea. From Stalin’s perspective, he had no interest in risking World War 3 over Korea, when he was clearly not willing to risk it over Germany and Europe at large. But, as the battlelines in Europe had been frozen, the Korean peninsula seemed outside of the implied protective perimeter of the Truman doctrine. Stalin seemed willing to let North Korea and China gamble and see if there were some potential gains to be made. While the situation quickly escalated into the full-scale American military engagement he dreaded, it just as quickly turned into an opportunity his regime could exploit — failing to protect its former prodigy, the credibility and geopolitical position of the United States were at stake, and with it came the increased attraction of the Soviets as the protector-of-choice for many countries around the world, particularly the newly independent ones and the ones seeking independence.</p><p>The fear of losing credibility that led the US into the senseless losses in Korea and domestic political turmoil was a foreshadowing of further tragedies in, inter alia, particularly Vietnam and Afghanistan. These extensions of the original principal reasoning and the consequences of this war led to the globalisation of the Cold War. While originally intended rather narrowly to secure sections of Europe, Truman’s strategy to do so through the utilisation of the promises and threats of the Truman Doctrine made the conflict global.</p><p>Conclusion</p><p>To reiterate, the globalisation of the Cold War can be largely attributed to the Truman Doctrine, and its mortal flaw — the lack of territorial limitation of its applicability. It can be said to be a rather understandable calculation in its context, as explicitly limiting such applicability only to the regions the US had a genuine interest in protecting for their strategic purposes would open the doors for Soviet adventurism beyond these lines. However, it dragged the US into deadly and costly conflicts in areas in which their intervention had not only no legitimacy but (to add insult to injury), also provided no concrete strategic advancement for their agenda.</p><p>Marija Carter LLM</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=466b78e15a10" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/illumination/was-the-globalisation-of-the-cold-war-a-logical-consequence-of-the-truman-doctrine-466b78e15a10">Was the globalisation of the Cold War a logical consequence of the Truman Doctrine?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/illumination">ILLUMINATION</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[International Court of Justice, 8 July 1996]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@marijacarter/international-court-of-justice-8-july-1996-87e141a73230?source=rss-201c52db69e8------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/87e141a73230</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[international-law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[nuclear-weapons]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[international-courts]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[united-nations]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[denuclearization]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Marija Carter]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jun 2023 13:19:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-09-13T12:07:56.107Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h4>The Legality of Nuclear Weapons under International Law</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*K7e_YjyRcAwlQHMt6Rvc2g.jpeg" /></figure><p>The purely fission-based atomic bombs dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki had a blast yield equivalent to 15 and 21 kilotons of TNT respectively. Modern fusion-type weapons based on the three-stage Teller-Ulam model can produce a yield of up to 100 megatons of TNT. At its peak in 1985, the nuclear stockpile stood at 63,632.</p><p>The WHO had submitted a request for a decision concerning the legality of nuclear weapons to the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, the ICJ. While denied as ultra-vires, the application did, politically, pave the way for the successful application of the UN GA, asking the Court to urgently consider whether <em>‘the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance [is] permitted under international law.’ </em>In the face of immense political pressure to the contrary, the ICJ stated its jurisdiction on the matter, confirmed the ‘legal character’ of the request and proceeded to deliver one of its most controversial Advisory Opinions in history.</p><p>The ICJ unanimously stated nuclear weapons to be subject to the UN Charter Arts 2(4) and 51. The Court had noted that the <em>‘threat’</em> and <em>‘use’ </em>of a specific type of force are analogous for all relevant legal purposes, but that the possession of nuclear weapons does not constitute a threat <em>per se</em>. Should the use of a type of force be illegal on its own merit or due to its circumstances, then the threat of use of such force will likewise be illegal.</p><p>Equally unanimously, on its initiative, it pronounced an obligation on the part of the NWS to, in good faith, pursue negotiations towards nuclear disarmament. The Court specifically reiterated the relevance and merit of the Martens Clause and the law of neutrality, as well as the continued applicability of environmental protection obligations. The core principles of IHL, such as the prohibition on pursuing civilians as an attack objective, the ban on any weapon inherently incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets, and the prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering to combatants must be observed regardless of whether States ratified conventions containing them, for they represent <em>‘intransgressible principles of international customary law’</em> — although the Court opted not to pronounce them as <em>jus cogens</em>.</p><p>The ICJ noted that the employment of nuclear weapons will be<em> ‘scarcely reconcilable’</em> with the requirements of the law of armed conflict. Nonetheless, it decided that it <em>‘cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.’</em></p><p>The ICJ ruled that there exists no conventional prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons, rejecting the argument that such prohibition can be inferred by the ‘poisoned weapons’ under the Second Hague Declaration, the Hague Convention IV and the Geneva Protocol. The Court opined that weapons of mass destruction are customarily outlawed by specific legal instruments, not by the extension of the existing framework — effectively a reiteration of the <em>expressio unius est exclusio alterius </em>maxim.</p><p>Considering the body of treaties regulating nuclear weapons, from acquisition and manufacturing to possession, testing, and ultimately, deployment, the Court found them to represent the growing concern of the international community — potentially foreshadowing general prohibition, but not constituting it. The ICJ found itself unable to observe <em>opinio juris</em> in the face of such polarised State practice.</p><p>Criticisms of ICJ’s lack of appetite for judicial activism are precisely as common as the decisions themselves. As ICJ’s institutional design gives States the de facto clincher on the practical extent of its jurisdiction, resorting to techniques of judicial avoidance is regularly argued to be a pragmatic tactic allowing the Court to install its observations into the public domain. Judge Higgins and Judge Schwebel noted, the Court had pronounced<em> ‘a non liquet on the key issue on the grounds of uncertainty in the present state of law and of facts.’</em></p><p>Judge Weeramantry had likewise argued against the nod to <em>‘the current state of international law’ </em>and the claimed lack of ‘elements of facts at [the Court’s] disposal’. Para 105(2)(E) has been criticised ever since its inception by the casting vote of President Badjaoui due to an even split of the Court. Finding general illegality, the ICJ nonetheless failed to address the fundamental clash between the very concept of IHL and the reality of nuclear weapons, opting for improvident vagueness concerning the<em> ‘extreme circumstances’ </em>that would potentially justify the use of a nuclear weapon. As para 104 instructs, the application of para 105(2)(E) is restricted to interpretations compatible with the restraints outlined in paras 105(2)(D) and ©. However, ICJ believed that the operation of the principle of proportionality does not automatically disqualify the use of nuclear weapons from potential legality under IHL in a scenario of self-defence under UN Charter’s Art 51.</p><p>This conclusion conflates <em>jus ad bellum</em> and <em>jus in bello</em>. It can be easily argued that any circumstances in which IHL applies are, by definition,<em> ‘extreme circumstances,’</em> as the situation triggering its applicability (armed conflict) represents a complete breakdown of most other national and international frameworks of governance. The core of IHL allows no derogations to be conferred upon a State by reference to its right to avoid its defeat at all costs.</p><p>The ICJ was unwilling to state whether the core IHL rules and principles (such as the prohibition on taking civilians as an attack objective, and by extension, the illegality of any weapon inherently incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets) form a component of <em>jus cogens</em>. However, as Judge Koroma observed, whether the Court would opt to acknowledge the peremptory status of these norms or not, establishing international legal standards constitutes a crucial part of its judicial function.</p><p>Conversely, the Court was well willing to strengthen the status of a different practice — the ‘policy of deterrence,’ in doing so disturbingly relying on the practice of NWS as the basis for customary international law. As Judge Shi remarked, the <em>‘appreciable’</em> observation of the doctrine by a section of the international community should not be interpreted as its material power, and indeed, <em>‘the policy of deterrence should be an object of regulation by law, not vice versa.’</em></p><p>Despite compelling arguments that there are no circumstances in which the use of a nuclear weapon would not violate international law, and President Bedjaoui’s insistence that eventual complete denuclearisation is the only legitimate outcome, Judge Weeramantry warned in his dissent that para 105(2)(E) <em>‘opens a window of permissibility (…) within which a nation may seek refuge.’ </em>The ICJ should have opted for a more decisive approach, not in the naïve belief that it would prevent a potential nuclear war any more than the one they embraced, but for the sake of legal and moral integrity. For if it is indeed correct to state that there exists a set of circumstances under which the use of a nuclear weapon might be following international law, then such international law is of questionable merit, if of any at all.</p><p>Marija Carter LLM</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=87e141a73230" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>