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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Marina de Carneri on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Marina de Carneri on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Marina de Carneri on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[SEX or GENDER?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@marinadecarneri/untitled-be8396bf99a5?source=rss-9de169a85b47------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[feminism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sexual-difference]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[judith-butler]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Marina de Carneri]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 02 Feb 2019 19:34:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-27T15:37:15.859Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/565/1*P6qiYkYbXTU52kEeEuzPwg.jpeg" /></figure><blockquote>If there is no such thing today as femininity, it is because there never was. Does the word ‘woman’, then, have no content? It is what advocates of Enlightenment philosophy, rationalism or nominalism vigorously assert: women are, among human beings, merely those who are arbitrarily designated by the word ‘woman’; American women in particular are inclined to think that woman as such no longer exists. If some backward individual still takes herself for a woman, her friends advise her to undergo psychoanalysis to get rid of this obsession.</blockquote><blockquote>Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex</blockquote><p>Who would have imagined fifty years ago, when the so-called second wave of feminism started, that sexual dimorphism, a major biological feature in most animal species including human beings, would one day be considered merely a socially constructed function arbitrarily and violently imposed on individuals by culture and upbringing? Yet this is exactly what has happened, first in the US and later in Europe, as feminism left the consciousness raising groups and entered universities and political institutions. This passage has been accompanied by a transformation of the very concept of sex — the word ‘sex’ has been eclipsed by the term ‘gender’ assuming an overlap, even an equivalence between the two terms.</p><p>The concept of gender was first used by feminists to articulate the idea that femininity, — i. e., the way in which femaleness is manifested in society — is not something that emanates directly and naturally from the sexed female body, but it is the effect of social and cultural constraints that have shaped female bodies and minds in the course of history. Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex synthesized this idea in the famous statement that “one” is not born a woman:</p><blockquote>One is not born, but rather becomes, woman. No biological, psychical or economic destiny defines the figure that the human female takes on in society, it is civilization as a whole that elaborates this intermediary product between the male and the eunuch that is called feminine.”(1)</blockquote><p>But how are we exactly to understand this statement? If femininity is the effect of a process of adaptation that society imposes on the human female, can all human beings, regardless of their sex, be turned or perhaps voluntarily turn into women? Even though the power of nurture (gender) over nature (sex) can never be underestimated, things are not so simple. The Second Sex is an analysis of the origin, development and contradictions of femininity, but nowhere does it point to the conclusion, or the assumption, that there is no relationship between sex and gender and that anatomy and biology have no impact on the construction of femininity, or masculinity, for that matter. De Beauvoir never meant to say that women are not born with a female sex, but that sex in itself does not determine “the figure that the human female takes in society”. In other words, the biological features of women being what they are (as debatable as they can be), their existence can be employed or developed differently according to the function and value a society grants them. In The Second Sex, de Beauvoir spells out the biological features that condition women to embrace femininity as we know it:</p><blockquote>On average, she is smaller than man, lighter; her skeleton is thinner; the pelvis is wider, adapted to gestation and birth; her connective tissue retains fats, and her forms are rounder than man’s; the overall look: morphology, skin, hair system, and so on is clearly different in the two sexes. Woman has much less muscular force: about two-thirds that of man; she has less respiratory capacity: lungs, trachea and larynx are smaller in woman; the difference in the larynx brings about that of the voice. Women’s specific blood weight is less than men’s: there is less hemoglobin retention; women are less robust, more apt to be anemic. Their pulse rate is quicker, their vascular system is less stable: they blush easily. Instability is a striking characteristic of their bodies in general. (2)</blockquote><p>Anatomy is destiny, de Beauvoir says, because woman has fallen into her status as second sex on account of her “subordination to the species.” By this she means — just like Freud — that from an evolutionary point of view the fulfillment of woman as an individual is superfluous, even contrary, to the reproduction of the human species. From a strictly biological point of view the function of the female is simply to carry out the work of reproduction, not to aspire to self-realization or to cultural creation. Because in the human species impregnation requires the male’s orgasm, but not the female’s, it is irrelevant that she enjoys or even that she consents to intercourse. But since humans are not simply animals — since they need to give meaning to their actions and feelings — de Beauvoir concludes that woman is the most alienated of all the mammals:</p><blockquote>This is the most striking conclusion of this study: she is the most deeply alienated of all the female mammals, and she is the one that refuses this alienation the most violently; in no other is the subordination of the organism to the reproductive function more imperious nor accepted with greater difficulty. (3)</blockquote><p>Yet gender identity theorists maintain that there is no relation between a person’s sex and its social and psychological phenotype. In an early article devoted to an analysis of the concepts of sex and gender in The Second Sex, Judith Butler suggests that in de Beauvoir:</p><blockquote>The presumption of a causal or mimetic relation between sex and gender is undermined. If being a woman is one cultural interpretation of being female, and if that interpretation is in no way necessitated by being female, then it appears that the female body is the arbitrary locus of the gender ‘woman’, and there is no reason to preclude the possibility of that body becoming the locus of other constructions of gender. At its limit, then, the sex/gender distinction implies a radical heteronomy of natural bodies and constructed genders with the consequence that ‘being’ female and ‘being’ a woman are two very different sorts of being. This last insight, I would suggest, is the distinguished contribution of Simone de Beauvoir’s formulation, “one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.” (4)</blockquote><p>Butler radicalizes de Beauvoir’s position by stating that being a woman is “in no way necessitated by being female”. She calls this non-relation “a radical heteronomy” of natural bodies and constructed genders, by which she means that the construction of gender is totally independent from the functioning of natural body. As a consequence, individuals should consider themselves liberated from the constrictions of their biological sex and ought to embrace the notion of having, not a sex, but a gender, which is not a destiny or a destination, but a process of free becoming through language by which the yet unknown and unmarked potentialities of bodies are realized within the realm of culture and through personal endeavor:</p><blockquote>If gender is the variable cultural interpretation of sex, then it lacks the fixity and closure characteristic of simple identity. To be a gender, whether man, woman, or otherwise, is to be engaged in an ongoing cultural interpretation of bodies and, hence, to be dynamically positioned within a field of cultural possibilities. Gender must be understood as a modality of taking on or realizing possibilities, a process of interpreting the body, giving it cultural form. (5)</blockquote><p>Butler borrows Sartre and de Beauvoir’s theory of transcendence v. immanence displacing it from the spirit (ésprit) to gender. For existentialism, the task of each individual is to overcome their own immanence. Immanence — from the Latin in-maneo — is the inclination of beings to remain in their given situation or state. Every entity remains what it is unless it has the capacity to transcend itself, i.e. to willfully overcome its own immanent state. The only beings able to do so are human beings in so far as they have a project and a principle by virtue of which they can transform themselves. Sartre expressed this by saying that “existence precedes essence” by this meaning that human essence is an effect that emerges retroactively through experience. Similarly, Butler suggests that individuals are in the position to transcend the immanence of their sex by achieving their own gender. She calls this process “becoming one’s gender,” with the implication that one’s gender is a choice and a task, not a state, and that it might not coincide with the socially “assigned” one.</p><p>Butler employs gender as a signifier of existential authenticity. The pursuit of authenticity in the age of identity politics is the achievement of one’s true nature, that is one’s real gender in opposition to the gender that has been assigned to an individual by society without taking into account one’s true inclinations. To become one’s gender is, therefore, essentially a declaration of self-determination: each one has the right to define and determine who they are and have others recognize their identity. But how do we “recognize” the gender identity of someone once their genital and genetical makeup is judged irrelevant?</p><p>Butler always connects gender to bodily appearance — gender is manifested by the way bodies feel, move, and look to others. For Sartre the body was a vehicle that allows the individual to carry out the project of his or her transcendence in the world through action, but the body itself could not be transcended. Butler, instead, sees body (i,e, gender) as the very seat of the transcendence of the ego because the ego is not consciousness, but is always already body. Since the ego is body, it can realize itself only by transforming and performing itself as body. The body/ego, she says, is not static, it is a mode of intentionality and desire:</p><blockquote>Although Sartre’s references to “surpassing” the body may be read as presupposing a mind/body dualism, we need only conceive of this self-transcendence as itself a corporeal movement to refute that assumption. The body is not a static phenomenon, but a mode of intentionality, a directional force and mode of desire. As a condition of access to the world, the body is a being comported beyond itself, sustaining a necessary reference to the world and, thus, never a self-identical natural entity. The body is lived and experienced as the context and medium for all human strivings. Because for Sartre all human beings strive after possibilities not yet realized or in principle unrealizable, humans are to that extent ‘beyond’ themselves. This ek-static reality of human beings is, however, a corporeal experience; the body is not a lifeless fact of existence, but a mode of becoming. Indeed, for Sartre the natural body only exists in the mode of being surpassed, for the body is always involved in the human quest to realize possibilities.(6)</blockquote><p>Sartre defines human existence as “ek-static” (i.e. “standing outside of itself) because it is always engaged in the world with an intentionality that constantly pro-jects the individual outside of his/her immanence. Butler reduces the ek-static reality of human existence to a corporeal experience based on the negation of the natural body. While Sartre’s theory was based on the split of body and mind, for Butler there is only body. In fact there are two bodies: the natural body existing before language and culture, and the cultural body. Since all post-structural philosophies are based on a very restrictive reading of the Derridian motto “there is no outside of language,” the natural, pre-linguistic body is deemed unattainable for humans are always immersed in language. It follows that gender is the manner in which the natural body — which ends up begin the old Cartesian res extensa, i.e. just ‘matter’ with no specific qualities — must be surpassed if an individual is to achieve their singularity.</p><p>Because Butler denies any cartesian split between mind and boy in her theory, she insists that becoming one’s gender is not an intellectual effort, but a bodily act:</p><blockquote>To ‘choose’ a gender in this context is not to move in upon gender from a disembodied locale, but to reinterpret the cultural history which the body already wears. The body becomes a choice, a mode of enacting and reenacting received gender norms which surface as so many styles of the flesh. (7)</blockquote><p>Butler insists that choosing a gender independently of one’s sex is not the operation of a mind (“a disembodied locale”), so what is the agent of such transformation? Apparently, it is still body: the body would somehow feel an affinity towards a gender and predispose itself to “become” that gender.</p><p>Since the body before language is just amorphous and passive matter, only language can shape it into something individual, but language by definition is a categorial tool that forms universals, not singularities. Thus, the construction of a new gender can never be a singular endeavor nor a tool for the liberation of the individual, given that the individual under these conditions cannot exist. The problem of course is the assumption that the “natural” body is totally subsumed into language and consequently forever lost and infinitely pliable to cultural interventions.</p><p>The fact is that nothing could be less arbitrary than the relation between sex and gender because on women falls the burden of reproduction, the danger of giving birth, and the immediate responsibility of taking care of the newborns, which from an evolutionary point of view go hand in hand with the development of the personality traits that render these activities less painful and even gratifying. No doubt, we could imagine a different history in which women as a group were able to limit their contribution to the species to giving birth and managed to oblige the group of men to attend to the children. Anthropologists have found small and hidden away communities who display similar features. However, we must recognize that if all over the planet patriarchy has prevailed, it is because it has been the path of least resistance. It is easier and simpler to let the responsibility for the young fall upon those who delivered them and can nurse them, and it is more efficient to have those who are physically stronger do the work of transforming the environment for human needs. Moreover, the women who have survived are those whose mothers have taken good care of them and have transmitted those character traits to the female progeny.</p><p>It is also the path of least resistance that the stronger will take advantage of the weaker. This is, as de Beauvoir says, the enormous, unacceptable injustice that women have undergone and which has alienated them from themselves and from history. The subordination of women is not only a discontent within civilization; it is also a discontent of civilization as such. We have no way of knowing what the relation between the sexes was in the hundreds of thousands of years of pre-historical human evolution. We cannot exclude that some human communities may have had a female-centered social organization perhaps similar to the one we today find among the bonobos. However, if these societies existed, they have been wiped out by evolution.</p><p>Clearly, it has been the very development of human civilization toward a greater complexity, stratification, and specialization together with the consolidation of power in the hands of those who grabbed it first that inexorably led to patriarchy. In The Creation of Patriarchy, Gerda Lerner observes that women’s subordination was not immediately caused by women’s ingrained docility or men’s innate aggressiveness, but by historical-material dynamics:</p><p>Women would need to have had more pregnancies than live births as continued to be the case also in historic times in agricultural societies. Infancy was much prolonged, since mothers nursed their infants for two to three years. Thus, we may assume that it was absolutely essential for group survival that most nubile women devote most of their adulthood to pregnancy, child-bearing, and nursing. One would expect that men and women would accept such necessity and construct beliefs, mores, and values within their cultures to sustain such necessary practices.</p><blockquote>It would follow that women would choose or prefer those economic activities which could be combined easily with their mothering duties. Although it is reasonable to assume that some women in every tribe or band were physically able to hunt, it would follow that women would not want to hunt regularly for big game, because of their being physically encumbered by children carried in the womb, on the hip, or on the back. (8)</blockquote><p>Neither “culture,” nor “language,” but the imperative of reproduction has caused the division of labor and the permanent separation of sexual roles. Patriarchy has prevailed everywhere because it has been for a long time the most successful — although certainly not a fair or equal way to organize the social body.</p><p>Lerner observes that human civilization has progressed by way of the exploitation of two groups — women and slaves. But it all started with women, she says. Pre-historic human communities were organized in tribes and each tribe was occasionally at war with the others. In order to establish peaceful relations among tribes, it was necessary for the members of two groups to intermingle. Naturally, the easiest way was through marriage and children. Thus, members from one tribe would be required to marry members from the other. As Lévi-Strauss has pointed out, primitive human societies are based on the exchange of women, that is, only the women (not the men) of each tribe are required to leave and marry somebody outside their group. Why women and not men? Lerner writes:</p><blockquote>… Supposing grown men were exchanged among tribes, what would ensure their loyalty to the tribe to which they were traded? Men’s bond to their offspring was not, then, strong enough to ensure their submission for the sake of their children. Men would be capable of violence against members of the strange tribe; with their experience in hunting and long-distance travel they might easily escape and then return as warriors to seek vengeance. Women, on the other hand, would be more easily coerced, most likely by rape. Once married or mothers of children, they would give loyalty to their children and to their children’s relatives and would thus make a potentially strong bond with the tribe of affiliation. This was, in fact, the way slavery developed historically, as we will see later. Once again, woman’s biological function made her more readily adaptable for this new, culturally created role of pawn.(9)</blockquote><p>Men captives from hostile tribes could always rebel and fight back, while women were physically less strong and could be made pregnant. In early human societies, the continuity of reproduction was essential because it was always at risk. Since only women could produce children, they had to be constantly engaged in reproduction and nursing to compensate the birth-death ratio. Moreover, women’s status as child bearers made them constantly exposed to the risk of abduction and rape. Ancient myths and legends testify the practice of the abduction of women, the most famous being the rape of the Sabine women.</p><p>According to Roman mythology, after founding the city of Rome the Romulus needed women to populate it. The Sabines were a neighboring tribe that had refused to establish relations with the Romans, that is, to agree to the mutual exchange of women, because they feared the growth of a rival society. The Romans therefore decided to abduct the Sabine women. According to Livy, they invited the Sabines and their women to a festival in Rome dedicated to Neptune Equester. Once their guests arrived, the Romans grabbed the women and fought off the men. Naturally, since in legends everything is well that ends well, the story has it that the Sabine women themselves later convinced their fathers to let them become the lawful wives of their abductors. Women were the material (i.e. reproductive) and cultural mediators between communities, but paradoxically this function undermined their social position — they became objects and pawns in a political game of war and peace among tribes. This of course may have happened gradually and over a very long period of time, but it is confirmed by the passage from matrilocal societies — where women remained in their family and men married outside — to patrilocal societies where it was women who left their families and married into a different tribe. This social arrangement, called exogamy is everywhere complemented by the institution of the incest taboo that forbids male relatives to have sexual relations with the women of the family and obliges them to exchange them with women from a different tribe in order to ensure peace to the community as well as the highest number of healthy breeders and children.</p><p>Thus, patriarchy developed as the most efficient way to meet the challenge of population reproduction and growth. As Lerner points out:</p><blockquote>Things developed in certain ways, which then had certain consequences, which neither men nor women intended. Nor could they have had an awareness of them, any more than modern men launching the brave new world of industrialization could have had an awareness of its consequences in regard to pollution and its impact on the ecology. By the time consciousness of the process and of its consequences could develop, it was too late, at least for women, to halt the process.(10)</blockquote><p>This means that patriarchy was already in place long before laws started recording it. The first recorded laws in Western civilization date back to the Code of Hammurabi (1752 B.C.) regulating life in the city-states of Mesopotamia. This is a collection of 282 laws with their corresponding punishments graded according to the social status of the parties involved. Scholars agree on the fact that the Code of Hammurabi is a systematization and revision of previously established customs. In particular, the Code of Hammurabi casts light on the condition of women and slaves. Although many forms of enforced labor existed in the early cities, the creation of slavery required the formulation of a new idea, namely that there were human beings who could be exploited permanently not only because they were foreigners, war prisoners or poor and indebted, but because they were intrinsically inferior. Lerner argues that the idea of an inferiority by nature was derived from the concept of womanhood. In other words, being the first to be subordinated and exploited for their sexual characteristics, women provided the example of an individual who had already been categorized as less worthy:</p><blockquote>In most societies women are more vulnerable to becoming marginal than are men. Once deprived of the protection of male kin, through death, separation, or by no longer being wanted as a sexual partner, women become marginal. At the very beginning of state formation and the establishment of hierarchies and classes, men must have observed this greater vulnerability in women and learned from it that differences can be used to separate and divide one group of humans from another. These differences can be “natural” and biological, such as sex and age, or they can be man-made, such as captivity and branding.(11)</blockquote><p>Because women were considered natural objects of exchange, it became possible to extend the notion of a “natural” inferiority to other categories. In order to promote stability in a system where some classes of individuals don’t enjoy the same rights as the others, it is necessary to convince those individuals that they are in fact inferiors. The same strategies later used on slaves were experimented first on women prisoners: forcible change of name and residence, loss of friends, family relations and personal freedom. In case of wars among tribes, men were killed, but women and their children were captured alive and relocated in the new community because they were precious for their reproductive and sexual function. Rape was another important instrument of subjection not only because of its symbolic meaning, but also because becoming pregnant and giving birth would make women much more docile in protection of their children. Lerner observes that:</p><blockquote>Biological and cultural factors predisposed men to enslave women before they had learned how to enslave men. Physical terror and coercion, which were an essential ingredient in the process of turning free persons into slaves, took, for women, the form of rape. Women were subdued physically by rape; once impregnated, they might become psychologically attached to their masters. From this derived the institutionalization of concubinage, which became the social instrument for integrating captive women into the households of their captors, thus assuring their captors not only their loyal services, but those of their offspring. (12)</blockquote><p>Male war prisoners, on the other hand, were too dangerous because they could rebel, so they were either killed in mass, or blinded, castrated or variously mutilated (the feet or nose were cut, their face was tattooed). The Mesopotamian kings needed workers to build their palaces and their temples, and to maintain the canals; and they needed soldiers in times of war. For the system to run smoothly slaves should not be allowed to disguise or deny their status — they had to be immediately identifiable. Milton Meltzer writes:</p><blockquote>The slaves of Mesopotamia were branded as the animals were. The brand might be a symbol or the name of the owner. It was harder for a runaway slave to escape if he could be recognized as a slave by his brand. (Running away must have been common, for Hammurabi’s Code devotes much attention to the problem.) The mark of ownership was probably applied directly to the skin with a red-hot iron. It was a serious offense for anyone to cut away the branded flesh or sear off the mark. In addition to the brand, the slave wore a small clay tablet around his neck like a dog tag, carrying his name as well as his master’s. (13)</blockquote><p>As a matter of fact, in the Mesopotamian city-states (but not only there, of course) all individuals had to make their social status visible. In particular, besides their status as slaves or free, women also had to signal whether they were sexually available or not. This was indicated by the veil. Lerner quotes an Assyrian tablet belonging to the Middle Assyrian Code of Law:</p><blockquote>Neither [wives] of [seigniors] nor [widows] nor [Assyrian women] who go out on the street may have their heads uncovered. The daughters of a seignior . . . whether it is a shawl or a robe or [a mantle], must veil themselves … when they go out on the street alone, they must veil themselves. A concubine who goes out on the street with her mistress must veil herself. A sacred prostitute whom a man married must veil herself on the street, but one whom a man did not marry must have her head uncovered on the street; she must not veil herself. A harlot must not veil herself; her head must be uncovered. [MAL § 40] (14)</blockquote><p>The veil indicates whether a woman is married or not, or in any case if she belongs to a man (concubine). Women who wear the veil belong to a higher class than the unveiled ones because the function of the veil is to show that a woman belongs to one man. The veiled woman reserves her sexual service (intercourse and reproduction) to her husband or master if she is a slave, while the woman who doesn’t enjoy the protection of a man must not wear the veil, by which she indicates that she cannot refuse sexual service.</p><p>The veil has come and gone in the social history of women, but their subordinate position and their value for sexual-reproductive services has remained a constant across cultures albeit manifested in different ways. Italian anthropologist Paola Tabet has called the fundamental relation between the sexes “the sexual-economic exchange.” In Le dita tagliate (Cut-off Fingers), Tabet observes that in a world in which the near totality of wealth and power is concentrated in male hands and where women work in subaltern positions and at the same time carry out the reproductive/sexual function, there is a chronic economic dependence of women on men. This dependence becomes clearly visible in the universal phenomenon of prostitution, but prostitution itself manifests only one aspect of the sexual-economic exchange, which exists across cultures in a much broader and nuanced way than it looks at first sight. (15)</p><p>Let’s take for example Malinowski enthusiastic recount of sex relations in Samoa. When he describes the relationship between women and men, Malinowski notes that women are very sexually free. However, women’s sexual acts are considered services rendered to men that men must be remunerate with gifts beginning from childhood and continuing into marriage. This means that a woman who receives a gift is compelled to reciprocate with sex. So women’s apparently free, frequent and spontaneous sexual activity is in fact the effect of the underlying sexual-economic contract.</p><blockquote>There is an interesting side to Trobriand love that might either escape the attention of the superficial observer, or give rise to many misunderstandings. In the course of every love affair the man has constantly to give small presents to the woman. To the natives the need of one-sided payment is self-evident. This custom implies that sexual intercourse, even where there is mutual attachment, is a service rendered by the female to the male. (16)</blockquote><p>What is the nature and function of the gift? Here is what Malinowski reports:</p><blockquote>As to the size and nature of the gift, this varies with the type of sexual relationship. As we have seen, even small boys, imitating their elders in every detail, will give their sweethearts some small gift: a pinch of tobacco, a shell, or simply a blossom. Boys of riper years have to give a more substantial present: half a stick of tobacco, a betel nut or two, and, from time to time, a turtle shell ring, a shell disc, or even an armlet. Otherwise a girl would object: Gala huwaniy afaykiy “You have no payment to give me — I refuse.” And his reputation for meanness would spread, and interfere with his future conquests. (17)</blockquote><p>Thus, sex is ostensibly “free”, but at the same time it must be paid for, and the remuneration is not purely an act of courtesy — it is mandatory, so much so that if the woman receives no payment, she will refuse to have sex. Malinowski then goes on to describe the sexual arrangement in marriage:</p><blockquote>When marriage is concluded, payment for sexual intercourse becomes the complicated family affair described in chapter v, in which husband and wife, their household and the wife’s family, father and children, children and maternal uncle are all involved. The personal account between husband and wife consists in her offering him permanent sexual accommodation, which he repays by all he gives to the children in love, care, and goods. The children, as we know, are regarded as legally hers, and not his. The early cares he bestows on the children, their education, and even his love for them are accounted for by this obligation. “The payment for sleeping with the mother,” “the payment for sexual services of the mother” and similar phrases are repeated when the subject is discussed. Thus the commercial aspect of love also, and very definitely, obtains in marriage. (18)</blockquote><p>In marriage, gifts are given more sparingly because the husband receives from the wife “a permanent sexual accommodation” that he pays back by providing support and care for the wife and the children. As Tabet observes, Malinowski does his best to misrecognize the obvious mercenary aspect of love in the heavenly Trobriand Islands and explains it away as a simple “custom” analogous to Western men’s habit of bringing flowers to their fiancées (without realizing, ironically, that also flowers and chocolates in the West obey to the same logic):</p><blockquote>Above all, it would be entirely erroneous to draw any parallel with forms of prostitution in higher cultures. The essence of prostitution is that payment is the woman’s motive for surrender. In the Trobriands, love-making is as spontaneous on the part of the girl as on the part of the boy. The gift is a custom, not a motive. The institution is much more akin to our custom of giving presents to a fiancée or to someone whom we merely admire than to the institution of purely commercialized sexual services, which are the essence of prostitution. (19)</blockquote><p>The essence of Western prostitution, says Malinowski, is that payment is the condition for granting intercourse, while gift-giving is more akin to what we in the West would call courting: “the gift is a custom, not a motive.” Really? The evidence shows that sexual relations among the free, polyamorous and non-patriarchal Trobrianders in fact are not “for free” and they are not symmetrical either — women are clearly defined as the sex providers and men as the buyers just as they are in the Western world.</p><p>Tabet describes analogous arrangements in modern Africa and in Haiti showing that the sexual-economic exchange is not limited to the institute of prostitution, but that it is the more or less hidden universal regulator of the relations between the sexes. In this sense, sadly, it is not inaccurate to say that “all women are whores” and that prostitution is the “oldest profession.” But sexual services are offered in many ways and can be more or less stigmatized, praised, encouraged or disguised. Between the two poles of marriage and prostitution there has always been a continuum of female sexual availability. Daniel Defoe in The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Famous Moll Flanders makes a realistic portrait of the life of women without means in 18th century England. The novel is at least partially based on the real life of one Moll King that Defoe met at Newgate Prison and the protagonist’s life is outlined in the book’s subheading in this way:</p><blockquote>The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Famous Moll Flanders, &amp;c. Who was Born in Newgate, and during a Life of continu’d Variety for Threescore Years, besides her Childhood, was Twelve Year a Whore, five times a Wife (whereof once to her own Brother), Twelve Year a Thief, Eight Year a Transported Felon in Virginia, at last grew Rich, liv’d Honest, and died a Penitent. Written from her own Memorandums. (20)</blockquote><p>Moll Flanders finally becomes rich, and in old age “repents” for her numerous sins, even though those were the only way she could get to where she got. The story shows that the only way in which a woman without family protection could find a place in society at the time was either by stealing or, more gainfully, by entering the sexual-economic contract and become a whore, or preferably a wife bearing children. And that none of these things were mutually incompatible.</p><p>Even today in our Western societies while prostitution is ostensibly condemned (albeit for all the wrong reasons) and women who engage in it are vilified, selling sex becomes much more acceptable, even glamorous when a little sugar coating is applied. For example, “escorts” are more presentable than simple hookers because they don’t work on the streets and cater to an upper-class clientele. Then there are strippers, who can be seen as uninhibited young women who need money to supplement their income or pay for college. The same goes for sugar babies who are attractive and ambitious women offering company, sex, affection and understanding in exchange for tuition, rent, and other gifts from rich, older men. Clearly, the sexual-economic exchange still rules and appears in many forms, degrees and nuances. Sometimes women just provide affection and a beautiful presence, sometimes they become the beautiful wives of millionaires. The common ground, however, is the sexual-economic contract, which is the female declination of the social contract — women shall provide sexual attractiveness, emotional responsiveness, and sex.</p><p>In Western countries the existence of the sexual-economic exchange is denied, disguised or glamorized. It can be easily glamorized because beauty is the gift of femininity and sexual attraction is considered a natural asset of femaleness whose exploitation is an index of sexual liberation and entrepreneurial spirit. Moll Flanders is still well with us. For example, books are printed that teach how to be a successful sugar baby making it clear that the aim is not to find true love, but to hook up with a man who will provide money, social access and an overall better life. For example, in her book The Sugar Daddy Formula, Taylor B. Jones writes:</p><blockquote>I know how hard it is wanting to be in a better situation than where you are right now, and having no help or the financial resources you need because I struggled myself. Therefore I now use what I learned to deliver information into the hands of Sugar Babies, giving them the “how to’s” by increasing their success rate with Sugar Daddies to get them what they want, and a better life. (21)</blockquote><p>The author does not mince her words, and why should she. Sugar babies must understand that they are in the business of selling themselves and that if nobody is buying it is because the “packaging”, i.e. the services offered, are not sufficiently appealing. Sugar babies are much more than prostitutes, they are courtesans and they provide what has come to be called “the girlfriend experience.” This “experience” is a product for sale that requires tact, sensitivity, and real marketing strategies:</p><p>Everybody is selling something. It is the most difficult thing in the world to make a human being do anything. You can make a dog jump through a hoop. You can even make a mule do what you want him to do if you’re persistent enough. With people it’s different. The surest way to antagonize a Sugar Daddy is to give him the idea that you are trying to force him to do something. When a Sugar Baby says to her potential Sugar Daddy, “You must provide me an allowance,” he has a tendency to refuse. And let’s say that your potential Sugar Daddy can provide you with what you want. Why doesn’t he? Simply put: He can’t afford you mentally. Reread that. That means: He doesn’t feel he can get enough value out of your relationship to justify investing in it. It comes down to price elasticity. Everything has a price. Everyone has a price (standard). And with that comes price resistance.</p><blockquote>So you have to do one of two things:</blockquote><blockquote>Lower the price, or come up with a packaging he can’t refuse to let you pass him by.</blockquote><blockquote>- Your price (worth) depends on the value to your potential. It all boils down to how well you can sell yourself.</blockquote><blockquote>Do you know what you are selling? You are in the business of selling yourself. (22)</blockquote><p>Does it mean that all women, one way or the other, are sugar babies? Certainly not. Most women today (in the Western world, that is) have jobs — and a growing number of them are lawyers, doctors, scientists, academics, journalists, politicians (not too many of those), engineers (not too many of those either) — and they don’t depend on men, although don’t their husbands still depend on them for sex? Has this part of the marriage deal actually changed? Has the function of women as sex providers ever changed? The booming business of online pornography and prostitution show that it has not.</p><p>But if you cannot deny reality, you can still deny its name. You can, for example, posit that the problem lies not in the real relation of desire, body and power across the sexes, but in the language that it is used to define and describe them. Feminists themselves starting in the 80s have increasingly made the claim that the existence of the very concept “woman” is the real cause of women’s oppression because it is a tool to homogenize and universalize what otherwise would be an infinite variety of free individualities. In Am I that Name? Denise Riley suggests that gender identity is a cage that no woman can inhabit without a sense of horror and that in fact, femininity should not be conceived as a material condition, but as a psychological and fluctuating state:</p><p>But if being a woman is more accurately conceived as a state which fluctuates for the individual, depending on what she and/or others consider to characterise it, then there are always different densities of sexed being in operation, and the historical aspects are in play here. (23)</p><p>Thus, femininity becomes a mutable and intermittent personal feeling — sometimes I feel like a woman (when others treat me as such or if my behavior or character fit the current definition of femininity), sometimes I don’t. Womanhood becomes an internal “identity” that I can accept or not and as a consequence the term ‘woman’ cannot accurately describe it. In fact, it imprisons me in a fixed definition.</p><p>The same impermanence is applied to the notion of ‘woman’ in history. There is no history of women because there is no trans-historical essence of woman (although one may easily object that it is the very permanence of the thing that allows for the recognition of its changing predicates), but only a history of mutable conceptions of femininity that create variable configurations by intersecting with other identities and differences. If reality is created by “discourse,” it is the very existence of the word ‘woman’ as a universal signifier that brings about women as a subaltern category. As a result, as Monique Wittig points out:</p><blockquote>… Domination is denied; there is no slavery of women, there is difference. To which I will answer with this statement made by a Rumanian peasant at a public meeting in 1848: “Why do the gentlemen say it was not slavery, for we know it to have been slavery, this sorrow that we have sorrowed.” Yes, we know it, and this science of oppression cannot be taken away from us. (24)</blockquote><p>Unfortunately, the “science” of oppression, that is, the knowledge that there is oppression, is not a permanent acquisition of consciousness. It can be taken away with a philosophical sleight of hand by saying that women’s persistent social and cultural subordination is not a consequence of the constraints deriving from their position as the species’ reproducers, but it is caused by the nefarious meanings that have been arbitrarily attached to the word “woman.” It follows that in order to put an end to the thing (subordination), we just need to deconstruct the word itself (woman) by showing that it doesn’t indicate anything consistent or stable. The dissolution of the concept of ‘woman’ will bring about the end of women’s subordination. Liberated from the chains of “language,” women will feel free to achieve their own real gender. The age of personal “empowerment” and identity politics begins.</p><p>Works cited</p><p>1. Simone de Beauvoir. The Second Sex. London: Vintage Books, 2014, p. 203.</p><p>2. Simone de Beauvoir. The Second Sex. London: Vintage Books, 2014, p. 47.</p><p>3. Simone de Beauvoir. The Second Sex. London: Vintage Books, 2014, p. 47.</p><p>4. Judith Butler. Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex. Yale French Studies, 72 (1986): 35–49, p. 35.</p><p>5. Judith Butler. Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex. Yale French Studies, 72 (1986): 35–49, p. 35.</p><p>6. Judith Butler. Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex. Yale French Studies, 72 (1986): 35–49, p. 38.</p><p>7. Judith Butler. Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex. Yale French Studies, 72 (1986): 35–49, p. 48.</p><p>8. Gerda Lerner. The Creation of Patriarchy. New York: Oxford University Press. Revised ed.1987, p.41.</p><p>9. Gerda Lerner. The Creation of Patriarchy. New York: Oxford University Press. Revised ed.1987, p. 47–48</p><p>10. Gerda Lerner. The Creation of Patriarchy. New York: Oxford University Press. Revised ed.1987, p. 47–48.</p><p>11. Gerda Lerner. The Creation of Patriarchy. New York: Oxford University Press. Revised ed.1987, p. 77.</p><p>12. Gerda Lerner. The Creation of Patriarchy. New York: Oxford University Press. Revised ed.1987, p. 87.</p><p>13. Milton Meltzer. Slavery: a World History, Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1993, p. 22.</p><p>14. Gerda Lerner. The Creation of Patriarchy. New York: Oxford University Press. Revised ed.1987, p. 134.</p><p>15. Paola Tabet. Le dita tagliate. Roma: Ediesse, 2014, p. 25.</p><p>16. Bronislaw Malinowski. The Commercial Aspect of Love in The Sexual Life of Savages. New York: The Readers League of America, 1929, p. 319.</p><p>17. Bronislaw Malinowski. The Commercial Aspect of Love in The Sexual Life of Savages. New York: The Readers League of America, 1929, p. 320.</p><p>18. Bronislaw Malinowski. The Commercial Aspect of Love in The Sexual Life of Savages. New York: The Readers League of America, 1929, p. 320–21</p><p>19. Bronislaw Malinowski. The Commercial Aspect of Love in The Sexual Life of Savages. New York: The Readers League of America, 1929, p. 321</p><p>20. Daniel Defoe. The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Famous Moll Flanders (1722).</p><p>21. Taylor B. Jones, The Sugar Daddy Formula. Alpharetta GA: R&amp;D Publishing, 2014.</p><p>22. Taylor B. Jones, The Sugar Daddy Formula. Alpharetta GA: R&amp;D Publishing, 2014, p. 10.</p><p>23. Denise Riley. Am I that Name? Feminism and the Category of Women in History. London: MacMillan, 1988, p. 6.</p><p>24. Monique Wittig. The Straight Mind in The Straight Mind and Other Essays. Boston: Beacon Press, 1992, p. 31.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=be8396bf99a5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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