<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mark Buchanan on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Mark Buchanan on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@mark__buchanan?source=rss-decf46100ce4------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 13:13:48 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@mark__buchanan/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Greece: The Ungrateful Biped]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/bull-market/greece-the-ungrateful-biped-758ec9a5c367?source=rss-decf46100ce4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/758ec9a5c367</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[grexit]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[greece]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eurozone]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Buchanan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2015 14:06:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-06-30T17:51:02.137Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Greek default and exit from the Eurozone might be “unthinkable” for the bureaucratic engineers of the monetary union. For the Greek nation, it would be a laudable assertion of independent existence.</p><p>Dostoevksy defined man as the Ungrateful Biped. Ungrateful because, even if he were given an orderly heaven on Earth, rationally designed, perfect in all respects to serve his needs, he’d remain likely to disrupt the mechanisms, and to tear the order apart, just to feel alive and to assert his ability to do as he likes.</p><p>“Man is stupid,” the narrator says in Dostoevsky’s <em>Notes from Underground</em>, “phenomenally stupid; or rather he is not at all stupid, but he is so ungrateful that you could not find another like him in all creation. I, for instance, would not be in the least surprised if all of a sudden… in the midst of general prosperity, a gentleman with an ignoble, or rather with a reactionary and ironical, countenance were to arise and, putting his arms akimbo, say to us all: ‘I say, gentlemen, hadn’t we better kick over the whole show and scatter rationalism to the winds… to enable us to live once more at our own sweet foolish will!’. That again would not matter, but what is annoying is that he would be sure to find followers — such is the nature of man.”</p><p>I imagine that something like these words must be ringing through the heads of officials from the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank, as they ponder the possibility of Greek exit from the Euro. Greece’s creditors just can’t understand why the Greeks won’t play by the rules, accept the obvious weakness of their position, and acquiesce to the creditor’s demands, derived as they are from the prevailing view of what makes economic good sense. Get your government and institutions in order, they demand, become more competitive by cutting pensions and slimming down government. It’s what we’re all doing. The Greeks respond by — gasp! — asking the people of Greece to actually decide what they want to do in a democrattic referendum.</p><p>I’ve been hoping for some time now that Greece will leave the Euro, for a couple of reasons. First, it seems like the only way Greece will be able, eventually, to return to a stable economic situation as an independent nation. Greece would have a period of significant financial hardship, but, with its own independent currency, would ultimately recover. Second, I think that Greek exit from the Euro — along with, perhaps, the exit of a few other nations, including Spain and Portugal — would be a healthy reality check for the architects of European integration. The Euro as a currency does not fit all the nations of Europe, and insisting that it can just continues creating imbalances and problems. The mere fact that European authorities seem to think that steps away from further integration are “unthinkable” is a sign of deep trouble.</p><p>Some of the history of the European project, and the thinking of key players, is actually quite frightening. I’m just going to quote from <a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-11-28/is-europe-too-rigid-to-survive">something </a>I wrote a few months ago, derived from the research on the history of the European Union:</p><blockquote>The French political scientist and diplomat Jean Monnet, widely viewed as a founding father of the EU, envisioned that integration would be directed by an elite of pro-European bureaucrats. The project was designed to be immune to voter concerns and virtually irreversible. Problems would serve only to propel it forward, by revealing the need for the further expansion of European political power. Ultimately, voters would see the wisdom.</blockquote><blockquote>“Europe will be forged in crises,” Monnet wrote in 1976, “and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.”</blockquote><blockquote>Supporters of European integration talked about creating an unstoppable “chain reaction.” Turning back, even temporarily, would never be an option. The great strength of the euro, as German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt saw it, was that “nobody can leave it without damaging his own country and his own economy in a severe way.”</blockquote><p>Just soak in the hubris.</p><p>The fiasco over Greece has been going on now for five years. And it increasingly looks as if the aim of the creditors was never to help the Greek nation restore itself to financial stability, while retaining its independence. The funds dispersed haven’t gone to help Greece but to shore up the balance sheets of the French and German banks that were originally most vulnerable to a Greek default. The Greek people have suffered greatly, while their government has moved a long way toward satifying the arbitrary demands of the creditors. If you Greeks want financial stability, and to stay in the Euro, the creditors have effectively said, then you must lose your independence. More hubris.</p><p>So I’m hoping that next week, the Greeks give a resounding answer of “no” in their referendum. They would, I expect, be seen then by European leaders as a nation of Ungrateful Bipeds. But they would have shown good human sense by any other measure.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=758ec9a5c367" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/bull-market/greece-the-ungrateful-biped-758ec9a5c367">Greece: The Ungrateful Biped</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/bull-market">Bull Market</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Paul Romer mis-handles atomic physics]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/bull-market/paul-romer-mis-handles-atomic-physics-702e88758064?source=rss-decf46100ce4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/702e88758064</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[paul-romer]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Buchanan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2015 13:47:13 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-06-30T17:58:06.686Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HvmZBH8fVIsnLQ_68WKaxg.png" /><figcaption>The Bohr model of the atom, showing an electron transitioning from one orbit to another by emitting a photon. CREDIT: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Introduction_to_quantum_mechanics#/media/File:Bohr_atom_model_English.svg">Wikipedia</a> <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/">CC BY-SA 3.0</a></figcaption></figure><p>He thinks that some of the core mathematical models of modern economics are every bit as sound and scientific as Niels Bohr’s 1913 model of the atom. It’s not really true.</p><p>Economist Paul Romer recently <a href="http://www.docdroid.net/10gny/aer2ep20151066.pdf.html">attacked</a> some of his colleagues for employing what he called “mathiness” in their research. Nobel Prize winners Robert Lucas and Edward Prescott were among his targets. Romer claimed that these economists, in constructing theories about economic growth, have often been guided mostly by ideology and politics. They’ve slipped preposterous assumptions into their economic models to guarantee the results they want, and hide their subterfuge behind clouds of complicated-looking mathematics. Their work is mostly politics, and has little to do with science.</p><p>Romer’s attack ignited a fierce debate to which many people have contributed, including <a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-05-26/in-economics-what-calculates-isn-t-always-right">myself</a>, <a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-05-22/how-mathiness-made-me-jaded-about-economics">Noah Smith</a> and <a href="http://www.bradford-delong.com/2015/05/over-at-project-syndicate-putting-economic-models-in-their-place.html">Brad DeLong</a>. I suggested that much of the mathiness of modern economics has come about because economists, for historical reasons, use mathematics like mathematicians — following the influence of Gerard Debreu and the famous Bourbaki school. They don’t use it in the practical way that physicists and engineers use it.</p><p>Feeling that I (and others) had misunderstood his views, Romer has since tried to clarify his thinking in several further posts. In <a href="http://paulromer.net/more-cowbell/">one in particular</a>, he suggests that he actually thinks the formal Debreu style of building models — starting with axioms, and deriving propositions through the use of logic — is quite all right. Moreover, he believes that models such as the original Arrow-Debreu model of a competitive equilibrium work much like their counterparts do in physics, and should be held in high esteem for this reason. He compared the Arrow-Debreu model to the Bohr model of the atom, introduced by Neils Bohr in 1913, in an effort to explain how atoms absorb and emit light only at specific frequencies. As Romer put it,</p><blockquote>There are a few instances in the development of a discipline in which pure Bohr-style science (which is not motivated by any specific problem) can yield a big return. I’d cite the work that Arrow, Debreu, and McKenzie did on formalizing a general equilibrium as an example of successful Bohr-style science that focused on tool building.</blockquote><p>When I first read this I assumed that Romer, with the term “Bohr-like,” must have been referring to some peculiar philosophical position put forth by Bohr. He couldn’t, I thought, actually be making an analogy between Arrow-Debreu (add McKenzie if you want) and Bohr’s model of the atom. That seemed doubly impossible given his use of the phrase “not motivated by any specific problem,” given that Bohr’s model was very much motivated by a specific problem. But after further reading, it seems to me that this is precisely what Romer meant — that these two theories, one in physics and one in economics, work in a parallel logical fashion. And, hence, that this kind of theoretical work is an example of economics at its best.</p><p>I think this is completely confused, so let me explain why. The only way, it seems to me, that Romer can link these two theories in his head is if he has completely forgotten why Bohr proposed his model, and what they model achieved.</p><p>Physicists in 1913 knew that the hydrogen atom — the simplest atom, with one electron orbiting around a proton — absorbed or emitted light at a particular, discrete set of frequencies. This was hugely puzzling, because in classical physics radiation gets generated by the acceleration of charged particles, and the frequencies produced reflect the nature of that acceleration. Heat hydrogen, and you should expect that, as atoms bang into one another, electrons ought to be driven to undergo all manner of complex motions, certainly not motions just at one or a few discrete frequencies. You would expect their motion to create a broad and continuous spectrum of radiation. Why on earth do atoms, in reality, radiate at only a few specific frequencies?</p><p>This is the extremely specific and practical problem that Bohr had in mind. Why specific frequencies only, and why the particular frequencies actually observed? To attempt some explanation, Bohr made a bold supposition — unsupported by anything in earlier physics — that perhaps electrons can only inhabit orbits having specific values of angular momentum, with those allowed being integral multiples of the new fundamental quantum of action, h, introduced earlier by Max Planck. This would imply that an atom would have a series of states of distinct energies. Bohr then added to this a second, even bolder supposition — that the frequency of radiation given off by an atom as an electron goes from a higher state to a lower one is simply the energy difference between those two states divided by Planck’s constant h. This is weird because it says that the frequency of the radiation coming out has nothing to do with the frequency of electron motion in either the beginning or ending state. In essence, it dismisses electron motion entirely in working out the frequencies of radiation.</p><p>From any classical point of view, this is crazy. Bohr dreamed it up only as a desperate measure to find some way to account for experimental observations. In contrast to Romer’s claim, Bohr was completely motivated by a very specific problem. And everyone would have ignored the theory entirely had it not been spectacularly successful in explaining just what is observed. When Bohr worked out the energy levels for a hydrogen atom, and then the frequencies of light generated by an electron falling from a higher to a lower state, he found precisely the frequencies that experimenters observed from heated hydrogen gases. You have one series of lines, the Lyman series, for transitions in which electrons end up in the lowest energy state, another series, the Balmer series, if the electron ends up in the 2nd lowest state, and so on. Bohr’s theory made a few simple if strange assumptions, and had a spectacular empirical success in explaining a broad set of data. The Bohr model soon failed, when applied to more complex multi-electron atoms, but it was a great leap forward for a time.</p><p>Now compare this to the Arrow-Debreu theory of competitive equilibrium. As far as I’m aware, this model was indeed not motivated by any specific problem. Rather, it was designed to give a mathematical form to economists’ prior idea — going back ultimately to Adam Smith — that prices might help a market to match the aims of producers and consumers in an efficient way. Arrow and Debreu showed in a highly abstract model, with a host of assumptions, that there would exist a unique set of prices that would achieve this. The only similarity to the Bohr model is that Arrow and Debreu stated some assumptions and derived some implications. There the similarity ends.</p><p>The analogy would only hold if it were the case that the Arrow-Debreu theory made immediate and specific quantitative predictions for a host of things that could be measured, and that these predictions turned out to be just right in many cases. This, I believe, is very much not the case. I don’t think that economists ever invoke the Arrow-Debreu work as a direct explanation of some set of economic data. It is, rather, just a formal statement of a picture of the world that many economists like to hold in their minds. They like it as a mathematical object, not as a theory of anything real.</p><p>In this, the Arrow-Debreu model shares quite a lot with most of the models used by economists. They’re models of the Debreu-Bourbaki style — formal mathematical structures not intended to be directly compared to reality. Economics, for many economists, including Romer it seems, is the exploration of mathematical models of the kind that economists like to study, some of which are of the kind initially proposed by Arrow and Debreu.</p><p>So, in the end, I would agree with Noah Smith that mathiness is all over economics, and Romer’s criticism applies to the field at large, not just to some specific works of Lucas and Prescott. As Smith notes, the basic approach that economic theorists use….</p><blockquote>… would never fly in engineering. Engineering is something you expect to work. But macroeconomists often treat their models as simply ways, in the words of David Andolfatto, vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, to “organize our thinking” about the world. In other words, macroeconomists use math to make their thoughts concrete, to persuade others, and to check the internal consistency of their (sometimes preposterous) ideas, but not to actually predict things in the real world.</blockquote><blockquote>Back to Romer’s complaint. He singles out Lucas, Prescott and a few others for having tenuous or sloppy links between mathematical elements and the real world. But from what I can see, such tenuous and sloppy links are the rule in macro fields. Romer says that I am “jaded” for saying that, and that it was bad apples like Lucas and Prescott who soured me on macroeconomic theory. Well, he’s right that I’m jaded, and he’s right that it was learning about models by Prescott that I first became jaded. Romer, you got me.</blockquote><blockquote>But when I looked beyond those models, to older or newer models, I found what seemed to be only a difference in degree, not in kind. Macroeconomic theory is chock full of mathiness. It’s not just Lucas and Prescott, it’s the whole scientific culture of the field.</blockquote><p>Exactly. Bohr’s model is almost the anti-thesis of theorizing in the style of Arrow-Debreu, or Lucas, or Prescott — or Romer.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=702e88758064" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/bull-market/paul-romer-mis-handles-atomic-physics-702e88758064">Paul Romer mis-handles atomic physics</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/bull-market">Bull Market</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Let’s just re-engineer the climate]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/bull-market/let-s-just-re-engineer-the-climate-46632cf8c37b?source=rss-decf46100ce4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/46632cf8c37b</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Buchanan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 30 May 2015 22:42:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-05-30T22:42:10.725Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Well, maybe not. Geo-engineering isn’t the easy and painless fix for climate change that many proponents say it is.</p><p>Harvard engineering professor David Keith is a big proponent of geo-engineering — using technology to save the planet from climate change. Maybe we’ll do some Solar Radiation Management (SRM) by injecting sulfate aerosols at high altitudes to “turn down the sun,” reducing the amount of its radiation hitting the Earth’s surface. Or we might instead find ways to suck the CO2 we’ve put into the atmosphere back out and pump it into the ground.</p><p>To be sure, Keith thinks that the first and most important thing we can do to tackle climate change is to reduce CO2 emissions, but <a href="http://www.vice.com/read/sos-0000653-v22n5">he thinks</a> it would be crazy to be against exploring these other options as “Plan B.” Indeed, he has an analogy:</p><blockquote>Imagine a doctor refusing to administer chemotherapy to a stage III lung-cancer patient out of fear that it would reduce his incentive to cut his smoking habit from two packs to one pack a day. That, in a nutshell, is the morally obtuse thinking that has undermined humanity’s best bet to curb climate change: solar and carbon geo-engineering.</blockquote><p>Morally obtuse? It’s certainly a powerful analogy. But is it the right one? I don’t think so.</p><p>Someone diagnosed with stage III lung cancer has — according to a few medical web sites I visited — a roughly 10% chance of living for another 5 years. There are treatments, and they’re getting better, but this condition is in most cases terminal. No matter what is done, the chance of surviving the cancer and going on with life is very, very low.</p><p>This is a terrible analogy to our climate situation, because, while our current emissions trajectory, is bad, there is every reason to believe that a determined global effort to reign in emissions and switch to cleaner (i.e. not CO2 emitting) energy could keep warming to less than 2 degrees C. The consequences of that would, scientists believe, be manageable, if not great. A better medical analogy for our climate predicament would be to a patient who is currently a very heavy smoker, deeply habituated to that health-damaging practice, and beginning to suffer from hacking and wheezing etc, but who doesn’t yet have cancer.</p><p>Indeed, Keith’s analogy would make more sense if the consequences of warming were already with us, catastrophic and irreversible, short of dramatic intervention in the climate system. It would be right if climate change had already brought to a halt <a href="http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/kits/currents/06conveyor2.html">the global system of oceanic currents</a> which move heat and salt around the world. Or, if global average temperatures had already gone up by 5 degrees C, and were set to climb higher still. If we didn’t think seriously about geo-engineering then, that would be crazy.</p><p>But being hesitant about it right now isn’t crazy at all. Given the forces pushing back against CO2 reductions — big coal and oil, of course, well-funded conservative think tanks, and simple human nature, among them — it is completely unrealistic to think that wide discussion of the allegedly “simple fixes” offered by climate engineering won’t reduce the incentives for making the kinds of changes we need. Indeed, it will most likely become a major element of the rhetorical arsenal used to argue against the need for CO2 reductions.</p><p>More importantly, the idea that geo-engineering is a simple fix is deeply incorrect. Take Solar Radiation Management. Let’s say we spray lots of sulfate aerosols into the atmosphere, mimicking the effect of volcanic eruptions, which we know tend to reduce global temperatures. The aerosols reflect more sunlight back out into space. Proponents of the idea imply that we can, in this way, reverse the influence of CO2 and keep global temperatures from changing. We can go right on ahead burning fossil fuels. One potential problem is that we’ll have to keep pumping aerosols into the atmosphere indefinitely, and in increasing density, to counter the still increasing levels of CO2. The consequences of stopping — due to international disagreements or war, for example — would grow more dire with time, as we’d experience extremely rapid warming upon any cessation of aerosol injection.</p><p>So there’s really no sense in which this would be returning the atmosphere to its state before our activities put so much CO2 into it. We’d just have an atmosphere with even more CO2 and increasing levels of aerosols as well, even further removed from the atmosphere of a few centuries ago.</p><p>There’s also another reason SRM won’t take us back: it actually won’t even keep temperatures stable. As atmospheric scientist Anders Levermann <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anders-levermann/why-climate-engineering-wont-work_b_7239816.html?utm_campaign=naytev&amp;utm_content=554cc9a1e4b0ede370b98b0e">points out</a>, it will actually increase some forms of climate disruption:</p><blockquote>The reason is as simple as fundamental: The extra abundance of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere does not change our climate in a uniform manner. The Arctic, for example, is warming almost twice as much as the tropics. This has to do with a well-known effect called polar amplification. The main reason for this is that warming enhances the amount of water vapor in the atmosphere, which then snows-off in the dry and cold polar region where it releases energy and warms the atmosphere. Now, if this sounds too complicated, one just has to hold up a thermometer in the Arctic and another one in the tropics: They show that temperature up North rises faster than at the equator.</blockquote><blockquote>Now, reflecting sunlight back into space would have the exact opposite pattern. It would do a lot in the tropics where sunlight is strong, and less in the Arctic and Antarctic. This is fundamentally true and cannot be fixed. So, reflecting radiation back into space could cool the planet on average, but it cannot reverse the effect of the greenhouse gases — not even remotely.</blockquote><p>Again, this is not the story one often hears from fans of climate engineering. Keith suggests that it has the potential “to roll back — not just delay — carbon’s climate impacts,” but that isn’t the case. Driving a further increase in the temperature difference between the poles and equator isn’t going to do much to stop melting of ice sheets.</p><p>Removing CO2 would be a better option, but it’s not perfect either. Technologically, it’s hard to do . Maybe we can effectively replant all the trees and other vegetation which have been removed by human activity? Sounds good, but that will take time, and compete with agriculture. Maybe we’ll invent some super efficient way to remove CO2 using nanoelectronics; this <a href="http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/acs.nanolett.5b01254">recent paper</a> reported a significant advance on that front. But even with great technology, the scale-up required for effective use will be tremendous. It would have to be done on a truly enormous scale — comparable to all the human activity currently putting CO2 into the air. We essentially need a second industrial revolution to counter the first one.</p><p>At which point you might think — maybe a revolution in economic organization and social habits to reduce CO2 emissions might be quite a bit easier.</p><p>In his recent <a href="http://www.vice.com/read/sos-0000653-v22n5">essay</a>, Keith expressed disappointment that geo-engineering still gets little attention in international climate negotiations. I think that’s OK. It may be something to consider if all else fails, when the consequences of climate are already as serious and irreversible as those of Stage III lung cancer, and there truly is no other option. Until then, of course, some limited research makes sense, so we know more about what we should expect from different means of intervention. To be honest, we ought to be learning much as we can abut climate and how it works no matter what. Even if we do solve the contemporary climate change problem, we may be challenged in other ways in future — from climate change that is rapid, unpredicted and not linked to human activity. It would be good to know as much as possible about how we might respond.</p><p>But for now, geo-engineering ought to remain far down the list of practical things to do about climate change.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=46632cf8c37b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/bull-market/let-s-just-re-engineer-the-climate-46632cf8c37b">Let’s just re-engineer the climate</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/bull-market">Bull Market</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Violent warfare is on the wane, right?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/bull-market/violent-warfare-is-on-the-wane-right-99223faa45e6?source=rss-decf46100ce4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/99223faa45e6</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Buchanan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 17 May 2015 17:54:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-05-17T21:45:03.483Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Many optimists think so. But a close look at the statistics suggests that the idea just doesn’t add up</p><p>A spate of recent and not so recent books have suggested that “everything is getting better,” that the world is getting more peaceful, more civilized, and less violent. Some of these claims stand up. In his book <em>The Better Angels of Our Nature</em>, psychologist Steven Pinker made the case that everything from slavery and torture to violent personal crime and cruelty to animals has decreased in modern times. He presented masses of evidence. Such trends, it would certainly seem, are highly unlikely to be reversed.</p><p>Pinker also suggested — as have others, including historian Niall Ferguson — that something big has changed about violent warfare since 1945 as well. Here too, the world seems to have become much more peaceful, as if war is becoming a thing of the past. As he wrote,</p><blockquote>… wars between great powers and developed nations have fallen to historically unprecedented levels. This empirical fact has been repeatedly noted with astonishment by many military historians and international relations scholars…</blockquote><p>Pinker admits that this might be a statistical illusion; perhaps we’ve just experienced a recent lull, and war will resume with its full historical fury sometime soon. But he thinks this is unlikely, for a variety of reasons. These include…</p><blockquote>the fact that the drop in the frequency of wars among great powers and developed states has been so sudden and massive (essentially, to zero) as to suggest a qualitative change; that territorial conquest has similarly all but vanished in the planning and outcomes of wars; that the period without major war has also seen sharp reductions in conscription, length of military service, and per-GDP military expenditures; that it has seen declines in every exogenous variable that are statistically predictive of militarized disputes; and that war rhetoric and war planning have disappeared as live options in the political deliberations of developed states in their dealings with one another. None of these observations were post-hoc, offered at the end of a fortuitously long run that was spuriously deemed improbable in retrospect; many were made more than three decades ago, and their prospective assessments have been strengthened by the passage of time.</blockquote><p>Again, Pinker has gone to lengths to emphasize that none of this proves anything abut future wars. But it is strongly suggestive, he believes, that this is significant evidence for such a belief.</p><p>Nassim Taleb <a href="http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/longpeace.pdf">criticized</a> Pinker’s arguments a few years ago, arguing that Pinker didn’t take proper account of the statistical nature of war as a historical phenomenon, specifically as a time series of events characterized by fat tails. Such processes naturally have long periods of quiescence, which get ripped apart by tumultuous upheavals, and they lure the mind into mistaken interpretations. Pinker <a href="http://stevenpinker.com/files/comments_on_taleb_by_s_pinker.pdf">responded</a>, clarifying his view, and the quotes above come from that response . Pinker acknowledged the logical possibility of Taleb’s view, but suggested that Taleb had “no evidence that is true, or even plausible.”</p><p>That has now changed. Just today, Taleb, writing with another mathematician, Pasquale Cirillo, has released <a href="http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/violence.pdf">a detailed analysis</a> of the statistics of violent warfare going back some 2000 years, with an emphasis on the properties of the tails of the distribution — the likelihood of the most extreme events. I’ve written a short Bloomberg piece on the new paper, and wanted to offer a few more technical details here. The analysis, I think, goes a long way to making clear why we are so ill-prepared to think clearly about processes governed by fat tails, and so prone to falling into interpretive error. Moreover, it strongly suggests that hopes of a future with significantly less war are NOT supported by anything in the recent trend of conflict infrequency. The optimists are fooling themselves.</p><p>Anyone can read the <a href="http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/violence.pdf">paper</a>, so I’ll limit myself to simply summarizing a few of the main points:</p><ol><li>Following many historians, Cirillo and Taleb use the number of casualties as a measure of the size of a conflict. Obviously, since the human population has grown with time, larger wars have become possible. So, they sensibly treat the data in a fractional sense — looking at the number of deaths as a fraction of the human population.</li><li>For nearly more than 50 years, going back to Lewis Fry Richardson, it’s been known that the cumulative distribution of wars by size follows a rough power law, the number of events larger than size S being proportional to 1/S raised to an exponent α. This is also an approximation, of course, because there is an absolute maximum possible size for a conflict — it can’t be more than then entire population. Hence, the power law form can only hold over a certain range. To take this into account, Cirillo and Taleb also rescale the data to take into account the finite size of the human population.</li><li>Having done this, they find using various statistical methods that α falls within the range 0.4 to 0.7. For maximum sensitivity in the statistical tests, they derive this by focusing mostly on the largest wars over the 2000 years, those equivalent (in today’s numbers) to at least 50,000 casualties.</li><li>Note on the value of α — this is smaller than the exponent known to hold for either earthquakes or financial market fluctuations. This implies that statistics of wars is even more prone to large fluctuations than these other processes, which are of course highly erratic themselves.</li><li>It also implies that the sample mean over any period is NOT a very useful statistic for estimating the TRUE mean of the underlying statistical process. For example, it turns out that, for a process following this statistical pattern, one should expect fully 96% of all observations to fall below the true mean of the process. This brings home just how non-Gaussian and non-normal this process is. We’re used to thinking that, if we observe instances from some random process, we ought to (very crudely) see events about half above and half below the mean. Instead, in this process, one should expect that almost all observations will be below, and even far below, the actual mean. We almost always see fewer wars than we, in a sense, should. The process is set up almost perfectly to make an observer complacent about the possibility of large events.</li><li>Related to the above, it also turns out to be &gt;90% certain that the true mean of the process is higher than the observed mean. What we have seen in the record of wars over the past 70 years, for example, almost certainly offers an underestimate of the true likelihood of wars. The statistical process makes rare but large events so likely that looking forward on the basis of recent past observations is a recipe for unwarranted optimism. In actual numbers, Cirillo and Taleb find that the true expected mean — say, the number of deaths we should expect over the next half century — is actually about three times higher than what we’ve seen in the past.</li></ol><p>There are quite few other gems in the analysis, but these seem to me to be the most important.</p><p>One final thing, and maybe this is most important. Cirillo and Taleb make a strong argument that the quantity that one should study and try to estimate from the statistics is the tail exponent α (see point 5 above). This is certainly not easy to estimate, and it takes a lot of data to get even a crude estimate, but working with α is a much better way of getting at the true mean of the process than working with the sample mean over various periods. Looking at past events, and estimating the average number over any period, is simply a bad way to go about thinking about any process of this kind. The sample mean is NOT a mathematically sound estimate of the true mean of the process. For more on this, see Taleb’s comments at the top of the 3rd page of <a href="http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/longpeace.pdf">his earlier criticism</a> of Pinker’s argument.</p><p>And that, I think, is pretty good reason to believe that all talk of the dwindling likelihood of wars based on recent past experience is mostly based on illusion and people telling themselves convincing but probably unfounded stories. Sure it looks as if things are getting more peaceful. But, looking at the mathematics, that’s exactly what we should expect to see, even if we’re most likely due for a much more violent future.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=99223faa45e6" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/bull-market/violent-warfare-is-on-the-wane-right-99223faa45e6">Violent warfare is on the wane, right?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/bull-market">Bull Market</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Greg Mankiw and the economic ideology of free trade]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/bull-market/greg-mankiw-and-the-economic-ideology-of-free-trade-923ca6430993?source=rss-decf46100ce4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/923ca6430993</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Buchanan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 30 Apr 2015 05:29:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-04-30T05:29:17.793Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>International trade isn’t always beneficial, as economists well know. So how can the Chairman of the Harvard economics department imply otherwise? And not be professionally humiliated?</p><p>Irritated by <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/upshot/economists-actually-agree-on-this-point-the-wisdom-of-free-trade.html">this recent and I think highly dishonest Op-Ed</a> in the <em>New York Times</em> by Harvard economist Greg Mankiw, I had written a column in response for <em>Bloomberg View</em>. In the column, I pointed out some of the sleight of hand Mankiw had used in arguing that Congress should go ahead and give President Obama “fast track” status to negotiate a trade deal — the Trans-Pacific Partnership — with nations in the Pacific. In short, Mankiw in his piece didn’t mention a host of inconvenient things that economists know about the real world consequences of trade, and did so, apparently, so that he could push a narrow ideological argument in favor of his position. Shameful behavior, I think. Not at all a model of what an academic should be doing.</p><p>If I was irritated, so was Noah Smith, who also <a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-04-28/free-trade-aids-growth-even-though-some-people-lose">wrote a column in response</a> —and faster than me! — and ended up getting into Bloomberg first. So my effort was wasted. Fair enough. To be even more fair, I have to admit that Noah’s article was better than mine: he knows way more economics than I do, and brought it to bear very effectively.</p><p>But I would like to draw on what I did write to emphasize some things that Noah didn’t. When economists let ideology get in the way of scientific reasoning, they can do a lot of damage — particularly when choosing policies that affect the lives of millions. Dogmatic faith in the self-correcting features of markets, for example, helped clear the way for the 2008 financial crisis and amplified its consequences. After the financial crisis there was some talk of the need for <a href="https://ideas.repec.org/p/mdl/mdlpap/1103.html">a code of ethics</a> for economists, but nothing ever happened. Mankiw’s behavior is a pretty good illustration of why something like that is needed. As a respected economist at a prestigious institution, his words carry weight and influence lots of people.</p><p>Many people think that economists’ views are often motivated by ideology, and I know that economists generally don’t like that idea. But Mankiw’s Op-Ed could be exhibit A of the evidence.</p><p>He argued that, because nearly all economists agree that international trade is always good, Congress should hurry up and go forward with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (or TPP). As he put it, despite economists’ penchant for “vociferous debate,” the issue is a “no-brainer” for them. He invoked Adam Smith, who pointed out that the people of a nation can benefit by producing and exporting what they can make most efficiently, while importing other goods from elsewhere. He could have (but didn’t) invoked David Ricardo’s idea of comparative advantage to make the argument a little more sophisticated. Mark Thoma discusses that clearly <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-dont-trade-agreements-receive-more-public-support/">here</a>.</p><p>But it doesn’t take a PhD in economics to see that Mankiw, who headed the Council of Economic Advisers under President George W. Bush, is offering a simplified and highly partial explanation of how economists think the world works. If this is economics, then it’s economics run through a filter of conservative ideology. Mankiw himself recognized as much: In an open letter to Congress last month, he and 12 economists noted that the benefits of free trade are “unevenly distributed and some people are negatively affected.”</p><p>Many economists — including Columbia’s Joseph Stiglitz — <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Globalization_and_Its_Discontents">have argued</a> that whether or not free trade will benefit a nation depends on many conditions, including government control of labor conditions, environmental regulation and the pace of socioeconomic change. As Richard Green <a href="http://real-estate-and-urban.blogspot.fr/2015/04/is-free-trade-good-for-everyone.html">points out</a>, research suggests that trade between two nations tends to help already advantaged sectors, which in the U.S. would mean a better outcome for capital over labor, and for skilled labor over unskilled. Although economists largely agree that trade increases the total size of economies, that doesn’t mean that the losers will be better off. The losers, in fact, might well vastly outnumber the winners.</p><p>In other words, any trade agreement almost certainly benefits some parties and hurts others. The identity of those parties should be the central issue facing congressional leaders, who must answer to their constituents. That’s far from a no-brainer.</p><p>None of this means that the trans-Pacific agreement is necessarily bad. The proposed deal is actually less about trade and more about intellectual property rights and their enforcement. There are <a href="http://www.vox.com/2015/4/17/8438995/why-obamas-new-trade-deal-is-so-controversial">legitimate concerns</a> that it can be used to get around environmental protections, and even to undermine democratic governments if they get in the way of corporate profits. Then again, there are good points. Green, for example, argues that such agreements decrease the likelihood of wars, and that’s nothing to take lightly.</p><p>Trade deals should be struck on the merits, not as a result of ideological persuasion and claims that economists agree on something they do not. It’s good that Richard Green and Noah Smith and Mark Thoma have all pushed back against Mankiw, bringing more of the full picture of what economists know about free trade into the open. But it would be even better if the culture of economics was such that a Harvard professor writing very publicly about an important economic issue would be ashamed to offer such a skewed picture of what the best economics says about it. Today, it still seems that naked ideology, even by respected professors, gets a pretty free ride.</p><p>Many economists hope others will consider their field to be scientific, at least in some sense, as a body of knowledge built up through dispassionate attention to logic and facts. If so, then academics making appeals to ideology need to be punished. Maybe not formally — that might open many cans of worms — but at least by a broad loss of respect. It may be old-fashioned, but Mankiw really should be ashamed.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=923ca6430993" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/bull-market/greg-mankiw-and-the-economic-ideology-of-free-trade-923ca6430993">Greg Mankiw and the economic ideology of free trade</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/bull-market">Bull Market</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The end of fossil fuels? Nearer than you think.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/bull-market/the-end-of-fossil-fuels-nearer-than-you-think-14a14404a034?source=rss-decf46100ce4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/14a14404a034</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Buchanan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Apr 2015 07:34:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-04-29T07:34:04.636Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Expect more panic and desperation soon from those heavily invested in their continued use.</p><p>Social change, when it happens, tends to happen faster than we expect. When opinions, practices or social norms shift from some position A to another B — from slavery is OK to slavery is an abomination, or from almost no one using cell phones to nearly everyone using them — there’s a natural accelerating factor in the process. It’s the influence of social conformity. Early on, very few people want to stick their necks out as first adopters. Socially, we’re a cautious lot. But as a few go ahead, their actions make it easier and even more attractive for others to do the same. At some point, change suddenly accelerates as the pressure of conformity flips, now encouraging further change rather than slowing it.</p><p>The hidden role of social conformity is what makes serious social change always seem unlikely if not impossible before it happens, and then obvious and even inevitable immediately after the social avalanche.</p><p>This isn’t just a theory based around a story or metaphor. A decade ago, a pair of physicists, Quentin Michard and Jean Philippe Bouchaud, <a href="http://arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0504079">looked</a> at data on a number of historically important social shifts — including cell phone adoption and the abrupt decline in birth rates in Western nations — and showed that the pattern of change in every case falls onto a single simple curve. There’s a slow beginning phase, and then a rapid acceleration as social conformity and imitation trigger a flood of others to follow along. Even more interesting, they showed that the pattern of change is identical to the transition, at the end of an opera or other public performance, as an audience goes from silence to applause. Almost everyone wants to take place in the applause, once it’s started, but few want to stand out as the very first to applaud. The process of social participation, as people join a round of applause, turns out to be a simple archetype of a sharp transition describing many other, more complicated social transitions from one behavior to another.</p><p>Most importantly, the physicists showed that this process of social influence makes social transitions generally happen far more explosively than one might otherwise expect.</p><p>Now, take this general perspective, and imagine what it might imply about the prospects for the future of fossil fuels. To my mind, it should make the fossil fuel companies, as well as anyone with money invested in them, extremely nervous, for several reasons which make the scenario described above a pretty close fit to the present fossil fuel situation. Here’s why:</p><p>First, the pattern described by the physicists occurs when social change is driven by some real, external factor. Technology made the wide use of cell phones ultimately more or less inevitable. Demographers know that birthrates eventually fall in all sufficiently developed nations, as women gain opportunities to have careers or do other things besides raising children (among other factors). The influence of social conformity is what makes such driven changes happen very slowly at first, as there’s resistance, and then much faster once things get going. Well, a profoundly important external factor is driving the shift away from fossil fuels in favor of solar energy and other renewable sources. Many climate scientists think we’ve already gone past the stage of being able to reign in CO2 emissions to avoid global temperatures rising on average by more than 2 degrees Celsius, long considered the limit for safety. This is why many scientists — see <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Four-Degrees-Global-Warming-Australia/dp/0415824583">this recent book</a>, for example — are now exploring what we should expect in a world that is warmer by 4 degrees C, or 6 degrees C, or even more. If we burn the fossil fuels still remaining in the ground — something the fossil fuel companies very much hope to make happen — we <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10414.html">can expect</a> an average temperature rise of more than 6 degrees C, possibly as much as 10 degrees C (with temperatures over land higher still). As the consequences of such a change are utterly unknown, and potentially catastrophic, it is in the interest of the vast majority of people on Earth to make sure that most of those fossil fuels stay in the ground. There is, then, a powerful external force driving us away from fossil fuels.</p><p>Second, there is a clear route by which this change can happen, as solar energy is <a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-04-08/clean-energy-revolution-is-way-ahead-of-schedule">becoming more affordable</a> very quickly, and investors are starting to flock into it. As Noah Smith notes:</p><blockquote>The most important piece of news on the energy front isn’t the plunge in oil prices, but the progress that is being made in battery technology. A <a href="http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v5/n4/full/nclimate2564.html">new study</a> in Nature Climate Change, by Bjorn Nykvist and Mans Nilsson of the Stockholm Environment Institute, shows that electric vehicle batteries have been getting cheaper much faster than expected. From 2007 to 2011, average battery costs for battery-powered electric vehicles fell by about 14 percent a year. For the leading electric vehicle makers, Tesla and Nissan, costs fell by 8 percent a year. This astounding decline puts battery costs right around the level that the International Energy Agency predicted they would reach in 2020. We are six years ahead of the curve…</blockquote><blockquote>The United Nations Environment Programme recently <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/03/31/renewable-energy-is-growing-very-very-fast-its-just-still-not-fast-enough/">released</a> a report showing that global investment in renewable energy, which had dipped a bit between 2011 and 2013, rebounded in 2014 to a near all-time high of $270 billion. But the report also notes that since renewable costs — especially solar costs — are falling so fast, the amount of renewable energy capacity added in 2014 was easily an all-time high. China, the U.S. and Japan are leading the way in renewable investment. Renewables went from 8.5 percent to 9.1 percent of global electricity generation just in 2014.</blockquote><p>Hence, there is a clear route by which the shift away from fossil fuels can happen; there is no immovable obstacle in our way.</p><p>Third, the direct shift away from fossil fuels — and more importantly, the seeding of this process in the awareness of people around the world — has been stimulated by the fossil fuel divestment movement. The frequency of student protest <a href="http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/fossil-fuel-divestment-protests-hit-colleges-nationwide">is increasing</a>, as they urge university administrators to rid their endowment investments of links to fossil fuels. Encouragingly, as that article reports, the protests are triggering a response:</p><blockquote>… the institutions that continue to invest in the fossil fuel industry are uncomfortably shifting in their seats. This Thursday, an email from Harvard President Drew Faust informed student leaders of Divest Harvard that she would be happy to meet (in private, off the record), but that first the group would have to stop “disrupting” business as usual on campus. Students responded that they’d be happy to meet, but wanted an actual dialogue about divestment — much like the <a href="https://newsoffice.mit.edu/2015/debate-fossil-fuel-divestment-0410">open forum MIT recently hosted</a> — rather than a lecture behind closed doors. And that they wouldn’t put a moratorium on protest until Harvard put a moratorium on its fossil fuel investment…</blockquote><p>And <a href="http://gofossilfree.org/commitments/">a long and growing list</a> of universities and other organizations have committed themselves to divestment. Of course, divestment doesn’t actually hurt the fossil fuel companies financially, as they have immense wealth and plenty of sources of alternative funding. But that’s not the point. The point is all about public consciousness, and the growing willingness of a large fraction of people and organizations to take action to move away from fossil fuels. The avalanche of changing social opinion is what should make the fossil fuel companies most terrified. This is what will trigger large scale political change, and ultimately cut the fossil fuel companies out of the global energy equation.</p><p>For these reasons, I think the end of fossil fuels is closer than we think. If you’re heavily invested in them, you should be in a panic. Change is beginning, and accelerating, and we have good reason to believe that, when the end game comes, it will come not slowly and gradually, but rapidly and explosively, far faster than we expect. Fossil fuels will be swept into the history books.</p><p>Of course, the idea may seem surprising now. Big and fast social changes always seem against the odds. But afterward, I bet, we’ll look around and say, “well, of course, we should have seen that coming. That was inevitable.”</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=14a14404a034" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/bull-market/the-end-of-fossil-fuels-nearer-than-you-think-14a14404a034">The end of fossil fuels? Nearer than you think.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/bull-market">Bull Market</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Climate change? Nothing to worry about.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/bull-market/the-earth-as-a-black-box-5309410f299d?source=rss-decf46100ce4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5309410f299d</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Buchanan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2015 11:38:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-03-30T11:47:27.217Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At least, if you’re happy to ignore what we know about physics</p><p>Two weeks ago I wrote <a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-03-15/cliff-asness-should-manage-money-not-the-planet">a short column</a> in Bloomberg referring to a recent <a href="http://www.stumblingontruth.com/articles/Its%20not%20the%20Heat%20its%20the%20Tepidity%2020150310.pdf">draft paper</a> on climate change circulated by Cliff Asness and Aaron Brown, both of the hedge fund AQR. <em>Fortune</em> magazine ran <a href="http://fortune.com/2015/03/11/climate-change-cliff-asness/">an article</a> about the Asness-Brown paper under the title “Top hedge fund manager: Global warming isn’t a danger.” When I read that, I thought “What?” For that is not the message any honest reader could possibly take away from the paper. Asness and Brown undertook a certain intellectual exercise, motivated by their impression that lots of people believe that the record of temperatures over the past century, <em>taken by itself</em>, implies that we face dangerous climate change. They show that it doesn’t, but readily admit that climate scientists don’t just work from this one set of recent temperatures, but use lots of other data too, and also take everything we know about the physics of the Earth system into account as well.</p><p>Some readers took my column as a direct criticism of the Asness-Brown work, despite my effort to emphasize just how honestly I think their paper was written. Maybe my tone was wrong. One Ross Kaminsky certainly <a href="http://spectator.org/articles/62079/will-warmists-please-stop-whining">took me</a> to be some species of knee jerk lefty “warmist” unable to handle the obvious truth that climate change is just a hoax perpetrated by scientists to get more research money.</p><p>So let me try, in the simplest terms possibly, to clarify my point. My concern isn’t with the Asness-Brown paper itself, as the authors make every effort to be clear and cautious, but with the potential for misunderstanding on the part of others, especially others who, like the editors at <em>Fortune</em> (it would appear), may actually prefer to mis-understand. Asness and Brown themselves, in a postscript to their paper (added 16 March), have also complained about the misleading perspective furthered by <em>Fortune</em>.</p><p>Anyway, for clarification, let’s use an analogy. Imagine there’s a black box with a red light fixed to it. The light flashes every second or so on average, but in a highly irregular and unpredictable way. Some people argue that the flashing is getting more frequent with time, and showing larger fluctuations from its average behavior. Others say, no way, that’s an illusion, it’s always been irregular and these apparent changes are only insignificant and temporary fluctuations.</p><p>Two sets of people set to work to figure out if the pattern of flashing really is changing, and to predict how much we should expect it to change in the near future, if at all. The two teams go about their work in very different ways. Team A decides to work just with the mathematical pattern of flashing recorded over a not-too-distant interval of the past — say, one week. The other team, Team B, also uses that information, but decides to supplement it with other recordings of the flashing pattern from further in the past, some going back months, even years. Team B goes further too, using X-ray, MRI and ultrasound imaging of the box to work out a detailed, but certainly incomplete, picture of what goes on inside the box — gears and electronics and other stuff — to produce the flashing. They do experiments outside of the box to tease apart these mechanisms, and to get insight into how different mechanisms might interact within the box.</p><p>As the system turns out to be highly complex, Team B also starts to build replicas of the box, as well as large-scale computer models designed to simulate the interplay of all the mechanisms inside of the box. They test and refine both the replicas and the simulations over time using real data from the box. The members of Team B, knowing how easy it is for people to confuse themselves, and to believe they understand more than they really do, also splits itself into a number of sub-teams which compete against each other on standard data sets so they can get objective measures of improvement of these simulations over time. Who can run a simulation, based on plausible mechanisms, which can reproduce what the box did between 10 and 12 week ago? How does a model, trained on that interval, do if applied to other intervals later on? In this way, Team B slowly builds up a capacity for understanding what goes on in the box, and for predicting how it will likely behave next.</p><p>Now, suppose Team A and Team B make predictions for what they think is most likely to happen to the flashing pattern in the near future — say over the next 5 weeks. Both would acknowledge that the task is difficult given the complexity of the system. But which team do you think is more likely to make the better prediction? I think most people would naturally choose Team B, as they’re using a much richer set of information and data about the box and it’s behavior than Team A. They’re taking into account lots of things that Team A is not. Usually, the more information one brings to bear on a problem, the better one does on that problem. Indeed, most of the theories developed by Team A based on the short time series alone can be immediately shown to be highly unlikely by comparison with other data studied by Team B.</p><p>This situation is directly analogous to the analyses offered by Asness-Brown (Team A) and climate scientists around the world (Team B). It’s not that Asness and Brown don’t know about all this other information, of course. It’s just that, in the present paper, making the most accurate prediction IS NOT their purpose. They limit their analysis to the temperature record from 1880 to the present because, as they see it, lots of people mistakenly believe that this temperature record alone is strong evidence for rapid and highly problematic rising temperatures over the next century. Indeed, they cite a number of papers which they suggest make this error. Their analysis aims to stop such confusion, by showing quite clearly that simple mathematical extrapolation of the temperature record alone does not suggest such rapidly rising temperatures. They make it very clear that they’re leaving all the other information to the side, and acknowledge that this other information might very well lead to a very different conclusion. But that’s another matter, and not the topic of their paper.</p><p>This basic logic is all I wanted to make clear in my column, and mainly because, within a few days of the paper being circulated, the editors at <em>Fortune</em> had already completely missed the point. I’m quite certain a few other people will miss it as well. In fact, I wouldn’t be surprised if the Asness-Brown draft soon becomes widely cited within certain circles as delivering a definitive disproof to claims of rapid warming, despite the authors best efforts to disavow such interpretations.</p><p>I actually quite enjoyed reading their paper because of it’s profound clarity. They offer a completely legitimate analysis, and if many people really do think the temperature record alone suggests rapid warming, then this work ought to come as an excellent corrective.</p><p>However, on the broader question of what we should expect from future climate based on the best analysis of all information, I think (and so I believe do Cliff Asness and Aaron Brown) that the projections of Team B, the world’s climate science community, ought to be considered as likely to be the more accurate.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5309410f299d" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/bull-market/the-earth-as-a-black-box-5309410f299d">Climate change? Nothing to worry about.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/bull-market">Bull Market</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Can market crashes be predicted?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/bull-market/can-market-crashes-be-predicted-c594d8ed0f4f?source=rss-decf46100ce4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c594d8ed0f4f</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Buchanan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2015 16:20:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-03-27T17:05:57.807Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Can market crashes really be predicted?</h3><p>Maybe — if you’re clever enough to find the right measures that capture growing imbalances between those who want to buy and sell.</p><p>You don’t have to be a true believer in the lunacy of the <a href="http://physicsoffinance.blogspot.fr/2011/05/whats-efficient-in-efficient-markets.html">Efficient Markets Hypothesis</a> to accept that market movements are hard to predict. The mere fact that there are lots of smart people with ample funds out there trying to predict markets and profit from those predictions makes it certain that prices will generally move in unpredictable ways, even if there are persistent patterns as well. Trend following is a<a href="http://physicsoffinance.blogspot.fr/2014/04/how-to-consistently-beat-market-follow.html"> profitable strategy</a>, which means there are verifiable trends in price movements. Some relatively simple patterns in movements <a href="http://physicsoffinance.blogspot.fr/2011/05/whats-efficient-in-efficient-markets.html#uds-search-results">have persisted over decades</a>.</p><p>Still, it’s hard to predict market movements, and especially big movements — the large rallies of crashes that move markets by large percentages over short periods of time. But hard doesn’t necessarily mean impossible. I’m working my way through <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583743">a new paper</a> by physicists Jonathan Donier and Jean-Philippe Bouchaud which proposes a method for detecting moments when crashes are more likely. What makes it interesting, to my mind, is that it doesn’t take the usual approach of reading tea leaves, i.e. trying to find some weird and predictive mathematical signature in price times series. Rather, it looks at the much more promising data in the order book — the actual list of all the buy and sell orders entered into the market by traders.</p><p>Sensibly, Donier and Bouchaud argue that this data reflects, at least partially, how the crowd of traders is divided between optimists and pessimists, those ready to buy and those ready to sell. Because crashes (or rallies) happen at moments of great imbalance between these two groups, you might expect such imbalances to show up in the data, and provide useful signatures of large impending movements. The two physicists suggest that this is indeed possible, although the story is a little involved.</p><p>One problem is that the order book in most markets doesn’t truly reveal traders’ intentions, as traders often act to hide their intentions as much as possible, only posting orders when they need to. Why give others information on your intentions, which they might use to trade against you? What traders really think and feel only becomes evident as prices begin to move and they post new orders. The true intentions of traders, in other words, are only latent in the market, only hinted at by the actual orders listed in the book. They remain secreted away in peoples’ heads and not open to scrutiny.</p><p>This may seem like fatal problem, but Donier and Bouchaud have found a way around it by looking to the market for BitCoin, where (for reasons unknown) participants do tend to place orders far in advance. Here, as they show, it’s clear that relatively simple measures of buy/sell imbalance, especially a drop in the number of buy orders, can be used to project the size of a market crash. For example, the first figure below shows the Bitcoin price in US dollars (blue) in the run up to the crash on 10 April, and in the two weeks after. The price rocketed upward from $13 in early January to $260 just before the crash. The red curve is a “support price” calculated by looking at the actual price and correcting it with data from the order book; specifically, projecting the price that would result if a fixed fraction of the existing orders in the book were suddenly executed. The growing departure of the red and blue lines signals a bubble in Bitcoin, as buy orders grew increasingly scarce.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/513/1*uXht7Qqsz6ktD22T9hsYOA.png" /></figure><p>Indeed, this support price, based on a correction using the full order book, gives a nice prediction of the rough size of the crash which ultimately took place.</p><p>Of course, one curve isn’t so convincing. But the authors carried out a study of the biggest 15 or so single day drops between January and April 2013 in the BitCoin market, and found that price adjustments using the orders present in the order book just before predicted them all very accurately. This is clear from the figure below, right side, which shows the predicted drop versus the actual drop for these crash-like events.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/535/1*RKJYLXNsvJUVTHZT76DZUw.png" /></figure><p>So there you go: more than a dozen prominent crashes in this market predicted (in size, not in precise timing) from information present in the market just before they happened. Predictions made well after the fact, of course. But this information is available right now and should be usable to detect further events as well.</p><p>However, thinking about markets more generally, the authors admit that BitCoin is a bit special. This kind of analysis simply can’t be done for most other markets, where people don’t post their orders well in advance, so that no one has access to the full demand curve of potential supply and demand. The trading volume in the order book at any moment, for most markets, is only about 1% of the daily trading volume, meaning that most orders are latent — in peoples’ hearts and heads and only put into the book when prices begin to move. However, the rest of the paper is devoted to showing how the same information can be estimated, accurately, just from the orders actually present.</p><p>I won’t get into these details, which get fairly technical and invoke a number of earlier results on studies of price impact (how much single orders tend to move prices), and the dynamics of liquidity in markets. The end result is the suggestion that it’s possible, using readily observable quantities only, to detect legitimate early warning signs of an impeding crash. What is the key quantity? Well, if σ is the daily volatility in some market, and V is the daily volume, then the key measure of how illiquid and prone to a crash the market is a quantity, call it ILL, defined as σ divided by the square root of V. Extremely easy to calculate from public data for just about any market.</p><p>The paper notes that Bouchaud and two other physicists actually proposed ILL as an early warning signal three years ago, though not with such a strong foundation as presented here. Some economists have run some preliminary tests against stock market data (see their reference 23), and found promising results. What’s really new in this most recent paper in a much more solid founding of the theory behind ILL on the basis of analysis of the unique BitCoin data. Previously, as the authors note, is was “quite a leap of faith” to assume that this simple expression for ILL was the same as some much less easily calculable quantities. Now this seems secure.</p><p>All of which is, to my mind, pretty cool, and gives just the kind of result one might expect. The ability to predict a crash doesn’t come from any miraculous discovery of weird patterns in price movements, but from teasing out from liquidity signals real information on emerging buy/sell imbalances, and especially the drying up of buy side liquidity.</p><p>The authors admit that they still can’t say when precisely such a crash may happen, but this is probably to be expected. Conditions for a huge forest fire may be very real, but it still takes a random spark to set it off. Similarly, it may take the right coincidental series of sales to trigger a crash, even if this is only possible under certain conditions.</p><p>And, of course, the usual caveats apply. If this idea does turn out to work, and becomes widely known, then this may well alter behavior, changing the market again. But for now, the idea of predicting market crashes isn’t as far fetched as it may have once seemed. There’s no impenetrable mystery. It just takes a lot of work to find the right measures of collective human behavior.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c594d8ed0f4f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/bull-market/can-market-crashes-be-predicted-c594d8ed0f4f">Can market crashes be predicted?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/bull-market">Bull Market</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Recessions sometimes cause themselves]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/bull-market/recessions-sometimes-cause-themselves-93a86e4a36df?source=rss-decf46100ce4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/93a86e4a36df</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Buchanan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 28 Feb 2015 10:56:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-02-28T10:56:53.617Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Economists generally put economic trouble down to unfortunate shocks, which can knock an economy temporarily out of equilibrium. A more plausible view is that economies often get into trouble all on their own.</p><p>Place a lit cigarette in an ashtray in a closed room where the air is perfectly still. As everyone knows, the smoke will rise, but not in a simple regular flow; the rising flow is unstable, begins to wobble, and then breaks out, as in the photo above, into a tangled mess — turbulence. You don’t need any outside cause or shock to the rising smoke to make it happen.<br>Economies do highly irregular things too, as a rule, going through repeated booms and busts, and yet economists seem quite hesitant to see such fluctuations as the result of similar natural instabilities. In recent decades, at least, they seem to have greatly preferred the idea that fluctuations around average growth must be caused by “shocks” to the economy of some kind, disturbances coming from outside, firm in their belief that an economy on its own should settle into a stable equilibrium. Noah Smith recently gave <a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-08-18/recessions-and-hunks-of-junk">a nice summary</a> of the Real Business Cycle theory of Kydland and Prescott, which Prescott and colleagues are still pushing today:</p><blockquote>Here’s how recessions work. Sometimes, scientists and engineers invent less new stuff than normal. Fewer new inventions this year mean fewer new inventions next year, too. Anticipating this, companies invest less, and they also cut workers’ wages. When wages go down, workers decide to take a vacation instead of work. Voila — a recession!<br>Actually, I’m kidding. I don’t think this is how recessions work at all. But the theory I just described <em>is</em> a real macroeconomic theory. It <a href="http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/prescott/papers/timetobuild.pdf">came out</a> in 1982, and its name is the Real Business Cycle model. In 2004, its creators, Edward Prescott and Finn Kydland, won a Nobel Prize for their work. The theory inspired a generation of researchers, and became the dominant theory in certain places, such as the University of Minnesota.<br>You might be forgiven for thinking that Real Business Cycle theory, or RBC for short, doesn’t deserve its moniker. Just as the Holy Roman Empire was none of the above, RBC theory doesn’t seem to have much to do with business or cycles, and for that matter doesn’t sound particularly real. Most people think that recessions are caused by asset-price crashes, by disturbances in the financial sector, or by Federal Reserve tightening of the money supply.<br>RBC says we’re all wrong about that. The financial sector, RBC adherents claim, isn’t important. Asset prices crash because people see a recession coming ahead of time and act accordingly. And the Fed, according to Prescott in a recent <a href="http://noahpinionblog.blogspot.com/2014/01/the-econ-nobel-prize-is-really-weird.html">interview</a>, has no more effect on the economy than a rain dance has on rain. In fact, RBC is really sort of a giant null hypothesis — a claim that the phenomenon known as the business cycle is just an illusion, and that recessions are the normal, smooth functioning of an efficient economy.</blockquote><p>It’s true that some economists like a more subtle version of the shock theory. You might call it <a href="http://economics.mit.edu/files/8135">amplification theory</a>. They suggest that interactions between different parts of an economy might make it possible for even tiny shocks to have big consequences, much as a spark in a parched forest can trigger a vast fire. A small downturn for an auto manufacturer might hurt its suppliers, undermining their ability to supply other auto makers and creating a growing cascade of distress. The cause is less the shock and more the links that amplify it.<br>But for most economists, that’s the end of the discussion: Recessions are either the result of big shocks, or of small shocks with amplification. They ignore a third possibility: that an economy might sometimes get seriously out of shape with no shock at all.</p><p>A while back, in Bloomberg,<a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-08-26/recessions-and-the-big-shock-theory"> I wrote about</a> some recent work that puts this shock perspective into a very new light. It suggests, in fact, that theories of the RBC class, if examined more closely, actually predict the existence of inherent instabilities in economies, not unlike (in qualitative terms) those affecting rising smoke. Specifically, the research — a collaboration between some physicists and economists—shows that if you relax even slightly some of the heroic assumptions usually employed in RBC type theories — regarding agents’ perfect rational foresight, or the ability of firms to adjust their output instantaneously to changing economic conditions — then these models become unstable, so that large recessions will occasionally happen even without any external shocks, simply because of coordination failures within the economy.<br>More people should know about <a href="http://arxiv.org/pdf/1406.5022.pdf">this work</a>, which suggests that the interactions of firms and individuals in an economy should naturally create an ongoing turbulence with sporadic recessions arising from a natural lack of coordination, without any shocks at all. The conclusion is pretty much the opposite of what the Real Business Cycle theory’s creators originally intended. They wanted to defend the notion that markets work perfectly, not to entertain the possibility that recessions might reflect an inability of markets to coordinate supply and demand. Their own model actually destroys that hope.</p><p>Lest anyone think this is not practical work, it’s extensions —in <a href="http://arxiv.org/abs/1501.00434">this very recent paper</a>, for example— show that the instabilities which can stir up recessions may easily be triggered inadvertently by central banks through their efforts to steer an economy with monetary policy. Obviously, policy making based on theories which don’t even allow for instabilities—today’s standard macroeconomic theories—aren’t likely to offer good advice on how to avoid such problems.</p><p>Posted by Mark Buchanan at <a href="http://physicsoffinance.blogspot.co.uk/2014/09/economics-beyond-shocks.html">11:18 AM</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/18/0*MYJ3BZeZAU23DJxA.gif" /></figure><p><a href="http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=1684157780354336888&amp;postID=8394915926548717283&amp;target=email">Email This</a><a href="http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=1684157780354336888&amp;postID=8394915926548717283&amp;target=blog">BlogThis!</a><a href="http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=1684157780354336888&amp;postID=8394915926548717283&amp;target=twitter">Share to Twitter</a><a href="http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=1684157780354336888&amp;postID=8394915926548717283&amp;target=facebook">Share to Facebook</a><a href="http://www.blogger.com/share-post.g?blogID=1684157780354336888&amp;postID=8394915926548717283&amp;target=pinterest">Share to Pinterest</a></p><h4>2 comments:</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/36/0*VYgRLFkd3kbhu90m.png" /></figure><p><a href="http://www.blogger.com/profile/00872510108133281526">Robert Vienneau</a><a href="http://physicsoffinance.blogspot.com/2014/09/economics-beyond-shocks.html?showComment=1410432974317#c4688136488398244906">September 11, 2014 at 12:56 PM</a></p><p>May I suggest Agliari, Chiarella, &amp; Gardini’s 2006 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization article, <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268105001034">A re-evaluation of adaptive expectations in light of global dynamic dynamic analysis</a>? It has been known for some time that mainstream models, perhaps with slight twitches, can exhibit interesting bifurcations, chaotic behavior, and endogenous cycles. I think especially of overlapping generations models. It would be nice if this research has some general impact on economists.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/p/93a86e4a36df/edit">Reply</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/36/0*o1ZPDmubrWP7dy_8.png" /></figure><p><a href="http://www.blogger.com/profile/11288455251267863265">Mark Buchanan</a><a href="http://physicsoffinance.blogspot.com/2014/09/economics-beyond-shocks.html?showComment=1410514589927#c4322520657049547498">September 12, 2014 at 11:36 AM</a></p><p>Hi Robert,</p><p>Thanks very much for suggesting the paper. It does look very interesting and hits on much the same topic. Did this paper get a lot of attention amongst macroeconomists? I’m guessing it was just ignored?</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/p/93a86e4a36df/edit">Reply</a></p><p><a href="https://medium.com/p/93a86e4a36df/edit">Load more…</a></p><h4>Links to this post</h4><p><a href="http://www.blogger.com/blog-this.g">Create a Link</a></p><p><a href="http://physicsoffinance.blogspot.co.uk/2014/09/how-to-build-roads-without-destroying.html">Newer Post</a> <a href="http://physicsoffinance.blogspot.co.uk/2014/09/make-people-be-nice.html">Older Post</a> <a href="http://physicsoffinance.blogspot.co.uk/">Home</a></p><p>Subscribe to: <a href="http://physicsoffinance.blogspot.com/feeds/8394915926548717283/comments/default">Post Comments (Atom)</a></p><h2>Twitter follow</h2><h2>Search This Blog</h2><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=93a86e4a36df" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/bull-market/recessions-sometimes-cause-themselves-93a86e4a36df">Recessions sometimes cause themselves</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/bull-market">Bull Market</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How to predict economic growth]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/bull-market/how-to-predict-economic-growth-7902a8d7f1f3?source=rss-decf46100ce4------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7902a8d7f1f3</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Buchanan]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 26 Feb 2015 16:31:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-02-26T16:31:39.113Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Forget fancy regressions on past growth numbers. They don’t work. You need to look at the real factors that let countries create new wealth</p><p>What makes one nation grow rapidly and another sink into economic stagnation? Ask any economist and they’ll probably rattle off a list of factors. Does a country have effective governance and property rights? What about its labor force and level of education? How about the nation’s outstanding debt? Is this likely to be a drag on future investment? It seems sensible that all these factors should matter, yet economists’ predictions of growth have never been too successful.</p><p>Another approach is to carry out sophisticated statistical analyses of past records of growth, and then see if these project a continuation into the future. This doesn’t work so well either, and seems to be more or less akin to reading tea leaves. As economists Lant Pritchett and Larry Summers <a href="http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/events/2013/november/asia-economic-policy-conference/program/files/Asiaphoria-Meet-Regression-to-the-Mean.pdf">argued</a> two years ago, what the data shows is that periods of really impressive growth don’t generally predict anything but future reversion back to the global average growth rate. As they noted,</p><blockquote>… the single most robust empirical finding about economic growth is low persistence of growth rates. Extrapolation of current growth rates into the future is at odds with all empirical evidence about the strength of regression to the mean in growth rates. Second, especially outside of the OECD countries, the process of economic growth is not at all well characterized by business cycle variations around a (relatively) stable mean. Developing country growth rates are strongly episodic and large (and apparently discrete) shifts in medium-term growth rates of 4 ppa or more common—and particularly prominent are large slowdowns. Episodes of super-rapid growth tend to be of short duration and end in decelerations back to the world average growth rate.</blockquote><p>Applying this to the recent super performers, China and India, Pritchett and Summers suggested that we should expect their growth to wane. They’ll simply fall back into the realm of the ordinary.</p><p>I expect this is all justified by the numbers on past growth, taken on their own. Another way to put it is that time-series on growth year by year just don’t seem to contain information that is useful in making future predictions—except in the negative sense of saying that trends don’t tend to predict anything. Of course, this leaves aside the question of whether other kinds of information might be useful in making growth predictions, perhaps in combination with data on past growth. Perhaps there are hidden measures of economic health and growth potential which economists just haven’t yet identified? Surely something makes one nation grow faster than another. Why can’t we identify and measure that thing?</p><p>Well, according to <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0117174">some recent research</a> of a rather unconventional kind, these measures do exist, and, if used appropriately, can be used to make better predictions of future economic growth. The key, it turns out, is Big Data—and a desire to drill down through it to identify or at least estimate just how diverse and sophisticated is the set of production skills that any nation possesses. Faster growth, it’s not crazy to think, follows on from improvements in productive skills. This new work shows how to detect recent changes in such skills — doing so means handling data on millions of products of varied kinds — and how to turn this knowledge into better predictions.</p><p>OK, a little detail and background. It’s natural to think that wealthier nations, in comparison with poorer ones, should be economically more complex, and more able to produce a vast array of different products. This intuition turns out to be right, although this was only discovered five years ago, when Harvard physicist Cesar Hidalgo and economist Ricardo Hausmann <a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/106/26/10570.full">noted</a> a strong correlation between national wealth, as reflected in GDP, and measures of the variety of products nations produce. They also found that wealthier nations not only produce a wider range of products than poorer nations, they also produce more highly specialized products — think cars powered by electricity, drones or advanced rocket boosters — which can be made only by a small number of other nations.</p><p>So GDP and diversification of productive skills go together. It’s only a short further step to wonder if near-future GDP growth might be predicted by looking at what countries have recently done in developing their productive capacities. Growth ought to be more likely in nations which have recently expanded their repertoire of export products, but which haven’t yet reaped the economic benefits.</p><p>The <a href="http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0117174">new work</a> shows that this is true, although it takes some tricky analysis to show it. Physicist Matthieu Cristelli and colleagues used global data on exports over the past 15 years to estimate the economic “fitness” of various nations — this being a measure of the range of products they currently produce, as well as the sophistication of those products. For each year, plotting this number against current GDP, the data falls roughly around a line sloping upward. This is essentially the same thing Hidalgo and Hausmann found — that productive breadth and GDP go together (although Cristelli et al. use a slightly different measure for their “fitness” than the earlier work did). Some nations fall slightly above the line, with more GDP than you would expect for their capabilities, while other nations fall slightly below the line. From year to year, as economic output fluctuates, nations move around in this plane.</p><p>Cristelli and colleagues then looked to see if there were predictable patterns of movement. There are — but they aren’t quite as simple as some regression back to the mean. To find the patterns, they had to use some methods drawn from the analysis of weather dynamics. Technical details aside — see <a href="http://www.nature.com/news/physicists-make-weather-forecasts-for-economies-1.16963">this short article</a> in <em>Nature</em>, if you like— the figure below shows the core of what they found. What you see are arrows showing the directions of past economic evolution for nations, over the past 15 years, located at various places in the fitness-GDP plane. The analysis shows that there are both predictable and unpredictable regions—or “laminar” and “chaotic” in the terminology of fluid dynamics, which Cristelli and colleagues employ. Specifically, growth appears to be much more predictable for nations of intermediate to high fitness, yet very irregular and chaotic for nations of low fitness.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/568/1*ww-2W5mNUk0K52Axqnsr2A.png" /></figure><p>The authors cannot really say precisely why some zones show regular and predictable patterns, while others do not. This just comes out of the mathematics. But they speculate that, since the predictable regime exists for intermediate and higher levels of fitness, it may be that economic fitness only becomes able to dominate future growth once it becomes sufficiently developed. For nations of low fitness, differences in the diversity of productive skills may be insufficient to drive measurable growth differences, as they are swamped by other more powerful factors — civil wars, natural disasters, poor governance and so on. Only when fitness becomes sufficiently large, do the productive forces come to dominate future growth.</p><p>So what predictions come out of this analysis? First, that in contrast to prevailing doubt, China and India will probably keep growing steadily and reach a combined GDP of around 26 trillion dollars by 2022. That’s roughly a tripling of their combined GDP in the next 7 years. The analysis also suggests that a handful of other lower-fitness nations will finally escape the trap of chronic poverty. These include Senegal, Madagascar, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. What sets these nations apart, this analysis suggests, is their storing up, over the past fifteen years, of a wealth of new capabilities enabling them to make more complex and valuable products and to thereby enter new markets.</p><p>Considering all countries together, the study suggests something else— that future growth prospects really do appear to be shifting from Western developed nations to countries to Asia.</p><p>More important than this specific prediction, of course, is this idea as a new way to predict future growth. It suggests that finding predictable patterns means going beyond regressions on aggregate data — it means wading into the messy details of actual skills and capabilities. And today that means using Big Data. The analyses involved in this work were highly computational, and based on building and analyzing huge mathematical networks of nations linked together with the vast range of products they are capable of producing. It’s rather like judging the capabilities of a cell by looking in detail at its entire metabolic system and listing out all the biochemical reactions it is capable of carrying out, and also ranking them by their level of complexity.</p><p>This may well be the future of studies on economic growth. If so, it will be a lot more interesting than the past, mired as it has been in uninformative statistical regressions.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7902a8d7f1f3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/bull-market/how-to-predict-economic-growth-7902a8d7f1f3">How to predict economic growth</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/bull-market">Bull Market</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>