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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mark Warner on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Mark Warner on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@markjwarner?source=rss-f65dc3ecc70c------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Mark Warner on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@markjwarner?source=rss-f65dc3ecc70c------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Unknown Prisoner?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@markjwarner/unknown-prisoner-5efe17962096?source=rss-f65dc3ecc70c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5efe17962096</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ww2]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Warner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Apr 2019 12:47:41 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-06T12:54:27.372Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the last weekend of my secondment to Germany, I visited the Dachau concentration camp, just north of Munich. It was the first time I’d visited a memorial site of this kind, so was especially moving. Dechau was a uniquely notorious camp, used as a “model” for the other camps that came after, and was the only one to exist throughout the entire war.</p><p>Between 1933–1945, the men (and towards the end women) endured some of the worst treatments ever inflicted on mankind. When walking around the camp, it was difficult to imagine the physical and mental horrors that prisoners must have endured. The physical pain from hunger, the constant fear of death and the humiliation from being stripped of ones dignity and identity. Prisoners were no longer people, they were numbers.</p><p>At the end of the guide I was taken to a statue named <em>“unknown prisoner”</em> depicting a frail inmate in prison uniform. Frailty was typical of those imprisoned in these camps, which for many led to their deaths from being purposefully overworked by their captures. However, this prisoner was standing with his hands in his pockets, looking up, instead of down at his feet. Whilst prisoner uniforms in the camp had pockets, their use was strictly forbidden, a form of psychological torment similar in nature to the <em>“work sets you free”</em> sign on the iron gates at the entrance. The hands in the pockets, and head held high indicate this man was no longer imprisoned, either through liberation which came in the form of the American Army on April 29, 1945, or perhaps more sadly, the liberation that came to him through his death. I suspect being titled <em>“unknown prisoner”</em> the latter is most likely.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/748/0*LYlD1Pr2wkqe3bXc" /></figure><p>I focused on this statue because of the text written underneath, which in German reads “Den Toten zur Ehr, Den Lebenden zur Mahnung” translated “To honour the dead, to remind the living”. To remind the living. To remind me, to remind us all of the events during this period.</p><p>After WW1 Germany was one of the leading countries in Europe, progressive in manufacturing and technology, a period known in Germany as the Golden Years. Had you asked anyone then whether Germany would be capable of such acts, the response would have been a resounding, conviction filled no, yet history tells a very different story.</p><p>The people who died in these camps wanted to send us an eternal message. They wanted us to remember the events of WW2 to prevent such suffering from ever happening again, to save us from ourselves, and to learn from the shadows of our past.</p><p>As we go forward into a future which is unknown, riddled with uncertainties, we should be vigilant of acts that divide us, acts that stem hatred, driven by desires for power at the immense cost to others. We should stand up to these acts of hatred and division, even if they have little effect on us now, they may affect us in the future.</p><blockquote><em>“First they came for the Socialists, and I did not speak out — Because I was not a Socialist. Then they came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not speak out — Because I was not a Trade Unionist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out — Because I was not a Jew. Then they came for me — and there was no one left to speak for me”</em></blockquote><p>Poem by Martin Niemöller</p><p><em>Originally published at </em><a href="http://www.privacurity.com/prisoner/"><em>www.privacurity.com</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5efe17962096" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Privacy, Research & Design]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@markjwarner/welcome-to-my-privacy-and-behaviour-research-website-631f617da3e?source=rss-f65dc3ecc70c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[healthcare]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mark-warner]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[phd]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[welcome]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Warner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Apr 2019 12:31:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-06T12:45:19.436Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Welcome to my PhD research blog. I will be keeping this blog up-to-date with findings from my own research, discussion of other research in related areas, as well as posting on news articles and current affairs that relate to my work.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vCltBhXhoQ4gY96QySpShg.jpeg" /></figure><p>I’m interested in how men who have sex with men (MSM) manage HIV status information in online sex-social applications (apps). Using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methods, I draw on economic, communication, and motivation theories to develop a rich understanding of how HIV status information in sex-social environments is being perceived, and how this information is changing interactions, behaviours, and social norms.</p><p>My work <strong>challenges the notion of control</strong> in the design of sensitive disclosure fields and suggests that privacy may <strong>unravel</strong> around undisclosed information, as those not disclosing are assumed to be “hiding” undesirable information.</p><h3>Background</h3><p>I studied part-time for a masters degree in Security Management at the University of Portsmouth where I was awarded a distinction. My research was focused on how privacy concerns are formed, and how these concerns impact levels of self-censorship when communicating over online social messaging platforms.</p><p>Prior to joining UCLIC, I worked as an advisor in digital forensics for a criminal investigations department in the Middle East. I was responsible for developing enhanced capabilities for extracting, analysing, and processing data from electronic devices in criminal investigations.</p><h3>Publications</h3><p>Below are references to papers I’ve had published or that are under review.</p><h4>Full Conference Papers</h4><p><strong>Warner, M.</strong>, Maestre, J., Gibbs, J., Chung. C. &amp; Blandford, A. (2019) Signal Appropriation of Explicit HIV Status Disclosure Fields in Sex-Social Apps used by Gay and Bisexual Men <em>In CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems Proceedings (CHI 2019), May 4–9, 2019, Glasgow, Scotland Uk. </em>ACM, New York, NY, USA, 15 pages. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3290605.3300922">https://doi.org/10.1145/3290605.3300922</a></p><p>Gutmann, A. &amp; <strong>Warner, M.</strong> (2019) <a href="http://www.privacurity.com/publications/">Fight to be Forgotten: Exploring the Efficacy of Data Erasure in Popular Operating Systems</a> <em>In Annual Privacy Forum (pp. xx-xx). Springer, Cham.</em> <a href="https://doi.org/10.xxxx/xxxxxxx">https://doi.org/10.xxxx/xxxxxxx</a></p><p><strong>Warner, M.</strong>, Gutmann, A., Sasse, M.A. &amp; Blandford, A.(2018) <a href="http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10056127/1/CSCW18_CR_Unraveling_RPS.pdf">Privacy Unraveling Around Explicit HIV Status Disclosure Fields in the Online Geosocial Hookup App Grindr</a> <em>Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction</em> Vol. 2, CSCW (November 2018), 22 pages. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3274450">https://doi.org/10.1145/3274450</a></p><h4>Journal Articles</h4><p><strong>Warner, M.</strong> &amp; Wang, V. (2018) <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Victoria_Wang3/publication/331001047_Self-censorship_in_Social_Networking_Sites_SNSs_-_Privacy_concerns_privacy_awareness_perceived_vulnerability_and_information_management/links/5c91679245851506d71d3e0a/Self-censorship-in-Social-Networking-Sites-SNSs-Privacy-concerns-privacy-awareness-perceived-vulnerability-and-information-management.pdf">Self-censorship in Social Networking Sites (SNSs) — Privacy concerns, privacy awareness, perceived vulnerability and information management</a> <em>Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society.</em> <a href="https://doi.org/10.xxxx/xxxxxxx">https://doi.org/10.xxxx/xxxxxxx</a></p><h4>Workshop Proposals</h4><p>Maestre, J., Eikey, E., <strong>Warner, M.</strong>, Pater, J., Jacobs, M., Yarosh, S., Marcu, G. &amp; Shih, P. (2018) <a href="http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10062383/1/CSCW2018_Stigma_Workshop_PrePrint.pdf">Workshop: Conducting Research with Stigmatized Populations: Practices, Challenges, and Lessons Learned</a> <em>In Companion of the 2018 ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing (pp. 385–392). ACM.</em> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3272973.3273003">https://doi.org/10.1145/3272973.3273003</a></p><h4>Workshop Papers</h4><p><strong>Warner, M</strong> (2018) Using Online “Public” Data in Research on Stigmatised Communities <em>In CSCW’18 Workshop Conducting Research with Stigmatized Populations.</em></p><p><strong>Warner, M</strong>. &amp; Blandford, A. (2018) <a href="https://uclic.ucl.ac.uk/publications/1547209">Do I Really Have To Publicly Disclose My HIV Status?</a> <em>In CHI’18 Workshop Moving Beyond a ‘One-Size Fits All’ Approach: Exploring Individual Differences In Privacy.</em></p><h4>Under Review</h4><p><strong>Warner, M.</strong>, Kitkowska, A., Gibbs, J., Maestre, J. &amp; Blandford, A. (2019) <a href="http://www.privacurity.com/publications/">‘Prefer not to say’: Exploring Perceptions and Designs of Sensitive Non-Disclosures in an Online Dating Context</a> <em>Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction</em> Vol. 3, CSCW (November 2019), 20 pages.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=631f617da3e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Accidental Data Breaches: The Role of Language and Metaphors in the Design of Delete and Erase…]]></title>
            <link>https://blog.prototypr.io/accidental-data-breaches-the-role-of-language-and-metaphors-in-the-design-of-delete-and-erase-4d2871fc4653?source=rss-f65dc3ecc70c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/4d2871fc4653</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[design]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[gdpr]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[metaphor]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[data-breach]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Warner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Apr 2019 13:30:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-08T11:24:02.378Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><a href="https://blog.prototypr.io/theinteractionreview/"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*igsDR0dvJXkktxhQx2Wgfg.jpeg" /></a></figure><h3><strong>Accidental Data Breaches: The Role of Language and Metaphors in the Design of Delete and Erase Functions</strong></h3><p>Issues around the design of delete and erase functions in Win 10 and macOS could contribute to accidental data breaches. These include the inapropriate use of language and metaphors. Failure to update these legacy designs may result in serious violations of new data protection regulations within the EU (GDPR).</p><p>Our research will be featured at the <a href="https://privacyforum.eu/">Annual Privacy Forum 2019</a> in Rome, where my colleague <a href="http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/A.Gutmann/">Andreas Gutmann</a> will present. The paper titled <strong>“Fight to be Forgotten: Exploring the Efficacy of Data Erasure in Popular Operating Systems”</strong> will be published in the <a href="https://link.springer.com/conference/apf">conference proceedings</a> at a later date but the accepted version is <a href="http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/A.Gutmann/APF_2019_-_Fight_to_be_Forgotten_accepted.pdf">available now</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/474/1*9NxHnonc2f_1PmWvgqnDPA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Privacy and security risks from decommissioned memory chips</strong></p><p>The process of decommissioning memory chips (e.g. USB sticks, hard drives, and memory cards) can create risks for data protection. Researchers have repeatedly found sensitive data on devices they acquired from second-hand markets. Sometimes this data was from previous owners, other times from third persons. In some cases, highly sensitive data from vulnerable people were found, e.g. <a href="https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/41533350.pdf">Jones <em>et al</em>.</a> found videos of children at a high school in the UK on a second-hand USB stick.</p><p>Data found this way had frequently been deleted but not erased, creating the risk that any tech-savvy future owner could access it using legally available, free to download software (e.g., FTK Imager). Findings from these studies also indicate the previous owners’ intentions to erase these files and prevent future access by unauthorised individuals, and their failure to sufficiently do so. Moreover, these risks likely extend from the second-hand market to recycled memory chips — a practice encouraged under <a href="http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/19/oj">Directive 2012/19/EU</a> on ‘waste electrical and electronic equipment’.</p><p>The implications for data security and data protection are substantial. End-users and companies alike could accidentally cause breaches of sensitive personal data of themselves or their customers. The protection of personal data is enshrined in <a href="https://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/8-protection-personal-data">Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union</a>, and the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R0679">General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)</a> lays down rules and regulation for the protection of this fundamental right. For example, data processors could find themselves inadvertently in violation of Article 17 GDPR Right to Erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) despite their best intentions if they failed to erase a customer’s personal data — independent of whether that data was breached or not.</p><p><strong>Language and the use of metaphors around delete and erase functions</strong></p><p>The indication that people might fail to properly erase files from storage, despite their apparent intention to do so, is a strong sign of system failure. We’ve know for more than 20 years that unintentional user failures at a task <a href="http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/20247/2/CACM%20FINAL.pdf">“<em>is often caused by the way in which [these] mechanisms are implemented, and users’ lack of knowledge</em>”</a>. In our case, these mechanisms are — for most users — the UI of Windows and macOS. When investigating these mechanisms, we found seemingly minor design choices that might facilitate unintentional data breaches. A few examples are shown below and are expanded upon in the full publication of our work.</p><p>A number of the issues that we identified likely stem from a conflict between the colloquial use of linguistically similar terms ‘delete’ and ‘erase’, and their very different technical meaning. In simplified terms — although the details vary based on technical nuances such as the type of memory chip and file system used — ‘delete’ is an operation in which the OS simply <em>forgets </em>the existence of a file, while the ‘erase’ operation actively <em>removes </em>the file from the system, e.g. by overwriting or flashing the binary storage. Thus, ‘deleted’ files usually remain on the memory chip until overwritten by coincidence, whereas ‘erased’ files are typically impossible to recover.</p><p>Inconsistent language within the UI of an OS, such as when deleting files from <em>Trash</em> in macOS 10.14 shown in Fig.1, can foster the misunderstanding that the terms ‘erase’ and ‘delete’ would denote the same technical function. UI designers commonly use metaphors to make complex and abstract functions more intuitive and comprehensible for end-users. We see similar design methods being used around these functions. For instance, placing an unwanted <em>file</em> into the <em>recycle bin</em> or <em>trash</em> (see Fig.1) that can be <em>emptied</em>, uses multiple metaphors from a home and office environment, making it easier for users to relate these complex computing processes to everyday actions. Yet, the <em>delete</em> and <em>erase</em> metaphors are somewhat problematic now, as they denote different meaning in the UI, whilst relating back to the same actions in the physical world. Designers should therefore consider integrating new metaphors that better distinguish between these two functions to reduce the risk of confusion for users.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*h5UQVW2htG7ehOL1Qw2zDg.png" /><figcaption>Fig 1. Example user prompt for single file delete (left) and emptying “Trash” in macOS</figcaption></figure><p><strong>The way forward</strong></p><p>The evaluation of any design is always context-dependent. The design choices for the UI of delete and erase operations in Windows and macOS may have made sense at the time of their original design, but as circumstances around these designs have evolved (e.g., new legislation, new data recovery techniques and free to download software, etc.) they should be reconsidered. An important lesson we can (re-)learn from this is that designs need to be re-evaluated not only when they’re changed but also when their context changes.</p><p>As mentioned earlier, we know since more than twenty years that users’ unintentional failure at a task <a href="http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/20247/2/CACM%20FINAL.pdf">“is <em>often caused by the way in which [these] mechanisms are implemented, and users’ lack of knowledge</em>”</a>. Reworking the UI of Windows and macOS to improve these mechanisms is one side of the coin, the other is addressing the users’ lack of knowledge.</p><p>Our paper presents a number of alternative designs, but further research is suggested to identify further shortcomings in the existing UI around deletion functionality and to implement and evaluate alternative designs. Perhaps equally important is the reconsidering of less secure default options around delete and erase functions, as well as increase awareness and in-app guidance for users.</p><p>This article is an adapter version of an article first published by Andreas Gutmann on <a href="https://www.benthamsgaze.org/2019/04/04/how-accidental-data-breaches-can-be-facilitated-by-windows-10-and-macos-mojave/">Bentham’s Gaze</a>, a blog by Information Security researchers at University College London.</p><p><em>This work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 675730.</em></p><p>This article is part of The Interaction Review, the new publication from Prototypr. If you’d like to <strong>publish your HCI research</strong> and share it with our audience of designers, contact Laura at <strong><em>theinteractionreview@prototypr.io</em></strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4d2871fc4653" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://blog.prototypr.io/accidental-data-breaches-the-role-of-language-and-metaphors-in-the-design-of-delete-and-erase-4d2871fc4653">Accidental Data Breaches: The Role of Language and Metaphors in the Design of Delete and Erase…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://blog.prototypr.io/">Prototypr</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Privacy Unraveling as a Threat to Disclosure Choice Around Sensitive Information in Online Social…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/acm-chi/privacy-unraveling-as-a-threat-to-disclosure-choice-around-sensitive-information-in-online-social-ae9585760cea?source=rss-f65dc3ecc70c------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[disclosure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hiv-status]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[online-dating]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy-unraveling]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Warner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 Apr 2019 13:34:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-10T16:47:53.944Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Privacy Unraveling as a Threat to Disclosure Choice Around Sensitive Information in Online Social Environments.</strong></h3><p><em>This blog summarises a CHI’19 paper, authored by Mark Warner, Juan F. Maestre, Jo Gibbs, Chia-Fang Chung, and Ann Blandford, which is available </em><a href="http://homes.sice.indiana.edu/cfchung/assets/papers/chi2019-hiv%20disclosure.pdf"><em>here</em></a><em>. It will be presented at the ACM Conference on Computer-Human Interaction (</em><a href="http://chi2019.acm.org/"><em>CHI’19</em></a><em>) on Monday 7th May 2019 at 14:00 in the session on Privacy and Sensitive Personal Data in room Dochart 2.</em></p><p>What happens when a social technology does not meet the needs of a certain group of users? Are these users able to reshape these technologies without the involvement of developers?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*wRXnH-H9fYpiKn75NNDYjw.jpeg" /></figure><p>In conducting research into privacy and disclosure behaviours around HIV status information in geolocation-based sex-social apps (e.g., Grindr, Scruff), we found participants changing the meaning (signals) around specific elements of the user interface (UI). We refer to this way of appropriating social technologies as ‘signal appropriation’. We conducted interviews with 14 HIV positive and 14 HIV negative men who have sex with men (MSM) who were living in the UK. We report findings from these interviews in an upcoming paper (link) to be presented at CHI 2019.</p><p><strong>Does non-disclosure = concealing?</strong></p><p>At CSCW 2018, we presented a research study based on an analysis of online discussion boards (The full paper can be found <a href="http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10056127/1/Warner_CSCW18_CR_Unraveling_RPS.pdf">here</a>, and the blog summarising the research can be found <a href="https://medium.com/acm-cscw/what-do-we-disclose-when-we-choose-not-to-disclose-7235029cde0e">here</a>) in which we explored the introduction of HIV status information into these sex-social apps. We identified a concern related to a social effect known as <em>“privacy unravelling” </em>[4]<em>. </em>This effect can cause stigmatising signals to develop around users who choose not to disclose their HIV status information. For example, because participants thought revealing an HIV positive status was more “costly” than revealing a negative status, those not disclosing were concerned that their lack of disclosure would be perceived as them concealing an HIV positive status. In and of itself, <em>privacy unraveling</em> is a form of signal appropriation. The non-disclosure option was designed to allow users to maintain privacy and control over their HIV status, yet it could inadvertently be used to “signal” or infer a person’s likely HIV status.</p><p><strong>Appropriating technologies to mitigate stigma and connect with others</strong></p><p>In our latest study being presented at CHI’19, we found further support for these <em>privacy unraveling</em> concerns. However, we also identified the effect being used to subtly disclose an HIV positive status whilst maintaining plausible deniability (i.e., disclosing through not disclosing). For some people living with HIV, disclosing can be very difficult. The location-aware nature of many of these apps can lead to people from different spheres of life crossing-over. For example, a number of participants reported seeing, or being messaged by, colleagues through their sex-social app whilst at work. This can make disclosing a sensitive HIV status ever more challenging for people living with HIV due to the stigma around the condition. However, disclosure can also be used to help reduce the risk of being stigmatised. Some men use public disclosure as a way of finding other HIV positive men to connect with, describing the increased simplicity that comes with meeting other HIV positive men, as it neutralised the significance of their own status. Whilst <em>privacy unravelling</em> may limit the choice that users have around the disclosure of their status, the signal appropriation of these apps which exploit the effects of <em>privacy unraveling</em> can create a subtle form of disclosure that may help those straddling the line between being private and public.</p><p><strong>How can design carefully account for disclosure of sensitive information?</strong></p><p>So, from the perspective of technology designers, how do we deal with the potential social effects of <em>privacy unraveling</em> that may reduce disclosure choice for users, whilst at the same time, provide a subtle form of disclosure for others? Below we discuss a few of the design implications from our work.</p><p><strong>Reduction of stigma around HIV</strong></p><p>As a long-term goal, we suggest taking a serious look at the broader social issue around HIV within these sex-social environments. Our work highlights the need to reduce the stigma that HIV still attracts and suggests a form of community signalling to help reduce this stigma. Community signalling methods within this context, such as community “pledges”, are a potential way to address the stigma [3]. For instance, users can pledge to “live stigma free”. Future research should continue examining the short- and long-term effectiveness of these types of signals. Educating and raising awareness amongst these users may also help to tackle stigma. We also propose embedding educational functionality into apps that are used every day by people in at-risk communities. These functions could provide people living with HIV the means to share easy-to-understand, consistent educational information about their condition to others.</p><p><strong>Ambiguity as a design resource around sensitive information disclosure</strong></p><p>Finally, designers developing any system that provides users with an option to disclose sensitive personal information should consider the implications of binary style disclosure fields, and their impact on privacy and disclosure choice. Ambiguity could be used as a resource around these disclosure fields to help limit the effects of <em>privacy unraveling</em> and promote a more socially cultivated signaling system. Unlike the Grindr HIV disclosure interface shown in Fig.1 (left) which asks users to explicitly state their HIV status, Scruff shown in Fig.1 (right) asks what users’ safer sex practices are, allowing users to select multiple options.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/769/1*skfSJLON-7-sZFhmJP56cg.png" /><figcaption>Fig.1 Cropped screenshots of the HIV disclosure fields in Grindr (left), and Scruff (right)</figcaption></figure><p>One of the options provided is ‘Treatment as Prevention’, which refers to HIV prevention through effective treatment of HIV. People living with HIV who are on effective treatment are often able to suppress the levels of the HIV virus in their system to an undetectable level, making risk of transmission through even condomless sex effectively zero [1,2]. Whilst disclosing ‘Treatment as Prevention’ as a safer sex option could signal to others the user is HIV positive, it is appropriately ambiguous that it could also signal that the user is HIV negative and open to having relations with someone who is on ‘Treatment as Prevention’.</p><p>Our research suggests that ‘signaling systems’ designed around sensitive information disclosures can be shaped by its users through a process of cultural cultivation. Designers of these system should carefully evaluate how these systems are being appropriated by users in this way and consider making adjustments if they are disadvantaging certain groups or having a broader negative impact. We are currently conducting further empirical research which explores the effects of <em>privacy unraveling</em> around these sensitive disclosure fields to better understand the role design may play in reducing its effects.</p><p>To read more, please download our paper from <a href="http://homes.sice.indiana.edu/cfchung/assets/papers/chi2019-hiv%20disclosure.pdf">here</a>. If you would like to share your thoughts, please contact Mark Warner at mark.warner(at)ucl(dot) ac(dot)uk.</p><p><em>This work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 675730.</em></p><p>1. Alison J. Rodger, Valentina Cambiano, Tina Bruun, et al. 2016. Sexual Activity Without Condoms and Risk of HIV Transmission in Serodifferent Couples When the HIV-Positive Partner Is Using Suppressive Antiretroviral Therapy. <em>Jama</em> 316, 2: 171.</p><p>2. Alison Rodger, Valentina Cambiano, Tina Bruun, et al. 2018. HIV transmission risk through condomless sex in gay couples with suppressive ART: The PARTNER2 Study extended results in gay men.</p><p>3. Karen Levy and Solon Barocas. 2017. Designing against discrimination in online markets. <em>Berkeley Technology Law Journal</em> 32.</p><p>4. Peppet, S. R. (2011). Unraveling privacy: The personal prospectus and the threat of a full-disclosure future. <em>Nw. UL Rev.</em>, <em>105</em>, 1153.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ae9585760cea" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/acm-chi/privacy-unraveling-as-a-threat-to-disclosure-choice-around-sensitive-information-in-online-social-ae9585760cea">Privacy Unraveling as a Threat to Disclosure Choice Around Sensitive Information in Online Social…</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/acm-chi">ACM CHI</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What Do We Disclose When We Choose Not To Disclose?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/acm-cscw/what-do-we-disclose-when-we-choose-not-to-disclose-7235029cde0e?source=rss-f65dc3ecc70c------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7235029cde0e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[unraveling]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cscw]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[privacy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[hiv-disclosure]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mark Warner]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Oct 2018 15:36:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-10-29T14:20:31.854Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>What Do We Disclose When We Choose Not To Disclose? Exploring the Privacy Unraveling Effect Around Explicit HIV Status Fields in Grindr</strong></h3><p>The full paper, co-authored with Andreas Gutmann, M. Angela Sasse, and Ann Blandford, is available <a href="http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10056127/1/CSCW18_CR_Unraveling_RPS.pdf">here</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gkc9ca2C2sFLNNktZ1LaPQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Privacy unraveling around HIV status options</figcaption></figure><p>It will be presented at the ACM Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing on Monday, November 6th in the afternoon session on Privacy in Social Media.</p><p>For many gay and bisexual men, mobile dating or “hook-up” apps are a regular and important part of their lives. Many of these apps now ask users for HIV status information to create a more open dialogue around sexual health, to reduce the spread of the virus, and to help fight HIV related stigma. Yet, if a user wants to keep their HIV status private from other app users, this can be more challenging than one might first imagine. While most apps provide users with the choice to keep their status undisclosed with some form of “prefer not to say” option, our recent study which we describe in a paper being presented at CSCW 2018, finds privacy may “unravel” around users who choose this non-disclosure option, which could limit disclosure <em>choice</em>.</p><p>Privacy unraveling is a theory developed by Peppet (2011) in which he suggests people will self-disclose their personal information when it is easy to do so, low-cost, and personally beneficial. Privacy may then unravel around those who keep their information undisclosed, as they are assumed to be “hiding” undesirable information, and are stigmatised and penalised as a consequence.</p><p>In our study, we explored the online views of Grindr users and found concerns about assumptions developing around HIV non-disclosures (Warner et al., 2018). For users who believe themselves to be HIV negative, the personal gains of disclosing are high and the social costs low. In contrast, for HIV positive users, the personal gains of disclosing are low, whilst the costs are high due to the stigma that HIV still attracts. As a result, people may assume that those not disclosing possess the low gain, high cost status, and are therefore HIV positive.</p><p>We developed a series of conceptual designs that utilise Peppet’s proposed limits to privacy unraveling. One of these designs is intended to artificially increase the cost of disclosing an HIV negative status. We suggest time and financial as two resources that could be used to artificially increase disclosure cost. For example, users reporting to be HIV negative could be asked to watch an educational awareness video on HIV prior to disclosing (time), or only those users who had a premium subscription could be permitted to disclose their status (financial). An alternative (or in parallel) approach is to reduce the high cost of disclosing an HIV positive status by designing in mechanisms to reduce social stigma around the condition. For example, all users could be offered the option to sign up to “living stigma free” which could also appear on their profile to signal others of their pledge (Levy, 2017).</p><p>Another design approach is to create uncertainty over whether users are aware of their own status. We suggest profiles disclosing an HIV negative status for more than 6 months be switched automatically to undisclosed unless they report a recent HIV test. This could act as a testing reminder, as well as increasing uncertainty over the reason for non-disclosures. We also suggest increasing uncertainty or ambiguity around HIV status disclosure fields by clustering undisclosed fields together. This may create uncertainty around the particular field the user is concerned about disclosing. Finally, design could be used to cultivate norms around non-disclosures. For example, HIV status disclosure could be limited to HIV positive users, with non-disclosures then assumed to be a HIV negative status, rather than HIV positive status.</p><p>In our paper, we discuss some of the potential benefits and pitfalls of implementing Peppet’s proposed limits in design, and suggest further work needed to better understand the impact privacy unraveling could have in online social environments like these. We explore ways our community could contribute to building systems that reduce its effect in order to promote disclosure choice around this type of sensitive information.</p><p><strong>Acknowledgements</strong></p><p>This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 675730</p><p><strong>References</strong></p><p>Karen Levy and Solon Barocas. 2017. Designing against discrimination in online markets. <em>Berkeley Technology Law Journal</em> 32 [<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3084502">paper</a>].</p><p>Scott R Peppet. 2011. Unraveling privacy: The personal prospectus and the threat of a full-disclosure future. Nw. UL Rev. 105: 1153 [<a href="https://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/illlr105&amp;section=37">paper</a>].</p><p>Mark Warner, Andreas Gutmann, Angela M. Sasse, and Ann Blandford. 2018. Privacy Unraveling Around Explicit HIV Status Disclosure Fields in the Online Geosocial Hookup App Grindr. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction 2 CSCW, November [<a href="http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10056127/1/CSCW18_CR_Unraveling_RPS.pdf">paper</a>].</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7235029cde0e" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/acm-cscw/what-do-we-disclose-when-we-choose-not-to-disclose-7235029cde0e">What Do We Disclose When We Choose Not To Disclose?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/acm-cscw">ACM CSCW Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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