<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Matt Wensing on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Matt Wensing on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@mattwensing?source=rss-ba60142744bf------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 14:02:15 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@mattwensing/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Low-Risk Software Businesses]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mattwensing/low-risk-software-businesses-e18e1286f452?source=rss-ba60142744bf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e18e1286f452</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Wensing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2020 20:40:21 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-05-17T19:18:11.782Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Vqwp96OLceP2Daj4dIqWHQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@jaydenyoonzk?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Jayden Yoon</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/s/photos/legos?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>Traditional logic says that all startups are high risk, and small software businesses are startups; therefore, small software businesses are high risk. From this conclusion flows the culture and system of fundraising that surrounds us, i.e. <a href="https://sivers.org/fish">the water we’re in</a>.</p><p>But what if we could show that many small software businesses — particularly SaaS, are not startups, but are in fact de-risked — albeit small, businesses?</p><p>We could lower the risk premium of <a href="https://alexdanco.com/2020/02/07/debt-is-coming/">lending to these businesses</a>.</p><p>What good is a de-risked used-to-be-called-a-startup business with a lower risk premium? While modest in absolute size, the growth rates of these businesses are highly desirable.</p><p>A software business growing 2–5% monthly for 1–2 years is not an uncommon sight in this world. This march is so common that founders have a name for it: “the slow SaaS ramp of death.” [<a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=slow+saas+ramp+of+death">1</a>]</p><p>Why death, when there’s growth? Because the startup runs out of cash:</p><ul><li>For bootstrapped startups, the majority of founders lack the capital to get a new business off the ground from scratch. They exhaust their savings, or exceed their risk tolerances, and are forced to shut down.</li><li>For funded startups, financing has traditionally been provisioned in large, uncalculated lumps, underwritten by the belief that founders will figure it out, given enough time, where “enough” is defined as roughly 18 months given current burn rates and growth plans. These guestimate-based investments often leave startups in a gap when things perform worse or better than expected.</li></ul><p>For investors, thoughtfully financing <a href="https://toolkit.usesummit.com/">this growth ramp</a> through debt will yield returns that deserve a share of their portfolio — alongside, not in place of, venture capital. For founders, efficient access to capital that doesn’t expect a venture return or impose high-risk premiums could be the difference between shutting down or realizing their vision.</p><p>In order to access this capital, these small online businesses will need to accurately demonstrate their risk-reward profile — where they’ve been, where they are today, and a risk-adjusted view of where they’re headed.</p><p>For them, this demonstration of fitness will replace optics, decks, and elevator pitches as their new form of credibility.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e18e1286f452" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Bootstrapping Stormpulse, Part II]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mattwensing/bootstrapping-stormpulse-part-ii-5eb491b82474?source=rss-ba60142744bf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5eb491b82474</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[founder-stories]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bootstrapping]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fundraising]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Wensing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 05 Oct 2019 05:54:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-10-05T05:58:01.323Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This post, written in the spring of 2012, chronicles the second chapter of our struggle to bootstrap a weather startup. With the disappearance of Tumblr, I thought it had been lost forever — but thanks to the Internet Wayback Machine, it’s been resurrected for your encouragement.</em></p><p>When I finished <a href="https://medium.com/swlh/how-we-bootstrapped-a-weather-startup-b3f0463839d4">my last bootstrapping Stormpulse post</a>, I had a strong conviction that the difficult parts of starting up were largely behind us — that we were finally on the ascent from the trough of sorrows to the summit of startup success.</p><p><em>How wrong I was.</em></p><p>As Eric Ries has said, the key to the hockey stick curve is the long flat part at the beginning. This makes sense — if we think about a hockey stick in the literal, the long flat part is where all the leverage comes from.</p><p>But the most surprising part about being on the long flat part of the curve is you never really know when you’re about to make the turn. I thought Stormpulse was making that turn in early 2011. In truth, it would take us another 18 months to go through our real <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130908102541/http://techcrunch.com/2012/06/14/the-struggle/">struggle</a> and ultimately break free.</p><p><strong>October 2010</strong></p><ul><li>It’s been 6 years and 2 months since I had the idea for a better weather website. After several years of total obscurity, we’ve finally secured the attention of millions of free visitors and a couple hundred customers using a freemium business model. Still, things are tight, and revenue growth is very linear below breaking even.</li><li><strong>To save money</strong>, I move my family of 6 (wife, daughter, son, and twin baby daughters) into a small 3 bedroom, 2 bath condo in West Palm Beach at the corner of a very busy intersection. The pool is nice, but the living quarters are extremely cramped. The third bedroom, originally meant to be my office, quickly becomes a guest room for a stream of relatives visiting to help us with the twins.</li><li>I start working <strong>5–6 hours per day out of the local Starbucks</strong>. Lots of Christmas music, hot drinks. Noisy. The roof of my ’95 Accord starts to rust through.</li><li>To save more money, I buy a Chinese wok at the Target that is literally across the street and point it at the condo clubhouse to amplify their public wi-fi signal for my laptop.</li><li>Sales calls with government agencies and Fortune 500’s are conducted on my balcony with my cellphone.</li><li>We finally pay off our minivan, freeing up several hundred bucks per month.</li><li>Financially, <strong>Stormpulse is surviving on day-to-day basis.</strong> Money that we need to have by Friday to pay server bills or my paycheck, is often not available on Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday.</li></ul><p><strong>December 2010</strong></p><ul><li>To stay afloat, I decide to try selling Lifetime Memberships to our premium accounts for a one-time payment of $89. We quickly sell 100 of them, putting $8,900 of desperately-needed cash in our coffers.</li><li><strong>On Christmas Day, I get an email from a large, vertically-integrated cardboard manufacturer based in Austin, Texas.</strong> They want to know what we can offer in terms of weather alerts.</li></ul><p><strong>January 2011</strong></p><ul><li>Sales cycle with cardboard manufacturer begins.</li><li>On a whim, I decide to apply to pitch at <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130908102541/http://www.startupriot.com/">Startup Riot</a> 2011 in Atlanta, GA. I put together a 5-minute video, taken inside the local Starbucks, and I’m selected to present. This would be the first domino to fall in our spiral towards full-time fundraising (boy that sounds great, doesn’t it?).</li></ul><p><strong>February 2011</strong></p><ul><li>Startup Riot. <strong>My first pitch to a roomful of investors</strong>. I didn’t ask for money, though, I asked for advisors. I was still confident that with our business traction, we’d monetize well in 2011 and wouldn’t <em>need</em> funding. Here’s me:</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/0*sF5xTh5lz6f2v1rc.jpg" /></figure><ul><li>Just before going on stage, I get a call from the cardboard manufacturer telling me that they have the green light to purchase an enterprise subscription, <strong>making them our largest customer at the time by a healthy multiple.</strong></li><li>Feedback from the professionals in the audience is so positive I’m actually disappointed when Stormpulse didn’t place 1st, 2nd, or 3rd at the event. After 6 years of effort, we’re beaten by a startup that was <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130908102541/http://triplingo.tumblr.com/post/3350885403/startatlanta">literally built in a weekend</a>. After listening to my pitch, <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130908102541/http://twitter.com/lance">@lance</a> <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130908102541/http://blog.weatherby.net/2011/02/startup-riot-2011-live-blogging-3rd-session-.html">writes</a>: “Golly Matt Wensing talks fast … Someone should fund them.”</li><li>I meet <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130908102541/http://www.davidedicillo.com/">Davide Di Cillo</a> and find out he’s also from South Florida. I also meet someone from IBM Venture Capital Group with a keen interest our business. This will come in handy later.</li><li>The greatest compliment of the trip came from an <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130908102541/http://www.troutmansanders.com/atlanta/">Atlanta attorney</a>who told me all of his guys voted for us because they thought we “could be a 20-year company.” This comment imprinted itself pretty deeply on my thinking.</li></ul><p><strong>March 2011</strong></p><ul><li>After returning from Atlanta, I turn my attention to IBM and apply to present in Austin, TX at their SmartCamp event. <strong>Stormpulse becomes one of 5 finalists and is invited to come to Austin in May.</strong></li><li>We begin working hard on a total rewrite of our client-side map in a language called haXe, which will allow us to get on the iPad. Because of the pent-up anticipation, I think the iPad app will be the monetization silver bullet for us in 2011 (this turns out to be wrong).</li></ul><p><strong>May 2011</strong></p><ul><li>I practice my 5-minute pitch almost 100 times and give it twice. Based on <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130908102541/https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/mydeveloperworks/blogs/scott/entry/ibm_smartcamp_austin_winner_and_day_2_impressions?lang=en">feedback</a>, Stormpulse looks and sounds like the audience favorite, with numerous employees of IBM telling us how impressed they are by what we’ve accomplished.</li><li><strong>Once again, Stormpulse does not win.</strong> The audience was genuinely disturbed. Even some of the IBM-ers thought it was inexplicable. Rumor has it the panelist from IBM didn’t think there was anything defensible or patentable about Stormpulse, or that they could quickly scale our business model to various cities they were looking to make ‘smarter.’ At least I got a picture with one of my heroes, Jeopardy! champion Watson.</li><li>Stormpulse gets its <strong>first taste of Austin</strong>. IBM SmartCamp is an awesome introduction to the startup, business, and venture community in Austin. I meet an extremely energetic guy named Joshua Baer and a sagacious Bob Metcalfe, who opines about potentially-monetizable network effects.</li><li>My co-founder ends up staying in Austin for a lot longer than expected. <strong>The tech tractor-beam begins to suck him (and me) into its hub.</strong></li></ul><p><strong>June — August 2011</strong></p><ul><li>Hurricane season begins. <strong>This year we decided to completely kill off our B2C premium offering and only sell subscriptions to businesses. </strong>Consumers get the free site, businesses can pay a minimum of $499 for one year of access to our premium features, including the still-to-come iPad app.</li><li>Killing B2C premium accounts was<strong> tantamount to severing a limb of revenue</strong>, but in 2010 we had learned that B2B subscriptions were selling at 10x the price of B2C, and numerous businesses were still paying $49.95 for the consumer version. We made a bet that enough businesses would convert from $49.95 plans to $499 or in some case $690 plans.</li><li>One of these customers ends up being the White House, which makes for a very memorable phone call.</li><li>The bet was working. Paying consumers were miffed, but our support costs went way down and our revenue per paying customer went way up.</li><li>Still, our conversion rate is abysmal. <strong>The free site was still good enough for 99.99% of all of our millions of visitors.</strong> Financially we were surviving, but barely, and still not profitable.</li><li>Convinced that Stormpulse is undercapitalized, I email Joshua Baer and ask him who I should speak to in Austin about raising money. He tells me about the event he hosts called Capital Factory Demo Day. Another 3-minute pitch opportunity.</li></ul><p><strong>September 2011</strong></p><ul><li>I pitch Stormpulse to another roomful of investors at Capital Factory Demo Day in Austin. I learned a few things about pitching — investors care about markets first, products second. Here’s me walking in front of my logo graffiti slide:</li><li>These logos got a lot of investor attention. I proceed to meet with or have phone calls with more than 75 investors (a mix of angels and VC’s) over the next several months. From Austin to DC to the Valley.</li><li>Stacey Higginbotham publishes a well-timed GigaOm article called “<a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130908102541/http://gigaom.com/2011/09/20/how-stormpulse-made-more-money-on-fewer-customers/">How Stormpulse made more money on fewer customers</a>.”</li></ul><p><strong>October 2011</strong></p><ul><li>Meetings with investors continue, but <strong>momentum begins to wane.</strong> Fundraising turns out to be an awful test of not only determination, but faith in my own beliefs about what the business can be. <strong>Because we have revenue, we can’t sell hopes and dreams.</strong> Instead, we’re left telling people why businesses are paying us such small amounts of money ($499 is nothing in the B2B/enterprise world) and why we aren’t profitable if we have 10,000+ businesses eating the product from our hands. I try answering these questions in many different ways, but never really succeed.</li><li>I’ll never forget the expression of a super-angel in San Fran when he asked: “So, how much money do you have in the bank?” ’Right now?’ we asked. ”Yes.” he replied. ’Well …’ — he interjects “well, you have to have more than $20,000 if that’s how much it costs to run the business right? What are you going to do, shut down in 3 weeks?” He simply couldn’t fathom that we’d been running the company for over 3 years on a week-to-week basis. We didn’t really succeed at explaining how this was possible, either.</li></ul><p><strong>The Acquisition That Almost Was, Or So We Think</strong></p><ul><li>While making rounds on AngelList, I met an investor who introduced us to the CEO of a company based in SF that he said would be interested in us. It became apparent within a few exchanges that <strong>this company might acquire us</strong>. They even said as much. This was incredible news. We hopped on planes and headed west.</li><li>The meeting with the company went well. The personalities clicked, minds clicked, product visions clicked. The CEO remained very interested. And then we flew home.</li><li>I proceeded to <strong>check my email once every couple of waking minutes for the next 2 weeks</strong>. It was awful. Have you ever sat around waiting for a phone call that could change your life? We waited. And waited. Every time the light on my Droid started flashing I thought: “This could be it.” And it wasn’t.</li><li>Until eventually it was. And after a meeting or two with their Board of Directors, they had decided that they were not going to be able to “work with us.” They decided instead to stay the course and stay focused on growing their primary revenue stream through the channel they had already established, and not through our 6 million unique visitors. Hmph.</li><li><em>Honey — we’re still broke.</em></li></ul><p><strong>November 2011</strong></p><ul><li>Our fundraising efforts, begun in September, culminate in a single <strong>term sheet from a little-known VC in Dallas, TX</strong>. I am vacationing in Tennessee at the time, so I fly from Nashville to Dallas for the all-day meeting.</li><li>The VC office contains a lot of incredible Americana and antiques, including an original draft of the U.S. Constitution on rice paper. <em>Wow, these guys are rich.</em></li><li>The valuation should have seemed like a joke, but after all the effort to get to this point, and being on the verge of personal bankruptcy, I urge my co-founder to take the offer of $1.5 million. <strong>The VC’s play games with us</strong>, quietly changing terms from revision to revision of the sheet, and attempt bully us by telling us we have to make a decision within 24 hours. Yes, after 6 years of bootstrapping, we are told to make a fateful decision in less than a day.</li><li>I fly back to Nashville, term sheet in backpack. Advisors and friends wait to hear what we’re going to do. We don’t know yet.</li><li>On the hour-long drive back to the country home of a friend in Tennessee, I have to <strong>pull off to the side of the road to vomit in the front yard of some poor rural inhabitant</strong>. It wasn’t my nerves — I got food poisoning in the airport. But the irony wasn’t lost on me as I jumped back in the car just as the house lights flicked on.</li><li>We tell the investors this is insane, that we need time to speak with other founders they’ve invested in. We’re granted a stay of execution, and I learn from other founders that these VC’s are indeed honey badgers. However, $1.5 million is still $1.5 million, and we are broke.</li><li>We stand our ground and refuse to sign without the ability to call it off should we learn that they’re bad people. Negotiations end when we finally decide that these are not the kind of people we want to work with — sharks. Big smiles, nice handshakes, but sharks nonetheless.</li><li>An angel we met on AngelList wires us $25k to take the pressure off. <em>That’s a true angel, folks.</em></li></ul><p><strong>December 2011</strong></p><ul><li>Brad and I have several <strong>long discussions on the future of the company</strong>. We imagine ways to monetize, liquidate, or sell it as an asset. We assume more fundraising is not in our future.</li><li>Then, one fateful day, we were introduced to a firm in Austin that just so happened to have deep experience in big data, commodities, and weather. And they wanted to give us money. Or at least, they knew people that they were certain would want to give us money.</li><li><em>Hold everything right there.</em></li></ul><p><strong>January 2012</strong></p><ul><li>We begin extensive discussions with The Firm about ways to raise capital through their network. Extensive. Discussions.</li></ul><p><strong>February 2012</strong></p><ul><li>Weeks go by and money doesn’t appear, but the story gets more interesting. Rather than a straightforward investment, The Firm also wanted to set up a buyout provision. In less than 12 months, they would look to exercise a right to buy a controlling stake in Stormpulse for a 7-figure sum that would solve every financial concern in my near to medium-term future, but wouldn’t make me financially independent. In other words, I’d be very comfortable, but I’d have to start another startup if I wanted to achieve what had always been my goal.</li><li>I’m left with <strong>The Blessed Man’s Dilemma</strong>: after almost 7 years of work, sell control in the startup for a sum that is enough to make most people excited but leaves me feeling like my soul’s been extracted, or continue to forge ahead. Forging ahead would allow us to retain control, but the motivation to forge ahead had seemingly been sucked out of me by this apparent inability to fundraise, which kept the company in a zombie state. <strong>Not enough capital to seize the market opportunity, but not enough revenue or hype to raise on fair terms.</strong></li><li>Recognizing my shortcomings at fundraising (made apparent by the fact that we had yet to receive an exciting term sheet), I considered allowing someone else to step in as CEO. Someone asked me how I was feeling, and my answer was that <strong>I knew that I had finally reached my limits</strong>. Like the man 500 meters from the summit of Mt Everest discovering he just didn’t have it in him, but <em>‘nice try anyway’</em>.</li><li>I realize that for me, this is <strong>my reason for being an entrepreneur</strong>: because it’s the hardest thing I can possibly do professionally, and I’m not satisfied unless I’m finding my limit.</li><li>On top of this, I had been spending many days traveling, away from family. I flew from South Florida to Texas, DC, Texas, Dallas, San Fran … This whole period was incredibly hard on those that loved me most.</li><li>In other words:</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*dEB6Ef6dCbTJeP_j.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>March 2012</strong></p><ul><li>In a moment of insanity, faced with selling out, giving up, or pressing on without any motivation, I choose to do something I had resisted doing for years: <strong>completely change our business model by killing the free product.</strong></li><li>This may not sound very dramatic or insane, but considering that every aspiration we had to become a greater success hinged on the incredible distribution we had amassed, sacrificing that distribution for “the sake of short-term cash” was always considered — at least by me — as an evil thing. Not only was it evil, but it was insane and stupid.</li><li>The other element of evil is that it was slitting the throats of all the consumers that had spread the news of Stormpulse virally to literally millions of other people. I was now going to price them out of the product? <strong>If killing off the premium consumer plan was burning our boats (by committing to B2B), this was treason</strong>. If we fail, we won’t have a safe haven to fall back to.</li><li>But insane and stupid and potentially short-sighted were all things I could live with. Selling out or forging ahead into personal bankruptcy were not.</li><li>I sharpen a pencil, grab two pieces of blank paper, and stay up all night mocking up a <strong>total redesign of the Stormpulse.com home page</strong> — turning it from an app into a products page — and writing a blog post announcing the change, which I publish immediately. There will be no going back. I go to bed knowing that 6 million people will hit our paywall this year, and many of them will be very, very upset.</li><li>I tell my co-founder and The Firm that<strong> I am now in a race to make the company profitable</strong> so we can turn down their investment offer with a straight face.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/500/0*r2ZVYtb7DKzfuSI8.jpg" /></figure><p><strong>April 2012</strong></p><ul><li>I work 12–14 hour days for 3 weeks to build the paywall with my co-founder. I sleep an average of 2 hours per night. It’s a true case of the cornered animal gone mad.</li><li>The announcement of the impending paywall begins to boost sales.</li><li><strong>By the end of April, it becomes clear that we’ve won the race with the alternatives.</strong></li><li>Brad and I tell The Firm we’re no longer interested, and we go on to have <strong>our first profitable April.</strong></li></ul><p><strong>May 2012</strong></p><ul><li>And then our <strong>first profitable May.</strong></li></ul><p><strong>June 2012</strong></p><ul><li>And then our <strong>first profitable June.</strong></li></ul><p><strong>Clarity Through An Extended Poker Metaphor</strong></p><p>In <a href="https://web.archive.org/web/20130908102541/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_hold_%27em">Texas Hold </a>’Em, players are dealt 2 cards, and then 5 community cards are flipped over in succession, with bets taking place before each of the last 2 cards. These are called “The Turn” and “The River.”</p><p>As a business, Stormpulse had already been dealt a number of cards. Metaphorically, it was as if we were dealt the first few cards of a straight, maybe even a straight flush. For those that don’t know, this is when you get an entire hand of 5 cards in sequence — for example, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Or better yet, 10, Jack, Queen, King, Ace.</p><p><strong>The problem with this hand is that until you get the 7 or the Ace, you have no idea if you’re going to end up with a massive win or a total failure.</strong></p><p>Stormpulse was like this in many ways. A huge horizontal market, a product people loved, distribution solved, an audience with some willingness to pay … but the final missing piece had always been — <em>but how many of those free users are willing to pay, and is it enough to be interesting?</em></p><p>During fundraising, we were punting on these questions and forcing the investor to answer. <strong>Because there was a great risk that this last card was going to turn up nothing, we weren’t getting good terms.</strong> Here we felt we had accomplished so much, but what we really had done was turn up the first 4 cards of the straight. And if investors were going to take the risk of turning over the last card (and be our safety net if it was lousy), they were also going to give us terms that reflected that risk.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/319/0*RbqwKmVMFTx-QWbM.jpg" /></figure><p>What I ultimately decided was that<strong><em> we</em> deserved the outcome of the final card flip.</strong> After taking on the extreme risk of table stakes and raising and re-raising in my own personal life to get to this last card, I wasn’t willing to let someone else come in and significantly discount (i.e. rob) my reward if the last card happened to be great. I couldn’t live with that. <strong>I’d rather lose everything.</strong></p><p><strong>The Next Frontier</strong></p><p>Fortunately for us, we didn’t lose everything. What we did lose in the respect and admiration of hundreds of thousands of free users (with the emails to prove it), we are now recouping in the incredible investments being made by hundreds of new customers with problems our product solves. The clarity and focus we now have as a company makes this a frontier like none before.</p><p>Best of all, the inspiration to conquer this landscape has also returned with renewed vigor. Rather than chasing a dream of investment or delayed (but greater!) monetization, we are being quietly but powerfully fueled by our customers.</p><p>And that’s exactly where I want to be.</p><p><em>—</em></p><p><em>Now more than seven years after this article was written, Stormpulse.com, and its successor Riskpulse, continue to profitably serve tens of thousands of users.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5eb491b82474" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Chance, Curves, and Chaos: The New Era of SaaS Forecasting]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/swlh/chance-curves-and-chaos-the-new-era-of-saas-forecasting-21414712ff76?source=rss-ba60142744bf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/21414712ff76</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[forecasting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[saas]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Wensing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Aug 2019 13:30:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-13T17:01:06.225Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wjx_fFAfY9k5WIdRcFYoYw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/@ian_gonz?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Ian Gonzalez</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/search/photos/dice?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>Data science is beginning to replace spreadsheets for entrepreneurs wrestling with uncertainty in their business models. How did we get here? What’s really new? And how can founders at any stage get better at predicting their future?</em></p><h4>Staring into the Void</h4><p>If you’re like most SaaS founders, you’ve googled for a financial template you can use to forecast your subscription business. As of the writing of this post, a query for “SaaS forecasting” returns 2.8 million results, many of them providing financial lessons and file downloads offering to help you see into the future.</p><p>Maybe you took advantage of one of these, at first; perhaps, eventually, you retreated to a blank spreadsheet — preferring an empty canvas of your own design over the learning curve of someone else’s formulas, or worse — macros.</p><p>If you began filling out one of these templates, did you finish? If so, did you use it to make key decisions? How soon did you come back to it?</p><p>Good founders begin this exercise with good intentions. But often, the result falls short of expectations.</p><p>Is that because we’re searching for a crystal ball, or something else?</p><h4>Divining the Future: Past and Present</h4><p>As the practice of predicting the future, forecasting has lured, plagued, charmed, blessed, and doomed the plans of humans for eons. High-stakes operatives, from mariners to soldiers to astronauts, have drawn whatever advantages they can from tea leaves, constellations, and weather vanes. To stare at a blank Google Sheet, ready to populate columns B-ZZ with monthly timestamps, is to gaze from the edge of a remarkable wave of advances in philosophy — the shift from fatalism to humanism, as well as science — the discoveries of chance, curves, and chaos.</p><p><strong>Yet, while forecasting subscription businesses is a new frontier, it’s far from the state of the art. </strong>Because of its immense impact on warfare and commerce, weather forecasting has commanded significant research and development focus since the 1980&#39;s, second only to cryptography in global consumption of compute cycles. What could the evolution of weather forecasting teach us about our field of forecasting our SaaS performance?</p><p><strong>The weather forecasts we take for granted today would have made us gods among the ancients.</strong> Though they obsessed over cloud formations, the Sun and the Moon, without sufficient technological advances, their practice was reduced to guesswork. At last, shortly after the invention of the electric telegraph in 1835, the modern era of weather forecasting began. With it, the manual recording of observations on the shores of the United Kingdom could travel fast enough to deliver value to those downwind. Later, linear trend lines would evolve into systems of governing equations and eventually, deterministic models and statistical ensembles powered by supercomputers, fed by the latest observations from geostationary satellites and mesh networks.</p><h4>Measuring Up: A Forecasting Maturity Scale</h4><p>Where are we in our progress, brave SaaS financial template searchers, in comparison? Consider the parallels between observing and predicting two complex systems along a sophistication (maturity) scale:</p><ul><li><strong>Level 1. Anecdotal Observation. </strong>“It feels hotter outside than yesterday” : “Our sales team has more momentum than last month.”</li><li><strong>Level 2. Quantitative Records.</strong> “I’ve journaled that it’s 88 F” : “I looked through my email: we got 16 leads this month.”</li><li><strong>Level 3. Consistent Instrumentation.</strong> “The thermometer reads 88 F, according to my logs, yesterday it read 91 F.” : “This HubSpot chart shows that we have 4 fewer leads than last month.”</li><li><strong>Level 4.</strong> <strong>Derived</strong> <strong>Measurements. </strong>“At 88 F with a relative humidity of 75%, the heat index is 103 F! Yesterday’s heat index was 87 F.” : “We had fewer leads this month, but 12 were qualified, which is 3 more qualified leads than last month. Our lead velocity rate is 33%, up from 20% last month.”</li><li><strong>Level 5. Linear and Exponential Trends. </strong>“At this rate, it will feel hotter every day; by October we’ll be scorching!” : “At this rate, we’ll hit $73k MRR next month, and $284k MRR by October!”</li><li><strong>Level 6. Governing Equations. </strong>“To be that hot in October, weather patterns would need to shift dramatically to overcome the fact that we’ve begun tilting away from the Sun.” : “Our sales team would need to double in size to attack the number of leads required to hit $284k MRR by October.”</li><li><strong>Stage 7. Compounding Factors. </strong>“Sea surface temperatures are hotter than last year, but the stratosphere is unstable, increasing the chance of early arctic air masses arriving in North America.” : “We do have cash to invest — if we double our PPC marketing budget and drive leads towards self-service, maybe we have a chance? But our lead velocity rate is likely to decrease as we saturate this channel.”</li><li><strong>Level 8. Managing Uncertainty. </strong>“The atmosphere is a chaotic system where small changes in initial conditions can have a large effect on medium- and long-range conditions, so let’s combine all observations, equations, and factors into the global forecasting system and run it 50 times to see a wide range of possibilities.” : “I don’t feel certain about this, let’s have an exec retreat to look at these trends, budget limitations, and market factors, and then just make the best decision we can.”</li></ul><p><strong>Where is your business on this maturity scale? </strong>If you’re consistently using data from a CRM and metrics provider to make decisions, you’re at least to Level 3. If you’ve taken the time to know your funnel and used historical growth rates to create forecasts — congrats, you’ve made it to Level 5.</p><p>And if you’ve made it to Level 5, the act of a searching for a financial template is a natural next step. Armed with a constant or compounding growth rate, it’s easy to drag a =SUM(B2+1500) from cell C2 to M2, title it a 12 month forecast, and start sharing the news.</p><p>Yet, while these arithmetic forecasts are directionally interesting, their lack of enforcing constraints — unpleasant reality checks, harm their accuracy beyond a few months. Even after the earliest stages of starting up, resources remain limited, guaranteeing that a straight line from now to then is almost certainly not the path you’ll be taking. To acknowledge and account for these scarcities — like cash, hiring bottlenecks, and ramp-up periods for sales, is to enter the real world of Levels 6–7.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*29GNNpjAw1jDxt6WoWEmDA.gif" /><figcaption>Managing Uncertainty: These 51 forecasts show what the weather might be like in 96 hours.</figcaption></figure><h4>Constrained Reality</h4><p><strong>In the real world, it’s not straight lines or hockey sticks, but S-curves that dominate. </strong>These sigmoid functions draw our slow genesis, rapid growth, saturation, and then decay; they are the storytellers of the inescapable laws we face in complex systems. They explain why no hurricane intensifies indefinitely, and why no company grows forever. Regardless of LTV’s or CAC’s, friction catches up.</p><p>And these stories don’t just play out on the macro scale. The lifecycle of a sales channel’s cost-effectiveness, of an engineer’s efficiency, of managerial spans of responsibility — all contain these tales of zero to 1 and then diminishing returns.</p><p>How can we incorporate these laws into our forecasting? Most of our direct experiences with Level 7, to the extent we’ve dabbled with it in Excel, are short-lived; this is typically the Land of Someone Else’s Macros. But what about your own? Skills aside, while inspiration abounds at the outset, it’s hard to know where to stop. While I’ve seen a few founders bring GSheets to its knees creating a veritable simulation, most would not call it fun, let alone sustainable. Our creativity yields unmaintainable complexity.</p><p>Instead of this, most founders skip Level 7 and move straight to Level 8. Bringing all of their KPI’s, charts, and trends to meetings where they lean on the algorithms baked into their biology — i.e. gut. This is often the role of boardrooms and the C-suite. Properly run, this is the state of the art for 99% of us. We enter with a dilemma and exit with the best decision we can.</p><p>Some have argued that perhaps it is for this very reason — that we can’t enter these meetings without them, that the exercise of building these forecasts persists. This is amplified in the contexts of fundraising pitches and investor updates. Cynically: “founders show investors what they want to see.”</p><p>Does this mean our gut instinct is bad? Yes and no. In actual fact, our gut feelings are the output of biological formulas millions of years in the making. These formulas can’t be written into Excel and contain wisdom. Nonetheless, feelings can also mislead us into fantasyland where anything is possible, or doom is imminent.</p><h4>Hope for Tomorrow</h4><p><strong>So is this data-to-gut pipeline the future of SaaS forecasting?</strong> Far from, if meteorology provides a clue. While we SaaS founders were grappling in our minds with the compounding factors of Level 6, the meteorologists were turning to software systems, global in scope, incorporating constraints, and capable of considering the fact that their measurements and assumptions could themselves be wrong; wrong enough to tempt fate into producing a swan of a different color. From this, not one, but fifty forecasts emerge, along with analysis of consensus and deviations.</p><p>For modern weather forecasters, the boardroom discussion remains, but its purpose isn’t to re-discover or litigate the laws of thermodynamics; instead, it’s to review and discuss those fifty outcomes in order to do what humans do best — notice familiar patterns, and ultimately, to interpret. <strong>The focus shifts to translating future states into scenarios, and developing strategies for dealing with those scenarios. </strong>Risk is further reduced by evaluating which constraints matter most, and which factors are the least understood. And because it’s system-generated, this practice doesn’t take place monthly or quarterly, but rather four to six times per day.</p><p><strong>The breakthrough in weather forecasting was the creation of systems that shrank the time required to make predictions <em>while also improving accuracy</em>. </strong>These forecasting advances coincided with the dawn of the computing age, and are now as mission-critical to the world’s economy as they are pervasive.</p><p>Forty years later, and twenty years into SaaS, the same breakthroughs are beginning to define the modern era of subscription business forecasting. Internal systems at lenders like <a href="http://lightercapital.com/">Lighter Capital</a>, and investors including <a href="https://circleup.com/">CircleUp</a> and <a href="https://fundersclub.com/about/">Funders Club</a> are pushing the boundaries on complex systems designed to challenge or bolster their confidence in allocating growth capital. A <a href="https://www.dkv.global/">Hong Kong VC</a> and a <a href="https://www.tieto.com/">Finnish software company</a> have granted voting rights to algorithms. Meanwhile, startups like <a href="https://usesummit.com/">Summit</a> aim to make these systems available to founders for operational planning.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jL11FjQbAjO2Tiz-QV1WBA.png" /><figcaption>Multiple revenue forecasts for a single business, generated using <a href="https://usesummit.com/">Summit</a>.</figcaption></figure><p>These systems belong to an emerging, modern era of SaaS forecasting, in which<strong> software will carry us from observation all the way to exploring uncertainty, releasing us to focus on interpretation and application. Can software really predict the performance of your SaaS business?</strong> Such an exercise may sound reductionist. In many ways, businesses are unlike machines — they are organic, social, biological. They evolve. Because of this, whether your business will succeed is much less predictable than the theories and laws that govern the weather. Nevertheless, as SaaS founders we quest for repeatable, <em>predictable</em> revenue.</p><p>Given this search for predictability, we must move towards systems that acknowledge that the future is not like the present. Discontinuities abound: competition, new channels, pivots, price increases, new product tiers. Not to mention our desire to think through scenarios: “what if we raise prices? Hire two more sales reps?” etc.</p><p>These systems will also help us avoid fantasy. Impossible projections that surface when founders still know very little about their target market, their business model, or SaaS at large. In these cases, the founder has a blank spreadsheet, and without constraints, can feel pressured into presenting whatever’s most exciting, rather than what’s realistic. This often becomes a very expensive or fatal game of trial-and-error.</p><p>Instead, by dropping the cost of testing a growth plan to almost zero, <strong>new tools will enable founders to exponentially increase their rate of learning</strong> about their particular business designs, and SaaS in general. These systems will act as private laboratories to experiment, fail, and try again, before deploying new product, sales or marketing strategies in production. Once deployed, these systems will watch how your designs perform when reality begins to hit, alerting you to deviations and recommending next steps.</p><blockquote>“Risk comes from not knowing what you’re doing.”</blockquote><blockquote>–Warren Buffett</blockquote><h4>Back at Your Drawing Board</h4><p>If we accept that we are entering a new era, what about today? <strong>What should you do when you find yourself staring at that financial template?</strong> While achieving parity with the world’s most advanced forecasters may be out of reach, I would encourage all founders, regardless of stage, to adopt a modern mindset:</p><ul><li><strong>The forecasting process is more important than the output.</strong> Why? Because a steady stream of consistently-formatted, and therefore comparable, forecasts is more valuable than a single, glorious gaze into a crystal ball. The former enables a demonstration of progress that allows you to answer “well, how accurate are your projections anyway?”</li><li><strong>At medium- and long-ranges, you are going to be off.</strong> Accept it, and use new data or changes in your environment to re-forecast and adjust. While it’s disheartening to realize these time horizons are uncertain, you can only improve through repetition. And take heart — even in a chaotic regime, there are going to be short stretches of predictability. Having these flashlights on your dark path can spare you tragedy.</li><li><strong>Include your expenses.</strong> And have a realism-accountability partner. It’s easy to fall into the trap of forgetting you will need to hire new staff to support new growth. Hiring sales reps is sexy but what about your growing hosting costs, operations, SaaS vendors per headcount, and travel? Underestimating expenses is a fatal mistake; how many bankrupt startups leaned into a revenue-centric forecast?</li><li><strong>Don’t start with your revenue.</strong> Revenue isn’t input; revenue is the last output of a model that begins with assumptions as far upstream (top of funnel) as possible, then uses qualified lead and conversion rates to estimate your top-line MRR. For a simple hack, try making these estimates fuzzy by rounding down to significant digits. $40,000, not $44,418.</li><li><strong>To enforce realism, mind your cash flow. </strong>The ratio between your annual billing subscribers and monthly billing subscribers can be the life or death of your business. More annual means more cash to work with today, but it also means less of it tomorrow in the event that you spend it and growth doesn’t follow. This is where randomness can really help; and remember, true randomness contains more streaks of ‘bad luck’ than most want to imagine. What if your first 30 customers choose monthly billing? The world can be (very) lumpy.</li></ul><p><strong>Most importantly, take stock of your expectations and motives. </strong>The best forecasters in the modern era don’t make predictions in an ad hoc fashion or only when compelled to do so by shareholders.</p><p>Instead, they forecast in order to detect certainty as soon as possible. They support this goal by forecasting well in advance of decisions. They also forecast to measure uncertainty, and watch how that uncertainty changes over time. They support this goal by forecasting often, and admitting their uncertainty in their assumptions. It’s no coincidence that both of these behaviors are habitual: they know that forecasting — like all processes that improve by doing, is as much a practice as it is a skill.</p><p><em>Matt Wensing is the founder of </em><a href="https://usesummit.com/"><em>Summit</em></a><em>, an operational tool for teams to extend their SaaS metrics into the future.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=21414712ff76" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/chance-curves-and-chaos-the-new-era-of-saas-forecasting-21414712ff76">Chance, Curves, and Chaos: The New Era of SaaS Forecasting</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Joining the First Batch of TinySeed]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mattwensing/joining-the-first-batch-of-tinyseed-f58b8881dbf?source=rss-ba60142744bf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f58b8881dbf</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[funding]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Wensing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 May 2019 15:05:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-05-28T16:18:41.520Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>On April 14th, 2019, </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mattwensing/status/1117485862168793095"><em>I shared</em></a><em> that after 15 years of starting up, I was </em><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/ownership-mentality-aligning-professional-and-personal-63d4541b5b2f"><em>ready</em></a><em> to start something new. Today, I’d like to share the reasons behind my decision to join </em><a href="https://tinyseed.com/"><em>TinySeed</em></a><em>’s first batch of startups.</em></p><p>When I began coding <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2008/09/05/track-hurricanes-on-stormpulse/">my first startup</a> in 2004, Paul Graham’s <em>Hackers &amp; Painters</em> had just hit the shelves of Barnes &amp; Noble, acceleration meant moving to the Bay Area, and few to none would argue the viability of being a solo founder. In that environment, my journey from Florida-based founder with a family to CEO of a successful <a href="https://riskpulse.com/">enterprise SaaS business</a> was filled with friction.</p><p>Emerging fifteen years later to start anew, I rub my Rip Van Winkle eyes and am delighted at what I see. The world has learned that much of the headwind I faced previously was, or at least is deemed, unnecessary. Much has been said and written about the improved tooling of SaaS — there’s now a SaaS for almost every challenge of building a SaaS, but even better and more recent, the capital stack has also matured.</p><p>In 2008, halfway though my previous trek, Paul Graham wrote in his “High Resolution Fundraising”:</p><blockquote>Different terms for different investors is clearly the way of the future. Markets always evolve toward higher resolution.</blockquote><p>With the <a href="https://medium.com/@bryce/why-seed-scaled-f6c64646c59c">rise</a> of convertible notes, SAFE’s, and other standardized terms, this vision has been made manifest.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*1tg7cXB-DDBAzy0rzt1SsQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/ZloDJXzcMGA?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Biegun Wschodni</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/search/photos/spring?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>But even more importantly for me, different terms have finally emerged for <a href="https://medium.com/swlh/the-new-bootstrappers-how-alternative-funding-models-are-embracing-founder-lifestyles-bd66a6656120">different ways of life</a>. “<a href="https://tinyseed.com/">Startup funding for the rest of us</a>” is a feature of the landscape that I didn’t even know I needed the first time around. Now it’s <a href="https://tinyseed.com/">here</a>, <a href="https://indie.vc/">here</a>, and <a href="https://earnestcapital.com/">here</a>, and in later stages, over <a href="https://www.lightercapital.com/">there</a> too.</p><p>The fertile substrate of this Spring is the fact that, for many of us, the lines between the personal and professional are obsolete. Not because one must wither while the other grows, or an acceptance that one will inevitably choke out the other; rather, because the thought of sacrificing one for the other is nonsense. We don’t have to choose. I already see this among this batch: a group of founders, investors, and mentors reaping the tangible <em>and</em> intangible rewards of working <em>with</em> the flows of their own energy and values.</p><p>Yes, the seed stage is a promising time. But all the more so, given that my mission with <a href="https://simsaas.co/">SimSaaS</a> is to help us — founders and investors, select from many possible futures — futures where the financial and personal are often unabashedly commingled, I’m especially eager to prove, along with my new traveling companions, that the best futures will follow from each of us doing our work, for our reasons.</p><p><em>TinySeed is a 12-month program. You can follow my year-long journey building SimSaaS right here, or on Twitter </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mattwensing"><em>@mattwensing</em></a><em>.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f58b8881dbf" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Ownership Mentality: Aligning Professional and Personal]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/swlh/ownership-mentality-aligning-professional-and-personal-63d4541b5b2f?source=rss-ba60142744bf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/63d4541b5b2f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leadership]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[founder-stories]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Wensing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 14 Apr 2019 08:31:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-04-26T03:11:32.483Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EaIw1cKm9SywAjgMliMB-g.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/mG28olYFgHI?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Ross Findon</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/search/photos/chef?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><h3>Ownership Mentality: Aligning the Professional and Personal</h3><p><a href="https://riskpulse.com/">Riskpulse </a>— the company I co-founded 12 years ago this August, <a href="https://www.dcvelocity.com/articles/20190402-transplace-and-riskpulse-team-up-on-predictive-analytics/">recently announced</a> a partnership with the largest managed services logistics firm in North America. With this, the analytic I conjured — the Riskpulse Score, or RpS (think, a FICO score for shipping) will be used to optimize the movement of tens of millions of shipments annually, or roughly $400B worth of cargo.</p><p>It’s a crazy thing, really. An idea imagined on my living room sofa — <em>“what if … ?”</em> — is now being used by thousands of skilled humans — and many server instances, to guide the transportation of goods ranging from Hellmann’s to Budweiser to salt to Accords.</p><p>It’s gratifying proof that after 10 years of hustle — six of it in the manufacturing space, Riskpulse has broken irreversibly into the Fortune 1000; not through the funded purchase of attention or PR fanfare — as the flood of venture capital into the sector has made common, but through an earned reputation of delivering on our promises; of doing what we said we were going to do. The same kinds of guarantees our customers make when shipping their own, physical goods.</p><p>Removed, but likely not far from one of those shipments, I sit and type this reflection on the MacBook Pro provided by the idea that became a company, all the while hoping the butterfly keyboard resists the urge to ingest any of the pollen floating off this soccer field — a field my daughter criss-crosses.</p><p><strong>By design, this is a much different seat than I occupied two years ago.</strong> Then, I was CEO, strategic account lead, business development lead, as-needed product designer, and chief marketer. By the middle of 2017, 10 years in, I had long since passed the technical mantle to our CTO, customer success to a team led by industry veterans in professional services, and data science to a talented, hype-free magician.</p><p>Still, it was crazy at work. And it was crazy at home, too. At least, my extended home. My father passed away of cancer in July of that year, after 53 days in the ICU, 1,300 miles away. It would be too easy to say that trauma was a turning point, and it sells the intensity short. But it <em>is</em> as they say — nothing compares to the view from the front of the queue, that place you find yourself when a little “<em>d.</em>” gets post-fixed to your parent’s name.</p><p>Our children too, all 4 of them, are incapable of waiting to grow up. Perhaps because we all experience it first-hand first, doctors forget to remind us that the S-curve on our child’s growth chart applies to their minds, not just their heights and weights. That thing you talked about 12 months ago? It now feels as distant and irrelevant as 10 years ago. Things really do become “<em>so last week” </em>in a hurry.</p><p><strong>In 2018, I decided to make changes.</strong></p><p>Our COO took over account leadership and project management. Then, on a warm introduction, I recruited a Chief Strategy Officer. Title aside, his role would be taking over all sales and business development activities — qualification, pipeline management, negotiations.</p><p>After a year of working next to me, with the board’s approval, I decided to ask him to become our CEO. He accepted, then pushed in the clutch, upshifting and formalizing the business into a series of components.</p><p>I let go of the wheel. By the end of 2018, my role had narrowed to vital relationships with anchor clients and strategic prospects, and, ironically — far at the other end of the sales process — initial demos.</p><p>One more veteran hire — with recruitment led by my replacement, and …</p><p>… by the time the press release announcing Riskpulse’s new milestone hit the news wire, I had arrived at an uncommon definition of success: I had worked and recruited myself out of every job at my own company. My calendar, once occupied by 8–10 meetings per day, was now intentionally empty, save a few perfunctory handovers.</p><p><strong>My team and board have been nothing but supportive. </strong>Being proactive about my own succession has enabled a transition that has accelerated, rather than hindered, progress. For me, it was a no-brainer: yes, I am a founder; yes, I <em>was </em>the CEO, and of course I was an employee; but first and foremost … I am, and always have been, an owner. Through those eyes, it’s easy to agree with the founder: <em>this change is good.</em></p><p>How do I feel? A bit nervous? Maybe. Surreal? Yes, at times. But overall, it does feel good. Good to have had these 12 years — of memories, experiences, and hard —my goodness sometimes very, very hard — lessons. As such, it’s also good that I will stay involved, as a guide, board member, and evangelist.</p><p>As for all that empty time on the calendar?</p><p>When I’m not reflecting … I’m filling it with code.</p><p><em>Thanks for reading. You can follow me on my next adventure here or </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mattwensing"><em>on twitter</em></a><em>.</em></p><figure><a href="https://medium.com/swlh"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YqDjlKFwScoQYQ62DWEdig.png" /></a></figure><h4>This story is published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a>, Medium’s largest entrepreneurship publication followed by +442,678 people.</h4><h4>Subscribe to receive <a href="https://growthsupply.com/the-startup-newsletter/">our top stories here</a>.</h4><figure><a href="https://medium.com/swlh"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ouK9XR4xuNWtCes-TIUNAw.png" /></a></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=63d4541b5b2f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/ownership-mentality-aligning-professional-and-personal-63d4541b5b2f">Ownership Mentality: Aligning Professional and Personal</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Alternative Funding Calculus: A Quant Comparison of Tiny, Indie, and Earnest]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/swlh/alternative-funding-calculus-a-quant-comparison-of-tiny-indie-and-earnest-8d61d35d5ad5?source=rss-ba60142744bf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8d61d35d5ad5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fundraising]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Wensing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 10 Feb 2019 10:24:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-13T16:57:52.724Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*gKsnN4cbdRZfueyRWA6fjg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/aIYFR0vbADk?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Erol Ahmed</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/search/photos/math?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/the-new-bootstrappers-how-alternative-funding-models-are-embracing-founder-lifestyles-bd66a6656120">Previously</a>, I described the new wave of funding sources that are emerging for bootstrappers. Today, we’ll place a fictional startup named “Array” under the microscope, consider a fundraising strategy, and compare the financial outcomes of raising money from three alternative funds based on publicly-available term sheets.</p><p><em>NOTE: This post was revised on May 23rd, 2019 using a new version of </em><a href="https://usesummit.com/"><em>Summit</em></a><em> that corrects the previous calculation of Earnest Capital’s “Founder Earnings” term. Thanks to </em><a href="https://medium.com/u/8d56c3254158"><em>Tyler Tringas</em></a><em> of Earnest Capital for the clarification.</em></p><p><strong>Imagine you have your very own startup: Array, </strong>a video conferencing tool for distributed teams. You have a real passion for the problem because you (like every other human), knows that every existing web conferencing solution sucks. Even better, you’ve already solved the real crux of it, which required rewriting part of the standard WebRTC library using C++. That means this idea is <em>way</em> out-of-bounds for most web dev kids-these-days. Which is nice, because you’re <a href="https://medium.com/swlh/the-new-bootstrappers-how-alternative-funding-models-are-embracing-founder-lifestyles-bd66a6656120">not interested in going faster than you want</a>.</p><p>So you have a real product with a technical moat. What else is great about Array? Let us count the ways.</p><p>You’re so stoked about the design and UI/UX breakthroughs that you plan to <strong>charge a premium</strong> for the service compared to other solutions like GoToMeeting. $299/mo per team (up to 10 users) has a nice ring to it. That said, you don’t plan to sell to enterprises because they will ask for things you don’t want to do, and for you, custom is loathsome.</p><p><strong>You and your co-founder are both technical,</strong> but you don’t consider marketing a dirty word, so you spend a fair amount of time shielding your brilliant Woz from any such distractions.</p><p>Product? Check. Positioning? Check. <a href="https://medium.com/swlh/hack-hustle-and-bundle-potent-teams-in-vulnerable-markets-d16f33e8dc9c">Team</a>? Check.</p><p><strong>Early response to Array has been positive. </strong>You have just over 150 prospects visiting your site each month and signing up for your newsletter. Early access customers (who are enjoying a free trial) have written testimonials for your next home page. And you just wrote a killer content marketing piece that succinctly explains in 8 hand-crafted pages why distributed teams are the future because distributed teams of futurists literally distribute the future more evenly. And your, product, does, that. <em>Wow!</em> People love it.</p><p>Life is good, but given that your goal is to become free to focus full-time on this venture, you feel a bit stuck — Array isn’t earning the $200k-$300k per year (ARR) it would cost to feed, clothe, and shelter you and your co-founder and your families. So you’re giving some of the new, bootstrapper-friendly funding options like <a href="https://tinyseed.com/">Tiny Seed</a>, <a href="http://www.indie.vc/">Indie.vc</a>, and <a href="https://earnestcapital.com/">Earnest Capital</a> some serious thought.</p><p>But before you engage, you wonder — what will it really cost you, and what will it take to break free? Are you better off bootstrapping? Would one set of terms work better for you than another set? Knowing there’s always some amount of give and take, what terms deserve your focus?</p><p><strong>To decide on the best form of funding for Array, you consider two factors: your speed to market, and your profitability.</strong></p><p><strong>Speed analysis: </strong>Taking money would allow you to go faster, no question. On the other hand, you’re not sure you <em>have</em> to go faster to achieve your dreams. Your arcane, low-level moat is wide enough that an upstart can’t easily come along and steal the opportunity. That said, a large, innovative incumbent like Slack — whose video tools are used widely within the kinds of organizations you’re targeting, might have the chops and means to launch something killer if they take the initiative.</p><p><strong>Speed verdict:</strong> We may have a strong defense from weekend upstarts, but we should move into the market with Array before an incumbent includes this as a killer feature in their in-market platform.</p><p><strong>Second, you consider profitability.</strong> If you were intent on pushing the incumbents out of existence, you’d need to spend a boatload of cash of marketing and PR at scale. This would keep profits thin until you were dominant. You’d also need a more powerful competitive advantage — something that attracted users by the millions and took them away from the incumbent services. Something more powerful than a better experience, perhaps? You’re not sure what that is, but is it possible? Sure, maybe. And if so, a larger product team with a growth hacker or two sprinkled in, would be necessary … and expensive.</p><p>On the other hand, the nature of this market isn’t winner-takes-all, at least not now. Should you spend millions trying to make it that way? You could, but do you have to, to achieve your dreams? Could you build something exciting that was profitable instead of acquiring customers at the highest possible rate? Could you balance these and be content?</p><p><strong>Profit verdict: </strong>Your software is going to be at a premium price point, which means your unit economics will be healthy if you’re successful. With this assumption, and the speed verdict (you don’t <em>have</em> to go ludicrous speed), you decide that taking a modest profit — not investing every dime back into the business to grow as fast as possible, could make sense.</p><p>With this strategy in mind, you compare funding options by creating a 2-year growth forecast using your current monthly mailing list signups (155), estimated conversion rate (5–15%), team size (2), current MRR ($2,400), inherent product virality (k=1.0), and target price points ($99-$499/mo, billed annually 20% of the time, 80% monthly). Rather than open Google Sheets or Excel, you use <a href="https://usesummit.com/">Summit</a> to do the heavy lifting.</p><p>The first question you want to answer is how much cash you should raise. You set “Bootstrapping” as your funding model, which will assume you only have your current cash balance of $10,000 to work with.</p><p>Your 24-month cash forecast based on those inputs:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*H8seo868HPbzCMB2Djn9CQ.png" /></figure><p>This forecast contains 10 runs, representing a range (ensemble) of market timings and momentum (because things never go according to plan). The 3 runs in this image represent a weak-median-strong spread.</p><p>To interpret this chart: if you and your co-founder were to go full-time next month at $100,000 pre-tax salaries, your bank account would bottom out at roughly negative $70,000 in approximately 8–10 months. And that’s assuming none of your assumptions are rosy.</p><p>Your net income, meanwhile, for these scenarios shows break even occurring somewhere between months 9–12 (purple areas shifting above $0):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*mTXaU5QVTnz45WpUQVAwVw.png" /></figure><p>The tall green bars are dividend payments to your team, monuments of hope on the horizon.</p><p>Lastly, revenue, showing all 10 runs to illustrate outliers vs. consensus:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ALQ-avRBAQvVdZckMGMeuA.png" /></figure><p>Not a hockey stick, but you’re just above $600k ARR in the best case scenario — and not doing terribly at $360k ARR in the weakest case. The average is ~$400k. In the strong case, you’ll have profit to pay dividends, or hire help. In all cases, you’re alive and growing — if you can make it that far.</p><p>If negative $70,000 is the nadir, raising $100k-$150k from an alternative funding source could make sense. Let’s compare taking $140k from each:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yIGQq5LX0YJZH6yDBTqNzQ.gif" /><figcaption><strong>Source</strong>: SimSaaS</figcaption></figure><h4>TinySeed</h4><p>More cash should allow you to grow fast, but to stay conservative, you decide to keep almost of your growth assumptions the same, selecting TinySeed first and punching in $140k for 12% ownership. Their terms also make TinySeed eligible to receive dividends, just like your team. If, for example, you chose to pay $100,000 out as a dividend (better than income for [U.S.] tax purposes), you would receive $88,000 and TinySeed would receive the difference of $12,000.</p><p>The one change you decide to make: with the new cash, you will allocate 10% of your monthly budget (non-variable expenses) towards paid lead acquisition at an estimated CPA of $50 per, driving leads into the top of your funnel to boost ARR (and your own return on dilution):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ok2k1mnbGKOgQRBfy2mm4Q.png" /></figure><p>Assuming you don’t pay dividends until you reach profitability, and assuming that you only pay dividends when you have more than 3 months in expenses, the future looks like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*xqcmZAPo4ScJGdTe9pWDSw.png" /></figure><p>Using the above strategy — keeping the business well-fed with 3 months of cash even while profitable and gaining steam, in the average case you have paid $12,600 out to you and your teammates while sending $1,724 to TinySeed, which is 12.3% of their original investment. In the weak case — one in which you are still on your way to a $475k+ ARR business, you have elected to pay out $0 to conserve cash. And the strong case is a numerologically-satisfying 10x of the weak case.</p><p>And of course, your cash forecast is looking much better; in all scenarios, you survive “the dip”:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*VdWaPG8C4Cj8WRBxB4Maog.png" /></figure><h4>Earnest Capital</h4><p>Great. So far so good. You run it again, using Earnest Capital as the funding source, like so:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*S8_IOPOpyxB5Cdo4EBBJmg.png" /></figure><p>Using the same logic for paying dividends, the box score results are:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tG1TeuvcP6D7w9Kx9Nn6ZA.png" /></figure><p>And for illustration, here are the timings of payments to Earnest (dark green) against a Net Income backdrop:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*OA8GBmQvBPeCeYRiZh3c_A.png" /><figcaption>NOTE: Earnest’s terms specify payments on a Quarterly schedule (Monthly shown here).</figcaption></figure><p>You now see that, although launching in the same frame and marketing to the same audience, these two alternative-to-VC funding sources are quite different in terms of operational finance.</p><p>Painting by number:</p><ul><li>Your payments to Earnest in the average case are $34k vs. ~$2k to TinySeed.</li><li>The balance of the 3x Return Cap ($140k x 3 = $420k) is $385k.</li><li>Team dividends are small in an absolute sense but still noteworthy — $0k (Earnest) vs. $12k (TinySeed).</li><li>Earnest has an ‘Equity Basis’ of $385k.</li><li>Payments to Earnest have reduced their convertible ownership to 12.8% based on converting their equity basis into a $3 million valuation cap (pulled from vanilla term sheet).</li></ul><p>How far will their equity basis shrink? Based on their terms, their stake would have a floor of $140,000 (their initial investment amount) divided by the Valuation Cap in their term sheet. Ergo, $140k as a floor for their Equity Basis would give them an eventual, residual stake of 4.6% after you pay the $420k cap in entirety.</p><h4>Indie.vc v3</h4><p>With those trade-offs swimming in your mind, you turn to the Seattle-based pioneers of alternative funding models next: Indie.vc.</p><p>You consider raising $140k from <a href="https://medium.com/u/510b99e51849">Bryce</a> and company, like so:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fE8v9lmkkhrzUw0y2_dg3g.png" /></figure><p>Playing out the future with the same growth assumptions again, the scoreboard looks like this:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*PptsYt9L4hDrSUKaibsO-g.png" /></figure><p>Indie has received $8,453 in payments in the average scenario, while the team has received $14,705. The redemption element of Indie’s terms has shrunk their ownership to 11.7% vs. their original 12%.</p><p><strong>And what about those redemption payments? </strong>They occur regularly, monthly, after an lapse of time specified on a per-deal basis, commonly 20–24 months post-investment, like so:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*NHEUz1nNCmDkpquZyE_EEQ.png" /></figure><p>Because we are looking at a 24-month timeframe, the payments are only beginning to peek into the forecast. These will continue until Indie’s 3x return cap is reached, at which point they will retain a very small, residual stake of 1.2%.</p><h4>Decision Time</h4><p>Few, if any, of the thousands of founders that apply to these funds will have the luxury of choosing among multiple offers, but knowing the trade-offs between these offerings can help you decide what matters most to you.</p><p>In terms of equity —each is in the same zone, but headed in different directions. After their return caps are met, Indie will own 1.2%, Earnest 4.6%. Meanwhile, without a return cap, TinySeed’s ownership is constant at 12%.</p><p>In terms of cash, things are — counterintuitively, not entirely reversed: TinySeed is indeed the least expensive option in these first two years, receiving the fewest dollars as an investor while you capture more for your team than you would with the terms of Earnest or Indie. But Earnest, meanwhile, who was second in residual equity, has received the most cash out of all scenarios — $34k to Indie’s $8k.</p><p>Of course, given the same original investment and return cap, Indie and Earnest will cap out at $420k, while TinySeed will not. TinySeed’s cumulative receipts from their 12% stake will continue to grow while Earnest and Indie’s stay capped. If Array <em>is</em> the next Basecamp, this difference will be measured in the millions of dollars per year. This is a major trade-off.</p><p>But, will the additional payouts in the short-term required by Earnest and Indie hinder your ability to <em>become</em> the next Basecamp? Indie.vc navigates this by delaying repayments for 18–24 months. Earnest does not.</p><p><strong>So what’s your decision? </strong>With valid legal tender and mentorship circles, all three funds are viable vehicles for getting Array where you dream it can go, but the differences are real: Indie.vc allows for a path to maximizing your ownership while delaying repayment, TinySeed requires zero cash repayments at the expense of the most long-term equity and cash in the case of profitable success, while Earnest presents a hybrid that reduces their ownership at the expense of the highest cash outlay in the early years.</p><p>For the scrappiest founders that don’t mind the additional cash up front, Earnest offers an ownership-reduction mechanism; for those that do, TinySeed and Indie.vc are strong options, as their cash draws are simply smaller early on, with salary triggers that are higher or non-existent. For TinySeed founders, this will come at the cost of cash in the post-seed, pre-exit phase. Meanwhile, if you plan to raise a single round of capital, Indie.vc’s redemption program provides the lowest long-term equity cost by a wide margin.</p><p>Your decision is made.</p><p><em>Thanks for reading. </em><a href="https://usesummit.com/"><em>Summit</em></a><em>, the tool used to run this analysis, is now available for free to founders.</em></p><figure><a href="https://medium.com/swlh"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YqDjlKFwScoQYQ62DWEdig.png" /></a></figure><h4>This story is published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a>, Medium’s largest entrepreneurship publication followed by +421,678 people.</h4><h4>Subscribe to receive <a href="https://growthsupply.com/the-startup-newsletter/">our top stories here</a>.</h4><figure><a href="https://medium.com/swlh"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ouK9XR4xuNWtCes-TIUNAw.png" /></a></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8d61d35d5ad5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/alternative-funding-calculus-a-quant-comparison-of-tiny-indie-and-earnest-8d61d35d5ad5">Alternative Funding Calculus: A Quant Comparison of Tiny, Indie, and Earnest</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hack, Hustle, and Bundle: Potent Teams in Vulnerable Markets]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/swlh/hack-hustle-and-bundle-potent-teams-in-vulnerable-markets-d16f33e8dc9c?source=rss-ba60142744bf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d16f33e8dc9c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[talent]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[product-management]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[growth-hacking]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Wensing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Jan 2019 07:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-29T15:51:16.682Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*d9QATrZ9cV4-lppuUDfIOw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/gS59xG5jzQw?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Vishal Banik</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/search/photos/stream?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p><em>Team and market are often cited as the two most important ingredients of outlier startup success. What do these really mean? What kind of team? And what kinds of markets?</em></p><p>Stories of <a href="https://medium.com/swlh/dont-copy-the-greeks-the-necessary-originality-of-unwelcome-distribution-2fe96bd7bce0">successful distribution by upstarts</a> are stories of exploited vulnerabilities in market incumbents. So it makes sense that growth specialists are called hackers.</p><p><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hackers-Painters-Big-Ideas-Computer/dp/1449389554">Hackers &amp; Painters</a>, Paul Graham’s seminal tome of the Web 2.0 era, drilled the importance of the hacker ethos into early 2000’s startup founders. In short, at the core of hacking is <a href="http://www.paulgraham.com/gba.html">rule-breaking</a>.</p><p>The hacker label appealed to programmer lore, but its technical connotations belied the fact that the successful penetration of market defenses calls for more than programming prowess. It also requires grey-hat (rule-breaking) sales acumen, i.e. hustle.</p><p>Ergo, later in the evolution of the startup landscape, tech leaders were eager <a href="https://www.marsdd.com/news-and-insights/hacker-hustler-and-designer-building-the-tech-team/">to underscore</a> the importance of something else: hustle. Because technical hacking — “rule breaking that is brilliantly imaginative” (Graham) manifests itself in tangible products, hustle, a soft skill manifested by persuasion that guides the future, is easier to misidentify.</p><blockquote>Hacking without hustle is brute force. Hustle without hacking is an ambush without ammunition. With both, a team is capable of achieving greatness.</blockquote><p><strong>Sometimes hustle is confused with ambition. </strong>Hard-working, ambitious people are often high-achievers, but rather than gain power through accretive trades up the social ladder, they are <em>granted</em> increased authority and rewards by pleasing the powers that be. In other words, their deft persuasion gets them promoted to a larger sphere of influence, but those boundaries are nonetheless drawn by their superiors. By definition, this is not rule-breaking.</p><p><strong>Hustle is also mistaken for sales success.</strong> Sales typically occur along a value chain — a process or series of well-defined, structured interactions where getting value (paid) requires paying your fair share for that value upfront. In enterprise sales, this looks like an RFP (request for proposal) being issued by the potential buyer, followed by many hours that span weeks or even months of evaluation. Regardless of whether the process is well-orchestrated, it remains tightly controlled, with lots of taxes and tolls installed along the way. Following the rules is mission critical. Therefore, sales success is a necessary but insufficient indicator of the presence of hustle.</p><p><strong>Hustle looks at sales process obliquely.</strong> While it’s important to jump through the required hoops to avoid disqualification, hustle looks for advantages outside the intended boundaries of the process. Similar to hackers exploiting HTML forms with buffer overflow attacks and SQL injection, hustle presses the boundaries on social constructs, testing the use of informalities that signal openness while remaining skeptical of the supposed absence of shortcuts, a young Link placing bombs against dungeon walls. This explains why enterprise sales happen at cocktail bars and golf courses: deals always happen between people, outside the formal process. Hustle knows that if all you have is formality, you still have nothing.</p><p>This applies to fundraising as well, since fundraising is enterprise sales (of equity, rather than product). For a great example of informality appearing to trounce professionalism, check out <a href="https://medium.com/u/8edc94d7a232">Andrew Chen</a>’s recent signing of a napkin-based term sheet at a California burger joint:</p><h3>Lucas Matney on Twitter</h3><p>Chatted with @andrewchen and @m2jr about their investment in Sandbox VR&#39;s $68M Series A https://t.co/yF3fIVJ6gM</p><p>Note that this wasn’t an isolated incident of hustle on the Sandbox’s team’s part, nor does it take away from the hacking required to bring their VR to life. Rather, it’s the visible symptom of a team that has both, the combination of which is essential: hacking without hustle is brute force; hustle without hacking is an ambush without ammunition. With both, a team is capable of achieving greatness in-market. How?</p><h4>Bundling &amp; Unbundling</h4><blockquote><em>There are only two ways to make money in business: One is to bundle; the other is unbundle.</em></blockquote><blockquote><em>— Jim Barksdale</em></blockquote><p>The dual threat of hack and hustle are best applied in markets where there’s an opportunity to bundle or unbundle. To bundle is to fuse links in a value chain in order to remove friction and improve consumer experience. To unbundle is to decouple fused links in a value chain to create choice.</p><p><strong>Bundling. </strong>Take, for example, the challenge of publishing digital photos with your phone in 2010. There <em>was</em> a way, but it was hard, messy, and poorly managed by Apple/Android, your Photo app, Dropbox/GDrive, and Facebook. The value flowed through a series of disorganized steps (a value chain), from photographer to viewer, like so:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*E7l6f9Wal0TyVMXTeNvL1g@2x.jpeg" /><figcaption>That’s a lot of loosely-connected steps (i.e. end-to-end tedium).</figcaption></figure><p>The UX of any given link was likely fine. The more important strategic observation — the one that the hustler sees, is that <em>no one company owned the end-to-end flow. </em>Instead, the value is flowing through many different hands, as evidenced by the number of logos involved. Any time value changes hands, it is open to consumer choice — a vulnerability along the daisy chain of expectations.</p><p>With bundling, this has all changed. Consumers have exchanged choice <em>that wasn’t adding value to their mission</em> for a deeply-ingrained habit of tapping the Instagram icon with every feature embedded (even the Camera!). Instagram has transformed what was previously an unstructured mess of value cascading left-to-right into a tight loop of events all contained within a single fortress (Facebook, Inc.):</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*yGICUJaxoONJ9SwJx2o4Bg@2x.jpeg" /></figure><p>Because none of the incumbents had an accurate appreciation of the end-to-end hassle, this bundling ended up being worth far more than any of the incumbents knew. As a result of this tight integration, the cost of publishing engaging photos has fallen exponentially. And when the means of production get exponentially cheaper, value creation explodes too. Behold: a unicorn.</p><p>Generalizing this, bundling opportunities emerge when the<strong> </strong>value flowing between two members of the ecosystem is poorly managed, i.e. unsecured. These are value chains within which multiple companies operate but the connections are loose, fuzzy, or klunky. If many people are attempting to traverse these clumsy links, hustle spies an opportunity to break convention and re-draw the boundaries of the market by putting a lasso around the entire chain. The hacker fulfills this vision by delivering the integrated app experience. Consumers, frustrated with the difficulty of performing actions along the old world chain, gladly forsake choice and flock to the new walled garden. [1]</p><p><strong>Unbundling. </strong>By contrast, consider the bundling of Google’s search engine with its advertisements (AdWords). These are tightly bound, and users do not have a choice of whether or not to participate in Google’s advertising business separate from their search results.</p><p>This lack of choice over advertising engines doesn’t look like a pain point, but privacy increasingly is. To capitalize on this forced loss of confidentiality, in late 2008, <a href="https://medium.com/u/e1a76f1f570">Gabriel Weinberg</a> set out to create <a href="http://duckduckgo.com/">DuckDuckGo</a>. Unlike Google, DuckDuckGo is the “search engine that doesn’t track you.”</p><p>How successful is DDG? This graph shows their climb upward since 2010, along with annotations of notable events:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*N87-8VHPZwGfmJXNEQgS7A.png" /><figcaption>Millions of searches, searches for free. (Credit: <a href="https://duckduckgo.com/traffic">DDG Traffic</a>)</figcaption></figure><p>While bundling typically delivers instant gratification (as users say goodbye to aggravating experiences), unbundling often delivers an accretive benefit in the form of savings: financial, physical, or mental, as users exercise their newfound choice to make smarter, healthier decisions. The annotations in this graph — where DDG’s growth rate gets a boost — mark moments in time when the value of privacy got underscored by the media. Each time this happens, the value of the choice enabled by DDG’s unbundling of search and identity becomes more apparent.</p><p>The hacking required to build a search engine is impressive (understatement), but the hustle came in Gabriel’s clarity of vision to see that this lack of choice was going to become increasingly difficult for incumbents to sustain. Splitting search and identity was a bold move that broke from the convention that Google had established, i.e. the way to make money as a search engine is highly-targeted, personalized ads. [2]</p><h4><strong>Spotting Incumbent Vulnerabilities in the Wild</strong></h4><p>What if you’re a hack-hustle team without a market insight?</p><p>For bundling, look for spaces where the steps in a value transfer between two parties is unclear, unmapped or unknown, accompanied by frustration. These are incumbent vulnerabilities, hiding in plain sight. In security, holes like these are sometimes found through <a href="https://el2.convertkit-mail2.com/c/preview/pnceh9hk/aHR0cHM6Ly9lbi53aWtpcGVkaWEub3JnL3dpa2kvRnV6emluZw==">fuzzing</a>, a penetration testing technique that plays with input (through randomness) to attempt to gain access to systems. And it makes sense that a void would get discovered through undirected play, rather than following any clear signs — there simply aren’t any.</p><p>Another ready-to-be-bundled clue: a vulnerable bundling implies a breach in trust. Flickr and Google Photos <em>trusted</em> that people’s digital snapshots would <em>somehow</em> make it to their services, but they underestimated the number of hops between mobile camera lenses and their clouds, and what these hops cost the consumer in terms of time. Time for which they would gladly surrender choice.</p><p>For unbundling, look for tightly-coupled experiences where you lack choice, and ask yourself why, and what if you did? Would you be free to benefit in a way that’s at least vaguely measurable? The easier to measure, the faster the growth opportunity for an unbundled experience.</p><p>What opportunities do you see now?</p><p><a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19027263"><em>Discussion</em></a><em> on Hacker News.</em></p><p><em>Thanks for reading. You can follow me here on Medium or on twitter at </em><a href="http://twitter.com/mattwensing"><em>mattwensing</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>NOTES:</p><p>[1] Another POV on bundling: when bundling is successful, it’s because incumbents misunderstood the job-to-be-done. It was never “post a photo to Facebook.” That was only the final step. The job was “express myself online”, which begins with opening the Camera app and ends with posting online. Because the job was certainly <em>not</em> “upload to cloud,” the acquirer of startups that bundle are usually the owners of the last step in the value chain. While not a disruptive threat, the startup <em>is</em> a valuable customer acquisition channel, reaching earlier into the chain than the incumbent can solo.</p><p>[2] The bundling of business model components is usually core to incumbents, so successful unbundlings are existential threats. Ergo, if DDG succeeds, it likely cannot be acquired by Google, just as matter can’t swallow anti-matter (without very bad things happening). More likely is DDG stays independent for a very long time or gets acquired by someone that wants to compete with Google using an unbundled offering.</p><figure><a href="https://medium.com/swlh"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YqDjlKFwScoQYQ62DWEdig.png" /></a></figure><h4>This story is published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a>, Medium’s largest entrepreneurship publication followed by +417,678 people.</h4><h4>Subscribe to receive <a href="http://growthsupply.com/the-startup-newsletter/">our top stories here</a>.</h4><figure><a href="https://medium.com/swlh"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ouK9XR4xuNWtCes-TIUNAw.png" /></a></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d16f33e8dc9c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/hack-hustle-and-bundle-potent-teams-in-vulnerable-markets-d16f33e8dc9c">Hack, Hustle, and Bundle: Potent Teams in Vulnerable Markets</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Indie.vc v3: Austin (Roadshow 2019)]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/swlh/indie-vc-v3-austin-roadshow-2019-e17399135648?source=rss-ba60142744bf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e17399135648</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[funding]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Wensing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jan 2019 07:51:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-18T07:51:03.172Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*AVIfu09woYARCWQDPUCh8Q.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Bryce Roberts (Indie.vc) &amp; David Hauser (Grasshopper) discussing David’s un-VC path to a $150M+ exit.</em></figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/510b99e51849"><em>Bryce Roberts</em></a><em> of </em><a href="https://medium.com/u/2932d151e989"><em>Indie.vc</em></a><em> made the first stop of his 2019 Winter Tour at </em><a href="https://medium.com/u/2a4ca6f3d8d9"><em>Capital Factory</em></a><em> in Austin, Texas on Monday. What follows is an overview of the evening’s discussion which I thought would be helpful to share with anyone interested in the </em><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/the-new-bootstrappers-how-alternative-funding-models-are-embracing-founder-lifestyles-bd66a6656120"><em>new wave of alternative funding</em></a><em> that Indie.vc pioneered.</em></p><blockquote>The v3 terms give us a new opportunity to tell our story. To remove uncertainty about what we’re doing and how.</blockquote><blockquote>— Bryce Roberts, Indie.vc</blockquote><h4>Agenda</h4><p>Background — 15 minutes<br>Founder story — from the trenches.<br>Live Q &amp; A.</p><h4>Notes</h4><p>On the heels of this NYT piece (below), there has been quite a few reactions among investors &amp; entrepreneurs alike:</p><h3>Erin Griffith on Twitter</h3><p>Here it is! After years of VC-worship, startups are rejecting venture capital and exploring other ways to grow their business: https://t.co/0E0R1B1uuv</p><p>The conversation Indie.vc is trying to have is a hot topic, and part of the goal of the Winter Tour is <strong>to address any mischaracterizations of the VC vs. bootstrap debate</strong>, which can often become personal with experiences and biases in ways that aren’t helpful.</p><p>The v3 terms give Indie a new opportunity to tell their story. To remove uncertainty about what they’re doing and how.</p><h4><strong>Background on Indie.vc</strong></h4><p>In 2005, Bryce &amp; colleagues observed a funding (seed) gap like so:<br><strong>Angels $100k </strong>— GAP — <strong>VC’s $5m+</strong></p><p>To meet this need (fill the gap), they started <a href="http://oatv.com/">OATV</a>. They were really interested in the tech trends that drive cost out of business. Particularly in tech startups that don’t require $5m-$10m funding so as to preserve optionality.</p><p>Along the way they realized this is a new business model, not just a gap in the market. A business model where your return profile could look fundamentally different than traditional VC.</p><p>It took 2 years to raise their first fund. The approach was unfamiliar and didn’t seem obvious (especially after the dot com hangover).</p><p>First fund: 2 yrs to raise from their investors (LP’s), second fund took 2 months! Then, the 2010+ seed surge. More and more options for founders.</p><p>New gap discovered:<br><strong>Bootstrappers</strong> — GAP — <strong>VC’s</strong></p><p>This appeared to be a binary choice: pick one. And the cadence was seed, Series A, Series B, … fundable milestone after fundable milestone. We discovered this cadence is not how all entrepreneurs approach their business progress.</p><p>Another way this gap was being presented:<br><strong>Lifestyle Businesses (<em>Small Ball, that’s ok …</em>) </strong>— GAP —<strong> Monopolies (Scorched Earth Domination!)</strong></p><p>When this becomes the investment lens, it becomes a game of trying to determine if startups that are in some cases pre-product, pre-revenue, pre-anything, will become a monopoly. Ergo, less about how <em>great</em> the business can be, more about how <em>fundable</em> the business can be down the road.</p><p><strong>“Unicorns Ate Seed Investing”</strong><br>The operative question became, ‘can it be a billion dollar business?’ Suddenly this is a question that everyone must answer, <em>a priori</em>. But a lot of startups don’t show indications of being unicorns, even in the first 3–5 years. This feels wrong. This mentality affected how seed and VC’s process deal flow (what they look for in prospective investments).</p><p><strong>Industry Trend: VC Dollars are Consolidating</strong><br>Later stage rounds are growing, early stage is shrinking(!), also:</p><p>98% of VC dollars to 1 gender<br>80% of VC dollars to 3 states<br>1% VC dollars to black/latino founders<br>0.6% of businesses raise any VC dollars at all</p><p>30 under 30 is rife with traditional profiles &amp; archetypes that calcify, turning into a reinforcement loop of who gets money and who doesn’t.</p><p>On the NYT article, <a href="https://medium.com/u/512799633b56">Bill Gurley</a>’s tweet:</p><h3></h3><p>100% agree with this article, &amp; have voiced this opinion my whole career. The vast majority of entrepreneurs should NOT take venture capital. Why? Article nails it: it is a binary &quot;swing for the fences&quot; exercise. Bootstrapping more likely to lead to individual financial success. https://t.co/s1mAOKwz6m</p><p>It’s true, the VC funnel is so narrow in how it measures success. How does this compare to Indie.vc?</p><p><strong>Indie.vc portfolio stats:</strong><br>Median rev at time of investment: $267k<br>Rev increase in 12 mo: +100%<br>Rev increase in 24 mo: +300%</p><p>Median investment: $250k<br>Avg. equity option: 9%</p><p><strong>Results:</strong><br>8 of 17 doing $1M+ in revenue<br>16 of 17 still in business<br>50% female, 20% black</p><p><strong>Goals of the v3 Terms &amp; Tour</strong><br>Create a standard (shared, open) set of terms within the emerging ecosystem.<br>Shorten time to first repurchase.<br>Improve tax efficiency of distributions<br>Empower entrepeneurs through equity and optionality<br>Create strong narrative around the ‘indie.vc gap’ opportunity</p><p><strong>What are the terms? Highlights:<br></strong>Structured as a convertible note with a few key additions:<br>- Introduces idea of equity repurchase after 18 mo. <br>- Founder repurchase up to 90% of equity option at 3x investment. <br>Conversion trigger at remaining equity option %:<br>- Acquisition<br>- $5M+ funding round<br> <br>Full details available on the <a href="http://www.indie.vc/faq">website</a>.</p><h4>Founder Discussion (Rough Transcript, Not Verbatim)</h4><blockquote>Running my own company, I never had a portfolio approach. I have only 1 game I’m playing and I HAVE to win that game, unlike my investor.</blockquote><blockquote>— David Hauser, Grasshopper</blockquote><p>David Hauser, founder of Grasshopper, which he bootstrapped and scaled to $10m+ in revenue, and sold to Citrix for more than $150 million. (<em>NOTE: As we learn later, they had only 2 people on their cap table at time of exit</em>).</p><p>David and his business partner were just 2 guys wanting to start a business, not sophisticated/savvy technologists, so they had to learn a lot on the fly.</p><p>David’s previous experience was taking funds from a NYC VC, who brought in management team. David did not like that experience.</p><p><strong>Example of bootstrapping in the trenches: </strong>first purchase of equipment for Grasshopper; cost was $250k, but they only had $100k. Because of this cash constraint, they got creative and figured out how to pay him NET 90 instead of up front. They had a spirit of doing whatever it took.</p><p>In Grasshopper they also had a labs function where they built other companies, most notably, <a href="https://www.chargify.com/">Chargify</a>. But David admits, even with the success of Grasshopper, they had capital (venture debt), so they were able to play it a little loose at times and did some things wrong … “I think in some cases we would have been more successful without it.” When you have it, you spend it vs. getting creative.</p><p><strong>Virtues of having constraints: </strong>David and his business partner did everything themselves (at least first) instead of hiring someone. “Literally every single job we did ourselves.” Taking sales calls, plugging in T1 lines, everything.</p><p><strong>Bryce: </strong>Having to be so capital efficient: managing your operation so closely, being conservative on the hiring, really understanding the levers of the business. This creates leverage down the road by learning every functional area. Found this makes a huge difference.</p><p><strong>David: </strong>Yes, and it turns out the things we learned in Years 1–5 were very valuable to the acquirer. We were a more attractive business. They liked buying an accretive cashflow, profitable businesses.</p><p><strong>Bryce: </strong>How would you contrast bootstrapping Grasshopper vs. your heavily-funded competitors? RingCentral was Sequoia funded, had an IPO event.</p><p><strong>David: </strong>When you go back and look at the numbers — although the IPO was bigger than our sale, they made tremendously less, multiples less, per founder. As a pure outcome to the founders, it was significant.</p><p><strong>Bryce:</strong> How did it effect your psychology to watch competitors have all these prestigious backers?</p><p><strong>David:</strong> We ignored all competitors. We didn’t care about their pricing; we didn’t care what they were doing. We added text messaging 5 years after our competitors because <em>customers weren’t asking for it</em>. Biggest frustration on the team was our “lack of TechCrunch coverage.” Meanwhile, RingCentral had VOIP, money, coverage.</p><p><strong>Bryce: </strong>Funding gets press, so what do you do?</p><p><strong>David: </strong>We fired our PR firm, hired a Jr Salesperson, and had them pitch to writers, hundreds of pieces covered that way. They were paid as a salesperson, $30k-$40k base, highly commissioned, $75k-$80k range. We suggested pitch angles that were never about funding. “2 crazy young founders from Babson College!”, whatever we needed to get their attention.</p><h4>Live Q&amp;A</h4><p><strong>Q (for David): “What did Grasshopper look like (in terms of people by dept roughly) before you sold it?”</strong></p><p>A: 10 engineers out of 42 people, lots in marketing, ops for 24x7, call center, NO SALES TEAM (all inbound).</p><p><strong>Q (for David): “How did you consider runway before hiring?”</strong></p><p>A: We didn’t think about runway. Focused on selling. No backend CRM. I was typing in SQL statements to look up the customer names as we took orders.</p><p><strong>Q (Bryce to David): “You’re an LP in Indie.vc. Why? What resonated with you?”</strong></p><p>A: At that time I had done 50–60 investments. I was never thrilled with how the terms were presented … I liked bootstrapping … but how about investment terms that prove there ARE other ways? The second thing … finding a structure that aligned me better with the founder compared to typical structure. Not based purely on fundraising wheel which isn’t aligned with me and the entrepreneur. Running my own company, I never had a portfolio approach. I have only 1 game I’m playing and I HAVE to win that game, unlike my investor. As far as outcomes, the difference is quite large. Money returned to founders for Grasshopper was way larger to us. We had 2 people in our cap table. So we didn’t have to get to a billion dollar even to get to an outcome that is life-changing. We sold for $100m. Not a great return for a VC.</p><p><strong>Q (for David): “Employees have expectations about equity as employee N on the team. If you’re bootstrapping … not planning to sell, what do you recommend?”</strong></p><p>A: At Grasshopper, in NYC, there was plenty of talent competition. We got asked this all the time. But … we gave equity to no one, because we didn’t expect to ever sell the business. Instead, we paid above average salary — pretty significantly above average. We also were able to fund a pool at the management’s discretion to pay annual bonuses. And we carved out money for the management team in the event of exit, because we said we’ll take care of you if we ever do sell. For employees, we had an active profit sharing pool that refreshed annually.</p><p><strong>Q (for Bryce): “How do your investors measure your success? What are their expectations relative to the LP’s of traditional VC?”</strong></p><p>A: They are used to IRR but we can’t use it … we are still working on it … our startups are profitable, growing revenue … <strong>we believe they will ultimately return a better return than if they were getting marked up. </strong>I probably underestimated the amount of rewiring required but we are fortunate to have great LP’s that have been with us for 4 funds now. We do frame ourselves as VC. We believe we will be competitive for the kinds of returns that VC yields traditionally. Out of 17 investments — 16 are still in business. There may be a story that says what used to be a 0, is now a 1,2,3. And the home runs are still home runs.</p><p><strong>Q (for Bryce): “How would you compare LighterCapital and indie.vc?”</strong></p><p>A: Lighter is pretty classic debt, they’ll be taking their slice the first month. We can give 18 months to 3 years before the founder needs to engage in a repurchase plan. Because we don’t borrow, we don’t have a cost of a capital. If a founder is debating 1 of the 2 … Lighter might end up being the better partner than us. But we are providing more than cash. We are providing an amazing community of founders, strategic support, advice on how to really grow your business — which is evident in the results we’re seeing in our portfolio companies.</p><p><strong>Q (for Bryce): “What industries or types of companies do you invest in?”</strong></p><p>A: We are pretty geographically agnostic, other than being tepid about international. What we’re looking for— it’s hard to say … a chip on shoulder matters more than the specific industry. People who share our DNA more than anything else. Business models where Indie.vc likely doesn’t make sense: long lag between development and commercialization, winner-takes-all, weaponized balance sheets can be competitive advantage —these are not for us. We also want people who aren’t afraid to sell … open to developing a real sales culture. This mentality gets you as close to your customer and ground truth vs anything else. It’s a bad situation when founders are avoiding getting on the phone and talking to customers.</p><p><strong>Q (for Bryce): “Can this form of funding work with longer sales cycles?”</strong></p><p>A: We do have a portfolio company that sells into government. <em>The trick is not believe that you’re going to be able to sell and scale faster than you realistically will. </em>The venture funded companies that get in trouble are the ones that think they’ve cracked the code on shortening the sales cycle (and they haven’t). We would want to know if the risk on the delay between start and finish of a sales motion is worth it.</p><p><strong>Q (for Bryce): “What are you offering in terms of benefits or resources you offer your portfolio companies once they apply and they’re in the v3 batch?”</strong></p><p>A: One of the things that has become a secret weapon over the last few years … there are lots of David’s out there … they don’t get the chance to talk about how they built their businesses. We are trying to create an alternative universe of founders that think and want to build along these lines. They talk about their business differently than someone that talks about just raising their Series A or Series B. We want to give founders exposure to people that know how to build real businesses. As one founder recently said, we offer ‘just enough VC BS’ — accountability, that phone call you know is coming every month … how it went, did you hit your numbers, miss your numbers, why …</p><p><strong>Q (for Bryce): “What happens in the event a startup can’t make redemption payments to Indie.vc?”</strong></p><p>A: In that situation (which hasn’t happened yet), we do have the right to force the repayment — in other words, find a lender to buy us out … but what we’re trying to do throughout all of this is <em>not</em> be a lender … we are partners.</p><p><strong>Q (for Bryce): “Who else is offering these alternative funding structures?”</strong></p><p>A: <a href="https://tinyseed.com/">TinySeed</a> &amp; <a href="https://earnestcapital.com/">Earnest Capital</a> are set up to do pre-revenue types of companies. We also get lumped together with Clearbank, LighterCapital. Our focus is on equity-efficient businesses. Can we create more [financial] tools that entrepreneurs can leverage to build their businesses?</p><h4>Closing Remarks (Bryce)</h4><p>The conclusion he’s coming to over and over again over the last 4 years is that this is a better model for most companies.</p><p>If Indie.vc can encourage that through structure, narrative, OR community … if they can support companies along this path … we are all going to see more Grasshopper-like companies. Recent examples: Qualtrics, Github.</p><p>We lose the plot on those companies way too easily. Magic that happens by focusing on customers, revenue, profit early. They want to tear down walls to show there’s another way. They want to provide just enough funding to allow entrepreneurs to continue down their path without having to swallow whole cloth everything that comes with the traditional model.</p><p><strong>END</strong></p><p><em>Thanks for reading. If you enjoyed these notes, you’d probably enjoy my recent write-ups on </em><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/the-new-bootstrappers-how-alternative-funding-models-are-embracing-founder-lifestyles-bd66a6656120"><em>alternative funding models</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/rise-of-the-transformers-db7887c26689"><em>the future of early-stage investing</em></a><em>. You can also </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mattwensing"><em>follow me on twitter</em></a><em>.</em></p><figure><a href="https://medium.com/swlh"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YqDjlKFwScoQYQ62DWEdig.png" /></a></figure><h4>This story is published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a>, Medium’s largest entrepreneurship publication followed by +412,714 people.</h4><h4>Subscribe to receive <a href="http://growthsupply.com/the-startup-newsletter/">our top stories here</a>.</h4><figure><a href="https://medium.com/swlh"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ouK9XR4xuNWtCes-TIUNAw.png" /></a></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e17399135648" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/indie-vc-v3-austin-roadshow-2019-e17399135648">Indie.vc v3: Austin (Roadshow 2019)</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Don’t Copy the Greeks: The Necessary Originality of Unwelcome Distribution]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/swlh/dont-copy-the-greeks-the-necessary-originality-of-unwelcome-distribution-2fe96bd7bce0?source=rss-ba60142744bf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2fe96bd7bce0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[entrepreneurship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup-marketing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[growth-hacking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Wensing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 10 Jan 2019 12:27:38 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-10T17:49:38.015Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-xcFw_PIBbu1hR2sKtsxig.jpeg" /><figcaption>Photo by <a href="https://unsplash.com/photos/DELDTYAjPrg?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Hans Reniers</a> on <a href="https://unsplash.com/search/photos/greece?utm_source=unsplash&amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;utm_content=creditCopyText">Unsplash</a></figcaption></figure><p>If market access is guarded by incumbents, how can unknown upstarts win? One common growth tactic is mimicking prior, successful attempts at gaining distribution. Founder stories get canonized, and eager disciples imitate.</p><p><strong>But, vulnerabilities exploited by upstarts get patched. </strong>Success of the mission aside, Troy would be caught off guard by the pregnant wooden horse once and only once. The next Instagram will not be able to piggyback on Facebook’s social graph. The next Tweetdeck will not be able to use what’s left of Twitter’s API’s. The next Zygna will not be able to embed their games into Facebook. Each of these startups dove headlong into gaps that quickly closed behind them. (Good on them. When your success depends on entering a wormhole in infinite space, timing and position are everything.)</p><p>This reactive patching of vulnerabilities in value chains isn’t unique to Facebook, or even to social media. And it doesn’t even require that the attacked be a singular entity. As the popularity of using invitations to aid consumer virality has increased, the general public has developed antibodies en masse. How many onboarding flows have you abandoned lately that asked you to import all of your contacts to spam all your friends?</p><h4>The Tollbooths of Troy</h4><p>With these moats widening, attempts at disruptive infiltration only preserve, or even strengthen, the existing order. Lacking novel inroads, startups are forced into paying the guards for entry, pouring money into the very giants (GOOG, FB) that control the most territory, as <a href="https://medium.com/u/8edc94d7a232">Andrew Chen</a> mused:</p><h3>andrewchen on Twitter</h3><p>What % of startup dollars end up going to FB and Google as customer acquisition costs on one end, and SF landlords (for their employee living costs) on the other? What % is actually left to build the business?</p><p>One answer:</p><h3>Thomasbcn on Twitter</h3><p>@andrewchen according to @chamath &quot;Startups spend almost 40 cents of every VC dollar on Google, Facebook, and Amazon&quot; https://t.co/yHfkY869yc</p><p>As even these channels have diminishing returns, a growth-at-all-costs mindset has evolved [1], sometimes with fatal consequences, as headlines about Uber, <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/the-inside-story-of-zenefits-2016-3">Zenefits</a>, and Theranos have <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackgarson/2019/01/07/entrepreneur-sickness-the-five-screwups-of-startups/#ed9ecd09e08c">attested</a>.</p><p><strong>So what’s the telltale sign of novel distribution? </strong>One thing that the great hacks have had in common: they were inexpensive. Hotmail’s “Sent via Hotmail” in footers, Zuck scraping dorm photos, Instagram freely posting to Facebook’s feed, AirBnB scraping Craigslist: if you diagram these, there were no financial transactions, i.e. none of the hackers paid the hacked to reach the market.</p><p>In other words, the best distribution hacks are those that find a way to siphon an existing value stream without payment. Why? Not because the hackers were cheap, though they were scrappy. Rather, because cash registers are the deployed code of incumbents, and <a href="https://medium.com/@devaul/https-medium-com-devaul-innovation-isnt-what-you-think-it-is-52f03a9d2d7d">innovation is</a> the business of robbing from the existing order.</p><p>Great artists don’t copy. And neither do they pay.</p><p>Comments on <a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18874769">Hacker News</a>.</p><p><em>Thanks for reading. You can follow me here on Medium, or on twitter </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mattwensing"><em>@mattwensing</em></a><em>.</em></p><p>NOTES:</p><p>[1] “Growth at all costs” is now <a href="https://medium.com/swlh/rise-of-the-transformers-db7887c26689">devolving</a>.</p><figure><a href="https://medium.com/swlh"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YqDjlKFwScoQYQ62DWEdig.png" /></a></figure><h4>This story is published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a>, Medium’s largest entrepreneurship publication followed by +409,714 people.</h4><h4>Subscribe to receive <a href="http://growthsupply.com/the-startup-newsletter/">our top stories here</a>.</h4><figure><a href="https://medium.com/swlh"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ouK9XR4xuNWtCes-TIUNAw.png" /></a></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2fe96bd7bce0" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/dont-copy-the-greeks-the-necessary-originality-of-unwelcome-distribution-2fe96bd7bce0">Don’t Copy the Greeks: The Necessary Originality of Unwelcome Distribution</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Rise of the Transformers]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/swlh/rise-of-the-transformers-db7887c26689?source=rss-ba60142744bf------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/db7887c26689</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[venture-capital]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fundraising]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matt Wensing]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 04 Jan 2019 07:28:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-13T16:59:03.251Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1000/1*htIjwMmK-FCy0II2iaLVFg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Not ordinary biplanes. (Credit: <a href="https://reflector.tfw2005.com/">Transformer Toys</a>)</figcaption></figure><h3>The Transformer Startup</h3><h4>Tremors, groanings, and the fat tail future of early-stage investing</h4><p>For years, founder decision frameworks have pointed toward an approximate true North: growth. How do you know if some thing is the right thing? “Ask yourself if it creates growth. If so, do it. If not … why bother?”</p><p>The needle of that reliable compass has started bouncing lately. “Growth at all costs” has entered the zeitgeist as a pejorative. And as an opposite — but by no means equal, not yet — reaction to the growth hacker nation, <a href="https://medium.com/swlh/the-new-bootstrappers-how-alternative-funding-models-are-embracing-founder-lifestyles-bd66a6656120">a new wave</a> of founders and investors have appeared. Their rallying cry? Sustainable growth through profits:</p><h3>indievc on Twitter</h3><p>After spending over a decade prior to @indievc helping seed stage companies raise hundreds of millions, it is seeing our founders achieve this &quot;profitable confidence&quot; that has been our most rewarding work, by far. https://t.co/mjV4WtlzZR</p><p>Even Paul Graham, author of the essay “<a href="http://www.paulgraham.com/growth.html">Startup = Growth</a>” that became an industry manifesto and rationalized VC funding for the sake of growth, is piling on:</p><h3>Paul Graham on Twitter</h3><p>I would be so excited to read an investor update where &quot;we&#39;ve achieved product-market fit&quot; was followed by &quot;now we&#39;re going to put our heads down and just grow&quot; instead of &quot;now we&#39;re going to spend months trying to raise money.</p><h4>Into the Fog</h4><p>For some founders, this shifting investor focus will feel like business as usual — the shroud of uncertainty is a constant companion; still others, burning through cash in pursuit of a dream, believing the next round is just ahead, likely won’t find a safe place to land.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/9d9e7084d6cb">Fred Wilson</a> — a VC with early investments in unicorns like Twitter, Zynga, and Kickstarter, spent some time looking into this Bermuda Triangle between customer growth, revenue, and profits and wrote:</p><blockquote>“It got me thinking that there is something about tech, particularly venture capital-backed tech, that allows us to operate for what seems like forever without a need to generate self sustaining profits.” — Fred Wilson, <a href="https://avc.com/2018/12/the-profit-motive/">The Profit Motive</a></blockquote><p>Fred continues: “This can be a fantastic way to generate value when the opportunity is large enough (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Twitter, etc). But it is not a fantastic way to generate value when the opportunity is constrained, either by a smallish market size (TAM) or by a ton of competitors (little to no barriers to entry) or a number of other factors.”</p><p>The line along which Fred chose to make this distinction — opportunity size, is insightful, perhaps even the beginning of a rubric that a founder could use to inform a new way of thinking. For now, however, his conclusion is a bit of a cliffhanger: “We don’t seem to value [profits] in the tech/VC/startup world very much. Maybe we should.”</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/68e8ed3ef2d8">Chris Savage</a>, co-founder and CEO of Wistia, hit on the same notion, from the seat of a founder that’s been on — and off, the VC train:</p><h3>Chris Savage on Twitter</h3><p>2/ The argument does make sense. If your startup can grow faster by spending more, that can give you a competitive advantage and help you seize opportunities in some markets. But that model just doesn&#39;t work for every type of startup. https://t.co/f4stfzSJlq</p><p>While Fred mused it’s when the opportunity is constrained, Chris <a href="https://savagethoughts.com/why-i-invested-in-sparktoro-72c101ff753d">outlines the trappings of VC</a>, but doesn’t mention opportunity constraints. In other words, passing on venture capital <a href="https://medium.com/swlh/the-new-bootstrappers-how-alternative-funding-models-are-embracing-founder-lifestyles-bd66a6656120">isn’t due to modest ambitions</a>.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/10e7e9d0a0af">Rand Fishkin</a>, the founder and former CEO of <a href="https://moz.com/">Moz</a>, a business with more than $45m ARR, has launched a new startup called SparkToro. Rand explains the crux of the challenge he and his co-founders faced in finding the right kind of funding for their latest venture:</p><blockquote>We spent a lot of time discussing the frustrating binary (succeed on a massive scale or die trying) of the classic tech startup model, and how we might craft a creative structure that would allow for the potential of a huge outcome without forcing an unhealthy growth rate or a destructively impatient approach.</blockquote><p><strong>So what’s the takeaway?</strong> “Venture capital isn’t for everyone”? This is true, but it does a disservice to the stories that have come to light recently, and painfully, as founders like <a href="https://medium.com/u/cc7e684f6a25">Joel Gascoigne</a> reach incredible heights but nonetheless choose to disembark the VC train in favor of an organic growth path by <a href="https://open.buffer.com/buying-out-investors/">paying back their investors</a>.</p><p>This pithy slogan also slips into classism, leading to <a href="https://twitter.com/indievc/status/1075815891676229632">unhealthy friction</a>. Presumably, Harvard also isn’t for everyone either. Yet Chris, Rand, and Joel are just a few of the world class founders that feel the venture industry isn’t meeting their needs as entrepreneurs. This can’t be about the pedigree of the startups in question.</p><blockquote>If VC isn’t for everyone, why not? And what is?</blockquote><h4>Running in Place</h4><p>It’s hard to move forward with a takeaway like “VC isn’t for everyone” because it’s a negative statement in the literal sense, creating more questions than answers. If VC isn’t for everyone, why not? And what is?</p><p>It’s possible that VC isn’t for everyone because VC hasn’t kept up with the needs of entrepreneurs at large.</p><p>In September 2010, Paul Graham <a href="http://www.paulgraham.com/hiresfund.html">praised</a> convertible notes, imagining “what high res fundraising will do to the world of investors.”</p><p>Eight years later we’ve gained efficiency through angel syndicates, validated novel fundraising techniques like crowdfunding, and tried new structures like SAFE’s … but the rules of the VC game remain largely intact: founders prepare, practice, and pitch; VC’s pontificate and profit — or don’t, and write it off.</p><p>It’s been argued that this modus operandi is only logical, viz. <a href="http://cdixon.org/2015/06/07/the-babe-ruth-effect-in-venture-capital/">the Babe Ruth effect </a>— 60% of VC returns come from 6% of investments. Investors swing hard because grand slams are rewarded so much more handsomely than doubles and triples. It’s the simple math of venture.</p><p>Is this why VC isn’t for everyone? In its current incarnation, yes. But should that be the end of the story? <em>“(insert industry here) is a hits-driven business!”</em> is the refrain of antiquated business models. See: Toys ‘R’ Us, Barnes &amp; Noble, Hollywood, music. There’s no point in allocating shelf or studio space to those long tail of niche toys, books, or artists instead of Malibu Barbie, Oprah’s latest choice, or whoever’s hot this season. I’ll lean on power laws and wager Taylor Swift has returned more cash for her producers than any other artist in their history by a margin that breaks the chart. (Fact check: <a href="https://www.spin.com/2018/10/taylor-swift-label-300-million-bidding-war/">turns out</a> she is responsible for 34.6% of their revenue).</p><p>While most incumbents continue to point to the inescapable math of the distribution, some financial innovators <a href="https://blog.usejournal.com/power-laws-in-venture-capital-why-the-long-tail-matters-22e057c6fa34">have been openly pondering</a> the long tail. Most recently, <a href="https://medium.com/u/bb46c9d797d8">Rob Walling</a> referred to <a href="https://tinyseed.com/">TinySeed</a> as “venture capital for the rest of us.” While the terms and structures of his and <a href="https://medium.com/u/62df4f5813fb">Einar Vollset</a>’s new fund are still unknown, this sentiment is directionally correct, sufficiently at odds with the traditions of the industry.</p><p>So if home-runs-only is an antiquated (pre-Internet) business model, why has it remained the way VC’s do business? [2]</p><h4>Moving VC Online</h4><p>As with many disruptions-in-waiting, the main culprit is the mental and physical shelf space required to make VC work. Shelf space is a useful metaphor because it implies scarcity at the point of sale, and check-writing is, to this day, primarily an offline, manual process. This means venture capital has more in common with manufactured items, like cars, dishwashers, and iPhones, than platforms (ironically the kind of businesses in which VC’s love to invest).</p><p>In contrast to platforms, which thrive as economies of supply-side abundance which they serve by <a href="https://stratechery.com/aggregation-theory/">aggregating demand</a>, VC firms are bespoke manufacturers — veritable florists, selecting, trimming, and arranging startup flowers into portfolio bouquets. They place a relatively small number of bets each year, spending human time and effort on sourcing and diligence for each bet, and committing to a high level of touch for each investment (board seat, value-add activities).</p><p>Prudent, yes, but a lack of speed isn’t inherently virtuous. The slow metabolism of most firms is an impedance for founders needing quick answers. [1] But this cycle exists and perpetuates because, like many manual operations to this day, the dexterity required to select and pick items is beyond the realm of machines. In other words, the first links in the value chain — cold email to partner’s meeting— have not yet been mechanized. Or if you prefer the <a href="https://medium.com/u/fa65e64cf273">Marc Andreessen</a> formulation, “software hasn’t yet eaten it.”</p><p><strong>How could software eat VC? </strong>The first step is to standardize packaging and protocols. As Rob Pike <a href="https://users.ece.utexas.edu/~adnan/pike.html">observed</a>, “Data structures, not algorithms, are central to programming.” Consider again the physical supply chain: global trade in the physical supply chain positively exploded with the <a href="http://info.plslogistics.com/blog/the-history-of-containers">adoption of the standard 53&#39; container</a>. Before that, bags and barrels filled the bellies of galleons, and longshoremen hauled them off with hooks and pulleys. Now, 90% of the world’s goods travel in containers with strict widths, lengths, and weight limits, enabling cranes, ports, and thereby nations to exchange value at an efficiency previously unimagined.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*N0Qo8X8Odbj-mmdpwccq5Q.png" /><figcaption>Containerization (1956) both enabled and supported a global trade value boom.</figcaption></figure><p><strong>What about venture?</strong> <a href="https://medium.com/u/510b99e51849">Bryce Roberts</a> highlighted the four reasons that <a href="https://medium.com/@bryce/why-seed-scaled-f6c64646c59c">seed stage investing scaled</a> over the past decade; all of them appeal to familiarization with standard ways of labeling, interacting, structuring, and staging capital. In other words, the cognitive overhead of providing and receiving early stage capital shrank. When founders and investors share expectations of what a deal should look like, conversations go faster. Assuming a deal is to be done, the task-at-hand shrinks to populating key numbers into a standard and widely accepted document.</p><p><strong>The other accelerant present in the ecosystem today is the movement towards greater </strong><a href="https://baremetrics.com/open-startups"><strong>transparency</strong></a><strong>.</strong> Founders have discovered many positive reasons for sharing their KPI’s and financials with the world: from HR (employee retention and recruiting) to PR (exposure amidst a sea of startups). However, the byproduct of this transparency at the ecosystem level may be even more interesting. The equal and opposite reaction of startups being transparent about themselves will inevitably be investors — especially those that want to court these kinds of startups — also being more transparent. Do we see evidence of this? Yes. Since 2015, <a href="https://medium.com/u/2932d151e989">Indie.vc</a> has led the way in publishing their terms, and the thought process behind their terms, publicly. <a href="https://sparktoro.com/blog/raised-a-very-unusual-round-of-funding-were-open-sourcing-our-docs/">More</a> <a href="https://earnestcapital.com/">investors</a> are already following suit, and this trend will continue.</p><p>As more gets shared in advance of deals being done, expectations will converge and new standards and structures <a href="https://usesummit.com/">for forecasting</a> and investing will emerge for convenience, increasing speed. The flywheel is spinning.</p><h4>Transformer Spotting</h4><p>As the last-mile delivery of capital becomes more efficient, the market will become increasingly viable for startups and investors previously kept out by a lack of signaling and deal flow — perceived or real. Just as Instagram opened the floodgates to a new supply of pro-am photographers, exponentially faster ways to deliver capital will unlock a fresh supply of angels. It’s estimated that more than 4 million accredited individuals in the U.S. currently do not participate in angel investing, but could. Meanwhile, the SEC’s loosening of restrictions through <a href="https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm">Reg CF</a> — accreditation is no longer required for the first $1m of startup funding, has not yet been leveraged at scale.</p><p>Some of these financiers will come armed with their modern portfolio theories seeking quick alpha through volume, hedging, and speculation. But the durable innovation will come from investors looking for ways to <a href="https://www.fool.com/investing/2018/05/26/9-key-principles-of-value-investing.aspx">appreciate the underlying value</a> of these startups in order to buy low and sell high over the same long horizons as the founders. In contrast to their moonshot counterparts, startups that openly and consistently demonstrate their value in terms of predictable revenue and/or reliable profits will get the most attention.</p><p>Just as the record labels continue to search for the next star, unicorn hunting will remain, supported by <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/faang-stocks.asp">FAANG’s</a> bottomless hunger for users and engagement. But within the long tail, savvy investors will forego the risky construction of rockets in exchange for browsing a fresh lineup of sturdy, proven aircraft.</p><p>While not exotic, their pilots don’t worry about runway. And many of them are more-than-meets-the-eye. Loaded with optionality, rather than pivoting out of weakness, they’re able to <a href="https://hackernoon.com/the-get-rich-slow-exit-strategy-fc3e301cb7c3?gi=ac93ec4a034c">transform from strength to strength</a>.</p><p>If they want to.</p><p><em>Thanks for reading. You can follow me here on Medium, or on twitter </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mattwensing"><em>@mattwensing</em></a><em>. If you enjoyed this post, check out </em><a href="https://usesummit.com/"><em>Summit</em></a><em>, the app to help founders and investors forecast many possible futures.</em></p><p>NOTES:</p><ol><li>This torpid cadence is so wasteful that perverse incentives start to appear. The VC’s inability to take a multitude of shots synchronizes with the founder’s burning desire to not have to go through the process of raising again for as long as possible. Through a mutual understanding, “How much money do you need?” becomes “How much money can you take?”</li><li>Founders in the long, fat tail may imagine that they remain undercapitalized because certain aristocrats don’t want him or her to succeed, or just don’t get it. VC’s do mistakenly pass on unicorns, and egos can get in the way, but as a general case, this is <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanlon%27s_razor">ascribing to malice that which shouldn’t</a>. Investors <em>are</em> motivated to make money. If they had a way to make equally-stellar money pursuing the long tail instead of, or in addition to, the home runs, it follows that they would.</li></ol><figure><a href="https://medium.com/swlh"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YqDjlKFwScoQYQ62DWEdig.png" /></a></figure><h4>This story is published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a>, Medium’s largest entrepreneurship publication followed by +406,714 people.</h4><h4>Subscribe to receive <a href="http://growthsupply.com/the-startup-newsletter/">our top stories here</a>.</h4><figure><a href="https://medium.com/swlh"><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ouK9XR4xuNWtCes-TIUNAw.png" /></a></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=db7887c26689" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/swlh/rise-of-the-transformers-db7887c26689">Rise of the Transformers</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/swlh">The Startup</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>