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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Maukqjzbb on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Maukqjzbb on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Maukqjzbb on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why Slowing Inflation Is Transitory]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mau7kq09j1zbb/why-slowing-inflation-is-transitory-361fb278b35?source=rss-7ae105dbf64e------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[inflation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[federal-reserve]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monetary-policy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maukqjzbb]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 09 Nov 2022 16:28:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-10T14:19:49.915Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In September 2022, the year-on-year inflation rate reached 8.2% in the United States, down from 8.3% in August, 8.5% in July and 9.1% in June. With inflation peaking, markets participants can breathe a sigh of relief and equity markets have been trading sideways since June. Most of them now anticipate inflation to slow down quickly to 2% and they stay there…forever. Not 0%, not 1%, not even 1.5%. 2%, right on the dot. An economic miracle!</p><p>If it hard to imagine anything else but inflation going down in the coming months, it’s a long way from already declaring victory. The inflationary period of the 1970s suggests that prices don’t go up in a straight line but rather in series of ups and downs with higher highs and higher lows. This behavior reflects Central Banks’ tendencies to react to recessionary pressures by loosening financial conditions, even with a high inflation. If you really believed the Federal Reserve when it says it is determined to keep monetary expansion in check even as the inevitable recession hits the U.S. economy, then the hypothesis of inflation peaking in June 2022 is plausible. But the recent history of the Federal Reserve suggests it won’t be the case.</p><p><strong>Chart 1. Inflation In the United States, 1967–1983</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*147ZkipOd7TupPbpiwbNRQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: FRED</figcaption></figure><p>And even if the Federal Reserve were to refrain to do what everyone expects them to do — what they have trained everyone to expect them to do — even then, the amount of liquidity already accumulated in the system since the pandemic is enough to fuel inflation for the years to come. How fast exactly it will take to for prices to absorb this excess liquidity is impossible to know.</p><p><strong>Graph 2. Quantity of Circulating Money per Output and CPI</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/795/1*2AuonqH1XuZMD7zIO_NbMw.png" /><figcaption>Source: Fred</figcaption></figure><p>The <a href="https://medium.com/@mau7kq09j1zbb/inflation-how-much-will-it-get-20-worse-548f429b07a9">current imbalance</a> between the CPI and the amount of <a href="https://medium.com/@mau7kq09j1zbb/how-the-federal-reserve-lost-control-of-money-supply-db63ac75ef14">circulating money per unit of output</a> suggests that inflation could average up to 9% annually over the next 5 years. If no more money is “printed”, not just by the Central Banks but by the banking sector as a whole, the equilibrium would be reached if inflation average 6.8% until the end of 2024, 4.6% until 2025 or 2.1% until 2020. Considering commercial banks’ sizeable reserves and the increasing incentives to lend as interest rates skyrocketed, and the Federal Reserves’ expected reaction to a recession, a scenario of stagnating money supply is unlikely. In this context, it wouldn’t be surprising to see inflation repeating it behavior of the 1970s, trending upward in wave-like fashion until someone decides to take it seriously.</p><p><strong>Graph 3. </strong><a href="https://medium.com/@mau7kq09j1zbb/inflation-how-much-will-it-get-20-worse-548f429b07a9"><strong>Distance From Equilibrium</strong></a><strong> And Forward Inflation</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/810/1*SLwIxacj2umkIPn6_29kqg.png" /><figcaption>Source : Fred</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Graph 4. Forecasted Inflation (Annualized) Based On New Money Growth And Time For Past Money Absorbtion</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/581/1*vuaKZpY1nWEjnc_1Iil3oQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: FRED</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=361fb278b35" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How the Federal Reserve Lost Control of Money Supply]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mau7kq09j1zbb/how-the-federal-reserve-lost-control-of-money-supply-db63ac75ef14?source=rss-7ae105dbf64e------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[banks]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[federal-reserve]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monetary-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[inflation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maukqjzbb]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 19 Sep 2022 11:19:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-19T19:51:21.219Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Money supply can either be increased by Central banks directly “printing” the so-called high-powered money (issued bills and coins, plus commercial bank reserves with the central bank) or having by commercial banks creating scriptural money through lending.</p><p>As Central Banks flooded banks with liquidity in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the share of high-powered money increased rapidly. However, it continues to represent a minority of the total money outstanding:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/617/1*mmpy0DtowIbi5VnCHs4GxA.png" /><figcaption>Source: FRED</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>Focus on the Money Supply circulating into the economy</strong></h4><p>If liquidity injections are not inflationary insofar as they stay on banks’ balance sheets, we should be deducting banks’ reserves from Money Supply aggregates when studying them. For instance, between 2008 and 2012, M2 increased by close to 30% due to the first round of QE, from $7.5tn to $9.7tn. In the meantime, inflation only rose 7.8% (about 1.8% annualized), increasing far slower than Money Supply, enough for some to believe that the link between money and inflation had broken down. However, most of the increase in Money Supply was then hoarded as reserves by banks’ eager to rebuild their liquidity. Consequently, the amount of money circulating into the economy only has only risen 8.5% during this period, very much in line with inflation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/595/1*6DCSVW0mLd8-FwgQA-oRcQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: FRED</figcaption></figure><h4><strong>M2 in Circulation Accelerates as Banks’ Step Up Lending</strong></h4><p>Central Banks’ attempt to constrain Money Supply by increasing the cost of credit is failing to meet its objective. As interest rates rise, commercial banks are incentivized to lend at a time where individual and companies’ creditworthiness was artificially boosted by successive rounds of stimulus cheques. As a result, the pace of lending picked up significantly which incidentally accelerated the amount of money circulating in the economy even as traditional monetary aggregates stalled.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/870/1*0yuXjIC0YBvQBEbZhAmkZA.png" /><figcaption>Source: FRED</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/573/1*2iyXTgSKNay58YOgBYuFeg.png" /><figcaption>Source: FRED</figcaption></figure><p>While raising interests will indeed limit the demand for credit in the long term, it fails to do so in the short term. Therefore, the only alternative to contain money supply and tame inflation over the medium to long term is to drain the excess liquidity out of the banking system via an aggressive round of Quantitative Tightening. In that regard, the monthly sales of $60bn worth of Treasuries looks like a drop in the bucket.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=db63ac75ef14" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Limit To Monetary Tightening]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mau7kq09j1zbb/the-limit-to-tightening-77de32789e74?source=rss-7ae105dbf64e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/77de32789e74</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[interest-rates]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investment]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[monetary-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[inflation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maukqjzbb]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 Jul 2022 13:18:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-07-28T08:14:05.591Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Expansionary fiscal policy in the U.S. will continue to weigh on the federal deficit, leading to an abundant supply of U.S. treasury bonds of more than $6tn in the next 4 years. In the meantime, the relative unattractiveness of U.S treasuries in comparison with other countries’ and other asset classes will contribute to weaken demand for these bonds. As an example, in 2021, private demand for U.S. treasuries represented less than $550bn of the $1.85tn issued by the Federal government. As a result, the supply and demand imbalances will restrain the Federal Reserve’s ability to reduce the size of its balance sheet without causing a significant spike in interest rates. <strong>The U.S. government’s large funding needs in the second half of 2022 will constrain the Federal Reserve to pause the tightening of its monetary policy and instead revert to liquidity injections to prevent a too rapid increase in interest rates</strong>.</p><h3>Supply of Treasuries</h3><p>Deficit reached unprecedented levels of $3tn in 2020 as a result of the pandemic. While a large share of it was linked to the extraordinary sanitary environment, deficits had started to rise rapidly back in 2016, and we expect this trend to continue even as COVID-19 fades away. In its Budget and Economic Outlook report of July 1st 2021, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects deficit for 2021 and 2022 to reach $3tn (13.4% of GDP) and $1.1tn (4.7% of GDP) respectively. Despite relatively optimistic assumptions, the CBO expects deficit as a percentage of GDP to gradually increase, from 3% in 2023 to 5.5% in 2031. In this report, the CBO does not include the passage of the Biden plan -which was already agreed upon on June 25th- and assumes no extension of fiscal spending or tax cuts.</p><p>Expansionary fiscal policies will continue to stimulate the economy and push financing needs from the U.S. government to historically high levels, as shown with the infrastructure bill of $1.2tn proposed by President Biden. In addition, demand for welfare measures will remain strong following the political success of supportive measures taken during the pandemic. <strong>Consequently, we forecast that public debt will continue to increase at a substantial rate over the next few years, by $3tn in 2021, $1.5tn in 2022, and above $1tn thereafter. </strong>As a point of reference, federal deficit reached slightly below $2tn at the peak of the Great Financial Crisis in 2009.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c_-BF1sZ9-ekEZTgzGQclQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Congressional Budget Office</figcaption></figure><h3>Demand for Treasuries</h3><h4>U.S. Government</h4><p>The U.S. government hold 40% of $28tn outstanding debt, broken down into Federal Reserve (17%) and other governmental agencies such as Social Security, Medicare, etc… (22%). Since Quantitative Easing was relaunched by the Federal Reserve in the last quarter of 2019, <strong>the central bank has bought the equivalent of 52% of the newly issued debt.</strong> Outside of the U.S. government, foreign governments and central banks are the largest holders of U.S. debt with close to $7tn (or 25%), followed by mutual funds (13%). The remaining of the debt is spread among financial institutions such as banks, pension funds or other investors.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*wBMjLXBcAvu_CjPatnJ3cA.png" /><figcaption>Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*nxi8S7q6h9pCmxmhixhINA.png" /><figcaption>Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, U.S. Department of the Treasury</figcaption></figure><h4>Foreign Countries</h4><p>Foreign countries held up to 34% of the total stock of debt in 2014. Several factors explained the strong demand for U.S. bonds from foreign countries. At the turn of the century, the emergence of China as a prominent trade partner for the United States led to the reinvestment of the country’s trade surplus into U.S. treasury. Consequently, between 2005 and 2010, China accounted for half of the foreign demand for treasuries. Following the Great Financial Crisis, foreign demand increased substantially as countries perceived the U.S. as a safe haven. <strong>Foreign purchases represented close to half of total demand during and after the GFC. Since 2015, aggressive fiscal and monetary policies in the United States, along with increasing political tensions between the U.S. and China, have eroded foreign demand for treasury bonds.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*a2DclqG0VET1ftZ48ctRaQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury</figcaption></figure><h4>Financial Institutions</h4><p>In the second quarter of 2020, the impossibility to consume, the agitated financial markets and the fear of an unknown virus drove a significant amount of Americans’ savings into low-risk assets such as government bonds. As the sanitary environment improved, consumption and investment behaviors normalized. <strong>In the near future, we can expect demand for treasuries from mutual funds to decline or stall as retail investors consume their excess savings or invest it into riskier assets.</strong> It is also worth noting that the lack of income from bonds’ coupons should lead institutional investors such as banks or insurance companies to sell the principal to meet their liabilities.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4mF2UX7-G1ngapRUCYBSRQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury</figcaption></figure><h4>Social Security</h4><p>The Social Security Trusts accounts for more than half of the amount of treasury bonds held by federal agencies, thanks to the $2.9tn surplus it has accumulated over the years. However, the agency’s ability to generate surplus has greatly eroded since the Great Financial Crisis and is expected to turn into a deficit. As a consequence, the ability of the federal agencies to contribute to the funding of the federal government’s deficit will be limited in the near future.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XGVWxX71ULgLwVLuZGIdIw.png" /><figcaption>Source: Social Security Administration</figcaption></figure><p><strong>In conclusion, weak private demand leaves the Federal Reserve as the last man standing.</strong> With only $98bn of private demand for close to $400bn treasury bonds issued, the first quarter of 2021 attests of the rising supply and demand imbalances. As the attractivity of the treasury bonds remains weak for the reasons mentioned above, we estimate that a $1tn gap could arise between supply and demand for treasuries, which could press the Federal Reserve to provide additional liquidity through its QE program and/or lead to higher treasury rates in order to render the investment more attractive.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*4WN0AykM0dZkeNBVu_k_ew.png" /><figcaption>Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7FOIZ7Mb1zWLeK6QSh7c9A.png" /><figcaption>Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury</figcaption></figure><h3>The Limit On Rates</h3><p>The expectation that the Federal Reserve will have to intervene in the second half of the years stems from the view that <strong>the U.S. economy is unable to withstand any meaningful rate increase due to its high indebtedness</strong>. With total debt-to-GDP currently holding close to 250%, we believe that short-term interest rates can reach between up to 2.5–3% before negatively forcing the Central Bank to backpedal.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/789/1*7ZZnoJxrniR7FjnJnfsYsQ.png" /><figcaption>Source: Yahoo Finance</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=77de32789e74" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Inflation: How much will it get? 20% worse!]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mau7kq09j1zbb/inflation-how-much-will-it-get-20-worse-548f429b07a9?source=rss-7ae105dbf64e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/548f429b07a9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[interest-rates]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[inflation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[invest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maukqjzbb]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Jul 2022 13:44:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-09-08T08:31:14.716Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Inflation: How much worse will it get? 20% worse!</h3><h3>Inflation, a monetary phenomenon</h3><p>The link between the quantity of money per unit of output on the one hand, and inflation on the other, has been observed for centuries, in all geographies. It is a well-documented phenomenon, discussed by the greatest minds in economics and mathematics. As I can’t claim to even come close to his eloquence I can only advise to anyone wanting to understand inflation and its cause to watch this amazing speech by Professor Milton Friedman, 1976 Nobel prize laureate for his work monetary history and theory: <a href="https://youtu.be/B_nGEj8wIP0">https://youtu.be/B_nGEj8wIP0</a></p><h3>Applied to today</h3><p>Updating Professor Friedman’s graphs to today for the United States would give the following :</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZUlnqJgxMI0K_G-GB21AUw.png" /><figcaption>Source: FRED — Data split reflects changes in CPI methodology around 1990</figcaption></figure><p>The graph above suggests that the equilibrium price level (CPI) for the current amount of money in circulative relative to output lies around 350. With CPI currently standing at 295, this indicates that prices in the U.S. should increase another 20% before inflationary pressures disappear, assuming the money supply remains stable.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=548f429b07a9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The impact of inflation on companies’ profitability and credit quality]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mau7kq09j1zbb/the-impact-of-inflation-on-companies-profitability-and-credit-quality-6951cdc0b7d5?source=rss-7ae105dbf64e------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6951cdc0b7d5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corporate-earnings]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[earnings]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corporate-debt]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[inflation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Maukqjzbb]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 13 Jul 2022 10:06:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-07-18T09:55:43.198Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The income approach to calculating gross domestic product (GDP) states that all economic expenditures should equal the total income generated by the production of all economic goods and services. In other words, one man’s expense is another man’s income. Although how much of the increase in spending is driven by quantity rather than price matters for both men’s standards of living, it doesn’t for their P&amp;L. Consequently, companies’ earnings growth correlates with nominal GDP growth rather than real growth.</p><h4><strong>The Income Side</strong></h4><p>Let’s illustrate this with an example. Imagine an economy with only two companies that produce two goods: steel and cars. Steel is used as an intermediate good in the production of cars such that one unit of steel is used to produce one car. Last year, the steel company was able to produce 10 units of steel at a cost of 8$ per unit, for a selling price of 10$. The car company paid a 12$ wage per car and sold each car for 30$. Finally, both companies had issued 100$ of debt with a 10% interest rate. Using the income approach, we find that GDP reached 300$ for the year, with both companies’ cumulated profits reaching 100$.</p><p>Now let’s double the size of this economy both in nominal and real terms and look at what it changes for the companies’ profits.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7ijlgGB2V1O-Y_PIURG8gw.png" /></figure><p>Scenario 2’s economy is now producing twice as much goods as Scenario 1’s (20 cars vs 10). However, companies’ profits and credit worthiness have improved to the same extent in both cases. In other words, companies’ financial statements are indifferent to whether growth from volume or price, nominal GDP growth reflects nominal earnings growth. The empirical study of GDP and earnings growth in the United States over the last 70 years confirms this intuition. Between 1947 and 2021, earnings of the companies composing the S&amp;P 500 index have multiplied 138 times. In the meantime, nominal and real GDP were multiplied by 95 and 10 respectively.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*RlmSFDIi9T7TWcYSIfExAQ.png" /></figure><p><em>Source: FRED, Shiller data</em></p><p>Inflationary pressures have driven nominal growth prospects through the roof. The consensus nominal growth in the Eurozone and in the U.S. is above 8% and 9% respectively, the highest it has been since the early 1980s. These tailwinds will continue to drive companies’ strong revenue growth and offset potential margin pressures to support operating income growth on an absolute value basis. This, along with a likely decreasing demand for loans as financial conditions become less supportive, should contribute to improve borrowers’ credit quality as inflation lowers the real value of nominal assets and liabilities, effectively redistributing wealth from lenders to borrowers.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*63ThtJYuM_pmYYbOwdD9vw.png" /></figure><p><em>Source: FRED, Eurostat</em></p><h4><strong>The Expense Side</strong></h4><p>Out of all commodities, market participants pay a particular attention to oil, and fears of surging oil prices hurting companies’ profit margins have risen despite the lack of evidence in economic literature and empirical data. Oil prices have risen sharply since the pandemic, from less than 20$ in April 2020 to 70$ by the end of 2021, before skyrocketing above the 100$ mark in March 2022 in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This rapid movement is reminiscent of the 1970s, where oil prices doubled between 1970 and 1973, before increasing ten-fold by 1980 as a consequence of the successive oil embargos. A look at this period shows that not only companies’ earnings have grown exceptionally fast on an absolute basis for the reasons mentioned above, profit margins also held up strongly, increasing from 8% in 1970 to 12% in 1980.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*q5w83yZ1e09P7lVqF8DfHA.png" /></figure><p>Source: nasdaq.com, FRED</p><p>Why this phenomenon? Rising prices are a signal of how supply behaves relative to demand, but do not give any indication on how they behave separately. In the 1970s, the exponential rise in oil prices did not reflect a decline in production, the world’s oil supply increased by 25% between 1971 and 1980. Instead, it signaled that demand was growing significantly faster than supply. When it is the case, demand becomes inelastic to price and it is easy for companies to pass cost increases down to the end consumers, regardless of their pricing power. Therefore, price increases are not limited to high value-added highly differentiated products but also apply to very competitive markets with little differentiation and low switching costs (such as commodities).</p><p>Therefore, in the current world of roaring demand fueled by government stimulus and accumulated forced savings, prices rise despite growing supply and companies easily pass costs through to the end-consumer. In other words, easy passthrough and operating leverage will provide buffer to profit margins insofar as both supply and demand continue to grow concurrently.</p><h4><strong>Impact on Credit Metrics</strong></h4><p>Even in the event of a decline in profit margins, the growth tailwinds are such that it would not automatically translate into worsening credit metrics. Instead, the more profitable a company is, the more it can afford to see costs rising faster than topline without taking a toll on the absolute value of its EBITDA. For instance, take a company with $100m in sales and an 80% EBITDA margin. If the company increases revenue by 10% to $110m, then a 72.7% EBITDA margin is enough to generate the same $80m of EBITDA. Said differently, the company’s costs can increase as much as five times faster than its revenue without affecting its credit metrics.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6951cdc0b7d5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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