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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Max Pasqua on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Max Pasqua on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Max Pasqua on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maxpasqua?source=rss-da2883c44748------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Virtual Holes in Virtual Worlds: $12.5k Metaverse Bug Hunt]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maxpasqua/virtual-holes-in-virtual-worlds-12-5k-metaverse-bug-hunt-7cfe841bc1cb?source=rss-da2883c44748------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7cfe841bc1cb</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Pasqua]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 May 2025 23:40:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-05-28T23:40:07.337Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In early 2020, Meta launched Horizon Worlds, a custom VR experience focused on user-created environments and social interaction. Initially, access was limited to a select group of users, but the platform has since opened up to the public, allowing anyone to create and explore virtual worlds. This broader access makes Horizon Worlds an appealing target for security research, as it combines a growing user base with accessible creation tools and interactive features.</p><p>This writeup details a series of vulnerabilities I discovered, including findings uncovered through reverse engineering the Meta Horizon Worlds desktop editor. The research ultimately led to four distinct vulnerabilities affecting Horizon Worlds and its associated platforms.</p><h3>Meta Horizon World Desktop Editor</h3><p>Meta Horizon World’s is very similar in nature to Roblox, Garry’s Mod, or Epic Games UEFN. It’s a somewhat barebones engine in which they provide capabilities to develop your own custom worlds/gamemodes on top of and even provide routes for monetization for creators.</p><p>In order to develop these worlds, the companies behind them often provide custom tooling which includes capabilities for custom scripts, modeling, and textures.</p><p>Meta’s version of this is the <a href="https://developers.meta.com/horizon-worlds/learn/documentation/get-started/install-desktop-editor">Horizon World Desktop Editor</a> which is built on top of the Unity Engine which was great for me as I’m already fairly experienced with this engine and there’s a lot of great tooling out there to work with it.</p><p>I initially launched the application with Fiddler running, hoping to intercept network traffic. Unfortunately, that wasn’t the case and it quickly became clear that some form of SSL pinning was in place. Based on my past experience with SSL-pinned Unity applications, I expected this to be a relatively easy bypass. Typically, these apps rely on UnityWebRequest’s certificateHandler class, which can often be bypassed by hooking the setter and preventing it from executing. However, after trying this approach, I was still unable to capture any traffic.</p><p>Additionally it’s important to note here that Unity Apps have the option to enable IL2CPP which compiles the initially C# application into a C++ application which makes it harder to debug. As such, it was time to launch x64dbg and take a peek under the hood.</p><p>The one saving grace of this application is that Meta built a lot of custom user modules ontop of the Unity Engine which contained exported functions which makes our lives a lot easier.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JWZ33Erw0AGQMfHznZX2Sw.png" /></figure><p>After a lot of trial and error due to the presence of five different libraries handling HTTP functionality, I eventually identified the correct exported function used for web requests: rtCreateHttpRequest in shared_runtime.dll.</p><p>The next step was to set up a proper hook on the relevant classes within rtCreateHttpRequest and begin logging the output. After compiling and injecting the code into the Horizon application, I was finally able to observe network traffic:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/971/1*3Cj5BDlHKeIimYuh6ORwwQ.png" /></figure><p>The full source for the request logging can be found here: <a href="https://github.com/maxpsqbb/horizontrafficinterception">https://github.com/maxpsqbb/horizontrafficinterception</a></p><p>Now that we have traffic interception, it’s time to get into the vulnerabilties discovered as a result of this!</p><h3>XSS in Facebook CDN via MIME Sniffing in Horizon Script Uploads</h3><p>The Meta Horizon Worlds Desktop Editor allows users to attach scripts to their world which are then uploaded to scontent.fbcdn.net (Meta’s CDN) for centralized storage and the ability for world collaborators to fetch script sources.</p><p>After uploading a file and sending a request to the CDN link, I noticed something interesting, the file was served without an extension and without a Content-Type header. As the header is missing the browser attempts to perform <a href="https://www.thehacker.recipes/web/config/http-headers/mime-sniffing">MIME type sniffing</a> where it will “guess” the Content-Type for the given resource. Since we have full control over the file’s contents, this allowed me to embed arbitrary HTML, which the browser then interpreted and rendered. As a result, I was able to achieve a stored XSS on Meta’s CDN.</p><h4>Reproduction Steps:</h4><p>1. Download Meta Quest Link (<a href="https://www.meta.com/help/quest/1517439565442928/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAYnJpZBExWjJHbDZhUjRVTE1zU0JTMwEeoKi4KAYLYjanfe9qqxjAFqSsPLgDdVXfCOR_jh54hzn59t5nO-HPtsYEnjg_aem_CzXNi1pYA6Np6NnSjgB63w">https://www.meta.com/help/quest/1517439565442928/</a>)<br>2. Follow the guide to get the Desktop Editor (<a href="https://developers.meta.com/horizon-worlds/learn/documentation/get-started/install-desktop-editor?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAYnJpZBExWjJHbDZhUjRVTE1zU0JTMwEeIqa8P-6it3QQXvTVARmAboXvBBe3Ci7oxW9UuuTDwzVc9jMgkGbx7enz39s_aem_sd-Y68OsDwW3naVAer0FRQ">https://developers.meta.com/horizon-worlds/learn/documentation/get-started/install-desktop-editor</a>)<br>3. Launch the Desktop Editor and create a new world and enter it<br>4. In the top left of the application select &quot;Scripts&quot; -&gt; &quot;+&quot; and name your script anything you choose.<br>5. Click on the script to open it in your IDE of choice, input any generic HTML + your javascript payload e.g.:</p><pre>&lt;html&gt;<br>&lt;script&gt;alert(“XSS”)&lt;/script&gt;<br>&lt;/html&gt;</pre><p>6. Save the file and wait 5 seconds<br>7. In the top middle of the application there is a Play, Stop, and 3 vertical line dropdown menu, open the dropdown menu and at the bottom of this panel you should see an icon of a Globe, click this and it should direct you to your horizon world in your browser. Within this URL note down the &quot;snapshot_id&quot; parameter<br>8. Send the following graphql request replacing SNAPSHOTIDHERE with your snapshotid from the previous step:</p><pre><br>fb_api_req_friendly_name=HorizonScriptGetCatalog&amp;variables={&quot;snapshot_id&quot;:&quot;SNAPSHOTIDHERE &quot;}&amp;doc_id=7679780495421023</pre><p>9. Within the response you should see receive a &quot;file_cdn_uri&quot;, browse to this URL and observe the javascript was executed.</p><p>As a side note, I would’ve attached a video PoC here for a more hands on visualization of the issue, however as a treat for my previous coworkers, I jokingly overlayed very loud airport background noise which ruined it.</p><h3>Path Traversal in Horizon Script Creation</h3><p>Diving deeper into the script creation, I realized that after fetching the script from the CDN, it would write it locally to disk with the same folder structure and path name as the existing file.</p><p>After a bit of testing I realized this was vulnerable to path traversal which would allow you to write arbitrary typescript files to a world collaborators machine.</p><p>I tried for weeks to get this to end in code execution on the collaborators machine, but came to the conclusion that it would only occur under very specific circumstances (e.g. a separate NodeJs project that used typescript with a manual configuration) and you would have to have previous knowledge of an existing projects location.</p><p>The odds of this occurring were probably one in a million, however, after asking around, @shmoul from the <a href="https://ctbb.show/discord">CTBB Discord</a> suggested to try UNC paths. When Windows attempts to resolve a UNC path, it initiates an SMB request, which can result in the user’s NTLM hash being leaked.</p><p>This ended up working and gave us a more concrete impact for the issue. If it weren’t for UNC paths the impact would be limited to DoS of other users Horizon World’s/the editor itself as you were able to overwrite existing typescript files used within the editor.</p><h4>Reproduction Steps:</h4><p>1. Download Meta Quest Link (<a href="https://www.meta.com/help/quest/1517439565442928/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAYnJpZBExNDE5V2NVQlhodEJtNEJwMAEeDWcor2nhTln_mSsOI2JAVhxoUmMZEmP_7Teijj9zkgOxdJwXqWeoC5NWmKY_aem_VWnmL-jlv2QR08gcFvIk2A">https://www.meta.com/help/quest/1517439565442928/</a>)<br>2. Follow the guide to get the Desktop Editor (<a href="https://developers.meta.com/horizon-worlds/learn/documentation/get-started/install-desktop-editor?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAYnJpZBExNDE5V2NVQlhodEJtNEJwMAEeYpevbLtpWtmtGatr3R7aoP_YHWLpM3KWJDoI4hHH2KrEn4vuuyKdLauosDg_aem_DNLDzQF9Isfo_X05zTLk9A">https://developers.meta.com/horizon-worlds/learn/documentation/get-started/install-desktop-editor</a>)<br>3. Launch the Desktop Editor and create a new world and enter it<br>4. Invite CollaboratorVictim as an Editor for your world<br>5. As CollaboratorVictim accept the invite<br>6. As WorldCreator create a new script and name it ../../../pathtraversed<br>7. Observe that a file was created in C:\Users\YOURUSERNAME\AppData\LocalLow\Meta\pathtraversed.ts<br>8. As CollaboratorVictim launch horizon editor and enter the WorldCreators world<br>9. Wait ~10 seconds<br>10. Observe that the file is written to your machine, traversed three directories from the world folder</p><p>Additionally after Meta implemented their original fix, I discovered this was possible via a different parameter which resulted in a double bounty for this issue.</p><p><strong>Video PoC:</strong> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gdyw3GMliqQ">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gdyw3GMliqQ</a></p><h3>IDOR in Horizon Worlds Events via useHorizonUGCEventEditMutation</h3><p>In addition to the Desktop Editor, Horizon Worlds also includes a web-based platform (<a href="https://horizon.meta.com/">https://horizon.meta.com</a>) where users can browse and access worlds directly through their browser, without needing a VR headset. One feature available via the web interface is the ability to create events, similar to Facebook events, but tied to a specific world, granting the event host certain additional permissions.</p><p>During testing, I discovered that the GraphQL mutation used to edit these events lacked proper ownership checks for the horizon_world_id provided in the request. As a result, a malicious user could create events for worlds they do not own. These events would appear on the targeted world’s page, and additionally grant the attacker elevated privileges during the event, such as the ability to kick users from the world.</p><h4>Reproduction Steps:</h4><p>1. As UserAttacker browse to <a href="https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fhorizon.meta.com%2Fcreator%2Fworlds_all%2F%3Ffbclid%3DIwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAYnJpZBExNDE5V2NVQlhodEJtNEJwMAEeEyXudko7-ho8KTUGSM3VY6bOgeG6W4s31xuyHqB1rF5aU2DRkAqvM1GMyJs_aem_a1wqXAsmInCtaCADCuQrfQ&amp;h=AT3qKPhiLMhDJ7xY-8sR7HzhEIuNTnwEmaTWPfBfiD3edyV1UbIFyt4o0SCfa0GeEN73Gon3gLvVHpERo8zDLy-oCXYqzQLNUMjS0TEC1aAc8NsOJYew19c8VlsK0p88_1F3Fwqv3Od2_FUtcvi4ng">https://horizon.meta.com/creator/worlds_all/</a> and click Copy World Link on any of your worlds and navigate to the copied link<br>2. Click create event, fill in all the needed information and hit next until youre shown the setting for “<br>Choose how to host your event”, ensure you choose “Host event directly in the world”<br>3. Click create draft<br>4. Click the three vertical dots in the top right of your event and hit “Edit Event”, click “Next” until the button is displayed as “Save draft”<br>5. Using Burp Suite turn on interception and click “Save draft”<br>6. Within the graphql request modify “horizon_world_id” to be the victims world id (this can be obtained from the url while browsing to their world) and modify start_time to be a sooner epoch time so you don’t need to wait 15 mins for the event to start.<br>7. Forward the request and you should now see that the draft event is targeting the victims world (may need a page refresh to reflect it).<br>8. Publish the event<br>9. Browse to the page for the victims world and scroll down, observe your malicious event is attached.<br>10. While the event is active enter the world, hit tab and scroll down and observe you now have permissions to remove/warn other users within the world.</p><p><strong>Video PoC:</strong> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rZ5gd3u1j5I">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rZ5gd3u1j5I</a></p><h3>Email Disclosure of Organization Members in <a href="https://developer.oculus.com/">developer.oculus.com</a></h3><p>The last issue here actually isn’t directly related to Horizon World’s and is rather in Oculus’s development platform, however, they’re closely related so I’ve included it here as well.</p><p>In the Oculus Developer Platform you can create organizations and add users to them. This invite can either be sent via email or via their oculus username. If invited by the oculus username their email address is never disclosed.</p><p>In the oculus developer platform there is an option for “Release Channels”, typically this is used to create separate channels (e.g. QA testing) that you can add users to manually for early releases/testing. This had a crucial flaw of preapproving organization members when adding them to the release channel, and when doing so it also discloses their email.</p><h4>Reproduction Steps:</h4><p>1. Browse to <a href="https://developer.oculus.com/manage/organizations/create/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAYnJpZBExNDE5V2NVQlhodEJtNEJwMAEeegopMHqytJrQ9GBYgqHcFZyRnkjZF4fsrcVGPzK7ITV4sriHA_-Xrv5g6DM_aem_MnAGTpVGX8B2eeDXM5LabQ">https://developer.oculus.com/manage/organizations/create/</a> and create a new organization<br>2. Create a new application for your organization<br>3. Browse to <a href="https://developer.oculus.com/manage/organizations/ORGID/members/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAYnJpZBExNDE5V2NVQlhodEJtNEJwMAEeo2RTINHxof4h3UCWUJ3wEz_FEX-lVJqcuWiWVbavazCJZu7IzMPohZInDak_aem_ngG_klQDRBIM5hYw6M-6RA">https://developer.oculus.com/manage/organizations/ORGID/members/</a> and click “Invite Member”<br>4. Invite your target user to your organization via their oculus username<br>5. As the victim accept the organization invite<br>6. As the attacker browse to <a href="https://developer.oculus.com/manage/applications/APPID/release-channels/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAYnJpZBExNDE5V2NVQlhodEJtNEJwMAEeEQ14SNJu1Xi4DfdAnXPXisfFYygaNAalAO3Y9Vt_-9GRCxLhBzEHwpuP0go_aem_BRCec5Zn_KLx96gnn6evPQ">https://developer.oculus.com/manage/applications/APPID/release-channels/</a><br>7. Select any release channel and navigate to the Users section and click “Email Invite Users” <br>8. Input the users username and click “Send Invite”<br>9. Observe that the user is automatically approved and their email is disclosed.</p><p><strong>Video PoC: </strong><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nx8AuhWOQtA">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nx8AuhWOQtA</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7cfe841bc1cb" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Type Confusion DoS in FB4A]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maxpasqua/type-confusion-dos-in-fb4a-747837d3a8e3?source=rss-da2883c44748------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/747837d3a8e3</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Pasqua]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 07 Mar 2025 21:51:19 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-03-19T16:11:36.363Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Summary and Messenger Testing Guide</strong></p><p>I’ve recently dove back into the Meta Bug Bounty program and as the landscape has changed over the four years I haven’t been hunting it was time to get myself up to speed on everything.</p><p>One of my favourite targets while hunting has always been Messenger, however this became a bit more difficult to test as everything has shifted over to websockets that have a mechanism in place that prevents easy modification with Burp Suite. In order to tackle this I performed some normal operations and looked for any unique strings within the request.</p><p>For this we’ll use “text_has_links” as an example:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Crx6XZ_Z7-ILucmcvL0hLQ.png" /></figure><p>From there I navigated to chromes developer console, went to sources, right clicked on static.xx.fbcdn.net, chose “Search in all files” and inputted “text_has_links”. Now this is going to provide you with a couple of hits and takes a little bit of intuition to figure out which one is of interest, however after a couple breakpoints it appears that this is the main handler for setting these parameters before the request is signed and sent as a websocket.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*XCTVEqyGmTfATM1BOxbA4A.png" /></figure><p>Now we can set some breakpoints and play around a bit, what caught my eye right away was “mention_lengths”, this controls how far a name will be underscored when mentioning someone via an @ in the group chat.</p><p>Your standard run of the mill tricks to cause something to blow up didn’t work here (presumably from prior reports I made that did blow things up here). However thats where our new issue comes in to play.</p><p><strong>Type Confusion Causing a Fatal NumberFormatException DoS Loop</strong></p><p>After a bit of testing I finally noticed a crash on my android emulator. I wasn’t sure what caused it immidiately as I had just rapidly thrown a ton of data into it and only checked my emulator afterwards.</p><p>Rather than retracing my steps and sending each payload one by one hoping for a crash I instead went to logcat which presented me with the following:</p><pre>3 17976 E AndroidRuntime: FATAL EXCEPTION: SynchronizedData_ReceiveThread<br>02-03 13:11:47.876 17923 17976 E AndroidRuntime: Process: com.facebook.orca, PID: 17923<br>02-03 13:11:47.876 17923 17976 E AndroidRuntime: java.lang.NumberFormatException: For input string: &quot;10000000000000&quot;<br>02-03 13:11:47.876 17923 17976 E AndroidRuntime: at java.lang.Integer.parseInt(Integer.java:618)<br>02-03 13:11:47.876 17923 17976 E AndroidRuntime: at java.lang.Integer.parseInt(Integer.java:650)<br>02-03 13:11:47.876 17923 17976 E AndroidRuntime: at X.5gz.AyU(Unknown Source:351)<br>02-03 13:11:47.876 17923 17976 E AndroidRuntime: at X.5hp.A4h(Unknown Source:463)<br>02-03 13:11:47.876 17923 17976 E AndroidRuntime: at X.5hs.A4h(Unknown Source:108)<br>02-03 13:11:47.876 17923 17976 E AndroidRuntime: at X.4fG.run(Unknown Source:16)<br>02-03 13:11:47.876 17923 17976 E AndroidRuntime: at android.os.Handler.handleCallback(Handler.java:938)<br>02-03 13:11:47.876 17923 17976 E AndroidRuntime: at android.os.Handler.dispatchMessage(Handler.java:99)<br>02-03 13:11:47.876 17923 17976 E AndroidRuntime: at android.os.Looper.loopOnce(Looper.java:201)<br>02-03 13:11:47.876 17923 17976 E AndroidRuntime: at android.os.Looper.loop(Looper.java:288)<br>02-03 13:11:47.876 17923 17976 E AndroidRuntime: at android.os.HandlerThread.run(HandlerThread.java:67)</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/495/1*uI0GgkMzurmvnmAHdjvV0g.png" /></figure><p>As discussed prior, when sending a mention it includes a “mention_lengths”, when sent via the websocket this is typically sent as an integer. If you attempt to send an integer that is out of the INT32_MAX it will overflow as normal and you won’t see any weird behaviour, however if you send it as a string wrapping it in double quotes Messengers backend will accept this as a valid data type as it still is an integer within the string, but when serving it to the Android application it is still a string type.</p><p>This is normally fine behaviour when the number is within its appropriate bounds as the java library will convert it back into an integer, however once its out of bounds java no longer considers it to be an integer, throws an exception, and crashes the application.</p><p>As this message is shown in the preview when opening the application, it is in a continuous DoS loop rendering the application inaccessible to mobile users.</p><p><strong>Proof of Concept</strong></p><p>1. As UserOne browse to <a href="https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=http%3A%2F%2Fmessenger.com%2F&amp;h=AT069OhYVwIgL_32vKtyUnmQ6lYkB_8_6IDinprk4mRuBjnzzUH0tvcEiDv-y429XzHClaykNqte7QJfSAj7dJ1YjSblHYWG4p2HICAouB6XPMR1Yvr48jVi3UET4EL4RtfrS_Fz0pWbH5CQMjTeZw">messenger.com</a><br>2. Open your developers tools and browse to the sources section<br>3. Right click on <a href="http://static.xx.fbcdn.net/">static.xx.fbcdn.net</a> -&gt; Search in all files<br>4. Search for: set(“mention_lengths”<br>5. There should be two references to set(“mention_lengths” within the correct file, set a breakpoint a line below the one with the lower array index (in my case c[67])<br>6. Send a mention in the group chat you want the DoS to occure within<br>7. Observe that are breakpoint is triggered, browse to your developer console and overwrite the existing value with our new malicious value, for example if your array index is c[67] you would run the following in your console:</p><p>c[67].set(“mention_lengths”, “100000000000000”)</p><p>Ensure that the value you are setting is wrapped in double quotes, we need this to be passed as a string rather than as an integer<br>8. Resume execution in the debugger and observe that UserTwos android applications has now crashed and is stuck in a crash loop</p><p><strong>Video</strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FQwvJ3Ul2LG4%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;display_name=YouTube&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DQwvJ3Ul2LG4&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FQwvJ3Ul2LG4%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/69f3362c6c397045cdcc364566572db8/href">https://medium.com/media/69f3362c6c397045cdcc364566572db8/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Timeline</strong></p><p>Submitted- 3 February 2025</p><p>Triaged- 10 February 2025</p><p>Fixed- 4 March 2025</p><p>Bounty Rewarded ($5000)- 19 March 2025</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=747837d3a8e3" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Moving Platforms]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maxpasqua/moving-platforms-ded3fa555c76?source=rss-da2883c44748------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ded3fa555c76</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Pasqua]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 11 Jun 2019 02:59:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-06-11T02:59:34.183Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I’ve decided that I’m going to be moving platforms for my write ups.</p><p>You can now find all my new ones over at bugreader</p><p><a href="https://bugreader.com/max">Max Pasqua</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ded3fa555c76" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[DoS Across Facebook Endpoints]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maxpasqua/dos-across-facebook-endpoints-1d7d0bc27c7f?source=rss-da2883c44748------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1d7d0bc27c7f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Pasqua]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2019 13:41:08 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-03-19T13:41:08.618Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A while back I read a report by a friend of mine, <a href="https://www.facebook.com/Kassembazoun">Kassem</a>, where he was able to completely block a user from using Facebook Messenger with a long string of text. After reading this I decided to look through some Facebook endpoints to see if it was still viable. After a day or two of looking I found 7 different endpoints vulnerable to this type of attack. At first I thought I hit a gold mine with this type of attack but within a couple of weeks 6/7 bugs got flagged as a dupe of the original report I made.</p><pre>Thanks for reporting this issue to us. After investigating the issue, we have realized that this is a duple of your other report #2444785898871880. As such, this report will not be eligible for a bounty. I’m going to close this one and keep the conversation in the original report.</pre><p>Since the root cause was that Facebook wasn’t limiting the length on parameters they all sadly got classified into one bug. This bug will be the one shown next.</p><p><strong>Break Facebook Pages for Admins, Editors, and Moderators</strong></p><p>This bug allowed a malicious user with at least Moderator privileged to permanently break an entire page for the Admins, Editors, and Moderators.</p><p>This bug was a little weird as I ran into it by accident trying to test for other things, after firing big payloads at the endpoint I kept getting 500 errors, after enough 500 errors the page would completely break</p><p>This bug required a page to have the appointments function setup, the quickest way to get appointments is creating a button as seen in the video and hitting booking option to set up appointments through Facebook. After that test the button and put in an appointment and then go to the inbox to complete the rest of the bug</p><p><strong>Proof of Concept</strong></p><p>1) Once in the inbox of the victims page hit the create appointment button in the bottom right</p><p>2) Put in some text in the box and intercept the request sent to burp suite</p><p>3) Send the request to the intruder, highlight the text in the notes_for_customer parameter for the intruder position, set the attack type to battering ram, and go to options and turn off Make unmodified base request</p><p>4) Copy the text of a large string(Around 20–60mb) to your clipboard and go to payloads and hit paste until you have about 10 requests to be sent</p><p>5) Start the attack and you should start seeing 500 errors. After they all go through the page should be broken</p><p><strong>Video</strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2Fbnu9ydN6RD8%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Dbnu9ydN6RD8&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2Fbnu9ydN6RD8%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/f58c98906ecec2ece2c5bb3e7ee6ac17/href">https://medium.com/media/f58c98906ecec2ece2c5bb3e7ee6ac17/href</a></iframe><p>The other bugs reported use a similar attack type in the bug shown above but with different sized payloads to make it work, as they weren&#39;t as impactful I wont be making a full write up about them but if you’re interested in any of them feel free to message me on Facebook to ask.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/281/1*INES9Zpuk0HaT3eyfhsEGw.png" /><figcaption>Other Bugs</figcaption></figure><p><strong>Timeline</strong></p><p>Submitted- January 14th, 2019</p><p>Team asked for clarification - January 14th, 2019</p><p>More details provided- January 14th, 2019</p><p>Team asked for clarification again- January 17th, 2019</p><p>More details provided- January 17th, 2019</p><p>Team asked to reproduce it on a whitehat test account- January 23rd, 2019</p><p>Whitehat ID’s provided - January 23rd, 2019</p><p>Short Term Fix- February 18th, 2019</p><p>Bounty Awarded($500)- Short Term Fix- February 21st, 2019</p><p>Question about bounty amount- February 21st, 2019</p><p>Facebook team awards another ($250) as they were originally supposed to reward $750 total for the vulnerability but forgot to- March 11th, 2019</p><p>On a side note some of these vulnerability’s still work as the fix isn&#39;t working in full effect right now, I’ve been asked by the security team to include that anyone trying to emulate and report the same issues detailed here will be marked as duplicate!</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1d7d0bc27c7f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Unremovable Users in Facebook Collections]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maxpasqua/unremovable-users-in-facebook-collections-167958fc78e6?source=rss-da2883c44748------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/167958fc78e6</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[startup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Pasqua]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 28 Jan 2019 07:24:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-28T07:24:20.797Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Looking through Facebook newsroom I saw an update was put out ( <a href="https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/12/facebook-collection-sharing/">https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/12/facebook-collection-sharing/</a>) that added the feature to add users to a saved collections. After looking through it for a bit I found that when a user would block another person in the collection, they would be unremovable from said collection. The impact of this is that a malicious user can permanently lurk in a collection that could have sensitive info (ie. a business has a collection of potential new products).</p><p><strong>Proof of Concept</strong></p><p>1) Malicious user blocks the admin of collection</p><p>2) The admin will now be unable to remove or see the user in the collection</p><p>3) To view the collection as the attacker unblock the admin, view the collection, then reblock the admin to ensure you will not be removed</p><p><strong>Video</strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2Fw9ILkEQYYLg%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3Dw9ILkEQYYLg&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2Fw9ILkEQYYLg%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/e490144cbea149e44b803c2c78f6a34e/href">https://medium.com/media/e490144cbea149e44b803c2c78f6a34e/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Timeline</strong></p><p>Submitted- December 4th, 2018</p><p>Triaged- December 18th, 2018</p><p>Bounty Awarded($500)- January 28th, 2019</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=167958fc78e6" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Stealing Side-Channel Attack Tokens in Facebook Account Switcher]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maxpasqua/stealing-side-channel-attack-tokens-in-facebook-account-switcher-90c5944e3b58?source=rss-da2883c44748------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/90c5944e3b58</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Pasqua]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 04 Jan 2019 21:37:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-01-04T21:57:10.618Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After receiving an email from facebook that somebody requested to join my group I decided to open the link in a different account to see the results. I was brought to the “account switcher” page that looks like this.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/574/1*ibLJy7WqkpJRldxRtIzNLA.png" /></figure><p>Upon hitting continue it would normally log you out and prompt you to log in on the new account. But in the url for the account switcher there was a next paramater controlling where to go after hitting continue. On top of being able to control where the request goes, it also appends a fb_dtsg_ag token (the token used to prevent side-channel attacks on facebook).</p><p>The next task was to somehow find a a way to steal the tokens once the user hits continue. My main goal was to get the token to redirect to apps.facebook.com where I could harvest the token using an embedded iframe to pull the data from the url. The only problem was the next paramater didn’t support subdomains so it could only redirect to <a href="https://www.facebook.com/">https://www.facebook.com/.</a> Luckily enough facebook has an endpoint <a href="https://www.facebook.com/">https://www.facebook.com/</a>n/? where you can put any facebook domain after the ? and it will redirect. After a little bit of url encoding the final URL looked like this</p><p><a href="https://www.facebook.com/notif_account_switching/&amp;next=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fn%2F%3Fhttps%253A%252F%252Fapps.facebook.com%252FAPPTOSTEALTOKENS%252523">https://www.facebook.com/notif_account_switching/&amp;next=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fn%2F%3Fhttps%253A%252F%252Fapps.facebook.com%252FAPPTOSTEALTOKENS%252523</a></p><p>I clicked continue, and then checked my websites log file to see this</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*m3kT6jvS3obB90D04IDCGg.png" /></figure><p>Success!</p><p><strong>Timeline</strong></p><p>Submitted- December 7th, 2018</p><p>Triaged- December 10th, 2018</p><p>Team Asks for Verification on fix- January 3rd, 2019</p><p>Bounty Awarded($1000)- January 4th, 2019</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=90c5944e3b58" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Chaining Two Vulnerabilities to Break Facebook Appointment Times For the Second Time]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maxpasqua/chaining-two-vulnerabilities-to-break-facebook-appointment-times-for-the-second-time-ac639f8c8773?source=rss-da2883c44748------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ac639f8c8773</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Pasqua]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Dec 2018 21:17:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-14T21:17:53.301Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Along with <a href="https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/breaking-appointments-and-job-interview-schedules-with-malformed-times-edef103e46ba">https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/breaking-appointments-and-job-interview-schedules-with-malformed-times-edef103e46ba</a> during my searching I found a second vulnerability to break the newly added appointment tab in Facebook pages. The first vulnerability allowed for the start time and end time of Facebook appointments to be the set to the same value making no available times for job interviews or services to be booked. Normally this wouldn’t be too impactful as an admin could just change the times back to normal but that’s where the second vulnerability comes into play. Providing a malformed time in the same graphql POST call to the max_advanced_notice parameter would then cause an integer overflow when trying to load the time schedule rendering it unchangeable and therefor locking in the previous vulnerability from being changed</p><p><strong>Proof of Concept</strong></p><p>1) Browse to your pages appointment settings</p><p>2) Hit change on the available appointment times</p><p>3) Intercept the POST request sent to /api/graphqlbatch/ to change the times</p><p>4) Edit the end_times and start_times parameters so they match (eg. end_times”:[540,540,540,540,540],”start_times”:[540,540,540,540,540])</p><p>5) Edit the max_advanced_notice parameter to a malformed/larger time (eg. 15552000000)</p><p>6) The appointment time settings should now be broken</p><p><strong>Video</strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FocdTr7Ny580%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DocdTr7Ny580&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FocdTr7Ny580%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/0517cd6e8e63130e54013587aabbdf22/href">https://medium.com/media/0517cd6e8e63130e54013587aabbdf22/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Timeline</strong></p><p>Submitted- October 12th, 2018</p><p>Triaged- October 16th, 2018</p><p>Bounty Awarded($500)- December 14th, 2018</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ac639f8c8773" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Unremovable Tags In Facebook Page Reviews]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maxpasqua/unremovable-tags-in-facebook-page-reviews-656e095e69aa?source=rss-da2883c44748------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/656e095e69aa</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[love]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Pasqua]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 14 Dec 2018 21:05:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-14T21:58:49.519Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Facebook pages have a feature to leave reviews on them. When making a review a malicious user could tag a victim and it would render the tag unremovable. Upon trying to remove it would give the victim an error. The impact behind this is that the victim is permanently stuck tagged. Attackers could leverage this with massive spam posts or embarrassing information against the victim and he will not be able to remove himself from the post.</p><p><strong>Proof of Concept</strong></p><p>1) Browse to the page that you want the tag to be stuck on (Preferably owned by the attacker so the owner of the page wont remove the post)</p><p>2) Create a review and tag the victim</p><p>3) The victim will now no longer be able to remove the tag</p><p><strong>Video</strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F779U5QEmlPg%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D779U5QEmlPg&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F779U5QEmlPg%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ac7e109995c6c2c93096c1e364a68a62/href">https://medium.com/media/ac7e109995c6c2c93096c1e364a68a62/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Timeline</strong></p><p>Submitted- October 13th, 2018</p><p>Triaged- October 18th, 2018</p><p>Bounty Awarded($500)- December 14th, 2018</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=656e095e69aa" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Breaking Appointments and Job Interview Schedules With Malformed Times]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maxpasqua/breaking-appointments-and-job-interview-schedules-with-malformed-times-edef103e46ba?source=rss-da2883c44748------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/edef103e46ba</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[facebook]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Pasqua]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 13 Nov 2018 23:27:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-07T03:50:57.540Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Facebook recently added an “Appointments” feature to pages. After a bit of searching through all the requests made I found that it was possible to use malformed times to break the appointment tab. The impact of this is that a malicious admin/editor can create irreversible damage to Appointments and Job Interview Schedules. This will stay permanently so even if the malicious actor was removed from the page. This could be especially impactful in a large organizations Facebook page as they would need to remake the entire page losing all current following on it to get a working Appointments tab back.</p><p><strong>Proof of Concept</strong></p><p>1) Go to <a href="https://www.facebook.com/PAGEID/manage_jobs">https://www.facebook.com/PAGEID/manage_jobs</a></p><p>2) Click on a job application and hit schedule interview</p><p>3) Turn on a HTTP Interceptor such as burp suite</p><p>4) Intercept the graphql query and change suggested_end_time to a malformed time such as 15393834250000</p><p>5) The Appointments calendar should now be broken and if anybody trys to view the applicants schedule info the window will break on them</p><p><strong>Video</strong></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FkCUrZ7K3hKA%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3DkCUrZ7K3hKA&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2FkCUrZ7K3hKA%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/f63e411e872be7ebe2c47e7e69ee2490/href">https://medium.com/media/f63e411e872be7ebe2c47e7e69ee2490/href</a></iframe><p><strong>Timeline</strong></p><p>Submitted- October 19th, 2018</p><p>Triaged- October 24th, 2018</p><p>Bounty Awarded($500)- November 13th, 2018</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=edef103e46ba" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Break Services tab on Facebook Pages with Integer Overflow]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@maxpasqua/break-services-tab-on-facebook-pages-with-integer-overflow-744720b43c11?source=rss-da2883c44748------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/744720b43c11</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Pasqua]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 23 Feb 2018 19:32:24 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-07T03:50:25.806Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This vulnerability allows an attacker to break the services tab of a page rendering it completely unusable and unviewable. This attack requires the user to be at least an editor of the page. The impact of this is that if an editor decides to go rogue on a page he can completely break the page from ever using services again. This is especially vulnerable on business pages that rely on facebook services as they would have to remake their page and lose all of their current following to get the tab back.</p><p><strong>Proof of Concept</strong></p><p>1) Browse to the service tab of a page you have privileges on to make a service</p><p>2) Create a new service with any random name and photo</p><p>3) Edit the service and change the time to any random value</p><p>4) Hit save and intercept the HTTP request sent to <a href="https://www.facebook.com/services/create_service/">https://www.facebook.com/services/create_service/</a> to save the edit</p><p>5) Change the duration_in_seconds parameter to a value high enough to overflow the integer limit (ie. 18000000000000)</p><p>6) Service tab will now be permanently broken</p><p><strong>Timeline</strong></p><p>Submitted- February 13th, 2018</p><p>Triaged- February 16th, 2018</p><p>Fixed- February 23rd, 2018</p><p>Bounty Awarded($500)- February 23rd, 2018</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=744720b43c11" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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