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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Max Harris on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Max Harris on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@mdnharris?source=rss-9d5435bd38c0------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Max Harris on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Still Time for Prime Minister to Make a Fair Decision on Quarantine Fees]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mdnharris/still-time-for-prime-minister-to-make-a-fair-decision-on-quarantine-fees-928f438b51e7?source=rss-9d5435bd38c0------2</link>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Harris]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2020 09:54:31 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-07-30T10:36:03.555Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On Monday Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said the proposal to charge returning New Zealanders fees for quarantining “isn’t about charging for the sake of managing the number of people who come in.”</p><p>“Charging”, she said, “is really about making sure it’s equitable.”</p><p>As has been the case several times while she has been Prime Minister, Ardern was using the right yardstick for decision-making. The yardstick is what’s equitable or fair.</p><p>It’s important we measure up what’s being proposed properly against that yardstick.</p><p>In determining a fair and equitable decision, we can be guided by our usual approach to public health, our own history, and Ardern’s own standards.</p><p>Our general approach in public health is to treat health as a basic public service. That means health is so important to our lives that it should be free for all of us, paid for through our taxes.</p><p>It doesn’t matter if some of us have greater need or if others could afford it. We’ve decided we should collectively pool our resources to care for each other — because it’s fair.</p><p>Not all of our public health system works like this: dentistry, for example, is paid for by individuals, and we still have GP charges. But the general principle that guides most of the health system is that we pay for costs as a community rather than leaving individuals to fend for themselves.</p><p>Quarantining is clearly part of our public health system. The government’s requirement of two weeks of isolation, with tests on day 3 and day 12, is absolutely consistent with that system. It’s a way to keep us all safe when some people, through no fault of their own, might be exposed to the risk of contracting covid-19 through travel.</p><p>So it’s fair for quarantine to be funded the way we fund the rest of our public health system: through our taxes, paid for collectively. To impose quarantine fees would be to go down an American path towards ‘user-pays’, a departure from our usual practice.</p><p>One other way we can judge what is fair is by reference to Te Tiriti o Waitangi, the (Māori version of the) founding document of New Zealand. That promises the Crown powers of government (Article One) alongside guaranteeing Māori sovereignty (Article Two). It also guarantees Māori equality (Article Three).</p><p>Quarantine fees don’t stack up well against Te Tiriti o Waitangi either. It is hardly fair, in light of the promises of our founding document, for Māori to pay a fee to the Crown to return to their own whenua (land).</p><p>Fairness is also about how different groups are affected by a policy. A quarantine fee discriminates against low-income or working-class New Zealanders coming back from overseas.</p><p>It might be easy for some returning New Zealanders to pay, say, a $3000 fee. But there are some — already facing visa costs and cancelled flights — who will go into debt because of this fee. Others have saved for months, even years in some cases, to afford to come home and may be unable to because of the additional cost. No policy should hit the poorest the hardest, which is partly why we fund our health system in the way we do.</p><p>Some have suggested that overseas New Zealanders are all well-off. Quite simply, that’s wrong. Many New Zealanders overseas are often trying to find work, struggling to pay the rent and bills, not able to get access to foreign benefits or some public services, and looking to rebuild community in a new place. We’re lucky to get the chance to travel (in part, because prior to covid-19, flights had plummeted in cost), but we’re not all wealthy.</p><p>So a quarantining fee is unfair when we consider public health, Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and how different groups are affected.</p><p>But it’s also unfair, or inequitable, by Jacinda Ardern’s own standards. Jacinda Ardern has earned praise for promoting kindness in politics, and a wellbeing-based budget.</p><p>It isn’t kind, or conducive to wellbeing, to make Kiwis pay to come home. Grandparents in New Zealand want to meet their grandchildren for the first time. Some New Zealanders might need to come home because of sick family members. Some New Zealander may want to go overseas. A fee could block that, or add distress to an already anxious journey.</p><p>Prime Minister Ardern said on Monday her “primary focus” was for individuals to return home “safely” so that “we can look after them”. This is absolutely right. But are we really looking after New Zealanders by imposing a fee when they get to the border?</p><p>One argument against continuing publicly funded quarantine is it just costs too much. Estimates are that it will cost the government $500 million to fund all quarantining until the end of the year. That’s just 1% of the Government’s Covid Recovery Budget: a good investment to keep 100% of New Zealanders safe.</p><p>Another counter to the current model is that New Zealanders in New Zealand have contributed to the country’s success, and others should pay their way to gain the benefit of that success. It’s true that New Zealanders at home have worked hard to achieve excellent results with rates of covid-19 transmission. But keeping those results will be a collective effort to which overseas New Zealanders can contribute.</p><p>The government has floated the idea of creating different categories of fee-payers: it’s suggested that those on holidays might have to pay the fee. But exemptions and carve-outs are costly and complicated to administer. It’s difficult to police the reasons for people’s entry and exit. It’s far simpler to keep quarantine publicly-funded for all.</p><p>Maintaining publicly funded quarantine is in the best traditions of the Labour Party, which under Michael Joseph Savage set up a public health system that has been eroded since. Rejecting user-pays should also fit with New Zealand First’s priorities, since New Zealand First has long railed against the privatisation of public services, especially those occurring in the 1980s and 1990s. The Greens have already come out in favour of keeping quarantine publicly funded.</p><p>The decision on quarantine fees is a progressive opportunity for the Prime Minister to reassert the foundations of public services we can be proud of, in the finest traditions of her party and her Government. That could lay the foundation of a second term in government that might expand universal basic services.</p><p>On the other hand, if the Government presses ahead with an individualised quarantine model now, that could reinforce the wrongheaded notion that user-pays is fair. Cementing that in our political culture may make it harder to win the argument in future for expanding public services: it may make it harder to expand our health system into publicly funded dentistry, for example.</p><p>Often periods of collective strain — such as the Second World War — have led to upswings in solidarity (even if they have sometimes resulted in exclusion), and government policies that have provided more extensively for the community.</p><p>It would be sad if, in this moment, we decided to restrict rather than expand our horizons.</p><p>We are heartened that the Government has not yet made a decision on quarantine fees, and hope this idea, proposed by the National Party, will be scrapped. That’s the fair way forward.</p><p>[I’m a co-organiser of the ‘Team of Six Million’ group, which you can join <a href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/367648494219248">here</a>.]</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=928f438b51e7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[What is Neoliberalism and What Comes After It?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mdnharris/what-is-neoliberalism-and-what-comes-after-it-86710cf8c94?source=rss-9d5435bd38c0------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Harris]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Dec 2018 19:35:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-12-25T19:35:44.174Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Neoliberalism is a word that can be used a little sloppily, and sometimes as a general cuss-word for policies or practices that are disliked, especially by those on the Left. But just because it is not always used rigorously does not mean it doesn’t exist.</p><p>Milton Friedman himself used the word neoliberalism, in a 1951 essay called ‘Neoliberalism and Its Prospects’. In that essay, Friedman argued that it takes twenty years for there to be “a change in the underlying current of opinion and the resultant alteration in public policy.” Friedman claimed that while elections could create a “difference of degree” and an “opportunity to begin a drift in a new direction”, “the direction this drift takes will be determined not by the day-to-day shifts in political power or the slogans of the parties or even their platforms but by the underlying current of opinion which may be already … determining a new direction for the future.” Friedman noted that he sensed the start of a move away from collectivism in 1951. “The stage is set for the growth of a new current of opinion to replace the old,” wrote Friedman, “to provide the philosophy that will guide the legislators of the next generation even though it can hardly affect those of this one.” Friedman said the problem with collectivism was its means, not its ends; in particular, its belief “in the ability of direct action by the state to remedy all evils”. He talked of the need for “a new faith”, which would put “a severe limitation on the power of the state to interfere” with individuals (while recognizing that the State can do some things well).</p><p>He said that this faith could be what is “sometimes called neo-liberalism”, associated particularly with Henry Simons. The faith would be “ideally suited to fill the vacuum that seems to me to be developing in the beliefs of intellectual classes the world over.” It would accept the liberal emphasis on the importance of the individual, but would add to this the goal of a “competitive order”. Monetary stability would be an important feature of the system. Governments, Friedman claimed, would still have a role in “relieving misery and distress”, but this would have to involve minimal interference with the market: minimum incomes and minimum wages could not be justified. He concluded that “neo-liberalism offers a real hope of a better future.” Of course, neoliberalism was never just about ideas, as I’ll explain further in a moment. It was, in David Harvey’s words, a political project. But what is interesting about this essay — apart from Friedman’s own use of neoliberalism — is that we find ourselves in a similar interregnum, or in-between moment, today: a moment where there is a vacuum. Part of the purpose of today’s conversation is to stir up thinking that might fill that vacuum.</p><p>The other preliminary point to make is that neoliberalism has not had the same character the world over. I will speak in particular based on what I have seen and heard in the places I’ve lived: New Zealand, Australia, Indonesia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Neoliberalism has had different emphases in different places, based on different cultural backgrounds and different understandings of the State.</p><p>Nevertheless I do think there is something unified called neoliberalism that has had some common features across multiple continents. What I want to talk about are six overlapping and interlocking elements of the neoliberal project. I want to sketch these out so that we can talk clearly about what neoliberalism is, and so that we can be open-eyed about what we have to move beyond. The six elements I’ll talk about are neoliberalism as philosophy, neoliberalism as policy package, neoliberalism as class project, neoliberalism as new language, neoliberalism as closure of the Overton window, and neoliberalism as a social force. I want to try to be both precise and speculative in what I say, and I apologise if this ends up satisfying no one. I’m going to quote a fair few people, partly to help fill gaps in my knowledge, and I do this not to sound like a name-dropper, but to show how much work has gone into constructing and deconstructing neoliberalism — and to highlight how much more work needs to be done to move beyond it.</p><p><strong>1.</strong> <strong>Neoliberalism as philosophy of government</strong></p><p>The first way of conceiving of neoliberalism is as a programme for what the government should and shouldn’t do. This approach is best illustrated by Michel Foucault’s book of lectures, <em>The Birth of Biopolitics</em>, which is not at all about biopolitics (by which Foucault means the politics of scientific measurement of human health, including birthrate and life expectancy), and more a history of liberalism and neoliberalism. Foucault sees neoliberalism as continuous with liberalism, and traces the history of liberalism back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He sees neoliberalism as a “framework of political rationality”, which emerged in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s, and was transported to France and the US. (This is, it should be said, quite a Eurocentric account.) For Foucault, liberalism has always been about the organization and management of freedom (and not necessarily the guarantee of freedom). He understands neoliberalism as a refashioning of old liberal forms to serve particular purposes. So he writes: “we should not be under any illusion that today’s neo-liberalism is, as is too often said, the resurgence or recurrence of old forms of liberal economics which were formulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and are now being reactivated by capitalism for a variety of reasons to do with its impotence and crises as well as with some more or less local and determinate political objectives.” According to Foucault, the key change in the shift from liberalism to neoliberalism is a focus on competition: the competitive individual, and the engineering of government so that forces of competition play out within and between governments. There is overlap here with the work of British writers Jeremy Gilbert and Eliane Glaser. Neoliberals, in Foucault’s view, take competition as something that is not a given, but as something that has to be created. This is “the neoliberal art of government”: a form of government that focuses on economic growth, that opposes monopolies, that aims to guarantee price stability, and that regards social policy as being concerned with equal access to market goods. French neoliberalism placed particular emphasis on the separation of economic and social policy, whereas US neoliberalism developed the notion of human capital and the entrepreneur. In this discussion, Foucault also emphasizes the importance of the rule of law to the neoliberal project, and it is notable that Hayek engages closely with law in his writing, and that Friedman begins his essay on neoliberalism by quoting Dicey, the nineteenth century Oxford-based constitutional theorist. The focus on the rule of law creates a bridge to other philosophical work applying market models to the domain of crime, with Foucault citing Gary Becker’s work (and gesturing at the world of law and economics) as an example of this. There are different ways of constructing what the neoliberal philosophy of government is, but Foucault’s is perhaps the most prominent, seeing neoliberalism as an active initiative to create competition and to extend the market into non-market domains. Will Davies has talked analogously about neoliberalism as a philosophy that replaces politics with economics.</p><p><strong>2.</strong> <strong>Neoliberalism as policy package</strong></p><p>The second way of conceiving neoliberalism is as a policy package, perhaps to implement this philosophy of government. A number of theorists have done the hard, fine-grained work of charting neoliberal legal and policy changes, including the New Zealand writer Jane Kelsey (who in my view does some of the best work in closely and thoroughly mapping policy shifts). Policy changes discussed by Kelsey and others include the deregulation (the removal or loosening of rules) of various markets, especially financial markets and banking practices (in a way that has increased private debt considerably as well as the complexity and size of financial markets); the privatization of key State functions, including the provision of water, power, and railways; the weakening of trade unions through restrictions on recruitment and closed-shop unions; the denting of progressive income taxation, the abolition of some taxes (including inheritance tax), and the introduction of more regressive taxes such as VAT (goods and services taxes); the corporatization of public services (through introducing chief executives, private sector-style incentives and strategic planning, and increasing use of government by contract); and the focus on inflation targeting by independent central banks; the lifting of subsidies and tariffs, and the removal of explicit industrial policies. Away from the sphere of economic policy, the 1990s and 2000s saw a punitive push in criminal justice policies (exemplified in the US and the UK); Louis Wacquaint writes that this push, which disproportionately affected black and indigenous peoples, immigrants, and women (notable that the world female prison population has increased by 50% since 2000), was used to shut down dissent against the neoliberal order, and to create a false sense of security amidst the insecurity of significant economic change. This was neoliberalism’s racial dimension, and it is relevant to here to note that in New Zealand, some indigenous activists that I know well have spoken of neoliberalism as simply another iteration of colonisation. International institutions were key actors in these policy shifts, in addition to domestic governments: with the World Bank and IMF pairing development assistance with neoliberal changes, and the World Trade Organisation enforcing a particular model of trade and State action.</p><p>I also think there has been insufficient focus on the role of lawyers in all of this. The role of economists, thinktanks, finance, politicians, and international institutions has been well-mapped. But (and maybe it’s just because I’m trying to find work for myself in law that will interest me) more work remains to be done on how lawyers advised policy-makers and devised key phrases and statutes for neoliberal change; and how judges themselves drew on neoliberal reasoning in the common law (which is often under-scrutinised by non-lawyers). What is clear is that this was a society-wide agenda of policy and legal change; an agenda that shifted the way people in government (including judges in the courts) themselves thought about the task of government.</p><p><strong>3.</strong> <strong>Neoliberalism as class project</strong></p><p>Third, neoliberalism was and is a class project: a point that David Harvey has brought out with great clarity. Harvey has pointed out that the charting of policy change, and the tracing of the philosophy of neoliberalism, can give the impression that this was a completely coherent intellectual endeavour. But neoliberalism’s intellectual commitments were selectively applied: for all that neoliberalism involved and involves an attack on the State, the size of many States increased during the 1980s, as Harvey explains (partly because of increases in defence and criminal justice spending to scaffold other neoliberal projects). This was not just about ideas, either. Neoliberalism was built up through the funding of thinktanks such as the Mont Pelerin Society and the Business Roundtable in New Zealand, and the development of strategic networks of neoliberally minded thinkers in government and the public service and business. But it resulted in an unmistakeable transfer of wealth to a small group of people, such that in 2016 (according to Oxfam’s research) 8 men owned the same amount of wealth as half the rest of the world, 3.6 billion people. In Harvey’s words, from a 2016 interview in <em>Jacobin </em>magazine, neoliberalism was a “political project carried out by the corporate capitalist class as they felt intensely threatened both politically and economically towards the end of the 1960s into the 1970s”, a project “that would curb the power of labour”, a “counter revolutionary project” that “would nip in the bud what, at that time, were revolutionary movements in much of the developing world — Mozambique, Angola, China — but also a rising tide of communist influences in countries like Italy and France.” It required, Harvey says, significant solidarity across a corporate capitalist class. So, when Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell talks — as he has done recently, paraphrasing Tony Benn — about the need for an irreversible shift in the balance of power towards labour, away from capital, he is referring to a response to the class project of neoliberalism.</p><p><strong>4.</strong> <strong>Neoliberalism as new language</strong></p><p>Fourth, neoliberalism involved new language: it involved a shift in how we talk about the economy and ourselves. Some of the best writers on this include Maurizio Lazzarato, who speaks in his book <em>Governing by Debt</em> about the “axiomatics of neoliberalism” (the maxims that gave neoliberalism a simple soundbite logic), and Wendy Brown. Brown, in her book<em> Undoing the Demos</em>, traces the rise of how individuals came to be figured as “human capital”; the focus on “governance” as opposed to government; the rhetoric of flexibility; the discussion of benchmarking and best practice; the view of speech as capital, which Brown analyses with reference to the US Supreme Court decision in <em>Citizens United</em>. We could also think of our own examples: the way citizens have become regarded as consumers or clients, for examples. What Brown’s examples — especially, I think, the reference to “best practice” and “benchmarking” — bring out is that neoliberalism also involved an attempt to depoliticize certain political debates: an effort to suggest that neoliberal change was technocratic and value-neutral. This new language had real-world impacts too, changing the way government officials thought about their work and the way that we as citizens viewed our responsibilities. Kate, of course, has shown in her work how visual framing in economics can have considerable impact, alongside verbal framing.</p><p><strong>5.</strong> <strong>Neoliberalism as a project to define the limits of the political world</strong></p><p>This point about neoliberalism as new language is closely linked to the fifth way of viewing neoliberalism: as a way of closing down what is seen as politically possible. Mark Fisher’s book <em>Capitalist Realism </em>is perhaps the best account of this, explaining how Margaret Thatcher’s claim that “there is no alternative” cast a shadow over political and cultural debates. Other writers have spoken about how the Overton window — the window of what is seen as politically possible at any one moment — was closed through the neoliberal era. The causes of this include the rise of technocratic language and thinking, and the diversion of policy-making to less accountable institutions such as central banks. The result is that for some time certain issues have seemed to be untouchable by politics — say, for example, rising food prices or nationalization — though it may be that in recent times that Overton window has begun to be prized open again. A further consequence, I think, has been greater disengagement from mainstream politics — especially amongst young people — borne of a view that the power of politics to transform everyday lives has been dented. In all of this, I think we are better off talking not just of the closure of the Overton window, but of the movement of the Overton window to the right, since it certainly cannot be said (at least in places that I’m familiar with) that ideas from the far-right of politics have not been given space for debate. The upshot of this is that when we talk about the widening of the Overton window, we are talking about the widening of the Overton window in one particular direction.</p><p><strong>6.</strong> <strong>Neoliberalism as social engineering</strong></p><p>Finally, sixthly, neoliberalism has been a social force: a project that was always designed not just to change government or politicians, but also the everyday values, views, and visions in society — the “current of opinion” mentioned by Milton Friedman. We are reminded of this by Thatcher’s references to there being “no such thing as society”, and her claim that “economics is the method; the object is to change the soul.” Writers such as George Monbiot and Lynne Segal have traced the shift to more individualistic values, including with reference to empirical evidence, in the last 20–30 years. Guy Debord, writing <em>The Society of the Spectacle </em>in 1971, wrote of “the vicious circle of isolation” ushered in by the economic system, and the lack of an available vocabulary for discussing our damaged social lives. The anthropologist Arjun Appadurai has traced shifts in the “social imaginary”. My friend Andrew Dean has written about young people growing up in the wake of neoliberalism, and has analysed the structure of feeling that has created: including a lingering sense of disconnection and anxiety (under the cloud of debt). I have written about persistent loneliness — it’s striking that in both NZ and the UK, 15–24 year olds are the loneliest group in statistics just constructed about loneliness — and how neoliberalism has infected friendship, through its creation of social distance (to borrow a term from Adorno). Hito Steyerl has written about neoliberalism in the art world, and cultural studies theorists and others have explored how neoliberalism has affected popular culture, especially music. My view is that neoliberalism has not destroyed our capacity for prosocial values, but has maligned and marginalised those values. Jon Cruddas drew my attention to this passage from Vaclav Havel’s essay, ‘Politics and Conscience’, which lays out the point well. Havel writes: “We must not be ashamed that we are capable of love, friendship, solidarity, sympathy, and tolerance but just the opposite: we must set these fundamental dimensions of our humanity free from their ‘private’ exile and accept them as the only genuine starting point of meaningful human community.” The imperative is not to reintroduce values that have entirely disappeared, but bring these values back from exile within our peresonalities.</p><p>There is much more that could be said about neoliberalism’s precise starting point — it can, as I have noted, be traced back to the 1930s, or the 1970s, or 1980s, depending on your view of it and the geographical scope of the analysis. We could also talk about different rounds of neoliberalism. My sense is that neoliberalism has had three incarnations: a first surge of ruthless reform, often in the 1970s and 1980s; a second wave under the Third Way of Blair and Clinton, which bedded in neoliberalism through some forms of technocracy (recall Blair’s refrain that he was concerned only with “what works”), something Nancy Fraser has described as progressive neoliberalism; and a third phase after the global financial crisis, which has involved new forms of financialisation (including a brief period of enthusiasm around crypto-currencies such as bitcoin) and the rise of what Nick Srnicek describes as platform capitalism, new digital monopolies such as Amazon and Google that challenge neoliberalism’s commitment to competition. On the theme of using capitalism and neoliberalism somewhat interchangeably, there is a further debate to be had about whether criticisms of neoliberalism are a diversion from the need to criticize capitalism more broadly (David Harvey prefers to talk about anti-capitalism over anti-neoliberalism). But I would maintain that it is helpful to at least understand the specific ideological and political form that has predominated in the last 20–30 years, the problems with which might be shared with the broader capitalist order.</p><p><strong>So what comes next?</strong></p><p>Neoliberalism has failed on its own terms in many places — not succeeding in boosting productivitiy or living standards or growth — while also ripping at the social fabric of various societies. I’ve not spent so much time on the harms of neoliberalism because I think that ground is well-trodden by Joseph Stiglitz and many of the authors I’ve mentioned above. Needless to say, dissatisfaction is felt both on the Right and the Left, with Trumpian aggressive, authoritarian Statist action representing one attempt to build an alternative. Our challenge, I think, is to build a different kind of alternative from the Trumpian vision — and to talk with some specificity about a new form of government, politics, and economic rationality, however transitional that may be. One of the exciting things about Kate and Martin’s work is it provides that level of constructive specificity.</p><p>A challenge that we face is that the image and reputation of government has been dented by neoliberalism, as Mariana Mazzucato and Max Rashbrooke and others have pointed out. Government is regarded as inefficient, bloated, and corrupt, and there is the added fact in many societies that the government has been responsible for colonization, which leaves indigenous peoples and others with a justified sense of suspicion and distrust towards it. Another challenge is that the Left has been notably patchy in its provision of a theory of the State (despite work done by Ralph Miliband, Leo Panitch, and others). And Foucault notes the problem goes beyond the lack of a theory of the State. “What socialism lacks,” he writes, “is not so much a theory of the state as a governmental reason, the definition of what a governmental rationality would be in socialism, that is to say, a reasonable and calculable measure of the extent, modes, and objectives of government action.” And a final challenge, perhaps the greatest of them all, is that not all objections to the State are based on myth. Government can be a destructive as well as a deeply emancipatory force.</p><p>The best account of this tension between the destructive and deeply emancipatory capacities of government is given, I think, by Stuart Hall, in a short essay called ‘The State — Socialism’s Old Caretaker’, published in <em>Marxism Today </em>in 1984. Hall says, “I do not … believe that what ‘we have always thought about the State’ on the Left will necessarily do for the next ten decades; or that posing ourselves difficult questions is necessarily a sign of the weakening of the faith.” In a key statement of the problem, Hall says: “On the one hand, we not only defend the welfare side of the state, we believe it should be massively expanded. And yet, on the other hand, we feel there is something deeply anti-socialist about how this welfare state functions. We know, indeed, that it is experienced by masses of ordinary people, in the very moment that they are benefiting from it, as an intrusive managerial, bureaucratic force in their lives. However, if we go too far down that particular road, whom do we discover keeping us company along the road but — of course — the Thatcherites, the new Right, the free market ‘hot gospellers’, who seem (whisper it not too loud) to be saying rather similar things about the state.” Hall notes that Marx and Engels’ view on the future role of the State is sketchy and does not offer much guidance. And he argues that the State does not have a “monolithic class character”. The Left, on Hall’s view, “has its part of the state, too”: including the the welfare state, the NHS, and other nationalized services. But there is “the parallel expansion of the warfare state”: the repressive, policing state, active in surveillance (and we might add, mass incarceration). Hall acknowledges that this state seeps into the welfare state. And the large bureaucracy of the State also “makes people into passive, greedy, dependent clients much of the time, rather than people claiming rights from a state which is supposed to be their state.” Hall mentions the challenge of being “in and against the State”, a phrase often used by John McDonnell. Hall says we cannot “afford to be naïve about the state”. It is a “contradictory force”, and “the state has to be dismantled, and another conception of the state put in its place.” But, Hall notes, “we have as yet a wholly inadequate conception of how a socialist state would operate in ways which are radically different from that of the present version.” He does not set out an alternative vision, but does observe that there is something to hold into in the concept of “the public”, and that a “partnership” should be envisaged between state and society”, where “the state itself is rooted in, constantly draws energy from, and is pushed actively by popular forces.” He ends by underscoring the importance of “democracy” to socialist thinking, across “a multiplicity of sites in social life”, and not simply by smashing the state. It’s worth noting that what Hall discusses is a little similar to what I understand of the writing of academic and now Bolivian Vice President, Alvaro Garcia Linera, who talks about the State needing to become a “State of social movements”: a government driven by and creating space for advocacy and activism.</p><p><strong>Salvaging the State</strong></p><p>I think we can still salvage the State. It is difficult to prescribe how in an overly abstract way, since the conditions of each society are different. But I think a starting point is to commit to disciplining, democratizing, and (in this society and some others) decolonizing the State. What I mean by disciplining is that the State should be guided by certain progressive values: I’ve suggested that in the New Zealand context those might be values of care, community, and creativity. What I mean by democratizing is something I hope Martin will speak more about: thinking hard, in Keaanga Yamahtta-Taylor’s words, about not just what the State owns, but who owns the State; and working hard — through the use of cooperatives and community forces — to ensure that State action is participatory and responsive to the many publics that exist in any one society. What I mean by decolonizing (and I have in mind here especially the British and NZ states, though it applies to many other) is undoing and understanding the negative effects of colonization; and recentring the views and values of colonized peoples, since this is crucial to the legitimacy of the State. I might add — and this is perhaps something Kate might touch on — that we need to speak of decarbonizing the State, especially given the IPCC’s recent report (and I’m very pleased to say that one of the authors of that report, Bronwyn Hayward, is in the room today) tells us we have 12 years to reorient our societies to avoid complete climate breakdown. This, for me, is how we resolve the paradox of the double-edged State: by disciplining, democratizing, and decolonizing it.</p><p>There are still many questions of detail, of course. Is it enough for the State to be disciplined by values-based politicians, such as Jeremy Corbyn, or can a single written constitution do more to buttress the direction of a salvaged State? The Left has also been ambivalent historically on matters of constitutional law, something that I’m interested in. What is the role of central banks, seemingly anti-democratic institutions, in all of this? What should the salvaged State do about finance, that sector that has grown considerably under neoliberalism? My sense is that on the contemporary British left, there are some subtle but important differences on this question, with some — like Mariana Mazzucato and, I would say, Graham Turner (primary author of a report called <em>Financing Investment </em>that I contributed to) — who think the challenge is to transform finance and harness it towards more progressive ends; and others who would seek to decentre finance more radically as part of a diversified economy. This raises the question: what, of the economy, needs to be democratized — and what needs to be dismantled? I think we should not be scared to have these arguments out. The Left should pride itself as being a place of contestation, and Stuart Hall is right, I think, that “posing ourselves difficult questions” is not “necessarily a sign of the weakening of the faith”. And the questions, of course, should not be confined to the State — there are many other aspects of a new economic model to be worked out, as I think Kate and Martin will speak about.</p><p>How do we get from where we are now to a salvaged State, a different vision of government beyond neoliberalism? I think we should be wary of copying the methods of the Right, and it is concerning to me to see some writers simply suggesting that what is needed is a Mont Pelerin-style thinktank and a similar circulation of ideas. The Left has different values and commitments, and these should apply to our methods as well as our ends. That means we should maintain a commitment to mass movement politics as the principal and best way to achieve bottom-up, society wide change — through the Labour Party and Momentum, in my view, and outside of it. We need to maintain a commitment to networks of advocacy groups, joining together with common cause. And there is also a desperate need for hard and rigorous thinking about these questions, from people in the university — through dissertations and theses, and also through other forms (including conversations and writing for a popular audience). All of us have a part to play in this project, and — in the face of climate breakdown, in the face of shameful homelessness, in the face of mass incarceration — in the face of all of these things, and even though we and others find ways to mask or not to face up to them, we have not a moment to lose.</p><p>[speaking notes from event on ‘Government After Neoliberalism’, with Kate Raworth and Martin O’Neill]</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=86710cf8c94" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Beyond a Superficial Politics of Compassion]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mdnharris/beyond-a-superficial-politics-of-compassion-f148266a6602?source=rss-9d5435bd38c0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f148266a6602</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Harris]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 05 Nov 2018 16:36:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-11-05T16:36:34.403Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Four months ago, I was on an inter-city bus in New Zealand — where I’m from — and throughout the journey a young women was coughing. About two hours into the journey, the bus driver — a middle-aged Māori woman — pulled the bus over, turned to the passengers, stood up and goes, “Right, who’s coughing?” The young woman nervously put up her hand. Then, just when I thought she was going to be told off or reprimanded in some way, the driver pulled out from under her seat a medicine bag. “Are two cough lollies enough for you?” she asked. Then she turned to the rest of the bus: “does anyone else want a cough lolly?”</p><p>Just under four years ago, I discovered that I needed urgent surgery. I had an aortic dilatation, or more scarily, an aortic aneurysm. I was terrified of the prospect of my aorta tearing at any point (something which would have been fatal), and I was terrified about the surgery. It was open-heart surgery, with a 2–3% mortality risk. But through the National Health Service I received incredible care and competence in the surgery. I had a surgeon, Mario Petrou, who challenged all stereotypes of cold, abrasive surgeons and told me, “we’re going into this surgery together”. I had nurses who were there in moments of great anxiety, and who treated me as a human being who happened to have a serious condition, as opposed to a medical specimen first. And I had family and close friends who reassured me, and held my hand throughout, I came through the operation, writing on a sheet of paper as soon as I woke up, “I’m so grateful to be alive.”</p><p>These stories involve different settings and different stakes. But they both involve everyday acts of compassion. I mention these everyday acts of compassion, which I’ve been a great beneficiary of, because it’s not an insignificant fact that compassion persists, in places like the United Kingdom and New Zealand, despite a concerted effort over the last 20 or 30 years to break our ability to act for others. There are two oft-quoted lines from Margaret Thatcher, which I think sum up that 20–30 year project. First, Mrs Thatcher said in 1981, “Economics are the method. The object is to change the soul.” Second, in 1987, she said, “There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families.” What these lines show is that what is sometimes called the neoliberal project was deeply anti-social. It sought to change not just politics, but people’s souls, through the application of a narrow economistic vision of the world. It sought to chip away at the idea that we could be more as a community than the sum of our individual parts. And the fact that compassion persists, despite the antisocial drive of neoliberalism, says something about the enduring, generative power of compassion, where it is practiced even against all odds.</p><p>But there’s an important point about the two stories I opened with, relevant to the second statement I quoted from Mrs. Thatcher. The bus driver on that New Zealand bus had to feel a connection to the young woman coughing, and to all of us on that bus, to show compassion. The surgeon who carried out my heart surgery, and the nurses caring for me, had to feel a link to me in order to display deep compassion in their actions. And what that reveals is that one of the building blocks of the project of creating a more compassionate politics is deepening the ties that hold us together as a society. One of the building blocks of the project of creating a more compassionate politics, to put the point another way, is to remember and reinforce the idea that there is such a thing as society. We should not forget the preconditions of the project of a more compassionate politics, the building blocks — especially if we identify as progressives or radicals, since I think that hard thinking about preconditions or building blocks characterises a progressive or radical worldview — and in particular so that we avoid merely a surface-level politics of compassion, which entails exhorting everyone to be more compassionate without addressing the forces that stand in the way of us all realising compassion. In my view, another precondition of a politics of compassion is a decolonised society — a society that understands and undoes the negative effects of colonisation — since ongoing colonial perspectives can skew how compassion is applied. It’s especially important that we mention that imperative in this College, which has only recently begun to acknowledge the way in which it has benefited from slavery; in particular, through a large bequest by Christopher Codrington (whom this College’s library is named after), whose wealth was built on the labour of slaves in the Caribbean.</p><p>On a related theme: a further way of going beyond a surface-level politics of compassion is to remember, and other speakers in this session have touched on this point already, that a politics of compassion must have a material dimension. Put simply: money matters and resources matter for a politics of compassion. As I heard someone say recently in a different context, if my boss at work treats me politely and civilly, never raises their voice at me, and acknowledges difficult situations, but does not pay me enough for me to make ends meet or does not allow me to join a trade union with which I could have the power to push for higher wages, that is compassion that only goes so far. And I think this analogy can be easily extended to politics. It would be tempting to interpret a politics of compassion to mean only that we need a different demeanour in politicians, a different way of interacting in the midst of disagreement, a different set of gestures. I don’t want to diminish any of those things. But a more fully-fledged politics of compassion must materially support those in need, as well as expressing support for their position. It must bake compassion in to its institutions, in the same way that compassion is at the core of the NHS. It is that structural change to our politics that might be more difficult to achieve than the more superficial shift in the style of that politics.</p><p>I want to draw on the experience of the new New Zealand government, led by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, to flesh out thie point. I wrote about New Zealand politics called <em>The New Zealand Project</em>, which was released early last year, and called for a politics grounded in care, community, and creativity — which I claimed was the best way to understand progressive values today.<em> </em>I also have great admiration for her as a politician. Prime Minister Ardern, as many of you will know, has spoken about themes relevant to a politics of compassion. She said recently in an interview with the New York Times: “That idea that power cannot be accompanied by notions of compassion and kindness and empathy; that’s something that I refuse to accept.” And I think Ardern’s government has made strides towards achieving a government of compassion: raising benefit levels, banning offshore oil and gas drilling in the interests of reducing carbon emissions for current and future generations, beginning a conversation about a different kind of criminal justice system focused on rehabilitation, developing a Living Standards Framework as an alternative to GDP. But material and structural change remains a challenge for that bold government. The government has announced a tax working group, which is facing opposition as it considers shifts towards a more progressive tax system, despite the fact that New Zealand has no capital gains tax, no inheritance tax, and a top rate of income tax of just 33%. Further, when Jacinda Ardern gave a recent speech to the UN underscoring the value of kindness in government, and the need to build on NZ’s past achievements in being the first country to give women the vote, a number of activists posting on social media lamented the fact that the position of Māori women — who make up 60% of NZ’s female prison population — still has to be further prioritised by the government. Capitalism and colonialism are entrenched forces that are, at this point in time, stifling how far Ardern’s politics of empathy and kindness can go.</p><p>So there are challenges for a politics of compassion here, and abroad. I want, in this last part of what I’ll say, to pose three more tough questions for us all, as individuals and groups invested in this political project. I think they’re interlocking. They’re all questions about whether compassion is the right value to centre at this historical moment. They’re all questions designed to ensure that we develop a framework of thinking that appeals not just to the heart — which I think is important — but also to the head, since we are likely to hear complaints that compassion is fluffy, or airy-fairy, or empty as a value.</p><p>First of all, does centring compassion put off the urgent need to bring those who are doing it tough directly into positions of leadership? Compassion, to me, means sympathetic understanding and concern for those in tough positions. And that sympathetic understanding and concern is an imperative for those who are not struggling — those of us, including myself, who are middle-class or wealthier, who are white, or male. But is the more important need to ensure that those who are struggling have the power and ability to shift policy, since these are the people who have not just an intermediate understanding of someone else’s plight but direct lived experience of that position? Or is the way to combine a politics of compassion with a politics of lived experience?</p><p>Secondly, relatedly, is compassion too static, too inactive, for the challenges of our time? In a world where we are told by the IPCC that we have just twelve years to radically reorient emissions patterns, where family and sexual violence are rampant, where mass incarceration continues to rip apart from families and societies and disproportionately affects minority communities, is sympathetic understanding and concern enough? I’ve written a little about a politics of love, and I’ve said in the past that love might be preferable to compassion since it involves not only deep warmth but also action, when perhaps compassion might be regarded as a more limited act of understanding and sympathy. But even now I’ve come to doubt whether love is enough, and I’ve come to think we need a politics that also values struggle and anger. Perhaps a more constructive way of putting the challenge is this: can we craft a politics of compassion that is active and consistent with conflict, struggle, and anger?</p><p>Thirdly, it’s a great virtue of the idea of compassion that almost everyone believes in it. It is a value that has been cherished by religious communities, by conservatives, by progressives, by indigenous groups, and others — as revealed by the diversity of speakers here today. However, a key focus must be on the question: to whom must we show compassion? Is compassion to be directed towards everyone? How do we go beyond showing compassion towards our in-group, since I would guess that almost everyone shows compassion to someone, or some group, and that the real challenge is in extending compassion beyond our in-group?</p><p>I raise these tough questions not because I want to weaken this project, but because answering these questions will make our project stronger. I want to end on a positive note.</p><p>One of the attractions of the neoliberal story of government and society — and, I think, the austerity story — is that it draws on simple, accessible narratives from everyday life, in particular the narrative of the household budget, in order to explain government. For a long time those wanting a different story (to use George Monbiot’s phrase) have not been able to find an alternative set of everyday experiences to ground a different worldview. And compassion just might fill that gap. People can identify with everyday stories of compassion: from the buses we travel on, or the NHS that we benefit from. If we can build — from ground up — those everyday stories of compassion, in a similar way to how that household budget story has been built up, we might just be able to move beyond the nasty, narcissistic view of who we are as human beings to something richer, better, and more inspiring.</p><p>[speaking notes for ‘Compassion in Politics’ conference talk at All Souls College, Oxford, on 20 October 2018]</p><p>-</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f148266a6602" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Don’t You Know I’m Shit at Having Friends: A Talk]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mdnharris/dont-you-know-i-m-shit-at-having-friends-a-talk-e43cdca2c937?source=rss-9d5435bd38c0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/e43cdca2c937</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[music]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[friendship]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Harris]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 20 May 2018 09:19:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-05-20T09:19:10.694Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Don’t You Know I’m Shit at Having Friends</strong></p><p>[play Jay-Z, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCSh48OlvMo&amp;t=382s">‘Moonlight’</a>]<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a></p><p>The video for Jay-Z’s song, ‘Moonlight’, released in 2017 off his album ‘4.44’, is a cutting comment on black representation in the US entertainment world. But — without at all wanting to sever the music video’s discussion of race and prejudice — it also offers us some acute observations about modern friendship.</p><p>The video, directed by Alan Yang, begins with the usual scene-opening musical kick. A wide shot reveals the apartment living room, familiar to <em>Friends </em>viewers, replete with ivory-coloured carpet, cream couch, and off-white lampshade. The all-black cast then recites lines from the episode, ‘The One Where No One’s Ready’. The authors of <em>The Unofficial Guide to Friends</em> say of this episode that “the script is dull and the performers seem to know it, with none of them trying particularly hard to make it work”.</p><p>The remake has all of the hallmarks of the 1996 episode. Ross, played by Jerrod Carmichael, appears in a tux. The hollow canned laughter cascades in the background. The central characters appear nonplussed about getting ready on time for each other. The conversation is superficial: Rachel, played by Issa Rae, worries about looking fat in her dress; Chandler (Lakeith Stanfield) and Joey (Lil Rey Howery) talk about drinking fat; Monica (Tiffany Hadish) worries about whether a phone message she’s left is “breezy enough”.</p><p>But there are some telling twists. When the screen fades to black after the first-minute teaser, the shot pulls up on the sofa in front of the fountain from the original <em>Friends</em>, the characters squeezing onto it and frolicking around cheerily, splashing water at each other. However, in place of The Rembrandts’ ‘I’ll Be There For You’ — with its hand-claps and sunny reminder that when “no one told you that life was gonna be this way,” “I’ll be there for you” — the soundtrack strikes a more offbeat note. The theme song is Whodini’s 1984 track ‘Friends’, which asks — underneath a skittish piano and slightly foreboding bass — “friends, how many of us have them? Friends, ones we can depend on?”</p><p>A minute later, the scene is short-circuited when Lil Rey Howery’s phone goes off mid-scene. Jerrod Carmichael asks to take five. He greets his friend, played by Hannibal Buress. When Carmichael asks Buress asks what he thinks of what’s just been filmed, and for him to be “100% honest”, Buress says it’s “garbage”. “It was episodes of Seinfeld but with black people,” Buress says, revealingly, since <em>Entertainment Weekly </em>had said that the original episode “owes a large stylistic debt to Seinfeld”. Buress’s own latest project — he’s just booked a part in ‘Pirates of the Caribbean: Cruiseline’ playing “a pirate with a bad attitude and a heart of gold” — doesn’t sound much better, and he admits it’s terrible”; but there’s a hint that in this moment of honesty, of being real, there’s much more friendship than what has just been depicted onset.</p><p>Carmichael gets this, and as the filming continues, he looks listless, blinking slowly in some kind of recognition, his face still as the dry jokes drone on. He looks up, his eyes slightly glassy, and begins to walk off set, led by Issa Rae. She points him in the direction of an external door once they’re out of the glare of the lights, and it’s not clear if she is suggesting a deserved break or leading him off. And Jay Z’s lyrics kick in. “We’re stuck in La La Land.”</p><p>Carmichael continues through the door, under a neon ‘exit sign’, and finds himself on a lawn outside. He approaches a park bench. With the whiteness of the film lights firing through the set door, the camera dollies back to reveal a full moon bearing down on him. At this point, we hear the voices of Warren Beatty and Faye Dunaway from the 2017 Academy Awards, announcing that the Academy Award for Best Picture goes to ‘La La Land’, to jubilant cheers that sound not all too different from the on-set laughter track. And as the credits roll, there’s the sound of rain on the outside lawn. It’s hard not to think of The Rembrandts line, for all its banality, that “I’ll be there for you/When the rain starts to pour” — and then to think of Carmichael, on his own in the moonlight, the cycle beginning again.</p><p><strong>*</strong></p><p>[Play Francis and the Lights, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wScYn10D2vo">‘Friends’</a>]</p><p>The full Whodini song, used in Jay-Z’s ‘Moonlight’, contains the following lines:</p><p><em>Friends</em></p><p><em>Is a word we use everyday</em></p><p><em>Most the time we use it in the wrong way</em></p><p><em>Now you can look up the word, again and again</em></p><p><em>But the dictionary doesn’t know the meaning of friends</em></p><p>If this is right, as I think it is — that we talk about friends all the time, that most of the time we use the word ‘friends’ in the wrong way, but that the dictionary can’t tell us what friendship is — the question is: what are ‘friends’, if more than canned laughter? To borrow from Whodini again, how many of us have them? Ones we can depend on?</p><p>I’m making generous use of music such as Francis and the Lights’ track ‘Friends’ that I’ve just played to explore these questions because I don’t think the nature of friendship is only illuminated by academic sources. As well, and perhaps more importantly, in lyrics I think we find efforts to make sense of our current moment in accessible language. Ruban Nielson of Unknown Mortal Orchestra recently said in an interview with <em>Dazed</em>: “When I’m writing, I feel like I just look round and see what’s going on and then write about what I find interesting. … I’m not trying to make any judgment, I just want to write about the feeling of wandering around, looking at what’s going on in the world and making little statements about it without real opinions.” I think this is very insightful. In music (including music videos) and lyric-writing — perhaps more than other activities, such as creative or academic writing — we often come across observation and description without accompanying judgment or justification. It’s almost the opposite of at least mainstream analytic philosophy, which has a focus on justification and conceptual clarification, but often describes or observes little about the world. I want to draw on the observations and descriptions of friendship that we find in music and lyrics, and bring that raw material into conversation with philosophical analysis of friendship.</p><p>The first thing to say about friendship is that it seems difficult to me to try to speak about friendship for all time and in all places. The norms of friendship reflect a region or country’s culture. They might differ based on the backgrounds (class, race, gender, and other) of those in friendship groups. What is possible within a friendship reflects the economic position of friends. There might be overlapping values or characteristics of friendship. But to try to claim that there is a timeless core of friendship appears to me to be perilously over-confident.</p><p>What we are left, then, is with the challenge of trying to understand friendship in our time and in our place. But even doing that is not without risks. I’m not sure I can assume one ‘we’, one ‘us’, one ‘our’, in the audience for this talk. We likely come from different backgrounds, different communities, different generations. Moreover, I would never claim to have a complete understanding of the essence of friendship. So let me instead say this: what follows are some reflections on friendships for our historical moment. They will inevitably be shaped by my experiences, in particular living in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and as a man from a comfortable middle-class background; but I hope that they will also be informed by my reading of work by authors from other places, and by my engagement with friends and colleagues from different countries.</p><p>I have a sense that I have practised friendship very imperfectly in the almost 30 years that I have been alive. And maybe from this inchoate sense I might be able to draw out some points about what friendship is. I do think I have been a good friend in moments — by, say, supporting others through difficult periods (including mental and physical health scares). But I have also dropped out of contact with people with whom I’d consider myself close; I have failed to follow up attentively with people who have shared distressing news; I have offered advice or my own thinking when nonjudgmental listening would have been preferable.</p><p>If these intuitions are based on a firm foundation (and not just mistaken views about what friendship is or requires), then it would seem that friendship — at least in the contexts I have lived in, and within the communities I inhabit — has something to do with support, attentiveness, and sensitivity to the needs of a particular person and situation. Simone Weil, the French philosopher and activist who died in 1943 aged just 34, writes about some of these qualities in her essay on friendship, in particular pausing on attention, which she describes as “the rarest and purest form of generosity”.</p><p>But this captures only part of what friendship is: perhaps a part concerned with times of difficulty or distress. In moments of difficulty or distress, and in other moments, friendship also appears to be centrally concerned with making sense of the past and present of our own lives. We communicate what has happened to us to a range of people in our lives: to family, to strangers, and others. But in friendship, at least the friendships that I can call to mind, I have found to be common the experience of unpicking the past, querying conduct, and seeking to explain others’ behavior. “Friendship is nourished by communication,” in Montaigne’s words. Friends help us to understand ourselves and others. They stretch us to be better. More than that, they constitute and define who we are. Donna Haraway has talked about “becoming-with-each-other.” And in case this sounds all too dry and rationalistic, I should emphasise that, to me, the sharing of emotion — anger, or sadness, or joy — is a significant part of this process.</p><p>Some synchronicity, if not reciprocity, is necessary — at least some similarity in worldview — a synchronicity that is perhaps signified by Bon Iver and Frances Starlite’s matched, minimalist dance routine that we see towards the end of their single-take video for the song ‘Friends’. Moments where thoughts and emotions intersect can be affirming, even exhilarating. We need, too, a capacity to relax and to be free in friendship: a space in which we can feel able to venture difficult thoughts that leave us vulnerable. Another way of putting this is that a certain threshold level of intimacy must be passed for an interaction to become a friendship. In Ralph Waldo Emerson’s words, “Before [a friend] I may think aloud.” But friendship is not only about what is said aloud; it is also about a particular mood or energy — something that is created in the space and spaces in between people. In addition, I think that, though friendship and love are different things, love — a deep sense of warmth towards another, which can manifest itself in terms of words (but also in other ways) — is a part of friendship. Simone Weil adds that in genuine friendship, there can “be no trace of the wish to please or the desire to dominate”. This is to put the point quite strongly, but it certainly seems right to say that desires to please or to dominate sit uneasily with friendship, properly lived out. There is a hint of the same point in Theodor Adorno’s <em>Minima Moralia</em>, though it goes further in Adorno, when he writes: “tenderness between people is nothing other than awareness of the possibility of relations without purpose”.</p><p>To sum up, then, friendship — in my experience — is a relationship of attentiveness, support, and sensitivity in times of need; a relationship that enables people to make sense of the past and present; and a relationship that creates space for intimacy and love, in a mode that involves some synchronicity of worldview and a minimising of desires to please or to dominate.</p><p>But in describing friendship in our time, we must add to these abstract, idealized reflections a more critical point highlighted by Jay-Z’s ‘Moonlight’ video: that friendship is often patterned along class, race, and gender lines. Plato once said that “similarity begets friendship”, and this remains true: we tend to be attracted to those from similar class, race, and gender backgrounds. Social psychologists call this ‘homophily’. What is unclear is whether homophily amongst friends has worsened as inequality has risen in many countries since the 1970s and 1980s. What is plausible is that as inequality has increased the “social distance” between people, to quote Adorno again, it has become harder to build friendships across class, race, and gender lines. So we get all-male friendship groups and elite friendship circles (which I have certainly seen and been a part of at different points, including in Oxfrd). We have to add, therefore, to our earlier discussion that friendships are positioned within social structures.</p><p>We only have to look back at the unbearable whiteness of <em>Friends </em>to see this point vividly represented and revealed. Despite the complaints in The Rembrandts’ song — that “it hasn’t been your week, your month, or even your year”, “that your job’s a joke, your broke” — the main characters on <em>Friends </em>sit in a similar socio-economic position, and their friendship reflects aspects of that positioning. There are complaints about finding work, sure, but this does not stop them from living in spacious apartments and without significant references to debt or finance-related anxiety. The original episode that Jay-Z bases ‘Moonlight’ on, The One Where No One’s Ready, had three additional characters alongside the core cast. All three additional characters were white, making the episode an all-white affair. And yet the closed, largely monochromatic makeup of this middle class, very straight world is hardly ever (if ever) commented on in the NBC series — something underscored by the remake of the episode with an all-black cast. We see what we are told are just ‘friends’: but these are friends whose relationships are underpinned by similar class backgrounds, and whose relationships reflect the often insulated character of white American middle class life. To draw on the words of Claudia Rankine from a recent talk, “white life is a standard for normal life”: “white people are the people”. In her words, whiteness is regarded as “neutral, nonpartisan, normal”.</p><p>But we need to name it, as Rankine encourages. It is white friendship that we watch on <em>Friends</em> and that practice is not neutral or unproblematic. It is a practice that can often maintain access to social and economic capital, albeit in the seemingly innocuous, relaxed sphere of ‘the social’. It is part of our task, as critical thinkers and activists, to problematise — and perhaps to politicise — this social sphere. All-white or all-male or all-elite friendships can not only concentrate power in racial, gendered, or class groupings. They also limit the insight and understanding people can have about the societies in which they live. How can anyone generalise meaningfully, as we all do in day-to-day life generalisations are based on a slanted slice of community? Writers, artists, and activists who work (at least partially) in the realm of representation will inevitably only represent a sliver of that society through their work if their friendships, and personal relationships, are limited along class, race, or gendered lines — a fact that we were reminded of when white American writer Jonathan Franzen said in 2016, “This is an embarrassing confession: I don’t have very many black friends.” If, as writer Lindy West noted, friendships are “engines of empathy”, homophilic friendships will also ringfence the empathy people can have — and that ringfenced empathy limits the potential for a truly progressive politics to be built in a society.</p><p>*</p><p>[play Fazerdaze, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RPVYySjLQlc">‘Friends’</a>]</p><p>The song I’ve just played by the young New Zealand artist, Fazerdaze, also entitled ‘Friends’, speaks of the difficulty in doing friendship well in our time. “I always leave without saying goodbye,” Fazerdaze sings, recalling — for me — moments of rushed departures in order to avoid awkward farewells. “Don’t you know I’m shit at having friends,” she drawls nonchalantly, “they always disappear or I forget …” And in the chorus, Fazerdaze hints at a sense of confusion, a sense of futility, about anything being different: “What did I do/How am I to know”, she repeats. The song raises the question: are those in my generation and the generation after, born towards the end of the twentieth century, any worse at having friends then others?</p><p>Here’s one possibility: our friendships have become rinsed through with neoliberalism, affecting the quality of our relationships. Neoliberalism is an order of reason, a rhetorical mode, and a set of policies that became dominant in many parts of the world in the 1970s and 1980s. It involved and involves the slashing of taxes (the top rate of income tax came down from 66% to 33% in NZ), the decimation of unions, the privatization of public services and the corporatisation of the public sector, the deregulation of many markets (including financial markets) — and the depoliticisation of all of the above: in other words, these changes were presented as necessary technocratic changes, and the scope for political debate (the Overton Window of what was seen as politically possible) was narrowed, as Mark Fisher so lyrically points out in his book, <em>Capital Realism</em>. It was and is a political project that built up the strength of the idea that free markets are a social good, and that governments are inefficient and corrupt and flawed, in order to allow for the selective application of policies that enhanced the power of capital over labour. It has resulted in the widening of inequality in the UK, NZ, and the US; massive increases in private debt; and expansions in corporate power and the size of financial sectors.</p><p>Most fundamentally, it has eroded collective institutions, enhanced individualism, and damaged social relations. Margaret Thatcher, one of the leading players in the neoliberal project, famously said, “There is no such thing as society” — a statement that is patently untrue, but which she sought to make true. Thatcher also said, “Economics is the method; the object is to change the soul.” And I would argue that she did change the soul of the British population, and that neoliberalism did change souls in many places. It normalised the notion of the competitive individual as the fundamental unit of modern society, as Jeremy Gilbert has noted, and it celebrated competitive individual as a model to which all should aspire. Technology, social media, and celebrity culture — all of which have been spurred on by neoliberalism — have reinforced these tendencies. And neoliberalism has had racial and gendered dimensions. It has given more power to those already wealthy in society, predominantly male and white; and prison populations have mushroomed, as a means of controlling dissent and warehousing those who have lost out through neoliberalism, which has disproportionately penalized people of colour and has entailed a particular increase in the number of women in prison (which rose by 50% globally between 2000 and 2017).</p><p>Against that backdrop, it is at least conceivable that friendships have changed too under neoliberalism. As norms surrounding the competitive individual (like self-interestedness) have become acceptable, it is arguable that it has become harder to do friendship well. Being a friend requires supporting another, being there for another, living through another by sharing in their highs and breaking their lows. Neoliberalism, put crudely, has crowded out space in our minds and in our societies for care, empathy, even love. It has done so in different ways for different people: it has shifted the model of success in society (towards that of an ambitious individual achieving wealth and fame), it has precipitated widespread precariousness for people in work (leaving even less time for projects of care), and it has separated people from each other in social, cultural, and economic terms. Friendships for those at the top of society may now carry more benefits, since social and economic capital is more greatly concentrated. But for many, given the social landscape I have described, it’s no surprise that we’re shit at having friends — that, in Adorno’s words, we have become socially defunct individuals. It’s no surprise — under conditions of a warped model of success, social distance, and precarity and stress — “they always disappear or I forget.” Neoliberalism, far from forging space for freedom, has reached into our most personal relationships and distorted their character.</p><p>There’s another, different way in which our friendships have been challenged by social conditions today, in a manner that might be influenced by neoliberalism. Loneliness — an unpleasant gap between desired and actual social contact that leads to a sense of not-belonging within our social worlds — is a feature of many contemporary societies. It is possible, as George Monbiot has said, that neoliberalism has contributed to that loneliness. Puerto Rican decolonial theorist Nelson Maldonado-Torres has pointed out that many political theorists of our time have understood freedom as consisting in the achievement of “the lonely subject”. And it seems at least suspicious, certainly troubling, that in both the United Kingdom and New Zealand’s recently adopted statistical measures of loneliness, people between the ages of 15 and 24 — the generation that has grown up with the norms of neoliberalism — are the loneliest of all age groups. Loneliness could affect our friendships through various channels. But one suggestion, emerging out of my and others’ anecdotal experience, is that widespread loneliness leaves us grasping for social bonds in a way that makes for imperfect friendships. Let me put the point another way. My hunch is that a large number of people are experiencing a sense of not belonging in our social worlds, a gap between desired and actual social contact, a feeling of not having the social life that we want or need. In that state, we feel moved to seek out social contact, to try out friends, and can be left cold by the interactions we cannot quite perfect. We are left, in my experience, with questions, not connections; with small talk over real talk; with catching up in place of being with each other. We are left, perhaps, with the sense of confusion and incapacity voiced by Fazerdaze: “What am I to do/How am I to know …” Friendlessness is the most severe result of some of these difficulties, and deserves further attention, especially if the social skills fostered by friendship are eroded in a state of friendlessness in a way that jeopardises people’s employment opportunities, mental health, and security within society.</p><p>Out of this maelstrom of loneliness, friendlessness, or imperfect bonds, the invitation to be a ‘friend’ on Facebook takes on a particular valence — and an especial emptiness. Being a friend on Facebook offers the prospect of the features of friendship we have discussed — support, attentiveness, synchronicity — but no guarantee of any of them. An offer to accept a friend request is an invitation to a zero-hours friendship contract. It is an emblem of how hollowed out friendship has become in our time.</p><p>*</p><p>[play Drake, ‘Maddiba Riddim’ — no YouTube link avaialbe]</p><p>So how do we come back from this? To adapt the Drake lines you’ve just heard, God knows, we’re trying. And we’re going to have to be taught how to love each other again. How do we find more life in bare life?</p><p>For some, lives can be redirected to attempt to resist the worst traps of neoliberal friendship. For those in a privileged enough position to be able to have some control over the communities that they inhabit, there can be a greater awareness of the homophily of social connection — say, a greater awareness of all-white or all-male friendship groups. And this should prompt individuals in that position to reflect on what different spaces they can put themselves in, as a way to broaden their social world. It is important that this is not done instrumentally or superficially, and with a recognition that a person’s worldview is blinkered without this wider engagement.</p><p>But such voluntary efforts to lead different lives are woefully insufficient on their own. Those individuals who have benefited from proximity to privilege through friendship — and I’d count myself in this — have a duty to contribute to institutional change. Private schools, living in certain economically and racially segregated communities, even universities (especially through alumni networks, which are currently growing in power) — all of these things contribute to friendships that can cluster around particular racial, economic, and gendered patterns. There is an urgent need to consider how to undo or at least mitigate the way that these institutions distribute social capital. At the same time, we need to protect, cherish, and advance those institutions that foster friendship across economic, gender, and racial lines: including public schools, public libraries, and other forms of public space. And we need to work to unravel the forces that have distorted what we understand friendship to be: that means organising against neoliberal capitalism, against misogyny, against colonialism; and building unions and other collective forces of resistance.</p><p>Because for all that can be said critically about contemporary friendship, it remains the case that friendship offers a model of a different way of being that is precious in today’s world. In Ivan Illich’s words, “friendship is the soil from which a new politics will emerge.”</p><p>Derrida nods at one reason why this is true when he tells us that friendship offers a rare “experience of equality” that prefigures a “democracy” that “is to come”. But friendship does more than this. At its best it reminds us that we are not atomised individuals. We need each other and, whether we like it or not, we are affected by each other. We are, in other words, interdependent — and we misunderstand the world unless we see ourselves in that light. Moreover, friendship gives us the strength and security to look honestly at our damaged lives, and to work to heal that damage. As Carla Bergman and Nick Montgomery write in <em>Joyful Militancy: Building Thriving Resistance in Toxic Times</em>, “Loving relationships can be what allow us to face the things we fear about ourselves. They can help undo the ways that we have internalized notions that we are not good enough, not worthy of love, or that we have to put up with things that deplete us and those we care about.” Friendship, finally, lets us look outside of our own minds and bodies to the other — and to the realisation that it is only with and through the other that we find not only our best selves but also our own liberation.</p><p>Contemporary politics across the world — in our time of Trump, Brexit, and nascent fascism — has the potential to further scar our damaged social lives. We need to turn our attention back to rebuilding the social in this moment: restoring relationships, strengthening inclusive community, instilling belief again in the idea of society in which our fates are shared. It’s our only hope, I think, to escape the tired cycles, the canned laughter, the scripted lives of la la land.</p><p>*</p><p>[Play First Aid Kit, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PiZ1sMkspJQ">‘New Year’s Eve’</a>]</p><p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Thanks to Isobel Dryburgh, Simukai Chigudu, Amia Srinivasan, and Gregory Kan for conversations and comments relevant to this draft text. The text formed the basis for a talk, playlist, and installation as part of Isobel Dryburgh’s show, Veronica, and was presented on Saturday 19 May 2018.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e43cdca2c937" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Economic Policy and Strategy for a Corbyn-Led Government:
Reflections on Paul Mason’s Clement…]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mdnharris/economic-policy-and-strategy-for-a-corbyn-led-government-reflections-on-paul-masons-clement-3a6f6b133851?source=rss-9d5435bd38c0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/3a6f6b133851</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[progressive-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[labour-party]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[corbyn]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Harris]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 06 Feb 2018 12:12:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-06T15:48:47.123Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>Economic Policy and Strategy for a Corbyn-Led Government:<br>Reflections on Paul Mason’s Clement Attlee Memorial Lecture</strong></h3><p>Just over two weeks ago I went to Paul Mason’s Clement Attlee Memorial Lecture, on ‘The Radical Left in Power — Challenges for Labour in Government’.<a href="#_edn1">[i]</a> The lecture theatre was full. I stood in a corridor leading from the lecture theatre to the lobby, and even that corridor was full. It’s clear that Mason — author of <em>Postcapitalism: A Guide to our Future </em>— is one of the most important, and sought after, thinkers working on the present and future of the British Left (perhaps alongside Owen Jones, Mariana Mazzucato, Gary Younge, and Jeremy Gilbert).</p><p>But I left the lecture, an hour later, feeling a little empty. I didn’t feel like I’d heard an inspiring vision for what was possible under a Corbyn-led government, or a convincing account of how Corbyn and co. might address inevitable challenges. Mason fell back on tired, technocratic language: the language of “resilience”, “innovation”, and “human capital”. Even he seemed to realise that “human capital” was an ugly phrase, wincing and acknowledging this the second time he used it. When he spoke about what the new Corbyn paradigm would be, he said it would be a mixture — some arrangement of “state, market, and non-market”. But he did not say what this mixture or arrangement might look like. And though the lecture was meant to be about the general “challenges for Labour in government”, the focus was on economic policy, hived off from questions of foreign policy or race or justice, for example.</p><p>What the lecture did help me realise is that we are all — or at least all of us engaged with progressive politics in the United Kingdom, all with some hopes for a Corbyn-led Labour government — wrestling with what needs to be done on the British Left, how that is to be done, and who decides. And, as Paul Mason eloquently argued, we all need to direct our intellectual energies to these dilemmas, especially those of us with the privilege of having time to think about them.</p><p>So, coming out of this realisation and Mason’s encouragement, here’s my attempt to sharpen some of the questions I think those that identify as being part of the British Left need to grapple with — along with some suggestions about further work that needs to be done to get to some answers. I discuss questions in the realm of economic policy in particular, building off Paul Mason’s prompt, though I try to say something about how economic policy is connected to other parts of policy and politics. Others — especially people at the New Economics Foundation, Novara Media, Momentum, and in local Labour branches around the country — have contributed to sharpening these questions. I tweeted about at some of them a week ago. This is my effort to articulate my thoughts in a more elaborated, considered form, and to say a bit more in closing about the strategy for taking these ideas forward.</p><p>I write this all as a supporter of the Corbyn project, who is nonetheless open to criticisms of that project that need to be addressed; as a non-economist, who has a basic grasp of economics and an interest in new economic thinking; and as a critic of neoliberalism, hungry — like others are — for a different dominant political paradigm that better meets the needs of our time.</p><p>*</p><p><strong>1.</strong> <strong>What kind of State will a Corbyn-led Labour government build?</strong></p><p>If the 2017 election manifesto and the policy discussed since then is anything to go by, a Corbyn economic paradigm is not just going to be any haphazard arrangement of market, State, and non-State — and will involve a rejuvenated role for the State. That is clear from the proposal to nationalise the railways and from the proposal (to borrow the words of Tony Atkinson) to restore more progressive rates of taxation, amongst other things.</p><p>This role for the State needs to be articulated coherently. To justify this expanded vision of State action, Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell and others need to speak about why the State can be better at the market in carrying out key economic tasks: for example, the State can borrow more cheaply than the private sector, the State can achieve economies of scale, and the State can coordinate activity across different civil service departments. They need to speak about what they want the State to do — which might include a more expansive industrial policy, of the kind Mariana Mazzucato has alluded to.</p><p>But they also need to show how this State will address the shortcomings of the post-Second World War State. The State of the Attlee-Beveridge-Bevan era secured major achievements such as the establishment of the NHS, but it was also dominated by white men in positions of leadership and top-down.</p><p>No one in the Corbyn camp is talking about a return to that kind of State; one of the Tories’ easy attack-lines has been that a Corbyn government would take Britain back to the ’70s, or earlier. However, more needs to be done to show how newly nationalised services — like the railways — can be run in a bottom-up way.</p><p>What is the role for co-operatives in public services? Can new legal forms and structures support a different form of public ownership? And what place do trade unions have in all of this? Some answers to these questions are offered in outline in Andrew Cumbers’ interesting <a href="http://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Alternative-Models-of-Ownership.pdf">report</a> for the Labour Party on different models of public ownership: he writes about the need to improve co-operatives’ access to finance, more democratic accountability on the boards of newly nationalised services, and the role of municipal public ownership. Jeremy Gilbert has also <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/24/labour-can-win-corbynism-movement-philosophy">pointed</a> to the two strands of Corbynism that pull apart from each other — one top-down and focused on Jeremy Corbyn, the other bottom-up and emphasising mass movement politics — and highlighted the need for the Labour Party to be clarify this tension. The organisation <a href="https://weownit.org.uk/">We Own It</a> has been communicating in an accessible way the value of this new public ownership.<a href="#_edn2">[ii]</a></p><p>Thinkers and campaigners could usefully dedicate their energy, in the way called for by Paul Mason, to this sort of work: setting out the kind of State the Labour Party wants to build, explaining how this State interacts with and supports the community, and being specific about the policies that will realise that kind of State. (I say more below about how thinkers and campaigners can work together on this.) All of this is essential to building a new framework of thought beyond neoliberalism.</p><p><strong>2.</strong> <strong>What is that State working towards?</strong></p><p>A rejuvenated State, however, is not an end in itself. It is not the answer to our problems. It is a means to an end: a tool that can be used to build a better society. The harder task is spelling out what that better society looks like.</p><p>This was also a gap in Paul Mason’s Clement Attlee Memorial Lecture. Mason spoke of reclaiming social mobility as an ideal, and referred in moving terms to his father. But an important question remained unanswered when Masoned mentioned social mobility: mobility towards what? Across the twentieth century, particularly in the United States in the context of discussions of the American Dream, social mobility was hailed as a sign of a successful society. However, references to social mobility were all too often silent about where mobility was leading, allowing a basic truth to remain unuttered: that many proponents of social mobility simply sought access to wealth for all. Is that what we should be focused on, in progressive politics today?</p><p>Of course, some answers are close to hand, and were implicit in Mason’s talk. Social mobility is about ensuring that class positioning, or other forms of oppression, do not dictate the shape of a person’s life. Social mobility means that people are not held back. It means that people have access to the opportunities that those born into privilege take for granted: opportunities to be educated, to find meaningful employment, to lead lives of security, to draw on the bonds of community in order to become individuals.</p><p>Yet we could still do more to state — in language that is fresh — what the goals of social mobility, and the State, are. If the State is transitional, as Gramsci says, we need to know the next step in that transition. Paul Mason spoke of radical social democracy, a theme he has continued to explore in his public writing. That concept could be unpacked further; I have also written about a new ideal of public democracy,<a href="#_edn3">[iii]</a> since I think the limitations of social democracy have been well laid out, including by <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/08/democratic-socialism-judis-new-republic-social-democracy-capitalism">Joseph M. Schwartz and Bhaskar Sunkara</a>.</p><p>The need to avoid stale terminology has led me, in the past, to write about <a href="https://aeon.co/essays/it-is-time-for-love-to-become-a-radical-force-in-politics">love</a> as the object of politics: not a banal love, a love that collapses into generalised and directionless niceness, but a deep sense of warmth that is directed towards others — a love that might motivate anger and conflict just as much as it motivates goodwill and generosity. Others will disagree with love being identified as the end-point of economic policy, and a progressive policy platform more generally.</p><p>What is clear, though, is that some sense of direction can help to mobilise people to take action. For as historian Robin Kelley has said: “Without new visions we don’t know what to build, only what to knock down.”</p><p><strong>3.</strong> <strong>How will Corbynomics be integrated into a broader policy platform?</strong></p><p>Paul Mason’s talk was not only disappointing because it narrowed a discussion of ‘The Radical Left in Power’ to an analysis of economic policy. It also disappointed because Mason, from that hemmed-in starting point, took a limited view of what economic policy is.</p><p>I think in the last twenty or thirty years ‘the economy’ has been viewed in more and more blinkered and technocratic terms. It has become regarded as a collection of numbers: the central bank’s interest rate, the level of growth over the past quarter, the inflation rate, the unemployment rate. (Nancy Fraser has hinted at this shift over time in an illuminating recent talk with David Harvey for Verso Books, <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3601-video-spiraling-out-of-control-nancy-fraser-and-david-harvey-on-the-fate-of-capitalism-in-the-twenty-first-century">available online</a>.) But the choice to make the economy about these metrics, over others, involves value judgments. And the economy has always been about more than the sum total of a set of statistics covering inflation, interest rates, growth, and unemployment (as important as some of these might be).</p><p>Therefore a vision of economic policy under Corbyn needs to be connected to other features of the Labour policy agenda. One of the attractions of the current Labour Party is that it has attempted to integrate analysis of race and class (at a time when thinkers such as <a href="http://bostonreview.net/us/keeanga-yamahtta-taylor-sanders-clinton-democrats">Keaanga-Yamahtta Taylor</a> are working through similar issues in the States). But how will anti-racism and class consciousness — as well as a willingness to reckon with colonial pasts — feed into economic policy? Momentum has done fantastic work building progressive political energy amongst young people in the United Kingdom. How will economic policy deal with the problems faced by young people across the country, especially debt, and draw on their organising skills? The environment must also be a part of this debate. Can a government still follow the traditional Keynesian prescription — pumping money into an economy to boost aggregate demand — at times of crisis if that boost simply means greater consumption, and a contribution to global warming? Is that old Keynesian model appropriate, too, given the globalised structure of the British economy, and the likelihood that this increased spending might leak offshore rather than revive British aggregate demand? All of these questions must be explored if an economic policy is to be consistent with a broader Left agenda, and if a (justifiably) wide view is taken of what ‘the economy’ is today.</p><p>*</p><p>There is more and more talk of the need for progressive strategy in the US and the UK, as we see a resurgence of interest in radical politics — and as a Corbyn government appears to be within reach. Bhaskar Sunkara, founding editor of <em>Jacobin</em>, recently <a href="https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/12/become-a-jacobin-comrade-today">set up</a> <em>Catalyst</em>, a journal of “socialist theory and <em>strategy</em>” (my emphasis). I heard discussion of this at an interesting recent talk by Madeleine Davis of Queen Mary University, London, called ‘Problems of Socialist Strategy Redux’. By ‘strategy’ I think what is meant is the coordination of different actions that are needed to bring about a better future.</p><p>But one final question is: whose responsibility is it to develop strategy, and to answer some of the questions laid out above? How should responsibility be divided between people like Paul Mason, who have done hard thinking about future economic and political challenges, and others doing work on the ground to organise campaigns?</p><p>Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have offered the promising suggestion that in contemporary activism there is a need to flip the usual roles given to leaders and the rest of the mass movement: instead of leaders dictating strategy and the mass movement implementing tactics, the mass movement should dictate strategy — with logistics and tactics left to leadership. That is the approach already taken by many activist and campaigning groups. It is discussed in <a href="http://novaramedia.com/2017/10/14/michael-hardt-assembly/">this conversation</a> between Michael Hardt and James Butler from Novara Media.</p><p>This is, in one sense, the bottom-up model of change that is meant to underlie the Labour Party: remits are proposed by members, with the leaders having the responsibility to carry out the action taken to turn remits into policy and law. But for some time, in the United Kingdom and overseas, the ability of the mass movement to shape change within social democratic parties has become stunted. Work needs to continue to make membership of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom more meaningful, including through reform of internal processes. (Max Shanly’s <a href="https://medium.com/@maxshanly/towards-a-new-model-young-labour-29960414261a">note</a> on strengthening Young Labour offers some ideas of reform in one part of the party.)</p><p>It may be that Hardt and Negri’s suggestion also leaves leaders of a social movement only doing administration — and that this is too technocratic. Whilst there does in my view need to be greater power given to members of a mass movement, leaders — as Jeremy Corbyn has demonstrated — may play some useful role in charismatically giving voice to ideas emerging out of the movement.</p><p>What is the role of intellectuals in all of this? We might need to challenge old dichotomies here, too: in particular, the distinction between intellectuals and non-intellectuals. it is important to remember that ‘intellectuals’ are not the same as ‘university academics’ — and by intellectuals I mean something broader than university academics (without at all demeaning the work of those academics).</p><p>Everyone is capable of doing intellectual work. There are different forms of intelligence — analytical, emotional, cultural, social, and practical intelligence. (Each of these forms of intelligence also comprises different parts: analytical intelligence, for example, might mean a comfort with abstraction, a skill for drawing distinctions, an ability to foresee and combat counter-arguments, or a combination of these things.) As Gramsci wrote in his ‘Prison Notebooks’:<a href="#_edn4">[iv]</a></p><p>“There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded: homo faber cannot be separated from homo sapiens. Each [person], finally, outside their professional activity, carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, [they are] a “philosopher”, an artist, a [person] of taste, [they participate] in a particular conception of the world, [have] a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore [contribute] to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought.”</p><p>In short: we’re all intellectuals. Some people have the privilege of being paid for intellectual work, including those at universities (though their pay and work conditions are not always as good as they should be, as the upcoming University and College Union strike highlights) — and those people can, where possible, use the time they have to work through these challenges. Others, including those who write for a public audience, may have a skill in finding words that speak to people’s instincts and intuitions, and if they can use this skill for the purpose of advancing a broader movement, that is all for the good.</p><p>But then the intellectual work that feeds into strategy — the work that clarifies what actions need to be taken — must be combined with practical work: coming up with a sequence of those actions (something Paul Mason alluded to in his Clement Attlee Memorial Lecture), thinking through what is possible (while always pushing to widen the existing Overton window, in the spirit of what Mark Fisher discusses in <em>Capitalist Realism</em>), and organising people to make the action happen.</p><p>A division of labour — tailored to the task ahead — can help to clarify the different forms of intellectual work that must be done, the practical work that can discipline that intellectual work, and the way that mixed intellectual-practical labour adds up to a strategy. (After all, as Marx notes in volume 1 of <em>Capital</em>, division of labour is not necessarily a capitalist idea: it is rather the case that a capitalist conception of division of labour has been developed that distorts our proper place in the world.)<em> </em>That division of labour will emerge out of the fierce furnace of activism, and in calmer moments of community-building and conversation.</p><p>In sum, then, the work of developing the strategy — to accompany the theory — of Corbynism is partly intellectual and partly practical. The responsibility of developing that strategy lies with all of us.</p><p><a href="#_ednref1">[i]</a> Some of this lecture has been reproduced in this piece for <em>openDemocracy</em>: <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/neweconomics/neoliberalism-destroyed-social-mobility-together-must-rebuild/">https://www.opendemocracy.net/neweconomics/neoliberalism-destroyed-social-mobility-together-must-rebuild/</a>. (Paul Mason was not, however, wedded to his notes in his Clement Attlee Memorial Lecture, and there are sections in this <em>openDemocracy </em>that did not appear in his lecture.)</p><p><a href="#_ednref2">[ii]</a> I sit on the Board of We Own It.</p><p><a href="#_ednref3">[iii]</a> I have written about this in my <a href="http://bwb.co.nz/books/new-zealand-project">book</a>, <em>The New Zealand Project</em>, and in this piece about street art: <a href="https://thedial.co/articles/graffiti-politics-on-street-art-space-and-public-democracy.">https://thedial.co/articles/graffiti-politics-on-street-art-space-and-public-democracy.</a></p><p><a href="#_ednref4">[iv]</a> My particular thanks to Franck Magennis for his comments on this section, and his suggestion of this quote from Gramsci.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=3a6f6b133851" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Graffiti Politics: On Street Art, Space, and Public Democracy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mdnharris/graffiti-politics-2857defbc001?source=rss-9d5435bd38c0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2857defbc001</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[street-art]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[popular-culture]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[art]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Harris]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Jul 2017 20:04:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-25T22:01:12.386Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The cultural theorist Stuart Hall spent much of his working life focused on the politics of popular culture. As a lyrical <em>New Yorker </em>piece <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/stuart-hall-and-the-rise-of-cultural-studies">notes</a>, Hall saw popular culture as a site where the “struggle for and against a culture of the powerful is engaged”. And Hall sought to excavate how that struggle was played out — how popular cultural products could be outlets for oppression, as well as rallying-points for resistance.</p><p>I want to take Hall’s perspective as a starting point for thinking about the politics of street art. I want to think a little about how street art involves a struggle for and against “a culture of the powerful” — in particular in its sense of authorship, its accessibility, its relationship to ideas of private property and public space. Politics, for me, is centrally concerned with power — with how individuals, identities, and institutions gain or lose power — and I want to contend that it is possible to see street art as related to, and part of, that tussle for power. This is not, to be clear, an academic paper claiming to adhere rigorously to the tenets of Hall’s approach to cultural studies. It is, instead, some notes towards an account of the politics of street art, which uses Hall’s worldview as springboard and inspiration.</p><p>…</p><p>[This piece has now been picked up by the good folks at The Dial, and can be read in full there at <a href="https://thedial.co/articles/graffiti-politics-on-street-art-space-and-public-democracy">https://thedial.co/articles/graffiti-politics-on-street-art-space-and-public-democracy</a>.]</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2857defbc001" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Five Ways of Seeing the Relationship Between Art and Politics 
— In a Time of Trump]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mdnharris/five-ways-of-seeing-the-relationship-between-art-and-politics-in-a-time-of-trump-568a8bb94d65?source=rss-9d5435bd38c0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/568a8bb94d65</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[art]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Harris]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 22 Feb 2017 12:44:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-02-24T19:32:43.874Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Five Ways of Seeing the Relationship Between Art and Politics <br>— In a Time of Trump</strong></p><p>There has been a flurry of activity amongst publishers, curators, artists, and others in the weeks since the election of Donald Trump. This was prefigured by a (re)turn to politics and activism in the art world in the months preceding the US election. There has been a particularly pronounced focus on the question of the relationship between art and politics within these discussions. So what are the key themes of these discussions in recent months? What initial evaluation of these thematic explorations is possible? And what does this mean for the future of art and politics?</p><p>This short essay considers these questions. It aims, in the main, to describe the content of recent conversations about art and politics, drawing on art publications (online and in print), and events and shows in Berlin and New York, from 2016. (Using Berlin and New York as bases for extrapolating about ‘the art world’ is acutely Anglo-American, of course — and almost a caricature of most modern art writing. It remains true that Berlin and New York are hubs of artistic activity, however, and I refer to art events in these centres because I travelled to these cities in September and December 2016, respectively.) What follows is, hence, primarily a work of synthesis and aggregation of existing ideas (what <em>has been </em>talked about?), as opposed to a piece of independent, ground-up normative theorising (what <em>should be </em>talked about?). I take art very broadly to be forms of expression, play, and speculation that receive public display. I understand politics, meanwhile, to be activities relating to how power should be exercised and disciplined; in particular, politics is exemplified by parliamentary political activity, campaigning and activism, and the production of ideas, theories, and proposals that might provide a seedbed for parliamentary or activist practice.</p><p>The essay draws out of this five theses on the relationship between art and politics. These are the understandings of art and politics that have emerged in recent months (though I accept that value judgments are unavoidable, and that inevitably my blindspots and biases will affect my choice of dominant understandings). Some of the theses are overlapping and interlocking; some pull in different directions. The five theses are: (i) art as representation of political injustice, (ii) art as builder of political community, (iii) art as seed of political alternatives, (iv) art as escape or haven from politics, and (v) art as complicit in political oppression.</p><p>I write this essay not as an artist or art theorist, but as a writer with some background in politics and political theory. That perspective gives me a different (and hopefully, therefore, interesting) perspective to most writing about art and politics, although it also brings obvious drawbacks. My hope is that this essay throws some light on how art and politics might be related, and also reveals some of the shortcomings in contemporary conversations about that same subject.</p><p>1. <strong>Art as representation of political injustice</strong></p><p>Art can present features of contemporary life in stark form, highlighting injustices or suggesting trends or developments that warrant resistance. One need not be committed to a superficial notion of truth to understand the insight in Dada poet Hugo Ball’s claim that: “For us, art is not an end in itself … but it is an opportunity for the true perception and criticism of the times we live in.”</p><p>This dimension of art’s power has been demonstrated by new art depicting the institutional racism and white supremacy of contemporary Europe and America, and the activist responses to institutional racism and white supremacy. Luke Willis Thompson’s ‘Cemetery of Uniforms and Liveries’ at Galerie Nagler Draxler in Berlin presents, with powerful pithiness, the impact of police murder on families. Thompson’s show consists of two short film clips of family members of black British people killed by police. We see the faces of the grandson of Dorothy ‘Cherry’ Grace, Brandon, and the son of Joy Gardner, Graeme. The 16mm black-and-white footage forces a reckoning with the steady resilience written across Brandon and Graeme’s faces. It also compels close attention to details that assume outsized importance given our background knowledge: in the buoyant pulsing of a neck, for example, we see a fierce, defiant living in the face of police violence. Kameelah Janan Rasheed’s ‘Nomenclature’, represented at the Forward Union Fair in New York in December 2016, involves twenty-one images of labels traditionally attached to African-Americans: including ‘American Negro’, ‘Free Africa’, ‘Person of Colour’, and ‘Black American’. The images, framed in white and using block white letters on a black backdrop, highlight the changing and contested self-identification of African-Americans or black Americans — and there is a forthright strength in these images, which hints at the way that such nomenclature has been an empowering tool in the fight against white supremacy.</p><p>Both Thompson and Rasheed’s pieces do not just reveal pre-existing ‘facts’ about the world. They provide new perspectives on actors in political struggles — a distinct way of seeing, to crib Berger’s phrase. These installations are a reminder that Luigi Ghirri’s comment on the nature of photography — that it is less a medium for “offering answers” and is “rather a language for asking questions about the world” — applies to art as a whole. They suggest that one function of art, in the age of Trump, might be to allow us to see our society more fully, possibly in a way that prompts political resistance.</p><p>2. <strong>Art as builder of political community</strong></p><p>Art can bring people together, around gallery openings, events, and discussions — and a further theme emerging in recent months is the idea that communities created by art can have political potential, and that accordingly artists and curators should work to create and strengthen artistic communities.</p><p>Art publications and galleries have opened their doors to audiences in the aftermath of Trump’s election, in the same way that publishing houses (such as Verso Books) have showed a renewed energy in and urgency in organising events. Numerous examples could be spotlighted, but e-flux events in New York — including the double launch of books on machines and intersubjectivity in December — have involved particularly explicit discussions of the value of artistic community for political projects. Art departments at universities have also mobilised, and have perhaps been more willing to talk in explicitly ideological terms: an interesting case in point being New York University’s one-day December symposium on ‘Sense of Emergency: Politics, Aesthetics, and Trumpism’, organised by Andrew Weiner, which brought together activists, art theorists, artists, and others.</p><p>Some cautionary notes are needed about this impulse towards the building of community. There is a risk that the rush to construct collectives occurs without the development of any framework for understanding events or action, and without sufficient critical reflection about who is included within ‘the community’ and who is excluded. In a brilliant essay published on thetowner.com after Trump’s election, Elvia Wilk calls for those working in contemporary art — many of whom are part of the “notorious international culture class” — to ask these critical questions. “We need to construct and maintain support networks,” Wilk writes. However, she goes on, “if we are having meetings about what we can do, we should first and foremost be using them to discuss who we are. What voices are missing in our spaces?” She comments later in the essay on the exclusive rootlessness of much of the artistic community: “We exist in pockets of mostly urban areas, and those pockets connect directly to other pockets via travel and wifi, with an often uniform set of cultural principles and hierarchies extending across them.” I return to some of these contradictions of the art community below, when discussing art’s complicity in oppression.</p><p>If these critical conversations are initiated at the same time as attempts are made to consolidate community, it would appear that gatherings of the kind described can be significant political interventions, in our world of advanced capitalism whose goal remains — in Guy Debord’s words — “to restructure society without community”. At the very least, if events and discussions can be organised in a spirit of warmth and solidarity, we might see the stirrings of the coming community to which Giorgio Agamben once elliptically alluded.</p><p>3. <strong>Art as seed of political alternatives</strong></p><p>In addition to documenting injustice and building community, art can gesture towards new political ideas, solutions, and priorities. This perspective, that art can seed political alternatives, has also been voiced in the lead-up to Trump’s election, and in the period since 8 November.</p><p>These political alternatives, sketched in outline through art, can be more or less fully-formed. Mira Dayal offers one version of this thesis in a short contribution to ‘The Air Sheets’, a Sorry Archive publication, released in December 2016 “as a direct response to the disquiet and apprehension of the past month”. Dayal writes: “After the election, I went into my studio with the intention of making work that could convey disgust and nausea.” Her work, using rotting fruits and vaseline, and its effects, seems to call for a greater political focus on affect, emotion, and the visceral as a challenge to the arid, sociopathic liberalism that has long dominated Left political thinking. That notion, alluded to by Dayal, that political thinking should be grounded more squarely in feeling has been picked up by activists and theorists in the aftermath of Trump’s election, who have called for a politics that embraces anger, empathy, and love.</p><p>A more didactic reminder of the power of art to contribute to fresh political visions is found in Julian Rosefeldt’s ‘Manifesto’, displayed in New York, Berlin, and elsewhere over the course of 2016. The show features Cate Blanchett in varying garb and identities, including at a funeral and as a school teacher, reciting artists’ manifestos on 13 different screens. The swirl of sound, colour, and words that one experiences when viewing ‘Manifesto’ is an indication of the intellectual energy that art can produce. And the words articulated by Blanchett — from the Futurists, Dadaists, and others — showcase the stretching ambition of artists in the past, leaving open the question of whether artists should reclaim such ambition in our contentious political present.</p><p>The Hamburger Bahnhof’s ‘Capital: Debt, Territory, Utopia’, shown from July-November 2016, represents another iteration of the way in which art can seed political alternatives. The vast collection of video, sculpture, paintings, and other forms draws attention to the centrality of debt in our time. A range of theorists — from anthropologist and activist David Graeber, to economist Adair Turner — have begun to home in on private debt in recent years, with evidence emerging of the links between high levels of private debt and financial crises, and Mauricio Lazzarato in his book <em>Governed by Debt </em>laying the intellectual foundations to see ‘the indebted’ as the new proletariat. The Hamburger Bahnhof show directs greater attention to this problem of indebtedness. It also underscores that the art-making process and the act creative expression — about subjects like debt — could themselves be political acts. In Joseph Beuys’ words, captured in the show, “the concept of creativity is a concept pertaining to freedom while at the same time referring to human ability.”</p><p>There is some resemblance between the place of artists in this enterprise and the role of poets in giving voice to emergent political developments. The poet Don Share said after the US election in an interview in <em>The Atlantic </em>that “one of the things poetry is really good at is anticipating things that need discussion”. Share noted: “Poets are kind of like … canaries in a coal mine. They have a sense for things that are in the air.” The same could be said of artists — that they are canaries in our collective mine — with the 2016 works by Dayal and Rosefeldt, and the Hamburger Bahnhof show, demonstrating how artists can play this vanguard-type role in seeding political alternatives, whether that is through adopting a new approach to politics (grounded in affect), setting out manifestos, or spotlighting a particular policy issue (such as indebtedness).</p><p>4. <strong>Art as escape or safe haven</strong></p><p>In conversations I had with writers, curators, and artists about this topic as 2016 drew to a close, one question arose again and again: how can we square discussion of an artist’s political responsibilities with the view that art ought to involve an escape from politics? The thought can be expressed in two different ways: the art-making process could be seen as a space that needs to be apart from politics, or artwork itself could be regarded as speaking a different language, or addressing different topics; in both cases bringing art closer to politics might seem to threaten something fundamental about the practice of art.</p><p>This thesis is not the same as the simplistic claim (voiced at the e-flux launch of ‘For Machine Use Only’ in New York in December 2016) that any reference to art’s being political is a slide towards Stalinism. But it does involve an insistence that art should, in some meaningful sense, be kept distinct from (at least some forms of) politics. That separation of art and politics might be a means to the end of art seeing political alternatives or representing injustice, or it might be a politically important end in itself — a way to step away from, and stand up to, the messy maelstrom of politics; to create a space for freedom of the kind discussed by Hannah Arendt and Ariella Azoulay.</p><p>A variant of this thesis is outlined by Maggie Nelson in her 2011 book, <em>The Art of Cruelty</em>. Nelson draws on Jacques Ranciere’s principle of emancipation: that “art is emancipated and emancipating … when [it] stops wanting to emancipate us.” On this view, art should not set out explicitly to represent injustice, build community, or seed political alternatives (though arguably this does not preclude observers from pointing out that art can have these consequences). Nelson develops the point with reference to art depicting cruelty. For her, “when things are going well with art-making and art-viewing, art doesn’t really say or teach anything.” She resists the idea that art can tell ‘the truth’ of our times: “The artist standing bravely in the face of the (inconvenient, brutal, hard-won, dangerous, offensive truth) … — what could be more heroic?” Nelson asks. But we should be more comfortable with the idea that art can’t tell us “how things are”, but instead can only give us “the irregular, transitory, and sometimes unwanted news of how it is to be another human being”. Ranciere and Nelson’s points take us a little away from art as an escape, or safe haven; but they are connected. They suggest that what art can do is produce singular insights about human experience, and that we should acknowledge that art is at its best when it seeks these insights, and is cautious about doing the grand general theorising that is customary in political writing and action.</p><p>It is important that this thesis about art’s capacity to be a safe haven from politics does not make the naïve assumption that art can be apolitical. Politics seeps into our pores, and saturates society, wherever we are positioned (and even when we aim to stand apart from society): through our upbringing, through the spectacles of advertising and media that are difficult to escape, through the registers and substance of our everyday interactions with others, online and offline. Even art that is produced in a space set back from politics cannot but be influenced by political mores of some sort. Nevertheless, as long as this depoliticising impulse is resisted, it remains possible for art to aspire to be distinct from various political developments. This posture is an important one when arguably the need for independent critical thinking has never been greater. (It is worth mentioning in passing, though, that some have argued that it is independence <em>from art </em>that is necessary, too: this is the position of McKenzie Wark, who claimed in his 2008 lecture, ’50 Years of Recuperation of the Situationist International’, that critical thought has to “take its distance” from the three “worlds of journalism, art, and the academy”, even at the same time that those worlds provide the conditions for critical thinking.)</p><p>5. <strong>Art as complicit in political injustice</strong></p><p>The final way that art and politics have been commonly related and conceptualised in recent months is through a framework of complicity: with the claim being that art should see itself as at least partially responsible for some of the political injustices of our time. Two different approaches to complicity have been offered by Adam Curtis and the New York-based #decolonizethisplace project.</p><p>In his film, <em>Hyper-Normalisation</em>, Adam Curtis argues that artists’ retreat from collective projects in the 1970s, and turn towards individualism, is partly to blame for the rise of aggressive neoliberalism. Patti Smith comes in for particular criticism, though she is regarded as an embodiment of a broader trend amongst artists. In an interview for <em>ArtSpace</em>, elaborating on the point, Curtis says that in the 1970s “more and more people looked to art as a way of expressing their radicalism in an individual way”, and “the very idea of self-expression might not have had the radical potential they thought.” Curtis claims that self-expression aligned well with a neoliberalism guided by self-interest, and it prevented the emergence of “really radical and different ideas that are sitting out on the margins.” Curtis calls for artists to “go into the woods at night together”, to “give yourself up to something that is bigger than yourself”, and to do more to attack the world of power. Some of this is overblown and misguided. Curtis’s denial that he himself is an artist is dubious and self-serving, and he seems to conflate the co-option of self-expression by neoliberalism and the pursuit of dissident self-expression. While his cry for a Left politics more focused on power and collective projects is undoubtedly necessary, his vision for the future of progressive politics also seems to leave little room for critical individuals (and is a little myopic when it comes to race, gender, and other forms of oppression). Notwithstanding these shortcomings in his analysis, Curtis raises interesting questions about how artists may have knowingly and unknowingly contributed to the injustices of contemporary capitalism.</p><p>#decolonizethisplace acts from very different starting points, but reaches a similar conclusion about the complicity of contemporary art, as Amin Hussain explained at the New York University symposium on ‘Sense of Emergency: Politics, Aesthetics, and Trumpism’. The project — an art space and network of activists, artists, and others driven by the MTL+ collective — has undertaken a series of direct actions to address the entanglement of the art world in institutional racism and exploitation, and to make the positive case for indigenous struggle, black liberation, a free Palestine, de-gentrification, and a global movement of wage workers. Husain described one prominent action organised by the group in May 2016, when activists occupied the Brooklyn Museum to draw attention to the Museum’s links to gentrification and the displacement of Palestinians in the West Bank. The ‘decolonization’ rallying cry has also been issued by student movements in universities in South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States (including by the #RhodesMustFall movement in Oxford, with which I have had some involvement). Overall, the work of #decolonizethisspace in New York and elsewhere appears to be a welcome intervention, given that the world of contemporary art remains dominated by men, especially men racialized as white, and implicated in some of the worst excesses of contemporary colonial capitalism.</p><p>Different arguments can be made about what ought to flow from contemporary art’s complicity in political injustice. Perhaps what is needed is an honest reckoning with the historical and present-day narrative, of the kind that Adam Curtis attempts in <em>Hyper-Normalisation</em> or of the kind offered by Dan Fox in his lucid assessment of the relationship between contemporary art and class in Frieze in November/December 2016 (though we should notice, in passing, that both writers are themselves white men). But perhaps a stronger response is needed, if we are to follow the lead of #decolonizethisspace — an ending of projects that contribute to displacement, imperialism, inequality, patriarchy, and so on; and possibly even some further action to redress art’s complicity in the past. For others a logical response might be support of accelerationist projects (of the sort nodded to in Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams’ book <em>Inventing the Future</em>) to speed up the end of capitalism and the current economic and social order.</p><p>Difficult questions of responsibility arise when considering what duties artists might have to take action (does ‘the contemporary art world’ have a collective responsibility for past artists’ actions?). What is clear, however, is that when we consider the relationship between art and politics, we should not view artists in some heroic light, as vanguard activists who wear the mantle of righteously leading the left-wing charge against villains, the political establishment, and the indifferent. Instead, we should tell a more nuanced story. Like everyone, enmeshed as we all are within the unjust structures of contemporary society, artists can be oppressors as well as the oppressed, contributors to injustice as well as catalysts of emancipation.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>As Bruce Sterling wrote recently in Texte Zur Kunst, “It’s hard to write of momentous events in the hot, crispy, pan-fried moment in which events are momentous.” I have attempted to delineate some major threads of recent thinking on art and politics in an attempt to make sense of this messy moment we find ourselves in.</p><p>I did not plan to write this piece, after Trump’s election or later. What I found, particularly on a two-week trip to New York, was that people rooted in political activist spaces (a realm I am more familiar with) and people working in and around contemporary art (a realm I am less familiar with) were expressing an interest in, sometimes a need for, <em>each other </em>— and a desire to develop ways of thinking about how they ought to relate to each other. For those working in progressive politics or activism or organising, there was a sense that old methods were clearly not working, that new communities would have to be reached — and that curators, artists, and art theorists represented one such community with whom new relationships should be built. For those in contemporary art, the gravity of political developments after the election of Trump prompted a push for more engagement with individuals and groups doing explicitly political work. Those expressions set me off in my thinking about art and politics, forcing me to reconsider recent shows in Berlin as well as in New York. This slight essay represents a small effort to facilitate the conversations between these communities. It also represents an effort to bring some order and clarity to the frenzied conversations that are occurring in the aftermath of Trump’s election — though I acknowledge that the themes that I have explored are not usefully frozen in time, and will develop dynamically in the coming months and years.</p><p>I have not addressed every theme touching on art and politics that has been raised in recent months; my lack of references to the post-Internet turn in art (and its political implications), or to activities at the edge of the artistic world (in gaming and coding, for instance) may seem like significant omissions. I have aimed instead to draw out themes that have been prominent in conversations to which I have been privy; but no doubt a person with a different background and set of interests could explicate a distinct set of theses about art and politics.</p><p>I have also largely ignored historical work on the question of how art and politics should be related. These questions aren’t new, of course. Related concerns were raised at the time of the rise of fascism in Europe in the 1930s, and discussed by theorists such as Walter Benjamin, as well as artists like Bertolt Brecht and W.H. Auden. Constructivist art sparked many similar arguments. And indigenous thinkers and artists have also engaged with the need for resistance through art in New Zealand, Australia, and elsewhere in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in particular.</p><p>This might be the next challenge, to circle back to an observation at the outset of this essay: discerning what is truly novel about Trump times, and what represents a recurrence of patterns of oppression or an echo of past ideological move. It is a challenge to which those working on contemporary art and those working in politics can make a distinct and important contribution.</p><p>I do not want to end with any quasi-authoritative pronouncements about how art and politics are ‘really’ related. The relationship is contextual, and may differ not just across countries but also across local communities of artists and political thinkers, depending on a variety of factors. What may be fruitful in these times when artistic and political communities have significant reserves of energy, and when there is no shortage of problems to which that energy might be directed, is simply for these communities to continue — in conversation with each other — to experiment with the different possible relationships, in a spirit of simultaneous self-criticism, boldness, play, courage, and love. What could come of these experiments and collaborations seems beyond prediction or anticipation, and perhaps in this moment we can hope for nothing better than that.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=568a8bb94d65" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A RADICAL POLITICS OF LOVE]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/perspectiva-institute/a-radical-politics-of-love-fbe259170646?source=rss-9d5435bd38c0------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/fbe259170646</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[neoliberalism]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[philosophy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-theory]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[love]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Max Harris]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 29 Nov 2016 15:22:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-11-30T14:41:50.986Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>A RADICAL POLITICS OF LOVE</strong></p><p>In a time of Trump, an age of fear, love could be a revolutionary idea. A politics of love, to be more precise, might just have the power to transform how we do politics and how we relate to each other.</p><p><strong>What is love?</strong></p><p>Artists, writers, theologians, and people going about their everyday lives have reflected on this for centuries. Susan Sontag once said: “Nothing is mysterious. No human relation. Except love.” And maybe love is beyond definition, a concept that if reduced to constituent parts becomes over-simplified or distorted.</p><p>But philosopher Harry Frankfurt, theologian Simone Weil, and writer James Baldwin have offered accounts of love that, I think, come close to capturing the truth of love.</p><p>For Frankfurt, love has five elements: “a disinterested concern for the wellbeing or flourishing” of the object of love, “conscientious attention”, an “ineluctably personal” concern, “an identification with the beloved”, and “constraints upon the will”. This seems to underscore well the fact that love has to be channeled towards an object of love, a beloved. What it lacks is a sense of love’s intensity or visceral depth. Frankfurt’s definition might also mix up what love <em>is </em>and what love <em>requires</em>. Having our will constrained is a consequence of love, but not love itself.</p><p>Simone Weil is less cold than Frankfurt, and adds something to his approach to love. Weil says that love is “intense, pure, disinterested, gratuitous, generous attention”. This description offers a fuller vision of love’s richness. It connects love, rightly (I think), to selflessness — “gratuitous, generous attention” requires a departure from self-interest and a willingness to consider others. But Weil’s stringing together of five adjectives to describe love might narrow down excessively what love is. As well, love — in my mind — requires more than mere “attention”. Love requires something active. It is not just about having regard to or taking notice of someone.</p><p>James Baldwin has a different perspective, and one that valuably fills gaps in those provided by Frankfurt and Weil. In <em>The Fire Next Time</em>, Baldwin describes love as “a state of grace”, “a tough and universal sense of quest and daring and growth”. This gets closer to capturing the fact that love should be demanding. And Baldwin suggests — in my view, correctly — that love might be something closer to a mood or disposition, when he calls love a “state of grace”. However, perhaps Baldwin, too, is overly specific. Does love really require a “universal sense of quest and daring and growth”?</p><p>I’d suggest that love is a deep sense of warmth directed towards an object, usually another person. I’ve developed this definition with Philip McKibbin, with whom I first <a href="https://theaotearoaproject.wordpress.com/2015/05/20/the-politics-of-love-max-harris-and-philip-mckibbin/">wrote</a> about the politics of love. The word ‘warmth’ might seem indeterminate or ambiguous (it remains, of course, a metaphor), but it suggests that love is a demeanour more than it is an act or a behavioural trait. ‘Warmth’ also shows that love must emanate from someone, towards another. The words ‘deep’ and ‘directed’ indicate that love must be more than superficial and that love must be personal and tailored. According to this definition, love need not be particularistic. And describing love as ‘a deep sense of warmth directed towards an object’ leaves room for attention, affection, attachment, and listening to be manifestations of warmth.</p><p><strong>Love in Politics</strong></p><p>In <em>The New Yorker</em>’s <a href="http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-power-of-love-in-politics">words</a>, “love is in the air” in contemporary politics. In recent weeks, American politicians Cory Booker and Hillary Clinton have explicitly referred to love in politics, and Australian parliamentarian Andrew Leigh gave a <a href="http://www.andrewleigh.com/the_politics_of_love_speech">speech</a> on ‘the politics of love’ around a fortnight ago.</p><p>What role could love play in politics, where politics is the arena of disputes about the allocation of power? It’s helpful to split up the different <em>functions </em>love could have in relation to politics, and also to divide the varying <em>registers </em>in which people might speak about politics.</p><p>Love can have four functions in politics.</p><p>First, it could be a new motivating force for politicians, activists, and others involved in politics. Rather than politicians or activists or others being motivated by ambition or power, they might be motivated by a sense of deep warmth directed towards another — and a politics of love could be seen as a way to ensure that shift in motivation.</p><p>Second, love could be what we want all political action to express. If we accept that politics can express ideals (as Richard Pildes and Elizabeth Anderson have discussed in their account of expressivism), we could demand that politics gives expression to love, from the perspective of the impartial observer. This would mean that a politics of love would be focused less on the motivation of political actors and more on the substance of political action or policy. President Jimmy Carter once said that government should “radiate love”. He may have been hinting at a similar function.</p><p>Third, love could be the end-goal of politics. On this view, all political action would be oriented towards achieving love for all. This function would raise, particularly starkly, the question of the limits of love: should love be achieved for all citizens? For all within a political community? Others? We’ll return to this question below.</p><p>Fourth, love could be a virtue that we expect to be demonstrated by those engaged in politics. This function involves expecting certain standards of conduct and behaviour from politicians and activists, rather than calling for motivations or consequences.</p><p>A politics of love could be achieved through any one of these functions. But I don’t believe it’s incoherent to call for all four functions to be served by a politics of love: for love to be a motivator, an ideal to be expressed in action, an end-goal, and a virtue for political actors.</p><p>The registers — or voices, or degrees of sincerity — that people can employ when articulating a politics of love are three-fold. A politics of love can be superficial, minimalist, or radical.</p><p>A superficial register uses the language of love in a cynical political way, perhaps to gain votes. Some might attribute Hillary Clinton’s use of love in her campaign to this register. She’s said, “I know it’s not usual for somebody running for president to say what we need more of in this country is love and kindness. But that’s exactly what we need more of.”</p><p>A minimalist register accepts that there are different interpretations of love, and that we should all simply sign up to love as a starting-point — but use love to drive different policy conclusions. Cornel West, in appearances within Democratic Party meetings in 2016, invoked love to argue that Democrats should adopt a more pro-Palestinian stance. This was a minimalist register at work: love being given quite thin content, but being used to justify certain specific policy proposals.</p><p>A radical register — a radical politics of love — gives love more content, and claims that a politics of love requires particular policy conclusions. It claims that a politics of love must be applied to all within a political community, since love is inherently other-regarding. Iris Murdoch once said that, “Love is the extremely difficult realization that something other than oneself is real.” Cleve Barlow, a Maori thinker, has expressed a similar point when saying:</p><p>Ko te tangata e mea ana he aroha tōna, ka taea e ia te kite, te atawhai te iwi whānui ahakoa iti, ahakoa rahi.</p><p>A person who claims to possess the gift of aroha demonstrates this love by sharing it with all people and without discrimination.</p><p>A radical politics of love acknowledges that we all need love, that we are all interdependent, and that certain preconditions of love might need to be met. It could result in a more welcoming approach to immigrants (including refugees) and a more robust system of welfare support. It might also lead in the direction of decarceration and prison abolition, since prisons deny warmth to inmates and lack love in almost every respect.</p><p>Che Guevara came close to expressing a radical politics of love in his 1965 letter to Carlos Quijano, ‘Socialism and Man’. Guevara wrote there:</p><p>“… the true revolutionary is guided by great feelings of love. It is impossible to think of a genuine revolutionary lacking this quality.”</p><p>A radical politics of love best harnesses the possibilities of a politics of love. It achieves love in the most thoroughgoing fashion, going beyond a merely superficial or minimalist approach to the content of love to a vision of politics that aims to apply love expansively, generously, and ambitiously.</p><p><strong>Why a Radical Politics of Love Matters</strong></p><p>Could a radical politics of love be truly transformative, or revolutionary? It is not enough to add the word ‘radical’ in front of the phrase ‘politics of love’, and to assume that the inclusion of this word alone makes the concept meaningful.</p><p>One reason a radical politics of love could be transformative is that it could (re)open a space for emotion in politics. Political theorists have shunned emotion in politics. But many political ideals, like justice, have an emotional dimension. Freedom, as Nina Simone has said, is “just a feeling”. Bringing love into politics can remind us that politics cannot escape being emotional. As Marek Sullivan has said, we can then have more fruitful debates about which emotions should be a part of politics, rather than spending time emptily querying whether politics can be emotional at all.</p><p>A radical politics of love could connect politics, too, to people’s everyday lives. David Harvey recently said in a <em>Jacobin </em>interview that we need a “politics of everyday life”. A radical politics of love could give effect to that kind of politics — since everyone understands and appreciates love, either through its absence or presence in their own lives.</p><p>A radical politics of love is unifying, if not universal. Versions of this kind of politics have been voiced in religious traditions, indigenous traditions, emancipation and decolonisation movements, liberal circles, and socialist streams of writing. A radical politics of love is far from Eurocentric, too, having been developed in Latin American, Asian, Pacific, African, and European traditions.</p><p>A radical politics of love also offers the promise of an anti-selfish politics. Neoliberalism has succeeded since the 1970s because it has offered the interlocking logic of an individualistic, anti-public, anti-State vision of politics. What is needed as an alternative to neoliberalism, in my view, is a framework that is less selfish, more in favour of the ideal of the public, and clearer on how the State can be transformed into an instrument of public good. A radical politics of love offers the outline of an alternative to neoliberalism. Charles Eisenstein has said that to develop a compassion-based politics is “to enact politics from a different place”. The same is true of a radical politics of love.</p><p><strong>In Defence of a Radical Politics of Love</strong></p><p>Why a radical politics of <em>love</em>? Wouldn’t a politics of compassion, or dignity, or empathy be an easier pitch? The answer to this is simply that love is not the same as compassion or dignity or empathy. It is more active, more visceral. The fact that it has been less commonly invoked in politics is a strength, not a weakness, I think: it means that a radical politics of love is a newer, possibly more exciting way to frame what is important politically.</p><p>Some have claimed bringing love into politics distorts love. Hannah Arendt claims in <em>The Human Condition </em>that “love can only become false and perverted when it is used for political purposes such as the change or salvation of the world”. She suggests that love is divisive when used in politics. But Arendt’s conception of love is more particularistic; it is not clear that love needs to become “false and perverted” if we start with a more open, all-encompassing view of love’s scope. Sara Ahmed has claimed, relatedly, that a politics of love risks becoming a “humanist fantasy”. This is all the more reason to ensure that a radical politics of love has real content and substance — to ensure that it does not amount only to banal generalities.</p><p>We might ask, as well, whether a radical politics of love is consistent with anger. Salvage magazine’s May 2016 editorial expressed caution about Jeremy Corbyn’s “kinder politics” (which is a more limited version of a politics of love) because it precluded, the Salvage editors said, the “targeted brutality” that may be necessary in contemporary politics. Amia Srinivasan has also written powerfully on the importance of anger in politics, as “a reasonable response to an unreasonable world”. I think there is a place for anger within a radical politics of love. Sometimes to give effect to love we need anger. In fact, sometimes a radical politics of love might require anger. A radical politics of love requires us to angry about the prison system, for example, since prisons represent the ultimate failure of love — and since we can reasonably be angry about institutions that deprive vulnerable individuals of much-needed love.</p><p>Finally, how would love figure in policy trade-offs? How would love be balanced, say, against a £100,000 gain in efficiency? This question misses the point of a radical politics of love. In fact, it misses the point of political ideals. Political ideals — like freedom, or justice, or love — are not designed to be converted into numerical form within economic trade-offs. They are designed to be lodestars for political decision-making. If we must resort to trade-offs, political ideals can be used as cross-checks once we’ve undertaken trade-offs. We should expect as much of love as we can expect of justice.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>Around the time of the rise of the Occupy movement, words like ‘Indignaos!’ and ‘Indignez-vous!’ became the rallying-cry of protesters in Spain, France, and elsewhere (inspired by 93 year-old Stephane Hessel’s book <em>Indignez-vous!</em>) — translated variously as ‘Indignation!’ or ‘Outrage!’.</p><p>As a complement to, not a substitute for, outrage or indignation, perhaps we need today a further injunction for work in the political arena:</p><p>Love!</p><p><em>Max Harris is a writer, academic and activist based in Oxford, where he is an Examination Fellow at All Souls College. He Tweets at </em><a href="https://twitter.com/mdnharris">@mdnharris</a></p><p><em>This blog post is based on a talk given at Open School East on 4 August 2016</em>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=fbe259170646" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/perspectiva-institute/a-radical-politics-of-love-fbe259170646">A RADICAL POLITICS OF LOVE</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/perspectiva-institute">Perspectiva</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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