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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Murtaza Hussain on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Murtaza Hussain on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@mecolalu?source=rss-d6640f3614e1------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Murtaza Hussain on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mecolalu?source=rss-d6640f3614e1------2</link>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Speed vs Perfection]]></title>
            <link>https://mecolalu.medium.com/speed-vs-perfection-5c434c79b581?source=rss-d6640f3614e1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5c434c79b581</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[product-management]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Murtaza Hussain]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2019 19:04:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-14T19:04:54.920Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/498/1*vNG5eO9e-J_d-ZiFecN4Qg.gif" /></figure><p>Speed is one of our core values. I often see people struggle with whether to do some thing fast, or to do it well. If I say you can do both, I get blank stares.</p><p>Here is how you do it.</p><blockquote>Do less.</blockquote><p>Its that simple. Fight less battles. Cut out features. Sunset existing features that are not being used. Remove code that was once written and now 3 years later no one even know what it does.</p><p>As product managers, especially newer ones, we offset our insecurities by adding features. The logic is some thing like, if they don’t like feature A, then they may like feature B, C, D etc… This logic is fundamentally flawed. And it causes product road maps to get bloated and then developers are faced with the choice of doing a mediocre job but shipping <em>all</em> features. Coz if they don’t, it feels like a failure. And especially if the product fails, not having polish is equated with ‘not having all the features’. This is wrong AF and it is almost always the product managers fault.</p><p>Things that add complexity. And if you have more than one, the scale is logarithmic. People, size of project, number of users, # of devs on project etc. So here is the shocking conclusion. Bigger the company, bigger the user base, the smaller and more focused the product needs to be. Otherwise the problem gets more and more complex, and either you take a year to ship or you ship with mediocrity. Your choice.</p><p>So as a product owner, you are faced with the following, almost impossible task. From the 7 awesome features in your new cool idea, you need to remove 5. And you don’t have the data to know which ones. It almost always comes down to a gut decision. And if you get it wrong, you’ve wasted many months of dev time and hundreds of thousands of dollars (maybe even millions). This is why if you get it right, you get paid the big bucks.</p><p>So my suggestion to anyone having to make these decisions is to really work on your ‘gut instinct’. Spend a lot of your time actually using your own product. Be your own customer. The deeper you dive into your own product the better this ‘instinct’ will get. Its not an over night process. It takes years. But thats the best way I know how to get there.</p><p>You need to develop a very opinionated view of your industry and your product. And then focus all your dev &amp; design resources into singular focal point. If you get it wrong, which you often will, its okay. Learn and adjust. But please don’t spend time making feature after feature, and thinking users will like your product since now it has more features.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5c434c79b581" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[New Paypal Checkout Flow]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/streamlabs/new-paypal-checkout-flow-97b17e8eba8c?source=rss-d6640f3614e1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/97b17e8eba8c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[payments]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Murtaza Hussain]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Jul 2018 18:33:51 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-08-21T00:29:00.406Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is being rolled out in phases over the next few weeks. You’ll see a notification in Recent events when its enabled on your account.</em></p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2F6K33UYxRGzA%3Ffeature%3Doembed&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D6K33UYxRGzA&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fi.ytimg.com%2Fvi%2F6K33UYxRGzA%2Fhqdefault.jpg&amp;key=a19fcc184b9711e1b4764040d3dc5c07&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=youtube" width="854" height="480" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/ba314695709ec5fe342bb26c2af351d4/href">https://medium.com/media/ba314695709ec5fe342bb26c2af351d4/href</a></iframe><p>Streamlabs &amp; Paypal have been working closely together to improve the tipping flow for Streamers, and we’re excited to announce some major upgrades. This change requires action on your part — make sure you follow this blog post carefully and thoroughly.</p><h3>One Click Tipping</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*11zgGsMJQcpbSWMHgxcYSw.gif" /><figcaption>No need to login to Paypal.com everytime you tip!</figcaption></figure><p>This allows a viewer to tip with a single click — gone are the days of having to go to Paypal.com &amp; enter your username and password each time. Reducing this step has significantly increased conversion rates. Aka. you make mo’ money!</p><blockquote>In our testing we’ve seen conversion on tip pages increase by 37.5% — that means 37.5% increase in tips for you!</blockquote><p>This may seem like a simple change, but it has dramatic consequences on your bottom line.</p><h3>What you need to do</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*j3WyPjE7__fO0TJqGLOJ0Q.png" /><figcaption>Hit the Link Your Paypal Account Now button</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UjlRUjEeD8sM1MRHq1z0tQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZhCpizTzUom6O860NPJz6Q.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zwGo7h-Y33FrprJTYdgjog.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/882/1*BZXhrgzEv03l0wW9-8gCTA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/906/1*nfmNnljBAwYUFGeFVvmrMA.png" /><figcaption>Thats it! You’re done.</figcaption></figure><h3>Login Required for Tippers</h3><p>In order to reduce and better help you fight charge backs, we will now require all users to login (any platform of choice) before tipping. This helps us create global black lists for bad actors and reduce fraud. We have a dedicated team now working on reducing fraud and fighting charge backs. More updates coming on this soon.</p><h3>New PRO Checkout</h3><p>A lot of people want to use the fancy PRO effects with their tips, but hated the idea of subscribing. Good news! Subscribe no more! Viewers can now (totally optional!) buy PRO effects for a single donation. Here is what the flow looks like:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9Gg5rm0aEwcv8hRoKKh_qg.png" /></figure><p>Please note the PRO effects fee shows up as ‘Partner commission’ in your PayPal dashboard. Streamlabs is not taking a cut of your tip— we are and always will be a 100% free platform. This is the optional PRO effects bought by the viewer. This is what you will see:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/873/1*mbxI1ufJXQjE6pfNBGTTTQ.png" /><figcaption>In this example, the viewer tipped $10 and bought optional PRO effects for $2.</figcaption></figure><p>Note: Streamlabs is a free service and we rely on PRO effects to keep the lights on. If you don’t like it, you can simply turn this feature off from the <a href="https://streamlabs.com/dashboard#/donationsettings">dashboard</a>. If you choose to keep it on, we really appreciate it! Helps us to pay all the sweet folks that work hard bring you awesome features.</p><p>For those tippers who want to subscribe (lets face it, better value for money!), you can still subscribe from the top right menu. Not happy with your sub? cancel anytime!</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/276/1*pgreyqb6WaTi1xJGOdl4SA.png" /><figcaption>To subscribe, go to Menu =&gt; PRO Settings</figcaption></figure><p>As always we’d love to hear your feedback. The good, the bad, the ugly. We’re always looking to improve our service, and your constant feedback keeps us motivated. <a href="https://twitter.com/streamlabshq">Tweet </a>at us, reply to this blog post, or come hangout on <a href="http://discord.gg/stream">Discord</a>. Or if you’re old school send us an <a href="http://support@streamlabs.com/">email</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=97b17e8eba8c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/streamlabs/new-paypal-checkout-flow-97b17e8eba8c">New Paypal Checkout Flow</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/streamlabs">Streamlabs Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[ Live — True Cloud Backups ]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/streamlabs/live-true-cloud-backups-af220ee88308?source=rss-d6640f3614e1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/af220ee88308</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cloud]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[live-streaming-software]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stream]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[stream-labs]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[backup]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Murtaza Hussain]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 23 May 2018 19:08:37 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-11-19T05:24:09.198Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/493/1*rN_bBCgcd0yEqOtNlRIQPw.gif" /><figcaption>Credit: Giphy.com</figcaption></figure><p>We’ve all been there. When you realize your PC is dead. It failed, or maybe an Ex smashed it with a sledge hammer. Your hard drive refused to spin up. Maybe you installed a Windows update and everything went blue. It has happened to all of us. It ranks as one of the worst moments in a streamers life. All your stuff — setup, files, overlays, sounds, sources, labels, settings, alerts — just *poof* gone.</p><blockquote><strong>81%</strong> of streamers have experienced a hardware or software failure resulting in serious data loss of their stream</blockquote><p>That means having to spend hours or days setting up everything again. Finding all those media files again. Setting up transitions, filters, audio syncs. Grabbing your alert box and widget links. Thats many hours of your life you’re never getting back (if you ever manage to find the files at all)— until now…</p><h3>Introducing True Cloud Backups with Streamlabs Desktop</h3><p>Just install the latest update and everything will be sync’ed up with our servers. This includes your scenes, sources, transitions, filters, widgets, overlays — and all your media &amp; other files. Even if you have 4k videos that are 100s of GBs. Its all sync’ed and if you switch computers, all you have to do is login with Streamlabs Desktop on a new PC and everything will be restored.</p><blockquote>Its truly magical and we can’t wait for you to try it out. And the best part — its available today and its completely free! (yes we we’re offering unlimited storage for free ♥♥ )</blockquote><p>An added benefit, you can use this to instantly restore your entire setup at conferences, friends house, LAN party. Whatever your social event of choice. Imagine showing up, simply logging-in and you’re ready to stream.</p><h4>You can:</h4><ul><li>Pull out your hard drive, and smash it with a hammer</li><li>Format your C: D: E: or any directory</li><li>Create a power voltage surge, fry all your hardware</li><li>Let your manager fiddle with your setup, deleting everything</li><li>Travel to a conference or tournament, without taking anything with you</li><li>Go to a LAN party, without taking anything with you</li></ul><p>…and you’ll be totally fine. True Cloud Backups from Streamlabs Desktop will take care of you ♥.</p><p>Don’t get fooled by claims of cloud backups from other services. All they do is reload a full screen browser source. That has none of your scenes, labels, transitions, settings, images, videos, sounds or local files. This is different — it’s a <strong>complete, true cloud backup</strong> that syncs all your local files and the entire setup of scenes, sources and the hundred-odd settings you’ve spent hours customizing. Its a true backup-and-restore function, like Apple’s Time Machine. Its taken us many months of effort and hundreds of thousands of dollars in servers to make it happen and we’re extremely excited to finally release it. Sorry it took so long, but we wanted to do it right.</p><p>Its magical. Its a super-power. But unfortunately its not going to help you improve at Fortnite. Thats on you :)</p><p>Try it now &gt;&gt;<a href="https://streamlabs.com/streamlabs-obs?s=58"> Streamlabs Desktop</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=af220ee88308" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/streamlabs/live-true-cloud-backups-af220ee88308">🔴 Live — True Cloud Backups 🔥</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/streamlabs">Streamlabs Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Game Aware Video Encoding]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/streamlabs/game-aware-video-encoding-dbf970492f8b?source=rss-d6640f3614e1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/dbf970492f8b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[video-encoding]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[youtube]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[twitch]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[videogames]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[machine-learning]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Murtaza Hussain]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Jan 2018 20:53:20 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2018-01-05T21:42:40.780Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here is the story of how we’re improving the video encoder settings and customizing them by game. This effort is an on-going effort and will likely continue for years to come. There is no silver bullet here, just a series of small, incremental improvements that all combined can result in some legit gains.</p><p>The inspiration for this project came from work currently being done by <a href="https://qz.com/920857/netflix-nflx-uses-ai-in-its-new-codec-to-compress-video-scene-by-scene/">Netflix </a>and others.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/932/0*O1xRBlxOlZQyluHV." /><figcaption>Optimizations published by Netflix</figcaption></figure><p>Our thesis was that games are actually a lot more predictable in terms of the type of video content than movies. So if others are seeing serious gains on movies, we should be able to see just as good, if not better gains on gaming.</p><p>We spent a few months recruiting a team of video encoding engineers that have worked on this problem set before. And then we started to experiment. Over a period of 6 months, we ran about 20K tests. By focusing on a small set of games (LoL, Dota2, Destiny2, Fortnite, Pubg), we tested hundreds of combinations in the x264 encoder and measured the corresponding result in video quality using industry benchmarks like psnr and vmaf.</p><p>Eventually we automated this process &amp; trained a machine learning system to encode video games. The hard part here was getting data sets to train these models. It’s not fully finished yet, but automation + machine learning is resulting in significant improvements. As I said before, there is no silver bullet here. Just many small improvements, that collectively add up.</p><p><em>Important to note here is we are not changing the encoder (say from x264 to Nvenc). For now, we only have optimized settings for x264. The NVENC and AMD optimizations are being generated and will be available soon.</em></p><p>Now if you’re from the industry, you’re probably skeptical. And you would be right. Industry standards are standards for a reason. They’ve been developed over many years by large groups of people and tested thoroughly. When we showed our results to folks at Twitch and other platforms, they were initially skeptical as well. But here is the key insight: x264 profiles (as used in OBS) were developed for a generalized use case; not for gaming and certainly not for a specific game. So by specializing the use case, there are gains to be made.</p><p>The gains (images and videos below) we found were the following:</p><ul><li>Weak CPUs — for users with weak CPUs and who are forced to use presets like ultrafast or superfast, the gains are immense.</li><li>Low bit rate conditions — if your internet is weak and you’re streaming at or under 3k.</li><li>If a user has a weak CPU and bit rate limitations, then the gains are incredible.</li></ul><p>Eventually we’ll publish more research and data sets but for now, here are some results you can check out. The results are meaningful and conclusive — at least in our humble opinions! And this is certainly not the end — we will keep doing constant updates to further improve the results. What we’re sure about is that this approach works and there are meaningful gains to be had.</p><p>All these tests have the same CPU usage (encoded using x264). On the left is with our optimizations, and on the right is the ultrafast preset. Bitrate for both is 2.5K.</p><h3><strong>Destiny 2</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*iKEQtoTer2Kc33Y3zDdnlA.png" /><figcaption>High res: <a href="https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/video-encoding-optimization/First+results/Destiny2.png">https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/video-encoding-optimization/First+results/Destiny2.png</a></figcaption></figure><p>High res <a href="https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/video-encoding-optimization/First+results/Destiny2_SideBySide.avi">video </a>can be downloaded here. Use VLC to open.</p><h3><strong>Fortnite</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9Y_UQaw9WLp4DGjxAYPf7w.png" /><figcaption>High res: <a href="https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/video-encoding-optimization/First+results/Fortnite.png">https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/video-encoding-optimization/First+results/Fortnite.png</a></figcaption></figure><p>High res <a href="https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/video-encoding-optimization/First+results/Fortnite_SideBySide.avi">video </a>can be downloaded here. Use VLC to open.</p><h3><strong>League of Legends</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*qy4V5BJZVu4Nmavmir2FHg.png" /><figcaption>High res: <a href="https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/video-encoding-optimization/First+results/LeagueOfLegends.png">https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/video-encoding-optimization/First+results/LeagueOfLegends.png</a></figcaption></figure><p>High res <a href="https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/video-encoding-optimization/First+results/LeagueOfLegends_SideBySide.avi">video </a>can be downloaded here. Use VLC to open.</p><h3><strong>PUBG</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y7WDouzxhGAI_E9gNIYF-Q.png" /><figcaption>High res: <a href="https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/video-encoding-optimization/First+results/PUBG.png">https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/video-encoding-optimization/First+results/PUBG.png</a></figcaption></figure><p>High res <a href="https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/video-encoding-optimization/First+results/PUBG_SideBySide.avi">video</a> can be downloaded here. Use VLC to open.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=dbf970492f8b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/streamlabs/game-aware-video-encoding-dbf970492f8b">Game Aware Video Encoding</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/streamlabs">Streamlabs Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Part 3: how we did 15 startups in 21 months.]]></title>
            <link>https://mecolalu.medium.com/part-3-how-we-did-15-startups-in-21-months-d69941ac06f0?source=rss-d6640f3614e1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d69941ac06f0</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[gaming]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Murtaza Hussain]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 02 Jun 2017 05:09:04 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-01-23T22:41:59.112Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0HBU9tbxRpZoYESlGIZYNQ.png" /><figcaption>Ben’s awesome illustration work</figcaption></figure><p><a href="https://medium.com/@mecolalu/how-we-did-15-startups-in-21-months-a7008c8f2c97">Part 1</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/@mecolalu/part-2-how-we-did-15-startups-in-21-months-27c9a2f77bb7">Part 2</a> linked here.</p><blockquote>[Update] — Logitech buys Streamlabs in 2019 for $145m</blockquote><p>Its been almost 2 years since I wrote the <a href="https://medium.com/@mecolalu/part-2-how-we-did-15-startups-in-21-months-27c9a2f77bb7">last update — Part 2</a>. Sorry its taken this along to get an update out.</p><p>As I predicted in my last post, the daily fantasy industry hit road blocks. DraftKings / Fanduel are no longer the unicorn darlings they were 2 years ago. They’re <a href="http://www.legalsportsreport.com/11240/draftkings-fanduel-dfs-2016/">surviving </a>but given the preferences of the combined $1B they have raised, employees and founders are going to suffer.</p><p>Back in June 2015 we saw this coming and decided to pivot the company (yet again). Doing a pivot with 5 employees is easy. I’m PRO at it. But doing a pivot with 60 employees. Well thats a shit show.</p><p>From June 2015 — March 2016 we went from 60 FTE and nearly $1m/month in revenue to 15 FTE and $0/month in revenue. And thats the best thing we could have done for the business. Let me explain.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*I7u0b-pAi_2OhC0Gl7jbYA.jpeg" /></figure><p>We intentionally killed our revenue — we shut down vulcun.com etc despite the on going revenues. The reason: we did not see this working long term and any short term revenue just served as a distraction. We need to be doing what was going to build long term enterprise value. So yep, we pulled the plug. Unfortunately as part of that we lost a lot of good people who had put their heart and soul into the company. That part really sucked.</p><p>On a personal level the pups, Seda and Ali kept me going on. Some days were down right shitty. But we kept marching…</p><p>We knew Twitch / Gaming is where our hearts were and wanted to do stay within the industry. So we used our fresh VC funding and bought couple of companies (twitchalerts &amp; streampro). And in a few months made the hard transistion from daily fantasy into building tools for twitch streamers.</p><p>We changed our name and combined everything under <a href="http://streamlabs.com/">Stream Labs.</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/360/1*LQcZHkMgOwiOACbT3pYRAg.gif" /><figcaption>Credits: Morgan &amp; Ben</figcaption></figure><p>Then came the important lesson of technical debt. Twitchalerts was written by a single founder (Tom) as a weekend project was never meant to scale to the level it did. We realized that if we wanted to add more features and build out our vision we would have to first begin by re-writing everything. <em>Everything</em>. That took 6 months and a lot of thankless effort on behalf of Salman and Morgan.</p><p>Then came the job of paying our bills. We added a Viewer Pro feature that helped us with that. We’re not out of the woods, but its been a nice not worrying about running out of money. Our team size is up to 32 FTE now, so it takes some $$ to keep the lights on.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*mx5GzbtGf-XrBsYOjBBm4Q.gif" /><figcaption>Viewers pay to make their alerts look extra cool!</figcaption></figure><p>Most of the core team from the Vulcun days are still with us. Salman, Jeff, Morgan, Mike, Tom, Marilyn, Aaron, Chelsea, Harsha, Karl. They survived the lay offs and pivots.They’re fighters. Its been amazing to see them grow personally and be the founding core of whats about to become an important company. As a founder thats one of the big reasons of what makes this journey so rewarding.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*F7tzKNcF8865xL_ZMHX_Rw.jpeg" /><figcaption>Napa trip April 2017 @ Alpha Omega</figcaption></figure><p>Things are going quite well right now. If you know me, you probably know i’m quite cynical — so thats a big statement even for me. Last post, we had just raised $12m and I wrote about why our industry &amp; product was doomed!</p><p>Heres why I think we have a legit shot at making a very important company right now. I believe that the future of TV is the ‘<a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4007938/The-10-Highest-Paid-YouTube-stars.html">Twitch/Youtube format</a>’. Its going to be live. Its going to be long tail. Its going to require a lot of two way interaction between the people on stream and the audience. 10 years from now, this is how most video content will be consumed. Don’t believe me, <a href="http://variety.com/2015/digital/news/youtubers-teen-survey-ksi-pewdiepie-1201544882/">read this study. </a>Right now its mostly young kids, but they will grow up and when they do, this will become main stream. Its going to be very difficult for media companies to adopt to this change. Same thing happened with Facebook 10 years ago. Now FB’s is worth more than all other traditional media companies combined. I’m not sure who is going to win the battle for live video, but everyones got a horse in the race (MSFT: Mixer, Twitter: Preriscope, Amazon: Twitch, Facebook: FB Live+Instagram live, Google: Youtube Live).</p><p>All these content producers will need tools to run their business. And the under lying technology of letting viewers and streamers interact will become the foundation of why live succeeds. We’re (finally!) in a position that puts us strategically in a leadership position on a wave thats going to continue for the next 10–20 years. It took 15+ pivots and 6 years of trying to get here. But I think we’ve finally arrived at a business that will scale.</p><p>Some highlight numbers from our reports <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/18/streamers-flock-to-youtube-live-but-the-money-and-crowd-is-still-at-twitch/">here</a> and <a href="https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/24/streamer-numbers-and-incomes-are-rising-healthily-according-to-data-from-popular-tool/">here</a>. You can see its already a big business and tens of thousands of people are supporting themselves full time by streaming on Twitch and Youtube. Its not very different than people earning on AirBnB or driving for Uber. But in this case, we’re helping people do what they love — play games all day and get paid for it.</p><p>Not sure if it makes sense to do a Part 4. I think the story has been told. I’ll update this post once theres an ‘End’. Until then, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ho%CA%BBoponopono">ho’oponopono</a>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/670/1*omxWGjfD3f0CQWqIqmlZPA.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d69941ac06f0" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Setting the Record Straight]]></title>
            <link>https://mecolalu.medium.com/setting-the-record-straight-724a88f80edd?source=rss-d6640f3614e1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/724a88f80edd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[android]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[mobile]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Murtaza Hussain]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Feb 2016 21:28:11 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-02-10T19:25:32.446Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><em>Update</em></strong><em>: In response to our objections, the FTC did in fact update their press release. We appreciate the gesture!</em></p><p>In lieu of the FTC actually issuing the executed consent order — which is found <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/02/tech-company-settles-ftc-charges-it-unfairly-installed-apps">here</a>, the FTC (and someone that had no involvement with us in this case) decided to write an opinion article, which has many inaccuracies and blatant factual errors. Read the <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160205vulcunorder.pdf">consent order</a> and count them yourself.</p><p>In the spirit of opinion pieces and narratives, here is what happened from the inside. Sorry it took a few days to publish this, as we were waiting for a green light from the FTC. We got the go ahead from them this afternoon and here it is.</p><h4>Some background</h4><p>This was the first iteration of Vulcun.com (before it was the eSports site).</p><p>In the summer of 2014, Ali and I, were building technology that would allow mobile apps to do Desktop to mobile — attributed installs. What that basically means is that having the ability to install a mobile app from the desktop version of the google play store and having the ability to track it on the mobile phone. <a href="https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&amp;rls=en&amp;q=mobile+atribution+companies&amp;ie=UTF-8&amp;oe=UTF-8#q=mobile+attribution+companies">There are many companies</a> that do this for mobile to mobile and its standard industry practice. Its just that no one had figured out how to do this from traffic originating from desktop devices.</p><p>The way we cracked this problem, was using the users Google Play email address. We realized if we could match the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD5">anonymized MD5 hash</a> of the email address on desktop and mobile, we could attribute the install. We spent 3 months building the tech, filling a few patents, and integrating our technology with other mobile attribution companies, like Tune, Adjust, Kochava etc.</p><p>The key to this process was being able to read the user’s Google play email address. To do that, we needed a browser extension installed on the users computer so when they visit play.google.com, we can read that email address. Once we read it, we converted it into a MD5 hash, and it was sent to our servers. At no point, we did actually know the plain text email address. The plan was to only share the anonymized hash with partners to do the attribution. This way the user’s personally identifiable information was protected.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*hZ0LnLe8ZSr5a_cS1opUbw.png" /><figcaption>Attribution Flow</figcaption></figure><p>As part of this, we experimented building our own Chrome browser extensions. We featured apps on the Chrome start page in the following format (and thats how the flow worked).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CJth5-LAazm0AGEi2quJXw.png" /></figure><p>App discovery is a major pain point for both users and app developers. We felt this was a great new format to solve that problem. We would feature the top grossing / top free / top paid apps and (in the future) promoted ones. Note, at this point, we did not promote any paid apps or get paid by any app developer. Total users using our services was fairly small (few thousand). This was totally opt in — you first had to install the browser extension, then agree to its permissions, then click on an ad, go to play store… etc.</p><h4>Apps By Cindy / Running Fred</h4><p>So now that we had this technology running, we needed distribution. We bought an existing browser extension called Running Fred and here is where I believe the FTC press release has factual errors that need to be addressed.</p><blockquote>“After Vulcun acquired the <em>Running Fred</em> game, they used it to install a different app, commandeer people’s computers, and bombard them with ads,” said Jessica Rich, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “We’re very pleased we were able to stop these practices.”</blockquote><p>So here are the issues:</p><ol><li>When we changed Running Fred into Apps by Cindy, we had an <strong>explicit OPT IN</strong>. We did not do it by default. In fact, there were two opt ins. One by the Chrone web store (their default: everytime an app updates and asks for new permissions) and ours. Here is a screen shot of ours.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Trbwi2nqudZOT-lz9Nsn5w.png" /><figcaption>OPT IN PROCESS</figcaption></figure><p>Only users who explicitly opted in were enrolled. The program was once a week, we would use our technology to install an app on their phone. Looking back, we should have done a lot better to explain this process, but these are facts. People opted in. There was disclosure. Of the 200K users, about 15% or so Opt’ed in.</p><p>2. Users were not bombarded with ads. The only ads that were shown, as disclosed were on the Chrome start page (screen shots above). And they were not really even ads — they were the top apps on the app store for that day (we did <em>not</em> get paid for showing these apps). There was only 1 instance where we promoted a paid app (see next).</p><p>3. The last (and the biggest) issue I have with that statement is:</p><blockquote>“We’re very pleased we were able to stop these practices.”</blockquote><h4>Here is what really happened</h4><p>Once we had about 30K or so users that had opt’ed in, we ran our first (and only) paid promotion. This was only sent to users who had opt’ed in on the screen above.</p><p>The technology was able to do about 2000 or so attributed installs. A lot of the users liked it. However some of them had simply forgotten that they opt’ed in to this program and were surprised why/how this app got on their phone. They started to complain on the reviews section of the app. There were about 20 or so complaints, (lets put that in perspective, 20 users complaining is not a lot), HOWEVER, we felt this was a bad user experience. They had no idea how this app got on their phone and were annoyed. As a percetange of total users who got the app, the number that complained was very small (about 1%), but still, we were not ok with that. So we suspended the promotion. One user reported the app keeps re-installing itself. This is simply false (and if you’re a developer, you know its technically not possible).</p><p>We spent the next few weeks trying to figure out a way to improve this model. At this time Google de-listed the app we were promoting from the Play Store. This was quite heart breaking for us. We also conducted a ton of user surveys and focus groups — the conclusion was simple. <em>There was no way of eliminating the 1% — some people will always forget the opt’ed in and get suprised when they receive the app.</em> Its that simple. The question was whether we could live with certain percentage of users having a bad user experience and we decided no. <a href="https://medium.com/@mecolalu/part-2-how-we-did-15-startups-in-21-months-27c9a2f77bb7#.9lqprju3g">We shut it down. I even wrote about it last year.</a></p><p>That was the end of it. It sucked having to shut down a project we worked so hard for, and we had such strong product market fit. However the edge cases, of people having a bad user experience did not justify this business. <strong>We made that call, ourselves.</strong></p><p>We shut down in December 2014, and around July 2015 we get a notice from the FTC. They want to open an investigation into this product due to user complaints (about 20 or so!!). Google Inc, itself is under multiple FTC orders and as part of that, reports all such complaints to the FTC and they decide which ones they would like to pursue</p><p><strong>FTC did not shut this practice down. We ourselves did once we realized it was a bad user experience for some users. Our first contact with them was 9 months after the fact.</strong></p><h4>Conclusion</h4><p>I feel the FTC does actually do great work, and due to their efforts, consumers are safer and better protected. You can read more about them at <a href="http://ftc.gov/">ftc.gov</a>. However with this press release, they seem to have (in my opinion) violated the same directive they are accusing us of violating — the FTC’s press release would not pass their own standard for false and misleading statements. Section 5 of the FTC Act would label this claim as false and misleading if it were made in connection with corporate advertising. Ah the irony!</p><p>As a young startup we have enough issues to worry about, and dealing with the FTC is going to cost a lot and be a big distraction. Unfortunately reality of the American legal system is it doesn’t matter whether you’re right or wrong, legal fees are just the same ($750/hr). We decided to sign their order and move on. And then boom — many months after signing I see this press release that makes us look almost like con-artists. As entrepreneurs we live and die by our reputations and I felt that I needed to set the record straight and tell my part of the story. You be the judge.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=724a88f80edd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Part 2 : how we did 15 startups in 21 months.]]></title>
            <link>https://mecolalu.medium.com/part-2-how-we-did-15-startups-in-21-months-27c9a2f77bb7?source=rss-d6640f3614e1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/27c9a2f77bb7</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Murtaza Hussain]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2015 02:48:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2015-06-24T02:48:56.072Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I wrote the medium article “How we did 15 startups in 21 months” on Jan 3rd 2014. Its June 23rd 2015 now. Its almost been a 1.5 years since then. I wanted to write an update for everyone.</p><p><em>I can’t spell, so there will be plenty of spelling and grammatical errors in this article. Please control the urge to correct.</em></p><p><strong>BizChat</strong></p><p>First half of 2014, we spent trying to build a business focused chatting application called BizChat. We developed simultanoeuly for iOS and Android — and launched it in the summer of 2014. We were counting on viral methods of SMS marketing (milder versions of what PATH did), but none of that seemed to work.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*I47hAHKIVG8q7n9tnDBWCA.png" /></figure><p>After all was said and done, we were experiencing a higher virality rate over email invites, than SMS invites. Part of the issue is once you get someones address book, about 70% of the numbers are wasted due to formating issues (to add +1, or 001 or 0044 etc etc). Rules are different by country and its hard to figure this out programtically. Without a growth channel, there was no point in continuing this any further.</p><p>This really sucked since we invested so much time and energy into creating high fidelity apps for both iOS and Android. App development is a whole other ball game vs. web development.</p><p><strong>Email Cherry</strong></p><p>While doing BizChat we got good at creating Node.js real time apps and connections. We decided to give chrome extensions a shot. We tried to build out high quality Chrome extensions focused on an enterprise use case.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Njt6v9wfcko5SlTMVAJexw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eVzO7vEh8CMas99rdjbznA.png" /></figure><p>Email Cherry allowed you to see who opened your email in real time and notify you in under 1 second. We built out a pretty impressive backend on Node.js that handled millions of concurrent connections with extremely low latency. We even got 50K or so users. But then we discovered the ugly truth behind chrome extensions — no one freaking pays. Even for a business use case. Our upgrade rates ($19.99/mon) were under 0.30%. I think Yesware has built a really nice business around this use case, but they sell through a traditional sales force. We were trying to do the opposite, get people to adopt it organically and then upgrade. Seems like unless their company is paying, most professionals just don’t want to pay out of their own pockets.</p><p><strong>Mobile Ad-Network</strong></p><p>In trying to figure out how to monetize our own chrome extension, we figured, lots of other extensions must have this same issue. Lets try and build out an ad network that helps monetize this space.</p><p>Turns out a lot of other people, over the last decade have been down this road. There are several (mostly Israeli) companies that do over $100M in revenue in the space. Heck they even have place in Tel Aviv called ‘Download Alley’ — named after all the downloadable software (aka-ad/spyware) companies based there. Its a fascinating, highly questionable space that makes cash flow like there is no tomorrow. Ali and I were facinated.</p><p>We found lots of desktop based ad networks but no one had quite figured out how to do desktop to mobile ads. Mobile to mobile ad networks are a dime a dozen, but desktop to mobile — now there was a gold mine. We built technology, filed some patents, and were off to the races. The core of this was we figured how out to do 1 to 1 attribution for a install originating on the desktop (for a mobile app).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/897/1*zt-THcTr532sqEflvvi0nA.png" /></figure><p>We spent the next 3 months integrating our technology with all the major attribution providers in the space. Very painful to do 10+ custom integrations, but we did it and we did it fast. Then came along, getting advertisers on board. By Nov, we had over $15M in I/Os. We also did deals with many of the large publishers in the space to get the inventory.</p><p>And then we launched — first few days were great. We were on track to deliver on our I/Os by the end of the year. Finally, Ali and I were like we got this… Finally. Heres our break. Final(fking)ly! After 3 years of experimentation, we finally found some thing that can scale.</p><p>And then we had oh-fuck moment. Turns out, users, even though they had expressly opt’ed in and installed our chrome extension, did not realize / forgot that the app on their phone — came from their desktop. Most users have never installed an app on their phone using the Desktop google play store. They were confused and thought the app (they had expressly clicked to install) had installed itself.</p><p>They started complaining — not a lot, only 20 or so, but some how Google took notice and decided they did not like our attribution model. It was based off matching the users google play email from desktop to mobile and decided to ban us and delisted one of the apps we were promoting from the app store.</p><p>Losing out on our revenue is one thing, but having one of our friends apps get de-listed. Well…. That really broke us into pieces. Words can not really describe how hard that was. Mad respect to those guys for supporting us during this and standing by our side. You know who you are — thank you. We will never forget.</p><p>We decided to exit the chrome extension space all together. Did we leave too soon, perhaps? Could we have made an alternate model work. Maybe. But dealing with google’s (or rather lack of) compliance team, just left a bad bad taste with us. We were 100% legit, trying to do the right thing, and yet no one (including people we know), at google would give us the time of the day. Ah well. Fuck this. Move on….Shutting it down, was a very hard, painful, public defeat.</p><p>Sometime last year, we got this cutie. Benji. Rubbing his belly somehow makes every thing better :)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/640/1*TXOvxk8E-ZMVWbf6fkmvvA.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>VULCUN.com — Daily Fantasy for eSports</strong></p><p>After the ad-network, Ali and I were spent. We had hired a great team, (Aaron, Marilyn, Jared). Salman had been through hell and back with the technology and integrations with 30+ companies. We were all burnt out. We let the team go and decided to take 3 months off. No work. No stupid startups. No ideas. Just focus on ourselves. I pledged to surf daily. Ali wanted to bike. Trying to bring balance back in life.</p><p>So all of that lasted 3 weeks. We came across Fanduel.com and thought, we should do this for eSports. We know eSports -we ran the #2 League of Legends team in North America. We got this. We promised ourselves 3 months off. But I guess we really can’t help ourselves.</p><p>Problem was the League of Legends season was starting in 4 weeks. This business is very season dependent — if we had to launch, we had to do it in 4 weeks. So Ali cancelled his Hawaii trip, I ended up working on mine (surf+weather was shit anyways). In 2 weeks, Salman and I built the site. We launched on Jan 12th this year.</p><p>This is me in Hawaii while we launched. Total FML mode.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*p-zZxIF74JLWYYi_D8HyiQ.jpeg" /></figure><h3>Here is what we built and launched.</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*9W3THjxpw7fbFm4Ab1OcQQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ijFvOdQAjPlinWxnr16qYQ.png" /></figure><p>And then magic happened. Given our connections in the space, we were able to scale very quickly. So did the top line. Magic was all around. Finally product market fit. Finally…</p><p>This was our last shot. We were running on fumes (few months of cash left). We decided to increase our marketing spend for us which brought us down to 2 months of cash. If this had not worked, we would have folded the company.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/350/1*3aNSzpOSl5tKhvT8ghH9Vg.jpeg" /></figure><p>And then the VCs came calling. We literally had our pick of the valley. Initially we decided, oh lets not raise too much. $3–5m would be fine. After 2 weeks of meetings, we ended up raising $12.2M from Seqouia. We met them for the first time on a Thursday, and signed on Tuesday the next week. They literally moved faster and were more decisive than any other VC i’ve seen. The term sheet was signed at 10:30pm at our office. We included a host of other folks in the round that we really liked (<a href="http://vulcun.com/main/about">full list here</a>).</p><p>And if you’re thinking, yes, this is still the same company, same investors as Higear. We brought everyone onboard. No investor has ever lost money with us, and we’re very proud of that. Short term it means more dilution for us, but reputation is everything, and people tend to always remember such things. Always make investors whole (or better) no matter what.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*zkjx_ltRRPk2tKPqnsBFNA.jpeg" /></figure><p>I’ve been around long enough to know it wasn’t really us. These things are based on hype cycles and we’re definately in a hype cycle right now. Right after we raised our $12M, our #2 competitior raised $4.2M off our tail wind. I don’t think our business deserved the valuation we got, and neither did theirs. Fanduel and Draftkings each have raised over $300M at this point. We just got lucky getting their tail wind + eSports is blowing up and everyone wants in.</p><p>There are some serious issues with the model.</p><ol><li>Its extremely low margin — hard to build a big business when you’re running sub 5% gross profit margin. Ours is much higher, but long term will trend towards the same margin as Fanduel and Draft Kings. Especially Draft Kings — after accouting for promotions, they’re running at sub 5% margin. Investors haven’t figured this out yet / or are in denial. Scale will solve things. Or once the competitive pressure eases. Ya right. Lets see how this plays out.</li><li>The DFS business is built on high rollers, and in this case, they are very price sensitive. Any new site offering a lower margin will attract users, especially if it has liquidity. These users have very little loyalty. Hard to build out enterpise value when your most power users are so fickle.</li></ol><p>Jury is out on how the DFS space will play out. We’re doing whatever we can on our part, not to get into the low margin high volume business. But lets see how it all plays out.</p><p>So heres the scorecard for the last 1.5 years since I wrote the first article. Failed at another 3 startups — and finally got 1 to work. So total of 4 in 15 months.</p><p>Vulcun is off to a great start. We’re at 30 employees now (up from 3, few months ago) — $12M in the bank and a booming top line. To the outside world it certainly must seem like overnight success. <a href="https://medium.com/@mecolalu/how-we-did-15-startups-in-21-months-a7008c8f2c97">But you know the real story.</a></p><p>All in all, 19 startup attempts in the last 4 years. Probably more to come.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*FLXV4wb3eZJ-h5U7M-pIiw.jpeg" /></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=27c9a2f77bb7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[How we did 15 startups in 21 months]]></title>
            <link>https://mecolalu.medium.com/how-we-did-15-startups-in-21-months-a7008c8f2c97?source=rss-d6640f3614e1------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a7008c8f2c97</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Murtaza Hussain]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 03 Jan 2014 21:02:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-06-01T21:31:22.729Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>How we did 15 startups in 21 months: Part 1</h2><h4>Our journey, truimphs and failures (so far…)</h4><blockquote>Our Background</blockquote><p>Ali, and I <a href="http://techcrunch.com/2010/09/27/peanut-labs-acquired-by-online-research-company-e-rewards/">sold Peanut Labs</a> about 3 years ago. Peanut Labs was our first real venture funded company. Initially started off as <a href="http://www.xuqa.com/">Xuqa.com</a>, and after missing the social networking bubble, we morphed it into a monetization network for social games. The model worked well and we found a blue ocean in the Facebook platform and the new emerging social gaming trend. We partnered with all the major game companies and delivered value to their users. We scaled the company over 3 years (2007-2010) to $15M in annual revenue and eventually had a<a href="http://techcrunch.com/2010/09/27/peanut-labs-acquired-by-online-research-company-e-rewards/"> decent exit</a> for the company, employees and our share holders. I had always thought making the first million or selling your first company was always the hardest. In a way it is, but here is the untold story of what came afterwards. This is the story most repeat entrepreneurs will never tell.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/900/1*l3guhZtIIfMlRwTziGvdHw.jpeg" /></figure><p>We stayed on board after the acquisition for 8 months. During that time, it became apparent to us that due to internal issues at our new parent company, we were not going to be able to hit our earn out metrics. Due to confidentiality issues, I can’t say much more here, but the situation sucked. We had delivered on everything we had promised and yet we were going to not hit the earn out metrics. Ali and I got disheartened and decided to leave to start a new company. After all, we’re entrepreneurs at heart and when you can’t control the situation, its best to walk away.</p><blockquote>Starting Over</blockquote><p><strong>HIGEAR</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/proxy/1*hMeCdwL4zyA76OQtAGjWkg.png" /></figure><p>We decided to start a peer to peer service for high end cars. Think getaround.com / relayrides.com but for nicer, more aspirational cars. We called it HIGEAR.com. Ali has always loved sports cars, but owning one is just downright impractical. So we thought, here is a great service that allows anyone to have access to greatest inventory of sports and luxury cars without the trouble of actually owning one. People would line up by the hundreds to use this. And in a way they actually did!</p><p><strong>Fundraising</strong></p><p>Given we had just sold Peanut Labs, fund raising turned out to be quite straightforward. While raising money for Peanut Labs, I literally pitched and got turned down by 32 VCs. That equates to over 100 actual meetings on Sand Hill road. This time around, we did maybe a dozen meetings and in 3 weeks raised $1.3M at very decent terms. We ended up raising money from eVentures, Battery Ventures, 500 Startups and about 8 angels. With $1.3M in the bank, we were set to hit the pedal hard.</p><p>At this point, most people would have said, hold on! Go on a vacation. Get some rest before starting your next company. I did not feel tired or exhausted. In fact, being small and nimble again, I was energized and full of excitement. Success solves a lot of problems, including energy, and we were off to a great start.</p><p><strong>Launch to Shutdown in 5 months</strong></p><p>We spent 3 months building a working V1 of the website and launched it August 2011. Had a phenomenal launch party, <a href="http://techcrunch.com/2011/10/22/high-end-car-sharing-service-higear-is-expanding-to-l-a/">got covered on Techcrunch </a>countless times etc.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8YgVCkvM0pyTVh-8GQLzQA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Our Tesla Roadster -Bruce Willis drove this in the movie Looper!</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YiYOv2gRo4tyfLE49KuxHQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>HIGEAR Girls photo shoot on Treasure Island</figcaption></figure><p>We spent a lot of time and energy developing the brand. We had a hi-fi website, lots of pretty professionally done photo shoots. Models, sexy cars, apparel. You name it and we probably did it. And we did this all this in an extremely short amount of time (5 months total). We were very lucky to have some extremely talented people work with us. Dan Geily as CTO, Nabeel Khan, lead developer, and Sigouy Mo as our lead designer.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*4-nWO3pIkTkcqraNigfs_w.jpeg" /><figcaption>HiFi Design to support the Brand</figcaption></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*iUK_gdTjYdn8fr75ZMFGjQ.jpeg" /><figcaption>Usually I don’t do black bg, but this product demanded it.</figcaption></figure><p>3 months after launch, due to our aggressive marketing we were doing $60k/ net revenue month. At the time, that was more revenue than either of the other peer to peer car sharing guys were going. They had both raised $10M+, had been in business for 1-2 years each and had much bigger teams than us.</p><p>But during this time, Ali and I both were getting pretty uneasy about the fundamental business model. We had an incident where <a href="http://techcrunch.com/2012/02/27/following-thefts-luxury-car-sharing-service-higear-acquired-by-rent2buy/">4 cars got stolen. </a>But in reality that wasn’t that bad — within a month all cars were recovered (including my BMW!) and the total bill was less than $5k.</p><p>The elephant in the room was the shitty business model. We kept 30% and the owner was paid 70%. After we accounted for insurance, incidentals, user acquisition costs, we were running a negative margin business. Now in startup land, the VCs encourage this kind of practice. Its OK to lose money, and everyone thinks you’ll make it up in volume / repeat biz. That rarely ever happens. You can’t escape basic unit economics. And we felt the entire P2P car sharing space, had extremely bad unit economics. So after 3 months of having an incredible run, we decided to pull the plug. Shut down the service because we did not feel we could ever turn around the negative unit economics.</p><p><a href="http://techcrunch.com/2012/02/27/following-thefts-luxury-car-sharing-service-higear-acquired-by-rent2buy/">After TechCrunch ran the story, we were approached by Rent2Buy</a>. They had recently sold their company to Hertz and were veterans of the car rental industry. We made full disclosures of our challenges and sold Higear.com, and its assets to them.</p><p>Interestingly enough, during this process, Ali and I became friends with the founders of other car-sharing services, like GetAround, Wheelz, &amp; Relayrides. We actually told all of them why this model sucks, and they need to pivot ASAP to keep their companies alive. I think once you’ve raised $10-20M, its very hard to back to your investors and say <em>“Ooops, we were wrong. This won’t work</em>”. History will tell how this space turns out, but for now, I can safely say, our predictions on the business model were spot on. Most of these guys have either shut down, merged or pivoted the business model.</p><p>My only regret from HIGEAR is I should have had the insight (aka. balls) to do ride sharing (Uber, Lyft etc). We considered the model, but thought, <em>“Hey there is NO FREAKING WAY the city will allow that. Its soooo illegal!!”. </em>We could have been there way before UberX, Lyft etc. *sigh*. Live and learn.</p><p><strong>18 Months — 22 Product Experiments.</strong></p><p>So it was now April 2012. We had $750k in the bank (of the $1.3M raised). A a completely blank slate. So began the craziest, most creative, &amp; and downright painful period of my startup career.</p><p>I thought as you do more, it gets easier. In a way it does — you have a lot more insight and hopefully don’t repeat the same mistakes twice. People return your emails more often, its easier to raise money etc. But here is the part that doesn’t get easier. And you’re not going to have a successful company without this bit, no matter how good you are at recruiting / raising capital / selling.</p><h3>FINDING PRODUCT MARKET FIT</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/1*0fTCQTkH3kUZ1CBrfXkeLg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Product market fit is sort of like finding love. You don’t find it, it finds you. You just have to keep working hard, and hope you’re ready when it does find you. And its not absolute — you can have a product market fit for a product that will scale to $1M in revenue, and not beyond. Its truly difficult to find product market fit for some thing that will scale to $100M+ in revenue. And the problem with being a repeat entrepreneur is, $1M just isn’t exciting anymore (such ungrateful brats we are!). Its not black or white — its freaking 50 shades of gray.</p><p><strong>Here is a list of products/experiments we launched from April 2012-December 2013.</strong></p><ol><li>Corporate greeting cards</li><li>Mobile dating app - (Apple rejected it).</li><li>Hedge fund — (seriously!! looked into starting a hedge fund).</li><li>Buying existing internet companies and scaling them (looked at 30+ companies, made some offers, but didn’t close any).</li><li>5 different versions of monthly gift box subscription clubs like Shoe Dazzle — (got CPA down to $75, but weren’t excited by the biz).</li><li>HireVsNot — (ratings for biz professionals)</li><li>Jobs Newsletter — (sending daily jobs newsletters. Generated $10k/month).</li><li>BizChat on Mobile — (whatsapp but for biz. SMS invites are <em>not </em>viral. Wasted 4 months trying to learn mobile).</li><li>MangoLabs — (MOOCs for corporate training)</li><li>FabDates — (got initial traction, but kept getting our ads account banned by FB. CPA was 3x of LTV).</li><li>Numbersgame.co (dating site that is a ad network — allows you to target exactly who you’re looking for — running into same issues with FB as Fabdates).</li><li>League of Legends PRO Gaming team — VULCUN Gaming. — (started last of the league, finished #3 in North America. Became too distracting so sold it off).</li><li>Themepot.com — wordpress theme site. Got to $10k in revenue. Hard to see it scaling into a big biz so dropped it.</li><li>FB Birthday calendar app — got to a few million users. Very little re-engagement. Fizzled out.</li><li>Business productivity apps — about 7 different apps with varying levels of success. Combined users, about 3 million. Hard to scale beyond that.</li></ol><p>Part of what helped us do such rapid iterations and so many experiments, is Ali and I learned to design and code. All of the products we did post Higear, either Ali or myself did the front end development for. Nabeel &amp; Salman, being the super stars they are, did all the backend. So in total most of these experiments were run by a total team of 4. In general i’ve found, smaller the team, the more you get done.</p><p>The jury is still out on what works, whether we’ve done the right things, and how this all turns out. Think of this as a mid way report. I’m sure when I look back after this is all done, the line to success or failure will seem straight and direct. But right now, while we’re still figuring things out, its quite jumbled and messy. The path an electron takes to get from A to B — to us it seems like a straight line, but in (quantum) reality its passed through every possible path, and then arrived at point B.</p><blockquote>For now, here our our half time stats. Last month, our products received about 1.2M visitors &amp; generated sufficient revenue to keep us profitable. The search continues for product market fit for the big one.</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/960/1*dGe2tpTLPjk1dldp_1X-yA.jpeg" /><figcaption>Pacifica Surfing Trip — Dec-2013 (photo credit: Seda Balci)</figcaption></figure><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a7008c8f2c97" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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