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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Medium Legal on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Medium Legal on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by Medium Legal on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[AB 2880 — Kill (this) Bill]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/blog/ab-2880-kill-this-bill-8f7d9cbd9ac5?source=rss-3b39f7f5be5b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[copyright]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Medium Legal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jun 2016 00:10:46 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-11T15:57:25.573Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/800/1*GxJ5fQOj1oCq-TOpFmdx0A.png" /><figcaption>Image credit: <a href="https://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2016/06/02/copyright-california-how-a-new-bill-could-curtail-access-to-public-information/">The Sunlight Foundation</a></figcaption></figure><p>Fellow Californians, please join us in opposing <a href="http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVersionsCompareClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB2880">AB 2880</a>, which would allow and encourage California to extend copyright protection to works made by the state government. We think it’s a bad idea that would wind up limiting Californians’ ability to post and read government information on platforms like Medium.</p><p>On Medium, people can write at length about policy (among other things) and respond to each other. We’re proud that in the few years it’s been around, Medium has helped leaders and citizens talk with each other about matters of substance.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/u/c9d0071ccfde">The White House</a> regularly posts <a href="https://medium.com/the-white-house/asked-and-answered-a-letter-home-on-hiroshima-b33c0ec2f41b">letters</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/the-white-house/an-interview-with-author-viet-thanh-nguyen-on-his-hopes-for-u-s-vietnam-relations-38882c96e36f">interviews</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/the-white-house/day-two-in-photos-charting-a-new-course-eb745afdde4b">photo collections</a>, and <a href="https://medium.com/the-white-house/president-obamas-commencement-address-to-the-howard-university-class-of-2016-415f84d3c166">speeches</a>, including the 2015 <a href="https://medium.com/the-white-house/president-obamas-state-of-the-union-address-remarks-as-prepared-for-delivery-55f9825449b2">State of the Union address</a>, which President Obama posted before he delivered it. Former Secretary <a href="https://medium.com/u/762ff63cce75">Hillary Clinton</a> posts frequently about a range of issues from <a href="https://medium.com/hillary-for-america/the-state-of-our-infrastructure-is-an-emergency-and-an-opportunity-baa5444dcdaf">domestic infrastructure</a> to <a href="https://medium.com/hillary-for-america/my-plan-to-defeat-isis-769a7f485ace">foreign policy</a>. Senator <a href="https://medium.com/u/e8bf6bcf728a">Chuck Schumer</a> detailed the basis for <a href="https://medium.com/@SenSchumer/my-position-on-the-iran-deal-e976b2f13478">his opposition to striking a deal with Iran</a> and Senator <a href="https://medium.com/u/ebea1039dd50">Elizabeth Warren</a> analyzed <a href="https://medium.com/@SenWarren/going-to-extremes-the-supreme-court-and-senate-republicans-unprecedented-record-of-obstruction-of-c37fbf36d62a">the history of election year Supreme Court nominations</a>. The <a href="https://medium.com/u/1ab2a3ccf2a2">U.S. Trade Representative</a> released the draft of the <a href="https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership">Trans-Pacific Partnership</a> for discussion. And in the past few days, <a href="https://medium.com/u/c256e7b4d14e">Vice President Biden</a> and Senator <a href="https://medium.com/u/db7a8ceac708">John McCain</a> <a href="https://medium.com/the-white-house/on-senator-john-mccain-and-civility-ec5cb05968e1">exchanged</a> <a href="https://medium.com/@SenatorJohnMcCain/on-vice-president-joe-biden-and-civility-c9fe5235db25">views</a> about civility and leadership, inspiring others to join their conversation.</p><p>Here in California, Lieutenant Governor <a href="https://medium.com/u/69590a6d9461">Gavin Newsom</a> has written about <a href="https://medium.com/@GavinNewsom/reasonable-gun-control-4a7e28811ce1">marriage equality</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/@GavinNewsom/reasonable-gun-control-4a7e28811ce1">gun control</a>. San Francisco Board of Supervisors Member <a href="https://medium.com/u/5a2e5d91f709">Scott Wiener</a> posts on topics like <a href="https://medium.com/@Scott_Wiener/what-happens-when-we-dont-invest-in-transit-and-how-we-can-do-better-17b3caff32e2">public transit</a> and and <a href="https://medium.com/@Scott_Wiener/a-big-step-for-parental-leave-6fd989e19b49">parental leave</a>. <a href="https://medium.com/u/cb54dbe6fa12">Rep. Barbara Lee</a> posted thoughts about <a href="https://medium.com/@RepBarbaraLee/what-i-saw-in-cuba-and-you-should-see-too-d3bc30b2f8ed">Cuba</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/congressional-progressive-caucus/silicon-valley-has-a-race-problem-5d9a84f57465">Silicon Valley’s race problem</a>. <a href="https://medium.com/u/4d98b824265c">Congressman Mike Honda</a> posts about a <a href="https://medium.com/@RepMikeHonda/recommitting-ourselves-on-international-day-against-homophobia-transphobia-and-biphobia-7dbfccb7232d">range</a> of <a href="https://medium.com/@RepMikeHonda/why-brock-turner-deserves-more-than-a-hand-slap-on-the-wrist-416b5d32aed2">topics</a>. Representative <a href="https://medium.com/u/1dcf1e62b09f">Kevin McCarthy</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/u/9d525fac2040">Congressman Sam Farr</a>, Representative <a href="https://medium.com/u/f1e194d35074">Maxine Waters</a> — it goes on.</p><p>Citizens can use Medium to engage both leaders and fellow citizens in debating the details of proposed laws. <a href="https://medium.com/u/cd1ed7eaa716">POPVOX California</a> posts frequently about <a href="https://medium.com/@POPVOX_CA/caleg-update-ca-legislative-tech-innovation-caucus-names-priority-bills-a453c6228158">pending legislation</a>. <a href="https://medium.com/u/50e8305d562">Danny Sullivan</a> posted a thorough <a href="https://medium.com/@dannysullivan/open-letter-why-gov-brown-should-veto-california-s-unreasonable-unsafe-anti-drone-law-882daaeea822">evaluation of California’s proposed anti-drone law</a>, and <a href="https://medium.com/u/7853b87ecd99">Dave Maass</a> wrote a detailed <a href="https://medium.com/@maassive/an-open-letter-to-gov-jerry-brown-c1f45f3b704a">open letter to Governor Brown about CalECPA</a>. Former Governor <a href="https://medium.com/u/84ddbd9d1f22">Arnold Schwarzenegger</a> posted <a href="https://medium.com/@Schwarzenegger/let-s-build-california-s-future-e755f20de7cd">comments on SB 32 along with broader thoughts on California infrastructure and energy policy</a>.</p><p>But, our dream for Medium working with government goes even further than providing a place for leaders to publish statements and citizens to write open letters. We want it to be a place where anyone can post primary documents, like transcripts of legislative proceedings, environmental impact reports, or agency research reports, or embed content like videos of city council meetings. These primary documents can help anchor substantive debate about the details of what our government is working on.</p><p>AB 2880 would weaken the potential for these uses by putting California’s government documents under copyright by default. Posting documents like these to Medium <em>in their entirety</em> (with or without commentary) is exactly what we hope citizens will do. But AB 2880 would make anyone who does this a copyright infringer subject to potential penalties that would easily run to hundreds of thousands of dollars (leaving aside legal fees).</p><p>We want to be clear: the problem is not just whether, under this bill, a person would <em>ultimately</em> be found to infringe by posting government information. An equally big problem is the <em>chilling effects that will be created by uncertainty about what is legal to post</em>. In a world where government documents are free of copyright restriction, everyone knows they can copy and distribute them however and wherever they want. By contrast, in a world where the legality of posting a government document depends on a set of complex and subjective legal mechanisms, people will refrain from posting because they don’t want to take the risk of winding up on the wrong side of a copyright lawsuit. Large and uncertain copyright liability under the existing <a href="https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/IP/Samuelson_SDs_2013.pdf">statutory damages regime</a> would be a scary thought for anyone thinking about posting government documents online without explicit, advance permission. The regime contemplated by AB 2880 would give rise to norms of prior restraint — ask permission to post government material online or risk an expensive lawsuit — and cut off important civic conversations before they start.</p><p>Extending copyright protection to government documents bears no relation to the constitutional aim of copyright law: to promote progress by incentivizing people to write and create. Public servants need no such incentive to write the texts or film the meetings that structure and explain our state’s government. Taxpayers fund their creation because they are functionally necessary. No further incentive based on control of distribution is needed. Even worse, if extra revenue could be made by restricting distribution of a government document, it could only come at the cost of unfettered public access to it. The incompatibility between copyright incentives and government work is clearly embodied by the federal Copyright Act’s provision <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/105">explicitly declining</a> to protect works created by federal government workers. The incentives are no different for state government.</p><p>Further, this bill would create unnecessary bureaucracy. As just two examples, AB 2880 requires the state’s Department of General Services to track the copyright status of works created by the state government’s 228,000 employees, and requires every state agency to include intellectual property clauses in every single one of their contracts unless they ask the Department in advance for permission not to do so. This bureaucracy will burden, not encourage, the state’s development of material for its citizens.</p><p>In short, copyrighted government documents would restrict taxpayers’ access to the very information they’ve already paid to create. This outcome would at once distort the constitutional purpose of copyright law and undermine our state government’s admirable transparency. We ask our state leaders to consider that this bill threatens more harm to the public domain and transparency in state records than it stands to do good in other areas, and reject it.</p><p><a href="https://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2016/06/02/copyright-california-how-a-new-bill-could-curtail-access-to-public-information/">The Sunlight Foundation</a> and <a href="https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/06/growing-coalition-opposes-california-exerting-copyright-public-records">Electronic Frontier Foundation</a> have published statements analyzing and opposing the bill. The Columbia Journalism Review published <a href="http://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/california_state_copyright_bill.php">an analysis of its potential effects</a>.</p><p>Californians, if you oppose this bill, you can use <a href="https://action.eff.org/o/9042/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=10331">this handy web form</a> provided by the <a href="https://medium.com/u/2fa7aa79cd7a">Electronic Frontier</a> Foundation to tell your representative.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8f7d9cbd9ac5" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/blog/ab-2880-kill-this-bill-8f7d9cbd9ac5">AB 2880 — Kill (this) Bill</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/blog">The Medium Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Firewall With Me]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/blog/firewall-with-me-232936558361?source=rss-3b39f7f5be5b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[great-firewall]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Medium Legal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 19 Apr 2016 18:42:29 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-11T15:55:52.196Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*KUjCLn3ImtGX4YiZlyIGTg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Around April 10, we began hearing reports that Medium was blocked in China. The first evidence of a block involved WeChat. Over the following days, the various tools for testing site availability across China’s ISPs showed indications of blocking ranging from partial to full resolution failure for Medium’s web interface, both http and https. Currently, services like GreatFire.org show a more or less complete block of all posts on Medium.</p><p>We’ve heard several theories, and have a few of our own. But, we don’t know with any certainty the reason for the block. We haven’t spoken with Chinese authorities about it. If and when we have an update, we’ll let you know.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=232936558361" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/blog/firewall-with-me-232936558361">Firewall With Me</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/blog">The Medium Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Medium’s 2015 Transparency Report]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/blog/medium-s-2015-transparency-report-5c6205c48afe?source=rss-3b39f7f5be5b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[transparency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[company]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[medium]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Medium Legal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 11 Mar 2016 00:30:02 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-12T15:33:06.579Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here’s our second transparency report. It covers all takedown or information requests received in 2015, including government requests, and the actions we took in response.</p><h3>Takedown Requests</h3><p><strong>Copyright</strong></p><p>This section covers requests to take down content based on copyright infringement. They’re broken out into notices and counternotices received under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, other copyright-related grievances, posts reinstated, and accounts suspended.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/427/1*3T5bIvoDiXJQ0Rfit8uJ1w.png" /></figure><p>We review each DMCA takedown notice to make sure it includes all information required by the law. We send copies of takedown demands to the <a href="https://lumendatabase.org/">Lumen database</a> (formerly Chilling Effects), unless prohibited by law. Here’s our <a href="https://medium.com/policy/mediums-copyright-and-dmca-policy-d126f73695">copyright and DMCA policy</a>.</p><p><strong>Trademark</strong></p><p>This section covers takedown requests alleging trademark infringement.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/422/1*Xl6juQClXtEv2KIGbCRxBQ.png" /></figure><p>We review and investigate these requests and remove material where the trademark as used will likely confuse readers about its source. We don’t take down valid, legally-protected expression that includes company and product names. Here’s our <a href="https://medium.com/policy/mediums-trademark-policy-e3bb53df59a7">trademark policy</a>.</p><p><strong>Other Takedown Requests</strong></p><p>This section covers takedown requests based on violations of Medium’s <a href="https://medium.com/policy/medium-terms-of-service-9db0094a1e0f">Terms of Service</a> or <a href="https://medium.com/policy/medium-rules-30e5502c4eb4">Rules</a>, including harassment and privacy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/417/1*WPlX6fWOuUlxiud0jofEow.png" /></figure><h3>Law Enforcement Demands</h3><p>We didn’t receive any demands from law enforcement for user information in 2015.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/418/1*QF-fMJXE0Za98ztb28gunw.png" /></figure><h3>National Security Demands</h3><p>As of December 31, 2015, we received no National Security Letters or FISC orders.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/418/1*TMC9GH_HL_oImU0d5JktKw.png" /></figure><p>Here’s our <a href="https://medium.com/transparency-report">2014 transparency report</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5c6205c48afe" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/blog/medium-s-2015-transparency-report-5c6205c48afe">Medium’s 2015 Transparency Report</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/blog">The Medium Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Left to Our Own Devices]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/blog/left-to-our-own-devices-299a0115644a?source=rss-3b39f7f5be5b------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[apple-v-fbi]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[apple]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Medium Legal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 05 Mar 2016 05:33:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-11T15:52:49.251Z</atom:updated>
            <cc:license>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</cc:license>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Medium co-filed an amicus brief yesterday supporting Apple in its refusal to create custom code for the FBI that would weaken iPhone security. This brief was a joint effort with 16 other Internet companies, including <a href="https://transparency.automattic.com/2016/03/03/automattic-and-wordpress-com-stand-with-apple-to-support-digital-security/">Automattic</a>, Reddit, LinkedIn, <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/promises-matter">Kickstarter</a>, GitHub, and <a href="https://twitter.com/vijaya/status/705489178205638656">Twitter</a>. Combined, over a billion people use our products and services.</p><p><strong>What does the FBI want Apple to do?</strong></p><p>Granting the FBI’s request, the court ordered Apple to write custom code that allows the FBI to brute force open an iPhone used by San Bernardino shooter Syed Rizwan Farook.</p><p>The custom code would update the phone’s OS to do three things: (1) remove the “10 passcode attempts or everything is erased” feature; (2) remove the time lag between each attempt; and (3) allow passcode input from an external device rather than the touch screen.</p><p><strong>Why oppose this?</strong></p><p>There’s been a lot of opposition to the FBI’s request for many reasons, including fear that the code will almost certainly fall into other hands; that the government may not restrain its future use of the custom code and if it doesn’t, we won’t have any way of knowing; and, most broadly, that this precedent will provide a basis to force tech companies to undermine their own products’ security in the future. Congress held<a href="http://qz.com/629058/the-five-most-colorful-moments-from-the-apple-fbi-congressional-hearing/"> a hearing</a> on these issues last Monday.</p><p>We submitted this brief for our users. We think every single day about how to earn and keep our users’ trust — through transparency and clear language, through privacy policies that go beyond, through security, and many other ways. The government is asking Apple, and, if successful, all of us, to weaken the technical security and user trust that we work so hard to build.</p><p>We told the court that we strongly oppose a precedent under which law enforcement can have companies ordered to weaken their products’ security in ways likely to be systematic and uncontainable. We do and will continue to cooperate with law enforcement to help keep people safe by giving them information they need to investigate wrongdoing. However, we do so under well-established and more transparent ways of seeking the information, such as subpoenas.</p><p>There are more than enough inadvertent security flaws in the world. Creating them intentionally and on demand would make us all less safe.</p><p>Here’s the brief:</p><iframe src="https://cdn.embedly.com/widgets/media.html?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scribd.com%2Fembeds%2F302014025%2Fcontent&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scribd.com%2Fdoc%2F302014025%2FApple-Brief-Of-Twitter-And-Other-Web-Companies&amp;image=https%3A%2F%2Fimgv2-1-f.scribdassets.com%2Fimg%2Fdocument%2F302014025%2F111x142%2Fea785dab5c%2F1457037011&amp;key=d04bfffea46d4aeda930ec88cc64b87c&amp;type=text%2Fhtml&amp;schema=scribd" width="600" height="800" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"><a href="https://medium.com/media/9101548ad5780dcf9e49da85fafa3e73/href">https://medium.com/media/9101548ad5780dcf9e49da85fafa3e73/href</a></iframe><p>Apple has collected the <a href="http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2016/03/03Amicus-Briefs-in-Support-of-Apple.html">various amicus briefs</a> on its website including submissions from another group of <a href="http://images.apple.com/pr/pdf/Amazon_Cisco_Dropbox_Evernote_Facebook_Google_Microsoft_Mozilla_Nest_Pinterest_Slack_Snapchat_WhatsApp_and_Yahoo.pdf">tech companies</a>, civil society groups like the <a href="https://www.eff.org/files/2016/03/03/16cm10sp_eff_apple_v_fbi_amicus_court_stamped.pdf">Electronic Frontier Foundation</a>, and a group of <a href="https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/CIS%20Technologists%20Apple%20Brief%20Final.pdf">redoubtable crypto nerds</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=299a0115644a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/blog/left-to-our-own-devices-299a0115644a">Left to Our Own Devices</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/blog">The Medium Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Updates to Medium’s Terms of Service & Privacy Policy]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mediumlegal/updates-to-medium-s-terms-of-service-privacy-policy-7d1e36e67076?source=rss-3b39f7f5be5b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7d1e36e67076</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[medium]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Medium Legal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Feb 2016 01:16:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-02-27T00:38:42.184Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We’ve made some changes to our <a href="https://medium.com/policy/medium-terms-of-service-9db0094a1e0f">Terms of Service</a> and <a href="https://medium.com/policy/medium-privacy-policy-f03bf92035c9">Privacy Policy</a>. The changes will go into effect March 7, 2016.</p><p>We’ve summarized changes below. We’re also emailing all users about them.</p><p>Mainly, we’ve simplified some of the language, clarified some points in response to questions from users, and removed some parts that were unnecessary or redundant. The bedrock relationship between you and Medium won’t change. You own your content. We won’t sell it or your personal information to third parties. We respect Do Not Track. And we make it simple for you to delete your content for good if you want.</p><p><strong>Posting content. </strong>We’ve clarified the section about your rights to content you post. If you create something and post it to Medium, you own the rights, as you always have. We might use that content to promote Medium, and we might use it in connection with advertising on Medium. None of this is new. But, we’ve worked to make it clearer.</p><p><strong>Deleting content.</strong> When you delete a post, or your whole account, it is gone after 14 days (it used to be 30).</p><p><strong>Don’t break Medium. </strong>We’ve added a section listing some things you can’t do with Medium, such as spamming or scraping, manipulating our recommend system, and other ways of interfering with Medium that make the user experience worse.</p><p><strong>Third-party analytics. </strong>We want to make clear all the things we do to build user privacy into Medium, like respecting Do Not Track. We also clarify what third-party analytics we use and what tracking they do.</p><p><strong>U.S. Government-compliant Terms of Service. </strong>Some Medium users are posting on behalf of the U.S. federal government. They need government-compatible Terms. This is because the government has constraints in areas like ethics, privacy and security, accessibility, federal records, advertising and endorsements, and freedom of information. So, we added a government-compatible amendment for them.</p><p>All versions of the Terms and Privacy Policy are on <a href="https://github.com/Medium/medium-policy">GitHub</a> so you can see what’s changed. Let us know what you think at <a href="/service/mailto:%20legal@medium.com">legal@medium.com</a>.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7d1e36e67076" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Post Stays Up]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/blog/the-post-stays-up-d222e34cb7e7?source=rss-3b39f7f5be5b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/d222e34cb7e7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[malaysia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sarawak-report]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Medium Legal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 26 Jan 2016 20:25:49 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-11T15:50:06.989Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Medium Users,</p><p>As some of you have noted, Medium’s now blocked in Malaysia.</p><h3>Ikhwan on Twitter</h3><p>WTF why did they block medium com?! #Malaysia #Medium pic.twitter.com/ZAsDHxHedH</p><p>Here’s what happened.</p><p>The <a href="http://www.sarawakreport.org/">Sarawak Report’s website</a> has been <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/20/sarawak-report-whistleblowing-website-blocked-by-malaysia-over-pm-allegations">blocked in Malaysia</a> since summer 2015. They continued to reach the Malaysian public through Medium.</p><h3>Sarawak Report on Twitter</h3><p>We remain blocked in #Malaysia over our #1MDB investigations but Malaysians can access our latest story here - https://t.co/2jk9ZNyyKs</p><p>Last Wednesday, January 20, we received an email from the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/740/0*SEbYk3b71mEtFR4U." /></figure><p>The post at issue had been published on Medium by the Sarawak Report two days earlier — “<a href="https://medium.com/@sarawakreport/najib-negotiates-his-exit-but-he-wants-safe-passage-and-all-the-money-exclusive-disclosure-8d7d44343b50">Najib Negotiates His Exit BUT He Wants Safe Passage AND All The Money! EXCLUSIVE DISCLOSURE</a>.”</p><p>On January 21, we responded to the MCMC:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/459/0*3EGt3B8JZxi4UsPz." /></figure><p>We’ve received no response. The next morning, Friday January 22, Medium users in Malaysia began <a href="https://twitter.com/soulchild___/status/690569125958017024">reporting that Medium had been blocked</a> there (at least by some ISPs, including Telekom Malaysia).</p><p>Medium’s in no position to evaluate the truth of the Sarawak Report’s Medium post. We’ve received no evidence that the post violates any of our Rules, or any law. We stand by investigative journalists who publish on Medium. Until we receive an order from a court of competent jurisdiction, the post stays up.</p><p>[Update: <a href="https://www.digitalnewsasia.com/spurned-medium-mcmc-strikes-back-users-suffer">Digital News Asia’s reporting</a> includes a statement from the MCMC confirming that it instructed ISPs to block Medium.]</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=d222e34cb7e7" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/blog/the-post-stays-up-d222e34cb7e7">The Post Stays Up</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/blog">The Medium Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Gags on speech erode our users’ trust]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/blog/gags-on-speech-erode-our-users-trust-1ff7a6c5efe4?source=rss-3b39f7f5be5b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1ff7a6c5efe4</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[twitter]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[transparency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[free-speech]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Medium Legal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 18 Feb 2015 04:16:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-11T15:43:34.410Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Medium, along with the other tech companies listed below, filed this amicus brief on February 17, 2015 in support of Twitter’s opposition to the motion to dismiss its <a href="https://blog.twitter.com/2014/taking-the-fight-for-transparency-to-court">suit</a> against the Department of Justice. This suit concerns government restrictions on the right of companies to report the number of national security requests they receive. You can read more about Medium’s transparency practices <a href="https://medium.com/transparency-report/mediums-transparency-report-438fe06936ff">here</a>.</p><p>Marcia Hofmann (Cal. Bar No. 250087)<br>25 Taylor Street<br>San Francisco, CA 94102<br>Telephone: (415) 830–6664<br><a href="/service/mailto:marcia@marciahofmann.com">marcia@marciahofmann.com</a></p><p>Attorney for Amici Curiae<br>Automattic Inc.; CloudFlare, Inc.;<br>CREDO Mobile, Inc.; A Medium Corp.;<br>Sonic.net, Inc.; Wickr, Inc.;<br>and the Wikimedia Foundation</p><p>UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT<br>FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA<br>OAKLAND DIVISION</p><p>TWITTER, INC., Plaintiff, v.<br>ERIC H. HOLDER, United States Attorney General, et al., Defendants.<br>Case No. 14-cv-4480 YGR<br>BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE<br>AUTOMATTIC INC.; CLOUDFLARE,<br>INC.; A MEDIUM CORP.; SONIC.NET,<br>INC.; WICKR, INC.; AND THE<br>WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION IN<br>OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’<br>PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS<br>Date: March 31, 2015<br>Time: 2:00 p.m.<br>Courtroom 1, Fourth Floor<br>Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers</p><p><strong>STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE</strong></p><p>We are small Internet companies and communication service providers that want to be open and honest with our users and the public about the number of national security requests we receive from the government. We publish regular transparency reports that include statistics about government requests for user information, and we believe the reporting rules currently approved by the Justice Department do not allow us to tell a candid story.</p><p><a href="http://automattic.com/about/">Automattic Inc</a>. is the company behind WordPress. WordPress web publishing software powers more than 23% of the Internet — from small blogs to the websites of some of the biggest media companies in the world. Automattic has 300 employees worldwide.</p><p><a href="https://www.cloudflare.com/overview">CloudFlare, Inc</a>. offers some of the most advanced web security, distributed denial of service attack mitigation, and content delivery solutions available. CloudFlare is a community of over 2 million websites handling as much as 5 percent of global web and blocking more than 8.3 billion potentially malicious requests every day. In order to ensure the greatest possible participation in its community, CloudFlare is committed to transparency, free speech, and due process for all legal requests.</p><p><a href="http://www.credomobile.com/mission/home">CREDO Mobile, Inc</a>. is a U.S.-based telecommunications company that donates a portion of its revenue to progressive non-profits and engages in social change activism.</p><p><a href="https://medium.com/">A Medium Corporation </a>offers a publishing platform that allows anyone to easily read and share stories and ideas that matter to them. Medium has 80 employees and is based in San Francisco, California.</p><p><a href="https://www.sonic.com/about-us">Sonic.net, Inc</a>. is a regional Internet access and telecommunications provider offering competitive services in 125 California cities. Sonic provides telephone service, DSL and Gigabit fiberto-the-home Internet access, as well as custom services for businesses. Sonic has 210 employees and is based in Santa Rosa, California.</p><p><a href="https://www.wickr.com/">Wickr, Inc</a>. provides a communication platform that enables anyone in the world to communicate freely, privately and securely. Wickr’s technology was built by world-renowned encryption experts and human rights activists to protect the right to private communication and free expression around the globe. Wickr’s messaging platform processes over 4 million messages a day including text, photo, video, audio and other types of files. Users of Wickr’s mobile messaging product include law enforcement agents, journalists and human rights activists, families including young children and teens, professionals and celebrities worldwide. Transparency is critical to Wickr’s mission to build and protect the human right to privacy and free expression.</p><p><a href="https://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Home">The Wikimedia Foundation</a> is a non-profit organization based in San Francisco, California, that operates twelve free-knowledge projects on the Internet. Wikimedia’s mission is to develop and maintain “wiki”-based projects, and to provide the full contents of those projects to individuals around the world free of charge. The most well known of Wikimedia’s projects is Wikipedia — a free Internet encyclopedia that is the sixth-most visited website in the world and largest collection of shared knowledge in human history. Wikimedia has fewer than 250 employees.</p><p><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></p><p>This case is about an Internet company’s desire to be transparent about its role — or lack thereof — in national security investigations. Twitter, Inc. seeks a declaratory judgment that it has a right under the First Amendment to publish aggregate statistics about national security requests it has received from the government, and the laws and government orders restricting its ability to do so are unconstitutional and unlawful.</p><p>The outcome of this case is important for small Internet companies and communication service providers working to be transparent about their practices and provide meaningful information to the public. Reporting national security requests in the manner approved by the Justice Department obfuscates rather than illuminates the volume of national security requests a small company receives. We simply want to offer useful, accurate information and respond to the concerns of our users. Amici<br>urge the Court to deny the government’s partial motion to dismiss and proceed to the merits.</p><p><strong>BACKGROUND AND FACTS</strong></p><p>In this case, Twitter is suing the United States to establish its right to publish information about the aggregate number of national security requests the company receives from the government. Twitter filed suit after the Department of Justice denied Twitter permission to publish a transparency report in which Twitter wishes to provide aggregate numbers of national security process in smaller a bands than those currently approved by the government. Twitter also wants the freedom to report that<br>it received zero national security requests if appropriate. Twitter seeks a declaration that the government’s restrictions violate Twitter’s First Amendment rights and the Administrative Procedure Act. Compl. ¶¶ 43–44.</p><p>Twitter also challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2709 and 3511, two statutes that authorize the Federal Bureau of Investigation to issue national security letters (NSLs) in counterintelligence investigations demanding non-content information from telecommunications and Internet service providers. These letters are issued unilaterally by the Bureau without any prior judicial review, and are almost always accompanied by a non-disclosure order barring the recipient from revealing anything about the demand. Compl. ¶¶ 46–48. In fact, nondisclosure orders accompany about<br>97 percent of all NSLs issued by the FBI. <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/12/18/liberty-and-security-changing-world">Liberty and Security in a Changing World: Report and Recommendations from the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies</a> 92 (Dec. 12, 2013).</p><p>Finally, Twitter asserts that to the extent the government relies on the nondisclosure provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to prevent Twitter from publishing the aggregate number of FISA orders it receives, those provisions are unconstitutional on their face and as applied to Twitter. Compl. ¶¶ 49–50.</p><p>The government has moved to dismiss Twitter’s complaint in part, claiming 1) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review a letter from Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole to certain Internet companies explaining what national security statistics they are permitted to publish, 2) the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court should hear the challenge to FISA’s nondisclosure provisions, and 3) Twitter’s challenge to the NSL standard of review fails as a matter of law.</p><p><strong>ARGUMENT</strong></p><p>Amici urge this Court to reach the merits of this case and determine whether companies have a right to report data about national security requests. This question is crucial for all companies like amici seeking to provide accurate, useful information to their users in the aftermath of momentous public disclosures about government surveillance.</p><p>In June 2013, a National Security Agency contractor named Edward Snowden leaked a trove of agency records to the media, exposing government surveillance activities far more extensive than previously known to the public and raising profound questions about the lawfulness of those activities.</p><p>Among other revelations, the records disclosed a surveillance program known as PRISM in which the NSA taps directly into the servers of Google, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook, and several other prominent Internet companies to collect users’ emails, photos, audio and video communications, searches, connection logs, and other information. <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nineus-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-%20d970ccb04497_story.html">Barton Gellman and Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data From Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program</a>, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013; <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data">Glenn Greenwald and Ewan MacAskill, NSA PRISM Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others</a>, THE GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013.</p><p>While PRISM is intended to gather intelligence about designated foreigners abroad, the program also sweeps up the data of Americans who are communicating with those targets. The Internet companies disputed that they gave the government direct access to their servers, as the press had reported. <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-06-07/the-companies-lines-on-prism">Joshua Brustein, The Companies’ Lines on PRISM, BLOOMBERG, June 7, 2013</a>.</p><p>In the wake of the Snowden leak, several major Internet companies negotiated with the Department of Justice for the right to publicly disclose aggregate information about the national security requests they receive from the government. When these negotiations failed to yield results,<br>Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Yahoo!, and LinkedIn filed suit in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court seeking to establish that they have a First Amendment right to publish basic aggregate data about the FISA orders they receive. See Ryan Gallagher, <a href="http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/10/yahoo_google_facebook_microsoft_fight_for_permission_to_release_data_about.html">Tech Giants United in Court to Fight Against<br>Government Surveillance Secrecy</a>, SLATE, Sept. 10, 2013.</p><p>The case settled when those companies reached an agreement with the Justice Department permitting them to report national security requests in two different ways. <a href="http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/366201412716018407143.pdf">Letter From James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, to General Counsels of Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft, and Yahoo</a>, Jan. 27, 2014.5</p><p>The first option is to report numbers of NSLs, customer accounts affected by NSLs, FISA orders for content, FISA orders for non-content, and customer selectors targeted by each type of FISA order as separate categories in bands of 1000, beginning with 0 (i.e., 0–999). Id. at 2–3.</p><p>Alternatively, the companies could choose to report the total number of all national security requests received, and the total number of customer selectors targeted by all national security process, in bands of 250, beginning with 0 (i.e., 0–249). Id. at 3. The government apparently takes the position that these restrictions apply not only to the parties to the agreement, but more broadly to other companies, as well. Compl. ¶¶ 35–40.</p><p>The current Justice Department framework makes it impossible for small companies like amici to paint a truthful picture of what we see. The negotiated solution may work well for large companies that receive a high number of national security requests. But the bands are simply too wide for us to give our users any useful sense of the volume of national security requests we may receive. Under the Justice Department’s rules, it does not matter if the number is zero, one, or 100, because the figures will always be the same: 0–249 or 0–999.</p><p>Compare these permitted ranges to the number of regular law enforcement requests that amici can report with specificity. For example, between July 1 and December 31, 2013, <a href="http://transparency.automattic.com/information-requests-2013-h2/">Automattic</a> received 36 non-national security requests for user information from all law enforcement authorities worldwide (including all federal and state authorities). <a href="https://www.cloudflare.com/transparency2013">CloudFlare</a> received 50 non-national security requests from law enforcement throughout the United States during 2013.</p><p>Both companies detailed the number and type of these requests in their transparency reports — but reported that they received 0–249 national security requests for the same period, even though the high end of the permitted range is several times the number of all law enforcement requests each company received. Did these companies receive no national security requests? A handful? A couple hundred? According to the Justice Department, they are not allowed to say — which leaves their users with more questions than answers when it comes to this highly sensitive and controversial category of request. Reporting this way creates speculation about the level of government interest in a service, which invariably leads to<br>suspicion and lack of trust from users and the public.</p><p>This reporting framework is a poor fit for companies like ours, and the erosion of trust it causes has a very real, negative impact on our businesses. Users of online platforms and communications services are more sensitive than ever to disclosures of their data to governments, and there is a strong desire for truthful, accurate information about government interest in our users’ data (or lack thereof). This is especially true for our many users outside the United States, who may decide to use competing services based abroad if we lose their confidence. See generally Danielle Kehl, <a href="http://oti.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf">New<br>America’s Open Technology Institute, Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy</a>, Internet Freedom &amp; Cybersecurity 7–19 (July 2014) (discussing the negative economic impact of the surveillance revelations on American businesses, both domestically and internationally).</p><p>We just want to speak truthfully, address the legitimate concerns of our users, and provide useful information to the public. We urge the Court to deny the government’s partial motion to dismiss and proceed to the merits. This case raises a basic question that is not resolved by the Justice<br>Department’s framework: to what extent do companies have a right to report data about national security requests? Amici believe that there is no basis in law or policy for the government to prohibit recipients from disclosing the mere fact that they have or have not received a national security request and from publishing an accurate account of that statistic. We hope the Court will address this question to provide legal certainty for all service providers, large and small, seeking to be upfront with their<br>users.</p><p><strong>CONCLUSION</strong></p><p>Amici respectfully request that this Court deny the government’s partial motion to dismiss and reach the merits of the case.</p><p>DATED: February 17, 2015</p><p>Respectfully submitted,<br>/s/ Marcia Hofmann<br>Marcia Hofmann</p><p>25 Taylor Street<br>San Francisco, CA 94102<br><a href="/service/mailto:marcia@marciahofmann.com">marcia@marciahofmann.com</a><br>Telephone: (415) 830–6664</p><p>Attorney for Amici Curiae<br>Automattic Inc.; CloudFlare, Inc.;<br>CREDO Mobile, Inc.; A Medium Corp.;<br>Sonic.net, Inc.; Wickr, Inc.;<br>and the Wikimedia Foundation</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ff7a6c5efe4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/blog/gags-on-speech-erode-our-users-trust-1ff7a6c5efe4">Gags on speech erode our users’ trust</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/blog">The Medium Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Privacy & Security at Medium]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/blog/privacy-security-at-medium-f9c0a26c257b?source=rss-3b39f7f5be5b------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/f9c0a26c257b</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[legal]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Medium Legal]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2014 00:27:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2016-08-15T23:02:44.093Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is a questionnaire Medium sends to third party service providers before we work with them to ensure their data collection, storage, and security practices are consistent with our standards. We’re putting this in the public domain under Creative Commons license </em><a href="http://creativecommons.org/about/cc0"><em>cc0</em></a><em> with no rights reserved — feel free to copy, modify, or use within your own organizations.</em></p><h2>Privacy &amp; Security at Medium</h2><h3>Questionnaire for Technology Service Providers</h3><p>At Medium, protecting our users’ privacy and the security of their data is among our highest priorities. Occasionally, we work with technology service providers that may differ from us in their data collection, storage, and security policies. Before implementing any code from these providers, we seek to understand their approach to these issues and their practices around requesting and sharing data with third-parties.</p><p>If you’re reading this, we’re closely considering adding you to the very short list of service providers we work with. Please take the time to answer the questions below and submit them to <strong><em>privacy@medium.com.</em></strong></p><h4>Data Collection</h4><ol><li>Does your service require a tracking script? If so, please detail all data that it tracks, any endpoints it hits, and any sub-resources it loads.</li><li>Does your service drop a cookie? If so, please specify whether it is a persistent or session cookie, and detail all data that it tracks.</li><li>Does your service use other methods to track or identify users (for example, HTML5 local storage or Flash local shared objects)? Please detail all data your service tracks using these methods.</li><li>Does your service provide an API that can substitute for implementing a tracking script and/or cookie? If so, please provide documentation for using the API in this way.</li><li>Does your service supplement data collected online with offline data sources? If so, which offline data sources?</li><li>Does your service correlate activity across multiple websites, or allow third parties to do so?</li><li>Does your service comply with users’ <a href="https://www.eff.org/dnt-policy">Do-Not-Track</a> settings?</li></ol><h4>Data Storage</h4><ol><li>Does your service store non-aggregate data about users?</li><li>Does your service store private or personally identifying individual user data?</li><li>Does your service delete or anonymize private or personally identifying individual user data after it is stored for a certain amount of time? If so, when? If the data is anonymized, how is that done?</li><li>How long do you keep logs containing user data?</li><li>Will all data about our users be deleted (including from logs) if we stop using your services?</li></ol><h4>Data Security</h4><ol><li>Does your service use SSL/TLS by default to transfer data securely? If not, does your service support SSL/TLS so that users can opt to transfer data securely?</li><li>Does your service encrypt private or personally identifying individual user data at rest on its servers?</li><li>Have you ever had any significant security breaches? Please specify when the service’s last professional security audit was conducted.</li></ol><h4>Third-Party Services</h4><ol><li>Does your service send out requests to any third-party hosts?</li><li>For each host that needs to be CSP whitelisted, please specify whether the content is loaded via XHR, scripts/tags, or iframes.</li><li>Does your service inject an iframe? If so, what does it load?</li><li>Does your service pull in any third-party tracking pixels, such as DFA or Facebook’s conversion tracking pixel?</li></ol><h4>Commercial Use</h4><ol><li>Do you use customer data to promote your business through advertisements?</li><li>Do you sell customer behavior/information to third parties for marketing?</li></ol><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=f9c0a26c257b" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/blog/privacy-security-at-medium-f9c0a26c257b">Privacy &amp; Security at Medium</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/blog">The Medium Blog</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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