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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Mehdi Alouache on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Mehdi Alouache on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@mehdi.alouache?source=rss-e1ec8b05b2ed------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Mehdi Alouache on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mehdi.alouache?source=rss-e1ec8b05b2ed------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Stormshield SNS cleartext password leak]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mehdi.alouache/stormshield-sns-cleartext-password-leak-b436ef312fe9?source=rss-e1ec8b05b2ed------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b436ef312fe9</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[firewall]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[leaked]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[passwords]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mehdi Alouache]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 07 Nov 2022 08:14:12 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2022-11-07T12:46:29.644Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/972/1*__PiYxBd7oUtzQz752ET2g.png" /></figure><p><em>Foreword : the issue was privately disclosed to Stormshield. It is in their eyes a minor inconvenience but are not willing to address this as a vulnerability. Tested on SNS 4.3.7.</em></p><p>I stumbled on a very surprising behaviour on a <a href="https://www.stormshield.com/fr/produits-et-services/produits/protection-des-reseaux/">Stormshield SNS login page</a>.</p><p>When using Stormshield SSO modules, a user might want to login in order to get access to the company internal resources.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bUv7VycmqGIGKr3w_Qef3A.png" /><figcaption>Stormshield SNS login page</figcaption></figure><p>Several authentication methods are supported, such as LDAP(S) or SSL authentication for example. There is even a fallback mode : if the authentication is failing or timing out on method 1, SNS would try to authenticate on method 2, then method 3, etc…</p><p>And this is where things start to become annoying. Let’s take the following scenario :</p><ul><li>Authentication method 1 is LDAP(S)</li><li>Authentication method 2 is SSL certificate</li></ul><p>User tries to authenticate, so SNS starts to authenticate with method 1 using a POST request.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/682/1*g3Zoy5OwwBkCbDKr6hw8SQ.png" /><figcaption>A standard POST authentication request from SNS</figcaption></figure><p>If this method fails, the SNS will try to authenticate with the second method. And because SNS isn’t able to chain POST requests, it then switches to a GET request, <strong>containing both username and user password in cleartext.</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/862/1*VN8aVOt1r3-l7U4f92o6Zg.png" /><figcaption>Failover GET authentication request with credentials in cleartext.</figcaption></figure><h3>How can this be a security issue ?</h3><p>If properly setup, the HTTP requests are encrypted with SSL/TLS and thus are not vulnerable to a sniffing attack. However, the GET request with the plaintext credentials can be found in two places :</p><ul><li>In the user’s browser history</li><li>In your SIEM/EDR if you have TLS interception enabled</li></ul><h3>Additional details</h3><p>The failover authentication only triggers if the first method fails. Reasons for the failure :</p><ul><li>Service timeout (can happen, but low probability)</li><li>User types the wrong password</li></ul><p><em>But if it triggers when he types the wrong password, how can this be a security concern ?</em></p><p>Well, usually there is 2 reasons to type the wrong password :</p><ul><li>User did a typo (so the input is just 1 character inaccurate, easy to guess the real one)</li><li>User typed an old password or password from another application — and even if this is not his current domain password, this is still an entry point for a lateral movement.</li></ul><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b436ef312fe9" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Partially disable Cybereason EDR as low privileges user on Windows]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mehdi.alouache/partially-disable-cybereason-edr-as-low-privileges-user-on-windows-1405fd53e90e?source=rss-e1ec8b05b2ed------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1405fd53e90e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[edr]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybereason]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[xdr]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mehdi Alouache]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Oct 2022 15:04:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2023-12-06T12:42:46.561Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/0*fNNXqIYOjZ3QvvzG.jpeg" /></figure><p><strong>Update on December 6th, 2022</strong> : Cybereason investigated and wanted to exercise their right to answer. They noticed <strong>anti-tampering</strong> was not enabled on my test tenant, so they activated it. Since then, it is not possible to kill any probes except NNX.exe, which doesn’t seem related to detection capabilities, but only needed for less important features.</p><p>EDR — Endpoint Detection &amp; Response — has been a trending topic in cybersecurity since the last decade. Among the biggest players of this industry sits Cybereason, <a href="https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-excels-in-the-2022-mitre-attck-evaluations-100-prevention-visibility-and-real-time-protection">top performer of the MITRE ATT&amp;CK evaluation of 2022</a>, making it a good candidate for your security posture.</p><p>However, from an attacker point of view, how can you get rid of some of its detection capabilities ? Let’s see…</p><p><em>This article is not meant to bash on Cybereason. However, they do not offer any kind of public bug bounty program, so I felt free to write a short article here about what seems to be a flaw in the repair mechanism of the solution.</em></p><p><em>Please note I don’t have the full details of the roles of each loader and probe, as those details belong to Cybereason. Some parts of the presentation may be inaccurate.</em></p><p>Cybereason, and all EDR solutions in an extent, are designed to be unalterable. As attackers, we all have faced a pentest where we were able to remotely disable a classical antimalware (such as Defender) with a PsExec invocation as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. However this kind of method will not be useful agaisnt Cybereason, <strong>because nothing can uninstall or (permanently) disable Cybereason except Cybereason itself</strong>.</p><p><strong>That being said, can we politely ask Cybereason to disable itself ?</strong></p><h3>Cyberason probes</h3><p>Depending on the actives modules running, a number of different processes can be spawned by Cybereason, acting as probes to detect and prevent some threats.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/752/1*0ae9iE2RYjCKlB0d6170iQ.png" /></figure><p>In red, what I believe to be the initial loader. The CrAmTray.exe process is run is each user context, probably the GUI part of Cybereason.</p><p>In blue, some of the probes responsible for detection and or prevention. These are our target.</p><h3>Killing some probes</h3><p>As mentioned before :</p><blockquote>nothing can uninstall or (permanently) disable Cybereason except Cybereason itself</blockquote><p>Like many other Windows programs, Cybereason offers a GUI to repair itself or uninstall itself. The uninstallation requires a token to guarantee only an EDR administrator can remove it. But anyone can run the repair part.</p><p>Let’s run it.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/970/1*suPupv1bBy_RFR3s8P6Y_A.png" /></figure><p>In Windows application manager, select “Modify” on Cybereason</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/641/1*mSjKVTmcCPV730m7gzfzWw.png" /><figcaption>“Do you want to authorize this application to modify settings on your device ?”</figcaption></figure><p>Agree on running Cybereason.exe /modify</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/700/1*eD4BhjFjaLUn_ES4w_4-9g.png" /></figure><p>Run a Repair.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/698/1*-7rKi6GanRRVeDLTE6rsJg.png" /></figure><p>It will run until it waits for a while at “stopPylumLoader”. PylumLoader seems to be the loader for every other service.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/594/1*qharlBpY4B9Beb7-gI3HSg.png" /><figcaption>Kill Task</figcaption></figure><p>As soon as the stopPylumLoader phase ends, kill all Cybereason Sensor processes manually.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/704/1*K3Hvp5JdsMeJlwfaGOt1fQ.png" /></figure><p>Agent repaired failed, displaying this error. But let’s now give a look to the probes…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/948/1*AzGmIKqSWEEvV31-fhqs0g.png" /></figure><p>Some of them failed to restart after PylumLoader got killed improperly. The lime green bar displays a process still running, while the dark greens indicates the process was stopped. No other instance of those processes could be found, <strong>which means probes actually got stopped and couldn’t restart</strong>.</p><p>Ony the CrsSvc.exe service was able to stay alive during the manipulation.</p><h3>Final words</h3><p>The number of probes running depend of the modules activated. When all of them were running, this manipulation only disabled around 50% of them. I am not certain to be able to determine what they do, like for instance “NNX.exe”. Some are easier to guess, such as Execution Prevention Service.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1405fd53e90e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Pulse Secure version number disclosure in error messages]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mehdi.alouache/pulse-secure-version-number-disclosure-in-error-messages-143aa76c90cd?source=rss-e1ec8b05b2ed------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/143aa76c90cd</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[pentesting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pulse]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pulse-secure]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[owasp]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mehdi Alouache]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Oct 2021 08:41:58 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-12T08:43:14.730Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/920/0*ohhoLtK7ax79wYX-.jpg" /></figure><p><em>This article is a re-publication of something I wrote 5 months back, as I am merging my content on medium.com</em></p><p>As mentioned by OWASP, errors should be properly handled in order to ensure internal logic and additional information are not exposed in case of error message display : <a href="https://owasp.org/www-community/Improper_Error_Handling">https://owasp.org/www-community/Improper_Error_Handling</a></p><p>All versions* of Pulse Secure Network Connect are affected by an Information Disclosure issue allowing an attacker to detect the version of the last patch applied, without being authenticated. The issue was reported to Pulse Secure by official way on HackerOne but the bounty was denied.</p><p>Version disclosure makes it easier to find the proper exploit to run on the Pulse Secure appliances.</p><p>*All versions to the date of publication of the article, May 2021</p><h3>Identify Pulse Secure appliances in the wild</h3><p>Pulse secure appliances can be spotted by using a simple Google dork :</p><blockquote><em>inurl:”dana-na”</em></blockquote><p><em>This is not an attempt to make you think about Manau</em></p><h3>Fingerprint Pulse Secure Network Connect version</h3><p>The version is disclosed is HTML comments if you trigger an error on an authentication page.</p><p>I wrote a script to get the result : <a href="https://github.com/MedAlch/pulse-fingerprint">https://github.com/MedAlch/pulse-fingerprint</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=143aa76c90cd" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[ESET Endpoint Security credentials theft]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mehdi.alouache/eset-endpoint-security-credentials-theft-90082dfdf474?source=rss-e1ec8b05b2ed------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/90082dfdf474</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[eset]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pentesting]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[red-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[eset-nod32-antivirus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[vulnerability]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Mehdi Alouache]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Oct 2021 08:20:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-12T08:20:00.459Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The title should have been <em>Improper check of definitions updates in ESET Endpoint security leads to enterprise credentials theft</em>, but this seemed a bit long, isn’t it ?</p><p>I submitted what I believe to be a vulnerability in a confidential report to ESET first, but finally received an answer mentioning this was not eligible for a bug bounty.</p><p>A vulnerability leveraging quite similar behaviours was reported back on 2016 on a different perimeter : <a href="https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9892/">https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9892/</a></p><h3>TL;DR</h3><p>The vulnerability reported here allows an attacker who has a foothold in an organization using ESET to passively steal the ESET license as well as ESET License Administrator credentials (<a href="https://ela.eset.com/LicenseOwner/Converter">https://ela.eset.com/LicenseOwner/Converter</a>)</p><h3>Presentation</h3><p>The test was conducted on a Windows 10 21h1 computer, running a ESET Endpoint Security 7.32.2041.0</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/617/1*geH4SZ-H9oO58U8zF1eRJg.png" /></figure><p>At the moment, I have all the reasons to believe this behaviour can be reproduced against any version of ESET Endpoint Security.</p><p>During a security audit of an internal infrastructure, I was trying to hijack DNS traffic through a rogue IPv6 DNS beside Responder waiting for some employees to log-in somewhere. However, what happened was one instance of ESET Endpoint Security on the network tried to update its database by contacting pico.eset.com, sending me some <strong>plain-text credentials</strong>. The site seems to have an SSL certificate with an invalid Common Name (update.eset.com instead of pico.eset.com).</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*J7HQu3_Jr57o6FoRNr5ZAA.png" /></figure><p>Take note in the meantime that this website seems to be accessible as well on plain-text HTTP. I believe it to be an issue in itself.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/795/1*c6nQFVsirrbgUU0swq0JzA.png" /><figcaption>nmap scan of pico.eset.com showing http support</figcaption></figure><p>For the following, I have not been able to determine if I was able to capture the credentials because ESET tried to connect to pico.eset.com on port 80 or if it tried port 443 and did not perform a TLS/SSL check before, leading to the MITM attack success.<br>When presented a basic auth form by Responder following the DNS IPv6 spoofing, ESET sent the plaintext credentials with the username of the syntax “EAV-XXXXXXXXXX” as well as the password.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/558/1*W2urwVqIlC7GMh98qkWSFw.png" /></figure><p>These credentials can be reused to manually on the License Manager URL available here: <a href="https://ela.eset.com/LicenseOwner/Converter">https://ela.eset.com/LicenseOwner/Converter</a>. Then, licenses can be generated as follows:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/625/1*BBuqYzZv4sPkPLWeL67pvw.png" /><figcaption>“Use this license key to active ESET products”</figcaption></figure><h3>Summary</h3><p><strong>Prerequisites</strong><br>- A computer in the same network than your target on which you have administrator rights to use tools such as Responder or Wireshark<br>- Nothing else (but it is easier if your target responds to Netbios/LLMNR or has no static IPv6 DNS setup, otherwise a simple packet sniffer could do the job).<br><strong>Impact</strong><br>The target (individual or company) will get its licensing information stolen and the attacker can issue licenses for himself. Perhaps is there some other usage for the credentials that I didn’t identify yet. No impact for ESET company, only an impact for customers ==&gt; Additional costs on the licenses or licenses expiration by over-usage.<br><strong>Easiness<br></strong>Definitely not rocket science…</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=90082dfdf474" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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