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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by metanetwebhosting security on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by metanetwebhosting security on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@metanetwebhostingsecurity?source=rss-c9b37831a347------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by metanetwebhosting security on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@metanetwebhostingsecurity?source=rss-c9b37831a347------2</link>
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            <title><![CDATA[Testing Dating Apps: Security Findings from Our Research]]></title>
            <link>https://metanetwebhostingsecurity.medium.com/testing-dating-apps-security-findings-from-our-research-58b88a423271?source=rss-c9b37831a347------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/58b88a423271</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[metanetwebhosting security]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 05 Jan 2026 05:55:23 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-01-05T05:55:23.371Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*2wT0s8gvcZTY2ErqQhBbVA.png" /></figure><p>This research began as a focused security assessment conducted by our cybersecurity team. All vulnerabilities described in this post were responsibly disclosed to the respective organizations prior to publication.</p><p>To evaluate the security posture of modern dating platforms, our team tested over 20 popular dating applications. We intercepted and analyzed application network traffic to understand how user data was transmitted, processed and protected between client applications and backend servers.</p><p>One of the first observations was that most applications did not implement SSL pinning. In cases where SSL pinning was present on mobile clients, equivalent functionality was often exposed through a web version of the platform. As a result, security testing could be performed directly against web endpoints without requiring SSL pinning bypass techniques.</p><p>Below are some of the most common and impactful vulnerabilities identified during our assessment.</p><h3>Vulnerability 1: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)</h3><p>IDOR vulnerabilities were the <strong>most prevalent issue</strong> identified across the tested applications.</p><p>In multiple cases, modifying a userId parameter in API requests allowed unauthorized access to other users’ private data, including:</p><ul><li>Viewing private messages belonging to other users</li><li>Accessing restricted profile information</li></ul><p>In one application, the impact was significantly higher. By changing the userId value, it was possible to <strong>modify another user’s profile</strong>, including personal details and profile content.</p><p>Additionally, several platforms allowed message requests to be sent on behalf of other users, enabling <strong>account impersonation</strong>. This type of vulnerability could easily be abused for fraud, harassment or social engineering attacks, making it a <strong>high-risk security issue</strong>.</p><h3>Vulnerability 2: Bypassing Premium Features and Payments</h3><p>Several applications exhibited weak enforcement of premium features and subscription logic.</p><p>A common issue involved bypassing daily usage limits. By adjusting the device time to a future date, users were able to continue sending “likes” or “matches” even after exceeding the allowed daily quota.</p><p>In other cases, premium subscriptions could be bypassed through <strong>parameter tampering</strong> during the payment process. By modifying the amount parameter sent to the backend, users could pay significantly less than the intended subscription price—sometimes as little as <strong>$1</strong>—while still receiving full premium access.</p><p>These findings indicate insufficient <strong>server-side validation</strong> of both time-based restrictions and payment values.</p><h3>Vulnerability 3: Caching Issues and Deleted Content Exposure</h3><p>Several applications suffered from caching misconfigurations that impacted user privacy.</p><p>Even after users deleted their profile pictures, the images remained accessible if an attacker possessed the direct image URL. This allowed previously deleted content to be viewed without authentication.</p><p>From a privacy and compliance perspective, this issue is particularly concerning for dating platforms, where users reasonably expect deleted personal content to be permanently removed.</p><h3>Vulnerability 4: Denial of Service via XSS Payloads</h3><p>In one application, our team identified a Denial of Service–like condition caused by improper input handling.</p><p>By sending specially crafted XSS payloads via the messaging feature, it was possible to disrupt message rendering for the recipient. As a result, affected users were unable to access their messages, effectively locking them out of their inbox.</p><p>While this issue did not impact the platform globally, it allowed a malicious user to <strong>significantly degrade another user’s experience</strong> with minimal effort.</p><h3>Vulnerability 5: Account Deletion and Session Management Issues</h3><p>During our testing, we identified multiple applications that did not correctly handle <strong>account deletion</strong> and <strong>session invalidation</strong>.</p><p>In several cases, after a user initiated account deletion through the application, the backend continued to treat the account as active. Using previously captured API requests, it was still possible to:</p><ul><li>Send and receive messages</li><li>Edit profile information</li><li>Interact with other users</li></ul><p>This indicates that account deletion was not fully enforced at the backend level and that user records or authorization states remained active even after deletion.</p><p>Additionally, we observed <strong>improper session invalidation</strong> during logout events. Logging out of the application did not invalidate existing authentication tokens or sessions. As a result, previously issued API tokens remained valid and could still be used to access authenticated endpoints.</p><p>From a security perspective, these issues increase the risk of:</p><ul><li>Unauthorized access if a device is lost or compromised</li><li>Continued abuse of accounts assumed to be deleted</li><li>Violations of privacy expectations and data protection regulations</li></ul><p><strong>Final Thoughts</strong></p><p>Across multiple dating platforms, we observed recurring security weaknesses, including:</p><ul><li>Missing or insufficient authorization checks</li><li>Weak server-side validation</li></ul><p>Given the sensitive personal and private data processed by dating applications, these vulnerabilities pose serious risks to user privacy and platform trust.</p><p>All findings were responsibly disclosed, and this research is shared to raise awareness and encourage stronger security practices across the industry.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=58b88a423271" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Jira Misconfiguration Leading to Unauthorized Access]]></title>
            <link>https://metanetwebhostingsecurity.medium.com/jira-misconfiguration-leading-to-unauthorized-access-69d32ab5a5c7?source=rss-c9b37831a347------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/69d32ab5a5c7</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cyber-security-awareness]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[metanetwebhosting security]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Feb 2025 12:05:45 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2025-02-10T12:05:45.333Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At Metanet,our security research team regularly hunts for vulnerabilities in widely used software platforms to help organizations secure their environments. During a recent assessment, we uncovered a significant misconfiguration in Atlassian Jira, a popular project management tool used by organizations worldwide. This vulnerability exposes users to unauthorized access, potentially allowing attackers to gain administrative privileges and manipulate company data.We have succesfully found misconfigurations in popular platforms such as firebase,keycloak,drupal in the past.In this case we had jira on our radar as we had seen some instances in our bug bounty programs.</p><p>In this blog post, we’ll walk through how we identified this vulnerability, its potential impact, and recommendations for mitigating the issue.</p><p>We took a look at our favorite bug bounty program that had hosted jira at https://company.atlassian.net</p><p>while looking at the login flow,we noticed it had options to login with google,Miscrosoft,Apple,Slack.These third party authentication providers usually have misconfigurations. In this case it was on google.</p><p>While logging in with google we could get valid emails with a username wordlist and bruteforcing. no rate limiting was configured.</p><p>As this cannot be reported to bug bounty programs we decided to dig deeper.</p><p>while signing in and capturing requests with burpsuite we noticed is “ssoTest”:false as an body request endpoint</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0I8WsASq9iEhGnKp3hqC5A.png" /></figure><p>we changed the “ssoTest”:false to “ssoTest”:true and it replied with 400 error,meaning we have wrong email.</p><p>we know we can find employees emails with a wordlist.using a username wordlist and appending to @Company.com. valid ssoTest emails were found by filtering for 200 OK responses.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7TDCHAnBMNdSwlVCov29Iw.png" /></figure><p>With the test emails,we tried logging in to the jira instance</p><p>The first email did not work so tried the second email and behold we got “you logged in with your google account before”.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*7VlTPllI4C--TGpH7of_BQ.png" /></figure><p>with that email we got full jira access as company’s employee with administrator access.we could assign ,edit and delete projects.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*YPvYcpEOdHR2-bZD5yZJzA.png" /></figure><h4>Mitigation:</h4><p>To prevent this type of misconfiguration, it is recommended to:</p><ul><li>Implement rate-limiting on login attempts to prevent brute-force and enumeration attacks.</li><li>Secure the authentication flow by ensuring that test configurations like ssoTest are not accessible in production environments.</li></ul><h4>Conclusion:</h4><p>This vulnerability highlights a <strong>critical misconfiguration</strong> in Jira’s authentication system, specifically with third-party providers like Google. The issue was successfully reported to the bug bounty program, and rewarded as critical. The same technique was tested on other Jira instances, confirming the potential for widespread exploitation.</p><p>It is crucial for organizations using Jira to review their authentication mechanisms and ensure proper safeguards are in place to prevent similar vulnerabilities.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=69d32ab5a5c7" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Securing Crypto Company: Addressing Web 2.0 Vulnerabilities]]></title>
            <link>https://metanetwebhostingsecurity.medium.com/securing-crypto-company-addressing-web-2-0-vulnerabilities-209bd7fc3d85?source=rss-c9b37831a347------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/209bd7fc3d85</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty-tips]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[bug-bounty]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[metanetwebhosting security]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sat, 13 Jul 2024 07:54:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-07-13T07:55:52.379Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At Metanet Security, we emphasize the critical importance of robust security measures, especially in the high-stakes environment of cryptocurrency startups. Recently, our team encountered a scenario involving a crypto company, where vulnerabilities posed significant risks to user data and operational integrity. Let’s delve into the details and the crucial lessons learned.</p><p><strong>Vulnerabilities</strong></p><p>The journey began with a routine search for bug bounty programs on X(formely twitter), where a newly launched cryptocurrency startup caught our attention.The message was a few minutes old. Their program promised $5,000+ rewards for identifying critical vulnerabilities on their infrastructure.<br>This prompted our immediate investigation.</p><p><strong>Vulnerability 1: Information Disclosure</strong></p><p>while resetting password, a high severity flaw was uncovered in the API endpoint /api/xstc-auth/app-api/v2/auth/getUserInfo. This endpoint, designed to retrieve user information , was accessible without any authentication. Such oversight allowed unauthorized access to sensitive details like user UserID, mobile numbers,avatar,nickName,,isRealName,mobileAuth merely by inputting an email address. This exposed users to potential identity theft and other malicious activities.<br>This can be used to leak user details if an email is known.using no rate limiting issue we reported to the company and other OSINT or recon techniques we could get users emails.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jf_DVSQ0BeAuXWfZWamHFw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Recommendation:</strong></p><p>We advised the company to implement stringent authentication controls and ensure that endpoints return generic errors rather than divulge user-specific details.</p><p><strong>Vulnerability 2: Blind XSS</strong></p><p>Further investigation revealed a blind XSS vulnerability associated with user profile pictures api endpoint /api/xstc-user/app-api/v1/upload hosted on an AWS bucket.<br><a href="https://companyname-res.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/img/ImageID.jpeg">https://companyname-res.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/img/ImageID.jpeg</a><br>We tried uploading a html file to see how it was handled.luckily,there was no protection in place so we uploaded html code</p><p>&lt;b&gt;hello&lt;/b&gt; and got html injection.</p><p>we than tried blind xss payload as profile picture with .html extension. blind XSS attack successfully executed. <br> <a href="https://companyname-res.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/img/ImageID.html">https://companyname-res.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/img/ImageID.html</a></p><p>We used xss hunter to receive the pingback from the blind xss payload.<br>visiting our profile link enabled us to retrieve session cookies and IP addresses of logged-in users, compromising their accounts and potentially exposing their sensitive data.<br>as they had crypto airdrops and engaged their customers on discord,we could post the link on the discord and get active users data.</p><p>The upload KYC endpoint /api/xstc-user/usersSecurity/kycsubmit was also vulnerable. we could upload blind xss payload link as the backIdphoto and frontIDphoto and gain employee’s cookies who received our payload.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*94Fhmq59PqXGpPExkp_o_A.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*d8_wvkYPCAFsZjxxO8-jaQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8kkjvMEl80KRjvvCIz4ESw.png" /></figure><p><strong>Recommendation:</strong></p><p>We recommended implementing strict file validation checks and content security policies to prevent such attacks.</p><p><strong>Vulnerability 3: Lack of Rate Limiting</strong></p><p>The discovery of insufficient rate limiting on the API endpoint /api/xstc-user/send/loginSendSmsCode highlighted another issue. This oversight allowed attackers to systematically brute-force email addresses associated with user accounts, potentially extracting user information.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*H1ztP-m-xjkFVbwf8YhjUg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*TY0H9_3q6xqbFGE7ZzF8kQ.png" /></figure><p>We urged the company to enforce rate limiting on sensitive endpoints to mitigate brute-force attacks effectively.</p><p><strong>Vulnerability 4: CORS Misconfiguration</strong></p><p>A misconfiguration in CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing) settings posed yet another security risk. By manipulating the Origin header, we demonstrated how an attacker could force the server to respond with sensitive user information, potentially exposing account details to unauthorized domains.<br>The issue was site-wide.<br>origin header value was reflected in the response header.in our case we changed Origin: <a href="https://companyname.com/">https://companyname.com</a> to Origin: <a href="https://evil.com/">https://evil.com</a><br>and <a href="https://evil.com/">https://evil.com</a> was reflected on the response header<br>In our case we used the endpoint /api/xstc-user/userSecurity/accountSecurityInfo ,that retrieves user sensitive information such as account name,nickname,email,userID<br><strong>impact</strong><br>we could steal user’s sessions, some personal information as the site’s cors specifies the header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true</p><p><strong>Recommendation:</strong></p><p>We advised implementing strict CORS policies, including whitelisting trusted domains, to prevent unauthorized access and data exposure.</p><p><strong>Company Response</strong></p><p>Following the responsible disclosure of these vulnerabilities, the company responded the same day urging us to be patient as they evaluate the vulnerabilities.<br>After a week,the bounty payout offered was minimal and Despite discussions regarding the severity and potential impact of these vulnerabilities for them to raise the bounty amount they declined to raise the bounty amount.<br>This indicated the possible discrepancies in their assessment of risk and we decided to move on.</p><p>The vulnerabilities were fixed in the same month.</p><p><strong>Lesson Learned</strong></p><p>This experience underscores the importance of vigilance and comprehensive security testing in safeguarding cryptocurrency platforms. At Metanet Security, we remain committed to enhancing cybersecurity protocols and mitigating risks to protect both businesses and their users from evolving threats.</p><p>In conclusion, while challenges like these highlight vulnerabilities in crypto companies’ security postures, they also serve as opportunities for improvement and reinforcement of robust defense mechanisms. Stay tuned for more insights and best practices from Metanet Security as we continue to secure digital landscapes against emerging threats.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=209bd7fc3d85" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[SECURITY ADVISORY:Huawei router vulnerabilities]]></title>
            <link>https://metanetwebhostingsecurity.medium.com/security-advisory-huawei-router-vulnerabilities-7b9a494f9062?source=rss-c9b37831a347------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/7b9a494f9062</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[metanetwebhosting security]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Sun, 10 Mar 2024 07:51:14 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2024-03-10T08:00:36.932Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Huawei products are popular in both offices and home environments. As a response to their extensive usage, our team conducted an audit of one of the most commonly used router model in Kenya, which is utilized by leading Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and resellers. In the course of this audit, we identified vulnerabilities within this Huawei router that have been promptly reported to the vendor. We received vulnerabilityID and acknowledgement letter from huawei PSIRT team.Huawei has committed to addressing these vulnerabilities in the upcoming firmware updates. It is imperative that all users take the necessary steps to patch their routers upon the release of this update to safeguard the network security.</p><p><strong>Device</strong>: huawei router hg8145v5</p><p>To prevent any potential misuse, we have withheld detailed technical information on the vulnerabilities. Instead, we will provide an overview of these vulnerabilities in this report. The vulnerabilities we uncovered could enable threat actors to bypass authentication, potentially leading to severe consequences, such as DNS poisoning and complete router takeover.</p><p><strong>Vulnerabilities Overview<br>1. Information Leak<br></strong>The Huawei router was found to have an information leak vulnerability. This vulnerability resulted in the exposure of sensitive information, including the SSID (Service Set Identifier), username, password, ISP details, and network configured speed while being unauthenticated. Exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to authentication bypass.</p><p><strong>2. Password Lock Bypass<br></strong>The router portal implements a security measure that locks users out after a predefined number of incorrect password attempts (typically 5 attempts), with a default lockout period of 3 minutes. However, during our assessment, we discovered that under certain configurations, it was possible to bypass this password lock mechanism.</p><p>The severity of this issue is compounded when combined with the information leak vulnerability mentioned earlier. Threat actors could potentially perform brute force attacks on passwords without enduring the standard lockout period. Given the unfortunate reality that many users employ weak passwords, this represents a significant security concern.</p><p><strong>Recommendations</strong><br>To address these vulnerabilities and enhance overall network security, we recommend the following actions:</p><p>1. Apply Vendor’s Firmware Update<br>Once Huawei releases the upcoming firmware update to rectify these vulnerabilities, all users are strongly advised to apply it promptly. This update is expected to address the identified vulnerabilities and improve router security significantly.</p><p>2. Strengthen Password Security<br>Users should prioritize robust password security practices. Employ complex passwords that include a combination of uppercase and lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters. Avoid sharing passwords and refrain from using easily guessable information, such as common words or phrases.</p><p>3. Monitor Router Activity<br>Regularly monitor router activity logs for any signs of suspicious or unauthorized access attempts. If any unusual or unauthorized activities are detected, they should be reported immediately to the router’s administrator.</p><p>4. Network Segmentation (Business Environments)<br>For corporate or business environments, consider implementing network segmentation to isolate sensitive data from potential threats and limit unauthorized access.</p><p><strong>About Metanetwebhosting security:<br></strong>We are a team of dedicated and talented researchers that focuses on <br>application security,network and IoT security, incident response, penetration testing and security research. The team has performed hundreds of penetration tests and application security tests globally .We strive to uncover security issues that businesses faces everyday. Metanetwebhosting security is headquartered in Nairobi.</p><p>Contact Information:</p><p>Website: <a href="https://metanetwebhosting.co.ke/">https://metanetwebhosting.co.ke/</a></p><p>Phone Number: +254 711 916 863</p><p>Email Address: <a href="/service/mailto:support@metanetwebhosting.com">support@metanetwebhosting.com</a></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=7b9a494f9062" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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