<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:cc="http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rss/creativeCommonsRssModule.html">
    <channel>
        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Michael Harrington on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Michael Harrington on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@mharring54?source=rss-fa9e61570700------2</link>
        
        <generator>Medium</generator>
        <lastBuildDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 06:33:15 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <atom:link href="https://medium.com/@mharring54/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/>
        <webMaster><![CDATA[yourfriends@medium.com]]></webMaster>
        <atom:link href="http://medium.superfeedr.com/" rel="hub"/>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Other]]></title>
            <link>https://mharring54.medium.com/the-other-c2466fd69664?source=rss-fa9e61570700------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c2466fd69664</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[immigration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[migration]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[xenophobia]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[culture-change]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Harrington]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 Oct 2021 20:19:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-28T20:19:35.945Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uYGLCmIitvAAQbZT2iY06A.jpeg" /></figure><p>I find this book and its review oddly obtuse. The root cause remains mysterious? Perhaps the fact that these behaviors are documented across time, place, and culture might suggest a root cause in human nature? The author coins this as xenophobia, but that is not the accurate word because it suggests “otherism” is rooted in human psychology, whereas we observe the same behaviors in other species, especially those of pack animals like wolves, hyenas, and apes.</p><p>Instead, I would attribute “otherism” to a natural survival instinct that sees the other as a possible threat, especially when the invasion involves rivalry over scarce resources. This would apply across many species that exhibit a sense of “insider vs. outsider” groups.</p><p>The difference with human society is that we aware of the moral implications of ostracizing or persecuting the “other” as fellow homo sapiens. We also have a multitude of characteristics we can use to differentiate groups, such as skin color, race, ethnicity, language, gender, cultural habits, etc. In fact, this multitude implies that our current obsession with race may not be the most important factor. I would guess that several of these characteristics coalesce around the nuances of cultural antipathy. In other words, it may not be skin color that matters most, it’s just the most obvious.</p><p>For example, a black male that attends Ivy League schools and works on Wall St. can assimilate easily into mainstream society and apparently can easily become President, whereas a black rapper who speaks urban dialect, sports tattoos, and sags his pants below his posterior has almost no chance of assimilating into the dominant cultural milieu, no matter how rich he is. This would apply on a less obvious scale to those, say, who cannot speak fluently the dominant language of a society.</p><p>The challenge for a diverse society is to manage the cultural conflicts that arise from our differences. These conflicts cannot be managed with platitudes and bromides about tolerance or focusing solely on chosen identities. Unfortunately, this is where our author and reviewer end up: quoting polls about how people feel about national identity in Europe and the USA. It’s an odd comparison because the historical definition of being French or German is categorically different than being American. For centuries people’s identities were defined by where they were born into a dominant local culture. The American experiment is a complete departure from that because it is a land of immigrants (and involuntary servitude in the case of slavery). The true differences between indigenous tribes and European settlers is really a matter of when they arrived on the continent. The struggle for power dominance between insiders and outsiders is a global historical phenomenon, not just a North American one.</p><p>…</p><p>How can we meet this challenge of the “other” when globalization is turning us all into “others”? First, we must recognize that antipathy of the other is partly driven by fear, and the fear may very well be rational. Fear of Middle Eastern terrorists touting the conquering mission of Islam is not an irrational fear. An invasion of migrants across borders is a rational fear. The point being that rational fears can be overcome, but not by denying or condemning them.</p><p>Some have wrongly assumed that because nationalism can engender a negative attitude toward the other, the nation-state must be a detriment to peace and harmony. This is exactly wrong because nation-states with borders and defined governance are exactly what prevents chaos and conflict by defining the rights to scarce resources. It is why the nation-state has been so durable over the last 400 years. In this respect, One Worldism makes no sense and is a dangerous flirtation.</p><p>Second, as this idea of the nation-state suggests, we need to understand that a multicultural society can be detrimental to a free, democratic one. All communities develop and maintain cultural norms and values that make it easier to live together in peace. Accepting the dominant values of the society we live in is merely to understand this and not an impediment to celebrating one’s own cultural heritage. America has been more successful than other developed democracies because being American is not defined by skin color, or language, or race, but by the voluntary acceptance of the American credo of individual rights and freedoms. It is truly the melting pot. Anyone from anywhere in the world can adopt this spirit, even if they cannot transplant themselves. But this fact also underscores the importance of assimilation to the dominant values of a society’s culture, and the USA is no exception. In the USA we might classify these values according to constitutional principles of liberty, justice, and law as well as according to commonly accepted behavioral norms. It does not mean surrendering to any “other’s” cultural heritage but merely accepting those attributes easily assimilated without sacrificing our individual identities.</p><p>We can see that uncontrolled borders with uncontrolled waves of migrants only undermines the goodwill people harbor for embracing the other. It creates uncertainty and disruption to the stable societal norms and anxiety over scarce material resources. It also threatens the touchstones of national identity. Unfortunately, the southern border crisis is now something American society will have to manage and it is not helped by wrongly attributing the problem to systemic racism. This is merely a tragic fallacy. A free diverse society can embrace and has embraced a tolerant attitude toward newcomers, but the prudent pace of adaptation is crucial. No society can peacefully absorb a horde of migrants completely unassimilated to the cultural values and norms of that society. It only invites chaos and conflict.</p><p>One can only pray that our national leaders in Washington D.C. wake up to these realities.</p><p>…</p><h3>‘Of Fear and Strangers’ Review: The Others</h3><p>Many of history’s most nightmarish episodes are rooted in humanity’s propensity for hatred of ‘The Other.’ But the root cause remains mysterious.</p><p><a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/of-fear-and-strangers-history-xenophobia-book-review-the-others-11634912374?mod=Searchresults_pos3&amp;page=1">wsj.com/articles/of-fear-and-strangers-history-xenophobia-book-review-the-others-11634912374</a>October 22, 2021</p><p>By Adam Kuper Oct. 22, 2021 10:20 am ET</p><p>George Makari’s concern with xenophobia goes back to a childhood trauma. In 1974, at the age of 13, he was taken on a family visit to his parents’ native Beirut. Suddenly, the travelers found themselves caught in the midst of what would become a civil war. “To me, it was bizarre,” Dr. Makari recalls in “Of Fear and Strangers: A History of Xenophobia.” He continues: “All these bewildering sects were far more alike than different. All were Levantines who spoke the same dialect; all loved the same punning humor, devoured the same cuisine, abided by strict rules of hospitality, and approached any purchase as a three-act play: bargain, stage a walk-out, then settle. They were quick with proverbs and went agog when Fairuz sang. And yet, subtle distinctions in their identities now meant life or death.”</p><p>Of Fear and Strangers: A History of Xenophobia</p><p>By George Makari</p><p>W.W. Norton</p><p>Today, Dr. Makari, a psychiatrist, psychoanalyst and the director of Weill Cornell’s DeWitt Wallace Institute of Psychiatry, sees xenophobia as a threat to social peace, not only in the Middle East but also in Europe and North America, where recent political convulsions have been driven by a bristling hostility toward strangers and outsiders. Dr. Makari is clear that a lot of different impulses are often conflated here: “ethnocentrism, ultranationalism, racism, misogyny, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, transphobia, or Islamophobia.” What might they have in common? “Is there any one term specific enough to not be meaningless, while broad enough to allow us to consider whatever common strands exist between these phenomena?” He thinks that there is: xenophobia. And if all these disorders are variants of the same affliction, then perhaps they have the same cause and might be susceptible to the same treatment.</p><p>Dr. Makari traces the invention of “xenophobia” to the 1880s, when psychiatrists came up with a variety of “phobias” apparently caused by traumatic experience. “Hydrophobia” — a fear of water — was an old term for rabies. There followed a rash of other phobias, from claustrophobia to my personal favorite, phobophobia — the fear of being frightened. (One commentator remarked that the number of phobias seemed limited only by an Ancient Greek dictionary.) Xenophobia entered a medical dictionary in 1916 as a “morbid dread of meeting strangers.</p><p>Like many psychiatric classifications, early definitions of xenophobia covered too much ground. What began as a psychiatric diagnosis would soon be used to describe the fury with which colonized populations often turned on settlers. These settlers, in turn, would be accused of xenophobia by the critics of colonialism, as waves of migrations in the years leading up to World War I provoked fears of a loss of national identity.</p><p>In the U.S., three confrontations between different segments of the population proved formative. The first pitted the Puritans, who were themselves refugees from religious persecution, against Native Americans. The second was the forced migration and enslavement of millions of Africans by descendants of the country’s European settlers. The third was provoked by the migrants, first from Europe, then from Asia, who arrived after the Civil War largely for economic reasons.</p><p>Dr. Makari notes that in 1860 60% of the white population in the U.S. was of British origin, while 35% were broadly classified as German. By 1914, after 20 million immigrants had passed through American ports, 11% of the white population had British roots, 20% German, 30% Italian and Hispanic, and 34% Slavic. The settled sense of identity enjoyed by established white American Protestants was threatened. There was, in particular, a panic about Chinese immigration, even though the number of arriving Chinese was relatively small. This led to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, prohibiting the immigration of Chinese laborers. In 1892, 241 lynchings were recorded in America. Two-thirds of the victims were black; the remaining third were mostly Chinese and Italian. In 1908, the Harvard philosopher Josiah Royce asked: “Is it a ‘yellow peril,’ or ‘black peril,’ or perhaps, after all, is it not some form of ‘white peril’ which threatens the future of humanity in this day of great struggles and complex issues?”</p><p>Dr. Makari’s whirlwind historical survey tells a compelling story of racial and ethnic animosity, but he might have paid more attention to religious conflicts. Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries was torn by bloody wars between Catholics and Protestants, a feud that still festered in 20th-century Ireland. The Partition of India in 1947 was accompanied by violent Hindu-Muslim confrontations and the displacement of more than 10 million people. When communist Yugoslavia fell apart, Orthodox Christians and Muslims waged war in the Balkans. The Middle East is currently going through another cycle of Shiite-Sunni wars. Are these religious hatreds also to be considered xenophobia?</p><p>Then there are sometimes ferocious confrontations between political parties, or fratricidal quarrels between factions within parties. And what about all those brawling sports fans? So many apparently irrational fears and hatreds. Could they all possibly come down to the same psychic or social forces?</p><p>One idea is that there is something fundamentally human here. Early human groups competed for territory. All intruders were enemies. The more you feared and hated outsiders, the better your chances of survival. So xenophobia bestowed an evolutionary advantage. Sports fans are simply expressing inherited tribal instincts. Even babies are frightened by a strange face.</p><p>This is a popular one-size-fits-all explanation. But it is problematic. For one thing, anthropologists do not agree that constant strife was the norm during the 95% of human history when small nomadic bands lived by hunting and gathering. The Victorian anthropologist Edward Burnett Tylor said that early humans would have had to choose between marrying out or being killed out. When Europeans in the early 19th century made contact with surviving communities of hunter-gatherers, different bands were observed forming marriage alliances and trading partnerships that generally kept feuds from raging out of control.</p><p>In the aftermath of World War II and the Holocaust, however, a better explanation of mass hatreds was needed. The orthodox theory in American psychology at the time was behaviorism, which explained habitual attitudes and responses as the products of conditioning: Pavlov’s dogs salivated at the sound of a bell because they had been conditioned to recognize this as a cue for food. In the same sort of way, children are warned against strangers and so conditioned to fear others.</p><p>Less orthodox, but more influential in the long run, is the notion of projection. Each of us half-recognizes our shameful desires, infantile fears, aggressive impulses. Instead of dealing with them, we may accuse someone else of harboring those same feelings, cleansing ourselves by shifting the blame onto a scapegoat.</p><p>According to yet another analytic theory, the people most susceptible to collective paranoia are the children of strict and demanding fathers whom they feared and adored. Theodor Adorno, the lead author of the classic account “The Authoritarian Personality,” wrote that the typical subject “falls, as it were, negatively in love.” Cowed by the father-figure, he is masochistically submissive to authority and sadistically takes out his anger on the weak.</p><p>These psychoanalytic theories all seek to explain the personal traumas and particular pathologies of individuals. But how do whole populations come to share common anxieties and antipathies? In 1928, the sociologist Emory Bogardus published the landmark study “Immigration and Race Attitudes.” One of its disconcerting findings was that the most widely disliked people in the U.S. at the time were “Turks.” Though very few Americans had actually encountered a member of that group, they had heard about them. And what they had heard about was the massacre of Armenians in Turkey after World War I, which was presented in the press as a slaughter of Christians at the hands of Muslims.</p><p>It was this power of the media to shape popular sentiment that the journalist Walter Lippmann came to dread. An early supporter of American involvement in World War I, Lippmann had joined the Inter-Allied Propaganda Board in London. In 1922 he published “Public Opinion,” his study of “how public opinion is made.” In it, he borrowed a term from the printing press: stereotype. We all share ready-made ideas that facilitate snap judgments about people and situations. These stereotypes are crude but may be useful in a pinch. They save time and trouble.</p><p>Effective propaganda weaponizes stereotypes. Lippmann’s work inspired Sigmund Freud’s American nephew Edward Bernays, who set up the first public relations business. Bernays in turn influenced Joseph Goebbels, who made terrible use of his ideas. Social media now serves up propaganda on steroids.</p><p>Yet surely not everyone is gulled — at least not all the time. How then to explain what is going on when strangers are demonized? Dr. Makari suggests that some combination of these psychological and sociological theories may be cobbled together to guide our thinking. This is probably the best that we can manage at present. What then can be done to limit the damage? Here Dr. Makari is less helpful. He suggests that all will be well if society becomes more equal, open and informed. He might as well add that social media should be better regulated, and the public better equipped for critical thought. Failing that, we may have to relive these nightmares of collective hatred again and again for a long time to come.</p><p>Yet there are grounds for hope. A study released in May this year by the Pew Research Center reported that conceptions of national identity in the U.S. and Western Europe have recently become more inclusive. Compared with 2016, “fewer people now believe that to truly be American, French, German or British, a person must be born in the country, must be a Christian, has to embrace national customs, or has to speak the dominant language.” This may suggest that xenophobia waxes and wanes with recent events, and that politicians can fan or tamp down outbreaks of public fear and fury. Wise and prudent leaders really might spare us a great deal of trouble.</p><p>— Mr. Kuper, a specialist on the ethnography of Southern Africa, has written widely on the history of anthropology.</p><p>Copyright ©2021 Dow Jones &amp; Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c2466fd69664" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Progressive Paradox]]></title>
            <link>https://mharring54.medium.com/the-progressive-paradox-ec408cad09ef?source=rss-fa9e61570700------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ec408cad09ef</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[politics-and-protest]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ideology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[conservatives]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[progressive]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liberalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Harrington]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Oct 2021 18:03:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-10-12T18:03:05.226Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>While perusing my news feed recently, a <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2021/09/progressives-have-already-won/620195/">headline</a> from <em>The Atlantic</em> jumped out, “The Progressives Have Already Won.” This caught my eye because I wasn’t aware progressives in America had won anything in national politics since Woodrow Wilson captured the White House.</p><p>Reading through, I saw the headline rather referred to the battle inside the Democratic Party between the new progressive left-wing and the old-line guard of centrist liberals. Further reading revealed that the progressives hadn’t won anything more than the promise of support from President Biden. (One might pause to question how big of a win this is given his plummeting approval numbers.) The writer then admitted the harsher truth, that…</p><blockquote>…the progressives’ intraparty victory could wind up being an empty one in the end. With the Democrats’ slim majorities in Congress, the moderates have the votes to sink all but the relatively modest infrastructure portion of Biden’s agenda, which passed the Senate in a bipartisan vote this past summer. Embittered progressives could then reject the infrastructure bill, leaving the party with a catastrophic whiff heading into its already-uphill effort to hold Congress in next year’s midterm elections.</blockquote><p>Hmm, from “Already Won” to “a catastrophic whiff” in the blink of an eye. Such is political journalism these days. However, I’ll try to explain this puzzle with what I term the Progressive Paradox.</p><p><strong>What is Progressivism?</strong></p><p>What is progressivism? Is it the pure embrace of “progress”? Or does it seek to shape progress according to some ideological or sociological vision? It might help to define it relative to what it’s not. First, we should establish that Progressivism is not traditional liberalism (hence the Democratic party division between traditional liberals, or moderates, and progressives).</p><p>We can frame this discussion with the aid of a simple spatial diagram of political ideologies, sometimes referred to as the Horseshoe theory (labeled below to reflect US party ideologies). The horseshoe shows how the left-right spectrum actually bends back on itself as both extremes approach the same authoritarianism, whether of Marxist or fascist origin.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/654/1*Rna5RLBwxoolhPvem43iHg.png" /></figure><p><em>Liberalism</em> is the ideological opposite of the statist extremes, at the center of the spectrum, defined as “a political and economic doctrine that emphasizes individual autonomy, equality of opportunity, and the protection of individual rights (primarily to life, liberty, and property) <em>originally against the state</em>.” When we say we live in a liberal social order, this is what we mean, regardless of party identity.</p><p>Historically, liberalism confronted European monarchism, where power was concentrated under the royal monarchy and landed nobility. In this sense liberalism, in support of democracy and economic freedom, was also contra the conservative <em>status quo</em>. This original meaning of liberalism is retained in European democracies where Liberal parties are on the right in support of free markets and individual rights, whereas the European left is represented predominantly by labor and communist parties, and more recently have included environmental Green parties. Conservative, or nativist, parties have tended to gravitate farther toward the right, often forming coalitions with Liberal parties. Social democratic parties are most closely aligned with political centrists as a compromise between individual autonomy and state oversight.</p><p>American progressivism arose in the early 20th century in opposition to Democratic populists and Republican conservatives, with Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson and Thomas Dewey being its most notable political proponents. US progressives sought to co-opt the working class (i.e., organized labor) with statism designed to regulate and manage business enterprise. It was Franklin Roosevelt in the aftermath of the depression that united the Wilsonian progressives and modern liberals, or laborites, under the Democratic party. Classical liberals became a forgotten rump branch of the right, now referred to as Libertarians, but only very loosely aligned with mainstream conservatives. Conservative Republicans became the party of corporate business. (These party alignments have shifted again over the past fifty years.)</p><p>Using this framework, we can locate modern progressives, liberals, and conservatives as they relate across this ideological spectrum. Moral value priorities that differ between left and right are most often characterized as equality on the left vs. individual liberty on the right. Around the horseshoe we can observe that traditional liberals are political right-of-center with modern liberals a bit left-of-center. Conservatives, under both economic free market and social religious persuasions, have become more hardened on the right. In recent decades progressives have moved away from modern liberalism towards more Democratic Socialist positions (see blue arrow). Many now openly embrace a Marxist agenda. (The irony is that some present-day big government statists still attempt to hide behind the fig-leaf of liberalism.)</p><p>These political trends have created serious problems for party cohesion, with both major parties splintering into opposing factions. We have the Trumpers and NeverTrumpers battling for the soul of the Republican party, and the Sanderistas battling modern liberals for Democratic party identity on the left.</p><p>The Horseshoe illustration is a static representation of US party politics, so we can introduce the concept of time to analyze the dynamics of our political affairs, in other words, how changes cause our politics to evolve over time. I have introduced the time and change dimension with an arc over the top of the horseshoe. Conservatism (by definition) favors stasis and the past, while progressivism advocates proactive change (progress?).</p><p>Psychological studies show that people naturally resist change, largely because change is disruptive and introduces uncertainty and the risk of loss. Resisting change is a manifestation of our survival instincts. This individual psychology is reflected at the societal level: all societies naturally favor <em>time-tested</em> traditions that have helped them survive through evolutionary development. This means the natural bias of any society favors the stasis of the <em>status quo</em>. <br> <br> I’ve drawn a red arrow that points roughly to the center of gravity for the preferences of the American national polity. Yes, the US voting population has voted and still does vote right-of-center based on this somewhat gross generalization of political ideology. And yes, US national voting preferences have grown much more volatile in recent years. Leftists often claim a gradual societal movement to the ideological left and they are not entirely wrong, just often mistaken about the causes and implications.</p><p>The institutional design of the American political system reinforces this bias towards stasis and the <em>status quo</em>. Traditional societies find revolutionaries disconcerting and erect institutions that thwart radical change. The design of the US Constitution is evidence of this deliberate bias, with representative government, tripartite branches of governance, a bicameral legislature, decentralized levels of governance with cross-cutting constituencies, and electoral rules that force consensus through a two-party system. The purpose of this design is to reinforce compromise and consensus at the center, preserve the integrity of the union of states, promote political stability, and create continuity across time. The trade-offs are greater inertia and resistance to change and slower policy responses to populist demands. (We can see these trade-offs directly antagonize progressive interests.)</p><p>We also find the center of gravity for the US under the ideological position of “democratic capitalism,” which is the political and economic systemic manifestation of philosophical liberalism. Opinion polls show a large majority of Americans value both democracy and capitalism over all other forms of political and economic systems, save perhaps a fictional Utopia.</p><p>At the Marxist extreme, the goal has always been to overthrow democratic capitalism in favor of some form of socialized system. Over the past half century, progressives have gradually migrated towards the socialist position, adopting much of the Marxist rhetoric and agenda. But this means pulling or pushing American society away from its natural center of gravity on the center-right.</p><p>Thus, we have the Progressive Paradox: the constant need to push against the natural conservative tendency of a free democratic society. Like Sisyphus, progressives must constantly push against the boulder of institutional inertia in an uphill battle. Then, whenever they take a brief respite, the boulder rolls back down to erase most of their gains. It becomes a frantic race against time and the expenditure of energy.</p><p><strong>The Evidence</strong></p><p>Most left liberals and progressives are wont to deny the Progressive Paradox, but the evidence is manifest. The contradictions have been embedded in their political tactics, their messaging, their policy designs, even their emotional states of mind. For example:</p><p>1. Radical change and disruption of the status quo help the progressive cause, so they embrace such disruptions as opportunities to advance their goals. As Rahm Emmanuel stated explicitly, “never let a good crisis go to waste.” If a crisis does not exist, use political messaging to create one.</p><p>2. A focus on political messaging over substance. This is a tacit recognition that the substance of progressive policy itself lacks appeal, so one must repackage with effective messaging techniques. Objective policy analysis should be discounted, if not ignored.</p><p>3. An overriding sense the Progressive moment is fleeting, so legislative speed and overreach is crucial. This is the Sisyphean boulder of the <em>status quo ante</em> that will roll right back down as soon as progressive energy flags.</p><p>4. Progressive policies designed to reinforce patronage dependencies over time as they seek to harness loss aversion in their favor. This is the logic of creating entitlements that almost never can be taken away by democratic politics. This is the logic of the New Deal entitlements and the ACA and why progressives are so eager to get one foot in the door. In the recent battle over the Build Back Better legislation, progressives have sought a compromise that creates more policy programs with shorter time frames and lower budgetary scoring. As one reporter makes clear, “Progressives, who don’t want their policy ambitions artificially constrained… would prefer seeding a slew of new programs and embedding them in the nation’s social fabric, so they become politically difficult to terminate.”</p><p>5. Attacks on the constitutional design of political and legal institutions. The electoral system resists radical or populist change, so that system must be transformed to be “democratically” legitimate. This has been reflected on attacks against the Electoral College and the Senate. Progressives define democracy to favor majoritarian numbers over constitutional and legal principles, inviting the tyranny of a populist majority.</p><p>6. Co-opting non-democratic institutions to the progressive cause. Since progressives cannot control democratic legislatures, they must seek end roads around the process. This has been primarily targeted to bureaucratic regulatory restrictions and the judiciary with activist judges making laws from the bench. Abortion and government-controlled healthcare have been two of the most contentious issues that have roiled our national politics.</p><p>7. Focusing policy initiatives on indefinite commitments, such as climate change, universal health care, or free college. The question is not whether these are worthy ambitions, but if policy programs have any possibility of achieving the intended goals and at what cost.</p><p>8. Co-opting cultural institutions to reprogram cultural assimilation. This has been one of the most successful strategies of the progressive left as its ideology dominates the industries of news media, arts and entertainment, education, law, big tech, and now professional sports and corporate personnel policies. Biased corporate news media and technology platforms have been effectively enlisted to spread a left liberal, anti-conservative narrative that helps obscure or sanitize the progressive agenda.</p><p>9. The sole focus on identity as the basis of power and conflict. This is a modification of Marxist class conflict that has been adapted to race, ethnicity, gender and sexual preference. The idea is properly termed “Identity Marxism” with its strategy to unite different communities through victimization against the dominant class of oppressors. The entire political left has come to be defined by identity groups.</p><p>10. Psychological and emotional intolerance of dissent against the progressive narrative. Progressives assume disparate outcomes of the <em>status quo</em> are <em>prima facie</em> evidence of disparate treatment and opportunities. In other words, the disparate outcomes are evidence of unjust oppression. It is a moral stance that refuses to bend to counter-evidence. Based on these accepted assumptions rather than truth, progressives cannot tolerate dissent because to do so would weaken or refute those assumptions on which their ideology is constructed. Such is the psychological genesis of “woke” and “cancel” culture. The obvious contradiction between ideological diversity and group conformity only leads to extreme fragility for progressives’ intellectual foundations and, ultimately, failure in its goals and objectives to achieve positive change. It has been well-documented how the urban poor have suffered these policy failures for the past two generations.</p><p>11. The flight from objective truth leads to anti-intellectualism and political scientism, impeding our ability to relate to each other as rational citizens with a common understanding of meaning and truth.</p><p>12. Any failure of a progressive policy can be remedied with more funding. How much? A $trillion? Not enough. $2 trillion? Nope. $3.5 trillion? That’s a baseline. There is no limit to progressive aspirations.</p><p>One might view this list as a wholesale indictment of progressive ideology and strategic politics. However, there are two points to make to soften that take-away. First, this analysis of the Progressive Paradox in no way condones similar tactics by the opposition. One might write a different essay titled <em>The Conservative Conundrum</em> to address the contradictions on the right. Second, this is not a condemnation of progressive ideals, but only an analysis of progressive failure. The next section offers some ideas to resolve the paradox.</p><p><strong>A Simple Reconciliation</strong></p><p>The Progressive Paradox can be reframed away from ideological tensions over freedom and equality or policy positions and directed toward the problem of societal and cultural change. Change happens. It is said to be the only certainty in the universe. Over time everything in the universe adapts to change or ceases to exist. Societies founded on traditions resist change, but they are soon forced to adapt. Think of your grandmother with her smart phone.</p><p>As change forces society to adapt, the crucial factor for adaptation is the<em> pace of change</em>. A slow pace allows societies to adapt at a similar pace to maintain stability. A too rapid pace of change tends to disrupt that process as social institutions fail to adapt in time and instead collapse. The resulting chaos can often fuel revolution and reactionary backlash. Cohesive societies tend to favor evolutionary adaptation over revolutionary chaos. So, time is on the side of progressives who desire change, if only they can wait for it. With human societies we’re not talking in geological time frames, but generational. Witness the gradual acceptance of same-sex marriage over the past thirty years.</p><p>However, true progressives on a moral crusade find it difficult, if not impossible, to wait. For them the unacceptable <em>status quo</em> is a moral affront and they must push the envelope. As the leader of the Congressional Progressive Caucus recently <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/pramila-jayapals-perfect-pitch/">proclaimed</a>, “Child care can’t wait. Paid leave can’t wait. Health care can’t wait. Climate action can’t wait. Affordable housing can’t wait. A roadmap to citizenship can’t wait…” One might add the age-old promise, “Utopia can’t wait.”</p><p>The problem of course is that so few citizens and voters are willing to jump on this change train. As Michael Lind bluntly <a href="https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/democrats-majority-michael-lind">puts it</a>:</p><blockquote>Progressives are a small minority of American voters, and many progressive positions are controversial and unpopular both among Democratic voters and the electorate at large: Within the Democratic Party there are almost as many “conservatives” (14%) as there are those who describe their views as “very liberal” (15%).</blockquote><p>Unable to convince a majority of society to accept their politics for proactive change, progressives often feel compelled to resort to undemocratic tactics (see list above), while using Orwellian doublespeak to redefine the meaning of “fairness” and “democracy.” In other words, they choose to deny the Paradox and bang their heads against the stone wall of resistance while seeking to dislodge the institutional anchors of a free society they disagree with. The danger is that untruths used to push change faster than society can adapt leads to backlashes and regress. The progressive agenda can easily lead to the opposite of its intended effects. As proven by physics, every action leads to an equivalent reaction.</p><p>These tactics have only led to the continual failure of progressives to influence national political priorities, despite the fact they have taken control of almost all society’s cultural institutions. It has also led to an incalculable loss of trust in the institutions of our free society. Traditional liberalism does not necessarily suffer this defect because its moderation and bias in favor of individual freedom and rights discourages liberals from overreaching. Instead, if liberals stay true to a liberal society (which all conservatives who are not fundamentalists also champion), then change is managed at a pace that leads to gradual progress rather than backlash.</p><p>For progressives to succeed they should probably adhere to and support the democratic guidelines of the Constitution, and patiently guide society’s progress to its desired ends. This will not prevent the push and pull of competing interests and visions, but it does give greater weight to the foundations of democracy and freedom. It would be far better to take to heart the observations of the young, left-leaning French political philosopher Simone Weil, as she lived through the uprooting of European society by national socialism:</p><blockquote>To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul. It is one of the hardest to define. A human being has roots by virtue of his real, active and natural participation in the life of a community which preserves in living shape certain particular treasures of the past and certain particular expectations of the future … Every human being needs to have multiple roots. It is necessary for him to draw well-nigh the whole of his moral, intellectual and spiritual life by way of the environment of which he forms a natural part.</blockquote><p>If progressives constantly seek to uproot, they are doomed to fail again and again as a political movement. Really, the battle being waged across the spectrum from left to right — from radical to progressive to liberal to conservative to reactionary — is really a debate over adaptation to change and its rightful pace in a liberal world order. Our divide is not really a tug-of-war between equality and liberty, as we need to reconcile both. The immigration debate is a case in point: immigration should be legal and controlled by democratic consensus.</p><p>History is often driven by tribal conflicts and power dominance of one form or another, including the nation-state. But this path is fragile because true progress is driven by change, adaptation, and anti-fragility.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ec408cad09ef" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Is Social Media Destroying Democracy?]]></title>
            <link>https://mharring54.medium.com/is-social-media-destroying-democracy-24fd6bcb8079?source=rss-fa9e61570700------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/24fd6bcb8079</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[social-media]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[fake-news]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[google]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[facebook]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Harrington]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 06 May 2021 20:30:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-05-08T06:05:25.227Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*fBuFDMFQlsvUTwQPBPiqtA.png" /></figure><p><strong>It doesn’t seem so long ago</strong> when the promise of an inter-connected world was all the rage, with the free sharing of information being praised as the dawning of a new age for global communication and community. An audacious young Mark Zuckerberg praised his nascent social network, proclaiming that “Connecting the world is really important, and that is something that we want to do. That is why Facebook is here on this planet.”</p><p>The equally precocious founders of Google offered a mission to <em>Do No Evil</em> while organizing the world’s information to make it universally accessible and useful. Likewise, their youthful optimism gushed about “the potential for technology to remake the world into a better place.” Early outcomes were hopeful, as Facebook’s network grew quickly to more than 2 billion users, while the Arab Spring was heralded politically as “the Twitter revolution,” and “google” became a verb.</p><p>But how fast the wheel has turned. Today we find ourselves blaming social media for disseminating misinformation as propaganda (“fake news”), destroying objective journalism, invading user privacy, corrupting elections, enabling and fomenting ideological extremism, canceling political dissent by censoring free speech, cornering markets and suppressing competition, crushing small businesses, and harming the physical and mental health of its users. Whew!</p><p>No, it really hasn’t been that long. It’s like we’ve imbibed a heady drug, woke up and found ourselves addicted, wondering how we got here and how to break this compulsive habit before it breaks us. To paraphrase David Byrne, “How did we get here?”</p><p>There are two things we need to understand to better answer this question. One is the nature of social interaction, individually and socially, and how that flows from our behavioral instincts. Second, is how the business model and logic of large-scale social media networks manipulate and profit from those natural instincts.</p><blockquote>“<em>Man is by nature a social animal</em>” — Aristotle, <em>Politics</em></blockquote><p><strong>As Aristotle noted</strong>, humans crave social interaction. As young people, we seek the approval of elders and peers as a form of bonding and belonging. We form families, tribes, neighborhoods, and communities to fulfill this instinctual need for social engagement and mutual protection. Modern social networking technology feeds on that need, but what technology offers today differs from centuries of traditional social interaction in terms of scale and the implications for identity, trust, and commitment.</p><p>Evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar has observed that human face-to-face relationships have an upward bound of about 150 relationships before dissipating. Beyond that we lose track of our personal networks, so institutional structures must be established to cohere the community network. We understand intuitively that friendships formed through in-person relationships are fundamentally different than “friends” on Facebook. Nobody has 6000+ “friends.” Friends connected through online social networks (OSNs) are too easy; requiring little or no commitment. As the degrees of separation increase, peers on OSNs become virtually anonymous. So, as defined by trust and commitment, our social media friends are not really true friends at all. OSNs have allowed us to make connections that live on the other side of the globe, so we don’t really ‘know’ who we are engaging. What this means is that on social media we are able to shed the constraints of reputation, integrity, and trust. This opens up social engagement to all kinds of malicious intent.</p><blockquote>“<em>If you can’t say anything nice, then don’t say anything at all.</em>” ~ Aesop (c.620–560 BC)</blockquote><blockquote>“<em>Gossiping and lying go hand in hand.</em>” ~ Proverb</blockquote><blockquote>“<em>Whoever gossips to you, will gossip about you.</em>” ~ Spanish Proverb</blockquote><p><strong>Comparing</strong> <strong>OSNs to traditional gossip networks</strong> can provide valuable insights. As these quotes show, gossiping has a long, checkered history. In traditional societies, the human propensity to gossip can serve a useful purpose in reinforcing a community’s cultural norms and values by calling attention to and ostracizing those who violate those norms. These practices can range from the harmless to quite ruthless, all in the name of solidifying the community under those accepted norms. It’s how the traditional community survives and maintains stability. Individuals living in modern liberal societies often find such conformity stifling. But gossip can also be positive, promoting one’s good character, as indicated by the phrase, “Your reputation precedes you.” (The key here is how we value <em>reputation</em>.)</p><p>Scientific studies show the reward center in the brain — the caudate nucleus — is activated in response to gossip, especially malicious gossip. For instance, subjects seem to be amused or entertained by celebrity scandals. We all know this form of Schadenfreude as the basis of the business model for supermarket tabloids, as exemplified by the modern fascination with the British monarchy and its human foibles.</p><p>Furthermore, studies have shown that subjects get a dopamine hit from superficial engagement on social media. The likes, the emojis, the comments, all offer instant gratification that somebody out there approves of us or at least notices us. Popularity metrics signal our status on the social media hierarchy. All this feeds our sense of self-worth and self-esteem and helps shape our identity. This dopamine rush is exploited by social media user interfaces in order to provoke and prolong user engagement on the platforms.</p><p>By appealing to our base instincts social media has transformed itself into this role of spreading gossip, but on a far larger scale with far less restraint. In this respect, Facebook and Twitter have become little more than <em>global gossip networks</em>, where those gossiping and being gossiped about have no relationships to a shared community. We see this today in the attempts to cancel those who disagree with an accepted narrative or ideology, where perceived transgressors are set upon by Twitter mobs and trolls. We see it with teenage bullying and exploitation. We see it with constant virtue signaling.</p><p>With large-scale, anonymous networks, where no one can be held accountable for attacking another, bad behavior becomes far too easy and tempting, perhaps irresistible. Peoples’ careers and lives are being destroyed by what can be viewed as an unserious game with very serious consequences. In one study conducted in Germany, researchers found that Facebook’s own engagement tools were tied to a significant rise in membership in extremist organizations. In the US, Facebook has been blamed, rightly or wrongly, for the rise of white supremacist groups.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*aFVqJr4UlBUs43LRsrpeLQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Paradoxically, this scaling effect, enabling anonymity and lack of accountability, is what really makes today’s social media <em>anti-social</em>. There is no trust or reputational capital to be lost and removing these constraints can bring out the worst in us. OSNs have developed to the point where we are getting all the negative effects of gossip with fewer of the positive effects of shared community promised. In this respect, large-scale OSNs make no sense as a social institution. Nevertheless, the psychological and emotional allure of online social engagement is overpowering, while the financial power associated with OSNs is formidable. In terms of economic power and global reach, our social media giants can go head-to-head with most countries. The top five company valuations on US financial markets are all Big Tech, with Google and Facebook ranked at #4 and #5.</p><p><strong>The Primacy of Technology</strong></p><p><strong>The big social media platforms today, </strong>such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter<strong>,</strong> make money through targeted advertising, creating specialized interfaces to keep users engaged and collect as much data as possible to sell to targeted advertisers. The more users, sharing more information flowing through the network, the more advertising revenues increase along with company valuations.</p><p>With this profit incentive, the OSN platforms’ engagement strategies go beyond user-initiated behaviors, using AI machine algorithms and click-bait to solicit engagement among users by suggesting friends, games, similar content, contests, and memes. This is why Facebook asks users to play what seem to be silly games: such engagement, no matter how meaningless, can become instantly monetized. Most of these interactions are fairly innocuous, but, because sensationalism and conflict attract engagement, many are meant to provoke political conflict or collusion. In addition, the engagement strategies depend upon keeping attention siloed. If users are regularly exposed to different points of view, if they develop healthy habits for weighing fact versus fiction, they will be tougher targets for engagement.</p><p>At best, OSN click-bait strategies and target algorithms yield an endless cacophony of digital noise to compete against any positive human interaction. At worst, and most often than not, we get warring tribes that only venture outside their walled silos to engage with the enemy.</p><p>Furthermore, social media is a winner-take-all industry as OSNs have become virtual monopolies through network effects. Much like national languages and computer operating systems, the more users on the network, the more <em>new</em> users want to join the party, the more personal data is harvested, and the more valuable the growing network is to advertisers. This creates a significant barrier to entry for competitors, where any successful new platform is quickly swallowed up by the giants, as when Facebook bought up WhatsApp and Instagram, and Google purchased YouTube.</p><p>Their dominance grants Facebook and Google immense bargaining leverage over publishers, content creators, and other stakeholders, who often have no choice but to hand over their own proprietary data to satiate the platforms’ thirst for content. This bargaining power has crushed many creative professions and independent publishers. As far as users who provide all this valuable content go, well, they get a free profile page and a few tools to deepen their engagement.</p><p>When it comes to business practices and power over the global internet, Big Tech is unrivaled. As plainly stated by one recent study:</p><blockquote><em>Facebook and Google use their dominant position as gatekeepers to the internet to surveil users and businesses, amass unrivaled stores of data, and rent out targeting services to third parties who can then target content — from ads for shoes to racist propaganda — at users with a perceived precision unrivaled by any other entity. …The longer users remain on the platform — hooked on sensationalist content, which the platforms’ algorithms prioritize — the more money Facebook and Google make from advertising</em>.<a href="#_edn1">[i]</a></blockquote><p>Despite the apparent toxicity of these social media platforms, for those who wish to fulfill a sincere desire for wider social connection and engagement, there is no other game in town. Without meaningful competition, Big Tech has transformed their platforms not to help us communicate, but to addict us to their services in order to sell more advertising. For the rest of us, the result has not been the promised congenial, global community, but rather a malevolent battle for primacy and survival.</p><p>The result is that Big Tech has acquired its own acronym for its five biggest players — the FAANGs — referring to Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google. Fangs have never been warm and fuzzy.</p><p><strong>The Nature of Political Engagement in Democracy</strong></p><p>As suggested in the title of this essay, we need to address what all this means for political democracy. Current events might give us a clue, from a previous summer of ongoing urban riots across the country against local government and law enforcement to a protest at the Capitol in January against the 2020 presidential election that turned violent. The chaos in both cases can be traced to the role of social media provocation and coordination.</p><p>Democracy is a form of political order that relies on a social choice mechanism called voting that seeks to support and manage self-government. The social choice challenge is always how to distill an inestimable number of personal preferences and interests down to a single pragmatic social policy agenda. It’s not a simple task, nor an obvious one. Neither an authoritarian hierarchy nor a chaotic populist mob accomplishes the objective. Democracy is a messy business, as Churchill said, the worst of all possible political systems, except for all the alternatives.</p><p>American democracy is built on a decentralized structure that seeks to best fulfill the goal of self-government while adhering to our stated values of liberty and justice. This is an especially difficult challenge in a large population made up of diverse cultural, ethnic, and racial groups spread over a large landmass, like the USA.</p><p>When systems grow large and complex, nature, technology, and history show us that the best way to manage is to decentralize the process. So, in the US we have fifty states made up of thousands of counties and municipalities to decentralize government. What is also required to facilitate the process is a method of ranking policy priorities that can converge on a workable ordering of those priorities. The final condition is a voting process that allows people to compromise on the big issues and find convergence on decisions the entire population finds acceptable, if not ideal.</p><p>Our decentralized system of representative governance seeks to fulfill these objectives while also imposing some necessary trade-offs. Our voting system of winner-take-all plurality yields a two-party system where the winning strategy is to acquire more than 50% of the vote. This design eschews proportional representation with a multitude of competing interests by forcing voters to <em>set priorities</em> and move toward a centrist coalition. This design seeks a majority mandate through a process acceptable to the minority as well, the incentive being to capture the center of American politics.</p><p>After capturing that center through elections, the governing coalition must then govern the entire populace while adhering to the accepted process to maintain legitimacy. This requires, above all else, <em>convergence through compromise</em>.</p><p>The beauty of a two-party system is that voter choices are <em>forced towards the center of compromise</em> to be successful, so a winning strategy will appeal more to commonalities among voters rather than differences. The alternate idea of proportional representation and multiple parties creates more responsive but fragile coalitions, whereas, with a dominant centrist coalition, the two-party structure creates greater stability with greater resistance to change.</p><p>Naturally, this process favors the status quo (i.e., conservatism?) rather than change (progressivism?) and thus the trade-off is unappealing to those agents of change among us. Understandable, but all societies survive by following time-tested values and practices until they no longer serve, so the burden of change is always on those eager to embrace it. While time is on their side, the change agents often cannot wait.</p><p>Given America’s profile as a large country with a large culturally, ethnically, and racially diverse population, democratic governance is no small task. Convergence is far easier with a smaller population, a smaller land area, and a more homogeneous culture, with shared racial and ethnic identities. The USA has none of these advantages, but, starting with a relatively small population and land area, the designers of the US Constitution displayed remarkable foresight in their design.</p><p><strong>So, the million-dollar question is</strong> whether our social media technology is making our task easier or more impossible?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/750/1*XjF_0pN1fbvnFr1XmQNNgw.png" /></figure><p>As discussed above, social media is making us more tribal, more isolated from those different than us, more alienated from a common national identity. The face-to-face appreciation of each “other” is lost and technology’s depreciation of humanity allows us to cast that “other” in dark shadows instead of bright enlightenment. It is replacing true meaning with a false sense of tribal identity and differentiation. And where we cannot find this differentiation, we create it. It’s ironic that our commonalities far outweigh our differences, yet these small differences are what we magnify through much of our social media engagement.</p><p>We can easily see that these behaviors are short-circuiting our political democracy. We are creating a bimodal distribution of political preferences rather than a unified, centrist “national” one. Ultimately, we are adrift, wondering what American democracy is all about. Without the strength of conviction, we are weak and vulnerable. And as we drift, those with anti-democratic tendencies, whether authoritarian or anarchic, are harnessing these tools to overcome our institutional constraints and undermine our foundations of liberty and justice. We have seen how some of these interests have used the unique crisis of a global pandemic to advance their narrow agenda. It is particularly shocking how some narrow interests employ science as a political weapon, but then completely dismiss scientific skepticism when it doesn’t serve their purpose.</p><p>In the social media space, we are seeing censorship of opinion, even informed opinion; canceling of those we disagree with professionally and socially (this is a modern form of ostracism, banishment, and exile from the community); invasions of privacy; collusion; attacks on personal liberties; and the incitement of social disorder and chaos. What is worse is that our traditional media platforms in news journals and television/radio broadcasting have been sucked into this vile vortex, spreading propaganda as objective news.</p><p>These developments expose <em>two serious threats</em> to free democracy:</p><p>· An ideological ‘tribal’ civil war among citizens inflamed by information media, making democratic compromise impossible; and</p><p>· A danger of collusion between Big Tech and Big Govt to infringe upon constitutional freedoms and privacy by co-opting social media platforms, such as we have seen in China.</p><p>This second danger seems particularly acute as the solution recently discussed in the US Senate in response to the first danger. We cannot allow unaccountable governments to co-opt unaccountable technology platforms with the idea that “they” will make us safe. It flips the definition of a people’s democracy on its head.</p><p><strong>Remedies?</strong></p><p><strong>Are there remedies </strong>that can halt this disintegration of our social and political institutions or do things just fall apart? As a free democracy, we need to defend free speech as the basis of communication and comprehension of differing viewpoints. How else to find compromise? We also need objective sources of information we can trust. And we need the integrity of objective national media.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/765/1*sk-dZl7GRfLEjp5Nw7iYfw.jpeg" /></figure><p>There are many policy proposals that address the problems of Big Tech, from rewriting the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to make OSNs more accountable and liable for the information spread on their networks to breaking up the Big Tech monopolies to changing the revenue model. This essay is intended to bring attention to and explain the problem without going deeply into possible regulatory solutions, but the author’s impressions are that online “search” is likely a public good just like the public library and should be regulated like a public utility; broad and deep vertical integration of product markets is likely subject to anti-trust laws; while barriers to entry should be reduced to counter the network externalities that create quasi-monopolies and help foster greater competition and innovation in technology markets. The advertising revenue model relies on harvesting free data from users, so a more just model would share that data value with the users that create it.</p><p>But just as important is an appeal on the personal level to voluntary behavioral modifications among social media users, much like those promoted to decrease tobacco consumption. This is necessary for our personal mental health and our social peace of mind. We know the nihilistic and narcissistic behaviors we engage in on social media are unhealthy. We are fighting for attention, we are competing for status, we are allowing ourselves to become smug with our own created self-image. We are in zero-sum, finite games. But I doubt any of this brings us a sense of meaning, purpose, or fulfillment, no matter how many “likes” we get.</p><p>We also know that we crave the affirmation of our unique personal identities and a sense of belonging in our social communities. We need positive-sum, infinite games. (War is a finite game, peace is an infinite game.) Technology can serve us in this capacity, but only if we create social media that makes sense. What makes sense is small scale, inter-personal, commonality of interests, and a great deal of empathy and open-mindedness. What makes sense are positive social interactions that reward our human social and creative instincts.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*xSuDQW4U_73z5S1j5BKQtg.jpeg" /></figure><p>Lastly, we need to reject ideological politics as personal identity. Political differences are natural, but fused with identity they become threatening and lead to self-defensive reactions. Our partisan identities should mean relatively little compared to our identities as creative, intelligent, interesting, empathetic individuals.</p><p>Our online, interconnected world will become more so, but we need to ensure it doesn’t become a more conflicted and contentious one. We do not want a world that wages war by cyber means. More crucial, we need to ensure that technology enhances our humanity by safeguarding our treasured values of liberty and justice for all. (Now go share that on Facebook and Twitter!)</p><p><a href="#_ednref1">[i]</a> “<a href="https://www.economicliberties.us/our-work/addressing-facebook-and-googles-harms-through-a-regulated-competition-approach/">Addressing Facebook and Google’s Harms Through a Regulated Competition Approach</a>,” American Economic Liberties Project, April 10, 2020.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=24fd6bcb8079" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Liberal, Conservative? Po-tay-to, Po-tah-to?]]></title>
            <link>https://mharring54.medium.com/liberal-conservative-po-tay-to-po-tah-to-2aa954f73f7d?source=rss-fa9e61570700------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2aa954f73f7d</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[political-ideologies]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[ideology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[partisanship]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[political-identities]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[liberalism]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Harrington]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2021 16:27:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-22T16:27:07.700Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/768/1*19bDzlI2xe6TrL2wcJs6mg.jpeg" /></figure><p>I revisited this essay I wrote last year and wanted to repost it here on my Medium page. Somethings never change…</p><p><strong>I recently came across a post on my Facebook page via a friend (a Blue) that linked</strong> to<a href="https://gallagherwitt.tumblr.com/post/169422719191/an-open-letter-to-friends-and-family-who-arewere"> a blog post by a writer named Lori Gallagher Witt</a>. Apparently, this post found its way to my feed through a viral sharing on Twitter by some well-known celebrities, the film director and actor Ron Howard among them.</p><p>I clicked through and read the blog post, which was an open letter in the form of a manifesto of how Ms. Witt defined herself as “liberal.” I was immediately struck by how little of it defined liberal ideology from any other ideology. It was really a defense of 15 core beliefs by which Ms. Witt defined her political identity. I realized the manifesto was more of a profession of faith, not unlike what many religious groups adhere to. (Ms. Witt eschewed any form of religious faith or belief, adopting a live-and-let-live attitude with a strong tinge of anti-religious secularism. In other words, her religion is modern secular liberalism.)</p><p>I decided to write a response to this post in an article for Braver Angels not because I wish to critique Ms. Witt’s belief system but to address many of the deeply held beliefs that many citizens think distinguish them from their opposition. Rather, I believe most citizens share these beliefs, but understand that implementing policies consistent with these beliefs can lead to divergent political interests.</p><p><strong>As Ms. Witt writes, “let’s break it down, shall we?” I will classify her 15 principles</strong> into three categories to delineate defining differences.</p><p>First are those that seem completely agreeable to most Americans, especially those who go to church [bracketed sections are paraphrased.]</p><ol><li>I believe a country should take care of its weakest members.</li><li>I believe education should be affordable and accessible to everyone.</li><li>[I believe in freedom of religion, and non-religion.]</li><li>I believe [LBGT people] should have the same rights [as everybody else].</li><li>I believe in government regulation.</li><li>I believe we should take in refugees.</li></ol><p>Second are those beliefs that carry with them a positive right to goods and services provided by collective society (which means somebody has to produce them, somebody has to pay for them, and somebody has to distribute them.)</p><ol><li>I believe healthcare is a right.</li><li>[I believe in] fair wages, lower housing costs, universal healthcare, affordable education, and the wealthy actually paying their [fair] share.</li><li>I believe in funding sustainable energy, including offering education to people currently working in coal or oil so they can change jobs.</li><li>I believe companies should be required to pay their employees a decent, livable wage.</li><li>I believe there are far more humane ways to handle undocumented immigration than our current practices.</li></ol><p>Lastly are some of Ms. Witt’s opinions of the character of American society, which seem more interpretive than strictly factual:</p><ol><li>[I believe] I should pay my [fair] share [of taxes] as long as it’s actually going to something besides…</li><li>I believe our current administration is fascist.</li><li>I believe the systemic racism and misogyny in our society is much worse than many people think.</li><li>I believe in so-called political correctness.</li></ol><p>I’m not going to address this 3rd category of beliefs because, without extensive empirical data, these opinions are impossible to refute, just like religious doctrine. I make a point of it not to argue with peoples’ beliefs.</p><p><strong>Anyhow, Ms. Witt concludes her litany with this statement:</strong> <em>I’m a liberal because I think we should take care of each other.</em></p><p>I trust that Ms. Witt is sincerely expressing her deeply held, empathetic political beliefs, but I also don’t believe these beliefs define her differently than a generic conservative. One could easily substitute <em>I’m a conservative because I think we should take care of each other, </em>and receive no objection from conservatives. Perhaps that needs further explanation.</p><p>The first category above concerns the extension of equal rights and opportunity in a free society. I don’t believe anyone who believes in American exceptionalism could possibly disagree with these expressions of empathy and compassion for our fellow citizens, or even those who desire to become citizens. Differences of opinion mostly settle on the “How,” or the means to accomplishing those goals. For example, a conservative might ask — how do we make good education accessible to all? Or, how much regulation is necessary to ensure open competitive markets as the ultimate regulator? Or, how do we manage refugee flows to ensure the integrity of our free society? Or finally, how do we best take care of our weakest fellow citizens, or lift them up to where they can care for their own needs?</p><p>So, the difference is not who believes or doesn’t believe in these objectives of a good and free society. The difference is over how we achieve them.</p><p>Next, we must deal with the more complicated second category of the provision of goods and services. To merely say “healthcare is a right” is a declaration in search of a solution. This gets at a crucial difference between left and right. The left tends to seek positive rights, by which we mean things that must be guaranteed to citizens by the social contract. An example would be free education. Positive rights are different than negative rights, which are inherent to citizenship and must be defended by the legal and judicial system, such as the right to free speech.</p><p>The problem with positive rights is that the good or service offered by the government as a “right” to all citizens, what we call a public good, must be produced by someone, and then the costs of that production and its distribution must be paid for by someone else. Liberals see the solution in taxation and redistribution under the direction of government agents. This is done in many cases, but a conservative would ask, is it necessary, and is it more beneficial than costly? Obvious cases are the USPS, the VA, the military, police and fire depts and the DMV. (Social Security and Medicare as entitlements are not public goods, but transfer payments.) A conservative would probably side with the economist’s view that public goods are specific and cannot be provided by the private market, are inefficient and often wasteful, but also are politically necessary. They also see these public goods as mostly local and decentralized, not needing centralized Federal programs.</p><p>The second category of desirable social objectives, such as affordable education, healthcare, wage growth, and affordable housing, are all societal needs that we hope we can produce in sufficient supply to meet the demand. Conservatives would argue that the public sector is not capable of accomplishing this effectively and that conceding control over the production and distribution of such to the government apparatus is an unnecessary risk. Nobody really wants to make the DMV the model for good government — but that doesn’t mean conservatives oppose the goal of meeting those societal needs.</p><p>This second category of positive rights is also infused by the idea of “fairness.” We all think we know what’s fair. And we all think that idea is determined by universal moral values. The problem is that “fairness” is a subjective notion that constantly seeks a moral absolute, and depends largely on one’s point of reference. In other words, because fairness cannot be measured in any absolute way, what seems fair to me may seem unfair to you. We become lost in relativism. This is the problem conservatives see in demanding everyone pay their “fair” share of taxes. What, exactly, is fair?</p><p>Jonathan Haidt points this out by showing that conservatives and liberals have different definitions of fairness: “On the left, fairness often implies equality, but on the right it means proportionality — people should be rewarded in proportion to what they contribute, even if that guarantees unequal outcomes.”</p><p>It flows from this that conservatives believe that we can and should guarantee equality of opportunity, but not equality of result, and that’s about as fair as we can be. Most of us heard from our parents early on that “life is not fair,” which is true, but that’s why we have many non-political institutions such as family, kin networks, unions, charities, and more to help compensate for the unfairness of life.</p><p><strong>After thinking about Ms. Witt’s manifesto, I realized she was just declaring herself</strong> a humanist, a claim shared by almost all people who live in harmony among their fellow human beings. Humanism is noble (as long as it is not abused.) Humanists are liberal, conservative, socialist, libertarian, and also non-ideological.</p><p>I happen to believe that reds and blues share most of the same deeply held beliefs about American society but differ significantly in how to support those beliefs in practice. Differences in practice can be tested empirically and then converge on best practices. But attacking each other on moral grounds ignores our common humanity and drives us apart unnecessarily. I think as citizens, we want to achieve these goals through successful governance, and not just win elections and ultimately fail to achieve these goals.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2aa954f73f7d" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Real Tragedy of Chauvin-Floyd]]></title>
            <link>https://mharring54.medium.com/the-real-tragedy-of-chauvin-floyd-5aac20dfb31?source=rss-fa9e61570700------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/5aac20dfb31</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Harrington]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2021 15:01:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-04-22T15:01:34.060Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>The Real Tragedy of Chauvin-Floyd</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/275/1*pDA4-5rdQqOaYdm4ifwbWg.jpeg" /><figcaption>Black vs. White? or Black + White?</figcaption></figure><p>With the verdict received in the trial of Derek Chauvin, one could hope that a certain sense of justice had been dealt for the death of George Floyd. Mr. Chauvin was certainly guilty of a crime, though it is beyond my purview to decide exactly what that crime was. In any event, the jury made its judgment. But where do we go from here? Apparently, many of our political leaders could not resist voicing their opinions from the safe perch of social media, mostly echoing the overarching assumption of systemic racism, not only in law enforcement but throughout American society. The most florid Rep. Ocasio-Cortez tweeted that “this verdict is not a substitute for policy change.” I think perhaps we might be able to converge on that sentiment, provided it is based on reasoned logic rather than virtue signaling.</p><p>Because our media hypes emotional reactions over reasoned analysis, we end up focused on the symptoms rather than the causes of our social troubles. The problem of policing starts at the beginning, not the end, of the story. And at the beginning, there are two primary causes, identified by social scientists such as Daniel Moynihan, Thomas Sowell, and Charles Murray and affirmed by empirical data: First is the disintegration of urban black families under the direction of welfare state policies instituted back in the 1960s in response to Michael Harrington’s (no relation) <em>The Other America</em>. Economist Thomas Sowell has documented the evidence that black families were more intact with two married parents before the Great Society and marks the mid-1960s as the inflection point. The incentives provided by programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, which grew enormously during the decade after 1965, occasioned a virtual explosion of births to unmarried mothers. From 10% of all births of all races in 1970 to 41% in 2010. But for black mothers the increase was from 38% in 1970 to 72% in 2010, meaning that almost 3/4s of all births in the black community today are to unmarried mothers.</p><p>Besides the effects of welfare dependence, other factors likely include the decline of marriageability of black fathers due to lack of job opportunities, to changing sexual mores and behaviors, and to increased job opportunities for women. But no matter the cause, these trends demand a policy response to the break-up of family institutions that ensure social stability and upward mobility. As a Brookings report as far back as 1996 admits below, that policy response has been lacking and perhaps can be attributed to the second cause of urban decay.</p><p>“If we have learned any policy lesson well over the past 25 years, it is that for children living in single-parent homes, the odds of living in poverty are great. The policy implications of the increase in out-of-wedlock births are staggering.”</p><p>- <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/an-analysis-of-out-of-wedlock-births-in-the-united-states/"><em>Brookings Policy Briefs</em></a></p><p>This second cause can be traced to the redirected spending priorities of urban political machines under the cover of the liberal welfare state. The urban political machines that characterize politics in cities such as Baltimore, New York, Chicago, Detroit, Minneapolis, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and other large metro areas are run primarily for the benefit of organized public unions such as teachers, police, fire, waste disposal, and municipal workers. As they say, let’s follow the money.</p><p>In 1962, President Kennedy issued an executive order recognizing the right of federal and public sector employees to unionize and bargain collectively over labor contracts. This opened a Pandora’s Box that I suspect JFK would have strongly regretted had he lived to see the result. When public union officials bargain with politicians the only ones with skin-in-the-game are not even at the negotiating table. That would be the taxpaying citizens. Politicians who need votes and campaign funds for re-election readily grant contract conditions that never need to be rationalized financially and push serious liabilities — such as pensions and healthcare — off to the future (when they conveniently will no longer be in office). In return, they receive campaign funds and votes delivered by unions. The result has been serious deficits for municipalities that require a re-orientation of spending priorities — away from the dependent poor and necessary municipal services towards servicing public sector union wages and benefits. For those who have retired after 25 years of service, it has been a bonanza.</p><p>The budget squeeze has had the most deleterious effect on public schools that the urban poor depend upon to educate their children and free up parents to support a family. The performance failure of urban public schools is legendary and has now been exposed to all with the recent pandemic lockdown. In Los Angeles, where the United Teachers of Los Angeles holds sway over the public schools, only 35% of a $7+ billion budget goes to teacher salaries, with the bulk going to administrative salaries, pensions, and benefits. This has created a two-tier seniority system that characterizes most public unions today where legacy members receive most of the value while new hires do all the work and receive far less. The strain on resources means the students and their families end up with the short end of the stick.</p><p>Now let us connect the dots. The breakdown of urban families and the narrow self-serving policies of urban political machines have left young urban minorities with slim possibilities of becoming productive citizens and leave them mired in poverty and despair. Without a decent education and stability in the home, black youths face dismal opportunities in a society where intellectual skills have become a necessary passport to success. Is it any wonder they turn to a lucrative culture of crime and illicit drug markets with all the propensities for violence?</p><p>Faced with this violent crime problem, city officials then task law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system to clean it up, or at least keep it under control. Is it any wonder that confrontations between police and young black men and women dominate our crime incidents? And that a regrettable number of mistakes occur under harrowing conditions that prove fatal to both police and alleged perpetrators? That young black men populate our prisons and become more criminalized? Police and innocent bystanders have to put their lives on the front line in this battle for order, but bureaucrats and politicians who have failed us all along are comfortably ensconced with high-paying jobs and sinecures. And the destructive policies continue.</p><p>To ignore this reality for an unprovable narrative of “systemic racism” is the true tragedy of the Chauvin-Floyd trial. In essence, they are both victims of an urban society that has failed us. As I mentioned at the beginning of this essay, perhaps AOC is correct about the need for policy change. She is most certainly correct, but not in the way she intends. With the empirical evidence of the past half-century, one can make the case that the only truly racist institutions in America today are the public education system run by teachers’ unions and the welfare state run by public sector unions and their political cronies. The policy changes needed are school choice and constraints on public sector union bargaining. It’s high time those of us with skin-in-the-game took notice and demanded the right kind of policy changes.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=5aac20dfb31" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How Not to Manage Pandemics]]></title>
            <link>https://mharring54.medium.com/how-not-to-manage-pandemics-a3f18364169f?source=rss-fa9e61570700------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a3f18364169f</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[lockdown]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[policy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[pandemic]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Harrington]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2020 22:59:30 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2021-07-11T01:49:32.459Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*DvdhPGRooB04sOwZwef5zw.png" /></figure><p>We find ourselves approaching Month Nine of a world-wide pandemic shutdown with only a few isolated exceptions across countries. There seems to be no end in sight. This should suggest that the particular nature of a virus pathogen defies a rational, measured social response, especially for a free democratic society.</p><p>This nature is defined by an unmeasurable <em>risk</em> shrouded in a fog of <em>uncertainty</em> that is reflected in the emotional <em>fear</em> incited by the coronavirus. That fear is amplified by several scientific realities: there is yet no sure treatment cure, there is yet no effective, preventive vaccine, and there is yet little verified knowledge about how the virus behaves and what effects it may have on long-term human health. These truths create the impenetrable fog of uncertainty that incites our fears.</p><p>On a societal level, fear is manifested in a loss of trust among fellow citizens who harbor different tolerances for risk and uncertainty, which leads them to question whether others share the same risk profiles and associated safety protocols and what those protocols should be.</p><p>All these factors taken together present a formidable challenge to those charged with messaging and managing an effective policy response, from politicians and agency bureaucrats to scientists and medical practitioners.</p><p>We’ve seen historic cases of how this plays out. There was the Black Death, smallpox, and frequent outbreaks of the plague during the Middle Ages. We have the Spanish flu and the polio epidemic a century ago and, in more recent times, the Avian and Swine flus, AIDS, SARS and Ebola. We have discovered, despite our interventions, that most of these pandemics run their course before dying out. The coronavirus that afflicts us today appears to have certain unique characteristics that distinguish it from other, more familiar virus pathogens. One is that it seems to spread easily and effectively, despite strict hygienic practices. Second, the health and fatality risks seem to skew more seriously against the old and the infirm.</p><p>But what is far more salient to our fates with this virus are not the epidemiological factors, but the psychological effects on society at large. The costs of these effects are largely ignored because they are based on unknown probabilities. What we need to know is what is going on inside the human brain that influences mass social behavior, with its potential for hysteria.</p><p>Over the past fifty years we’ve accumulated a wealth of psychological research that addresses behavior under extreme uncertainty. The foundational research was produced by the collaboration of two Israeli psychologists, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. Much of their work helped shape our understanding of behavior and decision-making under uncertainty and led to a Novel Prize in economics for Prof. Kahneman in 2002.</p><p>What is interesting is that some of the experimental study scenarios they developed closely approximate what we are experiencing today in real time and help to illuminate why we mismanage such uncertainty. In particular, there was an experiment then became widely known as the <em>Asian Disease Problem</em>.</p><p>This experiment asked subjects to imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed, assuming that the exact scientific estimate of the consequence of the programs is as follows:</p><blockquote>If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.</blockquote><blockquote>If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and a 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. Which of the two programs would you favor?</blockquote><p>An overwhelming majority chose Program A, and saved 200 lives with certainty rather than take a gamble where 600 might die. They chose the certainty over the risk of trying to save all.</p><p>A second group of subjects got the same setup but with a choice between two other programs:</p><blockquote>If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die.</blockquote><blockquote>If Program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die and a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.</blockquote><blockquote>When the choice was framed this way, an overwhelmingly majority chose Program D.</blockquote><p>One can see that the <em>expected</em> outcomes here are identical: 200 people are saved for sure, while 400 people die for sure vs. 1/3 probability of saving all and a 2/3 probability of losing all.</p><p>The authors explain this flip as “framing” the issue either as a sure win or loss. When you frame the sure thing as a loss, people choose the gamble. But when you frame it as a gain, people pick the sure thing. The choice is determined by how the problem is framed. Furthermore, what led subjects to distinguish between a gain and a loss was a <em>psychological</em> state, which differs from individual to individual. We’ll explore how this may apply to the coronavirus pandemic, but first we must examine another key finding of Kahneman and Tversky’s research.</p><p>In another series of studies, they found that subjects were confused by remote probabilities. They feared a one-in-a-billion chance of loss more than they should and attached more hope to a one-in-a-billion chance of gain than they should. They treat all remote probabilities as if they are possibilities. People’s emotional response to extremely long odds leads them to reverse their usual taste for risk, and to become risk-seeking when pursuing a long-shot gain and risk-averse when faced with the extremely remote possibility of loss.</p><p>In gambles that offer a certain outcome, people willingly pay a premium beyond the expected outcome for that certainty. To predict how people actually choose when faced with radical uncertainty, one had to “weight” the probabilities with emotion. Then one can explain why people overpay when they buy insurance or lottery tickets. We reconcile this behavior as loss aversion to distinguish it from pure risk aversion.</p><p>The desire for certainty can extract a high price, but the problem we all face in life is that the only certainty is uncertainty. So, people unknowingly pay a high price for the<em> </em>mere<em> illusion </em>of certainty.</p><p>I hope we are beginning to see how these human instinctual behaviors will play out when faced with a radically uncertain virus pandemic. So far, we have two premises supported by empirical studies:</p><blockquote>1. People react differently to risk depending on how the narrative of uncertainty is framed;</blockquote><blockquote>2. People overestimate remote probabilities and react emotionally to loss aversion.</blockquote><p>In the context of a real virus pandemic we have several more confounding factors. First, unlike the Asian Disease experiment, we have no idea of the probabilities of imagined scenarios, so we are heavily influenced by psychological factors. Second is the effect of the media and the bias of its messaging. It is common knowledge in the news industry that emotional sensationalism sells the product far better than sterile information: “If it bleeds, it leads.” We see this in the emphasis of news reporting on daily death counts and unconfirmed fatality, hospitalization, and infection rates. Then these frequency counts and rates of change are projected in a straight line or even exponential function to invoke wild predictions of an apocalyptic future.</p><p>The effect on mass psychology, especially with the prevalence of unfiltered social media, transmutes rational prudence and caution into unrestrained fear and panic. This is very bad science, but profitable, if not good, journalism.</p><p>Finally, we must turn to the challenges facing public leaders in managing an uncontrollable pandemic crisis. What do they do? To fathom that we need to examine the incentives that these public officials themselves face, given that they’re subject to the same psychological effects as everyone else.</p><p>Public officials mostly face downside risk: they get blamed for obvious failure, yet the upside consists mostly of avoiding that blame. If they project 500,000 people might die if nothing is done, but then only 200,000 die, they can claim success. But if they claim only 150,000 may die and 200,000 actually die, then they are blamed for losing 50,000 lives. We saw these incentives in play early in the pandemic with wild predictions of 65% infection rates combined with 2% mortality rates, implying that millions if not tens of millions of people would die unless drastic measures were taken.</p><p>State and local officials could also avoid taking responsibility for the costs of these measures under the guise of Federal revenue sharing and disaster relief. In other words, they can pass the buck.</p><p>The result of this risk-reward incentive structure means these public officials and politicians, with few notable exceptions, are inclined to be extremely risk and loss averse, no matter what the cost. This means rational economic trade-offs are ignored in favor of extreme measures pursuing the delusion of zero-risk tolerance.</p><p>Medical experts, trained under the Hippocratic Oath to do no harm, face these same incentives, no matter how competent they are. They are trained to heal and avoid deciding life-and-death trade-offs of a deadly pandemic.</p><p>We can summarize how this story inevitably plays out and if that helps us understand how the pandemic mismanagement has unfolded in reality. When the threat was a distant one in a distant land, almost all politicians understandably downplayed the threat. The outbreaks in Italy then set off the media messaging, hyping the fear of coronavirus infection and death from Covid-19. The fact that the crisis could be politicized in an election year added fuel to the fire.</p><p>Let us recall “Flatten the curve” back in March, 2020, when exponential functions of death counts were all the rage. At this time certain governors promoted incomprehensible exponential predictions of mortality rates amid demands for complete shutdowns of society. All of this unfolded in a deep shroud of uncertainty with media accounts of catastrophes in China, Italy, and Spain.</p><p>So, the risk was framed as the ultimate loss of life with probabilities that had little basis in empirical data and were presented as likely possibilities rather than truly remote probabilities. With public criticism and accountability falling on political leaders, “flatten the curve” suddenly was transformed into perpetual lockdowns with moving goal posts.</p><p>The uncertainty surrounding the virus pathology led medical experts to issue contradictory and inconsistent directives and advice. First masks were unnecessary, then they became mandatory. A distance of six feet was determined as the range of infectious spread, but then sitting on a beach in solitude was deemed unacceptable.</p><p>Soon the data began to reveal the narrowness of the at-risk population based on age and co-morbidities, but the media focus targeted singular anomalies associated with anecdotal cases, heightening fears that Covid-19 is a deadly threat to all. The demands for zero-risk tolerance grew among those more loss averse and less affected by economic lockdowns. Life could not return to normal until a vaccine was developed, ignoring the fact that no virus vaccines are near 100% effective.</p><p>Rational health practices to bolster immune systems and protect at-risk population cohorts have been forced into one-size-fits-all safety protocols. At the same time, the deadly health effects of an endless quarantine are being ignored for this overreaction to remote possibilities. More data has started to make this clear, yet we seem rooted in the emotion-driven mistakes of the status-quo.</p><p>The risks of Covid-19 vary widely across the population based on personal characteristics, mostly age and immune health, so a general risk factor cannot be established except that it is extremely small compared to most other health risks. For example, I am a 66-year-old, Caucasian male in good health with no immune issues. I plugged my data into two online calculators of my risk for contracting the virus and my contingent risk of dying from Covid-19. My risk of contracting the virus and getting sick is 2.2% or 2 in 100. Assuming that I actually do test positive and get ill, my chance of dying in considered high at 1.08% or 1 in 100. But multiplying these two risks (I can’t die of Covid-19 if I don’t contract the virus) gives me a risk factor of dying from Covid-19 of 0.024%. That’s not 2 of 100 or even 2 out of 1000, but <strong>2 out of 10,000</strong>.</p><p>The question, of course, is how much am I really willing to pay to avoid a risk of 2 out of 10,000? And I am in a high-risk age category. Selling Covid-19 life insurance has got to be one of the most lucrative business ideas imaginable.</p><p>Given the behaviors driven by human instinct and emotion and the incentive structures of free democratic societies, we should concede the inevitability that such crises will be mismanaged with public policy. (Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, don’t face the same hurdles.)</p><p>This coronavirus pandemic is a global tragedy, one that is still ongoing. Unfortunately, the crisis gets magnified by our human failings. Probably the best free democracies can do is to take simple, not drastic, precautions and wait for the virus to resolve itself. We must live with that uncertainty.</p><p>Chalk it up to a costly and painful learning experience.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a3f18364169f" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How Can an Author Make Money?]]></title>
            <link>https://mharring54.medium.com/how-can-an-author-make-money-bd86327c1dba?source=rss-fa9e61570700------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/bd86327c1dba</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[publishing]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[books]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[music-business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[social-network]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[creativity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Harrington]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2020 19:12:59 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-14T22:01:15.867Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Q: How Can an Author Make Money?</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/862/1*xM0EfrnmacsknYPaYomJ8A.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Hint: It’s all about the data.</em></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past 30 years, we’ve witnessed a radical transformation of creative industries buffeted by digital formats. Moore’s Law governing the cost of digital computing has drastically reduced the costs of creative production and product distribution. For aspiring authors this means no need for commercial book printing — all one needs is a simple computer with a word processing program and eBook publishing software provided free online. The zero marginal cost of digital distribution has also made large scale distribution through publishing houses unnecessary; one can distribute through Amazon for a 30% fee or distribute directly for the price of an Internet connection.</p><p>Moreover, the massive capital outlays associated with producing and distributing physical product no longer apply in the digital world. This means risk capital is no longer the tail that wags the dog of creative industries (film production excepted).</p><p>Following the simple economic law of supply and demand, these trends have led to an explosion of supply while collapsing the selling price of content. Most self-published titles on Amazon sell for $2.99 or less. Many are given away for free to build a more valuable brand.</p><p>While global demand from readers has responded strongly to these lower prices, the considerable costs of matching supply and demand across global niche markets prevent the price from increasing to a sustained equilibrium. Recent data show the number of books self-published in the U.S. in 2018 was 1.68 million, up from 1.19 million in 2017, a 40% jump. But this is not a response to excess demand, rather an explosion of excess supply driving down unit prices and author incomes. According to the Authors Guild 2018 survey, the median annual income for all published authors fell from $3,900 to $3,100, while full-time traditionally published authors earned $12,400. That’s not a lot of money. For authors to rely on book sales as a primary source of income is an exercise in poverty.</p><p>The upshot is that creative content is mostly given away for free in order to build audience awareness while incomes for author/creators fall below the subsistence level. Hence the photo above.</p><p><strong>The Streaming Siren</strong></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*dg1mYWJrpC6p7lvxX5AAAQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>In his book, <em>Who Owns the Future</em>, technology guru Jaron Lanier cited the main failure of the digital age: By encouraging users to give away valuable information about themselves in exchange for free services, network platforms accrue large amounts of valuable data at virtually no cost. Lanier calls these firms “Siren Servers,” alluding to the Sirens of Ulysses. Instead of paying each individual for their contribution to the data pool, the Siren Servers concentrate wealth in the hands of the few who control the data centers.</p><p><em>Read more:</em> <a href="https://www.aspen.review/article/2017/jaron-lanier%3A-beware-of-siren-servers%21/">Jaron Lanier: Beware of Siren Servers!</a></p><p>In terms of creative content, when users share their creativity, or exchange and sell it, that very process creates valuable information that platforms sell to third parties. This information includes who you are, who your friends are, what you like, and what you buy. Amazon and other online booksellers accumulate this information through their online marketplaces and other services. Together with its bookstore, Amazon has successfully developed data mining through its various publishing services: Kindle Unlimited, CreateSpace, and the Goodreads sharing network.</p><p>One needs to unpackage the subscription-based streaming business model to understand what is going on. Storing and streaming all the world’s content is not economic as a revenue model based on subscription revenues alone. In other words, the cost involved in storing and delivering all the eBooks in the world greatly exceeds the $10/mo. subscription prices KU members pay, so these services are being subsidized by shareholders, and/or by revenues pooled from other sources by diversified companies like Apple, Amazon, and Google. In other words, Amazon or Apple can lose money on subscriptions indefinitely as long as they can see some additional return from another source. That source is the network information data generated by users.</p><p>Because the streaming model is not really profitable, except as a loss leader to keep signing up new users, cost pressures prevent platforms from paying authors fair value for their content. The online eBook lending Kindle Unlimited has used its data-gathering Kindle network to monitor readers’ habits and only pay out “per pages read” royalties to authors. Needless to say, these are extremely low compared to an outright sale.</p><p>In addition, traditional book publishers that control copyrights can demand the lion’s share of any licensing royalties. For existing catalogs, this is just free money with no production costs or investment risks involved. New boss, same as the old boss.</p><p>Interestingly, due to the almost zero market price of digital content, the cost of streaming/lending probably exceeds the true purchase price for that same content. The real difference is the actual content we are interested in consuming: the entire universe of possibilities or what we’ll actually consume? Streaming is an illusory choice: “I have the world’s library of books at my fingertips, but actually I’ll never read 99.9% of them.”</p><p>So, what are we paying for? Subscribers who read infrequently are cross-subsidizing the few who read voraciously. These voracious readers used to buy books; now they just rent them through Amazon’s digital subscription library so total revenue in the book marketplace is reduced, squeezing all participants. Amazon’s subscription lending service is essentially a global library where the price of admission is the subscription paid to Amazon as the gatekeeper. Once inside borrowing is free. This not how the public library system works.</p><p>We should also note that the lending model is less successful than it could be because many authors and publishers refuse to participate in Kindle Unlimited, refusing to allow their books lent out for a pittance. This is especially true of authors under print publishing contracts.</p><p><strong>Lost in an Ocean of eBooks</strong></p><p>With such a vast supply of books being published, the search and discovery process for individual consumers becomes prohibitive — it just takes too much time and energy to find what we want. The nature of creative content has a lot to do with this because the value of creativity is very subjective and difficult to anticipate. Professional critics exist but, with so much content, random popularity is usually the default while the commoditization of eBooks drives the price to the common denominator on price. A future Hemingway or Fitzgerald commands the same price as some erotic drivel.</p><p>The Big Data solution is to search and curate content for us with recommendation engines. Without the resources to consume and evaluate all that content, we must rely on machine algorithms that primarily measure objective factors such as stylistic similarities and streaming or sales counts. This means AI machine algorithms are judging and choosing the art we wish to consume.</p><p>This doesn’t mean robots are in control, but it does privilege certain metrics, like popularity. Success breeds success as we are fed the most popular content and creative incomes become more drastically skewed in a winner-take-all, superstar contest. This is why 5% of the authors are earning 95% of the revenues and the pressure to keep readers engaged means publishing shorter formulaic works more frequently. This is also why it’s so hard to find a refreshing new author within our chosen genres and interests. Unseen and unheard, innovative, risk-taking authors toil in obscurity or cease to create. Forget about the next <em>War and Peace</em>.</p><p>With a few notable exceptions, this is what we are seeing today with the streaming of digital content in music, eBooks, and movies. This state of affairs is unsustainable and damaging to the long-term evolution of culture.</p><p><strong>What to Do?</strong></p><p>To truly understand what has happened in creative industries, one must stop thinking about these industries using the business models of the recent era, which are defined by the ownership and control of physical media. In the publishing industry, this would be the printing and distribution of physical books. Physical media permitted centralized control over market supply and price, most often through the distribution channel. This is how distributors like record companies, movie studios, and print publishers came to dominate this era. All that has changed, but what has replaced it is not fundamentally different, with centralized control over online distribution networks by technology behemoths like Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon. Some great efficiencies have been realized, but the skewed distribution of value has become even worse.</p><p>Artists have been responding to the challenges of the digital age over the past two decades by harnessing many new tools provided by technology. We’ll discuss some of the more common online platforms in terms of their strengths and weaknesses, realizing that none of them solve the true problem.</p><p>In the digital age, artists are faced with three related challenges: promotion, distribution, and pricing. Social media is the primary channel for promotion and audience building. Platforms like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter can be used to build brand awareness and attract followers. Some streaming platforms connect their streaming services to a marketplace where artists can sell content for a nominal price. Examples are Amazon, Smashwords, Apple, and YouTube/Google.</p><p>With each of these promotion and distribution channels, artists are limited in their ability to monetize the value of their content. Because the age of physical media focused on the transaction value of content — selling books or CDs — many artists are still focused on selling content at the much-reduced price. This is not financially viable unless one is in the elite winners’ bracket; as with other free media channels, the sales revenue stream is negligible.</p><p>The current streaming/lending distribution services cannot solve this problem for artists, they can only make it worse. Spotify has been lobbying artists heavily to convince them that eventually, they will receive all of the royalty revenue streams, cutting out the record companies and publishers, but that only favors the elite winners who can reach a global market through their unique brand presence.</p><p>What really matters is audience share and follower networks. A successful author doesn’t need seven billion readers to survive, a hundred thousand will do, but the problem is being able to sift the billions of readers worldwide to find those one hundred thousand who want to read your book. This is a promotion and sales challenge that can’t be financed these days. On the plus side, artists who are savvy social media influencers can reap far more value from selling access to their follower networks to 3rd party advertisers and marketers. This is what the network platforms are doing with our data. Mostly they are selling it back to us and reaping the flow of data both ways: a ready supply of free content that creates user network data that they then repackage to advertisers who want to reach a targeted market. It’s great to be on the receiving end of that revenue model, as any shareholder of Apple, Google, Facebook or Amazon will attest. The trouble is most artist-creators do all of the giving and none of the receiving.</p><p>The only viable solution for the large majority of artists is to secure ownership and control over their audiences, or peer networks. But this means to control the revenue stream that platforms wish to exploit for themselves. The old centralized distribution model, with all the centralization of market control, has merely been replaced by a new centralized digital distributional network. But the true promise of information technology and data networks is market decentralization. This is where we can integrate social media, digital distribution, and blockchain to build an ecosystem that distributes value fairly across that ecosystem.</p><p><strong>The Secret Sauce: It’s All About Data</strong></p><p>The first maxim of this new world of digital media is that value is derived not from individual content, but from <em>the data networks created by sharing this content</em>. This bears repeating because it requires a different way of thinking about the role of creative content. Content is used as a means to create networks rather than as an end in itself. This may go against the grain of artistic expression and motivation for its intrinsic value, but it does promote the sharing of that expression with an appreciative audience. We should be seeking to reinforce that human connection.<br> <br> Broadcast television was built on the 3rd party advertising revenue model, so it’s not a radical innovation. Network platforms, like television broadcasters, gather the information data from their users and sell it. Think of Nielsen ratings. The problem, again, for artists and users is that they don’t receive a fair share of the data value they create in the network; instead, that value accrues to those who own and control the centralized network. This is especially true for those servers that, like tv broadcasters, stream content.</p><p><strong>How can we change direction?</strong></p><p>First, as previously mentioned, the solutions offered up by the streaming platforms don’t really solve the problem. Streaming services like Spotify, YouTube, TikTok, Apple, or Amazon Music/Kindle are consumer-centric in that they deliver an infinite supply of content to consumer devices at a low, subsidized price. Artists virtually give away their art in order to promote their brand and build audience awareness. Top streaming content can also be used to demonstrate market viability to attract interest from a publisher or record label.</p><p>Platforms for independent artists, like Smashwords and Amazon, are artist-centric in that they help artists build an online presence and monetize sales in a marketplace.</p><p>Pure social networks like Facebook and Instagram help artists promote their brands and can be harnessed by influencers to build follower networks that can be monetized through the platform.</p><p>But in each and every case, artists and creators end up with tiny residuals after the platforms take their share of the transactions and data network value created. Instead of continuing down this road, artists need a platform that allows them to <em>own </em>and<em> control</em> their audience shares. They also need to harness the power of social media networks to promote their content so they don’t have to become social media marketers in addition to artist-creators. In other words, <em>we need to harness social network dynamics to a marketplace with users in control of their peer networks.</em></p><p>One can imagine such a platform as illustrated in the graphic below. This model integrates social network dynamics with a peer-to-peer marketplace and blockchain ledgers to keep track of user-generated network data and value.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*H1fE7D0dcb4NwVZz2Gw5Fg.jpeg" /><figcaption>The <strong>tuka</strong> ecosystem</figcaption></figure><p>· The <strong>social network</strong> searches, shares, curates, and promotes content as it builds peer networks of users, or audiences, with similar content tastes.</p><p>· The <strong>peer-to-peer marketplace</strong> allows creators to sell or license their content directly to users. The importance is less about the price value of content and more about making strong network connections between artists and consumers.</p><p>· Control over peer networks (followers) allows users to <strong>monetize</strong> their audiences to 3rd party advertisers or promoters while spreading the value received across the peer network through special discounts or <strong>token rewards</strong>.</p><p>· <strong>Blockchain ledgers</strong> anchor the network data to artist content and user behaviors. Decentralized blockchain allows value to be distributed to users who create value through sharing and purchasing/licensing content. Tokens can be used post-sale by artists to reward followers/influencers who promote their content that leads to sales conversions. Crypto-tokens rewards become the unit of value to be exchanged, which can be used on the platform or converted to other currencies through an exchange.</p><p>Conceptually, a network platform hosting a decentralized creative content catalog that becomes large enough can develop a streaming channel that would operate more like an artist cooperative. Think <em>United Artists</em>. Revenue streams would include direct digital downloads, streaming royalties, and advertising.</p><p>So, the short answer to the question, <em>How Can an Author Make Money?</em> is: <em>By sharing their stories and controlling the network they create.</em> All one needs is the right platform.</p><p>If we build it, they will come.</p><p><em>Read More</em>: <a href="http://www.tukaglobal.com/"><em>tuka</em>: Connecting the Creative</a></p><p><em>The author is the Founder and CEO of </em><strong><em>tuka</em></strong><em> (</em><a href="http://www.tukaglobal.com/"><em>www.tukaglobal.com</em></a><em>), a social network platform for sharing creative digital content that will integrate with the Ethereum blockchain platform.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=bd86327c1dba" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[How I will Vote This Time. And Why.]]></title>
            <link>https://mharring54.medium.com/how-i-will-vote-this-time-and-why-ef14d17c6159?source=rss-fa9e61570700------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/ef14d17c6159</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[trump]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[2020-presidential-race]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democrats]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[democracy]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[biden]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Harrington]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2020 20:36:01 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-10-07T04:50:27.228Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3><strong>How I Will Vote This Time. And Why.</strong></h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IJNH2yVgEKW6reei1jbkmQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Back in September, 2016, I wrote an essay posted <a href="https://casinocap.wordpress.com/2016/09/03/why-i-will-vote-neither-nor/">here</a> explaining why I would not be voting for either Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump for POTUS. At the time I stated that “I do not believe Trump has the temperament, nor do I feel Clinton has the integrity, while neither display the requisite political skills to lead this nation.” At the time I argued for a protest vote and explained why, but nobody really needed to listen.</p><p>One could probably argue that I was only half right, because Trump did win the election and we’re still here. Political competence is probably in the eye of the beholder.</p><p>So, four years later we’re back with a similar choice between Trump for re-election or former VP Joe Biden to succeed him and I am again faced with the same quandary. You’re probably thinking, who cares? But I will state here in writing my decision for several reasons, in brief so as to not needlessly bore you if you’re still reading.</p><p>First, I’m a political scientist and policy analyst, so I’m not uninformed when it comes to American politics as I have been observing, studying, and analyzing our party politics for the better part of four decades. Second, due to my professional interests I find myself frequently in these contentious debates over partisan and ideological politics where the accusations and projections fly, the result being that I find myself constantly having to restate my initial positions, which are now published here forever on the Internet. With this record, I can merely refer my discussant to review what I wrote, rather than waste time restating it and not being believed.</p><p>This has been useful because for the past four years I have tried to explain to Trump-haters (and they really do hate him) that Trump is not the cause, but the symptom of our political dysfunction. Now, if you’re a Trump-hater, and I’m not, you’ll have none of it and so I have often been accused of being a Trump supporter, and I’m not. I just want to live in a rational world and there’s nothing rational about our current politics.</p><p>Let me give a quick overview of the situation as I see it. I don’t see a knight in shining armor here, either in the person of the President or his challenger. On one side I see a bull in a china shop, being deliberately poked and breaking things as his ego, self-aggrandizement, and political survival require. I do believe his one desire, for better or worse, is to be judged by history as a successful president. I imagine every president’s ultimate aspiration is to be judged in the same company as Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln.</p><p>On the other side, I see a historically weak candidate with 47 unremarkable years in Washington politics, paired with an ambitious dark horse running mate that failed miserably among her own voters; both being propped up by a shadow party eager to return to power. Given Biden’s obvious cognitive decline and the excessive demands of the presidency, I really have no idea who would be commanding a Biden administration or what agenda they would put forth once they no longer have an opposition to demonize. The candidate seems unable to articulate this.</p><p>Not a great choice, but this is where we are.</p><p>For me this election is not just about judging personalities and character, both of which I find wanting (the first debate confirmed this). What I see beyond the media-driven smoke and mirrors is a deep power struggle between two contending visions of American society and between two elite political camps who both want to secure that power. But these visions seem to be a means to an end rather than the defense of constitutional first principles. It also appears that either side will do anything, say anything, in order to prevail in the coming election, even fanning the flames of social conflict.</p><p>I don’t see American politics as a battle between Athens and Sparta, or Rome and Carthage, where the loser will be erased from history. Rather I see a pendulum swing that has always marked our national politics. In my own experience I have seen Nixon as a reaction to Johnson, Carter as a reaction to Nixon, Reagan as a reaction to Carter, Clinton as a reaction to Reagan/Bush, Bush as a reaction to Clinton, Obama as a reaction to Bush, and finally Trump as a reaction to Obama. Will Biden be a reaction to Trump, or will we need to wait for 2024?</p><p>At the same time, I have lived through a cultural evolution that has seen the decline of national identity that has diminished our sense of shared community. As a matter of fact, supported by data, this is most defined by a rural — suburban — urban divide, which has been blurred by our obsessions with multiculturalism and identity politics. We are also divided by class, with growing inequality between the asset-rich and asset-poor. These changes have accelerated with technology and globalization. The resulting tension is over the <em>pace of change</em>, between gradual managed traditionalism vs. proactive progressivism. This is a significant point, because opposing positions on the pace of change can be reconciled.</p><p>Unfortunately, I see us turning national politics into the ultimate prize conferring power over the present and future, and now even the past. I think this is largely a political conceit. The pendulum still swings, but in the short-term power means wealth and control and that seems to be what motivates our politics today, from the top down. Prudently managing change and stable continuity seems to have gotten lost in the shuffle.</p><p>If you love or hate Trump, nothing I write here is going to change your mind — that’s pretty much a given. But consider the endless parade of scandals for and against the Trump administration and how that reflects on our democratic governance. Look at the failures of the media — both for and against Trump — to inform us objectively. Look at the attacks on our institutions — again from both sides. Look at the decline in trust across our society. One can merely reference a long laundry list of inter-party sabotage: from Russian collusion investigations and counter-investigations; to impeachment proceedings that were cynically pursued even though everyone knew it was a purely partisan gambit; to the politicization of a global virus pandemic; to racial unrest that has degenerated into violence and disorder; to a democratic national election that establishment elites threaten to dismiss as illegitimate. As I write this, we can now expect to enjoin another fierce battle that further politicizes our Supreme Court and judiciary. And I thought justice was supposed to be blind.<br> <br> Trump is not “doing” this to us, and I’ve already used his name too many times in this essay considering he’s merely a symptom. My evaluation of his presidency is mixed, but one would think it to be an unmitigated disaster according to much of the news media. I can understand the dismay because the current administration has largely reversed the direction of the previous administration across most of the policy landscape. But that’s free democracy, which, despite protests to the contrary, we have not abandoned as we contest competing visions through the electoral process. But obsessing over the person of the presidency is driving us to the brink of insanity. Thank goodness for the Federal Reserve and Treasury, which keeps pumping money into our pockets (please note the sarcasm).</p><p>These last four years of political clashes underline the deeper societal dysfunction that has plagued us for almost two generations through divisive identity politics and a multiculturalism that deemphasizes our shared national culture. This is what I find far more disturbing than an elected official I didn’t vote for. What happened to winning elections through persuasion and common interests?</p><p>So, in brief, in November I will be casting a vote for the re-election of Donald Trump for three main reasons:</p><p>1. A Russian collusion/impeachment effort that has consumed 4 years of national governance for naught, promoted by a disingenuous political opposition and a complacent or duplicitous Fourth Estate;</p><p>2. A pandemic policy that has ignored rational risk trade-offs in a further attempt to politicize a health crisis that affects us all, especially those who can’t vote;</p><p>3. The promotion of racial animus and division through identity politics and public shaming in order to advance narrow political ambitions.</p><p>To be sure, racial minorities do have legitimate and pressing grievances. But these societal failures are not being addressed by cancel culture and the Black Lives Matter movement. Minorities, especially urban minorities, have been victims of poor housing policy, failures of public education that impede life opportunities, welfare policies that weaken family structures, failed drug and criminal justice policies, and class-based tax and financial policies that disfavor the asset-poor, driving inequality. I don’t see so-called woke activists addressing any of these challenges, but rather scapegoating the police who have been tasked to manage these aforementioned failures. With the exception of financial policy, these are primarily municipal and state failures and the only national demand on the POTUS will be to restore law and order.</p><p>In my reading of American politics, all the misguided efforts have been primarily driven by the singular desire to destroy a presidency by extraordinary, undemocratic means. And yes, he punches back with little concern for decorum. But this has only served to delegitimize and damage our trust in American democratic politics and institutions. In historical context this is truly a self-inflicted tragedy and one that our foreign adversaries certainly appreciate.</p><p>Perhaps the cultural rot goes much deeper and for that we have only ourselves to blame. Several recent books have traced this decline from the mid-60s to the present. Today one observes a certain psychological hysteria consuming much of the population over politics. Just yesterday I read another typical quote in the media on the upcoming SCOTUS nomination: “The Republican Party is preparing…to send the U.S. spiraling into an abyss of illegitimacy.” Really? This has been going on for four years and we wonder why so many voters have tuned out. In reality, I suspect some of these alarmists are staring into the abyss of political irrelevance.</p><p>I cannot see where this election takes us but I can’t condone political sabotage, no matter who’s holding office. And I’m not interested in childishness claims of, “He started it!” Four years ago, I registered a protest vote, but events have degenerated to the point I will cast my lot. What I seek above all in American democracy is the support and defense of liberty and justice for all, in the historical tradition of classical liberalism and a free society. A further descent into chaos and anarchy certainly doesn’t promote that objective. As I have tried to explain: Trump did not convince me to vote for him, the Democratic Party did.</p><p>I imagine many who read this will vehemently disagree with my interpretations and conclusion, claiming Trump is the threat to democracy. I’m unconvinced. Trump is a one-man force of nature opposed by the entire Washington establishment and mainstream press. He’s not an ideologue and can hardly lead an authoritarian coup — he has no army of Brownshirts and the other two branches of government have not collapsed. We can survive one man for four more years, but the collapse of democratic government will be far more costly. Trump’s election was a warning shot across the bow of both parties, so I would prefer to see the political establishments and media promote successful governance rather than trying to tear down a sitting POTUS. Trump’s instincts have been good, though he tests the waters with tweets meant to provoke. That’s his strategy to read public support.</p><p>Dissent is to be expected and tolerated in the messy process of democracy. However, there is a growing tendency to dismiss those who disagree with us as not acting in good faith. I find that tendency to run counter to the ideals of a free society. I would merely encourage each and every single voter to examine their own conscience, vote, and then accept the results with sober resolve.</p><p>Then we can get back to the more important task of living in peace.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=ef14d17c6159" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Q: How Can a Musician Make Money?]]></title>
            <link>https://mharring54.medium.com/q-how-can-a-musician-make-money-a7a3dfe65711?source=rss-fa9e61570700------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a7a3dfe65711</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-transformation]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[music-business]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[music]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[creativity]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Harrington]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2020 16:55:56 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-08-25T16:55:56.527Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Hint: It’s all about the data.</em></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Kl4R11iQz3nki6EHgPyY7Q.jpeg" /><figcaption><em>Hint: It’s all about the data.</em></figcaption></figure><p>Over the past 30 years, we’ve witnessed a radical transformation of creative industries buffeted by digital formats. Moore’s Law governing the cost of digital computing has drastically reduced the costs of production and distribution. For example, a $250,000 analog studio can now be eclipsed by a $2,500 digital home studio. The zero marginal cost of digital distribution has also made large scale publishing and distribution of physical products obsolete. Following the simple economic law of supply and demand, these technological trends have led to an explosion of supply while collapsing the selling price of creative output. Accordingly, global demand has responded strongly to lower prices, but the considerable cost of matching supply and demand across global niche markets prevents the price from increasing to a sustained level, or equilibrium. The result has been that creative content is almost free and incomes for creators almost non-existent. Hence the life of the busker pictured above.</p><p><strong>The Streaming Siren</strong></p><p>In his book, <em>Who Owns the Future</em>, technology guru and musician Jaron Lanier cited the main failure of the digital age: By encouraging users to give away valuable information about themselves in exchange for free services, network platforms accrue large amounts of valuable data at virtually no cost. Lanier calls these firms “Siren Servers,” alluding to the Sirens of Ulysses. Instead of paying each individual for their contribution to the data pool, the Siren Servers concentrate wealth in the hands of the few who control the data centers.</p><p><em>Read more:</em> <a href="https://www.aspen.review/article/2017/jaron-lanier%3A-beware-of-siren-servers%21/">Jaron Lanier: Beware of Siren Servers!</a></p><p>This is what streaming services such as Spotify, Pandora, Apple Music, Amazon Music, Google Play, etc. are doing with their cloud-based streaming models. One needs to unpackage the streaming business model to understand what is going on. Storing and streaming all the world’s content is not economic as a revenue model based on subscriptions. In other words, the cost involved in storing and delivering all the music in the world greatly exceeds the $10/mo. subscription prices members pay, so these services are being subsidized by shareholders, and/or by revenues pooled from other revenue sources by diversified companies like Apple, Amazon, and Google. In other words, Amazon or Apple can lose money on subscriptions indefinitely as long as they can see some future returns from another source. That source is the network data generated by users.</p><p>The next problem with the streaming model is that because it’s not really profitable, except as a pyramid scheme to keep signing up new users, cost pressures prevent streaming platforms from paying musicians fair value for their content. In addition, record companies that control copyrights can demand the lion’s share of any licensing royalties. For existing catalogs, this is just free money with no production costs involved. New boss, same as the old boss, and I’m not referring to Springsteen or the Who.</p><p><em>Read more</em>: <a href="https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2017/10/20/youtube-pays-million-views/">YouTube — 1.254 Million Views = $42.56</a></p><p>Interestingly, due to the almost zero market price of digital music, the cost of streaming probably exceeds the true price of buying that same content. The real difference is how much actual content we are interested in: the entire universe of possibilities or what we’ll actually consume? Streaming becomes an illusory choice: “I have all the music in the world at my fingertips, but actually I’ll never listen to 99% of it.” So why pay for it?</p><p>Lastly, we are relying on streaming services to search and curate our music for us. As alluded to above, this means we are relying on AI machine algorithms to judge the art we wish to consume. This doesn’t mean robots are choosing our music, but it does privilege certain metrics, like streaming metrics that lead to winner-take-all popularity contests. This is why 5% of the artists are earning 95% of the revenues.</p><p><em>Read more:</em> <a href="https://musicindustryblog.wordpress.com/tag/artist-income/">What it feels like to be a songwriter</a></p><p>The nature of creative content has a lot to do with all this because the value of creativity is very subjective and difficult to measure. Professional critics exist but, with so much content, audience popularity is usually the default. Without the resources to consume and evaluate all that content, we rely on machine algorithms that primarily measure objective factors such as stylistic similarities and streaming or sales counts. Success breeds success as we are fed the popular content and creative incomes become more drastically skewed in a superstar winner-take-all contest. Unseen and unheard, innovative, risk-taking artists cease to create. With a few notable exceptions, this is what we are seeing today with the streaming of digital content in music, books, and movies. This state of affairs is unsustainable.</p><p><strong>What to Do?</strong></p><p>To truly understand what has happened in creative industries, one must stop thinking about these industries using the business models of the recent era, which are defined by the ownership and control of physical media. Physical media permitted centralized control over market supply and price, most often through the distribution channel. This is how record companies, movie studios, and print publishers came to dominate this era. All that has changed, but what has replaced it is not fundamentally different, with centralized control over online distribution networks by technology behemoths like Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon. Some great efficiencies have been realized, but the skewed distribution of value has become even worse.</p><p>Musicians have been responding to the challenges of the digital age over the past two decades by harnessing many new tools provided by technology. We’ll discuss some of the more common online platforms in terms of their strengths and weaknesses, realizing that none of them solve the problem in a wholistic manner.</p><p>In the digital age, artists are faced with three related challenges: promotion, distribution, and pricing. Social media is the primary channel for promotion and audience building. Platforms like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter can be used to build brand awareness and attract followers. Streaming services like Spotify, YouTube, and TikTok are distribution platforms that also help to promote content and artist branding. Some streaming platforms connect their streaming services to a marketplace where artists can sell content for a nominal price. Examples are Amazon, Apple, Google, and Bandcamp.</p><p>With each of these promotion and distribution channels, musicians are limited in their ability to monetize the value of their content. Because the age of physical media focused on the transaction value of content — selling LPs or CDs — many artists are still focused on selling content at the much-reduced price. This is not financially viable unless one is in the elite winners’ bracket; as with other free media channels, the transaction price revenue stream is largely inconsequential.</p><p>The current streaming distribution services cannot solve this problem for artists, they can only make it worse. Spotify has been lobbying artists heavily to convince them that eventually, they will receive all of the royalty revenue streams, cutting out the record companies and publishers, but that only favors the elite winners who can reach a global market through their brand presence.</p><p>What really matters is audience share and follower networks. Some artists who are savvy social media influencers can reap far more value from selling access to their follower networks to 3rd party advertisers and marketers. Of course, this is what the network platforms are doing with our data. Mostly they are selling it back to us and reaping the flow of data both ways: a ready supply of free content that creates user network data that they then repackage to advertisers who want to reach a targeted market. It’s great to be on the receiving end of that revenue model, as any shareholder of Apple, Google, Facebook or Amazon will attest. The trouble is most artist-creators do all of the giving and none of the receiving.</p><p>The only viable solution for the large majority of artists is to secure ownership and control over their audience, or peer, networks. But this means to control the revenue stream that streaming platforms wish to exploit for themselves. The old centralized distribution model, with all the centralization of market control, has merely been replaced by a new centralized digital distributional network. But the true promise of information technology and data networks is market decentralization. This is where we can integrate social media, digital distribution, and blockchain to build an ecosystem that distributes value fairly across that ecosystem.</p><p><strong>The Secret Sauce: It’s All About Data</strong></p><p>The first maxim of this new world of digital media is that value is derived not from individual content, but from <em>the data networks created by sharing this content</em>. This bears repeating because it requires a different way of thinking about the role of creative content. Content is used as a means to create networks rather than as an end in itself. This may go against the grain of artistic expression and motivation for intrinsic sake, but it does promote the sharing of that expression with an appreciative audience. We should be seeking to reinforce that human connection.<br> <br> Broadcast television was built on the 3rd party advertising revenue model, so it’s not a radical innovation. Network platforms, like television broadcasters, gather the information data from their users and sell it. Think of Nielsen ratings. The problem, again, for artists and users is that don’t receive a fair share of the data value they create in the network; instead, that value accrues to those who own and control the centralized network. This is especially true for those servers that, like tv broadcasters, stream content.</p><p><em>How can we change direction?</em></p><p>First, as previously mentioned, the solutions offered up by the streaming platforms don’t really solve the problem. Streaming services like Spotify, YouTube, TikTok, Apple, or Amazon Music are consumer-centric in that they deliver an infinite supply of content to consumer devices at a low, subsidized price. Artists virtually give away their music to streamers in order to promote their art and build audience awareness. Top streaming content can also be used to demonstrate market viability to attract record label interest for the artist.</p><p>Platforms for independent artists, like Bandcamp, Soundcloud, Tunecore, and Amazon are artist-centric in that they help artists build an online presence and monetize sales in a marketplace.</p><p>Pure social networks like Facebook and Instagram help artists promote their brands and can be harnessed by influencers to build follower networks that can be monetized through the platform.</p><p>But in each and every case, artists and creators end up with tiny residuals after the platforms take their share of the transactions and data network value created. Instead of continuing down this road, artists need a platform that allows them to <em>own </em>and<em> control</em> their audience shares. They also need to harness the power of social media networks to promote their content so they don’t have to become social media marketers in addition to artist-creators.</p><p>One can imagine such a platform as illustrated in the graphic below. This model integrates social network dynamics with a peer-to-peer marketplace and blockchain ledgers to keep track of user-generated network data and value.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/720/1*H1fE7D0dcb4NwVZz2Gw5Fg.jpeg" /><figcaption>A Connection-centric Ecosystem</figcaption></figure><p>· The <strong>social network</strong> searches, shares, curates, and promotes content as it builds peer networks of users, or audiences, with similar content tastes.</p><p>· The <strong>peer-to-peer marketplace</strong> allows creators to sell or license their content directly to users. The importance is less about the price value of content and more about making strong network connections between artists and consumers.</p><p>· Control over peer networks (followers) allow users to <strong>monetize</strong> their audiences to 3rd party advertisers or promoters while spreading the value received across the peer network through special discounts or <strong>token rewards</strong>.</p><p>· <strong>Blockchain ledgers</strong> anchor the network data to artist content and user behaviors. Decentralized blockchain allows value to be distributed to users who create value through sharing and purchasing/licensing content. Tokens can be used post-sale by artists to reward followers/influencers who promote their content that leads to sales conversions. Crypto-tokens rewards become the unit of value to be exchanged, which can be used on the platform or converted to other currencies through an exchange.</p><p>Conceptually, a network platform hosting a decentralized creative content catalog that becomes large enough can develop a streaming channel that would operate more like an artist cooperative. Think <em>United Artists</em>. Revenue streams would include direct digital downloads, streaming royalties, and advertising.</p><p>So, the short answer to the question, <em>How Can a Musician Make Money?</em> posed at the beginning of this article, is: <em>By sharing their art and owning their network data.</em> All one needs is the <em>right</em> platform. If we build it, they will come.</p><p><em>Read More</em>: <a href="http://www.tukaglobal.com/"><em>tuka</em>: Connecting the Creative</a></p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/675/1*B5ElWf859lnKGuwNEaSk1g.jpeg" /></figure><p><em>The author is Founder and CEO of </em><strong><em>tuka</em></strong><em> (</em><a href="http://www.tukaglobal.com/"><em>www.tukaglobal.com</em></a><em>), a social network platform for sharing creative digital content that will integrate with the Ethereum blockchain platform.</em></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a7a3dfe65711" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[What’s Really Going On?]]></title>
            <link>https://mharring54.medium.com/whats-really-going-on-459b49ba100e?source=rss-fa9e61570700------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/459b49ba100e</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blm]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[antifa]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[urban-politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[politics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[anarchy]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Harrington]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2020 20:06:44 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-06-12T20:06:44.172Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/756/1*VPsGWWY8kqUuy4JIvqq6Rg.jpeg" /><figcaption>What’s next?</figcaption></figure><p>Reading the news each morning one might conclude that a significant part of our society has gone pretty much off the rails. A couple of article links are enough to make the point:</p><p><a href="https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/06/11/politics_as_religion_after_george_floyd_this_isnt_an_orwellian_novel_this_is_your_country_143426.html">The Orwellian Nightmare</a></p><p><a href="https://justthenews.com/nation/culture/forced-apologies-and-public-shaming-doctrinal-deviation-sweep-american-culture">The Thought Police Are Coming</a></p><p>These trends are antithetical to a free society, so what is going on? It would be easy to point to one factor, like the police, as the cause of this meltdown but social science and history are usually a lot more complex than that. In fact, one might rightly suspect most of what we see on the television, read in the news or on social media is one major distraction from the true challenges we face. And one does not need to dismiss any contributing factors like the virus pandemic, the shutdowns, or racist conflict to make the case.</p><p>There is racism in this country — it exists, it’s real. But there is racism to different degrees in every society — the fear and persecution of the “other” is one of the stains on the human soul, one of our original sins. The question is how determinant race discrimination is in any particular society in determining the outcomes and fates of those so discriminated against. Posing that question demands an empirical analysis — it cannot rely solely on anecdotal, lived experiences. In other words, if I have suffered a racist action, that alone does not prove the entire society is racist, only that one case of racism has occurred. A pattern of anecdotal cases is also not enough, we must do an analysis with a much larger data sample. So, “systemic” racism must be addressed with scientific data analysis, not lived experience and media narratives. That work has been done elsewhere and is not the focus of this essay.</p><p>Instead, we will zoom out from the chaos to gain a more measured perspective. Police violence is the tip of the spear propelled by a complex web of social and political policy failures. I cite a couple of recent articles that make the larger points surrounding our current social crisis:</p><p><a href="https://townhall.com/columnists/walterewilliams/2020/06/10/the-true-plight-of-black-americans-n2570249">The True Plight of Black Americans</a></p><p><a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-02/unrest-spotlights-depth-of-black-americans-economic-struggle?utm_campaign=news&amp;utm_medium=bd&amp;utm_source=applenews">[The] Depth of Black Americans’ Economic Struggle</a></p><p>The first article is written by Walter Williams, one of the most prominent scholars on the economic plight of blacks in America. He, along with Thomas Sowell, has examined the causes and effects of racism and their research, along with that of some sociologists, point to the more significant causes of urban poverty: the breakdown of the family due to welfare dependency, failures of public education, corrupt machine politics, drug culture, lack of economic opportunity, among others. These urban cities have been dominated by the post-60s liberal ideology of the Democratic Party. But we disassemble and allow these failed policies to continue, then expect the police to step in to control the chaos.</p><p>A simple graph of the plight of blacks in Minneapolis reinforces the case:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/300/0*3kAlDrRTrXJegjKS" /></figure><p>This is less a failure of black Americans to grasp the American Dream than it is of failed social, tax, and financial policy by the Federal and state governments under both party leaderships. The volcano we see erupting today has been boiling below the surface for the last 50 years. The biggest factor is financial policy, because, with the right financial policies, we can usually afford a lot of social policy failure.</p><p>The decoupling of monetary policy from the discipline of Bretton Woods pegged-dollar policy means the supply of money and credit is no longer constrained beyond the discretion of the monetary and political authorities. This happened in 1971 but it took a decade into the mid-80s before policymakers realized that they were no longer constrained by price inflation as well because of the explosion of global labor supply. The economic liberalization due to the failures of state planning in the USSR, China, India, Africa, and South America, opened up their labor forces to international trade and production. This kept wage push inflation off the table and allowed the Federal Reserve to pursue its massive credit creation and financial repression. The result has been a combination of cheap credit and low wages, leading to the massive leverage of existing productive assets.</p><p>That has driven wealth and income inequality that has impoverished those who do not own these appreciating assets. So, jobs have been created because they’re cheap in many respects, but everything one needs to buy — such as housing, education, medical care — has sky-rocketed in relative price. Most urban residents left behind on this train have dim prospects for wage incomes, decent educational opportunities, homeownership, or accessible healthcare. This is what has thrust the spear of police violence against the urban poor into the spotlight.</p><p>So one can understand how the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street came to this. The solutions are obvious, we just choose to ignore them because of our treasured political ideologies and partisanship identity politics. Urban minorities must turn the tide against corrupt urban machine politics. Zooming in again, here is an article showing how one city reformed urban policing:</p><p><a href="https://nypost.com/2020/06/09/camden-nj-did-police-reform-right-not-that-radicals-will-pay-attention/">Camden, NJ, did police reform right</a></p><p>The key cited here, which many on the Left will find disconcerting, is to reform public-sector union contracts to break up the cozy relationship between city councils and those who fund their campaigns: public-sector unions. This applies to teachers’ unions, police unions, firefighter unions, and municipal employees’ unions. At the same time, we need more transparency concerning the relationships of politicians with the private sector, including real estate developers and the Bar Association.</p><p>Zooming back out. These urban political reforms can only succeed if we get our financial house in order. Free-wheeling monetary policy — like the one that quadrupled the price of a house in the past 20 years — must be reined in to support fundamental value creation. In other words, our economy must produce and distribute wealth according to real value creation that improves our quality of life, not through speculating on asset appreciation. When the hedge fund industry and lives of the financial elites are no longer in the headlines, we’ll know we’re on the right path. Unfortunately, with our descent into the distractions of anarchy and chaos over identity, I don’t have hopes of this happening any time soon.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=459b49ba100e" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>