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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by Muhammad Aji Prasetyo on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by Muhammad Aji Prasetyo on Medium]]></description>
        <link>https://medium.com/@mhmmdajip?source=rss-bfad047d1586------2</link>
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            <title>Stories by Muhammad Aji Prasetyo on Medium</title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mhmmdajip?source=rss-bfad047d1586------2</link>
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        <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 06:47:11 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[SentinelOne Singularity Onboarding: Tenant Creation, Agent Deployment and a Lab Test]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/sentinelone-singularity-onboarding-tenant-creation-agent-deployment-and-a-lab-test-1ec86f75e26c?source=rss-bfad047d1586------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/1ec86f75e26c</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[sentinelone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Aji Prasetyo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 02:01:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-24T02:01:03.299Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*fP4mivVRwcIQvLpnV1HDUQ.jpeg" /></figure><p>Onboarding a new customer into SentinelOne sounds simple enough. Create the tenant, set up the accounts, push the agent, move on. But there’s a question that doesn’t answer: if that endpoint actually got hit, would any of it work? You don’t really know until you test it.</p><p>So that’s what we did here. This walkthrough covers the full onboarding tenant creation, user provisioning, agent deployment and then goes one step further: we ran an test attack against the endpoint once it was live.</p><p>Not a real one. We used Atomic Red Team to simulate, Which gives you the same behavior a ransomware incident would like files getting mass-created, a ransom note dropped somewhere, PowerShell doing sketchy things. just without anything actually getting encrypted or spreading past the box.</p><p>If the platform picks it up end to end, that tells us the tenant’s configured right, the agent’s actually reporting, and the detection and response side of things works the way it’s supposed to.</p><h4><strong>Tenant (Account &amp; Site) Creation in SentinelOne</strong></h4><ol><li>Log in to the SentinelOne Management Console using a Global Admin/Admin account with permission to create a new tenant.</li><li>Open the scope panel using the (<strong>&gt;</strong>) control next to <strong>Global</strong>.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/798/1*YlMZRNFcWLs0a3uPoifLQA.png" /></figure><p>3. Click the (+) icon to add a new site.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/808/1*Xm9oLjChrLeBS6esc6DXSw.png" /></figure><p>4. Since this tenant is being created for Incident Response purposes, select “IR” as the site type.</p><p>5. Enter the required site information, then click Next.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/652/1*IohEc56WE9_T2kEGIPc1pw.png" /></figure><p>6. For policy settings, inherit the Global Default Policy, or you can modify on you own policy.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/808/1*LVBqwETrKYLJAzyNk3YA-A.png" /></figure><p>7. after that you can click on Next and it will bring you to the summary and click on Create Site.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_xYW0AIdLeaamWPQjesvzg.png" /></figure><p>8. Generate and copy the Site Token. This token is required to install the agent on the target endpoint.</p><h4><strong>Customer User Account Creation</strong></h4><ol><li>Navigate to <strong>Policies and Settings &gt; User Management &gt; Console Users.</strong></li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/809/1*vXuU8c5y4qtlbMa2nOyCDw.png" /></figure><p>2. Click New User</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/811/1*qMWK8bSGEwkyXs3OfAR57g.png" /></figure><p>3. Enter the user’s email address and assign the user to the site/tenant created before.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*3mDjZK9Bq8d22E8SZyJFDg.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Agent Onboarding on the Suspected Compromised Endpoint</strong></h4><ol><li>Go to<strong> Agent Management</strong>, confirm you are in the correct site, then click Packages.</li></ol><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*TfftxKqUlM_snMD14f2a8Q.png" /></figure><p>2. Search for a package compatible with the target endpoint. In this case, the affected device runs Windows 10, so an .msi/.exe package was selected via <strong>Package &gt; Action &gt; Download Package</strong>.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*d9QclD_dj3oO1D5wh3AFaQ.png" /></figure><p>3. Run the downloaded installer. It will prompt for the Site Token generated, paste it into the installer and click Next.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*ByjEhkAJ-UhBg3m4soA9cg.png" /></figure><p>4. The installer proceeds with agent installation.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*Z15Y_jKTphNYe5uQDozbeg.png" /></figure><p>5. Once installation completes, confirm the SentinelOne agent process is running in the background.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*yyjVE_-ZFaN1-6qPC6j0qw.png" /></figure><p>6. Return to<strong> Agent Management &gt; Endpoints</strong>. The newly onboarded desktop now appears in the endpoint list. Click the endpoint name to review its status.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*RMKVpxcZIrLMFqNMjbEc-A.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Lab Testing Incident Analysis &amp; Investigation</strong></h4><p>Two complementary test cases were used to exercise different SentinelOne detection engines: a reputation-based detection using a known malicious test file, and a behavioral simulation of ransomware activity using the Atomic Red Team framework.</p><h4><strong>1. Reputation-Based Detection</strong></h4><ul><li>Atomic Red Team was pre-installed on the endpoint before the SentinelOne agent was deployed. Shortly after the agent came online, multiple entries appeared under Unresolved Alerts.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*hUqqFRHIZQLmFKc9C_OHCg.png" /></figure><ul><li>Atomic Red Team was pre-installed on the endpoint before the SentinelOne agent was deployed. Shortly after the agent came online, multiple entries appeared under Unresolved Alerts.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/856/1*JAM2RVnadCDE_883fkU5TQ.png" /></figure><ul><li>The file located at<br><strong>\Device\HarddiskVolume3\AtomicRedTeam\atomics\T1221\src\Calculator.docx <br></strong>was identified as a Trojan by SentinelOne’s Cloud Intelligence Reputation engine as medium severity.</li><li><strong>Purple AI </strong>generated an automatic natural-language explanation of the detection, and the Mitigation Actions panel confirmed the process was Killed and the file Quarantined successfully.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*TtDjuGcXN29WdjJTzxQJdw.png" /></figure><h4>2. <strong>Behavioral Simulation, Atomic Red Team T1486, Atomic Test #10 (Akira Ransomware)</strong></h4><ul><li>To evaluate SentinelOne’s behavioral detection capability against ransomware-style activity, Atomic Test #10 (“Akira Ransomware drop files with .akira extension and ransomnote”) was executed from an elevated PowerShell session on the endpoint.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*41_E34pqTMzv9e23sVVIfw.png" /></figure><ul><li>Following execution, the endpoint’s local disk showed 100 newly created files with the .akira extension, along with a ransom note (akira_readme.txt) dropped on the Desktop.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/853/1*36t0vrFXvnFLgxccC1XwnA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/855/1*dwJA_LLYIZhLWgjmOdlCcA.png" /></figure><ul><li>Event Search (Deep Visibility) was used to query for PowerShell-related activity using the PowerQuery below:</li></ul><pre>| filter( src.process.displayName == &quot;Windows PowerShell&quot; )<br>| columns event.time, event.id, event.type, site.id, site.name, agent.uuid,<br>  timestamp, src.process.storyline.id, src.process.user, src.process.uid,<br>  src.process.cmdline, src.process.image.path, tgt.file.path, tgt.file.size,<br>  tgt.file.type, tgt.file.isSigned<br>| sort - timestamp<br>| limit 1000</pre><ul><li>The query returned 162 matching events. One entry of particular interest showed the command script <br><strong>echo “” &gt;&gt; $env:Userprofile\Desktop\akira_readme.txt</strong>, <br>executed by a signed <strong>powershell.exe</strong> process spawned from the legitimate RuntimeBroker.exe.</li><li>Purple AI flagged this activity as significant, reporting 105 file creations, 147 file modifications, and classifying the underlying indicators as 339 general, 76 ransomware-related, 33 evasion, 21 injection, 7 reconnaissance, and 1 exploitation indicator, with no associated network or DNS activity.</li></ul><h4><strong>Remote Remediation via Remote Shell</strong></h4><ul><li>Since this activity was a lab test rather than a genuine compromise, cleanup was performed directly from the console using SentinelOne’s Remote Shell capability (<strong>Endpoint &gt; Actions &gt; Response &gt; Remote Shell</strong>), avoiding the need for local or RDP access to the endpoint.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*2KCTHo5CrafZKXJhobLy1Q.png" /></figure><ul><li>Clicking <strong>Start Session </strong>prompted for a 2FA acting as a step-up verification before remote command execution is permitted.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*PiYAIQKLey-E50J_A3AoAw.png" /></figure><ul><li>Once connected, the following cleanup commands were attempted</li></ul><pre>del C:\Users\PC-Labs\Desktop\akira_readme.txt<br>del C:\test.*.akira</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*bTJ_az3_eFxjOhGZHtTwDQ.png" /></figure><ul><li>Cleanup was verified with the commands below; an empty result and a False return respectively confirmed no artifacts remained on disk.</li></ul><pre>Get-ChildItem C:\test.*.akira -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue<br>Test-Path &quot;C:\Users\&lt;username&gt;\Desktop\akira_readme.txt&quot;</pre><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1016/1*zmx6FaAKT_kTw_QCLVLzIw.png" /></figure><h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4><p>This lab exercise successfully validated the end-to-end SentinelOne Singularity onboarding workflow, from tenant creation through agent deployment and initial incident investigation. The platform demonstrated strong, fully automated performance against a known-bad static threat, with detection, killing, and quarantine completed.</p><p>The behavioral ransomware simulation (Atomic Red Team T1486, Test #10) executed successfully and produced substantial forensic telemetry, which Purple AI was able to interpret and summarize meaningfully for an analyst a clear strength for investigation speed before they’re going into more deeper analysis.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=1ec86f75e26c" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/sentinelone-singularity-onboarding-tenant-creation-agent-deployment-and-a-lab-test-1ec86f75e26c">SentinelOne Singularity Onboarding: Tenant Creation, Agent Deployment and a Lab Test</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Collecting and Reviewing Endpoint Logs with SentinelOne, Before Going Deep]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/fmisec/collecting-and-reviewing-endpoint-logs-with-sentinelone-before-going-deep-c5d500d1beb3?source=rss-bfad047d1586------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c5d500d1beb3</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[sentinelone]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[incident-response]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[dfir]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Aji Prasetyo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 02:01:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-21T02:01:03.383Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*bwty1ojBVDxV_Pvz2z7ptw.jpeg" /></figure><p>SentinelOne’s <strong>Fetch Logs</strong> action pulls exactly that: agent activity logs, plus a slice of the endpoint’s own Event Viewer logs, bundled into a downloadable package, no scripting required. It’s not a full forensic image, and it’s not meant to be. It’s the fast first pass that tells you whether you’re looking at noise or something that actually warrants isolating the host and reaching for the heavier tools.</p><p>In this article, we’ll walk through pulling logs from an endpoint, and what’s actually inside the package once you unzip it.</p><ol><li><strong>Collect the logs</strong></li></ol><p>You can access to the SentinelOne Console first after that you can go to the <strong>Inventory &gt; Endpoint</strong></p><ul><li>Select the Endpoint you want to collect the logs</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*J47LkdoTvIO1uwKfqM6G2g.png" /></figure><ul><li>Click on <strong>Actions &gt; Endpoint &gt; Troubleshooting &gt; Fetch Logs</strong></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*2ZqiwdFUv-G1Z4Dzxpq4qg.png" /></figure><ul><li>It will pop up <strong>Fetch Logs</strong> options that you need to select the <strong>Agent Logs</strong> and <strong>Endpoint Logs </strong>after that you can click on <strong>Fetch Logs</strong></li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*iNIweyc585C3DJuOFVWnZA.png" /></figure><p><strong>2. Download the collected logs</strong></p><p>After you fetch the logs, you must be wondering. Where can I download it? Because after you click the Fetch logs, there is no pop up again or even the logs is not directly downloaded.</p><ul><li>After you click on the <strong>Fetch logs </strong>you may need to wait 1–5 minutes until the logs is fully fetched, to check. You can go to the <strong>Activities </strong>tab menu on your left.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*KmHq_CIV8izsGK_KL5CHmg.png" /></figure><ul><li>Now if you already see the <strong>Download File</strong>, you can click it and download the <strong>fetched logs</strong></li><li>The file is successfully downloaded.</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/588/1*mynxyZxpsUWFgu6heGtn1g.png" /></figure><p><strong>3. Download the collected logs</strong></p><p>After you download and extract the files, you can see a lot of files in it</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*szMdyAoisXyNj_ZbQ71oqQ.png" /></figure><ul><li>Scan_report.txt</li></ul><p>Contains information about summary of the last scan: files scanned, and any malicious detections found</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*8YG-OmJerj6iTlTWfAmMAQ.png" /></figure><p>For example, on this logs we found out a lot of Malicous files because this endpoint is tested as a labs and installed with a lot of script from the Atomic Red Team.</p><ul><li>LastScanReport.logs</li></ul><p>Verbose scan engine log (mostly “file locked, skipped” noise or not detections)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*cc9oQbZqoYlzGIdscuX4DA.png" /></figure><ul><li>FullActivityAnalyzerReport.txt</li></ul><p>This file contains information about the SentinelOne Agent activity used to troubleshoot interoperability or performance problems that might be related to SentinelOne Agent conflict with other applications.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*uWPWNrAL8vxHk0bzvL7GvA.png" /></figure><ul><li>PlatformLogs\EventViewer Folder: Includes key logs like:<br>- Application<br>- System<br>- Security<br>- Hardware Event<br>- Kernel Event<br>- Plus SentinelOne’s own event channels again</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*G6Ccve0i1n_9EUINAZAxEw.png" /></figure><ul><li>PlatformLogs\Misc Folder</li></ul><p>This Misc Folder have a lot of information that you can see through.</p><ul><li>NetStat-All.txt : contains active connections</li><li>DnsCache.txt : resolver cache</li><li>VssLog.txt : shadow copy status</li><li>AllApps.txt : installed software</li><li>LoadedModules.txt : per-process loaded modules</li><li>AdvFirewall.txt : firewall rule export</li></ul><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*ElHcRYpdpC6o60H2X3PsgQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Conclusion and Final Thoughts</strong></p><p>Fetch Logs isn’t a full forensic collection, and it was never meant to be one. What it gives you is the answer to the one question that actually matters at the start of triage. This step is easy to skip, especially when an alert fires and the instinct is to go straight for the bigger tools. A five-minute log pull is usually enough to tell you which pile something belongs in before you jump it to the bigger tools to check more deeper.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c5d500d1beb3" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/fmisec/collecting-and-reviewing-endpoint-logs-with-sentinelone-before-going-deep-c5d500d1beb3">Collecting and Reviewing Endpoint Logs with SentinelOne, Before Going Deep</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/fmisec">FMI Cyber Security Consulting Services</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Operation Blackout 2025: Investigating Windows Defense Evasion Through Event Logs]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/@mhmmdajip/operation-blackout-2025-investigating-windows-defense-evasion-through-event-logs-8ba12723900a?source=rss-bfad047d1586------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/8ba12723900a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[windows]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[digital-forensics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[htb-writeup]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[blue-team]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Aji Prasetyo]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 09:23:57 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2026-09-15T09:25:05.964Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/890/1*2z4lcO51jhEtz1f1sNtObg.png" /><figcaption>You have solved Operation Blackout 2025: Smoke &amp; Mirrors!</figcaption></figure><p>This was my first Hack The Box Sherlock challenge, and I wanted to write up my process in detail both for my own notes and for anyone else getting into Windows forensics for the first time.</p><h3>Scenario</h3><p><strong>Operation Blackout 2025: Smoke &amp; Mirrors</strong> drops you into a post-breach investigation with a twist: several of the security logs and Windows Defender alerts you’d normally expect to see simply aren’t there. That absence is the first clue. It strongly suggests the attacker didn’t just breach the host — they deliberately tampered with the system’s defenses to make their own activity harder to detect.</p><p>Instead of a SIEM with pre-built dashboards, the challenge hands you three raw Windows Event Log files and asks you to dig:</p><p>● Microsoft-Windows-Powershell.evtx</p><p>● Microsoft-Windows-Powershell-Operational.evtx</p><p>● Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational.evtx</p><p>The goal is to work through these artifacts and piece together exactly how the attacker weakened the host’s defenses one log entry at a time.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*CuaydahuwGq-VAxvpxzJiA.png" /><figcaption><em>The three Windows Event Log files provided for the investigation</em></figcaption></figure><h3>Tools</h3><p>Since this was my first time tackling a forensics challenge, I looked into what tools examiners typically reach for when working with raw .evtx files, and settled on two from Eric Zimmerman’s Tools:</p><p>● <strong>EvtxECmd</strong> — parses .evtx files into standardized CSV, XML, or JSON output. It turns Windows’ native binary event log format into something you can actually search, sort, and filter.</p><p>● <strong>Timeline Explorer</strong> — a fast CSV/Excel viewer built for exactly this kind of work, with grouping, filtering, and full-text search across multiple open files at once.</p><p>Both tools are freely available from <a href="https://ericzimmerman.github.io/">ericzimmerman.github.io</a>.</p><h3>Setup</h3><h4>Parsing the logs with EvtxECmd</h4><p>After downloading and extracting EvtxECmd, parsing a log is a single command: point it at an .evtx file, and tell it where to write the CSV.</p><blockquote>EvtxECmd.exe -f “&lt;path-to-the-.evtx-file&gt;” — csv “&lt;destination-folder&gt;” — csvf &lt;output-filename&gt;.csv</blockquote><p>For example, this is the command I used for the Sysmon log:</p><blockquote>.\EvtxECmd.exe -f “D:\HTB\Sherlock\Operation Blackout 2025 — Smoke and Mirrors\Smoke-and-Mirrors\Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational.evtx” — csv “D:\HTB\Sherlock\Operation Blackout 2025 — Smoke and Mirrors\Smoke-and-Mirrors” — csvf Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational.csv</blockquote><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*tV2DZ761ocdIv4JXdJcpBQ.png" /><figcaption><em>EvtxECmd parsing the Sysmon log and reporting event counts by Event ID.</em></figcaption></figure><p>I repeated this for all three .evtx files. EvtxECmd also prints a quick breakdown of Event IDs and record counts as it works, which is a handy sanity check before diving into the actual analysis</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*PPx9S6Vkj_4FeoxZFFJs3g.png" /><figcaption><em>All three logs successfully parsed into CSV.</em></figcaption></figure><h4>Loading everything into Timeline Explorer</h4><p>With three clean CSVs in hand, I opened Timeline Explorer and used File → Open, bulk-selecting all three files at once. Each one opens in its own tab, which makes it easy to search across all of them without losing your place.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*8bMA_dBIFJOKMOHM8ROo2Q.png" /><figcaption><em>All three logs loaded into Timeline Explorer and ready for analysis</em></figcaption></figure><p>With the setup out of the way, it was time to start hunting.</p><h3>Investigation</h3><p>The challenge is broken into five tasks, each pointing toward a different defense-evasion technique. My approach for each was largely the same: form a hypothesis about what kind of action the attacker likely took, then use Timeline Explorer’s search to pivot straight to the relevant log entries.</p><h4>1. Disabling LSA protection</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*EckcJy4RjhPRdiwstnGPXg.png" /></figure><p>The first task pointed at LSA (Local Security Authority) protection being disabled via a registry key.</p><p>Searching for <strong>“LSA”</strong> across the open logs immediately surfaced a handful of hits in the PowerShell Operational log.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*OAWOp9PXwKFl7INTfzIYNw.png" /><figcaption><em>Searching “LSA” across all three logs.</em></figcaption></figure><p>Drilling into the matching record revealed the exact registry command:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*Pa-z-QO-LTCBtroN2bNBkQ.png" /><figcaption><em>The ScriptBlockText showing the registry key being modified.</em></figcaption></figure><blockquote>reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v RunAsPPL /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f</blockquote><p>The answer is:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*4QHQ1Z7L_zOkGfXMA9sXhA.png" /></figure><h4>2. Disabling Windows Defender</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*AAzFfYq_EQ87D-UDJHpWfQ.png" /></figure><p>Next, I looked for how the attacker disabled Windows Defender itself. Defender is commonly tampered with via the Set-MpPreference PowerShell cmdlet, so that was my starting search term.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*sVIzSfB2xIwA9Vl5aHj6tA.png" /><figcaption><em>The first Set-MpPreference command executed against Windows Defender.</em></figcaption></figure><p>The first command the attacker ran was:</p><blockquote>Set-MpPreference -DisableIOAVProtection $true -DisableEmailScanning $true -DisableBlockAtFirstSeen $true</blockquote><p>This single line turns off several real-time protection features at once IOAV (download/execution) scanning, email scanning, and cloud-based “block at first seen” detection clearing the way for follow-on tooling to run undetected.</p><p>The answer is</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*rRfH7FtoAb3wBTD6T9KwZw.png" /></figure><h4>3. Bypassing AMSI</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*3xjE6C2c-XmU9yYxzPvQkw.png" /></figure><p>This one took a bit more digging. The task asked which function inside a DLL was being patched to disable AMSI (the Antimalware Scan Interface). I wasn’t familiar with AMSI internals going in, so I did some outside reading and came across a great breakdown from Offensive Security on common AMSI bypass techniques, which explained that most bypasses work by corrupting a function inside amsi.dll to crash or neutralize it.</p><p>( <a href="https://www.offsec.com/blog/amsi-write-raid-0day-vulnerability/">https://www.offsec.com/blog/amsi-write-raid-0day-vulnerability/</a> ).</p><p>Armed with that context, I searched for <strong>“DLL”</strong> in the logs and found a PowerShell Add-Type block that resolves and patches a function dynamically, using string concatenation to avoid an obvious static signature:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*o9qaNJSBiYBTvwkITt0ktQ.png" /><figcaption><em>The in-memory patch resolving amsi.dll and AmsiScanBuffer character-by-character</em></figcaption></figure><blockquote>GetModuleHandle(“a” + “m” + “s” + “i” + “.dll”)<br> GetProcAddress(h, “A” + “m” + “s” + “i” + “S” + “c” + “a” + “n” + “B” + “u” + “f” + “f” + “e” + “r”)</blockquote><p>Spelling out amsi.dll and AmsiScanBuffer one character at a time is a simple but effective way to dodge naive string-matching detections. <br>The target function, <strong>AmsiScanBuffer.</strong></p><p>The answer is</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*dlG9q9FRr_VBmK9vqVD62Q.png" /></figure><h4>4. Booting into Safe Mode</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*AI45fY-QKe6ufs8GOltJXA.png" /></figure><p>For the fourth task, I focused on how the attacker forced the machine into Safe Mode a technique often used to disable security agents that don’t load outside of normal boot.</p><p>Searching for <strong>“safeboot”</strong> turned up the exact bcdedit invocation:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*RFLREkTcKh3yYDJlQ90xLg.png" /><figcaption><em>The bcdedit command setting the boot configuration to Safe Mode with Networking</em></figcaption></figure><blockquote>bcdedit.exe /set safeboot network</blockquote><p>The answer is</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*3FvKD2zXsqC9o3WM_W8Q1Q.png" /></figure><h4>5. Disabling PowerShell command history</h4><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*IhVsD2jyo4VQeZuPrnSrAw.png" /></figure><p>The last task was the trickiest to pin down, and honestly, I found it more by accident than by a clean keyword search. After exhausting the obvious search terms, I started manually scrolling through the PowerShell Operational log just to see what else was in there and near the very bottom, I spotted a command referencing “History.”</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*1313fLxokwQW3pr4uk66GQ.png" /><figcaption><em>The command disabling PSReadLine’s history logging.</em></figcaption></figure><blockquote>Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing</blockquote><p>This stops PSReadLine from writing any further commands to the console history file going forward a quiet way to keep future commands off disk without having to clean up a history file after the fact.</p><p>The answer is</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/975/1*MO-5-A8vNM70M_NbQBveBg.png" /></figure><h3>Lessons Learned</h3><p>A few things stuck with me after finishing this challenge:</p><p>● <strong>“Missing” logs don’t mean missing evidence.</strong> The scenario’s whole premise was that expected Defender alerts weren’t there, but the commands used to disable those protections were still sitting in the PowerShell Operational log the entire time. Attackers can silence a detection, but the act of silencing it often generates its own evidence.</p><p>● <strong>Keyword-driven searching gets you far, fast.</strong> Once I had a hypothesis (LSA, Defender, AMSI, Safe Mode), searching for one term was usually enough to pivot straight to the relevant record.</p><p>● <strong>But it’s not a substitute for manually reading logs.</strong> The PowerShell history finding only turned up because I scrolled through the raw log out of curiosity. Some evidence doesn’t announce itself with an obvious keyword.</p><p>● <strong>PowerShell Operational logging is a goldmine.</strong> Nearly every finding in this challenge traced back to ScriptBlockText entries in that one log a strong reminder of how valuable PowerShell script block logging is in a real environment.</p><p>More broadly, this challenge reinforced something I’d only really understood in theory before: forensic investigation is rarely about finding one obvious smoking gun. It’s about connecting several small, individually unremarkable pieces of evidence and understanding how they fit together into a single narrative.</p><h3>Conclusion</h3><p><strong>Operation Blackout 2025: Smoke &amp; Mirrors</strong> was a solid introduction to investigating Windows-based defense evasion purely through event logs. Working through it end-to-end from parsing raw .evtx files, to hunting for specific artifacts. Gave me a much better feel for how much visibility Windows retains even when an attacker actively tries to strip it away.</p><p>As my first HTB Sherlock challenge, it was a great hands-on entry point into Windows event log analysis, PowerShell forensics, and registry-based defense evasion from a defender’s perspective. I’m looking forward to tackling the next one.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=8ba12723900a" width="1" height="1" alt="">]]></content:encoded>
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