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        <title><![CDATA[Stories by michael blastland on Medium]]></title>
        <description><![CDATA[Stories by michael blastland on Medium]]></description>
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            <title>Stories by michael blastland on Medium</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[It’s the ignorance, stupid.]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/wintoncentre/its-the-ignorance-stupid-a1eace78928f?source=rss-962f59639f3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a1eace78928f</guid>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[michael blastland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2020 17:59:03 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-04-22T11:54:51.684Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*vQQmsEcUZrWwWyx2k2pdyg.jpeg" /></figure><p>On February 20th, a group of Philip Tetlock’s superforecasters said the probability that one month later the WHO would report more than 200,000 cases of Coronavirus was 3%. That’s about as low as you’d go without claiming certainty. Two weeks later, they saw nothing to revise that opinion.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/791/1*za9jNmdDQIGvmI95Sr2EhQ.png" /></figure><p>Guess what happened.</p><p>Superforecasters are the best in the business. No one knows more about optimizing judgement under uncertainty than Philip Tetlock. So 3% from this lot should humble us all. Because be honest, really honest, how accurate were you two months ago?</p><p>Well, the future is full of surprises. But the ignorance it reveals is deeper than a little aleatory uncertainty. Remember when they cut the trains on the tube? And then how people travelled anyway — perhaps feeling they had little choice? Not so many, but cattled even closer. This, in the name of safety.</p><p>Remember the day we stopped sport? Then we stopped gatherings of all kinds. So, people went for a walk and set a record for crowds up Snowden, herding onto green landmarks everywhere. So, we had to stop that too.</p><p>Remember how, in Italy, the government restricted social life in the northern towns? People took the virus south.</p><p>It’s all obvious with hindsight. But as the title of a fine book once put it, everything is obvious once you know the answer. Maybe these hiccups were known risks. Even so, it’s striking how casually uncooperative life can be, how uncertain our grasp of the future, sure, but also of cause, consequence… and fact.</p><p>On the one hand, we can now rapidly discover the genetics of a vanishingly small organism that might once-upon-a-time have been understood only as a story about God or the Devil. We’ve come far. On the other, it’s plain how far human genius still falls short of nature’s. Just list the don’t knows: we don’t know how many of us are infectious, who’s had it or with what severity in any but a minority of cases, or with any accuracy how lethal it is, or how or when we’ll escape lockdown, when or if there’ll be a vaccine, or if test-and-trace can work — unknowns that we pray will turn out well enough to avoid repeated lockdowns for however long herd-immunity would take instead… if immunity lasts. We’re pushed even to count that most definitive of things, death — as we struggle to differentiate deaths from Coronavirus and deaths with it, or to capture deaths outside hospital. We’ve little idea how long-term costs to life and health will compare in the long run under different scenarios. Even when we know what’s coming, we seem not to know what to do with the information: aware for years that a lethal pandemic was possible one day, we appear to be making policy on the hoof, scrambling for ventilators and protective clothing, apparently unable to ramp up testing fast enough.</p><p>These failures and gaps invite two possible conclusions. 1. Our leaders and perhaps our experts are a bit hopeless. 2. The basics are not in any sense basic.</p><p>The first might be true, but my money’s on the second: the elusive, chance-ridden complexity and uncertainty of apparently simple or knowable things.</p><p>Two more quick illustrations. First, <a href="https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/this-is-the-age-of-me-me-me-until-we-need-a-scapegoat-and-its-them-them-them-x3gls8gwp">Matthew Syed’s thought experiment</a> (<em>Times</em>, paywall) about what we’d have said of any government that prioritised stockpiling kit and ventilators to gather dust in a warehouse, with many more urgent claims on resources. “Stupid” … “heartless” … “why ventilators”?</p><p>Yes, I think the UK could have done better and reacted faster; yes, the big arguments about austerity should be had; yes, my tolerance snaps at some leaders overseas. But tempted as we are to call out the government’s lack of preparedness, not much strikes me as straightforward. Catastrophic geomagnetic storm, anyone? Come on, where are you on this or on any other low-probability high-impact event, where’s the no-brainer outrage? Dan Gardner, a writer on risk, says we need ‘leadership willing to defy politics and support rational analysis and risk mitigation — not once or twice, but continuously, over a period of many years.’ No, it doesn’t sound like a slogan for the side of a bus to me either. It’s a culture change: desirable, probably, but that’s the barest beginning. And although we actually have a national risk register to try to stimulate that kind of discussion, what price a politics in which any government makes perhaps costly calls to protect against uncertainty without the media, the opposition (and us) damning this as ‘getting it wrong’ if nothing happens?</p><p>Second, consider two hypothetical scenarios I’ve mentioned before. A, that we’re infectious for 7 days and infect 2 others. B, that everyone is infectious for 5 days and infects 3 others. After ten weeks scenario A has infected about 2,000 people. Scenario B is racing towards 10 million.</p><p>Tweak the parameters, as Tom Chivers has pointed out on <a href="https://unherd.com/2020/04/how-likely-are-you-to-die-of-coronavirus/">Unherd</a> about current modelling, and the outcome can be another world. Think you know the right parameters — for the course of the pandemic, or easing lockdown? Do me a favour.</p><p>How should we deal with this? Of course we should build models and research rigorously, comparing options, always aware of our capacity to be horribly wrong. We should take the National Risk Register seriously. We should be ready to adapt, and brutally frank about the uncertaintites, which incidentally cut all ways: ignorance does not mean we do nothing. That might express too much confidence in nothing.</p><p>More fundamentally, in Thomas Pynchon’s novel <em>V,</em> the poet Fausto Maijstral says that we need to begin ‘the process of learning life’s single lesson: that there is more accident to it than a man can ever admit to in a lifetime and stay sane.’</p><p>Being bested by a bug ought to help that process along, but will it? As Pynchon suggests, the lesson might bounce off any normal ego. To accept our limitations goes against the grain of homo sapiens’ big-brained vanity. At any rate, there’s little sign the lesson is being learned. Already we have to put up with instant opinion from all corners (like mine). Already we’re drawing lessons from Coronavirus, and — who’d have thought? — the lessons are those we knew all along.</p><p>Those who love the NHS hail its finest hour. Those who hate it see it flailing. Whatever your side on Brexit, Coronavirus… there you go. Those who believe we neglected the state identify neglect of the state as the reason we’ve struggled. Those responsible for austerity laud austerity as the reason we’re in fiscal shape to cope. We were right, says Jeremy Corbyn, as he watches public spending and borrowing rise. Half the columns you read take the form: ‘Coronavirus proves… (insert whatever I’ve always said before).’</p><p>Some say everything will change but, who knows, it might change straight back. Passions soar, convinced they fly on logic. Here’s my prediction — as dodgy, probably, as every other: whatever happens, everyone will claim to have been right. Confidence in our knowing will resume uninterrupted.</p><p>Daniel Kahneman famously said that of all cognitive biases the greatest is overconfidence. This is our affliction: a kind of epistemic arrogance, as we bluff our way out of uncertainty, or observe how we don’t seem to be on top of things — and in the next breath or on the next subject assert the old supremacy.</p><p>A better reaction would be to head in the other direction entirely — towards what philosophers call epistemic humility — and accept that being up to our necks in ignorance and error is normal (here comes my own confirmation bias). The briefest history makes the point. For example, the belief that we had the economy sussed — right before the 2008 crash and a long shadow of wretched productivity and wage growth. Or there’s the case of science, where there’s talk of crisis over the alarming number of ‘findings’ that are failing to replicate. Or consider politics, which was reminded by Trump, Brexit, Macron, Corbyn, threats even to democracy… how everything we understood can melt. Time to let our ignorance sink in?</p><p>Of course I don’t mean we know nothing and never make progress (I’m pro-science to my second anorak). Only that knowing is still a devil. That’s why I so admire science for getting anywhere at all. But as the historian Daniel Boorstin once said: ‘the great obstacle to progress is not ignorance but the illusion of knowledge’ — and boy have we built illusions.</p><p>We can’t help chance or complexity. But we can be guilty of thinking we’re too clever for them. In the normal course of politics, often in business, sometimes science, that’s what I see: people persuading themselves that they know, hyping it, winging it. Some scorn uncertainty as if it’s a measure of weakness or incompetence. Are they sure? Probably. But as Voltaire remarked, doubt may be unpleasant, but certainty is absurd.</p><p>At least, I think so.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a1eace78928f" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/wintoncentre/its-the-ignorance-stupid-a1eace78928f">It’s the ignorance, stupid.</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/wintoncentre">WintonCentre</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Coronavirus and public trust]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/wintoncentre/coronavirus-and-public-trust-e156c89be5d4?source=rss-962f59639f3------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[public-perception]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[risk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[covid19]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[michael blastland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Fri, 20 Mar 2020 20:48:26 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-20T21:53:14.530Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The government has just published its evidence and reasoning about policy on Coronavirus and how it thinks the public will react, and it’s… amazing — according to Tom Whipple, science writer at <em>The Times</em>. He’s right. You can read his twitter summary <a href="https://twitter.com/whippletom/status/1240974464965324800">here</a>.</p><p>The document itself is <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/scientific-advisory-group-for-emergencies-sage-coronavirus-covid-19-response">here</a>.</p><p>But there’s so much more to say than that…</p><p>The Winton Centre For Risk and Evidence Communication wanted to find out what it could about how the public is actually reacting, not how it might in theory, which is mostly what the government reasoning goes into.</p><p>What does the public think of the information we’re getting? Do people trust it? Do we trust the government? Do we think they’re getting the strategy right? How worried are we?</p><p>So, we ran a fast survey, collated overnight, to get a sample of opinion in both the UK and the US. The same survey is now running in Australia with Spain, Germany, Mexico and Italy planned over the weekend, and we’ll run it again soon in the UK to look for changes.</p><p>Our survey technique is not perfect (see below for the survey methods and some limitations*), but the results so far are striking all the same.</p><p>And we’re making the whole dataset public for anyone to explore. It’s <a href="https://osf.io/jnu74/">here</a>:</p><p>Here are a few hints from that data and our first reactions to it.</p><p><strong>Would the public accept tougher controls against coronavirus? </strong>Yes, it looks like many of us might. We did not find evidence in this survey of a public bristling at what it considered panicked over-reaction. A few probably felt that way, of course, but on the whole we had the opposite reaction.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*0scP605ZrhYnuGg4uXS_VQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Do people think controls so far have been firm enough?</strong> No. Nothing like. Though they have the advantage of hindsight. But this evidence suggests they think governments in the UK and US could have gone further sooner. One of the starkest results…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*HLSY3p8zmWDzEiPCPFUi8A.png" /></figure><p><strong>Are they taking their advice from social media?</strong> Doesn’t look like it, not in our sample anyway (and the UK are more skeptical than the US). They think better of the WHO and scientific advisors. Some reassurance there? Journalists have a much more trusted role in the US than the UK</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CIfleL_X4vzb34_Tw0Sieg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ht2PGql3OVG9TBC_rLXHig.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*-xgOVVe9Y4YzbnEEsqNNaQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Pdulm3faddhKaZZGv8fsrA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*BCj6QpIrNmxixqw2gHFvLA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Jxab5Tr7aon-s7gvCwMqBw.png" /></figure><p>But there are some who definitely distrust government and officials in the US:</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*tq0kfxOZpc8jIc6uvqXTuQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>Are they worried?</strong> Very. Most of them anyway. No surprises there. But the strength of the worry ties in with other reactions.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*zF7c9QqocNj2prfS8ABVgQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>But maybe their other worries have receded.</strong> Immigration, crime, terrorism, climate are all low concern compared with coronavirus. Immigration is very low and only climate change comes close (though bear in mind the survey limitations). Does a big worry put other worries in perspective? (Some trends would help tell us if other worries have actually receded or just been overtaken). Whether there is a ‘finite pool of worry’ is one of the things the Winton Centre will be hoping to discover from running the study in multiple countries and multiple time periods.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*CIqTHbMNIGqeGLK2j8bq4g.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Y7iPI3XM-zSG2_EJj6_wMA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*uWEp79PA7n3SL2_VbTY5Cg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e7qeghnbigeQey2fswqefQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*esTSOkO4RSPyziC3X1a7oQ.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*Qree3tG5FvVgOjn4Kbe7XA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*_Ic59NqaXyZ_ycWMzqX1sg.png" /></figure><p><strong>Do they think they understand the strategy and do they have enough information? </strong>Could be better, but on the whole, mostly, yes.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*ahMJaE-YWgnO2DwicMgXwA.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*EcVhfhkatC2aWDmi1pWJiA.png" /></figure><p><strong>Do they think governments are up to the task?</strong> In the US, there is a stark problem with people not feeling the response has been effective and high distrust of the politicians’ ability to deal with the pandemic. In the UK, less so but still there are big concerns.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/851/1*6exGl89-EJKyyWUT4Iqrlg.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*IRQiIut1NBrVA1xe3q2a7Q.png" /></figure><p>Though US views on the need for tougher action both past and future does that suggest they are ok with government action per se, they just don’t like or trust what they’re getting at the moment?</p><p>And the US have slightly higher trust in their scientific advisors too…</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/713/1*08Hmauz1Ps0zoN7JP-dObQ.png" /></figure><p><strong>And do they feel that they themselves can make a difference? </strong>Yes, and in the US there is an even stronger tendency to look to individuals rather than the government.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*3Q7HowfzQla818RkIKMkIw.png" /></figure><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*8Jc7Tsvdq6UjGtKyzHQqIA.png" /></figure><p>There are lots more questions in the data set and we’ll be adding the other countries and pulling out more insights as we go.</p><p>We guess that how the public responds to the government strategy will be critical to the strategy’s success, but that there’s been little data so far on what people think and how they’re reacting.</p><p>Ideally, nothing in our survey will be news to those in charge. If that’s not the case, we hope this is informative if not conclusive, and a useful prompt.</p><ul><li><em>The survey is of 700 people per country, representative by age, gender and ethnicity for each country, but of course respondents are all online so that means that generally they’re from more-educated, higher socioeconomic status groups (and that can bring a liberal bias, although we have the data on their politics so we’ll be checking that). It’s the best we can do for a long survey in a short time. But do handle the data with care. 700 participants means that any proportion has a margin of error of +/- 4%, assuming the sample is representative.</em></li></ul><p><strong>The Winton team working on the survey and results are: Sarah Dryhurst, Gabriel Recchia, Claudia Schneider, Anne Marthe van der Bles, Sander van der Linden, John Kerr, Alex Freeman.</strong></p><p><strong>Translation: Maria Climent Palmer and Giulia Luoni.</strong></p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=e156c89be5d4" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/wintoncentre/coronavirus-and-public-trust-e156c89be5d4">Coronavirus and public trust</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/wintoncentre">WintonCentre</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Quick thoughts on Coronavirus and Experts]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/wintoncentre/quick-thoughts-on-coronavirus-and-experts-4956b153bbf?source=rss-962f59639f3------2</link>
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            <category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uncertainty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[expert]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[michael blastland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Thu, 19 Mar 2020 08:42:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2020-03-19T11:19:33.067Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<h3>Quick thoughts on coronavirus and experts</h3><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*jMcjA-SX2g7hpvuSLk9E_A.png" /><figcaption>Once Upon a Time in the West</figcaption></figure><p>In 2016 Britain was said to have ‘had enough of experts’. Shortly after, we had Trump’s ‘alternative facts’. But with the coronavirus, there’ve been claims of an end to all that — no more ‘post-truth’ — as people clamour for reliable information. Is this the moment the experts ride back into town?</p><p>I’ve seen comment to that effect — and it makes me nervous. I say this simply because of the uncertainty. Maybe I’m wrong but seems to me there’s plenty of room for everyone to be wrong, and I’m not sure how much tolerance there’ll be for errors of judgement. Maybe the public and politicians will be forgiving, maybe not. Of course, I’d rather be guided by Chris Whitty than Boris Johnson, but I really hope we’re not staking the reputational ranch on this one.</p><p>What worries me next is if we make matters worse by the way we deal with the uncertainty, and by how we talk about it. If one expert suggests publicly that another expert will be responsible for needless slaughter, what would you think about expertise? If some experts call shutting schools a no-brainer and others say ‘pointless’, then I’m not sure anyone comes out looking rosy. There’s too much that could be wrong. We might never know which. Hard views and soft data are an unnerving mix.</p><p>But they seem, weirdly, to go together. Uncertainty creates room for difference. Maybe we feel licenced to be more assertive, not less.</p><p>Which is another way of wondering if we need to reflect more before we shout. What’s the best way to have this argument? Maybe it’s bound to be fierce, given what’s at stake. Maybe not. One thought might be to go big on communicating the uncertainty a) because it’s true and nothing to be ashamed of and b) because to claim it’s clear what we need to do is such a hostage to fortune. Another is to try to keep the conversation civilised and see if it’s possible to resist the temptation to call each other stupid or careless of life. A third is just generally to be a bit humble in our comments on strategy when there’s so much guessing going on. All right, highly-educated guessing involving extraordinary expertise, but still with big unknowns.</p><p>I’m not at all saying we can’t disagree. That’s inevitable. It’s also easier now with social media, and there’s a lot at stake, so no one needs to feel they have to bury their differences for the sake of appearances. But there are ways to disagree, and reasons why that needn’t imply incompetence just when the public wants someone to trust.</p><p>Discussing them with David Spiegelhalter of the Winton Centre for Risk and Evidence Communication, he kicked off with three:</p><p>“a) different values — e.g. favouring economic stability over health (although recession will cause massive ill-health, but not easily measured)</p><p>b) access to different info — which is why people have been asking for more openness from government</p><p>c) different interpretation of existing info — such as behavioural scientists questioning the size of ‘behavioural fatigue’ “</p><p>I’d throw in more: different levels of trust in different sources, different experience in different contexts. The list could go on.</p><p>None of these differences feels to me like a cue for outrage. It’s debatable which are the best models, right conclusions, etc, and that’s fine. Argue it out. But are you sure you’re on a rock and they’re on sand? Doesn’t look like that from here.</p><p>If we want to rebut the thoughtless criticism of experts, I think we need to have a thought of our own for how expertise behaves when it handles uncertainty. Many people manage this perfectly well, in epidemiology as elsewhere. ‘Climate science has had to deal with this for years,’ David Speigelhalter told me, which is why they use the label ‘high confidence’ if there’s good quality evidence <em>and</em> scientific agreement.</p><p>At least, I think that’s what I think. Given the uncertainties, maybe I’m wrong. By all means disagree.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=4956b153bbf" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/wintoncentre/quick-thoughts-on-coronavirus-and-experts-4956b153bbf">Quick thoughts on Coronavirus and Experts</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/wintoncentre">WintonCentre</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Uncertainty Denial?]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/wintoncentre/uncertainty-denial-c2820e25862a?source=rss-962f59639f3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/c2820e25862a</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[data]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[uncertainty]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[economics]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[michael blastland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 04 Feb 2019 18:08:34 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2019-02-08T09:47:45.321Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Question: How many sheep?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/804/1*2yjk901YhT675hH8RJyLmw.jpeg" /></figure><p>Two? Or maybe one?</p><p>Does the lamb count?</p><p>No? A lamb isn’t a sheep, then?</p><p>All right, how about one and a half?</p><p>But not so fast… the ewe is about to give birth, imminently (I made that up, but let’s pretend).</p><p>So, what about one and two halves? That makes two, like some of you said, even if you didn’t mean that kind of two. Or maybe one, plus a half, plus a quarter?</p><p>And no, the white thing just visible above the one sheep that’s most uncontestably a sheep doesn’t count: that’s a rock.</p><p>Oh, come on… make up your mind!</p><p>…</p><p>You take the point: counting higher than <em>one </em>just got difficult, and the reason is all to do with definition. Whenever we count something, we define it. And if we want to count <em>two</em>, we’re saying they’re in some important way the same thing.</p><p>The simple idea here is that definitional ambiguity leads to uncertainty: how many sheep are there if we don’t agree what a sheep is / what season to count them in (maybe not in Spring) / etc?</p><p>What we measure, using what definitions and methods, can be highly contestable, and in much of our public data these things can and do change. This means that even if our counting itself is perfectly accurate, there will still be uncertainty.</p><p>Sheep are at the relatively easy end of the problem and — you’ll gather — not really what this post is about. We have bigger statistical fish to fry (don’t you love metaphors?), like comparisons of rates of cancer or other disease between countries, for example, or comparisons of productivity or GDP growth.</p><p>It’s the latter - the economic measures - that are our focus here. Vital to our understanding of what’s going on in the economy and capable of rattling politics with one bad set of numbers, these too are full of definitional headaches.</p><p>That matters for two main reasons. First, because the effects of definitional changes in economics can be huge; and second, despite this, because the implications for the reliability of any given economic number are often ignored and, with that, the implications for any policy based on those numbers.</p><p>Occasionally, though, the issue is forced into the open. Take UK productivity. In the long run, said the economist Paul Krugman, productivity is almost everything. As we produce more value for each hour worked (in the case of labour productivity) a modern economy grows richer.</p><p>Among current concerns about UK productivity are the apparent facts that its growth has slowed dramatically in recent years but we’re not entirely sure why — known as the ‘productivity puzzle’ — and that labour productivity per hour is strikingly lower than in many other large economies. You don’t have to look far to find people who are agitated. Take this comment piece, for example, from <em>The Times </em>in January.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/638/1*0nHvUF-xD4zufL3tEceraA.png" /></figure><p>But the UK is not lagging 20% behind. Or at least we don’t think so. And not because it abruptly caught up. About a month earlier in fact, the best estimate of the productivity gap fell overnight from about 20% to about 10% — an enormous correction. The OECD, working with the UK’s Office for National Statistics, <a href="https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/international-productivity-gaps_5b43c728-en">said</a> it had spotted differences in the way countries counted how many hours people worked. And if hours worked are counted differently, then output per hour also changes.</p><p>The UK had been making very few adjustments to reported working hours. In France, by contrast, those reported hours are corrected for holidays, strikes, sick leave and so on. This means French working hours appear shorter, and output per hour higher, than they would under the old UK formula. Once on a more like-for-like basis, it turns out that the notoriously overworked Brits actually work shorter hours than the notoriously long-lunching French — and the productivity gap between the two countries roughly halves.* Here’s how the OECD showed the new data.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/695/1*vo2AgqUPrIRq1tnZF6bcHg.png" /></figure><p>As a consequence of the change in estimated working hours, the gap in labour productivity with the United States is also around 8 percentage points smaller than previously thought — closing from 24% to 16%. With Germany, the gap shrinks from 22% to 14%. UK productivity also leapfrogs Italy.</p><p>Clearly, the gaps with France, Germany and the US haven’t disappeared. They are still, some might argue, embarrassing — though there might also be benign reasons for some of the gap in some cases. For example, France has fewer people in work and higher unemployment — UK about 4% unemployment, France about 9% (OECD). Are many of the UK’s extra jobs low-cost, low-wage, therefore often calculated as low productivity? (NB: This is no reflection on how hard low-paid people work, and it is not a moral valuation. It’s simply how the calculation of economic output is done). We could probably raise average productivity per hour in the UK if we sacked a few. But do you think we should? In other words, being behind might not be all bad.</p><p>However we interpret the gap, this was unquestionably a massive correction, with hindsight suggesting that we should have had serious doubts about how big the gap really was.</p><p>And yet, there was little sign of doubt in the presentation of that old data, nor much in those who discussed it. When <em>The Times </em>picked up the figure of 20%, presumably from an ONS press release or website, the published data had not yet been revised to take account of this latest methodological correction, and the paper appears to have been unaware of the OECD’s findings, or that a correction was on the way. Yet with hindsight we see that, because of the potential for methodological or definitional differences, we should not have accepted those old numbers with anything like confidence.</p><p>The problem extends further. Labour productivity has two components: hours worked — discussed above — and how much value we crank out of them. Definitional problems apply to both. Any measure of national output, like GDP, also rests on a thousand-and-one definitions, some subject to intense research and argument about what might have changed in an increasingly digital and service-based economy where output is far from easy to define. Some commentators suggest that current definitions fail to capture significant chunks of that output. Presumably, these definitions might also be revised.</p><p>The extensive doubts about what’s going on in these cases are essentially caused by definitional ambiguity, incorporated into methodology. What should we count when we count hours worked? When we compare counts in one place with those in another, are we sure we have every potential variation in method nailed down?</p><p>As for differences between places, so for differences in time, which can also raise methodological questions about GDP. Are we sure that our methods, whatever they are, don’t need to be changed in some way to account for changing patterns of work or output?</p><p>No, we are not sure, because we can’t be sure. We can’t know all the problems that might lurk in the data, old, new or emerging, as a result of our choice of method or definition, or with what magnitude of effect.</p><p>Then what do we do?</p><p>Do we assume we have now fixed the productivity comparison? Or could there be something else going on? Should we just whack on an extra ten percentage point potential error just in case, in either direction? What if definitions of output do also change — as seems likely at some point — when we find new ways to describe value in a service-based, digital economy, and what if these changes have varied effects on different economies which have different balances of economic activity — some more manufacturing based, others more service heavy? Then productivity will change again, and so will the gaps, even though real productivity — whatever that is — will be chugging along in its own sweet way wholly unaffected by any of these changes to what we say it’s doing.</p><p>When I discussed the productivity correction with the Winton Centre’s David Spiegelhalter, he said he was amazed at how little attention it attracted.</p><p>“This is so important, and it is generally glossed over,” he said. “I think politicians and journalists are deeply disturbed at realising the frailty of these concepts that they use in arguments, and would simply rather not know.”</p><p>I think he’s right that few are ready to face up to the frailties. On the other hand, I suspect a lot of us know deep down that these things couldn’t be other than frail. So we finish up with a classic cognitive dissonance: we know it’s dodgy, but we’d really, really like it to be reliable, and the way that we talk about the published figures, obsessing over small changes, implies that we simultaneously think there’s a solid ‘productivity’ or ‘GDP’ out there — and that the number is somehow true. The problem, then, is how to force the chatter out of its denial about what many know are the awkward limitations.</p><p>But David also invites a question: whether we should think of definitional problems as ‘uncertainty’: “I would not even call this uncertainty, since what is it we are uncertain of? Unless you think there is some true, platonic, ‘productivity’ out there, this is all convention, and so it is all ambiguity.</p><p>“’Uncertain’ should mean there is at least a theoretical possibility of being certain, either through additional knowledge or simply waiting to see what happens. The hint is in the term — ‘uncertain’”</p><p>From a practical point of view, I guess what most matters is whether the economy — including productivity — is going in a good direction for the right reasons at a reasonable rate, so that if it’s not we can try to change policy. In that sense, I think we use the word ‘uncertain’ to qualify our confidence in what we think is a reasonable judgement based on the data available.</p><p>But if we’re altogether uncertain how uncertain we should be, or what the thing is that we’re uncertain of, perhaps the problem goes beyond that.</p><p>The least we can do is acknowledge it — which journalism almost never does, and even the ONS doesn’t do much. I’d be delighted to hear any ideas about what a suitable qualification to the data should look like in these cases… if it’s possible to frame one. Meanwhile, we should use examples like the OECD’s revisions of labour productivity to remind ourselves that numbers we might be inclined to take for granted can be badly wrong in ways we hadn’t even thought of or understood.</p><p>*Do the French really work less than the Brits? Average working hours might not be the best measure. If a larger part of the working population in the UK than in France is part-time (UK about 23%, France about 14%, according to the OECD), then average UK hours will look low, even though full-time UK employees might be the bigger slaves to the desk. A definition of working hours that might sound sensible for the purposes of assessing productivity might be less good at telling us what we want to know about a long working hours culture.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=c2820e25862a" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/wintoncentre/uncertainty-denial-c2820e25862a">Uncertainty Denial?</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/wintoncentre">WintonCentre</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Fear of Crime]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/wintoncentre/fear-of-crime-a8b40607c19?source=rss-962f59639f3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/a8b40607c19</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[communication]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[risk]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[statistics]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[crime]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[michael blastland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Mon, 25 Sep 2017 18:11:05 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-09-25T18:13:59.405Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Fear of Crime</p><p>The ONS has <a href="https://visual.ons.gov.uk/people-greatly-overestimate-their-likelihood-of-being-robbed/">suggested</a> there’s a big gap between fear of crime — using robbery as an example — and the likelihood of being a victim. Is it right?</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/1024/1*e2RyvQkUkLeOALunFgnKdw.png" /></figure><p>The article says: “0.3% of adults were victims of robbery in the year ending March 2016, but 9% of those surveyed were very worried they would experience it in the forthcoming year — 30 times higher than the rate of victimisation.”</p><p>Is anything wrong with that? Ask yourself this question: if 1000 people knew that three of them would be robbed sometime in the next year, perhaps as they walked home from the station on a winter evening, perhaps outside a bar, how many should be seriously worried?</p><p>There are several possible answers.</p><p>You might say ‘all of them’, as everyone can wonder: ‘will it be me?’</p><p>Or you might say that everyone should be <em>a bit</em> worried, since being robbed is bad but, because it’s unlikely, that mitigates the worry somewhat.</p><p>Or you might say there are no rules about who should or shouldn’t be serioulsy worried, since it depends how horrible is the prospect to each of us of being robbed, and how content we are with average odds of more than 300–1</p><p>What I’m pretty sure you can’t say is that only three should be seriously worried because that is proportionate to the risk. But isn’t that what the ONS has implied? There was even a graphic to suggest how silly we are.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/823/1*nB-zpDOHD_PmhuyUBu_Aeg.png" /></figure><p>You could take this to imply that that the public is not just wrong but irrational. But if only three people in a thousand were seriously worried, the chance that the three who were worried would be precisely the three who were robbed is vanishingly low. The victims would most likely not be them.</p><p>There is simply no way of tying the degree of risk in this case to who or how many should be deeply worried. They are different things, apples and pears. Because 126 people have been reported killed by terrorism between 2000 and 2017 in the UK, should just 126 should fear it in the next 16.75 years? Which 126 exactly? When it comes to being robbed, there is only one deeply implausible scenario in which three would be the right answer: if the three who worried knew they were going to be the three victims, and they were.</p><p>Lacking clairvoyance, if we want to say that fear of crime is disproportionate, we have to be careful what we mean. If we mean that more people are worried than will be victims, well, that’s not surprising. It’s why people have insurance. Worry is partly an expression of uncertainty, not only frequency. It’s the <em>degree</em> of worry that might be disproportionate, such as extreme anxiety over an extremely rare event that has limited impact.</p><p>The report was written to launch the ONS crime calculator, which received good coverage — like this from the BBC — and is a useful tool for checking the likelihood of crime for different demographic groups.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/664/1*qUKcgGJfKLvVaL9OkESlgg.png" /></figure><p>The crime calculator is handy. And it could be used to make a more careful point: how much crime do people think there is versus how much crime there really is. The BBC’s coverage of the crime calculator wasn’t quite free of the worried/at-risk problem, but it made some good points, such as how variable the risk is depending on our characteristics (the calculator can be personalized), and that the young are less likely to be worried than the old, even though more likely to be victims. The latter, though, illustrates our point: who is right, young or old, both or neither? What would be the correct number of each?</p><p>So, it may be that better knowledge of the likelihood of crime will change some people’s worries if they hear (and believe) that the likelihood is much lower or higher than they thought. For that reason, the crime calculator might help. It is, in any case, a good thing to have the data in a neat, accessible form, especially personalized.</p><p>But we simply can’t align ‘per cent worried’ with ‘per cent harmed’.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=a8b40607c19" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/wintoncentre/fear-of-crime-a8b40607c19">Fear of Crime</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/wintoncentre">WintonCentre</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[Here we go again]]></title>
            <link>https://medium.com/wintoncentre/here-we-go-again-2d44693611ac?source=rss-962f59639f3------2</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">https://medium.com/p/2d44693611ac</guid>
            <category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
            <category><![CDATA[health]]></category>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[michael blastland]]></dc:creator>
            <pubDate>Tue, 21 Mar 2017 20:33:06 GMT</pubDate>
            <atom:updated>2017-03-23T10:40:43.035Z</atom:updated>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>News reports of risk fail on the fundamentals. But it’s not just the reports.</strong></p><p>I’m a journalist. I have the power to make people feel more afraid, or more reassured.</p><p>I don’t need physical threats, just data — the same data, which I can present or frame in different ways. It’s not even an especially accomplished trick: anyone can do it and the methods are well known.</p><p>For example, let’s say that a medication has the side-effect of increasing the risk of a potentially fatal illness by 50 per cent. It’s quite likely, I think, that I would be able to scare some people with this number, especially those taking the medication.</p><p>If, on the other hand, I tell them that this fatal illness occurs in only one in a million people, and a 50% increase means one extra person might die in every two million who take the medication, they might wonder what all the fuss is about.</p><p>One frame is a relative risk (up 50 per cent!); the other frame is an absolute risk expressed as what’s known as an expected, or ‘natural’, frequency (one person in 2 million). The essential point is that the seriousness of an increase in relative risk of 50 per cent can vary hugely depending what absolute risk you start with.</p><p>All this is old news to most people who talk about risk. It’s one of the basics: as a rule, if you want risks to look bigger, use a relative frame; if you want them to look smaller, use an absolute one. The slightly obvious point — unless you set out to make up people’s minds for them — is why not both? That is what journalists are encouraged to do.</p><p>Well, I say these methods are old news, and then you read the news, and realize that the argument you thought had been made and won a hundred times needs to be made all over again. Because there it is, the scary framing, all on its own, yet again — <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/mar/15/ibuprofen-sale-restrictions-study-increased-cardiac-arrest-risk">in a story this week</a> about painkillers and cardiac arrests.</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/451/1*Z_W-HrAABCOGgIrW67V8eg.png" /></figure><p>No absolute risks were reported anywhere in this story. In consequence, you cannot tell how big this risk is, only by how much it rises. But if 100,000 people take ibuprofen for a week, or two, or a year, in any given quantity, how many extra cardiac arrests will there be? From this report, you can’t say. People taking these drugs and wondering what to do are offered the equivalent of a scream.</p><p>It’s easy to blame journalists and their editors — and we should. They are in the business of communicating and they haven’t communicated the numbers in a form their readers can make sense of. Is this ignorance, or worse? The media, eh?</p><p>Except that it turns out it’s not just the journalists. In this case, <a href="https://www.escardio.org/The-ESC/Press-Office/Press-releases/harmless-painkillers-associated-with-increased-risk-of-cardiac-arrest?hit=twitter">the press release</a> did the same thing.</p><p>There are no absolute risk numbers in here, either. No mention of how common a cardiac arrest is in those not taking the painkillers, compared with those who do. Suddenly you feel an unnatural sympathy for journalists. How can they do their job when this is their raw material?</p><p>So you, and the journalists perhaps, turn to the <a href="https://academic.oup.com/ehjcvp/article/3/2/100/2739709/Non-steroidal-anti-inflammatory-drug-use-is">research paper</a> itself. And find to your dismay that it’s little better: all relative risks and no clear statements of absolute effects.</p><p>At this point, I feel what little patience I have left evaporate altogether. This is an interesting piece of research, and paper’s methodology is good, I’m told, and it does include a total for out of hospital cardiac arrests in Denmark over 10 years (about 29,000). But it does not state the absolute risk and it does not give us the population data from which we can calculate one. What’s more, this is not a count of all the cardiac arrests. It seems to be those for which resuscitation was attempted. There will be quite a few other cardiac arrests for which it wasn’t. There are also some arrests that are not caused by the heart itself, but by violence or accident for example. Quite how all this shakes down into the number relevant to this risk is a question that someone who knows about cardiac arrests could very usefully have addressed before I started lumbering through it.</p><p>Is all this an oversight, a lack of awareness of the effects of framing, is it too hard? The study design, a form of case-control study, gives a relative risk as an outcome, but what reason can there be for not reporting, prominently and clearly, the absolute risk — such that journalists (who need to tell their readers, listeners and viewers), doctors (who might want to communicate these results to their patients) and others can find it and understand it?</p><p>So, off you go to try to find some absolute numbers from somewhere else. How common is a cardiac arrest in the general population — so that you can then assess how important a 30% increase truly is? This is what I had to do.</p><p>Well, I tried. Cardiac arrest incidence data turns out to be not that easy to find. For want of better number or a clear understanding of what precisely to count, I began with that 29,000 total for cardiac arrests over 10 years reported in the research paper, took the Danish population (about 5.6 million), from which we can say that, very roughly, the 2.2m older people (aged 50 or over) have 95% of the cardiac arrests, so giving us about 2,750 cardiac arrests a year. That’s about 1/800 older Danes having a cardiac arrest a year.</p><p>The painkiller paper says the median treatment period is around 30 days. So the risk of having a cardiac arrest in a year — 1/800 — becomes a risk of about 1/10,000 of having a cardiac arrest in those 30 days being studied.</p><p>Which suggests that 3 heart attacks in 30,000 people, then, would go up to nearly 4 if they all took ibuprofen. Slightly more accurately, at least on this data, there’d be one extra cardiac arrest in about every 32,000 people prescribed — assuming that the effect is causal, which isn’t certain, and assuming that this is based on a vaguely appropriate baseline.</p><p>If you take ibuprofen for a whole year, your risk would rise significantly. As it would if you are significantly older. If you take it for a few days, say, and you are younger, it would probably be significantly lower.</p><p>How many painkillers per day would these 32,000 people need to take to cause this increase in risk? The paper can’t be sure and doesn’t tell us. Note, though, that it looked at cases on prescription, not over the counter. The maximum recommended dose appears to be 3,200mg a day (or 4 x 200mg tablets 4 times a day) for four days. The standard dose is about 200–400mg every 4–6 hours.</p><p>Now maybe a raised cardiac arrest risk of 1 in 32,000 from taking ibuprofen for a month or thereabouts sounds just as scary as a rise of 30%. Or maybe not. Maybe it feels a lot less scary. Maybe, if I’m in pain and ibuprofen works for me, I might accept that risk. Maybe if I’m simply told that it goes up 30%, I wouldn’t. Either way, I would quite like both absolute and relative numbers so that I can make my own choice.</p><p>It seems to me that the research paper, press release and news report could have emphasised a less scary-looking number. Clearly, they could also have used both methods of conveying the information. And by the way, why am I doing this work — and guesswork — to find out what should have been a basic part of the communication in the first place? I’m not a statistician. I’m not medically trained. I’m a hack with an English degree. It is ridiculous.</p><p>Let’s widen the complaint. Why do journals accept papers that use only a number that is known to magnify alarm? Is this consistent with a sense of public responsibility? What’s the role of peer review here?</p><p>I’d go further. I’d suggest that all journals reporting a risk should require a simple table which puts these different framings side by side. Anything less than this kind of balanced reporting — using varied framings of the key numbers to ensure that it is not being made to look particularly ‘big’ or ‘small’ — is a bias. If there was ever a time this was considered acceptable, it isn’t now.</p><p>My suggested table would include: absolute baseline risk as a natural frequency; absolute risk for those exposed to the risk as a natural frequency; relative risk. And I’d add one more to give patients and others a sense of the uncertainty: what’s called the ‘number needed to treat’ (NNT), or in this case better described perhaps as ‘number needed to expose’. This is (as calculated above) the number of people who would need to be exposed to the supposed risk in order for one person to suffer the consequences. For this example of cardiac arrest and ibuprofen, it could — I think — look something like this (applying the data to the Danish population and keeping the numbers approximate to make them round.)</p><figure><img alt="" src="https://cdn-images-1.medium.com/max/607/1*YzL70VkmQd_Pq8Q13BS7Gw.png" /></figure><p>I’ve no idea if this the best way to do it or if these are the best numbers. I repeat my lack of credentials — partly as an appeal for someone who knows their way around this kind of data to do a better job. For that, at least, I have no doubt that there is an urgent need.</p><p>If I were careless, or worse, in my work in the media such that I made the numbers as scary as possible, some might suspect me of being a bully who positively wanted people to be afraid. They’d have a point.</p><p>If I write a scientific paper, why should the judgement be different? Perhaps, in my defence, I think that making people take notice is the right way to talk about this risk: “I’m not scaring people, I’m saving them.” Perhaps I think they don’t need to make up their own minds as I’ve already used my superior judgment to decide that the risks are too great. Perhaps I think that everyone knows the incidence of cardiac arrests and so they know what the relative risks imply. Perhaps I think you can extract the relevant information from the tables in my paper, do your own calculation and come up with the absolute risks, so what’s the problem? (Well, sometimes you can, if you know how — though not in this case since not all the crucial figures were in there).</p><p>But why should you have to do all this work? And should you trust me if I use the kind of reporting an unscrupulous journalist might use when trying to produce the biggest, scariest number possible?</p><p>I’d like to be helpful, not merely critical, so let me put it like this: credibility is enhanced by varied framing.</p><p>People’s intentions in writing a paper or press release about a risk may be perfectly honourable. I’ve no doubt that often they are. But if they want to reassure their wider readership that they are not playing a risk up or down — if they truly want others to be able to assess the magnitude of a risk and make up their own mind about what to do — they should include some simple, clear, prominent, absolute numbers. Otherwise, I simply cannot tell if this is really a big problem. In short, anything press released about risk should include absolute numbers. Full stop.</p><img src="https://medium.com/_/stat?event=post.clientViewed&referrerSource=full_rss&postId=2d44693611ac" width="1" height="1" alt=""><hr><p><a href="https://medium.com/wintoncentre/here-we-go-again-2d44693611ac">Here we go again</a> was originally published in <a href="https://medium.com/wintoncentre">WintonCentre</a> on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.</p>]]></content:encoded>
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